PD-AAW-495
30529

SUMMARY REPORT

Fourth Basic Villages Services

Mid-Project Evaluation

Introduction

Background

Over the period February 15 to March 15, 1984, a team of Egyptian and American technical experts evaluated the BVS project at the request of USAID, Cairo. The evaluation started with case studies of three governorates which had been in the project from the beginning, and studied seven more, or a total of ten governorates--half of the twenty participating in th project--selected to achieve a representative geographic distribution. The team developed a matrix of ordinal measures scaled at values of one to five which it applied systematically across the ten governorates to determine relative status with respect to sixteen achievement variables such as goal, purpose, implementation progress, impact on private sector development, and impact on quality of life. In addition, the team conducted numerous interviews with parties involved in the project and reviewed volumes of materials produced by and about BVS, including all project documents and previous evaluations.

BVS was evaluated against the elements of the original logical framework, a copy of which is attached as Annex B. The project was also examined with respect to other criteria such as: a) whether BVS is functioning as a developmental, institution strengthening activity or merely as a cash transfer mechanism, and b) the degree to which it complements and stimulates the private sector. Finally, because BVS contains as basic elements most of the pillars of AID's current priorities, namely:

- Policy dialog and support
- Institution building
- Technology transfer and human resources development

and - Private sector stimulation

performance in these areas was explicity assessed.

How to Read this Report

The Executive Summary may already have satisfied the information needs of some readers. It contains all of the major findings and recommendations. The data base and analyses of the report are contained in the Appendices. This Summary Report is a synthesis of background, findings and recommendations contained in the Appendices. It is deliberately short to give the reader a quick assessment and grasp of the context, our overall assessment, major issues, and recommendations.

Readers interested in the data base are referred to Appendix II, "Governorate Reports and Summary Evaluation Matrix". Appendix I contains a description of local government in Egypt which may be necessary reading for a full understanding of the governorate reports.

Readers interested in the specific analyses of the project are referred to Appendices III and IV. Appendix III contains in-depth analyses of the major activity sectors involved in the project, namely training, engineering, impact on the private sector, and quality of life impacts. Appendix IV contains what we have called "Overview Analyses". These are analyses of processes and institutions which take place at or are controlled at a macro level in the project and include financial records analyses, and separate analyses of the individual roles and performances of ORDEV, Chemonics and USAID. Photos and a glossary are found at the end of the report.

I. PROJECT SETTING

Physical Setting

Prior to the BVS program the rural villages of Egypt were in a severely impoverished state. Most households did not have potable water, the limited existing rural road network was in very poor condition, irrigation canals were clogged and deteriorating, and rural sanitation was practically non-existent. Egypt had been through a long series of wars and capital resources were not getting down to the villages. Village economies were relatively stagnant.

Institutional

The Egyptian government policy for decentralization of rural development already was on the books. Popularly elected bodies called Popular Councils, with considerable decision making authority, had been createds alongside the previously existing appointed Village Executive Councils. By and large, based on our field reports and available literature, prior to the BVS program these Village Councils (combined Popular and Executive Councils) did not have the experience, know-how or even the initiative to take local actions. They were unaware of their

rights under the new laws by which they were established and since practically no resources were channeled to the villages which they were required to serve, there was no way for them to become activated or to develop their capacities. Most decisions regarding the few types of projects reaching down to the villages were being taken by line ministries in Cairo and being implemented by governorate level representatives of those ministries.

For example, one of the few investments coming down to the villages was for schools. Ministry of Education officials at the governorate level made needs assessments for the villages and decided what schools were needed and where. The Village Council, popular and executive, was asked to approve the location of the school, but even at that, its decision was not regarded as binding. Except for a few minor examples, this constituted their only experience. For all practical purposes, the pre-BVS Popular Councils slept, and the villages stagnated.

II. Project Description

BVS was instituted to change this state of affairs--to help Egypt activate and implement its decentralized rural development policy. The BVS program was to direct resources to the village to activate, train and vitalize village councils and to provide at the same time the basic village infrastructures needed to get village development moving in Egypt.

Goal and Purpose

The stated goals and purpose of the project, taken from the project paper, are as follows:

"Goal

The goal of this project is to expand decision making capacity on the broadest possible basis, within the framework of Egyptian policy of using the decentralization process as a means for achieving its development objectives, by providing local government decision-makers with experience in the allocation and utilization of resources and in developing the financial and other mechanisms to carry out development programs...."

The rationale for this goal is that such transfer to decision making power to the village level will stimulate a self-sustaining development process.

"Purpose

The immediate purpose of this project is to improve and expand a continuing capacity in local units to plan, organize, finance,

implement and maintain locally chosen infrastructure projects. While this purpose is necessarily limited to a capacity building effort with outputs characterized by physical improvements - roads, water systems, drainage structures - the infusion of a capacity for infrastructure becomes a stepping-off point by which other problems can be tackled and other solutions explored.

Capacity building viewed from this vantage is not gotten within the span of a single project nor under the urging of a single effort. But the advantage of experience in self-reliance, in participating in the setting of one's goals, gives strength and direction to other aims and efforts."

Strategy

The strategy for achieving this ambitious set of objectives was relatively simple. A BVS InterAgency Committee (IAC) was established to preside over the project on behalf of the Egyptian Government. A low-key central government institution, the Organization for the Reconstruction and Development of the Egyptian Village (ORDEV) was selected as secretariat for the IAC. BVS funds were to be channeled to the governorates on the basis of a standard allocation per governorate. The GOE was to put up a maintenance account equivalent to 10% of BVS funding to be kept by the village in an interest bearing account. The governorates in turn were to channel the funds to village councils on the basis of population size for projects selected and approved by the village popular councils. Village councils and supporting entities within the governorate were to be trained in project planning, implementation, accounting and maintenance. Village councils were to be given awareness training to inform them of their rights and potential activities. A U.S. contractor was to be hired to provide the necessary training and technical assistance and to establish an information and tracking system for BVS.

This, in combination with the actual experiences gained in project selection, planning and management as the BVS funds were channeled to village projects, would strengthen the local institutions and their capacity. Progressive development attitudes would be instilled and a self sustained development process at the village level eventually would be put in motion

III. FINDINGS

Methodology

The findings of the team are based in part on the analysis of factor attainment matrices developed by the team and filled in after each governorate visit. Two references will be useful here. Table 1. is a summary matrix of ratings by governorate for each of the project elements or impact factors rated.

The meaning of the scale for each element on the matrix is contained in the sample matrix found in the methodology discussion of Annex A. Each element, as noted, was rated ordinally on a scale of 1 to 5.

The second reference is the conversion of those ratings to two bar charts. Figure 1 is a simple rating of goal and purpose attainment by governorate and Figure 2 is a bar chart that clusters and collapses the ratings by major category: Decentralization Policy and Institutional Development, Technology Transfer, Private Sector Promotion, Implementation Progress, and Quality of Life. This is simply a means of conveying visually a large amount of data produced by the evaluation which is relevant to impact assessment. Anyone wishing more detail or backup description may refer to the summary governorate reports (Appendix II).

RESULTS

Given the scale of the BVS project and its scope--it covers over 480 of Egypt's 869 local village units (clusters of villages) in 20 governorates--and in its relatively short duration of three years, has made very impressive progress toward its goals and objectives. It has the makings of a major success story.

Goal

The pre-BVS conditions described in the above section have been dramatically changed in a majority of BVS governorates. Popular councils in six of the ten governorates observed had been delegated full authority in project identification and selection as shown in Figure 1. Of the remaining four, two are new to the BVS program and one, Sohag, is in a traditionally neglected region of Upper Egypt. In this latter case, it is going to take more than three years to convince the governorate level people that village councils have the capacity to act on their own. Sohag, in this respect, is a problem governorates. It is too early to Judge Ismailia and Red Sea Governorates as they have been participants for only one year in the program. However, Red Sea presents a potential problem area as it did not as yet establish popular councils at its local units.

Institutional Development

In examining progress in this area the team looked at the extent to which local units had full capacity to select, manage and implement subprojects. Five of the governorates had attained very good to excellent capacity, three had a moderate level of capacity in this area and two of the three newly participating governorates had developed or fostered little or no capacity at the local level. Length of participation in the BVS program was a clear factor in attainment of local institutional capacity (see Figure 1 and the Summary Matrix).

Again, commentary from the field visits at the village, markaz and governorate levels indicated beyond any doubt that the BVS training and project management experience--making things happen through local decisions and actions--had been responsible for this transition at the village level. Not only had skills, competence and confidence developed, but attitudes were changing. Popular council members maintain that the councils now thought more in terms of community improvement whereas prior to BVS they tended to be more concerned with their own personal gains. Village chiefs were saying that they now think in terms of change and development action. They want more training and more responsibility.

Technology Transfer: Training and Human Resources

A range of variables was lumped into technology transfer, including level of project understanding, level of participation in training, financial records maintenance, general maintenance performance and linkage with other AID Decentralization Sector projects. As a general indicator it suggested project performance in this area was fair to good, with only two new BVS governorates and again, Sohag, reflecting poorly. Within the indicator, maintenance was the weak reed, as will be discussed. Four of the ten governorates indicated no maintenance had been performed; significantly, three of these were new BVS governorates and the fourth was Sohag. Training participation was generally high throughout the governorates but, not surprisingly, it was low in those three governorates that scored very low on delegation of authority. These same governorates also scored low on general understanding of the BVS project. Financial records maintenance and training will be discussed in detail in later sections.

Private Sector Impact

Private sector impact was examined through two factors, direct impact through use of private sector contractors in BVS subprojects, and indirect impact, assessed through the extent that BVS subprojects appeared to be stimulating local private sector activity. The question of contracting was easy to access and we found that in most BVS governorates a majority of private contractors is used. The smaller the subproject and the closer to the village level contracting is done, the greater the likelihood of private contractor use. Chemonics has estimated that as much as 80% of BVS subprojects may be going through private contractors. While our observations do not conflict with this figure, neither were we able to support it.

The indirect private sector impact is hard to assess but nonetheless was much in evidence. Interviewees reported fifteen categories or tyupes of private sector activity that were, in various situations throughout the governorate, stimulated by BVS activities. Roads and water impacted on the widest range of private sector activities (see discussion and table in Appendix on private sector).

Another impact reported is the change in attitudes and increase in management skills and experience that have come about through BVS. It is reported that there is a direct carry over of these into the private sector.

There is a strong link in rural areas between the creation of local infrastructures at the town and village level and stimulation of local economic activity. We have had reports also of BVS impact on agriculture and the agrarian structure. This too is consistent with theory and with empirical evidence, for example, from India and the Philippines. The opportunity should not be missed to study this phenomenon in some detail in Egypt. An accepted rural development model is apparently being implemented successfully in Egypt, and on a major, unprecedented scale.

Socioeconomic Impact

In general, there is no doubt that BVS has had a direct impact on improving the quality of life in the Egyptian village and has acted as a powerful catalyst in stimulating private sector growth. Villages have become more accessible through BVS roads. This has aided commerce, added to profits for exports, and reduced prices of imports in some cases. Potable water has helped cut morbidityin water borne gastrointestinal diseases. In the opinion of many governorate and village officials interviewed, BVS has helped create a general improvement in health conditions at the rural level. In one village at which a water subproject had reached a majority of households, the doctor in charge of the local health unit estimated a 50% decline in cases of waterborne diseases.

In three of the governorates visited socioeconomic impact due to BVS was seen as high. In all but two of the others it was moderate. In one in which it was low, the benefits were offset by a major drainage problem. In the other, the project was in its first year and impacts had not been generated.

Although difficult to measure, the long-run benefits and differences between governorates should be monitored. Again, BVS should begin to develop associated study components.

Implementation Progress

Project implementation has been relatively smooth over the past two years. Based on data through FY 1983 and field observations, implementation appears to be on schedule. Only two first-year governorates, Gharbia and Ismailia, seemed to be lagging. The engineering aspects of implementation are discussed below.

Past Evaluation Issues

The team reviewed the issues raised during the previous evaluation (Gardner, 1982). These included: a) the question of delay in water

pipes delivery;) the lack of resolution on the issue of decentralization; c) the lack of understanding in the field on the role of the U.S. contractor; d) the absence of training and backup support, and e) the question of cash incentives to those actively involved in BVS. Of these issues, only the incentives issue remains unsolved. This, we understand, is beyond AID's purview to solve. The problem is in the Egyptian government system; it cannot pay incentives within existing GOE regulations.

The incentives issue was brought up with the present evaluation team in several different contexts. Various "non-cash" approaches to incentives for the BVS program were suggeted, including: a) special training as incentive; b) overseas training as incentive; c) awards and recognition as incentive; d) differential BVS allocations based on performance as incentive. This suggests that the incentives issue should be opened up again and creative solutions sought. While individual cash incentives apparently are out of the question, there is a range of other possibilities.

IV. OBSERVATIONS AND ISSUES

Sectoral and Overview Analyses

Detailed sectoral and overview analyses with recommendations are contained in the Appendices. The following summaries highlight major findings and recommendations.

Financial Records

The accounting system developed for BVS is based on the Egyptian accounting system and is sound and adequate for BVS needs. Official records tend to be kept at the markaz level but acceptable informal records were found at most villages visited. Disbursements are made at the local level through a standard GOE form (Form 50) and the local unit has sole authority over disbursements.

Records are reasonably accurate although there are discrepancies between actual records and the computerized monitoring system installed at ORDEV and several governorates by Chemonics. The computerized system needs substantial improvement, Egyptian users need more training in it, and it should be promoted nationally by ORDEV.

Continuing training in accounting and computer monitoring and analysis is needed. Training is needed especially at the local unit level where the GOE is establishing formal accounting units. Chemonics and ORDEV need to give particular attention to this situation as part of th Chemonics phase-out over the next six months.

Engineering

Subproject engineering has been generally appropriate to the needs and conditions of rural Egyptian villages. Design and construction supervision resources tend to be concentrated at the governorate level although widespread efforts have been made to establish these functions at the markaz level. With few exceptions, local personnel are sufficiently competent to design and construct the types of water, roads, sewage and other subprojects found in the BVS program.

Maintenance is the weak link in the technical chain. Water and sewage subprojects, in particular, are prone to malfunction without constant maintenance. Local officials generally do not understand the need for routine preventive maintenance and few village councils have spent any money on maintaining BVS subprojects. The problem is compounded by a great shortage of maintenance workshops at both the village and markaz level and by the tendency of the local councils to lock up their maintenance funds in time deposits in the village bank.

For the remainder of the BVS project, it is considered necessary to strengthen technical services at the markaz level and to give project priority to the development of maintenance awareness and the delivery of maintenance services.

Technical assistance by Chemonics has been especially effective in the preparation of technical manuals and the presentation of training courses. Over 2000 engineers, technicians and operators have been trained in various aspects of subproject engineering and have been provided with reference materials for subsequent use in their work. The BVS project is the first major effort in Egypt to provide technician level training in rural public works.

The delivery of external technical assistance services in the field has been more difficult to accomplish. The demand for such services at all levels of local government far exceeds the capability of Chemonics to supply them. As a result, governorates have learned to become surprisingly self reliant and to use the technical resources found in their own departments. This has allowed the field technical assistance of Chemonics to be used for overall subproject monitoring and specific trouble shooting. For example, one problem that is becoming increasingly serious in the lack of a suitable system for removal of wastewater and sewage. Surface water is collecting in some villages due to increased water use.

USAID has taken on a growing role in the area of technical monitoring and review. Direct-hire Egyptian engineers currently oversee all technical aspects of the contractor's work and of the subprojects. Additional technical inputs are needed, however, to review overall engineering strategy and to provide guidance on key technical issues. It is recommended that:

- Maintenance be made a number one priority in implementation programs;

- Concentrate at the markaz level first to build up a maintenance capacity;

- Provide some means of continuing technical mon .toring and assistance, e.g., through AID/W TDY and contractors, spot technical monitoring by LAD engineering staff and other means, as appropriate. Solution of the wastewater problem is one example of an immediate need.

Training

Over the past two years, more than 21,000 people have been trained through the BVS project. Of these, over 4,000 were trained through Chemonics-sponsored technical training programs and 17,000, through various awareness programs such as village council seminars and programming and management courses.

To conclude that the numbers of people trained by Chemonics, either directly, or indirectly through the village council through the village council workshops using Chemonics-trained trainers, are very impressive is to state the obvious. Regardless of any remaining weaknesses and shortcomings, Chemonics has undoubtedly done a commendable job in a relatively short period of time. Success can be found in the almost unanimous favorable reaction of government, markaz and village officials to training programs, especially technical training and awareness seminars, and the increasing number of governortes requesting more training; for example, 12 governorates are asking Chemonics for training courses on environmental issues.

Training is seen as the most critical component in an ongoing BVS program. There has been heavy turnover in village councils and village leadership, and this will be a continuing phenomenon. Training has not yet been extended to all of the technical people who need it. Moreover, training is needed to get at serious BVS implementation weaknesses, such as maintenance and sanitation and new activities such as village level accounting. There is room for improvement in existing courses as well (see Appendix on training).

The most serious problem at the moment is that the Chemonics contract ends in September 1984. ORDEV has limited capacity to organize and administer training, yet this is an essential element of the BVS activity.

We urge that immediate action be taken by ORDEV and Chemonics to develop a plan now to transfer training administration and management capabilities to ORDEV over the next six months. The plan should contain a mechanism for the continuation of training, e.g., management of training through the Sakkara Center.

Chemonics

Chemonics has done a job of which it can be proud. Six months remain in the contract and there is an opportunity for an orderly phase-out. Chemonics, ORDEV and USAID should come up with a plan for the phase-out which will effectively transfer training and information monitoring to ORDEV and minimize shock to the activity when Chemonics leaves. (See section in Overview Analyses on Chemonics, ORDEV, and USAID.)

V. Conclusions and Recommendations

General:

BVS is well on target in meeting its basic goals and purpose. It has activated Egypt's decentralization policy and made it a vital element of rural development. Beyond decentralization, BVS appears to be a viable approach to rural development in Egypt, stimulating local private sector economic activity, including agriculture, and improving the quality of life. It is strengthening development institutions at the village level and appears to be improving institutional performance also at the markaz and governorate levels.

USAID has performed well. The BVS activity has overcome major problems identified in previous evaluations and implementation appears to be moving along smoothly. This is the more noteworthy in light of the tremendous size and scope of BVS. It is the largest rural development program of its kind in the developing world.

ORDEV has performed effectively as the coordinating body and the governorate, markaz and village levels have responsded very well to the program. Governorates that tend to be lagging behind the majority tend also to be new to the program, although there are exceptions that may require special attention.

Chemonics, the U.S. contractor hired to support the BVS Program with training, technical assistance and management and information systems, has done a very good job of carrying out its mandate. Its achievements in the training areas have been remarkable in terms of scale, scope and general receptivity by trainees. Chemonics also has helped BVS overcome important technical problems such as the use of more appropriate water pipes. The issue of elevated water tanks, the problem of road blacktopping and others reported in the engineering appendix, and it has produced and distributed nineteen technical manuals, mostly in Arabic. It has made a good start in establishing a computerized information system although problems remain.

Chemonics now must move into a phaseout mode and concentrate on insuring that vital training, information and technical support functions continue after the Chemonics contract expires in September 1984. There has been insufficient attention given by ORDEV, Chemonics and AID to the Chemonics phaseout. Immediate action is needed in this area involving all three parties and the governorates.

There is complementary interaction of other decentralization sector activities at the village level. They tend to be mutually supportive and often are seen as such by village heads. However, there is no effort yet at the local level to actively coordinate these activities and we sensed that information at this level on the full range of relevant AID decentralization activities was not sufficient. The new SDS Activity should address this problem.

The questions of whether BVS should continue or what should happen in those governorates which are in their third and last year are questions that the evaluation team tried to address. With respsect to the general question of continuing the BVS activity the team has no equivocation. The impact of BVS has been very strong and it has been very positive. Moreover, it seems to take some time for it to register its full impact with respect to institutional development and some governorates have been in the program for only one or two years. It is our view that BVS should continue in those governorates for at least a total of three years and that it should be extended to those rural governorates not yet in the program.

Third year governorates pose a different problem. In most of them, the decentralization and development process is activated and local institutions have been strengthened. These appears to be a keen awareness and appreciation of the U.S. role and admittedly based on limited feedback, we sensed an awareness at the village level that BVS funding had a definite beginning and ending. However, in many villages we visited that were in their second and third year we were told that BVS should continue for a time period that varied between two and five years in order to "complete" installation of basic infrastructure. While it was beyond our scope to assess basic infrastructural needs in villages visited, it was clear that much remained to be done, even in third year villages.

At a minimum waste water removal systems should be installed in all villages where ground and surface water are seen as problems (see Engineering Sector Analysis) even if this means extension beyond three years. Further, villages not aware of ground water and surface water problems should be provided with that information, perhaps through BVS awareness training. However, design of an adequate wastewater removal system should proceed an information campaign.

There should be general phaseout strategy for BVS in which the GOE is a full partner. It probably would not be healthy to simply terminate third year governorates if there is nothing to replace the BVS resource flow. Villages will, no doubt, generate more of their own local revenues as a result of BVS development stimulation and local institution strengthening. However, some system for insuring a continue flow of development resources to the village through the Popular Councils should be developed. The idea of phaseout through a program of matching grants on a sliding scale was brought up at a USAID debriefing. This idea has merit.

In addition, the Mission and ORDEV might experiment with a variety of phaseout mechanisms, including a clean and carefully monitored cutoff in one or two governorates to test the will of local institutions and the GOE to continue BVS type activity on a reduced scale.

USAID and ORDEV should determine the most effective method to continue those segments of technical assistance most needed. The team offers the following alternatives for guidance purposes:

- o USAID provide money to ORDEV to contract locally for all the necessary services needed to continue BVS training, fully establish and maintain the information system and provide engineering support as needed.

- o USAID retain a few essential technical personnel from existing BVS support contracts to carry out these continuing responsibilities; these personnel to be located within ORDEVE headquarters and Sakkara.

- o Some combination of the above.

USAID is better aware of the pros and cons of these various arrangements than the evaluation team and certainly is in a better position to work out the final resolution.

Finally, the success story in BVS should be exploited. BVS represents a model for rural development --awakening the villages-- that could be important also to other middle eastern countries. ORDEV and USAID should contemplate the possibilities.

Specific Sector and Institutional Recommendations:

The reader is referred to the Sector and overview appendixes for a full renting of sector and institutional recommendations. However, there follows a summary of specific recommendations coming from each major analytical section:

Training:

1. USAID should ask Chemonics to work with ORDEV and prepare immediately a plan for transferring BVS training capacities to ORDEV over the next six months - focusing on establishing a management and TOT capacity at Sakkara.

2. Improve the general nature of the training program, including trainee selection, practicality, follow-up and duration.

3. Continue the ongoing process of decentralizing the training program.

Financial Records:

1. ORDEV should spearhead a coordinated effort by each governorate to review thoroughly all of its subprojects and make necessary records adjustments based on actual subproject status.

2. ORDEV should develop and apply stricter policies and procedures for subproject amendments in order to prevent unwarranted changes and maintain accurate subproject documentation.

3. ORDEV should develop new alternative measures of subproject status that do not depend exclusively on financial data to gauge progress.

4. Additional technical assistance will be needed at ORDEV and at the governorates to develop systems and processes to correct the weaknesses of record keeping now made very salient by the computerization.

Engineering:

1. Concentrate the majority of technical services at the markaz level -- this means some strengthening at that level.

2. Give project-wide priority to maintenance and the delivery of maintenance services -- this becomes especially important as the project matures.

3. Maintain appropriate levels of TA assistance after completion of the Chemonics contract. USAID should ask Chemonics and ORDEV for a plan, should make use of other Agency resources and should consider also some LAD staff training overseas.

Private Sector Impact:

1. Take steps to encourage more contracting at the markaz and village level.

2. Study further the impact of BVS on private sector activities, including agriculture. There is much to be learned in this area.

USAID and ORDEV

1. USAID's LAD-BVS staff should focus on the transition requirements of the project as Chemonics phases out. There should be a clear game plan and clear individual responsibilities for this transition. USAID may want to conisder short-term overseas training for its engineering staff with emphasis on preventive maintenance.

2. USAID and ORDEV should complete for other BVS governorates the type of governorate profiles developed through this evaluation for ten governorates. This will provide a good baseline for the next evaluation and a good management tool.

3. ORDEV should consider how it will respond to the differential performance of governorates under BVS. What will it do about lagging governorates?

TABLE 1: GOALS ATTAINMENT MATRIX INDICATORS BY GOVERNORATES' YEARS IN THE BVS PROGRAM

CATEGORY	SUBCATEGORY	3rd Yr Governorates			2nd Yr Governorates			1st Yr Governorates			
		Sharkia	Sohag	Fayoum	Menufia	Beheira	Giza	Gharbia	Beni Suef	Red Sea	Ismailia
A. Decent Policy and Institution Development	1. Delegation of Authority	4	2	2	5	5	4	5	5	1	2
	2. Institutional Development/ Capacity Building	5	3	5	4	4	3	3	5	1	2
	3. Decision-making	4	2	4	5	4	5	4	5	1	1
	4. Local Contribution (Labor/Capital)	4	2	1	4	4	2	2	2	1	1
	10. Source of Technical Asst.	4	1	4	4	2	2	3	1	1	2
B. Technology Transfer	9. Level of Project Understanding/US Funds	4	2	4	4	4	3	4	4	2	2
	11. Level of Participation in Training	4	2	2	4	4	3	5	3	1	4
	12. Financial Records	5	1	5	5	2	4	3	4	1	3
	13. Linkage with Other AID Projects	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	1
	17. Maintenance Performance	3	1	3	5	5	3	3	1	1	1
C. Private Sector Promotion	6. Use of Private Sector Contribution Contractors	3	3	4	5	1	5	3	3	5	3
	14. Impact on Private Sector	4	3	4	4	3	4	4	3	2	3
D. Implementation Progress	7. Funds Expended as of 12/31/83	4	3	3	3	3	2	2	3	4	4
	8. Subprojects Completed	3	2	3	4	3	4	1	3	3	2
E. Quality of Life	15. Socioeconomic Impact/ Quality of Life	4	3	3	3	5	4	1	3	2	3

GOAL AND PURPOSE ATTAINMENT BY SAMPLED GOVERNORATE



: Goal Attainment (Decentralization of authority to village local units).

: Purpose Achievement (Institution building .. capacity of local unit to select, manage, and implement their development projects).

Attainment ratings based on ordinal rankings using a relative scale of 1 to 5 for goal and purpose.

Figure 2: Attainment of Key BVS Project Elements by Governorates Visited in March 1984 Evaluation*



- Decentralization Policy and Institution Development
- Technology Transfer
- Private Sector Promotion
- Implementation Progress
- Quality of Life

*Attainment ratings based on ordinal rankings using a relative scale of 1 to 5. Factors scored were those contained in the BVS Evaluation Matrix (see Table 1). Fifteen factors were clustered by major category and averaged to produce this bar chart.