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Assistance to the Ministry of Housing,
Government of Zimbabwe,

with

Aided Self-Help Housing

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I. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

A. Policy

The Ministry of Housing received considerable media attention during the second quarter of 1983. This attention has focussed on brigade construction projects almost exclusively. The image conveyed has been one of vigorous provision of housing which meets with people's approval at the lowest possible cost. There has been little if any public scrutiny or debate of the effectiveness of programmes or adequacy of policy. The major aspects of housing which have received attention in the media, other than brigades, have been the lengthening of the housing waiting lists in various towns and the growing problem of both urban and rural squatters.

The MOH has successfully avoided involvement in publicity of waiting lists or squatters, preferring that local authorities or other ministries (in the case of squatters) take the lead. This attitude appears to be consistent with MOH's view of itself as solely a provider of funds for particular projects, especially brigade construction of new housing, without significant interest in or responsibility for human settlement issues in general. At this time MOH housing policy remains unchanged, with emphasis on high physical standards. Despite the official view that MOH policy is in a process of constant evolution in response to experience gained, attempts to discuss the application of policy within even a particular project are consistently stifled. In effect, the internal and external discussion of housing issues is extremely limited.

MOH does not, in fact, refer often to housing "policy," but rather to its housing "policies." The fairly consistent use of the plural points out that MOH has a certain set of responses to a certain set of issues, but has not yet developed a general policy base; attention can not be paid to a situation or issue outside of that particular set with which MOH is comfortable. It seems very clear that even individual policies have not been developed in response to a detailed consideration of circumstances, but are in effect a rhetorical pronouncement only. Despite MOH endorsement of several progressive policy components, such as

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affordability, full cost recovery, equitable allocation, aided self-help, and cooperatives, little attention is paid within MOH to these issues and strategies, with a consequent lack of substance or specific meaning accruing to them. MOH's primary interests lie elsewhere, for particular reasons.

In the second quarter, MOH's primary interests have been: (1) increased emphasis on brigade construction and materials production; (2) establishment of a rural housing programme on a large scale with emphasis on provision of an urban level of housing and services; (3) establishment of provincial MOH brigade headquarters for construction and production brigades and for storage and distribution of centrally-procured materials; (4) establishment of a large MOH-controlled central national materials production factory; and (5) spending as much as possible of its remaining 1982/83 budget before the end of the fiscal year.

It appears that MOH interests and activities are governed by the following considerations: (1) all housing planning and programmes is based on "perceived needs," with a consequent emphasis on high physical standards; (2) no element of house construction should include a profit component, with a consequent emphasis on public direct construction and production; (3) that MOH is a "builder" and is not involved in developing financial sources for housing, with the consequent attitude that "need multiplied by the cost of a brigade house equals the amount of money someone should give MOH to carry out programmes," and a consequent lack of financial planning, cost control, and accountability; (4) that MOH should have a rural emphasis because Government emphasises rural development; and (5) there shall be no criticism, overt or implied, of housing policy, with a consequent stifling of internal debate and discussion.

At this time, policy can be summarised, on the basis of these interests and considerations, as "MOH programmes must provide 4-room houses meeting high space and finish specifications, on fully-serviced plots of at least 300 square meters area, with the housing preferably built of publicly-produced materials and constructed by public direct labour. Individuals may produce materials and construct housing through self-help or cooperative efforts, but in all cases must initially complete at least four

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rooms meeting MOH standards. Existing housing should either be upgraded to these standards or be torn down. The level of housing production nationwide depends totally on the level of funding by central government financial authorities; the access by local authorities, who are charged with the responsibility for implementing programmes, to these funds depends on their level of cooperation with MOH in developing programmes which are consistent with policy."

B. Programmes and Projects: Impact on Policy

Quite clearly, there is considerable room for rationalizing housing policy. However, it does not appear that such rationalization will occur through discussion of issues, for several reasons: first, officials of the Ministry are expected to adhere strictly to policy while working with local authorities to implement projects. While MOH policy does endorse a variety of progressive components and strategies, the only strategy understood very well by staff is brigade construction, since that is the only strategy which has yet received attention within MOH, and staff are understandably reluctant to discuss or promote other alternatives. Second, advisors, who could contribute to policy rationalization, are controlled carefully by MOH, which offers virtually no other venues for potential policy discussion than meetings between MOH and local authorities, at which policy is propounded but not discussed. Control of advisors extends to carefully prescribed protocol, movement or contact outside MOH by prior approval only, and, apparently, personal reports to MOH by MOH officials who accompany advisors.

It seems apparent, then, that it is more likely that policy may be rationalized by the implementation of programmes and projects than by discussion and even ostensible agreement on issues. Actual implementation has and will continue to lead to the raising of issues over which MOH does not have sole control, through channels over which MOH has little control. Chief among these issues is funding and affordability. Since MOH's ability to fund projects and programmes rests almost entirely with decisions apparently made by the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning, and Development (MFLPD), MOH's ability to carry out programmes it has

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announced actually rests with MFEPD, at least with regard to MOH's total budget. The extent of this control is evident from MFEPD's "freezing" of \$25 million of MOH's 1982/83 budget, and, at the end of the quarter, questioning of whether MOH policy was in fact GOZ-approved policy. The latter exchange took place during negotiations on the 1983/84 MOH budget, during which most of MOH's bids went unfunded, including the entire request for \$125 million for rural housing. MOH has repeatedly stated that its policy is indeed GOZ policy. However, the exchange with MFEPD touched off a flurry of policy activity within MOH near the end of the quarter, culminating in the drafting of documents to provide a basis for a written MOH policy apparently intended to be taken up by Cabinet to achieve GOZ approval of MOH policy. Inputs from this advisor were not sought, and any final documents, if completed, have not been seen. It seems doubtful that the exercise will actually be carried through to completion, because formal approval of MOH policy by Cabinet (if MOH policy is actually not endorsed by the GOZ now) would not necessarily carry higher MOH funding levels with it, while an open debate on MOH policy might lead to demands for policy changes which MOH would view as undesirable.

At the programme level, then, it would appear that MOH's interaction with other ministries, especially MFEPD and the Ministry of Local Government and Town Planning (MGLTP), could lead to policy discussions that tended to rationalize policy. However, such interactions are irregular in occurrence. It would appear that MFEPD's interest in housing finance is limited to annual review of the MOH bid, while MGLTP's interest in housing is primarily in keeping with their review of applications by local authorities for borrowing powers for specific projects. Neither interaction is currently of sufficient magnitude in terms of funding or of sufficient frequency to be likely to lead to an inter-ministerial policy discussion, at least in the near future.

Since neither internal MOH discussions nor inter-ministerial discussions seem likely to lead soon to reconsideration of policy in general or at the programme level, the remaining opportunity for rationalization of policy lies at the project level, as is frequently the case. At the project level, several events could

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lead eventually to policy review and perhaps to revision. First, although MOH clearly favors the brigade approach over all other implementation strategies, it fairly consistently reminds local authorities that they are free to propose other strategies, except for contractor-built housing. This reminder sometimes includes noting that self-help and coops are officially approved. However, MOH has yet to offer any substantive assistance to local authorities to develop such an alternative, except in the case of those affected by donor-funded projects. Even in those local authorities (Harare, Kwekwe, Gutu, Chinhoyi, Marondera, and Kadoma), the proposals have been developed largely by various advisors to MOH rather than by local authority staff working in conjunction with MOH staff, assisted by advisors. The working relationship between MOH and local authorities appears to be tenuous in many instances and totally oriented toward brigade formation in others, suggesting that few if any local authorities would on their own suggest an alternative to brigades, either because they are disinclined to be seen "opposing" brigades or because they lack the capacity to prepare an alternative proposal. Nevertheless, the fact that local authorities are responsible for initiating and implementing projects, the fact that alternatives are being discussed in donor-funded project municipalities, and the fact that the various local authorities do communicate with each other, combine to suggest that over time, as housing shortages grow, local authorities will become increasingly aware of and vocal about the impact of MOH policy on the planning and funding of housing projects to meet the needs of their residents.

The second event at the project level which could impact on policy is, of course, the donor-funded projects themselves. It appears that despite the logic contained within the projects, any such impact on policy will likely not occur for some time. MOH in general seems to view these projects as singular events, disconnected from general MOH practice, being implemented only because arrangements to execute them had been made prior to formation of MOH. There is a high level of fear of "donor dictation" of policy which has led to a view that project components or methods

are "donor requirements" rather than logical practice or tested theory. In short, the donor projects are suspect to MOH, which has as a consequence given little support to project development and sought to thrust planning for implementation onto advisors without providing counterparts or even continuity of MOH staff at project meetings.

Nonetheless, implementation of the projects will provide valuable experience, although primarily at the local authority level rather than at MOH. While the local authorities will "learn by doing," MOH resists being involved sufficiently to learn very much from planning efforts or implementation. Only after implementation is it likely that any lessons learned may come to the attention of MOH, as local authorities propose new projects which incorporate elements experienced during execution of donor projects.

Obviously, the lack of policy and planning discussion at MOH will hamper institutional development. In order to increase institutional capacity, an agency must be capable of experimenting, evaluating experience, and "embracing error." While current projects may be regarded as "experiments," MOH lacks both capacity and inclination for evaluation of them, and certainly is disinclined to critically evaluate performance. Rather, the inclination is toward blaming "reactionary elements" for "sabotaging" progress with a programme or project, as evidenced in a MOH/City of Harare meeting April 14, 1983, at which MOH alleged that COH had not gotten brigades moving because private contractors had city councillors "in their pockets." It is difficult to determine to what extent the allegation is actually true and to what extent the lack of progress is due to simple inefficiency on the part of COH, to planning difficulties encountered, to lack of clear direction (policy) from MOH, to lack of technical assistance by MOH, to COH skepticism on affordability, funding levels, and standards, or whether it was merely a political game being played. MOH is little inclined to carry out planning; it distinctly prefers to "jawbone" local authorities.

When projects have been implemented and questions about them are raised, MOH has a strong inclination to not only defend its actions but to make the facts fit the occasion. For example, the key issue during the past quarter has been that of affordability (prompted primarily by advisors and donor representatives, but also raised by local authorities). MOH's response has been to agree that in general, people can afford to pay only a certain portion of income for housing, and then to assert that only a very limited set of shelter expenditures constitutes the basis on which shelter affordability should be calculated. In this instance, MOH wishes to restrict affordability determination to the cost of labour and materials for a house, while excluding land costs, monthly service charges, etc.

In summary, given the attitudes, capacity, and suspicions of MOH, it appears that implementation of donor-assisted projects offers the most likely avenue for eventual rationalization of policy; learning from implementation will be slow. It would also appear that the inclination to learn will only develop in response to considerable pressure, such as lack of funding unless planning is improved, non-receipt of donor funds, simple lack of actual house construction by MOH, visibly deteriorated housing conditions (as evidenced by increased squatting), and other manifestations of failure which inevitably result in questions being asked.

C. Management: Institutional Capacity

Recognizing that MOH is a relatively young agency, there are certain questions about capacity which arise. Since it is also a development agency, there are also questions about its ability to institutionally develop at a pace concomitant with demands placed on it. Evaluating an institution's capacity is difficult, as is determining its ability to develop further. A useful framework for such an evaluation is to examine the stages by which institutions develop, and the characteristics of institutions which do develop.

Typically, there are four stages to institutional development. First, there is "becoming effective," i.e., identifying primary tasks, functions, and roles to be carried out; second, there is "becoming efficient," i.e., being able to focus fewer resources to accomplish the same task; third, there is "expansion," i.e., meeting more and more of the demands placed on the institution; and, four, becoming "mature."

In order to develop, an institution must be able to "embrace error," to "plan with the people," and to "link knowledge building with action." (See David Korten, *Public Administration Review*, Sept/Oct 1980). An institution with these characteristics is referred to as a "learning organization." From a management point of view, the necessity for these characteristics results from the need to have a good "fit" between an organization's products and the market for them. It should be noted that MOH, while an institution, is not exactly "marketing products," (as in the case of, say, an industrial corporation), but does have the same necessity to develop programmes which "fit" beneficiaries' needs. The extent to which organizations are "learning organizations" is usually a product of the quality of leadership provided by their top management.

Without attempting an exhaustive review of MOH on the basis of the framework above, the following notes seem appropriate at this time:

1. Stage of Development: institutionally, MOH is at the first stage of development, "becoming effective." This may appear to be so because it was formed only in March, 1982. However, several other factors have contributed. Since MOH has formed from EGLTP, it would seem reasonable to expect that it quite quickly could have developed effectiveness, since the departments it was formed from were apparently quite effective (meaning that they had well-known roles, tasks, functions, and consequently, well-formed programmes and projects). However, a year after formation of MOH, its exact (or even somewhat inexact) roles and functions have yet to be agreed upon with EGLTP; MOH's powers and responsibilities remain poorly defined. For example, EGLTP carries

out physical planning of housing sites; this alone is not unworkable or even a detriment to MOH, but there is little apparent linkage between the planning priorities of MOH and those of MGLTP, something which could be overcome by regular and relatively simple liaison between MOH and MGLTP. A second example regards project funding. While MOH provides funds for housing, the authority to borrow funds from MOH must be approved by MGLTP prior to a local authority carrying out a project. Again, this is not unworkable, but little linkage between MOH and MGLTP appears to exist. At the practical level, without clear definition of roles and functions and without a working relationship, problems do develop. For example, MOH's emphasis is on brigade construction. Anxious to build housing, the municipality of Chinhoyi prepared a brief project document consistent with MOH policy and secured MOH approval. However, when Chinhoyi requested approval from MGLTP to borrow MOH funds, MGLTP approved on the condition that no ~~such~~ further ^{such} housing be built for at least four years. Further, MGLTP has asserted that since continued funding for brigade construction can not be assured, municipalities would have to recover (depreciate) plant and equipment costs in one year, making overhead costs extremely high. Even if it were assumed that MOH's brigade programme was a perfect fit with beneficiaries needs, it would be difficult for MOH to develop efficiency and then expand, with these constraints.

In addition to problems resulting from poor definition of roles and functions, MOH has also suffered from its rather remarkable and swift change of direction. In effect, the effectiveness and efficiency of the departments which were formed into MOH was greatly undermined by taking away from them the programmes they had developed (switching from contractor-built housing to direct labour) as well as the planning basis on which the programmes had been developed (changing from a research-action mode of planning to a mode which can only be described as that of the simple directive). While these changes in direction affected particularly the Technical Services Department (formerly HDSB), they have also affected other departments, notably finance.

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2. Institutional Characteristics: As noted earlier, institutional characteristics are generally those of the institution's managers (although this should not be taken too far). To a certain extent, these characteristics are linked to the institution's stage of development, i.e., a manager interested primarily in institutional expansion may not be concerned with institutional effectiveness or efficiency; a manager interested primarily in administrative efficiency may not be concerned with developing programme effectiveness.

While it is difficult to compare the institutional characteristics of MOH with its predecessor departments, several characteristics are evident. First, the advent of MOH led to a variety of staffing problems, some outside of MOH's control. Vacancies occurred at staff levels where leadership would normally be exercised, for example, leaving the Technical Services Department without any top supervisory staff with technical expertise. Similarly, the Policy and Admin/Finance Departments were without direct supervision (Deputy Secretary staff). Compounding the staffing problem, the Ministry was headed (Permanent Secretary) by a chief executive officer without bureaucratic experience (and apparently little interest in or experience with institutional development), and initial lower-level MOH staff had little housing experience or expertise.

Combined with the resignation of some mid-level and upper-level staff both before and shortly after formation of MOH, these staffing problems resulted in a formidable loss of institutional memory (as epitomized by the recurring question, "what was agreed with USAID?"). This loss of memory was enhanced by the new direction of the Ministry (the Permanent Secretary has related that upon arrival at MOH in October, 1982, he was informed by the Minister to never forget that "the history of housing in Zimbabwe only began last March."). The rapid change of direction and staffing problems also led to a steep decline in morale among staff.

With this background, what characteristics of MOH now seem

to be emerging? First, despite official cautions that planners must "listen to the people," the planning emphasis is on central planning of one shelter solution for all households (the four-room house for everyone). Second, this programme was developed with little if any consideration of effectiveness (i.e., is such a housing programme one which MOH can implement, learn from, and use to develop as an institution?). Third, there has been little if any interest in research, learning to ask relevant questions, opportunity for discussion, or deliberate engagement in experimentation.

Regardless of whether the product (four-room house) is or is not a good fit with beneficiaries needs, the process by which MOH's model programme was bought about (simple directive) did not foster the development of an operating organization with the skills, commitment, knowledge, systems, and freedom to adapt the model as may be required. In short, although a programme was developed, neither staff development nor institutional development took place. In my opinion, this is extremely unfortunate at the outset of an organization's existence.

In addition to the lack of a sense of fostering institutional development through action, research, and learning within projects, MOH does not appear to be capable of embracing error. Rather, MOH gives every appearance of developing into either a "self-deceiving organization" in which error is denied (as evidenced by the requirement that policy never be criticized, or by denials that a particular statement was actually made), or into what is called a "defeated organization," one in which error is externalized by discussing errors made by attributing them solely to environmental factors beyond the organization's control (such as "we have no funds for your project because MFEPD didn't give us enough" or "what exactly is written in the agreements between MFEPD and USAID?").

SUMMARY: While the characteristics discussed above may not seem useful in the sense of being applicable in quantitative terms, they are important in evaluating the Ministry's policy, programming, and operational environment. In that sense, the following characteristic MOH methods stand out:

1. policy is decided by directive;
2. criticism of policy is not tolerated; even a simple statement is easily regarded as criticism, by inference;
3. planning is ad hoc;
4. emphasis is on apparent activity, not substance;
5. substantive discussion is discouraged; venues for discussion of housing issues are extremely limited;
6. error is denied or externalized;
7. protocol is rigid.

In a more quantitative sense, professional planning and administrative capacity of the MOH is very limited. MOH technically depends to a considerable extent on expatriates. Administratively, there is a lack of experience among staff; however, resignations are to an extent being offset by addition to staff. Administrative management has been poor, but may be improved by recent additions to staff. Although the MOH has an organizational scheme, its division into three departments (technical, administrative, and policy) is complicated by an additional and essentially political division into urban and rural sections. This has led to the frequent confusion of roles. Tasks included in a position description may not actually be the tasks normally carried out by the individual staff person; ad hoc tasks, often of considerable importance may be assigned to any staff member without reference to their expertise or position; frequently, two or even more staff members may be individually assigned to the same task and work on it separately, each not knowing the other is working on it. While "chain of command" should not be sacrosanct in an agency, the evidence of administrative disarray during the past quarter indicates that the capacity of MOH to plan and implement projects effectively and efficiently has been diminished by poor resource management.

CONCLUSIONS: Limitations on capacity are typical of developing country institutions. However, after six months of observation of MOH and interaction with it, my conclusion is that MOH has retreated, rather than advanced. In my opinion, this is not due so much to limitations on technical or administrative abilities within MOH, but due far more to a lack of interest in and attention to institutional development in the broadest sense. As noted earlier, within the framework of "effectiveness -- efficiency -- expansion -- maturity," MOH is still in the initial stage of institutional development. Currently, it lacks an environment conducive to learning; without development of such an environment, it is unlikely that significant institutional development will take place soon.

The rural bias of MOH appears to be a factor in this. For example, MOH's major projects (donor-funded) close to implementation are urban projects, especially Parkridge-Fontainebleau. Within MOH, the simple fact that it is an urban project has led to a lack of interest in it. A rural project, such as setting up a district council brigade, receives more staff time and attention.

Nevertheless, it requires pointing out that Parkridge-Mountainbleau planning is sufficiently advanced that the project's objective of increasing shelter in Harare can be accomplished (i.e., houses will be built). Progress toward the objective of increasing institutional capacity to carry out such projects is very questionable. Further, while it seems apparent that the City of Harare may institutionally benefit from the project, without similar institutional development on the part of MOH, support required by the City of Harare to replicate projects to benefit the urban poor may not be forthcoming from MOH.

II. CONTRACT WORK WITHIN TERMS OF REFERENCE

Following is a report on the work carried out under the terms of reference of my contract as Aided Self-Help Housing Advisor. Prior to making specific remarks, I would like to make several general remarks about the work environment. First, the "leadership role" I am expected to play in organizing and implementing a program of aided self-help has been exceedingly difficult to carry out. Even "quiet" or behind-the-scenes leadership (roles with which I am quite comfortable) is hampered greatly by operating environment and protocol. At the operating level, by MOH choice, I can not "represent" MOH. Also by MOH choice, counterpart staff with whom to work are not provided. In short, opportunities for leadership are scarce. It is clear that MOH prefers advisors to endorse and strictly support MOH policy, regardless of professional opinion. Despite the limitations placed on advisors, MOH finds me useful, particularly when MOH has a particular immediate need. For example, at the Permanent Secretary's request, I quickly prepared a paper on MOH's training programmes and needs for submission to Cabinet. The paper was approved by MOH without discussion or alteration. Clearly, such an opportunity to be of immediate use is an opening to provide leadership and assist to bring substance to the MOH's non-existent training capacity. However, despite repeated follow-ups, suggestions, and offers to carry the work further, nothing occurred, not even the suggestion to provide a tentative framework for discussion.

A second general remark concerns my expectations when I undertook the contract. Upon inquiry, I was informed (by RHUDO) that local staff were naturally suspicious of foreign advisors, but open to

discussion of issues; further, they were highly pragmatic and inclined to support an argument or position which was based on fact and presented well. I can not say I have found this to be the case, not so much because RHUDO's impressions were wrong, but because circumstances have changed considerably.

Remarks on Progress: second quarter

1. "Assist MOH, COH, and secondary towns in preparing for implementation of housing project financed by USAID." During the past quarter I have developed and revised a draft project delivery plan for Phase I of Parkridge-Pontainbleau. The PDP should be ready for review by MOH early in the third quarter. During preparation I have liaised with the City of Harare, particularly with the Department of Community Services. While the document is well in hand, the exercise has been hampered by protocol and, particularly, by the wide gulf between MOH policy and the intended purposes of the project. At MOH much of the work has had to have been carried out on my own, since counterparts are unavailable on either a regular or intermittent basis. At COH, progress was hampered by policy differences; in effect, COH has been unwilling to put significant effort into developing a document which would not carry out the original project purposes, while also being unwilling to develop one consistent with MOH policy. COH clearly preferred to wait until MOH made proposals. Development of the document has included a conceptual framework and methodology for implementation; emphasis has been put on devising means by which COH and MOH can cooperate on and learn from implementation.
2. "In conjunction with counterpart staff, identify and recommend resource requirements." No counterpart staff available at MOH. PDP includes identification of resources and plan for mobilizing them, but limited to analysis lacking depth. COH only partly willing to invest effort in this exercise until specific MOH policy on the project was clarified and the financial, technical, human, and material resource requirements were better known.
3. "mobilize and organize small contractors and beneficiaries for mutual self help." 7. "identify their training requirements." With regard to these two responsibilities, I made a number of proposals for investigation. MOH made no comment or response. COH understands this aspect fairly well, but assistance to COH again limited by lack of clarity of policy (i.e., is this a self-help project or a direct construction project?). Proposals for self-help included in draft PDP.
4. "develop fair allocation procedures." Allocation procedures are hampered by MOH/COH insistence on using waiting list as basis for allocation. Little evidence of interest in equity or fairness has been displayed. Draft PDP contains allocation procedures (and beneficiary selection procedures) designed to maximize the equitable spread of benefits throughout the economic range of waiting list applicants.

5. "Prepare educational and training aids." No work anticipated until closer to implementation of project.
6. "Assist in supervision of construction." Limited work on this responsibility. Comments on demonstration house designs, made in detail, went without notice by MOH. Actual supervision will take place during implementation, provided that MOH protocol permits close project contact.
7. see 3 above.
8. "Organize bulk buying, storage, and distribution." Activity limited to operating procedures outlined in draft PDP.
9. "Develop and implement building material loans program." Draft PDP includes fairly detailed proposals for the loan programme and its administration. These proposals were the result of considerable study of beneficiaries incomes, costs of materials, and administrative procedures, including current methods of COH.
10. "Provide training." Activity limited to close collaboration with UNCHS/MOH team preparing training program for staff which will implement kwekwe/Gutu project. Activity included advising on training techniques and organization; also preparation of personal inputs to training activities; training to be carried out early in third quarter.
11. "Recommend ways and means of maximizing employment." No activity.

SUMMARY

Work during the second quarter on specific contract responsibilities has been hampered greatly by the wide policy differences between MOH and the purposes of the project. As a result of this, COH has been reluctant to commit substantial effort; MOH on the other hand is unwilling to discuss alternatives to policy. Rather, its consuming project interest has been a limited effort to understand the project agreements to determine exactly what constraints the agreements impose on carrying out the project according to its policy. The effect of this on my activities has been to stifle logical, orderly, and consistent progress. As a result, development of the PDP has not benefited from sufficient thoughtful interaction with MOH or COH staff. It is difficult to see how this situation will change until some version of the PDP is reviewed and approved by MOH. Therefore, I have continued to develop a PDP which reflects the original project purposes, in anticipation that review of it will prompt MOH to consider a number of issues. To some extent, the PDP is a "straw man" at this point, designed for the purpose of being set up and then knocked down, hopefully with the result that the outcome will be a re-defined set of terms for the project, possibly an agenda for action, some freedom within protocol, and opportunity to carry out my responsibilities within the framework of implementation rather than planning.

III. ADDITIONAL WORK

The following activities were carried out at MOH during the second quarter:

1. Preparation of speech for delivery by Minister at Helsinki --

Very shortly prior to the Sixth Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Settlements, I was requested, together with the UNCHS Chief Technical Advisor (T.S. Chana) and the Under Secretary for Research/Legal/Training (T. Zinyandu), to draft a speech for the Minister to deliver in Helsinki. In a small way, preparation of this speech is illustrative of how MOH works. After discussing the issues to be addressed at the session and the tone of the speech with them, I agreed to draft the speech, partly because I felt it was a concrete demonstration of usefulness to MOH and partly because I felt it was a way in which I might gain some contact with the Minister (hitherto totally lacking) and insight into his thinking from such interaction. I completed the draft a week before the Zimbabwe delegation departed. We agreed that the draft was an appropriate presentation, and that any revisions would be pointless until the Minister commented on it. We assumed that since this was an international conference, the Minister would comment quickly and perhaps wish to discuss it with us. However, no reaction was forthcoming. After several requests to the Permanent Secretary for reaction, we were informed the day prior to departure that the speech was approved as it stood. We then had it stenciled and copied for distribution. The next day we were told the speech was totally unacceptable. However, there were no specific comments; only that the Minister had no idea why he should speak about the subjects in the speech. Because departure was imminent, there was no time to revise the speech; Zinyandu, who attended the conference, took the original with him and said he would see what he could do.

After his return, he related the following story. The Minister told him not to revise the speech; he would speak extemporaneously. However, as the delegation listened to speeches by other delegations, he began to change his mind. When his turn approached, he asked Zinyandu for the original speech and delivered it verbatim. Zinyandu said the speech was well received.

Since the return of the delegation, no written report about the session or the role played in it by the Zimbabwe delegation has been circulated in MOH, if such a report has been prepared. (A copy of the speech is attached.)

2. Paper entitled "Land for Human Settlement in Zimbabwe" --

I participated, as a member of the editorial team, with the discussion, drafting, and final preparation of the GOZ national theme paper for presentation at the Sixth Session of UNCHS. (Copy attached).

3. Liaison with Danida/UNCHS -- in the field of training, I cooperated with UNCHS representatives with regard to developing a Danida/UNCHS pilot training programme in Zimbabwe in community participation. I also participated with the UNCHS advisors to MOH in preparing for the UNDP/UNCHS/MOH training programme for project staff in Gutu and Kwekwe.

4. MOH circular on preparation by local authorities of submissions

for borrowing powers -- I prepared and submitted suggestions on the essential components of aided self-help and cooperative housing which should be included in planning by local authorities wishing to implement such a project. The circular is meant to replace a poorly-prepared circular of February, which made it appear that the only mode of construction permitted by MOH was brigades. The circular has yet to be finally approved and circulated.

IV. ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED

The following issues require resolution:

1. Standards versus affordability -- MOH policy of high standards remains intact, despite continued debate over whether the standards are affordable. The issue has two aspects: first, whether a particular shelter solution is affordable by a particular individual; second, whether a programme emphasizing particular solutions is affordable to the nation (i.e., is capital available to carry it out?). This issue is recognized by MOH and appeared to be coming to a head late in the second quarter.
2. MOH's interest in self-help housing -- despite official policy recognition as a housing strategy, little interest is shown in what self-help is, how it can be fostered, or how it can be planned for.
3. Institutional arrangements --
 - a.) to a significant extent, relations between MOH and the City of Harare are adversarial in nature; the Parkridge-Fontainebleau project is to some extent a political football to be thrown back and forth. Unfortunately, it appears that the relationship is not sufficiently developed to permit the players to know, at any specific moment in time, who is throwing the ball and who is catching it. Rather, it often appears that both are throwing it and no one is catching it. There is no sense of cooperation; this lack is very evident now and although the PDP strives to overcome it, it will likely persist throughout implementation.
 - b.) my role as aided self-help advisor -- protocol, lack of interest by MOH in self-help, and the adversarial relationship between MOH and COH all combine to limit effectiveness. The lack of counterparts or continuity of staff assigned to the project makes it seem highly unlikely that my technical assistance inputs will have any impact on MOH capacity; at the same time, restraints placed on my movements by MOH makes it difficult to deliver assistance to COH.

V. WORK PROGRAMME FOR THIRD QUARTER

The following tasks are foreseen for the third quarter:

1. To continue to contribute to the debate on affordability, through delineation of the concept in the PDP.
2. To promote aided self-help, through delineation of the concept through the PDP and by verbal explanations within MOH.
3. To finalize draft PDP, prompt and assist review of it by MOH, with emphasis on promoting understanding of the shelter issues addressed by it. To gain comments on PDP from COH, promote MOH consideration of issues raised by COH, and produce final draft.
4. Participate in visits to and planning of Phase II projects.
5. Participate in UNDP/UNCHS/MOH training programme for Gutu/Kwekwe project staff.