
FINAL MONITORING REPORT ON
THE DROUGHT EMERGENCY RELIEF PROGRAM
FOR
USAID MISSION TO KENYA

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CONTRACT NO. 615-0000-C-00-4121

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CARE	Co-operative for American Relief Everywhere
DC	District Commissioner
DH&SMC	Deloitte Haskins and Sells Management Consultants
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FRC	Famine Relief Committee
GOK	Government of Kenya
KCHS	Kenya Cargo Handling Services
KPA	Kenya Port Authority
KR	Kenya Railways
KTA	Kenya Transport Association
NCPB	National Cereals and Produce Board
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OP	Office of the President
PA	Provincial Administration
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION

FINAL MONITORING REPORT ON
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SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION

This is our final report on the monitoring of grain distribution (contract number 615-0000-C-00-4121) under the Drought Emergency Relief Program for USAID. The Emergency Program was devised and implemented by USAID and GOK in response to the widespread drought of 1983/1984, which resulted, in the second half of 1984, in an estimated peak of 1.4 million people needing relief food supplies. The first USAID shipments of maize arrived at Mombasa in October 1984, and between January 1985 and October 1985 over 80,000 tonnes of yellow maize were freely distributed to the needy. During the same period, around 2,700 tonnes of pinto beans and 1,900 tonnes of non-fat dried milk were also distributed.

In October 1985 GOK stated that, thanks to the Program, the Emergency had successfully been overcome and that the food situation in Kenya had reverted to its normal, pre-drought condition. Independent corroboration was provided in the same month by the publication of an FAO report* echoing this view.

The Program benefitted from a generally high degree of commitment and co-operation on the part of the prime implementing agencies, including GOK, NCPB, KTA, KPA and KCHS. This resulted for the most part in the appropriate quantities of food reaching the appropriate people at the appropriate times. Undoubtedly, many lives were saved and much distress was alleviated. This was despite many logistical and communications difficulties which arose out of the remoteness of many affected areas, and out of the unfamiliarity with major feeding programs which existed in areas not habitually affected by drought. (Nevertheless, such difficulties did on occasion inhibit the effective implementation of the program, and we discuss these instances in this report.)

*"Food Situation in African Countries Affected By Emergencies" - October 1985

The role of DH&SMC in the Program was to monitor the distribution of US-donated foodstuffs on behalf of USAID, in order to provide an independent check on the effectiveness of the Program, and on the appropriate use of the foodstuffs, as the Program proceeded. A second task was to review the effectiveness of the systems and procedures employed by the Program's implementing agencies. (Our findings in this latter regard were detailed in our "Report on Systems Evaluation", issued in February 1985.)

In neither case was our role confined to the passive reporting of our observations; by virtue of our widespread field coverage we were often first to recognise problems or anomalies as they arose, and were thus able to suggest solutions informally, and then follow up to ensure that corrective action had been taken.

During the course of our monitoring contract we issued fourteen monthly reports on our findings, together with a number of special reports on matters of particular concern (such as the condition of maize stored at Sagana and Meru NCPB depots, and the offloading at Mombasa Port of maize shipped on MV Cove Trader). In this final report we provide an overview of the distribution program as a whole, from our perspective as monitors of the distribution. The scope of work for this report, agreed with USAID, was to:

- (a) make a comprehensive listing of all claims against GOK;
- (b) reconcile and verify payments claims by transporters, using NCPB and transporters' records;
- (c) reconcile DH&S and OP records of grain distribution;
- (d) prepare a summary analysis of the total distribution;
- (e) give an overview of the monitoring exercise.

The main text of this report is an overview of the total distribution and monitoring exercise, and is structured as follows:

- Section 2 describes the background of the drought which gave rise to the Drought Emergency Relief Program, key elements of the Program, and the role of DH&SMC as monitors of the Program for USAID.

- Section 3 sets out and analyses data on the overall impact of the Program, in terms of the nature and scale of relief needs, the quantities of PL 480 food supplied, and the overall pattern of distribution.
- Section 4 describes how the monitoring exercise was carried out and summarises key findings of the exercise.
- Section 5 discusses key lessons to be drawn from the monitoring exercise.
- In the appendices we deal with the reconciliations of available records regarding the transport and distribution of PL 480 commodities, together with our verification of payments to transporters and analysis of losses which could give rise to claims against GOK.

SECTION 2 - BACKGROUND TO THE DROUGHT
EMERGENCY RELIEF PROGRAM

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Introduction

The balance between food requirements and agricultural production in Kenya is a delicate one, characterised by rapid population increase and a relative scarcity of reliably productive agricultural land. Only 7% of Kenya's total land area can be classified as good agricultural land, in the sense that it has adequate and reliable rainfall, good soil, and is not steeply sloping. Another 14.5% is arable, but subject to periodic drought and crop failure. A further 20% of the land is suited to pastoral farming, and the remaining land (over half) is semi-desert.

Despite these physical limitations, agricultural output in Kenya grew very strongly (at 4.6% pa) from Independence in 1963 to the mid-seventies, encouraged by the introduction of high-yielding maize varieties and the extension of crop production on unutilised or under-utilised land in high potential areas. This progress proved difficult to sustain, however, and from the late seventies to date the growth rate fell considerably, to around 2.7% per annum. Kenya became a regular importer of wheat, and is partly dependent for self sufficiency in maize, which is the staple, on the 14.5% of the land mass which is susceptible to periodic drought.

Given the demands of a population growing at up to 4% a year, these factors serve to emphasise the fragility of Kenya's food security. A clear manifestation of this occurred in 1980, when inadequate maize planting and harvests, following relatively low producer prices the previous year, forced GOK to import food on an unprecedented scale.

The crisis in 1980 also induced GOK to undertake a review of its long term agricultural policies, leading to the publication of the 'National Food Policy' paper which set out the measures necessary to strengthen domestic food security. The principal objective was to achieve food self-sufficiency within ten years largely by encouraging small scale farmers to plant more food crops; by providing agricultural expertise to the small farmer; and by building adequate storage space to enable the supply of food to be smoothed between good and bad crop years.

Initial progress with this policy was, however, overtaken by events in 1983/4, when Kenya experienced a serious drought. Whilst part of a pattern of occasional (around once every five years) droughts in Northern Kenya and east of the Rift Valley, the 1983/4 drought was both more severe and more prolonged than usual. In 1983

there was a significant failure of both the 'long' (March to May) and the 'short' (October/November) rainy seasons. This affected not only the traditionally dry areas of Northern Kenya but also the vastly more populous Districts to the east of the Central Rift Valley (see Figures 1 to 4 in Section 3).

In these areas the rains failed again in the first rainy season of 1984, resulting in the third dry cycle in succession. Harvests in the affected areas were negligible and, in addition, in the mixed farming and pastoral areas, cattle were dying in large numbers (subsequently estimated by GOK to be around 50 - 60% of stocks in the worst affected areas). Although the main maize producing areas around Kitale in the West remained unaffected by the drought, the Government estimated in June that projected harvests and current stocks of food would together be insufficient to sustain the country beyond December of that year, unless supplemented by a major import program.

The Need for Relief and the GOK Response

The scale of the need for relief is shown by Government's own estimates of the numbers of people unable to feed themselves as a result of the drought. By August 1984, the numbers estimated to be in real distress were approaching a peak of around 1.6 million. This represented a relief food requirement of around 16,000 tonnes of staple commodities per month.

Those in need were spread over a wide geographical area, covering 25 of Kenya's 41 administrative Districts, and accounting for the major part of the country's land area. GOK's estimated distribution of famine relief recipients in August 1985 is reproduced as Table 1 overleaf. It shows a heavy concentration of needs in the Districts of Machakos (496,000 people in need), Kitui (326,000), and Meru (187,000) which lie to the east of Nairobi. Unlike the more sparsely populated northern Districts of Turkana (5,300 in need), Marsabit (83,500), and Wajir (14,200), these Districts were unaccustomed to the effects of severe drought and were ill-prepared in terms of the necessary infrastructure for carrying out relief operations.

* In the light of our own findings during the monitoring exercise, we think that some of the districts initially overestimated the numbers in need (and a smaller number underestimated numbers). Our estimate is that a truer figure for those in need at August 1984 would be around 1.4 million.

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TABLE 1 - GOK ESTIMATES OF RELIEF RECIPIENTS, AUGUST 1984

<u>DISTRICT</u>	<u>NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS</u>
Baringo	49,000
Elgeyo Marakwet	2,000
Embu	40,234
Garissa, Wajir, Mandera	48,197
Isiolo	40,500
Kajiado	4,000
Kiambu	15,000
Kirinyaga	5,000
Kitui	326,000
Laikipia	41,226
Lamu	10,200
Machakos	496,000
Marsabit	83,500
Meru	187,000
Muranga	4,000
Narok	5,000
Nyandarua	8,000
Nyeri	9,600
Samburu	72,000
Taita Taveta	12,500
Tana River	47,862
Turkana	5,300
West Pokot	63,142

	1,575,261
	=====

Source: OP

Not only was relief needed on a major scale, therefore, but it was also spread over a wide area, and was particularly heavy in districts inexperienced in coping with the demands of a substantial feeding program.

As the scale and nature of the crisis became apparent by mid-1984, GOK's immediate response was to embark on a major direct import program, buying maize and wheat in the world market. Between the middle and the end of 1984, GOK directly imported around 350,000 tonnes of these commodities, which were not principally for free distribution but were needed to supplement the available stocks of commercial food. At the same time that it started its import program, the Government also appealed to donor agencies for free food or long-term loan facilities, to ensure sufficient stocks of food for free distribution to the needy who were unable to pay for food themselves. USAID responded with an offer of 120,000 tonnes of grain over a six month period as free aid under the PL480 Title II program. Of the total, 40,000 tonnes were intended to be monetised by GOK to help defray the costs of distributing the remainder.

The Administration of Relief Commodities

The first USAID grain shipment arrived in early October 1984, and distribution of the grain began in earnest in January 1985. In the period leading up to the initial distribution, heavy reliance was placed on the NGO's operating throughout the country to contain the situation. The NGO's had the organisation in the field to set up emergency feeding programs rapidly. To co-ordinate and direct their efforts, a special committee was convened of all NGO's, UNICEF and other UN agencies, on which GOK was represented.

The committee decided that emergency feeding programs would be established or extended drawing on World Food Program supplies already available. Distribution would be through CARE to individual NGO's feeding centres. Existing feeding programs were expanded and resources were diverted from NGO development projects into the provision of emergency relief in the most seriously affected areas. As a result of these efforts, the situation had largely been brought under control by the end of 1984, and GOK had gained sufficient time to establish its own policies and procedures for administering the distribution of the USAID-donated grain.

Although the drought had been broken by the successful arrival of the short rains in October 1984, it was estimated towards the end of 1984 that emergency relief feeding would still be required, on a gradually reducing

scale, until after the second harvest of 1985. The first harvest of 1985, following the October 1984 rains, would be adversely affected by a significant shortage of seed for planting in many areas, and also by extensive damage to crops arising from an infestation of army worms which occurred during the rains. In addition, the recovery of pastoralist and mixed farming areas, where livestock losses were variously estimated at 50 - 70% of stocks, would take much longer than that of arable areas.

In contrast to the early months of crisis management, when NGO's played a leading role in identifying needs and in drawing down and distributing food supplies, the longer term administration of the Drought Emergency Relief Program was to be the direct responsibility of GOK*. Relying principally on the Provincial Administration to provide information on needs and to effect distribution, by the time the first shipments of USAID grain arrived, GOK had devised a set of procedures for planned and consistent distribution of the relief commodities.

The Drought Emergency Relief Program

The implementing agencies, systems and procedures employed by GOK are described in detail, and their practical effectiveness evaluated, in our "Report on Systems Evaluation" for USAID issued in February 1985. Briefly, a "bottom-up" approach was adopted, in which assessment and continuing re-assessment of needs was principally the responsibility of the lowest level of the Provincial Administration, the sub-location.

The Assistant Chief for each affected sub-location was responsible for chairing a Food Committee (comprising elected officials and representatives of local organisations) which would determine the numbers in need on the basis of local knowledge. This information would be passed through, and collated by, the Chief at the location level, and the District Officer at the division level, to reach the District Commissioner with overall responsibility for the District. An appropriately constituted Food Committee would be convened at each ascending administrative level.

 NGO's continued to operate their own longer term feeding programs, such as food-for-work programs and mother-child nutritional programs. The GOK/USAID Drought Emergency Relief Program, which is the subject of this report, operated simultaneously but independently of these other efforts. Co-ordination between the two sets of feeding programs was carried out locally on an ad hoc basis, and its effectiveness depended on the capabilities of local officials and relief organisations.

The District Commissioner would evaluate the information passed to him, prepare a formal distribution plan for the District and requisition relief food supplies from the Central Co-ordinator in the Office of the President. He in turn reported through his Permanent Secretary to a Task Force charged with overseeing the day-to-day activities of the Program. On the basis of information gathered from all the Districts, a monthly allocation would be drawn up by district, which aimed to provide a 10 Kgs monthly ration of maize for each individual in need. These allocations would then be communicated to the DC's.

Each DC and his Food Committee was responsible for dividing up the allocated food according to relative needs between the divisions in the district. The Divisional Food Committee would allocate between the locations, following which the location Food Committees would allocate to the sub-locations. Physical distribution of the food to the needy was carried out principally at the location and sub-location level. Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs respectively were responsible for compiling detailed records of each distribution.

These records were to show, as a minimum, the name of each recipient, family size, quantity of food received, and proof of receipt (signature/thumbprint) together with the date for each distribution. The records would then pass back up the administrative hierarchy to the DC's office, and thence to OP. At OP, the collated returns from all Districts would provide a comprehensive accounting for, and monitoring of, the distribution of relief commodities.

Storage and transport of the commodities, once out of Mombasa Port, were the responsibility of NCPB, together with Kenya Railways and the Kenya Transport Association. On the basis of the monthly allocation plan devised by OP, NCPB Head Office was responsible for:

- a) controlling and co-ordinating despatches of food to the appropriate upcountry storage depots;
- b) ensuring the safe storage of food in the depots;
- c) co-ordinating despatches from the depots to the recipient districts.

KR and KTA were contracted by NCPB to carry the commodities and were required to comply with NCPB's own documentation system, based on the matching of sales orders, despatch advices and receiving advices, to ensure full accounting control.

As originally devised, the procedures called for DC's to be responsible for the provision of transport from the appropriate up-country NCPB depot to final distribution points. In practice, this system did not work effectively, partly because the DC's own transport capabilities were inadequate, and partly because the DC's either were unaware or unable to take advantage of funds which were available from OP to supplement their own resources. These problems with transport were the key factor behind the delay in widespread distribution of USAID commodities before January 1985, although the first shipment had been cleared from Mombasa Port during October 1984. In January 1985, responsibility for transport to the final destination was passed to NCPB, and this enabled distribution to proceed.

Monitoring for USAID

Although the procedures devised by GOK were conceptually comprehensive and self-contained, in the sense of providing for full accountability for the distribution of USAID foodstuffs, they were, with the exception of existing NCPB systems, new and untried. The need for effective communications was essential, particularly within the Provincial Administration.

Information was to be passed through the administrative hierarchy from sub-location to OP, and back to sub-location, then back to OP, for each monthly cycle of needs assessment, food allocation, and recording of distribution. In addition there was no provision for independent monitoring of the Program's effectiveness as it was being implemented, although the documentation generated by the implementing agencies would in theory allow a post-Program evaluation to be carried out.

In order to "ensure that the receipt, transport, storage and distribution of these [USAID] commodities were handled in a prudent and timely fashion"*, therefore, USAID engaged DH&SMC to assist by providing a continuous and independent monitoring of the Program's implementation. The formal scope of work for this exercise is reproduced at Appendix 1. The objective of the work could be characterised as ensuring that "the right commodities reached the right people, in the right quantities, at the right time". In the next Section of this report we assess the extent to which this objective

* USAID RFP for Monitoring Contract.

was met by considering the overall impact of the Drought Emergency Relief Program. In the final two Sections, we focus specifically on the monitoring exercise itself, and our perspectives on:

- a) the effectiveness of the Program;
- b) the scope for improving effectiveness of any future program in response to a similar emergency.

SECTION 3 - IMPACT OF THE DROUGHT EMERGENCY
RELIEF PROGRAM

SECTION 3 - IMPACT OF THE DROUGHT EMERGENCY RELIEF PROGRAM

Introduction

We discuss below the impact of the Drought Emergency Relief Program, in terms of the pattern of needs during the period of the Program, the quantities of foodstuffs supplied by USAID, and their distribution. The discussion is based on the most complete information available, taken from our own monitoring records and reports, from NCPB, and from OP.

At the time of writing, two months after the official conclusion of the Program, there remain significant gaps in the information available, particularly since the submission of distribution returns by the Provincial Administration was both erratic and incomplete. We note the specific limitations of the information available in the text where appropriate.

The Pattern of Relief Needs

Eligibility to receive freely distributed PL 480 commodities under the Program was confined to those who had been both unable to produce sufficient food to feed themselves and had no means to pay for food on the open market. As indicated earlier, assessing the numbers of eligible recipients was the responsibility of the Provincial Administration, which was the only organisation with sufficiently comprehensive coverage, and sufficient local knowledge, to be potentially able to perform this task.

We observed during the monitoring exercise that this information provided a broadly accurate picture of relative and absolute needs of different locations, divisions and districts. We concluded, however, that the figures on needs were not completely reliable in a number of cases.

Inaccuracies arose partly because some districts were slow to provide comprehensive initial assessments, and to understand the basis for assessment; partly because some were slow to reassess needs as the availability of local food supplies rose or fell; and partly because of an inbuilt incentive for some leaders to exaggerate needs in order to ensure plentiful relief supplies (see Section 4). As might be expected, districts accustomed to periodic or endemic food shortages, which were already accustomed to reporting on local food requirements, tended to produce more reliable data than districts unaccustomed to food shortages.

The table below presents estimates for the total numbers of relief recipients at intervals throughout the emergency. The figures given are principally those supplied by OP, derived from district returns, and therefore suffer from the shortcomings described above. Wherever our discussions with local officials, or other information available locally, suggested the available figures were wrong, however, we have modified the figures accordingly. (The figures given by local officials to our monitors differed on a number of occasions from OP's figures, because OP had not been advised by district officials of the new assessments.) As a result, the estimate of recipients in August 1984 given below differs from the OP estimates supplied in Table 1 earlier.

TABLE 2: TOTAL NUMBERS OF RELIEF AID RECIPIENTS

August 1984	1,391,873
January 1985	1,288,503
April 1985	835,804
August 1985	530,902
October 1985	319,416

Source: OP and DH&SMC estimates.

The table shows that the number of eligible recipients is estimated to have peaked at around 1.4 million people in August to November 1984. This represented about 7% of the total Kenyan population of approximately 20 million. In some districts such as Samburu, 75% or more of the population was in real distress, whereas in others, such as Muranga, the proportion was 2% or less.

By the time full scale distribution of the USAID commodities began in January 1985, the number of recipients had fallen slightly as early maturing legumes and vegetables planted during the October rains were harvested, principally in the Central Province districts close to Nairobi.

By April 1985, when the long rains arrived, the first harvest of 1985 had been completed, and our figures show a substantial reduction in the number of recipients to around 836,000. (The OP figure for April 1985, at 1,055,000, is higher than ours, but we believe it reflects a significant lag between the actual reduction in numbers of recipients and the submission of revised estimates by districts to OP. Because our monitors were able to visit most of the seriously affected areas on a monthly basis, we were able to get information more quickly from the DC's, and also to verify this informally by observing the condition of the crops and the people.)

Following the long rains which began in April 1985, a further significant improvement had been achieved by August with the beginning of good harvests in some areas, and the overall number of recipients had fallen to just over a half a million. By August 1985, too, some of the pastoralist areas began to show their first real signs of recovery, as a result of improvements in grazing for animals. In Samburu for instance, the number of recipients had remained unchanged from August 1984 to April 1985, but was halved between April and August 1985.

As the main harvests proceeded in September and October 1985, the numbers in need continued to fall steadily reaching an estimated 320,000 in October. After the rains which came in October 1985, further steep declines in the numbers in need were expected, particularly since widespread calvings since the drought were anticipated at the turn of the year.

At a meeting we attended together with USAID at OP on 22nd October 1985, we were informed by Mr Reuben Ryanga, of OP, that the numbers of recipients remaining in October were regarded by GOK as habitual or longer term beneficiaries of regular GOK feeding programs, and were no longer the responsibility of the Drought Emergency Relief Program. Although small stocks of PL 480 commodities remained, they were to be used immediately to assist feeding in certain pockets of arable land where only spasmodic rain had been received, and in pastoralist areas where the condition of livestock herds remained poor. By October, therefore, the Emergency had been successfully contained and was officially over.

Relief Needs by District

In Table 3 overleaf, and in Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4, we show the distribution of recipients by district at the principal stages of the Emergency. They show that virtually the whole of the country's land area, with the major exceptions of Western Kenya around Lake Victoria, and a coastal strip on the Indian Ocean, was affected to some extent. They also show the areas of heaviest and most persistent need: first, districts to the east of the Rift Valley, including Machakos and Kitui; and second, across the Rift Valley to the west, including Baringo and West Pokot.

TABLE 3 - NUMBERS OF RECIPIENTS BY DISTRICT

<u>DISTRICT</u>	<u>AUGUST</u> <u>1984</u>	<u>JANUARY</u> <u>1985</u>	<u>APRIL</u> <u>1985</u>	<u>AUGUST</u> <u>1985</u>	<u>OCTOBER</u> <u>1985</u>
Baringo	72,000	72,000	90,000	50,000	25,000
Elgeyo Marakwet	20,000	20,000	60,000	40,000	25,000
Embu	40,234	40,234	24,900	15,000	10,000
Garissa/Wajir/ Mandera	48,197	48,197	45,000	23,000	15,000
Isiolo	40,500	40,500	32,500	15,000	5,000
Kajiado	4,000	14,000	12,850	12,850	9,000
Kiambu	15,000	9,700	5,000	3,000	3,000
Kitui	295,000	200,000	88,200	40,000	30,000
Laikipia	41,226	41,226	29,000	27,270	20,416
Lamu	10,200	10,000	10,769	10,769	2,500
Machakos	308,220	308,220	100,000	80,000	35,000
Marsabit	83,500	53,000	53,000	19,000	17,000
Meru	187,392	187,392	39,000	14,100	7,000
Muranga	4,000	2,000	2,000	1,000	1,000
Narok	4,000	4,000	15,000	15,000	10,000
Nyandarua	8,000	8,000	8,000	5,000	5,000
Nyeri	9,600	5,000	5,000	3,000	3,000
Samburu	72,000	72,000	72,000	37,500	37,500
Taita Taveta	12,500	11,800	11,800	21,413	10,000
Tana River	47,862	72,792	45,000	38,000	20,000
Turkana	5,300	5,300	15,000	10,000	8,000
West Pokot	63,142	63,142	71,785	50,000	21,000
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	1,391,873	1,288,503	835,804	530,902	319,416
	=====	=====	=====	=====	=====

Source: OP, Provincial Administration, and DH&SMC estimates.

FIGURE 2 - FAMINE AFFECTED DISTRICTS: APRIL 1985




FIGURE 3 - FAMINE AFFECTED DISTRICTS: AUGUST 1985





FIGURE 4 - FAMINE AFFECTED DISTRICTS: OCTOBER 1985



For simplicity, the affected districts can be grouped as follows:

i) Kiambu, Muranga, Nyandarua, Nyeri

Central Province districts, easily accessible from Nairobi, largely arable and fertile, not usually affected by drought, relatively few people in need, very few after first 1985 harvest.

Laikipia, Meru, Embu, Machakos, Kitui

East of Rift Valley, arable and mixed farming, relatively accessible but some roads vulnerable to rain, not usually badly affected by drought on a large scale. The area of greatest relief needs, although steady improvement seen from February/March 1985 onwards.

iii) Turkana, Wajir, Mandera, Garissa, Lamu, Taita Taveta, Kajiado, Narok

Relatively low lying and dry areas, with mixed or pastoralist farming, traditionally subject to drought and often with developed assistance programs. Sparse and dispersed populations in inaccessible areas, with relatively small numbers of recipients but persistent needs.

iv) Samburu, Isiolo, Marsabit

Similar to iii) but relatively high numbers in need, especially in early stages.

v) Baringo, West Pokot, Elgeyo Marakwet

Mixture of fertile and semi-arid land, with heavy and persistent needs. Parts of these districts relatively inaccessible.

The Supply of PL 480 Relief Commodities

On the basis of the numbers of recipients indicated above, a total quantity of around 75,000 - 80,000 tonnes of maize can be estimated "ex post" as having been necessary to sustain a feeding program over the main period of the distribution (January to October 1985) at a ration of 10Kgs/head/month. (This was the ration determined as desirable by GOK where relief commodities were the principal food source.) Table 4 below indicates the quantities of USAID PL 480 commodities which arrived at Mombasa Port.

TABLE 4 - ARRIVALS OF PL 480 COMMODITIES UNDER THE DROUGHT EMERGENCY
RELIEF PROGRAM

<u>VESSEL</u>	<u>DATE OF ARRIVAL</u>	<u>QUANTITY GROSS</u> (tonnes)
<u>1. YELLOW MAIZE</u>		
MV JEAN LYKES	10.11.84	10,533
MV DOLLY TURMAN	10.22.84	5,103
MV ATALANTI	12.17.84	11,435
MV BEAUJOLAIS	01.20.85	24,241
MV WORLD NAUTILUS	02.05.85	30,000
MV SS INGER	03.31.85	20,399
MV LEKEITIO	04.22.85	4,831

		106,542*
Less: quantity for commercial sale (monetisation) - (20,019)		

For Free Distribution	-	86,523 tonnes Yellow maize =====
<u>2. PINTO BEANS</u>		
MV HERIONAE	26.11.84	2,091
MV CHIKAS	13.12.84	617

For Free Distribtion		2,708 tonnes Pinto Beans =====
<u>3. DRIED MILK</u>		
MV AMERICAN ROBIN	12.11.84	1,831
MV AMERICAN CARDINAL		142

For Free Distribution		1,973 tonnes Dried Milk =====

* Does not include 40,000 tonnes shipped on MV Cove Trader, but rejected by GOK as unfit for consumption.

The quantities shown are those recorded on the Bills of Lading for the shipments. There were estimated losses of maize of 2,200 tonnes, or 2.1%, due to water damage prior to arrival, and spillage during offloading and transfer to the receiving warehouses. (See Appendix 2 for a complete reconciliation.) Thus the total quantity of maize available for free distribution was between 84,000 and 85,000 tonnes.

(The exact quantity of maize shortlanded is not known because the later ships to arrive - MV's Beaujolais, World Nautilus, Inger and Lekeitio - carried bulk maize, for which there is no accurate measuring equipment in working order at Mombasa Port. The bulk maize was transported to NCPB warehouses in Mombasa, where it was bagged in 50Kgs gunny sacks; the total quantity of maize per shipment was estimated from the number of filled bags. 50 Kgs bags were used to differentiate the maize from NCPB's commercial maize, which is in 90 Kgs bags. Earlier shipments of USAID maize - MV's Dolly Turman, Jean Lykes and Atalanti - had arrived already bagged, but in bags of 45.36 Kgs.)

In addition to the 84,000 tonnes of maize for free distribution, 20,000 tonnes were bagged in 90 Kgs gunny sacks and retained by NCPB for commercial sale to defray the distribution costs incurred in the Relief Program. A further 40,000 tonnes of maize, of which 20,000 tonnes were intended for free distribution and 20,000 tonnes for monetisation, arrived at Mombasa on MV Cove Trader in May 1985. This shipment, which is not shown in Table 4, was rejected by GOK as "unsuitable for the purpose for which it was intended". GOK did not take delivery of the maize and it was not included in the Relief Program.

Various options were explored by USAID for using the 40,000 tonnes, including the option of transporting it by road for free distribution in Sudan and Ethiopia. The maize was landed, bagged and stored in Mombasa warehouses, at USAID's expense, during June and July 1985. In order to ensure that the good and bad maize in the shipment were effectively identified and separated, and that the maize was fully controlled and accounted for, DH&SMC undertook a special 24 hour monitoring exercise of the unloading, transport, bagging and storage of the shipment. (Our comments on this exercise are contained in our Special Report on the Mombasa Monitoring Exercise.) Eventually, it was decided that hauling the maize to Sudan and Ethiopia was not a viable option, and it was resolved to sell the maize for animal feed.

Overall Pattern of Distribution - Maize

Table 5 overleaf shows the distribution of maize by district and by month, between January 1985 and November 1985. (The small quantities distributed in December 1984 are included in the January 1985 figures.) The information is based on records of despatches from NCPB depots to the affected districts. There are problems with this information, however; in cases where despatches were made from a depot to two or more districts simultaneously, for example, the records do not always identify separately the quantities sent to each district. In addition, the total quantity of maize distributed, according to these records, was 91,000 tonnes, which exceeds the actual estimated quantity available for free distribution by 6,000 tonnes. This inaccuracy appears to be the result of double counting by NCPB.

Whilst deficient in these respects, the NCPB despatch records do present the most complete and accurate picture available of distribution by district. The submission of distribution returns by districts to OP was very patchy; half the districts submitted no returns at all. (See Appendix 3 for reconciliation of OP distribution records.) OP's allocation records present a complete picture of the desired distribution, but we are aware of a significant number of instances where the actual quantities and timing of distribution were at variance with the allocation. Our own monitoring activities were not designed to provide 100% coverage of all districts each month; the information we gathered by visiting district headquarters and distribution points, therefore, presents only a partial picture of the overall distribution. (Where possible, we have used this information to cross check the despatch records, and we have not found major discrepancies.)

The distribution of maize, as shown in Table 5, is a reasonably close reflection of the pattern of needs (as shown in Table 3 earlier), although with some discrepancies in mid 1985 affecting a small number of districts. The areas which were hardest hit initially, particularly Machakos, Kitui and Meru, received large and frequent supplies of maize in the first half of the year, but these were substantially reduced thereafter as rapid recovery in local food production was achieved. Despatches to districts of more consistent or longer term need, such as Baringo, Samburu and West Pokot, were more evenly spread throughout the year, although, again, they tended to be heaviest in the first two to three months of the Program.

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TABLE 5 - OVERALL DISTRIBUTION OF YELLOW MAIZE
(per NCPB despatch records)

<u>DISTRICT</u>	JAN 85	FEB 85	MAR 85	APR 85	MAY 85	JUN 85	JUL 85	AUG 85	SEP 85	OCT 85	NOV 85	TOTALS
(tonnes)												
BARINGO	475.6	339.1	1912.5	985.3	2561.2	943.8	1666.0	1345.8	417.1	197.4	18.6	10862.4
ELGEYO MARAKWET	362.9	177.4	87.7	272.1	-	388.4	189.5	245.9	42.6	4.0	-	1770.5
EMBU	890.3	206.2	31.8	440.8	204.7	381.0	462.0	-	277.7	-	-	2894.5
NAROK	-	-	104.4	804.2	378.5	-	71.2	50.0	-	-	-	1408.3
ISIOLO	-	2538.2	2274.4	3536.7	203.5	297.0	4310.1	1498.7	160.0	-	-	18231.4
MARSABIT	1103.7	-	-	-	1696.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
LAIKIPIA	-	-	-	-	-	362.9	-	-	-	-	-	-
KAJIADO	503.8	700.8	414.2	231.3	198.9	-	150.0	-	-	250.0	-	-
KIAMBU	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2316.3
MURANGA	-	-	-	-	-	50.0	-	-	67.3	-	-	-
KITUI	3698.7	350.5	7.9	494.2	2178.9	-	710.0	1000.6	750.0	220.0	1772.6	11183.4
LAMU	1105.1	-	-	885.7	-	-	732.9	-	252.0	-	-	5626.7
TANA RIVER	-	-	-	741.3	-	551.2	545.0	502.0	-	311.5	-	-
MACHAKOS	1106.8	2877.5	729.5	1627.3	3645.6	1212.9	1760.2	-	230.0	-	-	13189.8
MERU	2962.9	866.8	588.0	81.8	456.9	247.0	68.7	151.9	-	-	-	5424.0
GARISSA, WAJIR	-	1590.0	-	-	378.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	1968.0
MANDERA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
NYANDARUA	1978.3	1172.7	-	-	927.2	271.3	1292.3	201.8	-	-	-	8018.0
SAMBURU	-	-	1572.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	360.6	241.2	-
NYERI	57.2	124.3	389.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	570.5
TAITA TAVETA	-	-	-	-	1225.8	-	258.0	58.0	52.0	-	-	1593.8
TURKANA	-	931.0	846.4	1116.2	-	-	1436.4	727.6	171.9	144.0	141.5	5965.0
WEST POKOT	-	-	-	-	-	450.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL (tonnes)	14245.3	11874.5	8958.4	11216.9	14055.4	5155.5	13652.3	5782.3	2420.6	1487.5	2173.9	91022.6

Note total quantity despatched for distribution, per NCPB (tonnes)

86,886

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Although the supply of maize for free distribution was broadly in line with the overall pattern of needs, there were some significant month-to-month variations both in the overall quantity despatched, and in the quantities despatched to individual districts, which did not appear to bear any relationship to changing requirements. In part this reflected changing levels of stocks available for distribution in the different districts. In part also, it was a planned response to physical difficulties in transporting the maize. Despatches to \ Garissa/Wajir/Mandera and to Tana River/Lamu, for example, were relatively infrequent due to the remoteness or seasonal inaccessibility of these districts. The size of each shipment was correspondingly large in relation to needs in these areas.

A further cause of irregularities in the despatch of maize, however, was planning, logistical and communications difficulties which affected the process of allocation by OP; the issuing of sales orders by NCPB Head Office; and the execution of those orders by the NCPB depot managers. These difficulties became evident during the second half of the distribution program, and were reflected, in a number of districts, in needed allocations of food failing to arrive on time. In June and July, for example, officials in West Pokot expressed concern that, whilst the size of allocations was theoretically adequate, unexplained delays in the transfer of commodities from NCPB depots to the district were causing unnecessary distress.

Embu and Kitui were also affected by unplanned delays in the receipt of foodstuffs at stages during the period of June to August. In addition, local officials were not always effective at carrying out an even distribution in cases where large but infrequent shipments of maize were provided. In Lamu, for example, according to the DO in charge of relief food distribution, the month-by-month quantities of maize actually distributed to the needy were erratic, rising from 365 bags (x 50Kgs) in April, to 3,190 and 11,211 bags in May and June, then falling to 1,280 bags in July.

Table 6 below provides further information on the extent to which supplies of maize to different districts were a fair reflection of relative needs. In the table, districts are ranked both according to their average monthly number of recipients during January to November 1985, and their average monthly receipts of maize over the same period. (Again the figures should be regarded as indicative rather than definitive, for reasons discussed earlier.) The two sets of rankings are largely congruent, indicating that the districts of greatest need received the greatest quantities of maize.

TABLE 6 - ANALYSIS OF RECIPIENTS AND AID RECEIPTS

<u>DISTRICT</u>	<u>RANK BY</u> <u>AV MONTHLY</u> <u>RECIPIENTS</u>	<u>RANK BY</u> <u>AV MONTHLY</u> <u>SUPPLIES</u> (MAIZE)	<u>AV MONTHLY</u> <u>RATION</u> (Kg/head)
MACHAKOS	1	2	10.9
KITUI	2	3	11.6
ISIOLO/MARSABIT/ LAIKIPIA	3	1	20.1
SAMBURU/NYANDARUA	4	5	11.2
W POKOT/TURKANA	5	6	9.0
BARINGO	6	4	16.3
MERU	7	8	9.4
LAMU/TANA RIVER	8	7	9.9
ELGEYO MARAKWET	9	12	4.0
GARISSA/WAJIR/MANDERA	10	11	5.3
EMBU	11	9	12.0
KAJIADO/KIAMBU MURANGA	12	10	11.5
TAITA TAVETA	13	13	12.3
NAROK	14	14	12.4
NYERI	15	15	13.0

This picture is broadly confirmed when the average monthly supply of maize is divided by the average number of recipients, to give an implied average monthly ration (in Kgs/head) for each district. The table indicates that the implied ration in most districts was close to the 10Kgs/head determined as desirable by GOK. There were, however, some significant variations around this standard, both over time and between districts.

Elgeyo Marakwet, for example, had an abnormally low average ration of only 4Kgs/head/month according to these calculations. Elgeyo Marakwet was one of the few districts where local officials complained to our monitors that relief supplies were inadequate and these complaints were supported by our monitors' observations. (These complaints were mentioned in our monthly reports.) Garissa/Wajir/Mandera also had a very low average ration of around 5 Kgs/head/month; however, because of the remoteness of these areas, and the nomadic nature of the people, there is large scope for error in the figures. On occasion, following visits to Garissa, we reported on apparent inadequacies in relief supplies in this area.

Isiolo, Marsabit and Laikipia districts, on the other hand, appear to have enjoyed an abnormally high ration of 20Kgs/head/month. Most of the excess supplies were concentrated in Marsabit, which is a large and inaccessible district with a shifting population of nomadic pastoralists. These factors hindered both the

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assessment of needs and the physical distribution of the maize. We reported in April that distribution was taking place largely at a few main centres, and that people not obviously in need were receiving yellow maize in return for work, alongside others who were evidently needy. The District Officer told us that the number of his recipients had fallen from 25,000 to 19,000, yet in May the district was allocated 32,000 bags of maize, implying a ration of 81 Kgs/head for that month.

In addition to these extreme cases, we reported a number of other disparities in ration size on a month by month basis. In our monthly report for May, for example, we noted with concern that we had found rations in that month varying between 2Kg/head in Garissa and 23Kg/head in Kajiado. These variations did not appear to be related to differences in the extent of needs (eg. for primary as against supplementary feeding, or vice versa); but rather were the result of a breakdown in the system of communication within the administrative structure of the Program.

As noted above, we have amended OP's official figures for numbers of recipients where our own findings suggest these to be inaccurate, and that this affects the average ration sizes indicated in Table 6. In cases where districts overestimated their numbers in need, in our view, this means that allocations of maize drawn up by OP were larger than the quantities we estimate were required.

We believe this to have been a significant factor at times in Meru and Kitui, two of the districts of heaviest need. Overallocation of relief supplies had different consequences in the two districts. Given strong preferences against yellow maize (white maize is the favoured staple), the people of Meru, who are unaccustomed to drought and not conditioned to major feeding programs, tended only to go to the distribution points for supplies of yellow maize when in genuine need. Overallocation of the commodity resulted in the build-up of substantial unused stocks at Meru NCPB depot by May 1985.

These supplies developed mould and began to rot. We first reported on the condition of the maize, to NCPB and OP, on 5/22/85 and 5/27/85 respectively. In September and October the maize was sorted by hand so that the edible maize could be depatched to other districts.

In parts of Kitui, by contrast, people are more conditioned to the effects of drought and to relief feeding programs. We were concerned, as were local leaders, to note growing signs of dependency on relief supplies in Mutomo Division of Kitui. It appeared that

some able-bodied people were content to continue receiving free food supplies, had neglected opportunities to plant and cultivate their own crops when the rains arrived, and resisted participation in food for work programs. We discussed these issues in our October 1985 report.

Overall Pattern of Distribution - Other Commodities

Tables 7 and 8 show the distribution pattern of pinto beans and non-fat dried milk respectively and are again based on despatch records. As noted previously, the detailed figures contain serious over-recording of despatches (some 15 to 20%) when compared with the total available for distribution. The tables show that more than half of these commodities were despatched for distribution in the first three months, reflecting the limited capacity of NCPB to store such commodities in large quantities. In some districts, however, substantial quantities of beans and milk powder remained undistributed for lengthy periods of time; in some cases up to several months.

Our discussions with local officials revealed that this resulted partly from the lack of a clearly defined and widely understood policy on the use for which these commodities were intended. There was no consistent understanding, for example, of whether these commodities were intended for general distribution, or were to be directed to selected categories of recipient, such as the young, elderly and infirm. Whilst the principles governing the distribution of maize were widely recognised, the distribution of beans and milk appeared to be a secondary consideration for local FRC's and was often neglected.

Stocks of beans and milk remained unallocated for many months in a number of NCPB depots, particularly Nairobi. We voiced growing concern over the possible deterioration of these commodities in our reports to USAID, and informally to NCPB. In October and November 1985, a final effort was made to despatch the remaining stocks, which resulted in a small number of districts, such as West Pokot, receiving large quantities of beans and milk powder which they were ill-prepared to use.

Conclusion

The major respect in which the effectiveness of the Program was weak was in the the speediness of initial distribution. Distribution did not begin in earnest until January 1985, although commodities had first arrived at Mombasa Port in mid-October 1984.

TABLE 7 - OVERALL DISTRIBUTION OF PINTO BEANS
(per NCPB despatch records)

<u>DISTRICT</u> (Bags of 45.36 Kgs)	<u>JAN 85</u>	<u>FEB 85</u>	<u>MAR 85</u>	<u>APR 85</u>	<u>MAY 85</u>	<u>JUN 85</u>	<u>JUL 85</u>	<u>AUG 85</u>	<u>SEP 85</u>	<u>OCT 85</u>	<u>NOV 85</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
BARINGO	849	-	235	-	62	3	-	-	800	415	-	2364
ELGEYO MARAKWET	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	700	-	-	700
EMBU	800	1139	-	21	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1960
NAROK	-	-	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	-	20
ISIOLO	-	4495	-	-	-	-	208	-	320	461	-	12546
MARSABIT	7062	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
LAIKIPIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
KAJIADO	632	817	-	-	88	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
KIAMBU, KIRINYAGA, MURANGA	-	-	-	-	-	176	-	-	-	-	-	1763
KITUI	8252	6768	349	560	70	1001	777	-	-	-	-	17777
LAMU	444	-	-	444	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	888
TANA RIVER	1056	-	-	561	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2615
MACHAKOS	40	12450	2549	218	10	328	192	287	-	998	-	16074
MERU	400	425	2190	200	35	1000	-	408	-	-	-	4658
GARISSA, WAJIR, MANDERA	-	-	-	-	-	-	2592	-	-	-	-	2592
NYANDARUA	340	564	-	-	26	16	-	-	-	-	-	1711
SAMBURU	-	-	581	-	-	-	-	-	-	145	39	-
NYERI	-	478	222	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	700
TAITA TAVETA	555	-	-	-	550	-	-	-	-	-	-	1105
TURKANA	-	-	1180	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
WEST POKOT	-	-	-	2778	-	-	-	-	500	-	500	4958
TOTAL (Bags)	20480	27136	7306	4782	841	2544	3769	695	2320	2019	539	72431
TOTAL (Tonnes equivalent)	929	1231	331	217	38	115	171	32	105	92	24	3285

Note total quantity despatched for distribution, per NCPB (tonnes) 2,737

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TABLE 8 - OVERALL DISTRIBUTION OF NON-FAT DRIED MILK
(per NCPB despatch records)

<u>DISTRICT</u>	<u>JAN 85</u>	<u>FEB 85</u>	<u>MAR 85</u>	<u>APR 85</u>	<u>MAY 85</u>	<u>JUN 85</u>	<u>JUL 85</u>	<u>AUG 85</u>	<u>SEP 85</u>	<u>OCT 85</u>	<u>NOV 85</u>	
(Packets of 22.33 Kgs)												
BARINGO	-	1091	292	205	30	-	-	-	800	777	-	3195
ELGEYO MARAKWET	-	-	550	-	-	-	-	-	-	700	-	1250
EMBU	-	600	-	1100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1700
NAROK	-	-	99	-	130	-	-	-	-	-	-	229
ISIOLO	-	3586	1490	680	-	-	245	-	-	1022	-	10223
MARSABIT	700	-	-	-	2390	-	-	-	-	-	110	-
LIAKIPIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
KAJIADO	2171	2898	240	-	360	-	132	-	-	-	-	5977
KIAMBU, KIRINYAGA	-	-	-	-	-	176	-	-	-	-	-	-
MURANGA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
KITUI	200	5348	467	2605	3945	-	-	-	-	-	-	12565
LAMU	4990	4999	-	440	-	1539	-	-	-	-	-	11968
TANA RIVER	3436	-	-	2928	-	-	-	600	-	973	-	7937
MACHAKOS	2581	3375	4114	4604	105	276	1673	-	-	-	92	16820
MERU	820	1475	1020	460	91	-	-	-	95	-	-	3961
GARISSA, WAJIR, MANDERA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
NYANDARUA	-	1281	-	-	30	75	29	49	10	-	-	3364
SAMBURU	-	-	1804	-	-	-	-	-	-	63	23	-
NYERI	-	-	440	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	440
TAITA TAVETA	-	-	-	-	573	-	-	-	-	-	-	573
TURKANA	-	5840	3975	5756	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
WEST POKOT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	500	500	500	17071
TOTAL (Packets)	14898	30493	14491	18778	7654	2066	2079	649	1405	4035	725	97273
TOTAL (Tonnes equivalent)	339	693	329	427	174	47	47	15	32	92	16	2211

Note total quantity despatched for distribution, per NCPB (tonnes) 1,908

Delays in initial distribution resulted not only from transport difficulties, but also because district administration officials were not sufficiently prepared to carry out their responsibilities. We noted in our report for the quarter ended December 1984 that no comprehensive distribution plans had been drawn up for the districts of Machakos, Kitui, Baringo and Meru as at that time. The assessment of needs, according to guidelines issued by OP, had not been fully or consistently done in these badly-affected areas; DC's were not forewarned of the arrival of relief supplies; and they were initially given no formal authority or instructions regarding distribution.

The confusion and delays, which arose out of the lack of initial planning and communications, were largely overcome in January 1985, not least due to the efforts of a newly-appointed Central Co-ordinator in OP. Nevertheless, it is possible that the failure to begin distribution early resulted in significant distress continuing when it could have been alleviated.

In overall terms, the Drought Emergency Relief Program met its objectives with a high degree of success. The total quantity of foodstuffs supplied by USAID for free distribution was closely in line with the total known requirement. The food was distributed to different districts in broad accordance with their relative needs, and continued to be distributed to needy recipients whilst the emergency officially lasted. Real distress was alleviated in the famine affected areas.

On our visits to affected districts in December 1984, many people appeared very weak and severely malnourished, on a scale which was not evident once distribution had properly begun. Only in Meru district did reports reach us of people dying, and Meru was at the time suffering an outbreak of cholera. Whilst lack of adequate food may have been a contributory factor in these unfortunate cases, the authorities concerned did not identify it as a primary cause.

SECTION 4 - THE MONITORING EXERCISE

SECTION 4 - THE MONITORING EXERCISE

Introduction

In this Section we discuss the scope of the monitoring exercise and we summarise our major findings regarding each of the specific terms of reference for the monitoring contract (see Appendix 1, items a) to i)).

As described earlier, the broad aim of the monitoring work was to determine whether the USAID-donated commodities were being received, stored and transported in a prudent and timely fashion, and were being distributed in sufficient quantities to those in need. Further, we were to make this assessment as the Program proceeded, in order that corrective action could be taken immediately.

To meet these aims, our monitoring team performed a wide range of field tasks on a monthly basis, including:

- . observing the efficiency of offloading at Mombasa Port;
- . examining storage conditions and verifying quantities stored in NCPB depots;
- . examining DC's distribution records;
- . visiting distribution points to witness distribution and interview recipients.

We review the scope of the monitoring exercise in more detail below.

Scope of the Monitoring Exercise

The monitoring work was carried out by a team of six graduate field staff recruited specifically to work full time on the exercise. Graduates were chosen in order to bring the necessary maturity, responsibility and initiative to bear on the task. The field staff were deployed by, and reported to, a full time team leader who was based principally in Nairobi, but who also undertook regular field trips to supervise the work of the monitors. Overall management of the team was carried out by a DH&SMC manager on a part-time basis.

The principal tasks undertaken by the team are summarised in Table 9 overleaf. Together, these tasks involved the monitoring of each stage of the distribution program, from arrival of the commodities at the port to receipt of the commodities by the needy.

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TABLE 9 - SUMMARY OF MONITORING TASKS

<u>Location/Agency Visited</u>	<u>Task</u>	<u>Purpose</u>	<u>Documentation</u>
Mombasa Port - KCHS	Observe offloading	Check efficiency, spillage, shortlandings; condition of commodities	Bill of Lading, KCHS Outturn Report; Survey Report
Mombasa Port - KCHS	Track location of commodities	Ensure no losses, diversions, misplacement or delays in offloading grain ships	KCHS daily offloading tally records
Mombasa Warehouses - NCPB	Reconcile port despatches with NCPB receipts at Mombasa NCPB warehouses	Identify losses, diversions and spillages	NCPB tally records of truck-loads leaving port and received at Mombasa warehouses
Mombasa Warehouses - NCPB	Count physical stocks. Observe bagging of bulk maize	Verify quantities. Identify losses. Check bagging efficiency	NCPB bagging tally records, warehouse Bin Cards; NCPB Stock Records.
Upcountry Depots - NCPB - KR - KTA	Reconcile Mombasa despatches and upcountry receipts	Verify movements and quantities. Identify losses	NCPB upcountry depot stock records NCPB despatch/Receiving advices from Mombasa
Upcountry Depots - NCPB	Count stocks/reconcile stock records. Observe storage conditions. Observe condition of commodities	Verify quantities/identify losses. Verify separate stacking from commercial foodstuffs. Verify clean and dry storage. Identify any deterioration of commodities; identify non-moving stocks	Stores records and bin cards. Report of Public Health Inspectors where appropriate
Upcountry Depots - NCPB - PA - Public Health Authorities	Supervise destruction of rotten maize	Ensure that all commodities (and only those commodities) officially condemned were destroyed in accordance with public health regulations	Reports of Public Health Inspectors. "Seizure" Forms and "Surrender" Forms
District Headquarters - PA - NCPB	Reconcile depot despatches with district receipts. Reconcile receipts with allocations	Verify movements and quantities; identify losses and delays	NCPB despatch notes
District Headquarters - PA	Examine distribution records, needs assessment records, distribution plans	Check compliance with reporting requirements. Check ration size and fairness of distribution plan. Check frequency of distribution. Obtain estimates of future needs, progress in recovery	Locational tally records of quantities distributed (with proper identification of each receipt)

of

District Headquarters
- PA

Examine relief stocks

Check condition of stocks/
reasons for stockholding

Reports of Public Health Inspectors

Distribution Points
- PA

Examine distribution
records. Observe
distribution

Check reporting compliance.
Check fairness of distribu-
tion. Verify appropriate use
of foodstuffs/eligibility of
recipients. Check ration size.
Identify undistributed stocks

Chiefs' and Assistant Chiefs'
distribution records

Distribution Points
- Recipients

Interview recipients.
Observe crops and
livestock conditions

Assess frequency/adequacy of
supplies. Check fair and
proper use of foodstuffs.
Assess changes in local food
supply/relief needs

Public Health Reports.
Veterinary officers' reports

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NCPB depots and recipient districts were visited on a sample basis each month (100% coverage of all 22 depots and 25 districts would have required a much larger team). The ability of our team to visit some areas was initially hampered by problems of inaccessibility, especially during the long rains in early 1985. Accordingly the monitoring contract was amended in May 1985 to provide for the hire of 4-wheel-drive vehicles, which enabled us to extend our coverage to the less accessible areas. Tables 10 and 11 show the depots and districts visited each month during the course of the monitoring exercise. This represents a 30-35% coverage of all depots and districts on a monthly visit cycle, with visit frequency determined by degree of need as reported by the district administrations, and by actual NCPB distribution patterns.

Field staff reported weekly to the team leader and manager in Nairobi, and presented written reports of their findings. These findings were summarised, and key points highlighted, in regular monthly reports issued to USAID. In addition we supplied commodity status reports to USAID setting out the weekly movements and balances of commodities in NCPB depots.

Aside from these regular reports, we also reported informally to USAID and to the other agencies involved on any matters of particular concern (eg, sales of aid maize, deterioration of stored maize) as we discovered them, in order that corrective action could be taken promptly. In such instances we pursued the matter to establish whether such action had in fact been taken

Altogether the monitoring exercise lasted from October 1984 to November 1985 inclusive, and involved a time input of 13,125 man hours by field staff and 2,521 man hours by supervisory and management staff (an average of 1200 man-hours per month).

Major Findings of the Monitoring Exercise

We have assessed the overall impact of the Drought Emergency Relief Program, and discussed the quality of the information available for making this assessment, in Section 3 of this report. Below we review the Program's implementation from the perspective of the specific Terms of Reference for the monitoring assignment. We discuss each of these specific areas in turn, as set out in our scope of work.

a) Eligibility of Beneficiaries

Eligible beneficiaries of the Program were those who had no (or inadequate) food supplies of their own as a consequence of the drought, and who had no means to buy food for themselves and their families.

TABLE 10: SCHEDULE OF DEPOTS VISITED

<u>NCPB DEPOT</u>	<u>DISTRICT(S) SERVED</u>	<u>1984 Q4</u>			<u>1985 Q1</u>			<u>1985 Q2</u>			<u>1985 Q3</u>			<u>1985 Q4</u>	
		OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV
ELDORET	ELGEYO MARAKWET														
EMBU	EMBU					/	/								
KABARNET	BARINGO														
KIBWEZI	MACHAKOS	/			/	/		/			/				
KIGANJO	NYERI					/	/								
KITALE	WEST POKOT, TURKANA					/	/								
KITUI	KITUI	/	/			/	/	/	/				/		
KONZA	MACHAKOS	/			/	/	/	/	/		/	/			/
MACHAKOS	MACHAKOS	/	/					/			/	/			
MERU	MERU, LAIKIPIA				/	/					/	/			
MKWE	LAMU				/	/				/	/	/		/	/
MOMBASA	LAMU, TANA RIVER, TAITA TAVETA	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/				
MWINGI	KITUI	/	/		/	/	/	/	/	/					
NAIROBI	KAJIADO, KIAMBU, WAJIR, MANDERA, GARISSA, OTHER NCPB DEPOTS	/		/	/								/	/	
NAKURU	BARINGO, OTHER NCPB DEPOTS												/		
NANYUKI	MARSABIT, ISIOLO, LAIKIPIA, NYANDARUA	/	/		/										
NAROK	NAROK				/			/					/		/
NYAHURURU	SAMBURU, NYANDARUA					/									
SAGANA	EMBU, MURANGA, KIRINYAGA	/	/		/			/	/		/	/	/	/	/
THIKA	KIAMBU, KITUI	/	/	/							/	/	/	/	/
VOI	TAITA TAVETA														/
MOMBASA PORT		/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/			

TABLE 11: SCHEDULE OF DISTRICTS VISITED

<u>DISTRICT</u>	<u>1984 Q4</u>			<u>1985 Q1</u>			<u>1985 Q2</u>			<u>1985 Q3</u>			<u>1985 Q4</u>	
	<u>OCT</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>JUL</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>NOV</u>
BARINGO			X	X					/	/	X			X
ELGEYO MARAKWET					/	X	X		X	X				X
EMBU					X				/		X	X		
GARISSA						X			X		X			
ISIOLO									X		X			
KAJIADO									X	X		X		X
KITUI									X		X			
LAIKIPIA	X	X		X	/	X	X	X	/	X	/	X	X	X
LAMU					/	X			X	X	X	X	X	/
MACHAKOS							/				X			
MARSABIT			X	X	/		X	/	X		/	X		X
MERU							X	X			X			X
MURANGA			X	X	X			X	/	X	X	X		/
NAROK					X				X					/
NYANDARUA						X				X	X	X		
NYERI					X			X						
SAMBURU					/	/		/						
TAITA TAVETA					X	X	X				X	/	X	X
TANA RIVER							X	X			X		X	
TURKANA									X	X	X		X	
WEST POKOT					/									
					/	X	X		X	X	X	X		X

NB: / Visit to distribution points
 X Visit to district headquarters and distribution points
 A number of districts were visited on more than one occasion per month, but for the sake of clarity these additional visits are not shown in the table.

The numbers eligible were determined by the Famine Relief Committees which assessed local needs, and by the Provincial Administration officials who supervised physical distribution of the commodities. Given this degree of decentralisation, different interpretations of the eligibility guidelines were to be expected, and were, indeed, evident to our monitoring team. As mentioned in Section 3, in some cases such differences amounted, in our view, to significant under or overstatements of needs in some districts. It was also common for some districts to be very slow in revising numbers of those in need, even at times when changes in the availability of locally-grown food supplies were plainly evident.

It was much less common, in our experience, for inaccurate needs assessments to result in either ineligible people receiving food supplies, or in eligible people not receiving food. We consider that one reason for this was the widespread cultural prejudice against yellow maize, which meant that in many areas only those in genuine need tended to travel to the distribution points to collect supplies. In districts where needs were underestimated, more people would travel to the distribution points than expected by the local officials. Since all the available food at any one distribution point tended to be shared amongst those who did arrive, it was much more common for ration sizes to vary (see below) than for serious breaches of the eligibility rules to be made.

Where our own observation of distribution, or discussions with recipients, suggested that the eligibility rules were being abrogated, we reported these findings both to district officials and to USAID in our monthly reports. Such instances were few, but included the following:

- In March we noted that the authorities in Laikipia and Garissa Districts had not devised any systematic method for assessing recipients and ration sizes, and that food was being given out on an ad hoc basis.
- In April we noted that no clear and appropriate criteria were being used in Marsabit district to determine either eligibility or ration size. There were sales of aid maize in the local market, and the people buying were evidently underfed and had been forced to sell livestock in order to buy food. However, the incidence of such sales appeared small.

- In August we noted signs of aid food dependency in Mutomo Division of Kitui District amongst able-bodied people who had neglected the opportunity to plant their own crops because they were content to continue receiving freely-distributed maize.

b) Ration Size

In Section 3, we estimated average monthly ration sizes for the Program period as a whole. These calculations indicated that average rations for the distribution of maize were close to the 10Kgs/head/month determined as necessary by GOK in the majority of districts.

The figures, however, conceal significant variations in ration size over time and within districts. In our monthly reports, we noted a substantial number of instances in which significant variations in ration size existed. Examples of these are:

- In our April report we noted that people in Mutei location of Elgeyo Marakwet had received only 2.5 Kgs/head for the month.
- In our May report we noted that the average ration in Kajiado district was 23 Kgs/head/month.
- In our July report, we noted that around 11,000 people in Lamu district had received food aid varying from 365 bags of maize (1.7 Kgs/head) in April, to 11,211 bags (51 Kgs/head) in June.
- In our August report we noted that two sub-locations in Kitui district, with 7,000 and 1,000 recipients respectively, had both been allocated the same quality of maize (300 bags), giving a ration of 2 Kgs in the former and 15 Kgs in the latter.

Not all of the variations from the standard ration size were anomalies. In April, for example, we found that rations substantially less than 10 Kgs/head/month were being given in Central division of Kitui, but that these supplies were regarded as adequate by a sample of recipients because they had harvested some vegetables to supplement the maize.

In most cases, however, we think the variations in ration size were anomalous, and were often associated with one of three main causes:

- i) inaccurate or outdated assessment of needs, on which allocations were based;

- ii) an infrequent or uneven pattern of supplies from depots;
- iii) in some districts, poor administration of the distribution by the lower echelons of the Provincial Administration.

c) Final Use of Commodities

Our comments on eligibility of beneficiaries indicate that the actual use of the commodities was in accordance with the intended use. Instances of abuse were rare. There were a very small number of cases in which we learned of sales of the aid maize, either by recipients or by officials.

In addition to the sales in Marsabit described above, for example, we discovered a discrepancy of 6 bags of maize in Masiro location of Narok in March. Investigations revealed that the Chief had sold the maize for his own gain. In such cases, the Provincial Administration generally moved quickly to correct the situation, and the Masiro Chief was sacked immediately.

d) Distribution Centre Records

The compilation of distribution returns has been discussed elsewhere in this report (See Section 3 and Appendix 3). Record-keeping at distribution centres varied greatly between and within districts; in some areas it was regrettably very poor or non-existent. Returns submitted through the ascending hierarchy of the Provincial Administration to OP account for less than 40% of the maize distributed.

We do not think that failure to keep records resulted from any attempts to mislead or to conceal malpractice. When we interviewed recipients at centres with no records, we were told that distributions had taken place on the days claimed by the local officials, and there were no significant and substantiated accusations of discrimination or favouritism.

Rather, the standard of record-keeping varied according to the competence and experience of the Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs responsible for distribution, and according to the effectiveness of communications between the different administrative levels. In areas with significant existing experience of drought and famine relief programs, both the competence of officials and the quality of communications tended to be higher than in other

areas. This tended to be reflected in better record-keeping. In some districts, too, there were notable improvements in record keeping resulting from experience gained during the Drought Emergency Relief Program itself.

As mentioned above, recording of distribution was the responsibility of Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs, who are the most junior level of the Provincial Administration, and who tend to be selected as much for their local standing as their administrative capabilities. In some areas, such as Tana River district, many Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs are illiterate.

Poor communications in a number of districts were reflected not only in incomplete information on needs and distribution from lower levels, but also in the inadequate dissemination of instructions from above to the junior levels of the administration. On numerous occasions we found that Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs did not comprehend the need or importance of compiling records, and were confused by the standard forms provided for this purpose. In such cases, our monitors attempted to impress on higher level officials the need to instruct and encourage the Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs to keep appropriate records. We noted in our monthly reports instances where such prompting had brought about significant improvements.

e) and f) Verification of warehouse inventories; review of receiving and despatch documentation:

We regularly carried out physical stockcounts at the NCPB depots we visited, in order to establish whether or not the NCPB stock records accurately reflected actual stocks. Although we found relatively minor discrepancies on occasion, we found nothing to suggest significant diversions or deliberate malpractice in this area.

In addition to reconciling stocks with stock records, we also reconciled NCPB despatch notes with NPCB receiving advices for inter-depot transfers. In some cases the two did not agree, either because short receipts or diversions of whole loads to alternative depots (due to inaccessible roads, etc) were not recorded. Examples of these and other discrepancies, which we highlighted in our monthly reports, included:

- In October 1984 we noted that 40092 bags of maize bound for Mwingi and Kitui depots had been received at Sagana and Thika depots, and 660 bags bound for Thika had been received at Sagana. We

were told that these diversions were due to the condition of rain affected roads. We subsequently followed up to ensure that the diversions were adequately reflected in NCPB records.

In November 1984, we noted that a number of depots had not updated their stock records to reflect current stocks. However, when we counted the stocks, the quantities tallied with balances advised to us by the depot clerks.

In January 1984 we noted seven instances of short receipts or receipts of damaged commodities at different NCPB depots, involving 83 bags of maize, 2 bags of beans and 94 packages of non-fat dried milk. As appropriate, we advised depot managers to investigate the causes of shortages with a view to making recoveries from the transporters.

In April 1985 we noted that an entire truckload (600 bags) of water-damaged maize had been received at Nairobi depot, because the truck driver had no tarpaulins. We informed NCPB Head Office, who arranged for the maize to be inspected. 153 bags were deemed unfit for consumption, and we followed up to ensure that full recovery was made from the transporters.

In June 1985 we noted a discrepancy between stocks and despatch records at Nakuru depot which suggested a possible misappropriation of 274 bags of maize. NCPB called in the CID, but it was subsequently discovered to be an accounting error; no fraud was involved.

As the above examples suggest, most of the accounting discrepancies within NCPB occurred in the earliest stages of the Program, when NCPB was still in the process of implementing a fully effective tracking procedure. (These difficulties were mirrored in other system defects, such as severe congestion of arriving trucks at some depots due to poor scheduling.) Within three months of the Program's start, however, NCPB's control systems were working much more effectively, and discrepancies were rare.

(g) Examination of physical conditions in warehouses.

Adequate storage of the commodities required that depots be clean, dry, and free of vermin or pest infestation, and also that the aid maize be stacked separately from commercial maize, in an orderly fashion, and on pallets clear of the floor.

On our regular visits to NCPB depots we checked to ensure that these requirements were being met, and that the condition of the commodities was not deteriorating. In the large majority of cases we discovered that the foodstuffs were being stored adequately and that the above criteria were being observed.

In a small number of cases there were significant defects in storage conditions. We noted in October and November 1984, for example, that the depot at Kitui had a leaking roof, and in April 1985 that rats were attacking bags of beans and maize in Nairobi depot, causing significant spillage. Such cases were, however, the exception rather than the rule.

Towards the end of the Program, there were an increasing number of cases of commodities spoiling or rotting, making them unfit for human consumption. This was largely a function of the length of time commodities had remained in store, compounded in some instances by a lack of adequate fumigation; a failure to prevent contamination spreading by restacking rotting foodstuffs; and a failure to observe the "first-in first-out" principle.

A list of losses due to spoilage is given at Appendix 4. By far the most serious case was at Meru depot, where, after an extensive sorting exercise, 7,737 out of 56,188 suspect bags of maize were found to be unfit for consumption. The sorting exercise was undertaken during September to November 1985, although we had first voiced our concern over the condition of the maize in early June, and visited the store with the District Health Officer in mid June. The maize had not been despatched because supplies to Meru exceeded demand, and poor ventilation in the store had contributed to the physical deterioration.

h) Surveys at Distribution Points

We regularly carried out surveys at distribution points, both to verify that distribution had taken place as recorded, and to establish whether distribution had taken place freely and without discrimination or prejudice.

We found no evidence to suggest discriminatory practices or falsification of records regarding the dates and quantities of maize distributed. There were two senses in which distribution was not always free. First, in a small handful of cases, we found that local officials had been levying a "transport charge" (of between Shs. 2/= and 5/= per kg) on maize recipients. Since NCPB was responsible

for organising and paying transporters, such charges were unjustified; and payment of any charges by recipients could not under any circumstances be regarded as justifiable as a pre-condition to receiving "free" food.

In such cases, therefore, we immediately informed the appropriate DC in order that such charges be stopped, and we also recorded the incidents in our monthly reports to USAID. Levying of transport charges usually arose out of misunderstandings, and were not sustained for long.

The second sense in which recipients were required to "pay" for food aid was by participating in Food for Work and other community programs. This tended to occur in the traditional drought areas, where such programs, and the necessary administration, were already in existence. Properly organised so that only the able-bodied were required to work (and the young, aged, or infirm continued to receive free food), such programs carried the dual benefits of contributing to local development efforts whilst minimising the likelihood of aid food dependency arising.

i) Market Checks

The market checks we carried out enabled us to form an impression of changing availability of locally grown food, and to compare this impression with our observations of changing crop and livestock conditions. These factors, together with interviews of recipients, enabled us to gauge informally whether local relief needs were rising or falling, and provided a useful guide to assessing the accuracy of the official figures.

As we have indicated earlier, we identified very few instances of sales of donated foods on any scale. One of the few instances we observed was in Marsabit district (see a) above) where there were excess supplies of maize in the urban areas. Altogether, we consider that sales of relief foods comprised an insignificant proportion of the quantities donated (much less than 1%).

SECTION 5 - CONCLUSION: LESSONS OF THE
MONITORING EXERCISE

SECTION 5 - CONCLUSION: LESSONS OF THE MONITORING EXERCISE

In assessing the overall impact of the Drought Emergency Relief Program in Section 3, we concluded that the Program had met its overall objectives with a high degree of success, but that a significant weakness was the initial delay of around 2 - 3 months between USAID-donated food supplies becoming available and being widely distributed in the areas of need. This delay could largely have been avoided by better planning, communications and preparation.

In Section 4, we examined specific aspects of the Program's implementation from our perspective as monitors of the distribution. Again, this assessment showed the Program to have been implemented effectively in broad terms, but with significant scope for improvement in a number of respects. We consider that the scope for improving the implementation of any future substantial relief program again depends on planning, communications and preparation.

A key area of weakness was the inconsistent performance of the Provincial Administration in providing accurate and timely assessments of local needs, and in submitting complete and timely reports on distributions carried out. We do not consider that the PA failed in its most important task, that of physically distributing the food to the needy, although we have noted that the distribution was marked by considerable and undesirable variations in ration sizes.

The inconsistent and at times indifferent performance of the PA arose largely from the decentralised, bottom-up approach which was adopted for administering the relief. This approach relied on the efforts of a large number of junior officials of varying capabilities, competence and experience; in some cases, Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs were not even literate. The bottom-up approach also necessarily involved extended information flows concerned with initial needs assessments, dissemination of allocation plans, and reporting on distribution. Required information could only be passed on in a timely manner if communications within the administrative hierarchy worked very well; and for a variety of physical, technical, and organisational reasons this was not always the case.

These difficulties do not invalidate the concept of the bottom-up administrative approach which had crucial advantages in terms of drawing on local knowledge and of maximising people's access to relief foodstuffs. Better performance in some districts, and improvements which were seen in others during the Program, suggest that much could be done to ensure a more consistent and adequate performance in a future emergency within the framework of such an approach.

With the benefit of experience already gained, and of adequate time (it is to be hoped) before a future emergency, GOK now has an opportunity to:

- a) draw-up a contingency plan for implementing and administering future relief programs, covering:
 - advance identification of impending food shortages, and of the scale and scope of relief required;
 - sequential steps and critical timings for implementation of a relief program;
 - activities, responsibilities and relationships of implementing agencies;
 - overall direction, co-ordination and communications;
- b) define and formally document procedures and systems for administering the distribution of commodities; regarding the PA, this would set out responsibilities, authority levels and reporting requirements for carrying out needs assessments, distribution planning, and submission of returns;
- c) prepare standard documentation together with appropriate instructions and guidelines for administrative staff;
- d) communicate the above plans and procedures to senior officials in the PA; prepare to provide specific and detailed training in systems to junior officials as a preliminary step in the implementation of a future relief program.

It should not be implied that the Provincial Administration is the only organisation able to draw lessons from the Program. Each implementing agency had, to some extent, to adapt to novel requirements and unusual demands in order to perform its appointed role. Each agency could with benefit examine the good and bad aspects of its own performance in the Program, with a view to assisting GOK in contingency planning for future emergencies. (We have already commented, for example, on the need for improved accuracy in NCPB's records of despatches to individual depots).

Many aspects of our own role as monitors were also new to us, and required us to become acquainted with unfamiliar issues, organisations, and procedures. In common with other agencies involved, therefore, we consider that we learned a number of lessons during the Program, and there are a number of ways in which we

would attempt to enhance the effectiveness of our monitoring activities in a future program.

One positive lesson springs from the performance of the graduates who were employed as field staff for the exercise. These staff were diligent and responsible, and very quickly acquired a thorough understanding of the Program itself and their role in it. Consequently, we would not hesitate to adopt the same team structure, and to engage similar staff, in any future exercise of this nature.

One area of potential improvement would be a more systematic definition of monitoring tasks, and assignment of monitoring priorities, than we achieved. A more systematic approach is easier to accomplish with the benefit of experience, when the potential problems (eg. ration size, reporting of distribution, condition of stored commodities) and less critical areas (eg. NCPB accounting, transport) are known, than at the outset. In the event, we do not think that our approach resulted in significant monitoring gaps, since our field staff showed commendable initiative in ensuring that no significant tasks or issues went unaddressed. It would, however, be unsafe to assume this would always be the case.

A second area of potential improvement is in reporting, particularly the reporting of issues or problems requiring immediate action which could not be dealt with adequately in regular monthly written reports to USAID. In general we reported such problems (eg. lack of distribution records, poor storage conditions in depots) as we discovered them, to officials of the relevant organisations, as well as to USAID. However, it is possible that we did not always immediately report such problems to officials of sufficient authority to ensure that necessary action was taken.

Thus, for example, we would always in future inform senior head office NCPB staff of a leaking roof or rodent infestation in a NCPB store, having learned that it is not sufficient merely to express our concern to the relevant depot manager. In this regard, there would be substantial advantage in each implementing agency having a senior member of staff specifically designated as a "troubleshooter" for his/her own organisation. There would then be no doubt as to which individual should be informed of any pressing problems or difficulties.

These reservations aside, we think that the output from the monitoring exercise demonstrates the virtue of USAID's decision to engage, on its own behalf, monitoring services for the Program. The key advantage of the monitoring exercise was to provide regular,

informed and impartial assessments of the specific and overall effectiveness of the Program, as the Program was taking place. Without these assessments, USAID would have had a much less complete or clear picture of the extent to which the Program's objectives were being met; and it is possible that, on the basis only of information available from the implementing agencies themselves, the overall success of the Program might not fully have been achieved.

APPENDICES

I. Introduction

The USAID Mission to Kenya wishes to employ a Kenya based Firm to perform the following scope of work: 1. to monitor food imports from arrival in Mombasa through to final destinations to the ultimate recipient. 2. provide an indepth review of present administrative, financial and reporting controls employed by all Kenyan agencies handling PL 480 Title II commodities supplied by the United States Government under the Drought Emergency Relief Program.

Time is of the essence. Companies proposing services under this request should provide the following:

- (1) Demonstration of the company's ability to provide the services, a list of former clients for whom similar work was done.
- (2) CV'S on the personnel proposed to accomplish the scope of work.
- (3) The costs estimated for the work must be quoted on a person-month basis (by function, IE team leader, monitor, and report personnel.

II. Objective

The GOK through a PL 480 food grant from the USG will import, and distribute approximately 250,000 tons of food commodities into Kenya from late September 1984 thru October, 1985. The USG wishes to insure that the receipt, transport, storage, and distribution of these commodities are handled in a prudent, and timely fashion. The company selected to perform the following scope of work will assist the USAID Mission in reaching this objective.

III. Scope of Work

The selected firm will provide the following personnel: (A) project team leader, (B) six food program monitors and (C) a 3 person systems evaluation team as detailed below:

A. Coordinator: Food Monitoring Program

1) The team leader will supervise the food monitors and will function and coordinating their activities within the food monitoring program. The monitoring program is established to assure that the food distribution program complies with U.S Public Law 480, Title II requirements.

2) Duties and responsibilities: General. Act as liaison between all implementing agencies and USAID under the supervision of the USAID Drought Coordinator (currently the USAID Deputy Director) or his designee to determine the extent to which the Government of Kenya is conducting its PL 480 Title II assisted efforts in conformity with the relevant sections of AID's Handbook 9. Specifically, the team leader supervises and assists the food program monitors to:

a) Determine if eligibility requirements established by the GOK for beneficiaries within each program category are being met.

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b) Determine whether the rations received by the beneficiaries are the ones established by the GOK for each one of the feeding programs.

c) Determine if the final use of the foodstuffs distributed is that which was established within the bilateral agreements.

d) Determine if the records of each distribution center accurately reflect the number of beneficiaries and food quantities distributed to each beneficiary.

e) Examine physical inventories of the warehouses in order to determine differences between records and real stock.

f) Review documentation of the central and regional warehouses to determine that the entries and outflow of foods are appropriately registered.

g) Determine whether the physical conditions in the warehouses and distribution centers are adequate and appropriate.

h) Carry out surveys or inquiries at distribution points to establish dates when products and quantities were distributed.

i) Carry out market checks of businesses to determine if there are sales of donated foods by beneficiaries or by other persons that are directly or indirectly involved in the feeding program.

j) Prepare monthly written field trip reports summarizing the above points in items a thru i.

k) Participate in and execute other activities required.

3) Qualifications: The team leader must have broad administrative, financial and inventory management background. Experience with Governmental institutions and PL 480 food projects is highly desirable.

B. Food program monitors:

1) Duties and responsibilities are basically an extension of those of the team leader with less emphasis on supervision and coordination.

2) Qualifications: Incumbents will be expected to conduct surveys, make inventories, and perform data collection functions. High School graduates are acceptable, but at least one year of College is preferred. Previous background in finance, inventory control, and management would be useful.

RECONCILIATION OF COMMODITIES SUPPLIED
BY USAID AND COMMODITIES DESPATCHED
FOR DISTRIBUTION BY NCPB

Introduction

In this Appendix we provide a reconciliation of the total quantities of PL 480 Title II commodities shipped to Kenya by USAID, with the total quantities of the same commodities which were distributed. The main purpose of this reconciliation is to identify any substantial discrepancies which could indicate major diversions or improper use of the relief commodities, or inadequate control of the movement of the commodities.

Tolerances

There are two potential types of discrepancy we have considered.

The first is the difference between quantities shipped and quantities landed at Mombasa Port. The relevant USAID rules and regulations state that for shipments of less than 10,000 tonnes, delivery is regarded by USAID as complete if the quantity landed is within a 5% tolerance, plus or minus, of the quantity contracted. For shipments of 10,000 tonnes or more, the tolerance level is 2%. USAID allows no tolerance to the shippers themselves.

The second is the difference between the quantity landed, and therefore available for free distribution, and the quantity distributed or otherwise accounted for (spoiled or remaining in stock). Given the scale of the relief program, and the strain it placed on the logistical and accounting capabilities of the key implementing agencies, we would regard a tolerance of up to 5% as acceptable in this area.

Available Records

The records available for performing the reconciliation are as follows:

- Bills of Lading: show the gross quantities shipped.
- KCHS Outturn Reports: show the quantities landed at the port by KCHS. These reports are reliable only for bagged commodities, since KCHS has no effective means of accurately measuring bulk landings.

Mombasa NCPB Bagging Reports: show the bagging of maize which was shipped and offloaded in bulk (78,204 tonnes). These reports are more accurate for bulk commodities than the KCHS outturn reports, but still represent an estimate since they rely on the assumption that the recorded numbers of bags are, on average, filled correctly.

DH+SMC tracking system for the commodities, based on monthly reports solicited from NCPB. These show the quantities despatched for distribution from NCPB depots, remaining stocks at NCPB depots, and losses due to spoilage, etc.

The quantities recorded in the DH+SMC distribution tracking system differ from those presented in Section 3 of this report. The latter were taken from NCPB despatch records, and are used in Section 3 because, unlike the DH+SMC records, they show the districts to which commodities were despatched. For the purposes of overall reconciliation, however, we consider the DH+SMC tracking records to be more accurate than the NCPB despatch reports.

For reasons amply discussed elsewhere (see Section 4), the distribution returns compiled by the Provincial Administration do not provide an adequate basis for reconciling the quantities of commodities supplied with those actually distributed to recipients.

Findings

The reconciliations are presented in the four tables at the end of this Appendix. They show some discrepancies between the quantities shipped, landed and distributed, but these discrepancies are small in relation to the total quantities concerned. As percentages of the gross quantities shipped, these discrepancies can be summarised as follows:

	Maize (Bags x <u>45.36kg</u>)	Maize (<u>Bulk</u>)	Pinto Beans (Bags x <u>5kg</u>)	Dried Milk (Packets x <u>23kg</u>)
Shortlandings (%)	0.2	1.8	0.1	-
Unexplained Loss/ (Surplus) in distribution (%)	1.3	(3.6)	(2.6)	1.5

These discrepancies all fall within the acceptable limits of tolerance discussed earlier. The unexplained losses/surpluses in distribution are, we consider, largely the result of human error in recording the movements of the commodities.

Conclusion

The available records allow us only to reconcile the quantities supplied with the quantities despatched for distribution from NCPB depots. This reconciliation provides no evidence of significant diversions or deliberate abuse of PL480 Title II commodities supplied under the Drought Emergency Relief Program. This conclusion is supported by the findings of our own monitoring team throughout the Program. We are convinced that any major instances of malpractice or fraud would have been detected in the course of our monitoring activities, and we are aware of no such instances having occurred.

Table A 2.1

RECONCILIATION OF SUPPLIES AND DISTRIBUTION

- YELLOW MAIZE IN BAGS x 45.36 kgs

	<u>BAGS</u>	<u>TONNES EQUIVALENT</u>
GROSS SHIPMENT (per Bill of Lading)	593,566	26,924
SHORTLANDINGS	(1,189)	(54)
QUANTITY LANDED (per KCHS Outturn Reports)	----- 592,377 =====	----- 26,870 =====
DESPATCHED FOR DISTRIBUTION NOV 84 - NOV 85 (per NCPB)	583,840	26,483
STOCKS AT END NOV 85 (per NCPB)	429	19
ESTIMATED LOSSES (per DH&SMC)	617 ----- 584,886	28 ----- 26,483
UNEXPLAINED LOSSES	7,491 ----- 592,377 =====	339 ----- 26,870 =====

NB: Shortlanding is equal to 0.2% of gross shipment
Unexplained loss is equal to 1.3% of gross shipment.

Table A 2.2

RECONCILIATION OF SUPPLIES AND DISTRIBUTION

- YELLOW MAIZE IN BULK

	<u>BAGS</u>	<u>TONNES OR TONNES EQUIVALENT</u>
GROSS SHIPMENT (per Bill of Lading)	-	79,622
SHORTLANDINGS + WASTAGE (per NCPB)	-	(1,418)
QUANTITY BAGGED per NCPB	-	----- 78,204
OF WHICH:		
BAGS x 50 kg for Free Distribution (per NCPB)	1,163,706	58,185
BAGS x 90 kg for Monetisation (per NCPB)	222,434	20,019 ----- 78,204 =====
DESPATCHED FOR DISTRIBUTION FEB 85 - NOV 85 (per NCPB)	1,208,056	60,403
REMAINING STOCKS END NOV 85 (per NCPB)	4,331	217
KNOWN LOSSES (per DH+SMC)	8,696 ----- 1,221,083	435 ----- 61,055
UNEXPLAINED SURPLUS	(60,397) ----- 1,160,686 =====	(2,870) ----- 58,185 =====

NB: Shortlanding is equal to 1.8% of gross shipment.
Unexplained surplus is equal to 3.6% of gross shipment.

Table A 2.3

RECONCILIATION OF SUPPLIES AND DISTRIBUTION

- PINTO BEANS IN BAGS x 45.36 kgs

	<u>BAGS</u>	<u>TONNES EQUIVALENT</u>
GROSS SHIPMENT (per Bill of Lading)	59,520	2,700
SHORTLANDINGS	(25)	(1)
QUANTITY LANDED (per KCHS Outturn Report)	----- 59,495 =====	----- 2,699 =====
DESPATCHED FOR DISTRIBUTION NOV 84 - NOV 85 (per NCPB)	60,342	2,737
STOCKS AT END NOV 85 (per NCPB)	NIL	NIL
KNOWN LOSSES (per DH+SMC)	680	31
	----- 61,022	----- 2,768
UNEXPLAINED SURPLUS	(1,527)	(69)
	----- 59,495 =====	----- 2,699 =====

NB: Shortlanding is less than 0.1% of gross shipment.
Unexplained surplus is equal to 2.6% of gross shipment.

Table A 2.4

RECONCILIATION OF SUPPLIES AND DISTRIBUTION

- NON FAT ORIED MILK IN PACKETS x 22.73 kgs

	<u>PACKETS</u>	<u>TONNES EQUIVALENT</u>
GROSS SHIPMENT (per Bill of Lading)	85,659	1,947
SHORTLANDINGS	-	-
QUANTITY LANDED (per KCHS Outturn Report)	----- 85,659 =====	----- 1,947 =====
DESPATCHED FOR DISTRIBUTION NOV 84 - NOV 85 (per NCPB)	83,922	1,908
STOCKS AT END NOV 85 (per NCPB)	35	1
KNOWN LOSSES (per DH+SMC)	428	10
	----- 84,385	----- 1,919
UNEXPLAINED LOSS	1,274	28
	----- 85,659 =====	----- 1,947 =====

NB: Unexplained loss is equal to 1.5% of the gross shipment.

RECONCILIATION OF OP AND DH+SMC DISTRIBUTION

RECORDS

Introduction

We have presented and discussed our own distribution records, and the despatch records of NCPB, in Sections 2 and 3 of the main text of this report. We also discuss these records in Appendix 2, and reconcile the overall quantities of PL480 commodities distributed with those despatched from USA and landed at Mombasa Port. In this Appendix we consider the data made available to us by the Office of the President concerning the overall distribution.

Work Done

We visited OP in January 1986 to examine the distribution returns submitted by DC's to the Central Co-ordinator in OP. The Central Co-ordinator kindly allowed us to examine his available records. We recorded from them all the information which was relevant to the reconciliation exercise.

Findings

In theory, the elapsed time between the official end of the Drought Emergency Relief Program, in October/November 1985, and late January 1986, when we visited OP, should have been sufficient for the final and completed distribution returns to have been submitted by the 25 Districts involved in the Program. We found that this was not the case. Only 13 Districts appeared to have submitted any monthly returns regarding commodity distribution, and some of those which had complied with this reporting requirement had done so erratically.

The information we gathered from the OP files is presented in the Tables at the end of this Appendix. Not one District appears to have submitted a complete set of distribution returns for the Program. Two of the Districts which came closest to providing complete information are Garissa and Wajir, where extensive feeding programs are carried out even when there is no generalised drought. The administration in these areas, therefore, is more familiar with the types of reporting procedures required by the Drought Emergency Relief Program than a number of others. Set against this, however, is the fact that the obstacles to effective communications in, and with, these Districts are far

greater than in a number of less remote Districts which failed to provide any reliable information at all. The other Districts which provided reasonably complete information were Baringo and Kajiado, where, again, longer term familiarity with feeding programs exists.

Because of the large gaps in the submission of monthly returns by the DC's, it has not been possible to perform an overall reconciliation between the records of distribution available at OP and our own/NCPB's records. Regarding yellow maize, for example, the OP distribution records account for only 31,200 tonnes, whereas the total quantity actually involved was over 86,000 tonnes.

In addition, there are individual discrepancies between the OP records concerning distribution and the NCPB records concerning despatches to the districts. In the case of Lamu, for example, the two sets of records show the following quantities of maize in the month of April to July 1985:

Lamu District Quantities of maize:	Despatches per NCPB (tonnes)	Distribution per OP returns (tonnes)
April	885.7	53.6
May	-	173.4
June	723.9	234.5
July	-	72.2

These discrepancies arise partly through timing differences; despatches to Lamu were large but infrequent, whereas distribution was carried out each month. They also reflect the incompleteness of the Lamu district returns, which arose because not all of the Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs at distribution points submitted returns to the DC, for onward submission to OP.

Conclusion

The inadequacy of the distribution returns submitted by recipient Districts to OP is not unexpected, since our regular monitoring activities revealed many instances of failure by local officials to compile records at the distribution points, and also a number of instances where communication between DC's and OP in Nairobi were very poor. The reasons for these breakdowns have been discussed in Section 4 of this report.

The failure of this reporting system is particularly unfortunate since this was the only mechanism incorporated in the Drought Emergency Relief Program for providing full information on the distribution of PL480 commodities, including the timing of distribution, quantities distributed, and numbers of recipients on

each occasion. (NCPB records show only the quantities of relief foodstuffs despatched to different Districts, or groups of Districts, and our own monitoring activities were not designed to provide 100% coverage of the distributions carried out). Since there are a significant number of cases in which the base data were never compiled at distribution points in the first instance, it would not now be possible to build up a complete picture of the overall distribution from Provincial Administration records, even by visiting each of the Districts, Divisions and Locations concerned to examine records which they have so far neglected to forward to OP. Thus no reliable and complete record of the actual distribution either exists or can be compiled.

The breakdown of the reporting system through the Provincial Administration also suggests that the assessment and communication of needs, using the same mechanism, may not have been accurately carried out and properly updated. As we indicate in the main text of the report, we believe this to have been the case, and we cite a number of instances in which we believe the official numbers of needy recipients were inaccurate. Fortunately, such inaccuracies do not appear to have resulted in inadequate allocations of supplies to Districts, since the discernible tendency was for needs assessments to exaggerate, rather than understate, actual needs. The extent to which the mechanism of the Provincial Administration failed to meet its objectives in accurately communicating local needs and in reporting on distribution, however, suggests that particular attention must be paid to these areas in planning for the contingency of any future drought relief programs.

Table A3.1

SUMMARY OF OP DISTRIBUTION RECORDSYELLOW MAIZE (TONNES)

<u>DISTRICT</u>	<u>DEC 84</u>	<u>JAN 85</u>	<u>FEB 85</u>	<u>MAR 85</u>	<u>APR 85</u>	<u>MAY 85</u>	<u>JUN 85</u>	<u>JUL 85</u>	<u>AUG 85</u>	<u>SEP 85</u>	<u>OCT 85</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
BARINGO	72.6	707.9	276.9	2163.3	1280.5	1429.9	1198.5	965.4	750.0			8845.0
BAMBURU												-
BAROK												-
BEST POKOT												-
BAIKIPIA	453.6	453.6	362.9									1270.1
BURKANA												-
CAJIADO	181.4	181.4	181.4	5035.0	279.7	150.0	150.0	135.0	90.0	90.0		6473.9
ELGEYO MARAKWET						299.9						299.9
HANDERA						103.3	183.0					286.3
KAJIR				4.5	22.5	8.2	33.6	25.4	7.0	45.3	11.2	157.7
KARISSA	50.3	2.5	70.3	134.0	67.7	192.2	72.1	290.0	81.4	90.4	0.5	1051.4
KANA RIVER			28.6									28.6
KAMU		3.5		193.3	53.6	173.4	234.5	72.2	34.0			764.5
KAITA TAVETA												-
KERU												-
KISIOLO	416.9											416.9
KARSABIT												-
KITUI												-
KACHAKOS				5792.6	3373.5	1580.5	515.1	253.1				11514.8
KIMBU												-
KIYERI												-
KIYANDARUA												-
KIRINYAGA												-
KIAMBU												-
KURANGA	90.7											90.7
TOTAL (Tonnes)	1265.5	1348.9	920.1	13322.7	5077.5	3937.4	2386.8	1741.1	962.4	225.7	11.7	31199.8

Total quantity despatched for distribution, per NCPB (tonnes) 86,886

Table A3.2

SUMMARY OF OP DISTRIBUTION RECORDS

PINTO BEANS (BAGS x 45.36 kgs)

<u>DISTRICT</u>	<u>DEC 84</u>	<u>JAN 85</u>	<u>FEB 85</u>	<u>MAR 85</u>	<u>APR 85</u>	<u>MAY 85</u>	<u>JUN 85</u>	<u>JUL 85</u>	<u>AUG 85</u>	<u>SEP 85</u>	<u>OCT 85</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
BARINGO		869	31	305	164							1369
SAMBURU												-
NAROK												-
WEST POKOT												-
LAIKIPIA												-
TURKANA												-
KAJIADO	88											-
ELGEYO MARAKWET						88						176
MANDERA			320									-
WAJIR				20	21	34		55		60	6	320
GARISSA			353									196
TANA RIVER			23				65					418
LAMU			207	162								23
TAITA TAVETA			92									369
MERU		280										92
ISIOLO												280
MARSABIT												-
KITUI												-
MACHAKOS												-
EMBU					66	29	41	451				587
NYERI												-
NYANDARUA												-
KIRINYAGA												-
KIAMBU												-
MURANGA												-
TOTAL (Bags)	88	1149	1026	487	251	151	106	506	-	60	6	3830
TOTAL (Tonnes Equivalent)	4	52	47	22	11	7	5	23	-	3	-	174

Total quantity despatched for distribution, per NCPB (tonnes) 2,737

Table A3.3

SUMMARY OF OP DISTRIBUTION RECORDS

NON FAT DRIED MILK POWDER (PACKETS x 22.73 kgs)

<u>DISTRICT</u>	<u>DEC 84</u>	<u>JAN 85</u>	<u>FEB 85</u>	<u>MAR 85</u>	<u>APR 85</u>	<u>MAY 85</u>	<u>JUN 85</u>	<u>JUL 85</u>	<u>AUG 85</u>	<u>SEP 85</u>	<u>OCT 85</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
BARINGO		1367	1257	103								2727
AMBURU												-
BAROK												-
BEST POKOT												-
BAIKIPIA												-
BARKANA												-
BARJIADO	352											-
BARGEYO MARAKWET						352		132				836
BANDERA			870									-
BARJIR			20	60	11	30	79	17	18	35	9	870
BARISSA		1113	264	29	5							279
BANA RIVER			3897									1411
BAMU			165									3897
BAITA TAVETA					200	27		40				432
BARU												-
BIGLO		980										-
BARSABIT												980
BETUI												-
BACHAKOS					704	176	318	1559				-
BABU												2757
BABERI												-
BANDARUA												-
BARINYAGA												-
BAMBUI												-
BARANGA												-
TOTAL (Bags)	352	3460	6473	192	920	585	397	1748	18	35	9	14189
TOTAL (Tonnes Equivalent)	8	79	147	4	21	13	9	40	-	1	-	322
Total quantity despatched for distribution, per NCPB (tonnes)						1,908						

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USAID GRAIN MONITORING PROJECT

APPENDIX 4

LIST OF LOSSES DUE TO ROTTING/ACCIDENT

<u>PLACE/DEPOT</u>	<u>PL 480 COMMODITIES</u>				<u>REMARKS</u>
	<u>Yellow Maize</u> <u>x 45.36 kgs</u>	<u>Yellow Maize</u> <u>x 50 kgs</u>	<u>Non Fat</u> <u>Dried Milk</u> <u>powder</u> <u>x 22.68 kgs</u>	<u>Pinto</u> <u>Beans</u> <u>x 45.36</u> <u>kgs</u>	
Isiolo District (Central Div)		10			Rotten
Mombasa (Dolly Turman)	34				Received water damaged
Mombasa (M V Heroinae)				645	Received oil damaged
				20	Sweepings from the ship which were thrown away
Konza Depot			20		Clumped
Nanyuki Depot			7		Short received
Nairobi Depot			74		Short received in railway wagon
Machakos Depot			96		Clumped, therefore condemned and destroyed
Kibwezi Depot				2	Rotten
Garissa District HQ		278			Bags mouldy and so unfit for human consumption
Meru Depot	11				Short received due to accident at Muranga
Meru Depot		7737			Condemned as unfit for human consumption
Mombasa (M V Heroinae)				8	Rotten
Sagana Depot		41			Rotten, therefore condemned and destroyed
Mombasa (M V Chikas)				25	Short landed
Kitui Depot				5	Rotten, therefore condemned and destroyed
Meru Depot		329			Short received due to accident at Meru
Samburu (Maralal Urban)		100			Rotten
Kitui Depot			222		Rotten, therefore condemned and destroyed
Nanyuki Depot	42				Received oil damaged
Kitui Depot		116			Short received due to accident Kitui-Machakos road
Nanyuki Depot		302			Rotten, therefore condemned and destroyed
Meru (Tigania Division)		117			Rotten, therefore condemned and destroyed
Machakos Depot		8			Received rain soaked and rotten
Thika Depot			9		Clumped
Nairobi Depot		153			Rain soaked from consignment of 600 bags
Narok (Mosiro Location)		7			Rotten
Kitui (Mutomo Location)		150			Rotten from Thika Depot
Kitui (Mutomo Division)		363			Rotten, therefore condemned and destroyed
West Pokot (Marichi Centre)		45			Received rotten at the centre
Thika Depot		78			Rotten, therefore condemned and destroyed
Laikipia (Mukogodo Division)		327			Rotten, therefore condemned and destroyed
Totals	87	10161	428	1064	

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VERIFICATION OF PAYMENTS CLAIMS BY TRANSPORTERS

Introduction

We carried out a reconciliation and verification of payments claims by transporters in order to ascertain whether or not these claims were correct according to the quantities, distances, and agreed transport rates.

Work Done

We carried out either a full verification or a sample verification on each of the main transport categories, as follows:

Rail Transport

Mombasa to upcountry NCPB depots.

Road Transport

Mombasa to upcountry NCPB depots.
Inter depot transfers.
NCPB Depot to Distribution Points.

The reconciliations involved performing the following tasks:

- i) Scrutinising individual transporters' invoices to check for correct distances, rates, and calculations;
- ii) reconciling invoices with NCPB despatch and receiving advices, to check that claims related to actual and completed movements;
- iii) reconciling invoices with NCPB payment vouchers and debit notes, to check that invoiced amounts had been paid, and that any appropriate deductions or recoveries (eg, for short deliveries) had been made;
- iv) reconciling summaries of total mileages, and payment amounts according to transporters statements and NCPB records;
- v) investigating any discrepancies identified in i) - v).

For transport from Mombasa to upcountry NCPB depots, we carried out a 100% reconciliation on the available records, which were to the end of February 1985 in the case of rail, and to the end of September 1985 in the case of road.

For inter-depot transfers and transfers to distribution points, we examined records on a sample basis relating to the following movements:

- Nanyuki Depot to Meru Depot
- Nanyuki Depot to distribution points
- Nakuru Depot to Kabarnet Depot
- Nakuru Depot to distribution points

We chose these movements partly because the relatively orderly nature of the records facilitated the reconciliation exercise. The records we examined related to around 90,000 bags of maize, or around 5% of the total distributed.

Finally we reconciled records from a number of depots relating to "diversions"; that is, cases where truck drivers, having reached their destination at a district headquarters, had been asked by the DC to take the commodities on further to specific distribution points. The records are examined related to around 60,000 bags of maize.

Findings

We found a small number of irregularities, involving both under- and over-payments. These arose largely through erroneous calculations, or through the use of incorrect distance figures. The number of irregularities was sufficiently small, and included a large enough proportion of under-claiming by transporters, to convince us that no deliberate misrepresentation had taken place and that discrepancies which did exist were the result of mistakes. We concluded, therefore, that the transporters' payments claims were essentially in order.

With regard to Mombasa - upcountry transfers, there was only one discrepancy which we were unable to resolve during the course of our reconciliations. This concerned an apparent overpayment of KShs 58,203 to KTA in respect of 1890 bags of maize transported to Lamu in April 1985. We discussed this case with Mr Khaemba, in charge of Road Transport Accounts at NCPB, who promised to investigate but who was unable to do so at the time due to the unavailability of some necessary documents.

Again regarding Mombasa - upcountry transfers, we summarised the total numbers of bags of maize short-delivered between October 1984 and June 1985, and checked the total debit charges made against transporters in respect of these shortages. We found that all shortages had been debited correctly to the transporters.

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Regarding inter-depot transfers and transfers to distribution points, we found no significant discrepancies. The quantities concerned and the rates per bag transported were correct. We were not able accurately to verify all of the distances involved in transferring maize to distribution points, since, unlike inter-depot transfers, no agreed mileages had been laid down for particular trips. However, we found no reason to suspect that the mileages used were wrong.

Regarding diversions, we again found that transporters' claims reconciled with NCPB and other records, and that the amounts claimed were correct.

Conclusion

Apart from a small number of errors, most which have since been resolved, transporters' payments claims were in order, taking into account agreed rates and distances, and actual quantities (less shortages) transported.