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5800

Review of Fifteen AID Agricultural Services  
Projects in Africa

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## AGRICULTURAL SERVICES PROJECT SURVEY

### Original Purpose of Survey:

The original intention of this survey was to gather data on 70 agricultural services projects undertaken by AID in Africa with an eye to unveiling patterns in project effectiveness. The key variables to be examined were: 1) project start-up date, 2) funds expended, 3) strategy: to develop a single capacity, capacities in a variety of inter-related areas, or planning, 3) focus: provision of agricultural inputs or development of marketing infrastructure, and 4) channel(s) of implementation: public, private, parastatal, or combination

### Methodology:

The method proposed for gathering project data and evaluating project effectiveness was to review design documents such as PROP's and PP's, and evaluation documents such as PAR's, PES's, Audit Reports, SER's, and Final Reports. Project effectiveness was defined as success in achieving input and output objectives, and progress toward attainment of the purpose and goal indicators stated in the project logframe. Projects were given separate ratings for their success on the input/output, and purpose/goal levels. A scale of 0.0 - 5.0 was used, with 5.0 being excellent.

### Actual Scope of Survey:

After reviewing several projects it became clear to me that I would not have sufficient time to achieve the original purpose of the survey. In the initial stages of my research I discovered that my lack of familiarity with the agricultural sector and with standard AID reporting documents necessitated that I review PP's and evaluations in much greater detail than I originally anticipated. I also learned that key design and evaluation documents for the projects in the survey were often unobtainable. This was particularly true for projects completed in the 60's. Finally, my inexperience in research analysis methodology led me to expend valuable time on reading and summarizing observations from project reports, when a cursory examination of project abstracts for negative and positive comments would have enabled me to get a far wider data base.

### Revised Purpose of Survey:

With the guidance of Ag Sector Coordinator, Anna Maria Long, I revised the objectives of my survey. The purpose of the data and analysis contained in this report is: 1) to provide an intensive review of 15 AID agricultural services projects in Africa for which substantial project documents are available in order to identify and highlight those problems judged most critical in lim-

iting project effectiveness at the input/output, and purpose/goal levels; 2) to analyze the data available from the 15 projects reviewed, in order to provide a model for future efforts, employing a much wider data base, and; 3) to provide information which will facilitate a follow-up effort to complete the pattern analysis, including lists of projects to be reviewed, documents available through the AID library in Rosslyn and CDSI, other useful sources of project abstracts and information, and useful contact persons within the agency.

PROFILE OF PROJECTS IN AGRICULTURAL SERVICES SURVEY:

A. Start-up Date:

1958 - 1            1 project  
1970 - 1  
71 - 1  
72 - 1            7 projects  
73 - 1  
74 - 1  
75 - 2  
  
1976 - 4            7 projects  
77 - 3

B. Amount Expended:

\$ 0 - 5 m:        10 projects  
\$ 5 - 10 m:       1 projects  
\$ 10 - 15 m:      4 projects

C. Strategy:

Multiple Capacity: 10 projects  
Single Capacity:    3 projects  
Planning Capacity: 3 projects

D. Focus:

Ag Inputs:            8 projects  
Ag Inputs and  
Marketing:            4 projects  
Marketing:            3 projects

E. Channels:

Public:                    8 projects  
  
Public and Parastatal:    2 projects  
Public and Private:       1 project  
Public/Parastatal/  
Private:                    1 project  
Private:                    2 projects  
Parastatal:                 1 project

PROFILE OF PROJECTS IN AGRICULTURAL SERVICES SURVEY:

F. Effectiveness Rating:

Rating	Inputs/Outputs	Purpose/Goal
0 - 1.5 (poor)	2 projects	5 projects
2 - 2.5 (fair)	5 projects	5 projects
3 - 3.5 (good)	5 projects	2 projects
4 - 5.0 (excellent)	2 projects	0 projects
Data Insufficient	1 project	3 projects

PROJECT NAME	START-UP	AMOUNT EXP.	STRATEGY	FOCUS	CHANNELS	RATING I./O.	RATING P./G.
1. Ghana: MIDAS 641-0067	76	12,942	Multiple Capacity	Ag Inputs/ Marketing	Public and Private	D.I	0.0
2. Ghana: Ag Extension and Production 641-0007	58	3745	Multiple Capacity/ Planning	Ag Inputs	Public	3.0	D.I.
3. Senegal: Grain Storage 685-0209	77	4292	Single Capacity	Ag Inputs	Public	3.5	0.5
4. Ghana: FAAD 641-0072	77	3346	Multiple Capacity	Ag Inputs/ Marketing	Private (PVO's)	3.5	2.5
5. ADO Niamey: Entente 626-0203	76	12,792	Planning	Ag Inputs	Public	4.0	D.I
6. N. Cameroon: Pilot Community Dev. 631-0010	77	348	Multiple Capacity	Ag Inputs	Private	1.5	1.0
7. Liberia: Upper LOFA 669-0142	76	4408	Multiple Capacity	Ag Inputs/ Limited Mktg	Public	2.5	3.0
8. Tanzania: Seed Multiplication 621-0092	70	6568	Single Capacity	Ag Inputs	Public/Para- statal/Private	3.0	2.5
9. Zaire: North Shaba Maize 660-0059	76	10,260	Multiple Capacity	Ag Inputs/ Marketing	Public/Para- statal	2.5	3.0
10 Tanzania: Ag Marketing Dev. 621-0099	71	1599	Planning	Marketing	Public	2.0	2.5

4)

PROJECT NAME	START-UP	AMOUNT EXP.	STRATEGY	FOCUS	CHANNELS	RATING I./O.	RATING P./G.
11. Senegal: Cereals Production 685-0201	75	4486	Multiple Capacity	Ag Inputs	Parastatal	4.0	D.I.
12. Upper Volta: Seed Multiplication 686-0202	75	1629	Single Capacity	Ag Inputs	Public	2.5	2.0
13. Liberia: Ag Pro- gram Development 669-0123	72	2622	Planning	Marketing	Public	2.5	1.0
14. Niger: Cereals 683-0201	74	15,594	Multiple Capacity	Ag Inputs	Public	3.0	2.5
15. Tanzania: Live- stock Development 621-0122	73	4289	Planning	Marketing	Parastatal/ Public	1.0	1.0

PROJECT EFFECTIVENESS MEASURED AGAINST MAJOR INDEPENDENT  
VARIABLES

VARIABLES	INPUT/OUTPUT EFFECTIVENESS	PURPOSE/GOAL EFFECTIVENESS
<u>Funding</u>		
\$ 0 - 5 m	2.45	1.50
\$ 5 - 15 m	3.12	2.00
<u>Start-Up</u>		
pre-1970		
1970-1975	2.62	1.90
after 1975	2.91	1.67
<u>Focus</u>		
Ag Inputs	3.00	1.90
Ag Inputs/ Marketing	3.00	1.83
Marketing	1.83	1.50
<u>Channels</u>		
Public	2.87	1.90
Mixed or Private/ Parastatal/	2.58	2.00

Observations on results of tabular analysis:

1. No matter what the variable, AID projects are uniformly more successful in delivering inputs and producing outputs than they are in accomplishing the purposes and goals for which they were designed.

Input/output ratings range between 2.45 and 3.12 (fair to good) for eight different project categories. Only those projects with a marketing focus show a rating below 2.0 for input/output delivery (1.83).

By contrast, the highest effectiveness rating for projects at the purpose/goal level is only 2.0. The average level of effectiveness at the purpose/goal level for projects in all categories is 1.8.

2. This table is provided merely as a model to show how data from a much wider survey than mine could be used to highlight patterns in project effectiveness according to the variables listed.

The sample size of my survey is much too small to be statistically significant. Two unusually poor projects or two unusually excellent one from the pool of 15 may skew the data. Since, for example, our survey includes only five projects in the \$ 5 - 15 m category, we cannot be sure that our 2.0 p/g effectiveness rating would hold for a larger sample. We are thus enjoined from concluding that projects in this category are more successful than projects in the \$ 0 - 5 m category for which we obtained a 1.5 p/g effectiveness rating.

The sample pool is also too small to allow us to make finer distinctions between different categories of projects. For example, with only two projects out of fifteen that were implemented through private channels, we have insufficient grounds on which to compare the efficacy of privately versus publically-implemented projects. In order to get more statistically reliable data, we are forced to divide our sample into "public" versus "other", grouping our two private projects with parastatal and mixed public, private, and parastatal projects.

3. With a wider data base it would be possible to combine some of the variables examined in our survey, and perhaps uncover more significant patterns. Our tabular analysis does not afford us the opportunity of differentiating, for example, between publically implemented projects in the \$ 0 - 5 m category, and publically implemented projects in the \$ 5 - 15 m category. Nor does it allow us to compare the efficacy of Ag Inputs projects implemented since 1975 with those completed prior to 1975.

Summary of Problems Cited as Most Critical in Limiting Effectiveness of AID Agricultural Services Projects:

- I. Design: 32 citations
- II. Implementation: 46 citations
- III. External: 9 citations

Summary Breakdown of Design, Implementation, and External Problems:

- I. Design
  - A. Project achievement dependent on technologies not yet developed. (4 citations)
  - B. Project start-up time requirements and financial needs underestimated. (5 citations)
  - C. Project design overestimates manpower and financial resources, and technical capability of host-country institutions. (5 citations)
  - D. Scope of project too narrow/ too wide/ poorly defined. (6 citations)
  - E. Inadequate attention devoted to examining cost-effectiveness, sustainability of project. (4 citations)
  - F. Other design problems. (8 citations)
- II. Implementation
  - A. Mismanagement by AID:
    - 1. Procurement of commodities delayed implementation. (5 citations)
    - 2. AID failed to provide adequate monitoring and re-design of projects. (7 citations)

B. Mismanagement by Contractor:

1. Contractor failed to supply qualified project personnel on a timely basis. (8 citations)
2. Contractor failed to coordinate project efforts with related host-country activities. (2 citations)
3. Contractor training of participants, counterparts judged deficient. (4 citations)
4. Contractor did not follow guidelines to promote sustainability of projects. (2 citations)
5. Other (1 citation)

C. Mismanagement by host-country organization responsible for implementing project:

1. Training, utilization of counterparts and participants judged deficient. (5 citations)
2. Host-country utilization of contract personnel is poor. (3 citations)
3. Host-country misused project inputs for personal or political aims. (3 citations)

D. Project implementation blocked by shortages of trained manpower or insufficiently developed host-country institutions. (4 citations)

III. External

- A. Economic deterioration (2 citations)
- B. Government pricing policies unfavorable to project implementation. (4 citations)
- C. Unforseen re-organization of cognizant government ministries or agencies (2 citations)
- D. Climatological (1 citation)

INCIDENCE OF CRITICAL PROBLEMS ACCORDING TO MAIN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

VARIABLE			DESIGN PROBLEMS		IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS		EXTERNAL PROBLEMS		
	no. proj.	% proj.	number	%	number	%	number	%	
<u>Funding:</u>									
\$ 0 - 5m	10	67%	21	66%	28	61%	7	78%	
\$ 5 - 10m	1	7%	3	9%	3	7%	0	0%	
\$10 - 15m	4	27%	8	25%	15	33%	2	22%	
<u>Start-Up:</u>									
Pre-1975	8	53%	17	53%	26	57%	5	56%	
Post-1975	7	47%	15	47%	20	43%	4	44%	
<u>Strategy:</u>									
Mult. Cap.	8	53%	18	56%	27	59%	4	44%	
Single Cap.	3	20%	6	19%	8	17%	2	22%	
Planning	4	27%	8	25%	11	24%	3	34%	
<u>Focus:</u>									
Ag Inputs/ Marketing	4	27%	8	25%	10	22%	3	33%	
Mktg.	3	20%	8	25%	8	17%	3	33%	
<u>Channel:</u>									
Public	8	53%	12	38%	28	61%	4	44%	
Mixed Private/ Parastatal/ Public	7	47%	20	62%	18	39%	5	56%	

## Observations on Tabular Analysis of Critical Problems:

The matrix on the preceding page was designed to reveal whether any pattern exists between the critical problems we identified in our project reviews and the major independent variables we used in the study. Again it should be noted that the sample size is far too small to allow us to draw any firm conclusions from the data.

1. Of problems cited as most critical in hindering project effectiveness, implementation difficulties rank first (46), design problems second (32), and external problems a distant third (9).
2. Start up: There is no discernible difference in the incidence of design, implementation, and external problems impeding AID projects begun (largely) in the 1970 - 1975 period, and those begun since then.
3. Funding: Whereas we might expect projects in the \$ 10 - 15 m category to have proportionally more design and implementation problems than projects in the \$ 0 - 5 m category, the data does not support that expectation.
4. Strategy: Projects which aim to develop host-country capacity through integrated efforts in a variety of inter-related areas, (e.g. ag research, extension and cooperative development) have a proportionally higher incidence of both design and implementation problems than those focussing on capacity building in a single area, or on planning alone.
5. Channels: The data indicate that projects implemented through host-country public institutions, such as the Ministry of Agriculture, have fewer design problems but are more difficult to implement than projects carried out through non-public or combined public-private-parastatal channels.

## Recommendation:

Explanations should be sought for general trends or patterns suggested by the data through a re-examination of individual projects. Is there a reason why projects implemented through public channels are more difficult to implement than those through non-public channels? Can specific examples be provided? If not, perhaps the pattern can be accounted for by a previously-ignored variable.

Inventory of Problems Cited as Most Critical in Limiting the Effectiveness of AID Agricultural Services Projects

I. Design Problems

A. Project achievement dependent on technologies not yet developed:

1. 686-0202: As of 1978 there were no markedly superior varieties of either millet or sorghum, the two major subsistence crops, to offer to farmers... (Upper Volta - Seed Multiplication)
2. 669-0123: The technology transfer failed because no technology specific to the Liberian situation was adapted. (Liberia - Ag Program Dev.)
3. 683-0201: Research has not provided new millet and sorghum varieties of unquestioned value. (Niger - Cereals)
4. 660-0059: Development of effective cultural technologies for the project area have only been modestly successful. (Zaire - Maize Production)

B. Project start-up time requirements and financial needs underestimated:

1. 631-0010: Administrative funding needs underestimated by contractor. (Cameroon - Pilot Community Dev.)
2. 631-0010: Contractor failed to include time in project design to start up the project, recruit personnel, and obtain local approval for sub-project activities. (Cameroon - Pilot Community Dev.)
3. 660-0059: Original 3 - 5 year project time frame unrealistic. Ten years more appropriate. (Zaire - Maize Production)
4. 621-0099: Because no one with a background in finance or agribusiness participated in the project design, the levels of input required were seriously underestimated. (Tanzania - Ag Marketing)

5. 683-0201: Poor set of original cost estimates from project designers for seed production facilities. (Niger - Cereals)

C. Project design overestimates manpower and financial resources, and technical capability of host-country institution

1. 641-0072: Ghanaian PVO's lacked organizational and administrative confidence and were completely dependent on AID financing. (Ghana - FAAD)
2. 685-0209: Project design presumed continued stability of ONCAD, a national marketing board. ONCAD was dissolved because of mismanagement and its replacement proved completely ineffectual. (Senegal - Grain Storage)
3. 685-0201: At AID's Current level of funding, little likelihood exists that GOS would be able to sustain the project itself after AID assistance ends. (Senegal - Cereals)
4. 669-0113: Project designers overestimated the Ministry of Agriculture's manpower and financial resources. (Liberia - Ag Program Dev.)
5. 685-0201: Project success predicated upon the presumed capability of parastatal marketing organization, ONCAD, to discharge credit and input supply functions. ONCAD proved deficient in both. (Senegal - Cereals)

D. Scope of project too wide/ too narrow/ poorly defined:

1. 621-0122: Project technicians had poorly-defined roles. (Tanzania - Livestock)
2. 621-0099: Consultant scopes of work were too broad. (Tanzania - Ag Marketing Dev.)
3. 660-0059: Insufficient attention paid to possibility developing multi-crop approach to farming. (Zaire - Maize)
4. 621-0092: Project goal is not achievable through this project alone, but requires parallel progress in research, extension, credit, storage, and marketing. (Tanzania - Seed Multiplication)
5. 641-0067: Project attempted to create new institutions, but should have concentrated on strengthening existing ones. (Ghana - MIDAS)

6. 685-0209: Project failed to include efforts to assist small farmers to improve traditional on-farm grain-storage technologies. (Senegal - Grain Storage)

E. Inadequate attention devoted to examining cost-effectiveness, sustainability of project:

1. 641-0072: While successful in promoting rural development, the PVO's involved in the project tended not to be cost-effective. (Ghana - FAAD)
2. 626-0203: Economic returns from subprojects low. (Niamey - Entente)
3. 626-0203: No plans developed to finance sub-projects after funding ends. (Niamey - Entente)
4. 631-0010: Cost of project too high to make it replicable. (Cameroon - Pilot Community Dev.)

F. Other design problems:

1. 621-0122: Project strategy geared to institution-building while goal-level objectives are focused on improving the incomes of traditional producers. (Tanzania - Livestock)
2. 686-0202: Demand for multiplied seed overestimated by project designers. (Upper Volta - Seed Multiplication)
3. 683-0201: Project production objectives for cereals were unambitious. (Niger - Cereals)
4. 685-0201: Project provides an insufficient level of participant training to address Senegal's long-term manpower needs. (Senegal - Cereals)
5. 621-0092: Level of mechanization, and sophistication of equipment called for has posed problems, specifically in training host-country personnel and obtaining spare parts. (Tanzania - Seed Multiplication)
6. 641-0067: Lack of original baseline data with which to measure project impact on beneficiaries. (Ghana - MIDAS)
7. 641-0072: Project design included insufficient guidelines for AID/PVO cooperation. Project required too much AID staff time. (Ghana - FAAD)
8. 621-0092: Seed farm sites chosen without adequate prior testing of soil suitability. (Tanzania - Seed0)

II. Implementation Problems

A. Mismanagement by AID:

1. Procurement of commodities delayed implementation:

- a. 641-0067: All commodities delivered by end of project, but delays slowed project progress. (Ghana - MIDAS)
- b. 641-0072: AID's fund and support services for PVO's were adequate, but procurement rigidities and cumbersome mission machinery hampered effectiveness. (Ghana - FAAD)
- c. 621-0092: Delays were caused by inappropriate specifications for equipment. (Tanzania - Seed)
- d. 686-0202: Delivery of some equipment was delayed up to 3½ years. (Upper Volta - Seed Multiplication)
- e. 683-0201: AID slow in processing requests for equipment. (Niger - Cereals)

2. AID failed to provide adequate monitoring and re-design of projects:

- a. 641-0067: Project wasn't re-designed to accommodate the realities of the changing situation in Ghana. (Ghana - MIDAS)
- b. 685-0209: AID didn't monitor warehouse construction closely and consequently failed to catch design flaws and deficiencies in the units constructed. (Senegal - Grain Storage)
- c. 626-0203: AID needs to monitor project, and sub-projects more closely. (Niamey - Entente)
- d. 631-0010: Lack of AID monitoring of project progress. (Cameroon - Pilot Community Dev.)
- e. 669-0142: Infrequent site visits by AID, no evaluation conducted in first four years of project. (Liberia - Upper Lofa)
- f. 621-0099: AID's review and timely response to changing project needs deficient. Should have revised entire scope of project. (Tanzania - Ag Marketing Dev.)

- g. 683-0201: AID failed to require GON to fulfill agreements to assume increasing share of recurrent project costs. (Niger - Cereals)

B. Mismanagement by Contractor:

1. Contractor failed to supply qualified project personnel on a timely basis:

- a. 641-0067: Project slowed by delays on part of contractor in placing project personnel. Quality of some extension contractors poor. (Ghana - MIDAS)
- b. 631-0010: Expatriate management personnel installed late. (Cameroon - Pilot Community Dev.)
- c. 631-0010: Contractor failed to identify suitable host-country counterpart to take over directorship. (Cameroon - Pilot Community Dev.)
- d. 660-0059: Contractor cites isolated rural setting of project as reason for its difficulties in attracting qualified personnel for long-term assignments. (Zaire - Maize Production)
- e. 686-0202: Project plagued by long delays in recruiting technical personnel, and finding replacements for out-going personnel. (Upper Volta - Seed Multiplication)
- f. 621-0099: Project implementation slowed by delays in recruitment of contract personnel. (Tanzania - Ag Marketing Dev.)
- g. 683-0201: Contractor staff rarely at full strength. (Niger - Cereals)
- h. 621-0122: Contractor failed to provide qualified personnel on a timely basis, and experienced high turnover rate. (Tanzania - Livestock)

2. Contractor failed to coordinate project efforts with related host-country activities:

- a. 683-0201: Project research and extension activities not adequately coordinated with related GON activities. (Niger - Cereals)

b. 641-0007: No effective link forged with agricultural research system. (Ghana - Ag Extension and Production)

3. Contractor training of participants, counterparts judged deficient:

a. 621-0122: Participant training lacking in practical applications. (Tanzania - Livestock)

b. 621-0092: Contractor has failed to provide adequate training for host-country personnel in agro-mechanics. (Tanzania - Seed)

c. 631-0010: Host-country personnel have not been involved in project activities. (Cameroon - Pilot Community Dev.)

d. 685-0209: Participant training in U.S. has not been geared to the level of the trainees. (Senegal - Grain Storage)

4. Contractor did not follow design guidelines to promote sustainability of project:

a. 631-0010: Contractor decided to concentrate funds on large infrastructure projects which were too costly and sophisticated for the local population to build and maintain themselves. (Cameroon - Pilot Community Dev.)

b. 660-0059: Contractor made no effort toward goal of sustainability/replicability of project or selected subsystems. (Zaire - Maize Production)

5. Other:

683-0201: Contract staff's inability to speak host-country language, French, has impeded project progress. (Niger - Cereals)

C. Mismanagement by host-country organization responsible for implementing project:

1. Training, utilization of counterparts and participants judged deficient:

a. 626-0203: Host-countries failed to identify pro-

posed number of candidates for participant training. (Niamey - Entente)

- b. 686-0202: Number of participants trained far below project target levels. (Upper Volta - Seed)
- c. 669-0123: Few of the 32 participants trained for the project remained with the Ministry of Agriculture (the implementing organization). (Liberia - Ag Program Dev.)
- d. 683-0201: Counterpart training ineffective because counterparts were not freed from more pressing logistical duties to work with American technicians. (Niger - Cereals)
- e. 621-0122: Participants who had received technical training in the U.S. were thrust into top management and administrative positions in the project for which they were not qualified.

2. Host-country utilization of contract personnel is poor:

- a. 621-0122: Failed to exploit potential contribution of project technicians as trainers and advisors. (Tanzania - Livestock)
- b. 621-0099: Poorly utilized project personnel from inception of project, diverting them to crisis management positions rather than using their expertise for assistance in training, economic analysis, and long-range food production planning. (Tanzania - Seed)
- c. 626-0203: Project management team allowed to dwindle from four persons to one. (Niamey - Entente)

3. Host country misused project inputs for personal or political aims:

- a. 669-0123: Soil science personnel made to work on private farm resource maps rather than national land maps. (Liberia - Ag Program Dev.)
- b. 669-0123: Inadequately trained personnel were granted important project positions under a system of social welfare. (Liberia - Ag Program Dev.)
- c. 669-0142: GOL diverted road-building equipment from project area for political reasons. (Liberia - Upper Lofa)

4. Host country devoted inadequate project resources to development of cooperatives and small farmer:

a. 641-0007: Project assistance was restricted to select group of farmers - those who were generally wealthier and better-educated and more likely to succeed using new practices. (Ghana - MIDAS)

b. 669-0142: GOL's project management has focussed its efforts on developing its own capabilities and has neglected the cooperatives. Consequently few farmers have joined coops and capital is insufficient for purchasing inputs or promoting marketing activities. (Liberia - Upper Lofa)

D. Project implementation blocked by shortages of trained manpower and insufficiently developed host-country institutions:

1. 669-0142: Coops involved in project were plagued by poor management and bookkeeping practices. (Liberia - Upper Lofa)

2. 669-0123: GOL could not identify qualified personnel to staff soils unit and to provide analysis of agricultural sector. (Liberia - Ag Program Dev.)

3. 683-0201: Niger extension staff too small and inadequately trained to carry out project objectives. (Niger - Cereals)

4. 621-0092: Tanzania Seed Company was unable to locate reliable contract seed growers. (Tanzania - Seed)

III. External Problems

A. Economic deterioration:

1. 641-0067: Inflation and general economic deterioration led to a lack of commodities for construction and credit. Scope and geographical concentration of project had to be narrowed. (Ghana - MIDAS)

2. 641-0072: Collapse of Ghanaian economy and consequent unavailability of spare parts, petrol, etc. hindered all participating PVO's. (Ghana - FAAD)

B. Government pricing policies unfavorable to project implementation:

1. 660-0059: Government-imposed price ceilings on corn blocked increases in small-farmer earnings despite production increases. (Zaire - Maize)
2. 685-0201: Rise in government-controlled price of fertilizer resulted in fewer farmers adopting improved technological practices. (Senegal - Cereals)
3. 686-0202: Project critically hampered by failure of GOUV to establish a national seed price structure and national seed policy. (Upper Volta - Seed)
4. 621-0122: Policies dictated to parastatal Livestock Company by GovTan often ran counter to stated project objectives. (Tanzania - Livestock)

C. Unforeseen re-organization of cognizant government agencies:

1. 621-0099: GovTan reorganized its marketing institutional structure in 1973, leading to dramatic revision of project scope of work. (Tanzania - Seed)
2. 685-0209: The national grain marketing board, ONCAD, was dissolved because of mismanagement and corruption, leaving no capable replacement. Project farmers were left with no purchasers for their surplus millet. (Senegal - Grain Storage)

D. Climatological change:

- 621-0099: The 1974-75 drought diverted GovTan's attention from project goal - long-range food production planning - to emergency food relief operations. (Tanzania - Seed)0

ANNEX I

Agricultural Services Project Reviews

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- projects studied, designed, implemented, and evaluated on schedule for Benin, Ivory Coast, and Togo.
- 2) 3-4 grant-financed small farmer food production projects designed, implemented, and evaluated for Niger and Upper Volta.
  - 3) Meetings, seminars, and other exchanges of information organized.

Partially Achieved:

- 1) Training of ten host-country nationals to M.S. level in agronomy and food production; five trained to M.A. level in rural sociology. Project behind schedule.
- 2) Project far short of target of ten, two-week seminars for host-country nationals, and ten one-month study trips.

12. Assessment of Implementation, P/G Level:

- a. Insufficient data
- b. Goal: Positive indication is that goals for total area under cultivation has been met. Not possible to assess food production impact with any precision, however, because subprojects do not have systems to monitor yields or impacts on beneficiaries.

Purpose: Too early to measure overall project impact on national ag policy of member states, but some subprojects have already exerted influence on national policies.

13. Issues/Lessons:

- a. AID must develop procedures to assure closer monitoring of projects. The Regional Economic and Development Service Office/West Africa should initiate regular monthly meetings with PMT to review project performance and plans. The Entente Fund should improve quarterly report content and improve procedures and content of reporting from subprojects (especially technical feasibility and economic viability). Information should be forwarded to REDSO/WA
- b. No adequate plans have been developed to finance subprojects after funding ends.
- c. Project Management Team was reduced from four to one in 1981.
- d. Economic returns from subprojects are suspected of being lower than anticipated, though actual data are lacking.

14. Rating of Evaluations:

a. Scope

1. Complete
- 2.

b. Quality

1. baseline data: no, not available
2. inputs/outputs: yes
3. purpose/goal: yes, fair
4. good



Outputs:

Achieved:

- 1) quantities of milled rice and shelled corn exceed indicators
- 2) quantity of improved seed produced meets demand
- 3) seed laws enacted
- 4) cooperators yield and income per acre exceeds quantitative indicators for 1968-71 period.
- 5) extension in-service training programs established

Partially Achieved:

- 1) quantity of fertilizer distributed through project not adequate, but shortfall made up by other donors
- 2) production goals for production of certified seed by private farmers met for rice, but not for corn
- 3) number of cooperators, 1000 of 1440 targeted
- 4) training of extension leaders for revised and expanded target far behind schedule, 508 of 2000

12. Assessment of Implementation, P/G Level:

a.

- b. Goal: Evaluation does not address overall project goal which is for Ghana to achieve a 5 percent per annum increase in ag production during the period from 1968 through production year 1972.

Purpose: Evaluation does not address overall purpose for Production activity which is "to strengthen Ministry programs for supplying production inputs and services to farmers."

The purpose of the Focus and Concentrate activity is to "demonstrate optimal use of ag inputs, including the Extension Service, in an organizational and catalytic capacity, properly integrated for maximum production. The short-run operational targets are 1) to assist cooperators in obtaining and using production inputs and services, and 2) to get other farmers to emulate the original cooperators.

Evaluation does not directly assess the success of the Focus and Concentrate activity, but does make the following observations: Extension agents did help some cooperators to receive credit, through the submission of farm plans. Cooperators received priority for fertilizer and mechanized services when they were available. Cooperators had substantially higher yields and incomes than non-cooperators. They were also generally the

wealthier and better-educated farmers, thus more likely to experiment and succeed using new production practices. Program was expanded from six districts to entire nation in 1970, but it is not clear that other farmers emulated the original cooperators.

The project made a significant contribution to developing an extension program with wide applicability to Ghana.

13. Lessons/Issues:

- a. The entire project was re-designed in 1968 and should have been re-named also, as it bore little relation to project efforts from 1958 to 1967.
- b. The Food and Concentrate activity was mis-typed as a production activity when in fact it was designed as an extension development program. Ghana was just re-instituting its extension service in 1967-68 after a four-year suspension. The project should be evaluated according to its contributions to this effort.
- c. As an extension development program, the Food and Concentrate activity suffered from two weaknesses: 1) no effective link with ag research, and 2) no extension training colleges to provide qualified field staff.
- d. The new maize variety, Diacol 152, was not adopted by all farmers because of certain physical characteristics which reduced its desirability as food. The impact of its higher yield was significantly reduced because it was sold at a one-quarter to one-third discount price over local maize varieties.

14. Rating of Evaluations:

a) Scope

- 1.
2. Partial (does not evaluate "Production" component)

b) Quality

1. baseline data: yes, for major outputs
2. inputs/outputs: outputs only
3. purpose/goal: poor, fail to address either directly
4. poor - evaluations make no attempt to analyze project's sustainability or replicability; fail to address the issue surrounding the focusing of project efforts on a select class of farmers.



- selected for project.
- 2) PVO's present acceptable programs to Mission.

Not Achieved:

- 1) FAAD resources for supporting PVO's effectively:  
Fund and support services were adequate, but procurement rigidities and cumbersome mission machinery hampered effectiveness.

Outputs:

Achieved:

- 1) Provision of contract services
- 2) Provision of operating expenses
- 3) Management procedures: New guidelines to PVO's on procurement and vouchering would have been more effective if introduced in a forum.

Partially Achieved:

- 1) Delivery of commodities

12. Assessment of Implementation, P/G Level:

- a. 2.5
- b. Goal: PVO's are able to operate with growing independence.

Results were mixed. Of the 7 PVO's involved, 2 came close to achieving original project targets. All PVO's met with some degree of failure due to the complete disintegration of the Ghanaian economy. The Ghanaian PVO's were particularly hampered by a complete lack of organizational and administrative confidence, and complete dependence on AID for finances.

All of the PVO's were dismayed at USAID's unwillingness to pay overhead for general support costs. PVO's have shown a capacity for reorganization, and for modification through expansion or substitution of activities.

Purpose: Sharing the skills of development with PVO's by helping them to increase the efficiency, effectiveness, and relevancy of their programs.

AID progress toward this purpose has been achieved through the assistance to PVO's in resolving procurement problems, linkage with other AID projects in Ghana, the enforcement of reporting and evaluation procedures, the

development of new accounting procedures, the support of the organization of a PVO consortium, and the support of one PVO (GOVA) to improve baseline survey techniques.

### 13. Issues/Lessons:

- a. The project taught that while PVO's can be used to promote rural development, PVO projects tend not to be cost effective. (Final Report)
- b. For future PVO projects, a new procedure is recommended. A grant should be provided to a single, well-established U.S.-based PVO which would register eligible indigenous PVO's and assist them in writing proposals and documenting and implementing grants. (Final Report)
- c. Because of the innovative nature of the program, USAID/Ghana had to spend considerable time developing new guidelines. Delays were caused by late delivery inputs, especially vehicles, and the unavailability of spare parts, petrol, and especially cement.
- d. Evaluations in May and Aug. 1980 concluded that projects had generally performed well, and not only proposed that a second phase be funded, but said the project deserved serious consideration for replication elsewhere.

One team noted that the unique, sectoral linkage of the FAAD subprojects "has led to highly productive collaboration among the seven sub-grantees, as well as with non-FAAD supported PVO's, local government extension workers, etc."

A 1980 evaluation team observed, "FAAD is having a positive, direct impact on 40,000 beneficiaries and indirectly on some 700,000 more, all of whom are from rural communities. No other type of AID-funded project could hope to have such a large, direct outreach for the relatively modest funding level."

- e. FAAD has brought considerable goodwill to the Mission and serves as an important channel of access to a wide range of groups and individuals in Ghana.

### 14. Rating the Evaluations:

- a. Scope
  - 1.
  2. Partial: Little attention paid to sub-projects
- b. Quality
  1. baseline data: no

2. inputs/outputs: no analysis that corresponds with logframe
3. purpose/goal: no analysis that corresponds with logframe
4. Interim and final evaluations at odds with each other.  
Final Report examines projects primarily from cost effectiveness angle, though no supporting data are given.  
Interim evaluations make no such effort, and instead concentrate on quality of AID-PVO interaction and progress of of sub-projects.



b. Inputs:

Partially Achieved:

- 1) Construction: As of 2/83, only one-third of anticipated construction complete. Lack of construction materials cited. Construction continuing under MIDAS II.
- 2) Commodities: All delivered by end of project, but delays were a factor in slowing project progress.
- 3) Technical Assistance: For the seed and credit components, the quality of staff and timeliness of arrival was satisfactory. For the research staff, placement delays slowed project progress. Quality of extension staff, unsatisfactory.

Outputs: Evaluations failed to address

12. Assessment of Implementation, P/G Level:

a. 0

- b. Goal: 1979 project evaluation states "there has been almost no opportunity for impact on the target small farmers." External factors, namely inflation, commodity shortages, and changes in government, are cited as major handicapping factors.

Purpose: Attempts to strengthen the capacity of implementing agencies to provide improved agricultural inputs to small farmers was only moderately successful. Continued deterioration of economic situation caused rapid decapitalization of working capital available for small farmer credit, and make foreign exchange with which to buy fertilizers and pesticides scarce. Project scope and geographical concentration was narrowed by necessity.

13. Lessons/Issues:

- a. Projects such as this should strengthen existing institutions rather than creating new ones.
- b. Project design should take account of possible/probable economic and political constraints, and special evaluation and re-design efforts should be initiated as appropriate to compensate for rapidly evolving social and economic environment.
- c. Project had no baseline data which would allow measurement of project impact on beneficiaries.

14. Rating of Evaluations:

a. Scope

- 1.
2. Partial

b. Quality

1. baseline data: no
2. inputs/outputs: inputs only.
3. purpose/goal: poor analysis
4. Poor. Both reports very brief, little analysis provided. Final report duplicates verbatim the "lessons" cited in the '79 evaluation.



- Vehicles poorly maintained and sometimes commandeered by other GOL agencies

Outputs:

- + Planning and Marketing units established and working effectively
- + Long-range ag plan developed
- + Data collection and tabulation established
- + Buying and processing centers established
- Soils unit not established as of 5/74. No chief or senior staff. Inadequate junior staff.
- No analysis of ag sector as originally planned. Manpower said to be insufficient.
- Soil survey mapping incomplete
- Number of participants trained is less than planned.

12. Assessment of Implementation: P/G Level

a. 1.0

- b. Available evidence does not suggest that the project achieved its goal of expanding agricultural production of the traditional agricultural sector.

The purpose of the project was to assist the Dept. of Agriculture in developing its capabilities in the design and execution of programs to provide production incentives and technology for traditional farmers. Present evidence indicates that the project was only mildly effective. No coordinated policy or program exists for research, extension and training. The Ministry of Agriculture has only a rudimentary planning capacity. Few of the 32 participants trained in planning and management have stayed with the MOA. Statistical division of MOA was established.

13. Issues/Lessons:

- a. Original project design overestimated the Ministry's manpower and financial resources.
- b. Liberian supervisors abused soil science workers, turning them to work on private farms instead of national land maps.

- c. Marketing component of project failed because marketing section filled with persons inadequately trained for positions. Jobs granted as a kind of social welfare.
- d. Technology transfer failed because no technology specific to the Liberian situation was adapted. Financial resources inadequate for this function.
- e. Ministry of Agriculture's approach to development traditionally built around various individual projects. This lends itself to uncoordinated effort in which individual projects develop their own vested interests.

1. Liberia
2. Upper Lofa County Rural Development
3. 669-0142
4. Amt. Ob.: 5,000 loan
5. Amt. Exp.: 4,408
6. Start: FY 76                      End: FY 81
7. Documents:
  - CAP (PD-AAC-118) 6/75
  - SER (PD-AAG-345) 5/80
  - Audit Report (PD-AAI-046) 6/80
8. Strategy: Capacity Building
 

To increase agricultural production and productivity of rice, coffee, and cocoa in Upper Lofa County, primarily to establish a farmer credit/co-op system, and through it, supply small farmers with a complete agricultural service package of improved cultivation methods and farm inputs such as seeds, seedlings, fertilizer, tools, sprayers, credit, staff and farmer training, and research. Project also includes health monitoring and road building.
9. Focus: Ag Inputs. Also, limited marketing.
  - seed multiplication, improved seed, seedlings
  - fertilizer and agricultural chemicals, tools and sprayers
  - credit, cooperatives, banking
  - research and extension
10. Channels: Public (GOL Project Management Unit and Ministry of Public Works)
 

Note: AID contribution is a \$ 5.0 m loan. Other participants include IBRD, \$ 6.0 m credit; GOL, \$ 5.9 m; and farmer labor contributions, \$ 1.1 m.
11. Assessment of Implementation, P/G Level:
  - a. 2.5
  - b. Inputs: Only shortfall in area of farm inputs. Audit notes that as of 6/80, only \$ 754,000 had been disbursed of \$ 2.1 m available. Explanation lies in failure of project to recruit enough farmers to cooperative movement. The lack of capital depressed input demand.

Outputs:

Achieved:

- 1) Training of PMU staff. After four years, staff is completely Liberian and is functioning well.
- 2) Training facilities built.
- 3) Farmer training and extension systems established
- 4) Land development: 90 percent of target level
- 5) Schistosomiasis surveillance program installed
- 6) Rice seed multiplication fulfills demand

Partially achieved:

- 1) Cooperative/credit system established. Number of cooperatives on target but number of farmers far short (3000 of 9000 targeted). Level of borrowing also far short of target (\$ 715,000 versus \$ 3.6 m). Recovery rates good (85%).
- 2) Input supply system only modestly effective. (see Inputs)
- 3) Marketing of incremental produce: Cooperatives lack capital to buy output. Cooperative members sometimes forced to sell to middlemen for low prices.
- 4) Farms to market roads built: Only 27 of proposed 62 miles of feeder roads built by Ministry of Public Works, mainly because equipment diverted to other projects for political reasons. Project road crew highly effective on access roads, however.
- 5) Little adaptive research accomplished.

12. Assessment of Implementation, P/G Level:

a. 3.0

- b. Goal: There are clear indications that income gains have been made by project beneficiaries, though no measures are provided. Wages of agricultural workers have risen 100-130 percent, therefore cost of production is also up for farmers. Consumption of market goods has risen, increasing secondary economic activities. Savings are also up. Accompanying these changes has been a rise in inflation.

Purpose: Agricultural productivity: Overall hectarage in project zone is 90 percent of target. Yields for swampland rice have almost doubled target level. Cocoa yield is 95 percent of target. Coffee, 77 percent. Upland rice, 74 percent.

14. Issues/Lessons:

- a. Failure of project to attract farmers to cooperative movement can be attributed in part to the tendency of PMU to concentrate on developing its own capabilities while neglecting the cooperatives.
- b. Cooperative members in general expressed distrust of PMU.
- c. Farmers outside Lofa County were so impressed with results of project, particularly swampland rice cultivation, that they clamored loudly for similar assistance.
- d. The revolving credit fund is in danger not only from under-capitalization but from poor management and bookkeeping practices.
- e. USAID did not undertake a single evaluation of the project in its first four years, and site visits were infrequent and undocumented.



ideally adapted to local conditions, e.g. threshers used were not designed for millet and their scales were not metric.

3) Farm inputs: Deliveries of fertilizer and seed to contract growers ran behind schedule in early stages of project.

Output: Major objectives met. Two outputs not achieved on schedule were construction of seed production facilities (largely attributable to poor set of original cost estimates) and the presentation of a sizable number of farm demonstrations.

12. Assessment of Implementation, P/G Level:

a. 2.5

b. Goal: Not possible to quantify this project's contribution to goal of increasing Niger's staple food producing capacity. Apparently the project is contributing to this goal.

Purpose: Production objectives were met in first year of project. This is largely attributable to good rains and unambitious planning, not to project contributions. Storage objectives have also been met. The diversion of 100,000 ha. of millet to other crops has not been met because it presumes the development of a successful technical package which does not yet exist.

13 Issues/Lessons:

- a. Research has failed to provide new millet and sorghum varieties of unquestionable value with which to launch the seed multiplication system.
- b. Counterpart training of technicians has not been adequate in many instances to assure project continuity. Counterparts often not free of more pressing duties to work freely with American staff.
- c. Project research and extension activities need to be coordinated more closely with related GON activities. Periodic coordination sessions would improve relations and effectiveness.
- d. Extension staff<sup>1</sup> too small and inadequately trained.
- e. AID failed to require GON to fulfill its agreement to assume an increasing share of recurrent projects costs in third and fourth years of project

1. Cameroon
2. North Cameroon Pilot Community Development Project
3. 631-0010
4. Amt. Ob.: 348
5. Amt. Exp.: 348
6. Start: FY 77                      End: FY 81
7. Documents:
  - PP (PD-AAB-746)    11/75
  - PP (PD-AAB-747)    9/77
  - PES (PD-AAG-874)   4/81
8. Strategy:    Planning/Policy: Project designed as replicable model for use by GOC.  
Project is designed to improve the economic and social well-being of a target group of villagers in Northern Cameroon through the development of community-based integrated rural development programs.
9. Focus:    Ag Inputs
10. Channels:    Private: establishment of community citizens councils
11. Assessment of Implementation, I/O Level:
  - a. 1.5
  - b. Inputs: Major problems included: the late installation of the project director, the failure of the implementing agency (Community Development Foundation) to identify a Cameroonian counterpart from the Department of Community Development, insufficient administrative funds, and over-budgeting of subproject funds which put pressure on CDF to support large infrastructure projects.  
  
Outputs:  
Achieved:

1) organization of village development committees and sub-committees for health/nutrition, agriculture, and water resources for all nine villages involved

Partially Achieved:

1) training of villagers in health/nutrition, and wells construction did not reach target levels  
2) targets for reduction of infant mortality and for increases in agricultural productivity were not attained

12. Assessment of Implementation, P/G Level:

a. 1.0

b. Purpose/Goal: No significant progress toward achievement of project purposes at time of evaluation. Project had had only one year to implement villagers' subprojects. No clear evidence of improvement in well-being of the target population. CDF has not succeeded in creating an effective grass-roots infrastructure since the village development councils apparently remain dependent upon CDF for initiative and motivation. Cost of project would preclude its replicability throughout Cameroon. Project not likely to contribute substantially to the development of a nationwide community development program.

13. Issues/Lessons:

- a. CDF failed to include time in the project design to start up the project, recruit personnel, and obtain local approval for sub-project activities.
- b. Project did not involve host country counterparts throughout project life, though the GOC was expected to assume management of program at project completion.
- c. Community development activities should emphasize the involvement of local people rather than the completion of large, complex activities which require substantial outside assistance. The activities should be appropriate to the villagers financial means, level of community knowledge, sophistication, and leadership capacities.
- d. Close scrutiny by AID could eliminate serious design and implementation problems before they have a chance to adversely affect the outcome of projects AID finances.

1. Senegal
2. Cereals Production I
3. 685-0201
4. Amt. Ob.: 4,486
5. Amt. Exp.: 4,486
6. Start: FY 75                      End: FY 80
7. Documents:
  - PROP (PD-AAC-149-B1) 12/74
  - PP Addition (PD-AAC-150-A1) 9/75
  - SER (PD-AAC-150-E1) 2/78
8. Strategy:    Capacity Building
 

To assist Senegalese agricultural extension agency (SODEVA) to expand training of farmers in Thies-Diourbel Region, principal area for millet and groundnut production. Necessary technology and methods exist to enable farmers to obtain greater yields for millet and groundnuts through use of better seed varieties, fertilizers, animal traction, and specially adapted farm implements, together with more rational and timely planting methods. AID funding will enable SODEVA to train additional extension personnel, set up an applied research unit, and administer a revolving credit fund. Additional funding allocated in FY 76 to extend training aspects of project to rural artisans involved in the production of farm implements, management and accounting training for members of newly-formed rural councils, and instruction in child-rearing, nutrition, agriculture, and domestic production for women and youth organizations. Funds also provided for national literacy office.
9. Focus:    Ag Inputs
  - training of extension personnel
  - seeds
  - fertilizer
  - adapted farm implements
  - animal traction
  - credit, through revolving fund
10. Channels:    Parastatal (SODEVA, also ONCAD)
11. Assessment of Implementation, I/O Level:
  - a. 4.0

b. Inputs:

Achieved:

- 1) Financial assistance for increased number of Senegalese extension personnel.
- 2) Two expatriate technicians provided: a training specialist and an agronomist.
- 3) Construction and equipment for training facilities.
- 4) Funding for applied research unit. (AID pays only salary of chief, offices for Bambey unit, equipment, and 10 percent of the local and operations costs.)

Partially Achieved:

- 1) Infrastructure and equipment: Project construction of infrastructure has been essentially completed, though delays have plagued certain units. Total construction costs have exceeded original budget.

Outputs:

Achieved:

- 1) Recruitment and upgrading of extension personnel by SODEVA in project area. 243 of 253 positions filled. Expatriate advisors in place. The level of training activity for the first two years satisfactory and well-managed though somewhat below projections. U.S. participant training for two Senegalese.
- 2) Establishment of required SODEVA infrastructure including training and farm demonstration facilities. AID inputs in constructing and equipping these facilities have been adequate.
- 3) Liaison unit functioning, though AID input limited.

Partially Achieved:

- 1) Increased number of farmers included in intensification program: The number of farmers using the lowest level of intensification exceeded projections by 214 percent, but for semi-intensive and intensive levels, only 64 and 51 percent of the projections were achieved.

12. Assessment of Implementation, P/G Level:

- a. data insufficient

- b. Goal: To contribute to the economic development of agricultural productivity in groundnut basin. Measurement of progress toward this goal not feasible at time of evaluation (2/78).

Purpose: 1) to assist GOS to achieve a higher and self-sustaining level of productivity in the agricultural sector.

The evaluation concludes that it is neither feasible nor realistic to measure project progress toward this achievement after only three years.

2) to support the effort of the Senegalese implementing agency, SODEVA, to diversify and intensify productivity in the project area.

The project has contributed substantially to second purpose through additions to infrastructure and equipment, additions to personnel strength and training, and creation of the CNRA liaison unit.

### 13. Lessons/Issues:

- a. Despite the fact that SODEVA/CNRA collect considerable amounts of data in the project area, there is a lack of objective data with which to measure project accomplishments. The SODEVA/CNRA data should be collated and analyzed to determine its adequacy, as well as to serve as a basis for designing more adequate data collection methods and content. Particular attention should be given to study and measurement of social impact.
- b. SODEVA, as the agent charged with the agricultural program in much of the dry land areas has initiated actions which go beyond the original concept of the Senegal Cereals Project, e.g. initiatives to integrate livestock production in the farming system. Such initiatives should be supported and encouraged as long as a sound basis for these actions can be discerned.
- c. The probability of the GOS supporting the project at present levels, even after assuming that infrastructure expenditures in the future will be limited, seems remote, given that payment of salaries alone accounted for about 50 percent of all AID financial supports for SODEVA. It is clear, therefore, that continuing even an acceptable level of effort will require external support.
- d. Several elements external to the project have an important influence on the achievement of project objectives. Among these the most important ones are: 1) input supplies and related credit. One of the assumptions for project implementation was the satisfactory discharge of

supply and credit functions by ONCAD. The record shows that this has been deficient in terms of quantities delivered, timeliness of delivery, and adequate coverage of area. b) Marketing and storage: Traditionally ONCAD interest has been concentrated on buying the groundnut crop. This coupled with limited storage facilities for grain either on the farm or the village or cooperatives creates a problem at harvest time in handling marketable surpluses of grain. c) Commodity and input prices: With both commodity and input prices fixed by the Government, careful attention to maintaining a balance which provides an economic incentive to farmers is essential. When significant millet surpluses do develop, the guarantee of a reasonable price to the farmer can become crucial to his decision to produce.

- e. The project has provided very limited participant training (three employees trained in U.S.). The requirement for higher level personnel in SODEVA and in the Liaison Unit should be carefully analyzed by a second phase design group so that longer-term needs can be anticipated and provided for in replancement of expatriates in keeping with GOS policies, and for general upgrading of extension staff.

#### 14. Rating Evaluation Documents:

##### a. Scope

- 1. complete assessment
- 2.

##### b. Quality

- 1. baseline data: no
- 2. inputs/outputs: yes
- 3. purpose/goal: data insufficient
- 4. good



Outputs:

Achieved:

- 1) Short-term training in U.S.: Number of personnel trained exceeded project goals.
- 2) Training of trainers: Met project targets.

Partially Achieved:

- 1) Long-term training: Of three employees trained, two returned to Senegal to work in grain storage.
- 2) In-country training: Quality of training judged successful, but total number of personnel trained substantially below PP goals. For example, 20 commercial cooperative agents trained as opposed to original goal of 500-600 secco warehouse managers. Outputs modified as result of dissolution of ONCAD in 1980.
- 3) Warehouse construction: Units completed on schedule, but with design flaws and deficiencies in construction. AID withheld 10 percent if construction fees from contractors pending alterations.

12. Assessment of Implementation, P/G Level:

a. 0.5

- b. Goal: Project goal was to aid rural poor by creating a grain reserve for distribution to deficit areas during times of inadequate local production. As a result of the inefficiency and mismanagement of national grain marketing authorities, the Government of Senegal's millet commercialization program may even have had a negative effect on the economy in discouraging private traders and sending out incorrect marketing signals. Senegalese farmers have responded by not taking the government's program seriously and by not increasing substantially millet stocks for commercialization. Farmers continue to store grain reserves on their own while government warehouses are virtually empty.

Purpose: Project purpose was to increase the capability of the Government of Senegal's national marketing board, ONCAD, to store and market locally-produced millet and sorghum. Project has proven ineffective largely as a result of external factors. ONCAD was dissolved in 1980 due to corruption and mismanagement, and project trainees joined one of two agencies, CAA, which replaced ONCAD, or SONAR, which is not even involved with grain. CAA has proved itself incapable of efficiently purchasing, storing, managing, or marketing millet in Senegal.

### 13. Lessons/Issues:

- a. The Grain Storage project was based on a faulty assumption of a strong commitment and capacity on the part of ONCAD to effectively administer the buying of local millet for a security stock and price stabilization program. When ONCAD was dissolved, no agency was able to assume its function effectively, and as a consequence the 1981/82 millet harvest led to a costly over-production of millet. Farmers have lost trust in national marketing authorities.
- b. Government efforts should be channelled toward developing the base for an efficient system of private market operators to complement a pared down, but more efficient public marketing system under CAA.
- c. Since 85 to 89 percent of all millet stored by the Senegalese is stored on the farm, the Ministry of Rural Development should intensify its use of extension services to train farmers in improved technologies for reducing storage losses.
- d. Training programs in administration and grain marketing techniques should be geared to executive management, heads of departments, regional coordinators, and others capable of affecting government grain policy.
- e. To ensure that warehouses are built to suit local climate and construction technologies in the future, USAID should carefully review and evaluate plans submitted by contractors, seek and consider recommendations from outside experts and sources, and modify warehouse plans accordingly.

### 14. Rating the Evaluations:

#### a. Scope

1. complete
- 2.

#### b. Quality

1. baseline data: yes (rudimentary)
2. inputs/outputs: yes
3. purpose/goal: yes
4. excellent; cogent analysis



- b. Goal: Increased self-sufficiency in food crops: Gains not attributable to project. 1974-75 drought severe limiting factor.

Purpose: Project has made significant contribution to establishment of procurement and processing facilities for food grains, but not for oil seed. Present storage and transportation facilities are still inadequate. No long-term financial and accounting systems are in place.

13. Issues/Lessons:

- a. Project design suffered from two weaknesses: Consultant scopes of work were too broad, and levels of input required were seriously underestimated. Someone with background in finance or agribusiness should have participated in design.
- b. AID's review and timely response to changing project needs was deficient. Entire scope of project should have been reviewed and changed when GovTan changed its ag marketing institutional structure in 1973.
- c. Project development and implementation hindered by delays, particularly in the recruitment of contract personnel.
- d. 1974-75 drought caused change in scope of consultants' work. They became crisis managers instead of addressing long-range problems for which they were recruited.



of project do not contribute to project goal.

Purpose:

1. The Tanzanian Livestock Marketing Company is established, but the competency of its staff is doubtful. There is no evidence that a well-defined national marketing livestock marketing policy has been produced
2. Implementation of the range management and water development aspects of project largely unsuccessful.
3. Despite some observable contributions by project staff, little progress was made in improving the financial/accounting/management operation of the livestock development authority (LIDA).
4. The subsector analysis completed by contractor was judged of poor quality and inadequate for Tanzania's needs.

13. Issues/Lessons:

- a. Project strategy which is geared to institution-building was not consistent with goal-level objectives oriented to improving the income of traditional producers. The project purposes do not contribute to achieving the project goal. For example, the range management and water development aspects of project were related mainly to parastatal ranches, not to traditional producers.
- b. Contractor received little guidance or support from USAID/Tanzania, and conflicting advice from major evaluations conducted in 1977 and 1979.
- c. Staffing was poor. There were delays and gaps in filling positions, high turnover, and dissatisfaction with some staff on the part of contractor and GovTan. Fault shared by USAID, and contractor. Low quality of housing for project staff also a factor.
- d. Project technicians had poorly-defined roles. They were used to fill operational slots. Their potential contributions as trainers and advisors were not exploited.
- e. Participants trained in U.S. were invariably thrust into top administrative and management positions in Tanzania for which they were generally ill-equipped.
- f. Policy dictated to the parastatal Tanzanian Livestock Marketing Co. by GovTan often ran counter to stated objectives of project.



Partially Achieved:

Outputs:

Achieved:

- 1) Participant training in U.S.
- 2) Seeds Act ratified
- 3) Seed testing/certification lab operating

Partially Achieved:

- 1) Only two of proposed four farms operational. Third farm is nearing completion and fourth is under study.
- 2) Training for Tanzanian counterparts, particularly mechanics is not adequate.
- 3) No operational plan instituted for procuring spare parts and equipment.
- 4) Seed multiplication among contract growers lower than planned.

12. Assessment of Implementation, P/G Level:

a. 2.5

- b. Goal: Project has contributed toward goal of self-sufficiency in food crops sub-sector, but this objective is not achievable through this project only. More seed farms are needed, and parallel progress in research, extension, credit, storage, etc. is required.

Purpose: Tanzania is still far from possessing a system which can produce the quantities of high quality food crop seeds necessary to satisfy national demand. With the help of the projects' seed farms, the demand for improved seed by those farmers in a position to purchase it, was apparently met. It isn't clear that the Government of Tanzania will have developed the technical and managerial expertise, nor the budgetary support required to run the seed farms once project assistance ends.

### 13. Issues/Lessons:

- a. Project success dependent upon success in independent but related efforts in research, extension, credit, storage, and marketing. Lack of coordination with research efforts, failure of Tanzanian Seed Company to locate reliable contract growers, have diminished the achievements possible in the project.
- b. Level of technology and mechanization places a burden on the client. Obtaining spare and replacement parts for machinery in timely fashion has proven difficult and has caused serious delays. In some cases, the equipment ordered has been much more sophisticated than necessary.
- c. Improper specifications for equipment has caused delays. Tractors, plows proved too fragile for rugged soil conditions.
- d. Training of Tanzanian counterparts in agro-mechanics clearly deficient.
- e. Seed farm sites selected without adequate testing. Sites selected on basis of altitude and rainfall factors, but ignored in-depth soil-analysis. Consequently, third seed farm may not prove suitable.

1. Upper Volta
2. Upper Volta Seed Multiplication
3. 686-0202
4. Amt. Ob.: 1,629
5. Amt. Exp.: 1,629
6. Start: FY 75                      End: FY 81
7. Documents:
  - PROP (PD-AAC-161-B1)
  - SER (PD-AAG-372-A1)
8. Strategy: Capacity building
 

Project designed to provide technical and material assistance to GOUV in the establishment and operation of a national seed service which would assure a constant supply of seed to farmers and promote a system of production and control through which improved varieties may be introduced as they become available from national or international research organizations. Participant training to be provided for personnel at all levels.
9. Focus: Ag Inputs - Seeds
10. Channels: Public
11. Assessment of Implementation, I/O Level:
  - a. 2.5
  - b. Inputs: As of 1978, most of technical and commodity inputs had been delivered, but only after considerable delays. The first technician did not arrive until a year after the project manager came on board. When he left in 1978, no replacement had yet been recruited. Commodities procured with delays of up to 3 1/2 years. Number of participants trained half of total contemplated.
 

Outputs:

    - + Seed multiplication equipment installed and operating
    - + A number of improved varieties of corn, peanuts, rice, sesame, and soybeans have been introduced to farmers
    - + Volume of seed produced meets current demands
    - No capability for conducting varietal trials and field

demonstrations at the farm level

- Participant training behind schedule

12. Assessment of Implementation, P/C Level:

- a. 2.0
- b. Too early to evaluate effect of project on net annual increase in production of food crops. At purpose level, the project to date had had modest success in creating a national seed service which is economically and organizationally capable of assuring the provision of seed to farmers and making improved seeds available as they are developed through research.

13. Issues/Lessons:

- a. The failure of the GOUV to establish a national seed price structure critically hampers project success. It is not economically feasible for the national seed production centers, and the regional seed production centers to produce the volume of seed intended for second and third stage multiplication when the price of seed is not maintained above grain prices.
- b. Late arrival of U.S. technicians and long delay in delivery of needed commodities got project off to slow start.
- c. As of 1978, there were no markedly superior varieties of either millet or sorghum, the two major subsistence crops, to offer to farmers. (It should be noted however, that multiplication of locally successful varieties of these crops, with proper cleaning and storage conditions, can significantly increase yield.)
- d. The National Seed Committee, whose responsibilities were to include the establishment of a national seed policy, the setting of prices and operational guidelines, etc., had not yet been called into session (as of 1978) and may be eliminated and replaced by a general agriculture committee. The primary reason for this is the paucity of professionally trained agriculturalists in Upper Volta. Without a formal policy and coordination organism, there will be growing confusion and duplication of effort by the various public, semi-private, and donor organizations involved in seed multiplication.
- e. Project designers have overestimated the demand for multiplied seed. The typical pattern for non-hybrid seed demand is irregular. Project managers need to develop more sophisticated methods for determining seed demand.

1. Zaire
2. North Shaba Maize Production
3. 660-0059
4. Amt. Ob.: 13,425
5. Amt. Exp.: 10,260 as of 9/82
6. Start: FY 76 End: FY 83
7. Documents:
  - PP Amendment 2/83
  - SER 5/82
  - PES 6/82
  - Memo, DAI to AID, 7/82
  - Memo, AFR/CA to Project Committee, 9/82
8. Strategy: Capacity Building
 

Project designed to increase production of maize in North Shaba region through coordinated efforts in six activities: research and extension; group/co-op development among local farmers; intermediate technology focusing on production of farm implements; transportation improved by repair, construction, maintenance of roads, bridges, and railheads; bank credit to merchants, co-ops, small farmers; data collection, analysis and evaluation.
9. Focus: Both Ag Inputs and Marketing
 

Project seeks to increase both production and infrastructures for marketing
10. Channels: Public: GOZ, Department of Agriculture  
Parastatal: Estagrigo
11. Assessment of Implementation, I/O Level:
  - a. 2.5
  - b. Inputs:

Achieved:

Outputs:

Achieved:

- 1) extension of improved technologies (Primarily improved seed) to local farmers
- 2) roads, bridges rehabilitated
- 3) project area marketing capacity expanded
- 4) information system developed and functioning at an adequate level

Partially Achieved:

- 1) development of maize and other crop technologies (primarily cultural) to suit project areas only modestly successful
- 2) establishment of viable farmers' councils has not met target levels
- 3) integrated Department of Agriculture program developed for post-project operations
- 4) intermediate technology: despite some apparent statistical successes in number of blacksmiths trained and tools produced, this component has proven weak due to low quality of tools produced

12. Assessment of Implementation, P/G Level:

a. 3.0

- b. Goal: Project has contributed significantly to goal of self-sufficiency in maize production (original project goal). Improved seed has been widely distributed and has yielded substantial increases. Development of transportation facilities has provided vital boost to maize production increases. Nevertheless, Shaba region continues to import substantial quantities of maize.

Purpose: Project was intended to raise net income of local farmers by 100 percent by raising corn production. Production objectives have been exceeded but farmers' incomes have fallen short of desired increase because of price ceilings on corn. Improved marketing system has allowed income increases from production of other crops besides corn. The second purpose of the project, the development of a replicable rural development model, remains unattained. The question of how to sustain project processes after external support has been withdrawn has not been answered.

13. Issues/Lessons:

- a. The 3-5 year original project timeframe was unrealistic under the constraints and obstacles existant in rural

Zaire. A ten-year timeframe is more realistic under the prevailing conditions.

- b. The comparatively unattractive environment of Zaire in general, and of rural Zaire in particular, make it difficult to attract well-qualified personnel, either Zairian or expatriate, to long-term project assignments in isolated rural areas.
- c. Project management assumed that the project would fall apart without U.S. Government support, and therefore made virtually no efforts toward the goal of sustainability/replicability for the project as a whole or selected subsystems.
- d. Insufficient attention has been paid to the possibility of developing a multi-crop approach to farming.
- e. Maize production gains will not be maintained unless the Government of Zaire takes steps to remove pricing and marketing restrictions which serve as a disincentive to farmers.

ANNEX II

List of Agricultural Services Projects  
in Africa

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571

gricultural Services Projects (Input)

Country	Project #	Project Title	Evaluation Documents				
			DS/DIV	Req.	Rec.	Ret.	Files
AFRICA							
Burundi	6950101	Basic Food Crops 80/85					
Cameroon	6310001	N.Cameroon Seed Multi. 76/83					
C. AF. Republic	6760001	C.A.R. Seed Prod. 76/80					
Ethiopia	6630181 6630214 6630166 6630159	Ag. Sector Dev. Micro Reg. Rural Dev. (PVO) 78/79 Pulse Diversi. 74/80 Shashemene Agr. Dev. 70/76					
Ghana	6420053 6410067 6410102	Ag. Advis. Serv.& Staff Support 69/74 Mgmt. input & Ag. Serv. 76/82 Mgmt. input & Del. of Ag. Services 80/84					
Africa Regional	6980401	Guinea Bisseau Rice Prod. 77/84					
Guinea- Bissau	6570002	Ag. Devel. 76/82					
Liberia	6690142	Upper Volta Rural Dev. 75/81					
Kenya	6150171 6150200	Ag. Loan Sector I 75/80 Ag. Sectoral Dev. 80/81?					
Mauritania	6820211	Rural Assessment Survey 78/81					
Area Dev. OFF.	6260203	Entente Food & Prod. 76/84					

Niger	6830201	Cereals Prod. Proj. 76/84
Senegal	6850201 <sup>209</sup>	Senegal Cereals Prod. 74/81-75/82
Somalia	6490101	Agr. Ext. Training Research 78/82
Sudan	6500018	Blue Nile Ag. Dev. 78/85
S.Africa Regional	690024	Swaziland R.D. 78/85
Upper Volta	6860202	U.V. Seed Multiplication
Zaire	6600059	N. Shaaba Maize Prod. 76/83
	6600050	Plng & Mgt. Svcs. 72/78
Tanzania	6210092	Seed Multiplication 70/82
	6210143	Arusha Plng. & V. Dev. 78/82

ANNEX III

Original Scope of Work for Pattern Analysis of  
Ag Services Projects in Africa

*final*

Scope of Work: Agricultural Services Pattern Analysis

BACKGROUND

The Studies Division of the Office of Evaluation (PPC/E/S) is conducting a series of impact evaluations in the Agricultural Services Sector. These evaluations will address the dual issues of providing farmers with the inputs and marketing infrastructure needed to increase food production. These studies will provide the Agency with lessons learned from past experiences.

PPC/E/S has been working in this sector for several months and has already identified a list of completed agricultural services projects for each bureau (see Attachment A). A pattern analysis for projects in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Near East ~~and of projects funded by S&T~~, is requested in this scope of work.

OBJECTIVE

The Contractor will review AID's experience with agricultural services projects (for the ~~SEA~~, Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Near East Bureaus) <sup>conducting program studies</sup> assessing trends over time and identifying those factors which contributed to successful projects, and those constraints which rendered projects unsuccessful. / For purposes of this analysis, successful projects are defined as those for which available documentation indicates that planned input/output targets were

achieved within (or reasonably near) scheduled timing and progress toward purpose/goal level objectives was recorded in evaluation documentation, with target population benefitting as intended.

STATEMENT OF WORK

A. Data Collection

The Contractor will locate the necessary project documents <sup>which may include</sup> to complete the compilation work started by PPC/E/S. Project documents <sup>may</sup> include project papers, or props, progress reports, end of tour reports, evaluations and audit reports. Documents are usually available from the AID information office (S&T/DIU), AID Reference Center, and Bureau Evaluation Offices. Often not all these documents will be available for one project. When projects have limited or no available documentation, Contractor should inform project monitor in order to decide if tapping alternate information sources is a worthwhile effort. Project papers (especially log frames) and evaluation reports usually contain the necessary information for this study.

<sup>Based on a review of Project documentation</sup>  
The contractor will review project documents and will <sup>the following</sup> collect the following information for each project.

- 1) Project strategy (whether project was designed as resource/capacity building, as a policy/planning activity, or both);

- 2) Project focus (whether the project includes the provision of agricultural inputs--seeds, chemical inputs, machinery and credit--and/or a marketing component);
- 3) Channels for project implementation (public, parastatal, private or cooperatives);
- 4) Overall assessment of the implementation process (i.e., achievements at the input/output level);
- 5) Overall assessment of project impact (success or failure at purpose/goal level);
- 6) Problems and issues identified as important in the implementation and in the success or failure of projects.

In order to facilitate data processing and presentation of information, a model format to record information will be provided (Attachment B). The Contractor may suggest modifications and improvements to make the data collection process more efficient.

#### B. Analysis

The Contractor will describe and summarize the information collected for each project on the six variables mentioned in part A and any other variables that may appear as relevant in the course of processing data.

The contractor will assess patterns of relations among variables in order to identify factors that influence project effectiveness and impact. An analysis plan should be prepared and approved by project monitor. Since the sample of projects under study is not statistically representative and the number of cases is relatively small, the analysis plan should be kept fairly simple (e.g., not more than 3 or 4 variable tables).

### C. Anticipated Outputs

The analysis of the data will be presented in a report to include the following: 1) A comparative analysis of projects among bureaus that would identify specific approaches or strategies in the different regions at different points in time. 2) Assessment of the factors that can be associated with the success or failure of agricultural services projects and 3) Appendixes that include a description of key characteristics to be specified by project monitor for each project reviewed and any other background information that the project monitor and contractor may deem useful.

### D. Schedule

1. Within seven days of initiation of work, Contractor will submit to the agricultural services sector coordinator, for approval, a proposed work plan indicating how he proposes to accomplish the specific tasks outlined above. Contractor is responsible for reporting progress toward achieving scope of

Work to the project monitor in biweekly intervals. Within eight (8) weeks of coordinator's approval of work plan, the contractor will provide a draft final report for the review of PPC/E/S.

2. A camera-ready final report (and ten (10) additional copies) will be submitted to PPC/E/S two weeks after the contractor receives comments and corrections for incorporation in the final report.

ATTACHMENT A

Agricultural Services Projects by Region\*

Latin America	73
Asia	34
Near East	25
Africa	<u>70</u>
	202

\*These figures provide an estimate of the maximum number of projects to be included in pattern analysis (specific list of projects will be provided by project monitor).

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ANNEX IV

List of Key Informants for Continued Review  
of Agricultural Services Sector

List of Key Informants:

1. Richard Collins, Computer Specialist/DIU:

Richard assisted me in accessing from the AID computers a list of all documents AID has on file for the projects to be surveyed. The 410 page printout, which contains abstracts for many of the projects listed, will be left with the Ag Sector Coordinator.

2. Margaret Pope, Information Specialist/AID Library in Rosslyn:

Margaret can direct you to the microfiche file containing a limited number of design and evaluation documents for the projects to be surveyed.

3. Gina Clansky, DIU/Rosslyn: Tele. 657-9319

Gina has access to more project documents than those contained in the library microfiche files. If you can provide her with specific document identifying numbers, she can send you fiches or hard copies for many of the projects. Be forewarned, however, that many of the important evaluation documents are not on file at CDSI, especially for older projects.

Information on Obligations, Expenditures, Project Start and End Dates:

AID's W-253 booklet contains this information. Copy will be left with Ag Sector Coordinator.