

PD-AAU-562
50016

6830240

1985 ANNUAL REPORT

presented by

Development Alternatives, Inc.

to the

Niamey Department Development Project

and the

Agency for International Development/Niger

In partial fulfillment of contract obligations to the

Niamey Department Development Project

Contract No. 0240-929

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Chapter 1: Major Accomplishments and Highlights	2
Chapter 2: Issues Facing PPN	16
Chapter 3: Fulfillment of Contract Obligations	24
Annexes A - F	

List of Tables

Table 1	Status of PPN Loans with CNCA
Table 2	Long-term Technical Assistance Personnel
Table 3	Short-term Technical Assistance Personnel
Table 4	1985 CFA Expenses and Exchange Rates
Table 5	Vehicles Purchased under the DAI Contract

List of Annexes

Annex A	1985 Workplan and Budget
Annex B	Memo to USAID re 1985 Workplan and Budget
Annex C	Executive Summary of Local Organization Study
Annex D	Description of the Fonds d'Investissement Local
Annex E	1985 FIL Activities
Annex F	Dollar and CFA Budget and Expenses: 1985

List of Abbreviations

ARMA.....	Artisant Rural Machinisme Agricole Cell
CNCA.....	Caissé Nationale de Credit Agricole
COTEAR.....	Comite Technique d'Arrondissement
CPT.....	Centre de Perfectionnement Technique
CVD.....	Conseil Villageois de Developpement
CVF.....	Centre Villageois de Formation
FIL.....	Fonds d'Investissement Local
GM.....	Groupement Mutualist
GON.....	Government of Niger
INRAN.....	Institut National de Recherche Agronomique du Niger
MDR.....	Ministry of Rural Development
M/Plan.....	Ministry of Plan
NGO.....	Non-governmental Organization
PPN.....	Projet Productivite Niamey
PTV.....	Projet Tapis Vert
SGA.....	Secretaire general adjoint
TDY.....	Short-term Technical Assistance
USAID.....	Agency for International Development in Niger
USRC.....	Union Sous-regional des Cooperatives

INTRODUCTION

ANNUAL REPORT: 1985

This annual report is presented to the Direction of the Niamey Department Development Project (PPN) and USAID/Niamey by Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI). This report fulfills the reporting requirements for an annual report found in the technical assistance contract number 0240-929 signed between the Government of Niger and Development Alternatives, Inc. The report covers the calendar year 1985 which represents the first year in which a DAI technical assistance team worked with PPN.

This report does not concentrate on the specific contributions and actions of the technical assistance personnel per se. Their complete integration into the PPN cells and direction and the CNCA precludes an annual report that focuses on the DAI role and contribution. Rather, the report complements other documents and reports written during the year and specifically 1) discusses progress made by PPN in 1985, 2) raises issues, difficulties and problems which remain, and 3) shows the effort made by DAI to fulfill the terms of the contract with the Government of Niger.

The report is divided into the following chapters:

- Major Accomplishments and Highlights
- Issues Facing PPN
- Fulfillment of Contract Obligations
- Annexes

Chapter 1

MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND HIGHLIGHTS

This chapter presents major accomplishments and highlights stemming from PPN efforts during 1985. It also includes certain commentary and analysis related to each accomplishment and discusses unfinished tasks facing PPN.

1985-86 Workplan and Budget

The workplan and corresponding budget for PPN operations developed in mid-1985 and which began to be implemented by PPN on October 1, 1985 are found in Annex A. The system used to develop the workplan was different than in previous years; planning started at the Arrondissement level and passed through the Department and PPN cell level before being acted upon by the PPN management.

Beginning the planning process at the Arrondissement level was very important for two reasons (also see Annex B). First, planning started with those individuals that are ultimately responsible for the execution of the majority of PPN operations; implementation responsibility was linked to a role in planning. Second, a more bottom-up approach follows the Government of Niger policy for the Development Societies.

The planning process that was started in 1985 was iterative. Lessons that were learned from this experiences include:

- The current level of knowledge and capacity which exist at the arrondissement level is not always adequate to guarantee a viable plan based on a critical appraisal of previous experience.
- Additional training at the Arrondissement and Department levels in the process associated with planning requires further PPN attention.
- ~~Constant feedback and discussion~~ between all parties involved in the planning process is required to ensure that all parties fully understand and support those operations retained for PPN support.
- All parties must use the same basis for calculating costs.
- Indicators must be developed and agreed to during the planning stage that will be used to monitor, measure and evaluate the relative success of each operation.
- A clear correlation must exist between the goals of the project and any operations presented to PPN management for funding support.

Local Organisations Study

In a joint effort carried out by Hamidou A. Sidikou of I'IRSH (under a PPN/USAID contract) and Bob Charlick (first under a contract with ABT Associates and later under the DAI contract) during the period of late 1984 and much of 1985, a study of village organisations was completed and presented to PPN. This study should have been undertaken during the first phase of PPN or at the beginning of Phase II in light of the importance given local organisations within PPN.

The results of the study (see Annex C for an executive summary) indicate that as organizations, the GM, the Samarya, and the CVD have contributed little to the success of the projet. The study finds that organisations such as cooperatives are poorly understood and little known by most people at the village level.

The study concluded with a series of propositions for the reorientation of the organizational aspects of PPN. The authors believe such a reorientation is necessary if the project is to have a greater developmental impact than currently exists.

Among these propositions are:

- a) Support for associations which group people on the basis of a concrete and real interest.
- b) Encouragement to groups which have private interests.
- c) Offering training to groups which is appropriate to their achievement of specific goals.
- d) A willingness to offer material assistance if groups are themselves willing to invest their time and material resources.
- e) Encourage requests by groups for assistance to be directed through the appropriate institution of the Development Societies.
- ~~f) Offer training in the course of developing and considering specific project proposals.~~

The authors believe the project must devote greater resources to training at the village level, and when appropriate at the cooperative level. Much of the training must be technical, but some organizational training is also necessary. The place and role of the CVD in the village development process should receive further attention.

The Local Organization volet as well as other PPN volets have incorporated many of the recommendations from the Local Organization study in the workplan for 1985-86. The quantity of training directed at village level groups is increasing as is the scope of the training supported by PPN.

Local Investment Fund (FIL)

With the assistance of a short-term consultant in mid-1985, the Local Organization volet built upon previous work to conceptualize and develop the systems and procedures necessary to establish a local investment revolving fund. This fund is meant to assist local group initiatives by offering loans and training to groups that want to pursue income generating microprojects (micro-realizations).

The approach used is participatory; village organisations are involved in all stages of microproject development and implementation, supported by the technical and administrative staff from the arrondissement. It is foreseen that through microprojects financed by this fund a growing number of village communities will not only see their production and income increase but that they will learn to better select, execute, and manage microprojects and become more capable to initiate and execute development activities.

Annex D gives a brief description of the FIL and how it is meant to operate. The 1985-86 workplan foresaw ten village based activities and set aside a sum of 30,000,000 CFA in support of these activities. At the close of 1985 PPN was concentrating assistance on contre-saison production sites (basically income producing gardening) and honey production and marketing. A number of cooperative stores and cattle fattening activities also have been identified.

Annex E shows the activities under the FIL that were begun in 1985.

Experience in 1985 showed that possibilities appear to exist for viable and feasible microprojects. However, rates of return are often very low. The experience so far in working with village communities in assessing their needs and identifying microprojects has been in general encouraging.

Experience gained in 1985 supported the conclusion of the Local Organization study that the capacities of local organisations are very weak and that there is a need for greater training and capacity building. The technical services at the Department and Arrondissement levels are generally understaffed and their capacity to provide support to village organisations is limited. Thus the capacity to utilize and absorb funds is limited. The situation is further complicated by the fact that villagers have little available cash and have been used to grants in the past. Thus they are often reluctant to commit themselves to programs involving loan repayments. While it is felt that the financing of locally initiated development microprojects is one of the best ways to start a sustainable process of rural development, the amount of funds allocated and the number of villages to receive assistance will have to initially be limited. The success of such a program will require a great deal of effort and ingenuity on the part of the project staff as well as the implementation of complementary training programs.

Study of CPT Graduates

The monitoring and evaluation unit undertook an extensive study in 1985 aimed at measuring the impact and use of literacy and technical themes by couples that had attended a CPT. Because the project has no baseline data with which to make comparisons of impact, retention and use of training given at a CPT, this study begins to give PPN an idea of what actually happens when a trainee returns to his/her village. The results, while not surprising, are far from encouraging.

The study gave the following results.

Equipment

- a) Use of the ox cart for transport of baggage, wood, and other material far surpasses the use of any other piece of equipment on a regular basis,
- b) A small percentage of the equipment is used on a regular basis, with some 40% of the equipment needing some type of repair,
- c) No regular repair service is available for the equipment.

Animals

- a) Care and feeding of the draft animals are highly dependent on the climatic conditions that prevail during the year. Ex-trainees often cannot afford to buy feed or pay for necessary veterinary medicines.
- b) Two oxen are always desired.

Application of Technical Themes

- a) ~~Ex-trainees could in general explain the various technical themes (84%) but only 29% actually applied some of them on a regular basis.~~
- b) Average cultivated area per ex-trainee was less than three hectares.
- c) A frequent issue raised by many ex-trainees for the non-application of the technical themes is the lack of inputs (access and means to acquire) such as improved seed, fertilizer, and insecticides.
- d) The incidence of regular technical follow-up by agricultural field agents is low--approximately 15% of the ex-trainees received regular visits during the past two years. Content of these visits is usually limited to a superficial questioning of the ex-trainee without giving any useful and/or seasonally appropriate technical advice.

Literacy Training

- a) About 60% of the trainees test as having learned the basics of literacy at the end of the formal training period. However, only half of these same trainees can pass a simple reading and writing test after leaving the CPT.
- b) The level of interest in literacy is extremely high in the ex-trainee population in spite of the mediocre results to date.

General Topics

- a) The general selection process for a trainee has not changed over time in that trainees are in general young, with less than half in charge of their own farms.
- b) A large percentage of the ex-trainees are not clear about the amount of their loans. Almost all ex-trainees of a given CPT signed up for the entire package that was being 'suggested' by the person in charge of that particular center.
- c) Since a relatively small number of ex-trainees use a limited amount of the technical themes, it is very difficult to state or measure any impact on the overall productivity of their fields.

This study gives strong support to the belief that an extension system based on the CPT concept is simply not working. The CPT concept has serious shortcomings such as a) removing people from their village for an entire cropping season, b) using technical themes that are not always appropriate for the CPT terrain nor for the terrain of the trainees in their respective villages, and c) advocating a total package of animal traction equipment that offers questionable economic return. The study supports the ~~often suggested premise that even should~~ these shortcomings be reduced or overcome, the lack of follow-up by the technical services, primarily the agricultural service, means very little retention and utilisation by trainees of themes and technics learned at the CPT.

The same type of study must be followed for CVF graduates to give ~~the project and other interested parties~~ a clear picture of whether the CVF approach offers a more efficient and realistic way of carrying out extension training. PPN thinks it is, now it must be proven.

Cooperatives

Three types of cooperative training were programmed in 1985. One type was directed at co-op leaders (president, secretary, and treasurer) and concentrated on learning how to read and write in order to control and keep up to date different types of documents

related to a co-op's activities. The second type concerned warehouse clerks and included learning how to read and write in order to fill out stock cards, delivery and sale slips, and to be able to make periodic inventory reports. Cereal bank clerks were the focus of the third type of training which concentrated on learning to read and write in order to keep relevant records for cereal bank activities.

For each type of training at least two people were chosen by each co-op because of the assumption by the project that out of at least two people one will be able to fill out most of any document that received attention during the training period. Together the two from any one co-op should be able to adequately keep and update documents relevant to their roles.

Out of 158 people that PPN planned to train in 1985, only 102 actually participated and finished the training program. The most common reason given by co-op's for not being able to send scheduled participants was that the participants could not afford the time off from their search for food for their families.

The training was carried out in three phases for a total of fifty-six days during a period covering three months. The training was divided as follows:

- a) Motivation Training 4 days
- b) Literacy Training 42 days
- c) Technical Training 10 days

The results from this year's training were very satisfactory. Over 80% of those involved reached a level of literacy required to read and understand all of the documents. Unfortunately the project grossly underestimated the time and effort required to start economic activities within many of the co-ops. Only four such activities were begun. These were all co-op run stores started with an initial loan to cover the purchase of millet for sale through the stores; this was at a time when millet was in demand because of the 1984 drought. The total value of the loans was 4.350.000 CFA.

The fact that only four activities were realised has led to a certain amount of discouragement of co-op personnel already trained. For lack of continued use many have lost the literacy and other skills learned.

Future training must be oriented directly at activities already in place or ready to be implemented in order to maximize the effectiveness of PPN sponsored training. In addition, trained co-op members must receive continued and regular assistance from the USRC personnel, an effort that is sorely lacking at the present time. Without such follow-up further training will not have a significant effect on self-management.

Agro-ecological Study

A three person team from Resources Development Associates carried out an agro-ecological study of the Niamey Department for PPN during a period of four months in mid-1985. This study found that climatic change and population growth are altering the farming systems found in the Department. Associated constraints include limited land availability, shortened fallows, declining soil fertility, deterioration of the vegetation, overgrazing, animal mortality and loss of organic fertilizers, increased erosion, and reduced productive potential.

Agro-ecological zonation maps were prepared for each of the Department's six arrondissements. Six test villages were identified to represent the major subzones delineated in the Department. For each test village certain recommendations were advanced that must be followed-up by the project in the coming years. The beginning of this work was programmed in the 1986 work plan and money budgeted for each test site.

Among the major findings of the study that affect the programming, direction, and technical themes advanced by PPN are:

- a. The agro-ecological zonation of the Department, the use of management recommendations for different soil types, the analysis of the farming systems by subzone and the test villages should provide a sound basis for the diversification of the agricultural technical packages for homogeneous sub-regions of the Department.
- b. The use of phosphate fertilizer could be a key factor in increasing agricultural production in Niamey Department.
- c. In the Intermediate Zone the project should shift from an overall emphasis of increasing productivity to one of insuring productivity. Project efforts aimed primarily at agricultural intensification and productivity increases should be concentrated in the Agricultural Zone.
- d. ~~Considerable potential exists for the further development~~ of dry season gardening in the Pastoral and Intermediate Zone.

This study must now become part of the material and data used in the planning of project supported research and operations.

Computer System

At the beginning of 1985 computer hardware at the project was made up of four Apple IIe's and related equipment. Three of these machines were at the project headquarters and one was with the CNCA. Because of the limited capacity of the IIe's and the growing need for larger data bases and spread sheets, the project acquired during 1985 through the DAI and ABT contracts two IBM-PC's and two IBM-XT's. One of the XT machines was placed at the CNCA. The other will be utilized at the N'Dounga center.

At the end of 1985 PPN had enough computer capacity to handle its needs well into the future. The 1985-86 work plan and budget are now computerized as is a simple system for monitoring project supported operations. Accounting and purchase request systems were also operational. An inventory control system, though available, saw little use in 1985. Word processing by project secretaries began.

The monitoring/evaluation advisor spent the vast majority of his time in 1985 setting up data base and other systems that can be utilized by people having little computer knowledge, i.e. menu driven systems. The project began the year with no one trained in the use of computers. During the year one person was trained by both the computer TDYer and the monitoring/evaluation advisor in basic computer operations. While this individual has made great progress, it remains questionable whether he is currently capable of becoming responsible for computer operations at the project. In addition to this individual, the person responsible for purchasing has learnt to make all purchase orders using a computer. Three secretaries have a knowledge of wordprocessing and the head of the administrative/finance service has simple knowledge of Lotus 1-2-3.

The number of people capable of using the project's computers must be increased if the capacity these computers present is to be better utilized. This should receive serious attention in 1986.

Animal Traction/Rural Artisan Cell

The animal traction and rural artisan cell (ARMA) was begun in early 1985 with the arrival of a technician under the DAI contract. The plan for the development of this cell and its activities was the Poulin/Imboden report of 1984; the cell was made part of PPN with the urging of USAID.

~~The Poulin/Imboden report proposed the establishment of a center that could be used to 1) develop and modify prototype animal traction equipment and other equipment that could be manufactured by local artisans, 2) train rural artisans, and 3) test prototype equipment at the center and directly with the farmer when deemed appropriate.~~

The year 1985 (from March onward) was used to begin to physically establish the center at the CFJA site of N'Dounga located a short distance from Niamey. This effort would have taken several years if the necessary equipment would have had to been imported. However, by the end of December the center was within several months of actual and ongoing operations due to the acquisition locally of good, secondhand equipment from Draggages. The efforts to procure this equipment were long and frustrating. The final approval of these acquisitions came in December 1985. The installation of this equipment and completion of the remaining construction work at N'Dounga should be accomplished in 1986.

During 1985 ARMA accomplished the following activities:

Prototype Workshop

- a. Engagement of necessary personnel for the workshop except for a warehouse supervisor,
- b. Construction of major portions of the workshop area at N'Dounga by these same people, and
- c. Purchase of material used in the construction at N'Dounga.

Rural Artisans

- a. Participation at the Agricultural Fair at Hamdallaye,
- b. Several training sessions for rural artisans,
- c. Control and repair of animal traction equipment of trainees leaving the CPT's, and
- d. Transfer to N'Dounga from project headquarters material related to rural artisan training and work.

Prototype Testing

- a. Recruitment of test farmers from the N'Dounga area for testing of prototype equipment and
- b. Several tests of prototype cultivators and seeders.

Many of the resources, both personnel and material, that were foreseen in the document that DAI thought was the base for the incorporation of this operation into PPN have been drastically reduced or eliminated. This change in resource availability has not been followed with clear directives to the cell of what actions must be reduced, altered, or eliminated altogether. Until such clarification and directives are provided by project management ARMA will remain an idea whose time is still to come.

Centre Villagois de Formation (CVF)

In 1985 the project opened eight new CVFs and continued support for four CVFs which began functioning in 1984. Approximately 120 young village couples received technical training through the CVFs in 1985.

The CVFs appear to correct several of the major weaknesses found in the CPT approach to training and extension. Among these weaknesses are:

- a) the difficulty of follow-up extension efforts because of a wide geographic dispersment of trainees,
- b) high per couple costs, and

- c) the fact that a CPT setting (land and environment) can vary significantly from that of the trainees actual fields.

However, the 1985 CVF experience was adversely affected by:

- a) the lack of training given the CVF chiefs,
- b) the continued use of a technical package that questionably responds to farmer's needs, desires, and economic capacity,
- c) the lack of a clear-cut program designed for use in the CVFs, and
- ~~d) a weak effort by the agricultural service to participate in the CVF training program.~~

Since the CVF concept is new and entails an evolving process, understanding the problems encountered in 1985 and taking appropriate action should help strengthen the CVF operations in 1986. It is planned that some 18 CVFs will function during 1986. There will be ten new CVFs and eight CVFs that will begin a second year's operation.

Because of the 1984 drought and lack of fodder and feed for animals through much of 1985, the purchase and delivery of a pair of animals for each trainee was postponed in many CVFs until late 1985. In the case of the two CVFs in Filingue, no animals were delivered due to a continued lack of available feed. However, all trainees had received a tool bar, a chiesel, and a cart by the end of 1985. The plow has been deemed inappropriate and dropped from implements available through the credit program, except where demanded by trainees (usually in soils with higher clay content).

Thought was given in 1985 to expanding the training period in a CVF to take greater advantage of the fact that the trainees reside in the village throughout most of the year. While this thought was not reflected in the 1986 workplan, the idea should be further explored. A greater breadth and depth of training would be possible by expanding the training period throughout the year, a greater level of literacy could be expected to be attained by the trainee, dry season gardening and production could receive greater emphasis, and village level projects could receive increased support from the project by following a year long program cycle.

Experience in 1985 shows that more emphasis must be given to developing a specific training program for CVFs. Such programs need to address the content of training for both men and women. Without such a program it is difficult to visualize success with the CVFs over a long period.

Centre de Perfectionnement Technique (CPT)

Nine CPTs were in operation from April until December. One of the ten CPTs constructed by the project did not open because of

the effects of the drought; too few people were left in the area to find suitable trainee couples. Just under ninety couples followed the 1985 training course.

While rainfall was better at most CPTs than in 1984, in most locations it was still under the twenty year average. Production was much better than in 1984. However, in only four CPTs did production value surpass direct production costs incurred (not including the value of labor).

In 1985 a maximum of ten couples participated at each CPT. Reducing the number of couples from twenty in 1984 to ten in 1985 reduced total trainee support costs for PPN. However, fixed costs of running each center changed very little.

In two CPTs the local population combined with PPN and the Projet Tapis Vert (PTV) to construct permanent type trainee housing using the Chikal type construction. The local population through the CVD provided much of the labor and local materials, PPN supported costs for non-local materials, and PTV provided the construction supervision. The trainees at these two CPTs appreciated this type of housing. This construction gives all who come to these two centers a chance to see a type of simple but durable housing.

In 1986 PPN is planning on collaborating with the local populations that surround three other CPTs (Gueladio, Kone Beri and Boula) and PTV to construct the same style of trainee housing at these centers. Having this type of housing gives the centers the possibility to really become centers that are used by the local population and Arrondissements for a variety of local training outside of the formal CPT training.

In 1986 PPN plans to reduce the number of operating CPTs to six, slightly change the emphasis of the training, and will require that trainee couples for a CPT come from no more than three villages. Factors such as costs, changes in population, low rainfall and corresponding weak production, and the transition to CVFs all played a role in these decisions taken by PPN. More emphasis than in the past will be placed on teaching the trainee how to become an effective trainer in his/her village setting. 1986 trainees will be expected to play key roles in the creation and functioning of new CVFs in their respective villages.

In the four CPTs that will not function in 1986, PPN will make an effort with the relevant authorities and services to see that these centers:

- a) Continue to serve the Arrondissements as centers where various training sessions can be held,
- b) Remain demonstration centers in service to the local population, and
- c) Receive support in reforestation and regeneration of the land allocated to each of the four CPTs.

APPLIED RESEARCH (RA)

The Applied Research cell is charged with testing agronomic results at various locations which have been shown worthwhile in on-station trials conducted by basic research organizations such as INRAN and ICRISAT. Prior to 1985 all applied research was undertaken at the CPT's under the direction of the RA cell. Actual execution of experiments was performed by the trainees under the guidance of the CPT chief. This same procedure was followed in 1985, with 55 experiments installed at nine CPT's. These experiments included varietal and fertility tests of millet, sorghum, cowpea, vouandzou, and sesame, as well as animal traction tests with millet.

A series of on-farm trials were initiated in 1985 at four villages representing a rainfall gradient from approximately 250 mm to 500 mm. Forty farmers were chosen to conduct two different tests resulting in 80 on-farm trials. These trials were laid out and fertilized under the guidance of local agricultural agents or CPT personnel with normal management operations left to the individual farmers.

Several problems were encountered due to the large number of experiments installed over a large area and the small number of people in the cell (only the responsible and his advisor made up the cell as such) to supervise the execution of experiments. Perhaps the most serious problem was the fact that the trainees at the CPT's were the executors of trials designed by the cell. Under the harsh environmental conditions that exist, there are many agricultural tasks which must be attended to very quickly. For example, because of the sandy nature of the soil there are only a couple of days during which crops can be planted. The trainees would tend to their own CPT fields first and plant experimental plots several days after the optimum period. This resulted in poor germination and general retardation of plant growth; many trials had to be discontinued. Total reduction during the season due to untimely management was approximately 50% in both the CPT experiments and on-farm trials. In the future this problem can be alleviated by reducing the number and complexity of experiments and by hiring more support staff.

Timely intervention and supervision of trials by the RA cell was often compromised by the organization and distribution of motor pool vehicles. There were many occasions when missions to various sites had to be delayed or cancelled because of the lack of vehicles or drivers, or simply the trip request was denied by project management. To be effective the RA cell requires a certain amount of autonomy and freedom to pursue adequately the supervision of the various sites. Without such autonomy in the future it is difficult to visualize the RA cell fulfilling its important role of bringing to the farm level trials that can directly benefit the farmer and be incorporated into the technical themes advanced at the CPT's and CVF's.

Much of the research data collected in 1985 was lost at the time that data entry into PPN computers was in progress. A briefcase containing all the data sheets was lost and all attempts at recovery were unsuccessful. Results from only five of the remaining CPT experiments and none of the on-farm trials had been

entered into the computer prior to the loss. Thus no general conclusions and recommendations from 1985 efforts were possible.

A system of using notebooks with multiple copies will be used in 1986 for all experiments. Any such complete loss of data as happened in 1985 should not occur again.

Caisse National de Credit Agricole (CNCA)

PPN furnishes through the DAI contract one advisor to the Niamey Agency of the CNCA. The project also assists the Agency with operational equipment and more importantly utilizes the Niamey Agency as the mechanism for cash repayment of loans received in-kind, such as animals and animal traction equipment, by trainees of the CPT's and CVF's.

As of the end of December 1985 the PPN credit account had a balance of 110.414.000 CFA, i.e. the value of in-kind loans to trainees by PPN since the opening of the first CPT. Table 1 shows the situation of these loans. It should be noted that the reimbursement rate for these loans is the highest currently found in the CNCA. For the Niamey Agency as a whole repayment rate for loans is 40% whereas the reimbursement rate for PPN related loans is 61%. However, even the latter figure supports the argument that the current system of operations of the CNCA is not a viable one for sustained rural agricultural credit delivery.

During 1985 the Niamey Agency made good progress in beginning use of a computerized system to follow most loan transactions. At the end of 1985 the system enabled the agency to quickly give the loan status of individual cooperatives and individuals, loans given each month and repayment schedules, and all loan repayments that are overdue.

Table 1

Status of PPN Loans with CNCA

Arrondissement	Total Loaned	Total Repaid	% Repaid
Filingue	39.882.000	26.930.000	65
Ouallum	35.245.000	18.741.000	53
Kollo	31.302.000	19.836.000	61
Say	3.984.000	1.457.000	37
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	110.414.000	66.964.000	61

Improved performance within Niamey Agency was affected by the general poor situation of the CNCA during all of 1985. For much of the year a governmental decision froze the granting of any new loans because of the enormous indebtedness of the CNCA and its very precarious financial position. Morale of the staff hit bottom in not knowing whether there would be a CNCA the next day.

With the dissolution of the UNCC in early 1985 the CNCA lost the means of direct contact with most cooperative recipients of loans. The Agency's small number of field agents were not able to adequately supervise the number of loans due and overdue.

In late 1985 the Niamey Agency put into effect an effort to raise the loan reimbursement rate from 40 percent to 75%. With the reasonable harvest in 1985 it is anticipated that significant progress should be made in raising the rate of reimbursement. The end of the first quarter in 1986 should give a clear reading of progress achieved.

Chapter Two

ISSUES FACING PPN

The following chapter discusses several issues and problems that face PPN, issues which impinge on the success of PPN. Each of these issues must also be dealt with in one manner or another by the technical advisors working under the DAI contract. Through continual discussion of these issues and problems PPN in conjunction with other relevant parties can best resolve or limit the negative effect these issues have on the project and its supported operations.

Issue: While PPN is judged on the success of the operations that it supports in the Niamey Department, the project is almost totally dependent for the execution of these operations on the technical services at the Departmental and Arrondissement levels. However, the project has almost no control over the performance of the services and their involved personnel. Should PPN be held responsible for success of planned operations when it has little or no authority over those that execute these same operations? Are the technical services fully capable for the execution responsibilities that are demanded of them by PPN?

Background:

Unlike several of the other productivity projects in Niger, PPN was designed to utilize and rely on the technical services for the execution of those operations and activities that it financially supports. At the same time the technical services were to be strengthened by PPN assistance, mainly through training and material support, to enable them to better carry out their normal tasks and those related to the project.

Because of the lack of personnel depth in most services and the fact that each service must execute its normal program as well as that of donors (both NGO and governmental), it appears that the most important services with which PPN works, i.e. Agriculture, Foret and Fauna, Animation, Alphabetisation, and Genie Rural, often are simply too overloaded to do justice to the total number of operations that they are called upon to execute.

An overloaded technical service can easily fall back on the argument that the project is not furnishing necessary inputs on time or in the necessary quantities. Thus one hears much too often from the services that "it is the fault of the project".

In addition, much of the planning of project operations in the past was done from the top down. The technical services were suppose to execute but not play a large role in the planning of the operations in which they were the primary executors.

In summary, three problems interact to impinge on the success of project supported operations. With limited personnel and technical capacity the technical services often become overextended. In turn blame is put on the project in that inputs are not sufficient (often means of transport or timeliness of

material or financial support) for the planned operations. With little feeling that these operations are 'their' operations but rather that they are 'project operations', necessary commitment and effort for successful operations becomes questionable on the part of the concerned service. PPN experience too often supports this type of scenario.

Suggested Solutions:

Involving the technical services in the presentation to PPN of operations that they plan and feel a commitment to is the key element to minimizing this problem. First, this type of decentralized planning places the responsibility on the technical services to not overextend their capacity. Second, the project with adequate lead time should be able to furnish the inputs necessary. Adequate lead time becomes the responsibility of the concerned technical service. Third, in a real sense an operation becomes their operation in that the planning initiative comes from the service that then must execute the operation.

The project must clearly set-out the parameters to the services for the type of operations that contribute to the goals of the project and then give them guidance in the planning process. Such an approach should shift the responsibility for proper execution from the project to those that execute. This approach also means better planning capacities will be with the services when the project terminates.

Issue: To be effective the DAI technical assistance personnel must have competent, qualified, and motivated counterparts to work with on a daily basis. Since DAI personnel are placed in advisory positions, counterpart importance becomes critical to achieving positive project results.

Background:

In the case of the Monitoring/Evaluation cell no counterpart was present at the arrival of the technical advisor in January 1985.. Not until the fourth quarter of 1985 was a counterpart assigned and in place. Early indications of the individual assigned show a willingness to learn and work hard.

However, the lack of a university trained individual in this position means that the advisor will have a difficult time in assuring that the computerized system the project is developing will be adequately understood and utilized. Because of this situation and the fact that no counterpart was on board during the 1985 planning effort, the technical advisor and the chief-of-party for DAI began to develop a simple monitoring system limited to following project supported operations, leaving aside the more complex tasks of impact measurement. The Poulin report found merit in this approach and suggested that it be followed through any extension of the project.

The women in development cell has two full-time women assigned to it, neither capable of conceptualizing an increased role and support of female advancement outside of traditional endeavors.

Thus this role fell exclusively to the female technical advisor. One only has to look at the memos and reports presented to the project management to attest to this fact.

In the two six-month project review meetings with the MDR, M/Plan, USAID and PPN the importance of a university trained counterpart was discussed and underscored. However, at the end of 1985 the situation remained the same with the exception that the female technical advisor resigned effective January 1986 to join the U.S. State Department.

ARMA presents a special case. The plan under which ARMA was created envisaged several technical advisors working with a well-qualified cell chief. Filling two of the proposed T.A. positions with volunteers was rejected by project management, leaving only the DAI supplied technical advisor in the field with no counterpart as cell chief for all of 1985. The advisor by default had to assume the role of acting cell chief, which meant most of his time was spent on administrative matters and not on the technical areas for which DAI felt that he was engaged.

This unfortunate situation is exacerbated by the fact that ARMA is really the only executing cell in PPN. Often this means different administrative matters arise in trying to execute the construction at N'Dounga and other activities than are the daily norm. This situation along with the strong result orientation of the advisor has meant conflict between the project management and SAF and the advisor. It is imperative that the advisor become exactly that, a technical advisor, and that execution responsibility be vested in a highly qualified Nigerian.

Since April 1985 the CPT/Formation cell has been without a qualified and motivated cell chief. Since a changed role for the CPT's is planned and the emphasis on CVF's is increasing, this cell is in dire need of someone to give it strong leadership and direction. It is also the only cell for which an advisor was not planned, which underscores the requirement that a well qualified individual be found or assigned.

The project assumed that a person who received his Master's degree in agricultural extension in the United States in September 1985 would be assigned to the project to fill this important position of CPT/Formation chief. Since this person's studies were supported by project funds, the match seemed natural. However, this individual was assigned by the MDR to IPDR/Kollo upon his return and not to the project.

Suggested Solutions:

No project can be better than the quality of personnel assigned to it. In the case of PPN the Government of Niger must make the best effort possible to assign qualified counterparts and personnel than has been the case. Should such people not be available nor assigned to the project, the project should give serious thought to reducing the number and scope of its operations until a better fit exists between the capacity of personnel and both the level and complexity of work undertaken or planned.

Issue: The system of financing day to day activity of the project, the payment of goods and services received and used, and the availability of funds when required is cumbersome and does not lend itself to either efficiency nor a spirit of trusting project management to manage project resources.

Background:

PPN has essentially three major means of financial support and one minor means. The important sources are counterpart funds (FCP) generated by USAID and controlled by the Government of Niger, regular GON investment funds (FNI), and direct reimbursement of expenses by USAID through dollar project funds. The minor source is the DAI contract.

During the 1984-85 year PPN operations were supported through all three major means of financial support. This mixing of means, or at least dividing monthly expenses between the different sources, has caused an enormous amount of misunderstanding and mistrust between the project and counterpart fund Secretariat and the controller's office of USAID. This situation should not repeat itself in that the 1985-86 budget of PPN operations is to come totally through counterpart funds; thus no mixing of funds should be possible.

However, the counterpart fund Secretariat is new and current turn-around time for payments submitted by PPN are slow. In addition, the project is no longer able to prefinance any operations or activities with available FNI funds because of the rule that FCP cannot be used to reimbursement expenses for which payment has already occurred. In other words, control of the project's budgeted funds is not in its own hands. This control rests outside of the project with the FCP Secretariat. In that GON and USAID regulations restrict the amount of money that can be used to form a small revolving fund for day to day use, the project finds itself with virtually no means to act upon opportunities for savings or procurement in a tight market or to even function efficiently on a day to day basis.

~~According to GON regulations, any one expense totally more than 1,000,000 CFA (\$2,800) must be put out to bid and then reviewed by an inter-ministerial committee. It is a procedure that is both time consuming and lengthy.~~

Suggested Solutions:

~~While it can be expected that the FCP Secretariat will become more adept and efficient at handling expenses submitted by PPN, PPN should do all in its power to make sure that documents are submitted to the Secretariat in a timely and complete fashion. On the other hand, the Secretariat should give PPN (and other projects financed with FCP) clear guidelines in regards to procedures and what expenses do and do not fall under FCP payment. The simple question of payment for overtime work is a case in point. The Secretariat says that overtime is a legitimate expense and then rejects all overtime payments submitted by PPN.~~

The project requires at least a 1.000.000 CFA revolving fund that would cover expenses falling under FCP payment. USAID, PPN and the Secretariat should work together to find a means to establish such a revolving fund controlled by the project's cashier.

The regulation that any purchase over 1.000.000 CFA must go out for bid should be reviewed and the amount revised upward.

Issue: During 1985 there was a strong GON emphasis on small, village-based projects to stimulate development at the village and local levels. However, there remains much diversity in the means of financing and carrying out such activities by government related projects, the technical services and NGOs. This leads to unnecessary confusion and misunderstanding at the village-level and can be counter-productive to the success of village-based projects.

Background:

There are several reasons for the emphasis on village-based projects. First, the 1984 drought experience showed once again the fragility for rural communities of relying entirely on rain-fed agriculture for both food and income. Second, the 1982 Zinder Conference set GON policy in motion which advocates a rural development approach involving the participation of rural communities in development efforts and the promotion of self-reliance and self-help. Village-based projects are seen as providing an opportunity for local communities to gain experience in initiating and implementing development activities, to learn to become more self-reliant and for the mobilisation of local resources.

In 1985 the project began to establish a revolving fund (FIL) that is meant to support village-based activities and initiatives. The project believes that the implementation of locally initiated small projects is a sound means to developing and diversifying village economies. Such projects also help increase the capacities of local organisations.

However, certain current constraints to village-based activities must be recognized. Among these are the limited number of potentially viable projects, the low state of development and capacity within local organisations, the limited capabilities of Arrondissement and Department level technical services, and widespread illiteracy in rural areas. In addition, the PPN approach is quite different in that the accent is placed on loans and not grants of gifts. The latter is more the rule and not the exception for many donors that support village-based projects.

Suggested Solutions:

More coordination of policy and approaches that affect the support and implementation of village-based activities is required at all levels. The SGA of Plan at the Department level should have the responsibility and use it to coordinate and oversee that varying approaches to village-based projects are not contradictory at the village level.

Issue: A project that assists planning, supports various types of training programs, assists various technical services, and yet has little execution ability and virtually no authority over those technical services that execute approved operations must find ways to ensure that information is shared and that meaningful communication between all concerned participants occurs.

Background:

PPN is one of the productivity projects that elected to work through the technical services and not create an internal capacity to execute various operations that were deemed useful under the project mandate. While such an approach called for strengthening the capacity of the technical services, little has been accomplished in regards to this capacity at the Arrondissement level. While several training seminars have been held for project cadre and the Department chiefs, little effort that really strengthened capacity on a sustained basis occurred during 1985.

Because of the PPN structure and the project's relationship to the various services, a constant flow of information sharing is necessary if the project and its supported operations are to run smoothly. Information must be shared among those that plan, manage, and execute. There is currently no established formal system within PPN or between PPN and its partners at the Arrondissement or Department levels to ensure that such sharing is adequate and sufficient.

Suggested Solutions:

Project management by example and decree establishes the system of communication flow. PPN management must have regular meetings to discuss all current issues, problems and actions to take that confront the project. As importantly, these meetings (at least twice a week) should be used by those of the project management unit to share information that each may have gathered that affects the project in one way or another. This is especially true when the project director represents the project in meetings with the Prefet, officials of the Ministry, or USAID and the subject matter discussed has an impact on the project. Such project unit meetings also save time in that individual briefings are minimized and information resides in at least three or four different people, all then capable of acting informatively and intelligently in the absence of the project director.

Regular staff meetings among the project management and those responsible for the various project cells is an absolute for a project as complex and diverse as PPN. During these meetings not only should there be a free sharing of information but also any previous or current actions or decisions taken by the project management should be shared. Such shared information and discussion almost always makes for greater work efficiency and a stronger commitment to project endeavors.

At least every six months there should be a meeting between the

Department chiefs, the Arrondissement coordinators, and project personnel and management to discuss the yearly work plan, progress and problems in executing the plan, and any other concern of a general nature that affects the working relationships between the project and services. Such a meeting should be planned well in advance to guarantee full participation.

In 1985 a system of monthly meetings of the COTEAR at the Arrondissement level at which the project had a representation was followed for several months. Such a system should again be used in 1986. However, before the departure to any Arrondissement each PPN team should discuss with project management the various pending actions and questions regarding operations in the concerned Arrondissement. Regular internal PPN staff meetings would diminish the need for this type of preliminary discussions to the Arrondissement meeting.

Without the type of regular information flow and discussion that result from following the above scenario, it is difficult to believe that PPN will leave much of a real development impact in Niamey Department.

Issue: The technical package developed by INRAN that has been taught and utilized in the CPT training must be reviewed and adapted to local customs and needs as well as to local environmental conditions. PPN emphasis on developing the CVF approach to training and extension makes localized adaptation of the technical themes even more necessary.

Background:

INRAN in the 1970's developed the basic technical package that is still generally advocated today by the agricultural technical service and forms the basis for much of the training at the CPT. While this package took into consideration seed variety, density, use of fertilizers, weeding and the use of animal traction, the use of this package in Niamey Department appears in most instances to not give a large enough return from agricultural production to pay for the costs of the inputs. This is undoubtedly one reason why reimbursement rates to the CNCA for the animal traction equipment given on loan to the CPT trainees are low.

With rainfall decreasing in most of Niamey Department an emphasis on production might be wrong. The Ministry of Plan has suggested that more effort should be placed on a sustainable system of production and not necessarily on increasing production as is the mandate of the productivity projects. When a rural family utilizes dryland agriculture only four months of the year and this primarily to guarantee adequate food stocks for the entire year, any system that places an additional financial burden on the family and increases the risks associated with dryland production should be rethought.

Suggested Solutions:

First, no quick fixes are likely possible. The effort has to be on a longterm research orientation that is both cost effective for the rural producer and minimizes the risks associated with using any improved techniques or inputs. INRAN is beginning such an orientation. Through its emphasis on the adaptive link with the farmer, the adaptive research cell and ARMA of PPN should focus on the issues of risk and cost included in the technical recommendations that are currently advocated.

In strong collaboration with INRAN and ICRISAT the project's support for research efforts should concentrate on several technical recommendations that hold the most promise to minimize risk and are cost effective to the producer.

Chapter Three

FULFILLMENT OF CONTRACT OBLIGATIONS

Negotiations for a technical assistance contract between the Government of Niger and Development Alternatives, Inc. began in early December 1984. While DAI had six out of eight of its proposed personnel available to be in the field in December, signatures that enabled field placement were not affixed to the contract until January 10, 1985.

The contract calls for 192 months of long-term assistance and 30 months of short-term assistance, a small amount of commodity purchases outside of Niger, and the in-country purchase of vehicles for the project. The contract is divided into a CFA component (meant to cover all in-country expenses) and a dollar component. All DAI costs are reimbursed in dollars.

The contract and its mechanisms have functioned smoothly in 1985 and given few problems to PPN, USAID or DAI. The contract is basically a technical assistance contract with few clauses open to interpretation.

Personnel

Long-term

The 192 months of long-term assistance were based on the assumption that DAI would be able to place people in the field in December 1984. DAI could not incur reimbursable costs until the contract was signed between PPN and DAI. Since the necessary signatures did not occur until January 10, 1985, there is no possible way that DAI will be able to furnish the full 192 person months before the project completion date of December 31, 1986. Table 2 shows the names of team members, date of arrival, time with PPN in 1985, and estimated time that each team member will work throughout the current DAI contract.

Table 2

Longterm Technical Assistance Personnel

<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Arrival Date</u>	<u>Time*</u> <u>1985</u>	<u>Est. Time*</u> <u>1985-86</u>
Tom Shaw	Credit/Inputs	1-1-85	12.0	24.0
J-L Marolleau	Local Org.	1-1-85	3.0	3.0**
M.K. O'Neill	Agronomist	14-1-85	11.5	23.5
K. Koehn	Mgt. Specialist	14-1-85	11.5	23.5
C. Routt	Monit./Evaluation	21-1-85	11.4	23.4
K. Heffron	WID	21-1-85	11.3	12.0***

R. Imboden	Animal Traction	26-2-85	10.2	22.2
B. Sawadogo	CNCA	1-3-85	10.0	22.0
H. Naficy	Local Org.	6-10-85	2.8	14.8
		TOTAL	83.7	168.4

* In person-months

** J-L Marolleau left at the end of March 1985 and was not replaced until H. Naficy arrived in October 1985.

*** Ms. Heffron resigned effective January 19, 1986.

The only member of the proposed DAI team that was not accepted by the GON was J-L Marolleau. However, because he had been with the project for some three years and was already in place, it was agreed that he would remain for three months under the DAI contract while DAI recruited a replacement. DAI presented several candidates over a period of several months. None were acceptable to the USAID mission until Hossein Naficy was proposed after a TDY with PPN.

When Kathleen Heffron resigned in late 1985, DAI immediately proposed a candidate to replace her. However, the project director felt that because most of the efforts directed at women were to be transferred to the Local Organization cell, there was little need to fill this position on a full-time basis and that short-term assignments would be sufficient to cover the work required. Because the WID position is a contractual position in the DAI contract, the project must initiate with USAID a contract amendment dropping this position from the DAI contract.

Short-term

In the RFP a total of 20 months of short-term assistance was requested during a twenty-four month period. During contract negotiations 10 additional months were added to specifically assist the project in the setting-up and reinforcing the computer operations for the project. Thus a total of 30 months of TDY time is found in the contract.

It is doubtful whether the full 30 months will be furnished if the 1985 experience is repeated. During 1985 a total of 10.9 person months of TDY time was furnished to PPN by DAI. In one instance a proposed TDY for a horticulturist to work with 'contre-saison' planning was postponed by the technical director because of a question as to what information was locally available through INRAN.

Table 3 gives the name, position, and time devoted to each TDY in 1985.

Table 3

Short-term Technical Assistance Personnel

<u>Name</u>	<u>Assignment</u>	<u>Time in Days</u>
Mike Wybo	Computer Operations	126
B. Sawadogo	CNCA	17
Bob Charlick	Local Organisation Study	45
Hossein Naficy	Local Organisations	24
Tony Barclay	Management Visit	5
Roger Poulin	Extension Document	18

TOTAL SHORT-TERM DAYS		235

Finances

Monthly expenses for both the CFA and dollar portion of the contract have been running less than originally foreseen. This is due to several reasons: 1) the time budgeted for both long-term and short-term technical assistance has not been totally utilized as shown earlier 2) certain expenses such as airfares, schooling, housing, and utilities have been less than budgeted, and 3) certain budgeted expenses such as freight for personal vehicles have not been utilized by team members.

It is safe to say that should expenses continue on a normal projection with past experience there will be money remaining in the contract. However, it is difficult to calculate the exact amount because of the wild fluctuations in the dollar and continual changes in rates for airfare, COLA, and per diem (for short-term assistance). For example, the per diem rate used in the contract was \$74/day whereas on January 1, 1986 it stood at \$82/day with expectations that it would go even higher. In addition, no COLA was calculated in the contract as Niger was at a zero level when the contract was signed. With the precipitous drop in the dollar during the last half of 1985, COLA began to be paid. Thus while there were savings on one side, there were also greater expenses on the other; the former outweighing the latter for the entire year.

Table 4 shows the weighted exchange rate of the CFA to the dollar for 1985 expense reimbursements to DAI was 444.15 CFA to \$1.00. The CFA portion of the entire budget was calculated at an exchange rate of 450 CFA = \$1.00. Should the dollar continue to decline in 1986, the CFA portion of the budget will be utilized at a much quicker rate than planned.

Table 4

1985 CFA Expenses and Exchange Rates

<u>Month</u>	<u>CFA Expenses</u>	<u>Dollar Reimbursement</u>	<u>Rate CFA/Dollar</u>
January	12.030.394	25,011.21	481.00
February	12.224.428	25,414.61	481.00
March	10.384.336	21,611.52	480.50
April	9.176.193	19,441.09	471.99
May	7.162.199	15,435.77	464.00
June	4.547.200	10,393.60	437.50
July	5.110.731	11,920.66	428.73
August	5.181.981	11,885.28	436.00
Sept.	4.916.010	12,138.30	405.00
October	9.895.249	24,862.43	398.00
November	2.908.127	7,553.58	385.00
December	5.862.021	15,911.24	375.50
Totals	89.398.869	201,279.29	444.15*

* Weighted average

Thirty-six percent of the dollar budget was utilized by the end of 1985, while some forty-nine percent of the CFA budget had been utilized during the same period (see Annex F).

Vehicle Purchases

Money was placed in the DAI contract for the purchase of 8 four-wheel drive vehicles destined for use by the different cells of the project and project management. With the money budgeted DAI was able to purchase 11 vehicles and still have some 2.000.000 CFA left over for purchase of spare parts. Since all vehicle purchases were made through the use of USAID advances, DAI did not receive any fee on these transactions.

As Table 5 shows, only 7 four-wheel drive vehicles were purchased. The remaining 4 are for use in town or where there are paved roads. Since Filingue and Kollo can both be reached by good paved roads, the project should save on both gas and wear and tear on the four-wheel drive vehicles in being able to make more use of regular type vehicles.

Table 5

Vehicles Purchased under the DAI Contract

<u>Type</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
Land Rover SW	3
Land Rover PU	3
504 Break	2
R4	2
Nissan King-Cab	1

Support Services

In January 1985 DAI arranged with a local Nigerien company, Haraka, to handle most of the support services normally required under a technical assistance contract. DAI was not interested in setting-up an administrative structure outside of PPN. DAI felt that arranging with a capable, local company to furnish administrative support would be the most cost effective way of proceeding. Experience in 1985 supported that thought. For 500,000 CFA per month a full-range of support services are available for DAI administrative matters such as accounting for all local expenses and the preparing of monthly billing and field reports, shipping and receiving of commodities and household effects, and visa type work. In addition, the services of Haraka enable DAI team members to devote all of their time to the technical job for which they were engaged instead of paying bills, replacing gas bottles, finding repair people for household problems, etc.

In general the arrangements with Haraka have worked well, especially so in light of the fact that DAI had to train Haraka in the accounting procedures to use and the different tasks to be performed. In addition, the precedent has been set for USAID that engaging a local company for administrative support can be both cost effective and efficient. Since DAI began to use a local company for administrative support, other USAID supported projects have also gone in that direction.

Commodities

A small amount of money was placed in the contract to enable DAI to purchase equipment, mainly computers and related peripheries, that would be of direct and immediate benefit to the project. With this money DAI purchased and sent to the project two IBM XTs, one IBM-PC, several printers, software such as dBase III and Lotus 1-2-3, several inverters and uninterruptured power supplies, and manuals/documents that would be of use in the computer operations of the project.

By the end of 1985 purchases of hardware and software required to support the accounting, monitoring, purchasing, and inventory systems needs of the project were in place. It is expected that only minor purchases will be needed in 1986 as well as possible repair costs related to equipment already with PPN.

It is evident that a host-country contract such as that under which DAI operates gives the project management a certain flexibility in procurement of commodities in comparison to GON procurement procedures.

ANNEXES

A - F

PROJET PRODUCTIVITE NIAMEY
 PLAN DE CAMPAGNE 1985/86
 ARRONDISSEMENT DE FILINGUE

ANNEX A
 EXAMPLE TAKEN FROM WORK
 PLAN

OPERATION	DESCRIPTION	RESULTATS	DEBUT	FIN
** ARRONDISSEMENT ** : FILINGUE				
* VOLET DE ** : AGRICULTURE				
DEFENSE DES CULTURES	Avoir mis à la disposition du SAD des moyens pour assurer la protection des cultures au cours du déroulement de la campagne agricole.	Intervention phytosanitaire. Protection végétale (à spécifier).	01.11.85	30.09.85
SEMENCES SELECTIONNEES (TRANSPORT)	Avoir appuyé le SAD dans la ventilation des semences sélectionnées dans la zone d'intervention du Projet.	40 tonnes de semences aux ULC.	01.02.86	30.06.86
CULTURE MARAICHÈRES-GAO ET DAMANA	Avoir assuré l'encadrement des sites des cultures maraichères de Gao et de Damana dans l'Arrondissement de Filingué.	2 sites maraichères aménagés et exploités.	01.10.85	28.02.86
RECYCLAGE DES EX-STAGIAIRES DES CPT	Avoir assuré le recyclage des ex-stagiaires détenteurs de matériel agricole.	100 ex-stagiaires à recycler.	01.01.86	01.04.86
* VOLET DE ** : ANIMATION				
FORMATION DVD DANS 12 VILLAGES	Avoir entrepris la formation des conseillers villageois de développement pour assurer le démarrage du programme villageois.	120 conseillers villageois formés.	01.02.86	01.05.86
* VOLET DE ** : COORDINATION				
FONCTIONNEMENT CELLULE COORDINATION/PPN	Avoir assuré le fonctionnement de la cellule de coordination de l'Arrondissement de Filingué.	Coordination de toutes les activités du PPN à l'Arrondissement.	01.10.85	30.09.86

ARRONDISSEMENT DE FILINGUE

OPERATION	DESCRIPTION	RESULTATS	DEBUT	FIN
CREATION DE MINI-PEPINIERES DANS QUATRE CVF	Avoir entrepris la production de plants d'ombrage, de brise-vents, des haie-vives et avoir assuré leur distribution dans les CVF et aux populations intéressées.	Production de 8.000 plants. 8.000 plantes utilisées. 30 stagiaires encadrés.	01.12.85	11.01.86
* VOLET DE ** : GENIE RURAL ENTRETIEN/REPARATION BUREAUX ET LOGEMENTS	Avoir mis à la disposition de chaque Arrondissement des moyens d'entretien des bureaux et des logements.	Batiments en bon état. 4 Bureaux. 3 Logements.	01.10.85	31.05.86
* VOLET DE ** : RECHERCHE APPLI VILLAGE TESTE KOUARA TESUT (PTV)	Avoir entrepris les activités prévues par l'Etude du Zonage Agro-écologique dans le Département de Niamey.	Essais agro-écologiques. Reboisement, défense, restauration des sols.	01.12.85	30.03.86
VILLAGE TESTE NIANKITAN (PTV)	Avoir entrepris les activités prévues par l'Etude du zonage Agro-écologique dans le Département de Niamey.	Essais agro-écologiques. Reboisement. défense, restauration des sols.	01.12.85	30.03.86
* VOLET DE ** : SANTE FORMATION D'AGENT DE SANTE VILLAGEOISE (CVF)	Avoir entrepris la sensibilisation et la formation du personnel para-médical pour les CVF/CPT dans l'Arrondissement de Filingué.	Capacité améliorée aux premiers soins sanitaires. Meilleure santé aux CVF/CPT. Gestion des pharmacies.	01.03.86	30.03.86
* VOLET DE ** : USSC SUIVI DES RESPONSABLES DES COOPERATIVES	Avoir redynamisé les activités des coopératives par le biais de la formation et de l'encadrement des structures coopératives.	Suivi et promotion des coopératives.	01.05.86	01.08.86
PROMOTION DES BOUTIQUES COOPERATIVES	Avoir renforcé les moyens des boutiques coopératives en vue d'améliorer leurs activités.	10 gérants formés.	15.12.85	30.03.86

BUDGET PROVISOIRE OCTOBRE 1985 - SEPT 1986
PROJET PRODUCTIVITE NIAMEY

***** FORMAT TESTE *****

/SERVICE	OPERATION	RESULTATS ATTENDUS	MONTANT
ONDISSEMENT DE : FILINGUE			
E VOLET/SERVICE : FL.AG.AC			
NGUE AGRICULTURE	DEFENSE DES CULTURES	Intervention phytosanitaire. Protection végétale (à spécifier).	750000
subtotal *			750000
E VOLET/SERVICE : FL.AG.CP			
NGUE AGRICULTURE	CULTURE MARAICHERE-GAO ET DAMANA	2 sites maraichères aménagés et exploités.	6000000
NGUE AGRICULTURE	RECYCLAGE DES EX-STAGIAIRES DES CPT	100 ex-stagiaires à recycler.	1756000
subtotal *			7756000
E VOLET/SERVICE : FL.AG.IA			
NGUE AGRICULTURE	SEMENCES SELECTIONNEES (TRANSPORT)	40 tonnes de semences aux ULC.	455000
subtotal *			455000
E VOLET/SERVICE : FL.AN.OL			
NGUE ANIMATION	FORMATION CVD DANS 12 VILLAGES	120 conseillers villageois formés.	1353000
subtotal *			1353000
E VOLET/SERVICE : FL.CF.CP			
NGUE CVF	CVF SANDIRE	10 couples formés en thèmes techniques. 10 couples ayant le niveau 5/6 alphabétisation. Stagiaires équipés au début stage. Convention pret signée à fin stage.	1766000

23

BUDGET PROVISOIRE OCTOBRE 1985 - SEPT 1986
PROJET PRODUCTIVITE NIAMEY

***** FORMAT TESTE *****

VOLET/SERVICE	OPERATION	RESULTATS ATTENDUS	MON
Subsubtotal *			180
CODE VOLET/SERVICE : FL.FF.CP ILINGUE FORETS ET FAUNE	MINI-PEPINIERE DANS QUATRE CPT	Production de 8.000 plantes. 8.000 plantes distribuées et utilisées. 40 stagiaires encadrés.	120
ILINGUE FORETS ET FAUNE	CREATION DE MINI-PEPINIERES DANS QUATRE CVF	Production de 8.000 plants. 8.000 plantes utilisées. 30 stagiaires encadrés.	53
Subsubtotal *			173
CODE VOLET/SERVICE : FL.GR.MC ILINGUE GENIE RURAL	ENTRETIEN/REPARATION BUREAUX ET LOGEMENTS	Batiments en bon état. 4 Bureaux. 3 Logements.	317
Subsubtotal *			317
CODE VOLET/SERVICE : FL.RA.RA ILINGUE RECHERCHE APPLI	VILLAGE TESTE KOUARA TEBUI (PTV)	Essais agro-écologiques. Reboisement, défense, restauration des sols.	400
ILINGUE RECHERCHE APPLI	VILLAGE TESTE N° DIKITAN (PTV)	Essais agro-écologiques. Reboisement, défense, restauration des sols.	400
Subsubtotal *			800

62

October 31, 1985

TO: Kevin Mullally, USAID Project Officer

FROM: Ken Koehn *K. Koehn*

SUB: PPN Work Plan and Budget 1985-86

I believe that several comments are in order in regards to the 1985-86 PPN Work Plan and Budget that are being presented to USAID and the Ministry of Agriculture for approval.

This planning/budget effort has taken the majority of my time over the last several months, with the total exercise taking much longer than I anticipated. While efforts were begun at the Arrondissement level in late July and early August, the planning/budget effort really did not get into full swing until both Bako and Zakou came back in early September from training in the States. Beginning at this time I was able to devote a majority of my time to the planning/budgeting process.

The whole effort has been a bottom-up approach; something that has never before been tried in PPN. This approach was utilized for several reasons:

- A. Such an approach goes along with the stated GON policy of decentralisation and the Societies of Development.
- B. In the past, those that executed had virtually no say in a heavy top-down environment that goes along with the bureaucracy. Thus they also had little interest or commitment to operations supported or advanced by the project. This was as true at the Department level as at the Arrondissement level.

~~While the vertical structure of the different services will always insure first commitment of personnel to the service and not to a more horizontal structure like PPN (that has virtually no control over the services that are responsible for carrying out PPN supported operations), working toward a strengthened commitment to rural development through the services taking the lead in developing and presenting field level operations (within PPN parameters) that then form much of the basis for PPN supported operations is an attempt to lessen the serious effects of the structural problem.~~

~~In other words, having those that execute also participate in the planning and budgeting of operations is being tried for the first real time at PPN. It has taken time, as one might expect. But a time that I feel should mean greater commitment and participation by the services to PPN efforts.~~

- C. We are making a conscious effort in the process to train people in planning and to think through the reasons, problems and approaches that should go into an operation before it is executed.

We have used a three step approach in the planning process:

- 1) Those responsible for the various services at the Arrondissement level were requested to present proposals for each operation in a format developed by PPN.

25

- 2) These proposals were then discussed by PPN personnel with the Department Heads and accepted, modified or rejected.
- 3) The direction of the project reviewed all proposals and made further refinements before accepting or rejecting a proposal.

Once a proposal was accepted, a thorough review of the budget attached to each proposal was made. In the end we ended up with the work plan that automatically gave us the budget. This work plan and accompanying budget is to be discussed with the sous-préfet, PPN coordinator, and chiefs of the technical services in each Arrondissement beginning November 4. The same exercise is planned with the department heads after the Arrondissement level meetings.

The budget itself is much less than that presented for the nine month fiscal year that ended the 30th of September. I would venture to say that the plan/budget is also much more in proportion to the capacities of the services, though still being very ambitious.

A review of the budget will indicate that we are trying to concentrate our efforts on specific locations, mainly villages, and reduce the dispersed efforts and covering actions of the services that have traditionally received PPN support. Examples of this include:

1. Reducing the number of operating CPTs from nine to six and insisting that stagaires for each CPT come from only 2-3 villages. This latter action should help make follow-up extension activities much easier. Recurrent costs associated with CPTs should be reduced by both decisions.
2. Increasing the number of CVFs to nineteen, the training of CVDs within these villages, making available resources for village level activities through the FIL, and ensuring what can be called a critical mass to work with. ~~(One reason that suivi/extension after training at CPTs has been so dismal is that the ex-stagaires have been very dispersed geographically and hard to reach on any kind of sustained basis. Ten or more couples located in one village certainly suggests that this is reason for poor extension efforts by SAD can be drastically reduced.)~~ Also, an increasing capacity toward development at the village level should engender further capacity/initiative for local development efforts.
3. The service of elevage in each Arrondissement presented a proposed operation entitled Formation of new and Recyclage of already trained ~~para-veterinary workers~~ ~~when pressed at the department level as to the efficacy of the suivi of these workers during the 1985 campaign, it was agreed that the service did not have the means to work with all those already trained.~~ Thus the question, why train more? This led to the conclusion that no more workers needed to be trained and that a limited recyclage would be sufficient to ensure effective use of available resources.
4. We are planning that 25 ex-stagaires from each CPT that still have their equipment, assuming that we can find that many, receive an intensive review. This will happen just before the CPTs open their doors in April to the new stagaires. To some extent this should help to overcome the almost complete lack of extension attention that

these ex-stagaires have received to date and give PPN the opportunity to reaffirm techniques with these ex-stagaires and insure that required inputs are available.

5. The budget shows support for both services of Agriculture and Elevage for what are termed covering activities. In the case of Agriculture, this translates into transport for seed and fertilizer. Unlike past years this is where PPN support stops; PPN, outside of cooperatives, will not purchase any of the commodities that are distributed/sold by the SAD. It was agreed with the SAD that the procurement and sale of seeds was their responsibility in conjunction with the Cereals Project.

In the past the project has purchased large quantities of veterinary products for the Service of Elevage that were then supposed to be sold. Sale proceeds were to be deposited into a special account to be used for further purchases. To date this account has a balance of approximately 250.000 CFA, a small percentage of what it should be. During budget discussions with Elevage at the Department level it was agreed that the project would only furnish the support for transport and minor equipment for operations that require vaccines or other pharmaceutical products. Elevage will undertake further efforts to recuperate funds that are due from the field or have to search elsewhere for the means to acquire veterinary products.

In the Work Plan an important effort has been made to have verifiable indicators for operations. This will not only help in the monitoring of activities by the project, but also gives the executors clear goals to work towards. These goals can now be followed easily on a time basis with the use of project computers.

However, the fact remains that the computer is limited to the information that it receives from the Monitoring/Evaluation volet. The Monitoring/Evaluation volet in turn is limited by the information that it itself generates or receives from those that carry out PPN supported operations. In the past the project has had trouble receiving timely and adequate reports from the Arrondissements that enable the project Direction to make necessary changes or modifications in project support and emphasis. It is possible for the Monitoring volet with this Work Plan and the help of the computer will be able to now follow more closely each operation and remind those responsible for reporting exactly those operations that are starting, underway, or should be finished.

~~Any comments or observations on the Work Plan or Budget from your part or others at USAID are most welcomed and encouraged. The process we are following is an interactive one that requires feedback and support.~~

cc: A. Baoua, PPN Director
K. Bako, DOT
Equipe DAI
DAI/Washington

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE POTENTIAL OF LOCAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE NIAMEY DEPARTMENT
 TO PROMOTE RURAL DEVELOPMENT
 FINDINGS AND AN APPROACH TO ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The objectives of this study are to deepen the understanding of how local organizations actually function in the Niamey Department in order to suggest how these organizations can be involved to a greater degree in a self-sustaining development process.

The field study was conducted from January to June, 1985 under the direction of Hamidou Sidikou, assisted by Robert Charlick (Consultant for U.S.A.I.D). A combination methods were employed to rapidly survey the structures, problems and potentials of the existing local organizations. Sixteen villages (four from each of the arrondissements currently covered by the project) were selected for study in close consultations with Nigérien technical and administrative personnel at the arrondissement level. Villages were selected on the basis of several criteria:

--representation of the different ethnic groups residing in the project area;

--representation of different types of villages (grouped and dispersed; small, medium and large populations);

--representation of major ecological zones;

~~inclusion of villages judged by departmental-level administrators to have relatively good development potential.~~

Our sample of sixteen villages (including two double villages) is not random. If anything we believe it is biased toward more dynamic villages in the Department, at least as perceived by arrondissement level officials.

~~The analysis of the data took place in July and involved a statistical analysis (on the Project's micro-computer in Niamey) of 500 individual questionnaires, the correlation of village level technical information with individual responses, and a qualitative analysis of interviews conducted with groups of village notables as well as with groups of ordinary villagers. Finally, an analysis was conducted on twenty small scale organizations which were discovered in the course of the village level and individual level interviews.~~

Following the terms of reference this analysis focused on three major areas of concern:

1. the relationship between physical factors and the receptivity of villagers to new ideas-- particularly the technical and organizational ideas contained in the project programs;

2. a detailed description of how official local level organizations (cooperatives, the "youth organization," or Samarya, and the Village Development Councils) actually function in the project area; and how these organizations are currently associated with project outcomes;
3. a description of the types and incidence of other forms of local organization which play and role in the local-level economy, and how these organizations might be associated more fully with development activities in the Department of Niamey.

The full report discusses these points in detail. The following is intended to be only a summary of our main conclusions to date.

A. Physical Factors Which Condition Communication Between Local Producers and External Sources of Information.

1. Several physical factors proved to be associated with knowledge of project programs, with the adoption of technical themes, and with receptivity to potential projet benefits (participation in the extension program for CPT trainees, use of selected agricultural inputs, use of the cooperative structure to sale crops and to obtain production credit, participation in one of the training session run by the project staff).

~~Factors External to the Village--~~

- ~~a. The distance separating a village from the capital (Niamey) proved to be a significant factor in project participation (Villages closer to Niamey participated more actively).~~
- ~~b. The type of soil prevalent in the village was also related to project results (villages with sandy "dune" type soils were less involved than those with more possibilities of irrigated agriculture).~~
- ~~c. Proximity to an improved road, however, did not prove to be decisive. Villages which were the least responsive to projet programs were situated on or very near a major tarred road, while villages which were located on an improved laterite road participated much more fully.~~
- d. Access to the mass media did not prove to be significant. Very few farmers reported that they acquired information on farming techniques from the radio or from television. On the contrary, most stated that they learned of these things from agricultural agents, or from other farmers.

Factors Internal to the Village

The study found that internal characteristics of the villages play a major role in the responsiveness of villagers to development activities.

- a. Villagers in communities which are the seat of a cooperative, or which have better physical infrastructure, are more likely to know about and participate in the various programs promoted by the project.
- b. The type of settlement pattern in villages significantly affects the flow of information and the probability that villagers know about and participate in project programs. Villagers who reside in communities where residences are grouped around a core village are more likely to be involved than villagers who live in dispersed settlement patterns.
- c. The level of education of villagers, even when that education is a minimal acquaintance with basic literacy skills, is highly correlated with knowledge of and acceptance of project programs. The overall level of education found among adults interviewed in this Department, however, is exceedingly low.
- d. Qualitative analysis indicates that social and authority patterns of villages are related to the communication and acceptance of ideas which suggest possibilities for development. Villages which are socially and politically unified are much more dynamic in their responses than villages which are badly divided.

The following factors seem to be associated with a unified and dynamic pattern:

- i. The authority the village headman is not contested.
- ii. Islam is strongly implanted in the village, and a central mosque exists and serves as a meeting place for villagers. This is associated with the existence of an influential group of koranic scholars or "marabouts" in the village.
- iii. A low level of social marginality due to ethnic diversity of relatively recent migrants to the village. This factor does not appear to be decisive, however, since in several villages we noted that ethnic diversity had become a factor of strength rather than of weakness in village communication patterns.

B. The Nature and Impact of Non-Governmental Informal Associations

1. Local level society is rich in organizations, and the willingness to work together cooperatively to achieve goals is well established.
2. A variety of forms of non-governmental organizations exists which we have classified according to their principal functions and their organizational characteristics.

- a. In general, groups which work together have well structured authority patterns with institutionalized leadership, established rules, and the capacity for action in a specific domain. They are limited, however, in their capacity to undertake new developmental activities by several of their characteristics.

TYPES OF INFORMAL GROUPS

FUNCTION	ORGANISATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS		
	NON STRUCTURED	STRUCTURED	
NON-HEREDITARY WORK GROUPS	+ RECIPROCAL LABOR EXCHANGE	+ MERCHANT GROUPS	+
	+ ITINERANT FARM WORKER GROUPS	+ BRICK MAKERS	+
		+ MECHANICS	+
			+
HEREDITARY WORK GROUPS		+ BLACKSMITHS	+
		+ WEAVERS	+
		+ BUTCHERS	+
CULTURAL OR RELIGIOUS GROUPS		+ BORI CULT FOLLOWERS	+
		+ MARABOUTIC GROUPS	+
SAVING ASSOCIATIONS		+ ROTATING SAVINGS FUNDS (ADASSE)	+
			+

i. Relatively few villagers (less than 10%) are involved in structured work groups.

~~ii. The groups themselves are normally quite small averaging about 10 members, and individual members often share close kinship relationships.~~

iii. Few groups own or manage corporate (group) property. Normally revenues are shared immediately after they have been earned by the work of the group. This limits the possibility of investment and improvement of productive techniques.

- iv. It is also rare for work groups to maintain a common account, or savings fund. Only three groups with some form of shared fund were identified in the course of our study-- two groups of weavers who invest part of their revenue in a livestock fattening operation, and a group of marabouts of the Tidjania order, who use their common fund to finance the construction, maintenance and equipping of their mosque.
 - v. There are relatively few multi-purpose groups, or groups which perform more than one type of activity. For the most part groups which do have several functions are kinship groups who practice a craft considered to be hereditary. For these groups their habits of producing together are so strong that they often agree to work collectively as well on other activities, such as farming or building huts and grain bins. Apart from these groups very few groups which exercise a profession, or which collaborate to conduct a religious or cultural activity, undertake additional activities. This may pose serious limitations on the efforts to use existing groups for new types of activities associated with opportunities for development.
 - vi. Savings funds (or adassé) are particularly limited organizations. They only perform the single task of collecting and immediately distributing money, so that one individual at a time can amass a significant sum. This sum is then used for purely personal needs, and is rarely invested in any activity which implies the interests of a broader group. Because their function is so limited, adassé have the most limited organizational capacity noted of any of the structured groups.
- b. There are, nevertheless a number of ways in which informal groups can be helped to produce more efficiently, and in which they can have a positive impact on the rural standard of living.
- i. Unstructured reciprocal work is so firmly entrenched in the habits of villagers in this region that this tradition should certainly be capable of being mobilized on behalf of the community in a number of infrastructural activities which have important economic implications. In the population surveyed over 70% of the respondents stated that they engaged in reciprocal labor (entr'aide) "alot." In general this habit extends to all strata of the rural population, apart from women who are clearly much less engaged in the types of activities that our question evoked. A local organization called the Samarya currently calls upon this willing to cooperate to achieve goals through its activities, but we think more can be done to orient reciprocal work habits toward development activities on behalf of large groups.
 - ii. Organisational patterns are well established, especially among the socio-professional work groups. Some use should certainly be made of these dispositions to cooperate in a highly structured way, although it is unlikely that these forms can be successfully applied to large scale associations, such as the local community as a whole.

- iii. Some socio-professional work groups are highly motivated to improve their productive and marketing techniques, and are likely to want technical assistance and training in this domain. The population affected by this training would no doubt be a small fraction of the total rural population, but it would not be limited to people from a given kinship or caste group, since at least some groups of this type are constituted on the basis of choice, friendship and other criteria. We believe that given the proper training and material assistance some groups of artisan could become true small scale enterprises which could stimulate rural production and exchange in a given area. Their impact might be much greater than that suggested by the small percentage of people who would be directly involved in these groups.
- iv. Some multi-purpose groups do exist, and it should be possible to work with them to expand their developmental activities in agriculture, particularly in irrigated agriculture which currently holds a great deal of interest for people in the project area. Such groups are most likely to undertake new activities of this sort where their members constitute a majority, or a dominant group within the local level society, and in such cases it will be difficult to distinguish between the activities of multipurpose informal groups and those of village level organizations.
- c. Three keys seem vital to supporting informal groups in the development process.
- associating groups in new activities based on the group's perception of its own interests;
 - enabling groups to have get access to training and material support through the institutions of the Société de Développement, which will require that these institutions acquire the capacity to recognize legitimate interests, and to support them in getting external help wherever possible;
 - A macro economic problem also exists which must be addressed in the broadest possible way, for without a general increase in the standard of living of the rural majority in the projet area purchasing power will simply be too low to support the market for the products which local groups can produce. The only alternative to policies which substantially and broadly raise rural incomes is marketing the products of these groups in urban areas, and to foreigners.

C. Official Local Level Organisations and Their Role in Development

1. The currently activities of the Niamey Productivity Project, as well as those which it is expected to promote in its next phase (small scale village development schemes) seem to require local organizations which have the following characteristics:
 - a. the capability of identifying the interests of members, and of articulating them as demands to authorities at the appropriate level of society.
 - b. the capability to make decisions which truly bind members which seems to imply a broadly shared process of participation in decision making.
 - c. the capability to mobilize both human (work, skill, talent) and financial resources appropriate to addressing the problems which have been identified.
 - d. the capability to manage the implementation of actions which the group decides to undertake.

2. The principal local organization emphasized by the Niamey Productivity Project has been the cooperative, especially the basic unit of the cooperative called the Village Mutual Group (GM). Currently these groups have almost none of the organizational characteristics which they require to be effective. Even the notion of the cooperative, as a modern institution distinct from the traditional patterns of "entr'aide" is poorly understood by villagers who we interviewed. Apart from some GM located in towns which are the seats of cooperatives, GMs undertake hardly any activities at all. They have little capacity to manage the sale of agricultural inputs, crops, or long term credit- the three main tasks of cooperatives, apart from the operation of a small retail store in some cooperative seat towns. The situation is somewhat better in some of the towns where the cooperative itself is located, and some recent training has occurred to improve management and accounting skills, but thus far this appears to benefit the vast majority of villages which are not cooperative seats very little. In these towns, the GM has simply not emerged as a group which represents a local level interest, at least a fairly broadly shared interest. Many local GM members don't even know why they are members of the "cooperative."

Obviously, as the basic unit of cooperation and development, the GM structure needs considerable support and training if it is to acquire the capabilities outlined above. Future project activities, based on the assumption that GMs effectively have these characteristics and can function are destined to produce very disappointing results.

3. The Samarya, on the other hand, seems to exhibit many of the characteristics of base-level organizations necessary for them to play a developmental role. Samarya have a decision making structure which is more broadly based than that found in the GM. This is true

- iii. Some socio-professional work groups are highly motivated to improve their productive and marketing techniques, and are likely to want technical assistance and training in this domain. The population affected by this training would no doubt be a small fraction of the total rural population, but it would not be limited to people from a given kinship or caste group, since at least some groups of this type are constituted on the basis of choice, friendship and other criteria. We believe that given the proper training and material assistance some groups of artisan could become true small scale enterprises which could stimulate rural production and exchange in a given area. Their impact might be much greater than that suggested by the small percentage of people who would be directly involved in these groups.
- iv. Some multi-purpose groups do exist, and it should be possible to work with them to expand their developmental activities in agriculture, particularly in irrigated agriculture which currently holds a great deal of interest for people in the project area. Such groups are most likely to undertake new activities of this sort where their members constitute a majority, or a dominant group within the local level society, and in such cases it will be difficult to distinguish between the activities of multipurpose informal groups and those of village level organizations.
- c. Three keys seem vital to supporting informal groups in the development process.
- associating groups in new activities based on the group's perception of its own interests;
 - enabling groups to have get access to training and material support through the institutions of the Société de Développement, which will require that these institutions acquire the capacity to recognize legitimate interests, and to support them in getting external help wherever possible;
 - A macro economic problem also exists which must be addressed in the broadest possible way, for without a general increase in the standard of living of the rural majority in the projet area purchasing power will simply be too low to support the market for the products which local groups can produce. The only alternative to policies which substantially and broadly raise rural incomes is marketing the products of these groups in urban areas, and to foreigners.

despite the fact that relatives of village chiefs participate more in Samarya activities and decisions than do other villagers. Samarya are multi-purpose organizations fulfilling a variety of economic and social roles within the local community. They nearly always have the capability to mobilize labor and often can mobilize financial resources as well. They have considerable experience in actually managing activities which interest at least a significant proportion of villagers.

Nevertheless Samarya are limited also in their capacity to promote new developmental activities, and some of their limits can be addressed through proper organizational and technical training. Samarya do not, as they currently function in most villages, adequately represent the interests or involve certain strata of the rural population--most notably women. They also suffer from the extreme lack of formal and practical education which limits their abilities to solve new and more complex problems. In terms of their role in the Niamey Project, Samarya have not been involved, perhaps because it was thought that they had not economic role. It is now clear, however, that it is the Samarya, not the GM, which organizes and conducts most of the collective field activities, and many of the irrigated perimeter (contre-saison) activities as well. The project must begin to support these organizations at the village level if it is to broaden its developmental impact.

4. The third local institution--the Village Development Council, is supposed to be the key to the functioning of the Société de Développement at the local level. But as of the present time this institution has brought very little new organizational capability to local level society in the Niamey Department. The concept structure of the CVD are poorly understood and it is frequently confused with the other institutions which the administration has created. In reality, the decision making structure of the CVD seems simply to follow the various pre-existing forms for organizing and managing village power, rather than modifying them in any significant way. Where pre-existing forms tend exclude segments of the population from participation and from the effective representation of their interests this constitutes a serious impediment to using local organizations for development. Where CVD do undertake specific actions, they seem to do so by working through the Samarya.
5. This study indicates that as organizations, the GM, the Samarya, and the CVD have contributed little to the success of the projet. Nevertheless, it is important to note that on the level of individual behavior an indisputable relationship exists between participation in official local organizations, and participating in the programmes offered by the project. The explanation for this relationship is not entirely clear, given the current stage of analysis, but two hypotheses seem to explain portions of the association. First, it is clear that villagers who hold positions of authority have superior access to project benefits, and specifically of long term credit, than do other villagers. This finding should be closely examined, for if viable local level organization depends on broad based participation and on relatively equal access to benefits which

in fact interest people, the continuation and reinforcement of this pattern may compromise the usefulness of these local institutions for development.

On the other hand, a certain amount of the association seems to stem from individual choice. It would appear that there are some very dynamic villagers who seek not only to promote their individual interests (modernizing their farming practices, getting some education, working for cash for someone, acquiring some modern consumer goods) but who are concerned about the interests of the village (participation in collective and reciprocal work, and participating of village level institutions). Rather than appearing as a problem this tendency seems to hold out the possibility of greater village development, and speaks to the importance of opening participation in local organizations up as broadly as possible in order to encourage new interest groups and ideas to emerge.

D. Support for Local Organisations-- Some Recommendations For A Reorientation of the Project Based on a Preliminary Study

1. Action Oriented Principles

This study has led us to formulate a series of propositions for reorienting the organizational aspects of the NND. The reorientation proposed is based on the application of nine principles which we think must be respected if the project is to have a greater developmental impact in the future.

- a. Support associations which group people on the basis of a concrete and real interest.
- b. Encourage groups which have private interests unless these private interests clearly conflict with those of the broader public. This means working much more than in the past with groups which do not coincide with a politico-administrative unit of society.
- c. Support groups by offering them training which is appropriate to them achieving specific goals. This training may be technical, organization or both, but it will rarely be abstract.
- d. Support group requests for material assistance if these groups are themselves willing to invest their time and their material resources. Such support may come from a variety of sources which the project will draw upon, including direct AID support, support through interested NGOs, and support through the investment budget of the GON, when the Nigerien economy returns to a healthier position which will make such support possible.
- e. Support the process of development by encouraging group requests for assistance to be directed through the appropriate institution of the Société de Développement.

- f. Equally importantly, support the process by offering organizational training to the appropriate institutions of the Société de Développement (normally the CVD) in the course of developing and considering specific project proposals.

The goal of CVD training will be to assist CVD to acquire the capacities which seem essential for their successful functioning-- the capacity to identify legitimate interests and to transmit them to the proper authority level; to associate people on the basis of their free choice and interest, to mobilize local resources more effectively, and to broaden the basis of participation and representation to include diverse strata of the population (women, socio-professional caste groups etc.).

- g. As a priority, work with institutions of the Société de Développement which are ready to operate on the basis of these principles.
- h. Work as well with institutions which are not ready to respect all of the principles, but which have specific interests which they are attempting to achieve. Use the opportunity to work with them as a chance to begin a process of training and discussion which may lead toward the later acceptance of these principles.
- i. Where local level institutions have no specific proposals to forward, and do not seem to have clearly defined interest groups, undertaken some preliminary organizational training which takes the form of self-study and self evaluation of village problems and possibilities. These studies can even be conducted with the leadership of non-project personnel, but they must essentially be village run. Only a small percentage of project resources can, however, be allocated for this purpose.

2. The Means By Which Specific Actions Can Be Accomplished

The means for implementing the principles outlined above are discussed in the final chapter of the report. In general the project must devote a considerably greater percentage of its total resources to training at the village level, and when appropriate at the cooperative level, than it has done in the past. This will include the training of groups and individuals which do not correspond with the interests of the entire village community. A good deal of this training will be technical, but some will be organizational as well. Project trainers must also be capable of helping CVD acquire the capabilities they need. This is a sensitive and complex task which will require skilled trainers.

We recommend that the project hire eight additional trainers, and that it employ the services of an NGO which has had a great deal of experience in village level organizational training to thoroughly train the trainers and to work with them for a period in specific actions, until it appears that the trainers have acquired the necessary habits and skills.

CONCLUSION

This study is only the beginning of what it is necessary to know about local level society in the Niamey Department. The many societies which make up the population are complex, and they are still very seriously understudied. We have far too little knowledge about existing village authority and power dynamics. There is still a great deal of far more detailed work to be done on specific types of groups. There is no magic formula to propose as to how to learn these things quickly and cheaply. But we do believe that the in-depth understanding of these societies is required if this Projet and the government is to be capable of successful institutionalizing a process of development which can truly become self-sustaining.

. Projet Productivité Niamey.

Description SOMMAIRE DU FONDS D'INVESTISSEMENT LOCAL
(FIL)

Le Fonds d'Investissement Local (FIL) est un fonds récemment établi dans le cadre du Projet Productivité Niamey pour le financement de micro-réalisations.

L'établissement du FIL a été précédé par plusieurs études menées en 1984 et 1985 par deux conseillers de courte durée et la Cellule d'Appui aux Organisations Locales du PPN. La conclusion de ces études est qu'un tel fonds peut jouer un rôle important tant dans le développement et la diversification des économies villageoises que dans le développement des organisations et leur capacité à l'auto-gestion, pourvu qu'une approche et un processus bien conçus et appropriés soient suivis.

L'approche proposée pour le FIL est participative et de "bas en haut" suivant la philosophie de la société de Développement. Les micro-réalisations sont basées sur les besoins exprimés par les villages eux-mêmes. Les cadres des Arrondissements (et dans les cas nécessaires du Département) et du PPN travailleraient donc avec les organisations villageoises pour la conception et planification des micro-réalisations. L'examen et l'approbation des micro-réalisations seraient faits par un Comité de Gestion, décrit dans la lettre de couverture. Pour l'année de 1985/86 un budget de 30.000.000 F CFA a été alloué pour le FIL. Cette somme assez modeste représente une décision consciente du PPN pour ne pas être trop ambitieux au début de son programme et de mettre l'accent sur des micro-réalisations bien conçues et préparées, ayant une bonne chance de rencontrer un succès. En même temps l'accent serait mis sur le développement des capacités des organisations locales et des cadres des services techniques des arrondissements en matière de planification, exécution, suivi, évaluation et entretien des micro-réalisations et en les engageant dans le processus de développement et d'exécution des micro-réalisations. Les fonds du FIL seraient alloués surtout sous forme de prêts, afin que le FIL puisse se renouveler et continuer même après la fin du Projet. Cependant il est possible que dans le cas de certaines micro-réalisations un élément de subvention soit justifié. Les genres de micro-réalisations qui recevraient une aide financière du FIL seraient pour la plupart de nature économique, soit agricoles, soit petites entreprises rurales (ex-culture contre saison, élevage, commercialisation de produits agricoles, boutiques coopératives, aide à l'artisanat, etc). De telles micro-réalisations pourraient augmenter la production et les revenus villageois et en principe dégager un certain surplus qui pourrait être réinvesti dans d'autres activités de développement économique.

ANNEXE E

SITUATION DU FIL (PROGRAMME 1985/86)

Micro-réalisations	Montant F CFA	SITUATION				
		Identification	Préparation	Approbation	Financement	Exécution
- Commercialisation de miel Koulbou (Say)	450.000		convention contrat signé	approuvé	Fonds dé- caissés	Entamée
- Culture maraichères Guessé (Ouallam)	630.000		convention/ contrat signé	approuvé	Fonds décais- sés	Entamée
- Cultures maraichères Mondolo (Ouallam)	1.160.000		convention préparé	approuvé		-
- Cultures maraichères Lele (Filingué)	6.260.000	Identifié	avant projet en préparat°	approuvé en principe	-	-
- Cultures maraichères Sandiré (Filingué)	3.235.000	-	avant projet en préparat°	approuvé en principe	-	-
- Culture maraichères Adaré (Say)	1.500.000	-	avant projet études tech. entreprises	approuvé en principe	-	-
- 11 Boutiques Coopératives (Kollo, Say, Filingué)	5.500.000	-	Discussions préliminaires		-	-
- Embauche Ovine (Ouallam)	2.000.000	-	Proposition reçue	-	-	-
- Embauche Bovine (Kollo)	6.000.000	-	-	-	-	-
- Assistance à l'artisanat	800.000	-	-	-	-	-
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>27.535.000</u>					

Dollar Budget and 1985 Expenses
(by line item)

Line Item	Budget	Total Expenses	Remaining Amount	Percent Utilized
Field Salaries	578151	235700	342450	41
H.O. Salaries	9261	6504	2756	70
TDY Salaries	139375	33743	105631	24
Fringe Benefits	48424	15009	33414	31
Overhead	466438	173501	292936	37
Travel & Trans.	286415	69507	216907	24
Allowances	191794	85827	105966	45
Other Dir. Costs	138520	52698	85821	38
Sub-total	1858378	672493	1185884	36
Fee à 8.5%	157963	57161	100801	36
TOTAL	2016341	729655	1286685	36

CFA BUDGET AND 1985 EXPENSES
(by line item)

Line Item	Budget	Total Expenses	Remaining Amount	Percent Utilized
Travel & Trans.	3525000	1442607	2082393	41
Allowances	41325500	8741447	32584053	21
Other D/Costs	143034800	72211217	70823583	51

SUBTOTAL	187885300	82395271	105490029	44
Fee	15970251	7003599	8966652	44
Vehicle Pur.	57600000	32294000	18306000	68

TOTAL	261455551	128692870	132762681	49