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END-OF-PROJECT EVALUATION
of the
PRIMARY AND NON-FORMAL EDUCATION PROJECT
IN CAPE VERDE
655-0008

by
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A report submitted to Mr. A. Hartman, ADO, in fulfillment of the contractual obligations between José S. Gonçalves, Ph.D. and the U.S. Agency for International Development/Praia Mission.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 102 classrooms and 15 teacher housing units constructed with the assistance of USAID, built 1/3 as many primary education facilities in Cape Verde in the past 7 years as were built in the over 500 years of Portuguese colonization. Although the project was completed some 5 years after the projected completion date due to many internal constraints faced by Cape Verde during the country's first decade of independence, the project output accomplished 102 rather than the planned 100 classrooms, and trained 350, or, 75% more educators than the number originally planned for the same original grant amount of \$3,000,000 dollars. With few exceptions, the evaluator found that the school construction component of the project is almost 100% completed as of the date of the site visits. The few details yet to be completed include sand filling and cobblestoning of some playgrounds and turning on of electric power in the few schools equipped with electrical installations.

Although the construction costs of schools were generally higher than the budgeted amount, thanks to the devaluation of the Cape Verdean escudo and the rise of the dollar in the past seven years, the total project was completed within the terms of the grant Agreement. Had the favorable escudo/dollar exchange rate not occurred, it is doubtful whether the project would have attained 3/4 of its completion objectives. While negative from a purely rational project management standpoint, the prolongation of the project from the somewhat unrealistic 2-year target to 7 years actual completion schedule was a positive factor in terms of providing employment to the rural population in Cape Verde during a period when hundreds of thousands of Africans in other similarly drought stricken areas of the continent were dying of starvation. The USAID-funded project then had both product and process benefits. As a product benefit it made a significant contribution toward meeting primary education needs in Cape Verde. As a process benefit it provided employment to the rural population which, due to the persistent years of drought, would have had few other opportunities of gainful employment.

The USAID-funded schools have values far beyond their principal function as primary classrooms. In rural areas, these schools function as veritable community centers as a result of the multitude of community activities which take place within them. With the exception of public dances and other community festivities which are prohibited, these schools are used to hold literacy classes, civic and party meetings, youth and women organization meetings, and mass is even held in one remote community when the priest makes a local visit. As a result of their multiple uses, it can be said that if the intended full use of these schools is as primary classrooms, the triple shift program which exists in many of them as well as the many community uses which they serve increase their functional use by 100 to 200 percent.

Overall, the evaluator found that the school construction and the teacher training and upgrading project implemented not only complied with the terms of the USAID/Government of Cape Verde Agreement but that the positive, unanticipated benefits far surpassed the objectives stipulated in the Agreement.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. INTRODUCTION	1
A. Evaluation Objectives	1
B. Project Background	2
II. METHODOLOGY	5
A. Focused Discussions	5
B. Informal Interviewing	6
C. Survey Questionnaire	6
D. Focused Observation	7
E. Documentation Review	8
F. Sampling and Site Visits	8
G. Limitations and Scope of the Evaluation	9
III. DISCUSSION	10
A. School Construction	11
1. Construction and Furnishing Costs	16
2. Population Served	19
3. Financial and Management Problems Encountered	21
B. Teacher Training and Upgrading	5
1. Major Problems Facing Primary Instruction	26
a. Teacher Training Needs at the Elementary Level	27
b. Primary Teacher Employment Conditions	28
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS	10
V. RECOMMENDATIONS	16
APPENDIXES	

List of Tables

<u>Table</u>	<u>Page</u>
1	19a
2	25a
3	27a
4	28a

APPENDIXES

- A Questions to Guide Discussions with Local Officials
- B Teacher Questionnaire
- C Site Visit Checklist
- D Engineering Report
- E Photos

I. INTRODUCTION

In early March 1985, the project evaluator received a letter from the USAID/Praia Mission inquiring into the availability and interest of the evaluator to perform an end-of-project evaluation of the Primary and Non-Formal Education Project later in June. Although the evaluator promptly agreed to perform the 15 to 23-day consultancy assignment, USAID funding authorization delay in Washington prevented the evaluation from taking place in June as originally anticipated. Later, schedule conflicts on the part of the evaluator were responsible for two more postponements of the assignment until April 15, 1986 when the project evaluation was initiated.

A. Evaluation Objectives

The objective of the evaluation were to:

A. Review project files, documentation, and related material to gain an understanding of the project history and major implementation events.

B. Discuss project with concerned officials at Ministry of Education and Culture to:

-gain understanding of overall project implementation from GOCV perspective

-determine how project might have been improved overall

-gain understanding of the teacher training element of the project and how it complemented the other project inputs

-attempt to quantify overall project impact

C. Make selected site visits to various school locations to review overall project implementation with local officials, and how they view project impact.

D. Suggest any future courses of action to be taken by GOCV to maximize utilization of project inputs.

B. Project Background

On August 19, 1978 an educational development Project Grant Agreement was signed between the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Government of Cape Verde (GOCV). The Agreement had two objectives which were:

- (1) to improve primary and vocational education facilities on the islands of Santiago, Fogo and Brava, and
- (2) to upgrade the professional skills of

teachers and administrators responsible for Cape Verde's elementary education program.

Initially, the project included the construction of 60 rural primary schools, 15 teacher housing units in more remote rural areas and two vocational education workshops while the training component specified the design and implementation of programs to train and upgrade the capabilities of 200 teachers and education administrators. Specific outputs were the construction and furnishing of:

- 30 one-room elementary schools
- 20 two-room elementary schools
- 10 Three-room elementary schools
- 2 workshops
- 15 teacher housing units

A total of 100 classrooms and 15 teacher housing units were intended to serve more than 7,000 students and 15 teachers and their families. Additionally, the project sought to provide two sessions in in-country training to:

- 100 teachers in the methods of teaching nutrition, sanitation, handcrafts, and music education;
- 10 industrial arts specialists in teaching methods;

15 teacher in methodology of teaching basic
curriculum; and
15 schools administration in educational
management

The benefiting agency was the then Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC), now referred to simply as the Ministry of Education (ME). The then , Ministry of Housing and Public Works (MHOP), now Ministry of Public Works (MOP), was expected to provide assistance during the school construction phase of the project. Actual project implementation, however, included other GOCV agencies, namely the Ministry of Finance, and local Administrative Secretariats responsible for most construction projects outside the capital city of Praia. Hence, the integrated nature of this project which, while permitting several ministries and government agencies to pull their resources and work toward a common goal, also led to potential conflicts and bottlenecks which resulted in project delays at several stages of the school construction phase.

II. METHODOLOGY

The evaluation utilized a multi-method approach to gather data from various sources. Because information on the project was dispersed throughout various ministries, agencies and individuals, techniques appropriate to each source and type of information sought were devised to yield the maximum amount of information within the constraints of the evaluation period. Specifically, five methods of research were employed: focused discussions, informal interviewing, survey questionnaires, focused observation and review of documentation.

A. Focused Discussions

Focused discussion was the first method used to gather information from key officials involved with overall project management and with those officials under whose responsibility the finished project would eventually fall. This form of data gathering took place during meetings with key USAID and ME officials where information was exchanged reciprocally -- by the consultant presenting the purpose and goals of the evaluation mission while the officials presented the background and their particular concerns with respect to the project. Discussions with key representatives of USAID and ME were particularly useful initially in

providing not only a general overview of the project but also in delineating the general context within which the project was situated.

B. Informal Interviewing

A second method utilized informal interviews conducted with key project managers actually responsible for the execution of the project during the construction of schools or implementation phase of the teacher training component. A 15-question interview guideline, Appendix A, was devised to provide a structured and systematic means of obtaining information from project managers during meetings with Delegados do Governo, local ME representatives (usually school sub-inspectors), Public Works, and Finance representatives. The consultant studied the questions beforehand and kept them in mind in the course of meetings with appropriate officials more as a means of flushing out key issues rather than to attempt to force an interrogatory-type interview. Hence, desired information was obtained during the course of 1/2 hour to 45-minute discussions which appeared to be more of a sharing of mutual concerns rather than a structured interview per se.

C. Survey Questionnaire

Thirdly, a 20-question questionnaire, Appendix B, was

devised to obtain information from teachers assigned to those schools visited. Due to the number of visits and time constraint, it was felt that a structured questionnaire would be an appropriate means of gathering information from teachers regarding their teaching experience, level and type of training, and their views of the USAID-funded schools where they worked. Although initially it was anticipated that teachers would complete the questionnaire in 15 to 20 minutes while the consultant inspected the school facility, early on it was discovered that teachers were not used to filling out questionnaires and consequently tended to take a lot more time to answer the questions which also appeared to reveal a certain lack of spontaneity in the answers given. As a result, from the second site visit on the questionnaires were completed by the consultant during a 15-minute face-to-face structured interview with teachers.

D. Focused Observation

A fourth method was focused observation through the use of a checklist, Appendix C. This instrument was created to guide the consultant to rapidly obtain descriptive information on the nature and condition of the schools visited. This checklist was devised after the first school visit when it was discovered that more systematic and time-efficient means of gathering

descriptive data was needed. Information gathered with the checklist permitted partial quantification of data sought.

E. Documentation Review

A fifth method of data gathering utilized review of existing documentation on the project. Sequentially, documentation review occurred immediately following initial discussions with the USAID representative and the ME Secretary-General. Documentation consisting of reports on file, correspondence, and internal memoranda were reviewed both at the USAID and at the ME offices. Review of project documents and initial discussions with key officials responsible for overall project management provided the basis for the design of the research methodology and identification of key areas of concern to be concentrated upon.

F. Sampling and Site Visits

The consultant's objective was to visit at least 50% of school sites and meet with corresponding individuals responsible for the project at those sites as well as with teachers assigned to the schools visited. Although no formal sampling of sites was conducted, the intention was to visit a cross-section of schools in urban and rural areas, as well as, easy access and remote sites.

Although, it was initially felt that seven days would be dedicated to site visits, nine days were actually spent (albeit, not all were as productive as desired due to difficulties with inter-island transportation schedule, and the week-long S. Filipe festivities in Fogo). Nonetheless, a total of 28 out of 51 sites were visited and a balanced representation of sites were included in the visits. Only in Brava were all six sites visited -- This was due primarily to the dedication of the local sub-inspector and to the small size of the island. In Fogo, five out of seven sites were visited and, in Santiago, visits were made to 17 out of 38 sites.

G. Limitation and Scope of the Evaluation

Three major constraints posed limitations to the evaluation mission: time, inter-island travels and punctuality. It goes without saying that from the point of view of the evaluator there is never enough time to conduct any evaluation. Therefore, all evaluation activities must be designed with time as the omnipresent constraint. The consultant was contracted for 23 days to perform the evaluation services, which included two days of travels to and from Cape Verde, thus leaving 21 actual working days in which to perform the services. It was around these 21 working days that evaluation activities were designed to include meetings, review of evaluation objectives, review of documentation, formulation and refinement of the evaluation plan, construction of the

research instruments, site visits, data gathering and analysis, preparation and submittal of the evaluation report.

Inter-island travels were the second constraint which had an adverse impact on the evaluation. Effected through a combination of planes and boats, the various delays and schedule changes shortened the Fogo visit by one day, and the site visits had to be conducted in two different time periods--prior to departure and upon return from Brava. Finally, confusion on the part of the local education representative regarding the consultant's return from Brava as well as the existing festivities in Fogo caused the consultant to lose an afternoon as a result of lack of escort and transportation means to make planned site visits. Fortunately, the plane was scheduled to leave Fogo for Brava on the afternoon of the following day rather than its usually scheduled morning flight which availed the consultant of another one-half day to make the minimum number of site visits planned for Fogo. In spite of these limitations, however, over half of the school sites for this evaluation were visited, albeit the number of days dedicated to this activity had to be correspondingly increased.

III. DISCUSSION

The overall project evaluation focused on the assessment and measurement (quantification, where possible) of

project outcome. Project outcome was in turn compared with set goals and objectives to establish the degree to which outcome met, exceeded or fell short of initial plans. Where specific outputs differed from initial plans, efforts were made to seek data and explanations for the deviation. Data gathering activities focused on the two complementary project components: school construction and teacher training and upgrade of teaching skills.

A. School Construction

In a general sense it can be said that the 102 classrooms and 15 teacher housing units constructed with the assistance of USAID built 1/3 as many primary education facilities in Cape Verde in the past 7 years as were built in over 500 years of Portuguese colonization. (There were only 321 primary classrooms in the country at the time of Cape Verde's Independence in 1975).

The school construction project initiated in January of 1979 anticipated the construction and furnishing of 100 classrooms, 15 teachers housing units and a workshop by September 1981, to serve over 7,000 pupils. The 100 classrooms were to be constructed in groups of the following type of schools:

30 one-room elementary schools

20 two-room elementary schools

10 three-room elementary schools

Due to modification in the original design plans which were properly approved by USAID, a total of 102 classrooms, 13 teachers housing units and one workshop were constructed and furnished by May 1986, some 5 1/2 years behind the projected completion date of September 1981. As the reasons explaining the completion delay has been addressed in depth in the Engineering Evaluation Report, Appendix D, the present evaluation report will be limited to the highlighting of key obstacles encountered, and will focus principally on those aspects which complement and supplement the areas of the school construction component touched upon in the engineering report.

At the time of the visits made to 28 of the 51 school sites, all but one school was not yet occupied. The unoccupied school, one of the largest 8-room complexes in the Concelho de Santa Catarina was inaugurated on May 8, 1986 and was to begin operation within one week with 576 pupils. Due to the extreme shortage of classrooms, most schools were occupied while construction on the outside facilities were still going on; occupation of classrooms began as early as 1979. Of the schools visited, all were 100% completed structurally. The only aspects not yet completed in a few cases are the earthen playground which are expected to be cobblestoned or filled with sand, one

bathroom in which fixtures need to be mounted and electrical power turned on at urban schools and one workshop. The workshop in Fogo is complete but not yet equipped with power tools which did not arrive from the U.S. until mid-April 1986. The general quality of school construction appear to be quite durable due to steel reinforced concrete beams and high utilization of local basaltic or granite rocks. As a result of the steel reinforced beams and support, the schools have a robust and massive look to them. The high peaked gable roof and the double porthole windows give them a certain chapel-like look. In fact, in Praia and S. Filipe, these schools are affectionately called Capelinhas (Little chapels) by the local population as a means of distinguishing them from other schools in the area. In rural Fogo, most of the population was convinced that not schools but churches were being built in the community and it was not until operations began that it became clear that the buildings were indeed one-room school houses and not churches. One thing is certain: With their USAID plates placed either at the corner or center of the building and their chapel-like aspect this USAID-funded project will leave a singular legacy for years to come.

The classrooms are well lit by large windows on both sides of the room. About 90% of the schools visited were equipped with unbreakable glass. The natural

light produced is a mixed blessing, however, because too much light enters and tend to affect visibility on the natural cement blackboard. In many schools these blackboards have been painted black to create a greater contrast with the white chalk as well as to minimize the excessive chalk wear. One drawback of these fixed cement boards is the fact that they are more suited to the height of the teachers than to 1st and 2nd graders who can only reach the bottom third of the board even while standing on tiptoes. A simple solution might be the construction of small wooden risers to permit smaller children to make an adequate use of the blackboards.

All the schools in Brava and most of the schools in Fogo were furnished with the USAID-funded desks and chairs. In Santiago, about 3/4 of the schools visited had received the USAID furniture and the others were expecting them at any moment from the Ministry of Education. The furniture is a metal-leg and wooden surface combination which were built by the Institute of Solidarity workshop in Praia. The square metal desk legs and frame which were purchased in Portugal are of weak construction and several desks which have been in use for a little over one year were already damaged. A shipment of chairs made from plywood are also beginning to come apart, apparently due to poor quality of glue used. Of the problems found with the condition of schools, the worse by far however, is the

poor quality of locks used which had either broken handles or other defective mechanisms. It was indeed rare to find a door with original lock in good working condition. Many locks have been changed with others of no better quality or doors were rigged as best possible. The doors are also another problem as most opened with some difficulty due to warping.

No windows were found broken, even the few which are made of glass. Some window hinges show sign of wear and loose screws. Strong winds in most school sites are a major causes of window damage. Consequently most windows and doors are typically kept shut because of high winds, a condition which causes problems of ventilation in the classrooms. One possible solution might be to use screens or some other device in the portholes to improve ventilation.

Electrical installations are another problem. In the few schools to be equipped with electrical power, already before the power is even turned on, the lines are dangling loose in certain parts of the schools. This problem was particularly noted near the outdoor stage area where the lines were installed on the outside of the stone walls at an unusually low level where even the youngest child can tug at them during recess. Pulling on these lines have not only loosened them but have shaken loose the small wooden anchors which hold them to the wall. Now they are only a

damaged item, but when power is turned on, this problem can pose a major hazard to the play area and potentially put the safety of children at stake.

1. Construction and Furnishing Costs

Of the \$3,000,000 USAID grant funding, approximately \$2,700,000 was actually spent in construction of schools, teacher housing, and furnishing of classrooms while the remainder was spent in teacher training and upgrading seminars. It is important to note, however, that had the Cape Verdean escudo not devalued and the dollar not risen during the approximately 7-year construction period, inflation and the relative high costs of remote schools would have significantly reduced the targeted figure of 100 classrooms and 15 teacher housing units.

Although cost factors were not one of the principal objectives of this component of the evaluation, cost-related observations made during site visits and conversations with local Delegados do Governo permit some cost-related comments to be made. Overall the cost of each school was higher than the budgeted amount, especially for those schools built in the more remote areas of the country. While there are many reasons for this cost variation, the first of these was due to erroneous budget estimates which did not appear to take into consideration the additional expenses involved in transporting material to distant and rough terrain by

animal or by hand. Rather, the budgeting was done in Praia and tended to use assumptions applicable to urban costs rather than assumptions appropriate to rural conditions. Hence, not only did remote schools cost more per unit than the more accessible ones but these schools also took longer on the average to build.

A second factor which significantly increased the cost of schools was site location. Some schools in Fogo and in the interior of Santiago were built on very steep inclines which required the construction of major stone and cement walls to make the ground sufficiently level to permit the construction of school building facilities and small outdoor play areas (see photos on back of report). In one case in Fogo, for example, the initial retaining wall collapsed during an advanced stage of construction and a new, more fortified wall had to be built before construction of the classroom could begin. Conversations with various people involved in the construction process indicated no reasons for the choice of the site. One version indicated that one of the USAID engineers determined the exact location where the building should be erected in spite of objections on the part of local officials. Another version indicated that the owner of a more appropriate land site, some 100 yards away, refused to make the plot of land available for the construction of the school. Because of the long period of time which has lapsed since the site location decision was made, it was not possible to ascertain which of the two versions or

combination thereof was the more accurate.

Building finishing was the third cause of high costs. Although all schools visited used stone as the principal building material, in many cases the buildings were either completely or greatly plastered and later painted. Where the building was not totally plastered, the stones were finely worked by hand and many times unnecessarily decorated in order to give the building the desired "rustic" look. Other stone joints were chipped after all the stones had been set in place and later cement filled and painted white--an extremely time consuming task of no functional value.

Low productivity and lack of construction materials were two other factors which were responsible for completion delays and resulting higher costs. Local representatives generally agreed that low productivity was primarily due to repeated delays in fund transfers from the Ministry of Finance to local Administrative Secretariats. It was not unusual for workers to go without payment for 6 weeks and sometimes as long as 3 months because there was no money on hand to pay workers. Consequently, as one Delegado do Governo put it: "it's hard to demand higher productivity of a worker who has not been paid for 6 weeks of work." He indicated that this is a common problem with construction projects under his responsibility and suggested that one solution might be the creation of a project operating fund that could be advanced before the

project begins to cover those periods when the funds are late in being transferred from the Ministry of Finance. Had workers been paid on a timely basis and construction materials had been always available, the Delegado felt that in his opinion overall construction expenses could have been cut by up to one third of the total amount.

2. Population Served

Initial projections anticipated the construction of 100 classrooms to serve over 7,000 students . As can be noted on Table 1, however, not only were 102 classrooms constructed but, by using other annexed facilities on premises in the more populated schools, a total of 110 classrooms are actually in use to serve a population of 6,690 pupils. Although the actual number of pupils served is lower than the projected figure of 7,000, the facilities constructed can adequately accommodate up to 7,400 students. That the number of students served fall short of the estimated amount is due to a general decrease of the population in the rural areas which tend to migrate to urban centers or external emigration. It was generally noted during site visits that while remote rural areas tended to have slightly over half of the national average of classroom occupancy of 36 pupils per classroom/shift, the problem in urban areas was the opposite, with overcrowding and three rather than two shifts per day being the norm. In some classrooms visited, a desk

designed for two pupils was often occupied by three children. This overcrowding condition was pointed out by teachers as an important contributing factor of low student performance.

In addition to their educational roles, the USAID-funded schools function as true community centers, especially in the rural areas. By and large, these schools are the best building and often the only spacious facility in the smaller communities. As a result, most community functions take place within these schools after normal school hours. Besides instruction, these schools are used for adult literacy classes, parent/teacher meetings, people's courts, social welfare and public health meetings, party, youth, and women organization meetings and, in one remote site in Brava, mass is periodically given in the one-room school house when the island priest makes a local visit. This church state collaboration in education is longlasting as there are places where for years primary classes were held in local chapels or other religious buildings. In sum, local rural schools have uses which surpass by far their principal function as classrooms for primary instruction. With the exception of public dances, these schools function as a place of all major community activities and thus form the central hub of the community.

4. Financial and Management Problems Encountered

The many financial and management bottlenecks and obstacles encountered at various stages of the construction phase had many adverse consequences on the execution of the project. Although the problems were eventually resolved, albeit not all in as timely fashion as would have been desirable, the resulting consequence was the delay in project completion, higher than budgeted costs and conflicts between the different parties involved which at times led to minor crises in the implementation of the project. That the total project is almost 100% completed as per established plans as of the moment of this report, is evidence that the many problems which emerged were indeed resolved. However, it was generally agreed by those with whom the evaluator met that it is possible to have avoided the many obstacles faced during the construction phase of the project. Many factors were identified as causes for delay and high costs of the project. Chief amongst these was the lack of funds to meet payroll expenses at the worksite. From information gathered from various sources it appears that the financial problem began with the budgeting of construction costs which utilized urban cost assumptions rather than the generally higher rural costs associated with this type of project. In all fairness, however, it should be remembered that the cooperation Agreement was signed in 1978, barely three years after Cape Verdean Independence,

a time when the MOP had very few qualified staff with the experience and technical expertise to draw a more realistic budget.

The second financial drawback identified USAID's cost reimbursement method as a major problem which was only corrected two years after the project began, with the implementation of the advance payment method. A major reason for the ensuing state of financial paralysis which developed under the initial method was due to the fact that the Ministry of Finance did not (and still does not today) have the financial means within its treasury to advance funds for project initiation. Hence, while work began immediately after the signing of the Agreement, work was done on credit at the worksite with the hope that funds would arrive in time to meet the bimonthly pay period. In fact, officials at the Ministry of Finance maintain that it took up to 30 days from the time invoices were presented to USAID before a check was actually received. The delay in USAID check issuing mechanism and the redundant interagency billing system in Cape Verde delayed payments at the worksite for up to 3 months at a time. Although this condition persisted for the first two years of the project, with the implementation of the advance payment method the USAID bottleneck was eliminated and flow of funds was somewhat improved.

The biggest financial bottleneck, however, was not with the USAID system but with the cumbersome manual accounting

system used in Cape Verde. While independent verification has demonstrated that the highly centralized and multi-layered accounting system in Cape Verde provides a high degree of financial control, the tedious accounting system while positive from a fiscal point of view, tends to slow payment on the worksite considerably, especially when the project is away from Praia. Due to the insular nature of the country and slow inter-island communication, the farther away from Praia the project, the longer it tends to take for payments to be made at the worksite. Thus, the constant financial crises which plagued the project from its very inception. Although, there tended to be a gradual improvement in the expediency of payments over the years of project implementation, it was never to the satisfaction of those responsible for project management on the field.

Management-related obstacles were another key problem area for the high cost and delay in project completion. Similar to budgeting miscalculations, project programming and completion timeline were both deficient and unrealistic. Initially conceived as a two-year project, the Cape Verde of 1978 (and even of today) did not offer the right conditions for building 51 schools, most in remote rural areas of the country, in two years time. A four-year timeline for project completion would have been more realistic and, even then, everything had to work under ideal conditions.

Although project management improved considerably over time, it was never really able to provide the level of supervision and planning which a project of this scale required. From the moment the USAID-contracted engineer assumed monitoring responsibilities, it appears that workflow and timeliness improved considerably.

Although as initially conceived, a project management team was created in MOP to be principally responsible for managing the USAID-funded project, lack of qualified management technicians in MOP prior to 1981 did not provide the project with adequate management guidance. When in 1981 a new manager was assigned to the project, he only assumed yet another project in addition to the many regional projects which he already coordinated on a full time basis. A project of this magnitude requires a full time manager and secretary dedicated exclusively to it. If such a manager could not be located in the country, an expatriate manager might still have been a cost-effective alternative. It was generally agreed by all those associated with the implementation of this project that the type of leadership which could be provided by a management team exclusively dedicated to the project could have completed the construction phase on a timely basis and at up to a third less cost.

B. Teacher Training and Upgrading

Under the teacher training and upgrading component of the project, a total of 200 educators and education administrators were to have received teaching and management skills upgrade training, respectively. The training was to take place during the summers of 1978 and 1979, and to include 100 hours each of instruction in such basic topics as teaching methods, health and hygiene, nutrition, arts and crafts, and so on. In addition, middle-level education management staff were also to be trained as trainers in order to be able to carry on future teacher training without expatriate assistance. The goal behind the teacher training component was to upgrade teaching and administration skills and, thereby, improve educational services and indirectly enhance the quality of Cape Verde's human resources.

Although the Agreement stipulated two summer training sessions, four consecutive sessions actually took place between 1979 and 1982. Correspondingly, while it was initially anticipated that 200 educators would undergo training, a total of 350 were actually trained (325 teachers and 25 administrators) during a total of 486 hours. For more detail, see Table 2. With the exception of 1979, in which two summer sessions were held, one in August and another in September, most training consisted of one 96-hour session per summer. Below are some descriptive details on the seminars.

Table 2
 Quadro 2

Participants in Teacher Training and Upgrading Seminars
 Participantes nos seminários de formação e superação de professores

	1979		1980	19. 1	1982	TOTAL
	A	B				
Trainers Enquadradores	5	6	13	11	12	47
Elementary Teachers Professores primários	50	20	55	100	100	325
Number of Hours Número de horas	96	96	96	102	96	486

16

Descriptive information on teacher training and upgrading seminars:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Participants</u>	<u>Subject Matter</u>
Aug 1-20, 1979	20 manual arts teachers 6 teaching staff	cabinetmaking, weaving and tapestry, basket-weaving, carpentry, electrical repairs, leatherwork, and political education
Sep 3-21, 1979	40 C.V. elementary primary teachers 10 Guinea-Bissau teachers 15 teaching staff	pupil motivation, school and community, educational evaluation, instructional objectives, teaching methods, child psychology, sanitation, nutrition, Portuguese, arithmetics, artistic expression, school legislation and political training
Sept 1-20, 1980	48 C.V. elementary primary teachers 7 Guinea-Bissau primary teachers 13 teaching staff	learning theories, evaluation, Portuguese, mathematics, family and school, visual education, communications, games, visual aids
Aug 17-Sept 11, 1981	100 elementary school teachers 12 teaching staff	instructional objectives, child development, communications, learning and evaluation, mathematics, Portuguese, personal hygiene, work and environment visual aids and physical education
Aug 16-Sept 11, 1982	100 elementary school teachers 13 teaching staff	child development, learning and evaluation, communications, mathematics, Portuguese, production of visual aids, sanitation, games and sports

As can be noted from the above, not only Cape Verdeans but 17 primary school teachers from Guinea-Bissau also participated in the 1979 and 1980 training sessions. This fact can be explained in the context of the concrete steps taken up to that time toward the creation of the unity between Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, a priority goal which existed until 1981 when unity plans were abandoned due to estrangement in relations between the two countries.

With the exception of mid-level educational staff and industrial arts instructors, the training focused principally on primary school teachers teaching grades 1-4, which in Cape Verde comprise basic primary instruction. Thus, the participation of 325 elementary school teachers in the USAID-funded program upgraded teaching skills of over 1/4 of the then approximately 1,200 primary teachers in the country.

USAID assistance went primarily to pay for 1-2 U.S. or Brazilian training consultants per session, participant transportation, lodging and per diem, and educational materials for demonstration or distribution.

1. Major Problems Facing Primary Instruction

Although the teacher training and upgrading program funded by USAID went a long way toward improving the quality of basic primary education in Cape Verde, there are still

some major obstacles facing this level of schooling. Two major and interrelated problems stand out most prominently: lack of adequately trained teachers and instability of teacher employment.

a. Teacher Training Needs at the Elementary Level

From information on Table 3 it can be noted that Cape Verde's primary teachers are severely undertrained. Only 16.3% of the nation's current teaching force possess full primary training while the remaining 83.7% only have basic or rudimentary training acquired on the job or from 2 to 3-month seminars and workshops. The overwhelming majority actually entered the teaching force with the minimum requirement of 2 years of high school and no training at all. Over 2/3 of the 45 teachers interviewed for this evaluation, however, indicated that they have been teaching for over 8 years. While most reported having learned a great deal on the job, it was generally felt that they lacked the experience in teaching methodology and modern pedagogical techniques.

Of those interviewed, less than 10% attended the USAID-funded training seminars. This small group did however, unanimously feel that, with their years of teaching experience, this type of intensive training can provide them with teaching skills almost equivalent to the fully trained primary teachers.

Table 3
Quadro 3

Number of Primary Teachers by Category
Número de professores primários por classificação

	S. Antão	S. Vicente	S. Nicolau	Sal	Boa Vista	Maio	Santiago	Fogo	Brava	TOTAL
Fully Trained Magisteriando ou Equivalente	21	119	6	1	0	1	85	8	1	243 (16.3%)
Basic Training Professores de posto	294	57	66	38	22	21	601	145	41	1,195 (80%)
Minimal Training Monitores	5	2	2	1	1	3	31	9	1	55 (3.7%)
Total	320	178	74	40	23	25	718	162	43	1,493 (100%)

Although the evaluator had hoped to survey more teachers who participated in the USAID-funded training program to determine the lasting impact of the seminars, only 5 were actually teaching at the USAID-funded schools. An inquiry made into the selection and assignment process revealed that not only had the best teachers been selected to participate in the skills upgrading seminars but that these teachers had more seniority and, therefore, tended to opt for urban rather than rural schools. Due to their seniority, naturally, they tended to be eventually assigned to the location of their choice. An initially surprising fact for the evaluator was that many of the better qualified teachers had left teaching for better paying jobs in other sectors or emigrated abroad.

b. Primary Teacher Employment Conditions

The exodus of primary teachers to more lucrative areas were explained by officials of the Ministry of Education as a condition resulting from the very nature of teacher employment in Cape Verde. While it was admitted that some teachers leave teaching due to lack of conviction and love for the profession, it was generally agreed that relatively low pay and lack of job security were the two major causes of teacher exodus. As indicated on Table 4, out of 1,493 primary teachers in the country only 242 or 16.2% are presently employed on a permanent basis. The rest have been working for years on renewable, 9-month contracts. --many have been working for minimum pay for up

Primary Teacher Employment by Category
 Emprego de professores primários por categoria

Category of Employment Categoria de emprego	S. Antão	S. Vicente	S. Nicolau	Sal	Boa Vista	Mão	Santiago	Fogo	Brava	TOTAL
Permanent Employment Professores de quadro contratados	7	57	8	3	0	1	154	11	1	242 (16.2%)
Temporary Employment Professores eventuais	223	121	66	37	23	24	364	151	42	1,251 (83.8%)
	230	178	74	40	23	25	518	162	43	1,493 (100%)

31

to 15 years. Permanently employed teachers, on the other hand, enjoy job security, basic benefits, and 12-month pay for 9-month work. The majority of permanently employed teachers work principally in urban areas. Over half, work in the major cities of Praia and Mindelo. Ironically, it is the overwhelming majority of rural teachers, working under the most difficult conditions, who not only earn less but have no job security as well. Officials of the the Ministry of Education appear to be well aware of the critical nature of this problem and have taken steps to attempt to stabilize primary teacher employment and, thereby, reduce the exodus of the more dynamic and often better qualified teachers to other sectors.

The first step, implemented in the past two years by the present Minister of Education, was to ask officials of those sectors to where teachers traditionally gravitate to cooperate by not hiring primary school teachers in their respective sectors. Secondly, all teacher requests for job transfers to other departments outside the ME have to be personally authorized by the Minister. The third, and perhaps most important decision, as far as the vast majority of teachers are concerned, is the decision to employ up to 1000 teachers on a permanent basis. The permanent employment contract to begin the upcoming school year will give preference to those who have been teaching for 10 years or more. This step will result in job security and employment benefits as well as a hefty, almost 50% increase in annual income for those affected.

Combined with the policy and administrative steps taken previously by ME, the teaching force should be able to significantly improve the retention of the better trained and more qualified teachers. In spite of this relatively gigantic employment step by the ME, however, almost one half of the present primary teaching force will still continue to work on a temporary basis and in addition to low pay, will receive no employment benefits.

IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Overall, the evaluator found that the school construction and teacher training project not only complied with the terms of the Agreement but that the positive, unanticipated benefits far surpassed the objectives established in the Agreement. In spite of the long delay in completing the project and the higher than projected costs of most schools, the project output realized 102 rather than the planned 100 classrooms, and trained 350 or 75% more educators than originally planned. When inflation and original budget deficiencies are taken into consideration, the long delay, which not only permitted the almost 100% devaluation of the Cape Verdean escudo and the rise of the dollar which combined were able to purchase almost twice as much goods and services in 1985 as in 1979, was indeed a blessing in disguise. Had the favorable dollar/escudo exchange rate not occurred, it is doubtful whether even 1/4 of the project objectives would have been attainable.

The schools visited are unquestionably of far better quality than other rural schools where other elementary school-age children are presently being taught. When asked how these schools compared with other schools where they had taught before, teachers overwhelmingly pointed out the fact that the spaciousness, luminosity and new furniture of the USAID-funded schools created a positive learning environment. Many teachers who had taught the same pupils in previously rented facilities in the same community were convinced that the observed higher student performance was due to the quality of the new learning environment. When compared with the rest of the primary schools, large numbers of which are no more than rented shacks in rural areas, there is really little doubt that the USAID-funded schools have significantly improved schooling in rural Cape Verde. (See pictures at end of report for a comparison of rented classrooms and USAID-funded schools).

Far beyond their anticipated function of serving as rural classrooms, these schools are veritable community centers. To be sure they function first as primary classrooms, but the multitude of uses which they serve as a place to hold community functions are perhaps equally as important from the point of view of the school/community relationship. Hence, it can be safely said that if the intended full use of these schools was as primary classrooms, as a result of the triple shift program which

exist in many of them as well as their function as community centers, increase their functional use by 100 to 200 percent. This same relatively heavy use of the facilities, however, has its drawbacks in terms of higher wear-and-tear and maintenance costs.

Due to the extensive use of plaster and paint in many schools, upkeep will be a relatively expensive item for the Ministry of Education. One possible suggestion to minimize this expense is to look for ways to persuade the local population to see these schools as their own public house that they will have to keep clean and well maintained. Given the fact that the community is already making extensive use of these facilities, it should not be difficult to persuade them to take total responsibility for its upkeep. Another alternative may be to charge a nominal user fee for extracurricular use. The funds generated from fees can be used to cover maintenance expenses. Due to their robust construction, however, the upkeep while expensive in terms of the local community's resources, is primarily limited to cleaning, painting and other minor repairs. In this respect, teachers need to be trained to become change agent in the community able to mobilize community pride and responsibility in maintaining the schools in good condition. But before teachers can become a spearhead in community development, their own low morale will need to be significantly uplifted.

Although relatively major steps have already been taken to

provide permanent employment to approximately 35% of the current teaching force, it is not clear how many of those who teach in the USAID-funded schools will be affected. The relative low morale of teachers with whom the evaluator met appear to revolve around employment problems. Teachers were generally quick to point out that their more enterprising colleagues with equal background and training had found relatively good jobs in other sectors. They, in turn, felt that education was a labor of love and sacrifice because the majority of teachers are the least protected of all civil servants. It goes without saying, however, that providing permanent employment for the 750 teachers who will not be affected by the new permanent employment program would represent a sizable expense for the Ministry of Education. Nonetheless, considering the low teacher morale with its consequent low productivity, the resulting educational benefits may well be worth the additional salary costs.

While none of the documents reviewed for this evaluation indicated any direct connection between the school construction and teacher training components, the evaluator attempted to explore whether any effort had been made to assign teachers trained with USAID assistance to work in the USAID-funded schools. Indeed only 5 of the 65 teachers interviewed had attended the USAID-funded seminars. These teachers did appear more enthusiastic than the rest, a further indication that the best had been selected to participate in the training seminars.

In conclusion, it can be said that the USAID-funded schools are the best primary schools in Cape Verde. an assertion unanimously made by teachers who daily use these facilities. It is clear that the physical learning environment has improved significantly in the three islands where the project was implemented. However, while it is difficult to argue against the merits of a conducive physical environment where the learning experience can be maximized, learning involves much more than sound and pleasant buildings. The ultimate determinant of learning is the human factor. In other words, children physically fit and mentally ready to learn and, equally as important, a teaching corps that has the enthusiasm and preparation to stimulate the child in the learning process.

Cursory observations made of teachers in the schools visited as well as the teaching methods used suggest that before learning in these fine rural schools can be maximized, the morale and training of teachers need to be significantly improved. Some steps to improve morale have already been taken and will undoubtedly affect a sizable percentage of rural teachers. What is in dire need however, is the upgrade of teaching skills, responsive to the needs of rural children. Observations made during classroom visits indicated that rural children are being taught identically what their counterparts in urban schools are learning. The observation does not mean to imply that rural children should receive lesser or better education

than urban children. Rather, it was observed that primary instruction in rural areas still continue to be overly bookish and does not seem to reflect the local surrounding. There is no need to produce new texts in order to establish a link between the school and the community where it functions. What is needed however, are well trained and creative teachers who will not be afraid to utilize local material and conditions of the surrounding environment to complement and supplement the texts slavishly studied and memorized.

Unquestionably, the USAID-funded schools provide a more adequate and pleasant learning environment than the rest of the primary schools in Cape Verde. What is now lacking is appropriately trained teachers who will fully integrate these schools into the community and make them a live learning environment. With properly trained teachers, these schools have the potential of becoming a model rural educational program. It may be a very worthwhile endeavor to explore which type of teacher training would best fit these schools and then implement a training program that would yield the best results. As they now stand, the USAID-funded schools are fine buildings. They could be turned into fine rural schools with relatively small investments in appropriate teacher training.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Paint all cement blackboards in classrooms black to enhance visibility and create a greater contrast with the white chalk.
2. Provide wooden risers in classrooms to enable pupils to make full use of the blackboards.
3. Change all defective and poor quality door locks with better quality ones to prevent vandalism.
4. Use screens or other devices on the portholes to permit better ventilation of classrooms. With appropriate ventilation, classroom doors and windows can be kept shut and thus assure a quieter classroom as well as minimize door and window damage that can be caused by banging, especially in the more windy areas.
5. Place metal grids on skylight over blackboards to prevent vandals from breaking into classrooms.

6. Provide each school with a hammer, two screwdrivers (one phillip and one flat end), and a box of nails for teachers to make minor repairs at the earliest sign of damage. By making these minor repairs on time, greater damage and additional expenses can be avoided. These minor repair sessions may be incorporated into the curriculum not only as a means of teaching children the value of proper school maintenance but also as an introduction to basic manual work.

7. Provide appropriate training to teachers who work in rural schools to assure that a greater linkage between the school and the immediate surrounding is created.

8. Train teachers as change agents to mobilize community pride and responsibility in the maintenance and care of schools.

9. Persuade the community to be responsible for upkeep and maintenance expenses of schools through small, regular contributions that can be made at teacher/parent meetings. This is already being done in a small scale in some of the schools visited.

10. Assure that teachers make use of written notices a standard practice of notifying parents of meetings in order to assure greater attendance at parent/teacher meetings.

11. Train teachers in the use of local materials that can be incorporated in the curriculum to create a greater relevance between the school and the community as well as foster greater appreciation for local community resources.
12. Provide seminars and workshops to train the 80% of untrained primary teachers in modern and effective pedagogical techniques.
13. Offer all primary teachers permanent employment as a means of improving the existing low teacher morale.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

QUESTIONS TO GUIDE DISCUSSIONS
WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS

1. Teve uma compreensão clara do projecto desde o início?
2. Teve uma compreensão clara do seu papel neste projecto desde o início?
3. Acha que os planos do projecto eram suficientemente detalhados para permitirem uma execução satisfatória do projecto no seu lado?
4. No seu ver, que entidade é que era principalmente responsável pelo projecto?
5. Que evidências concretas é que o leva a esta conclusão?
6. Quais eram os meios principais do fluxo de informação entre os responsáveis do projecto?
7. As comunicações eram claras e frequentes entre os responsáveis durante a execução do projecto?
8. Acha que a estrutura e articulação dos diferentes Ministérios envolvidos eram suficientemente coesas ou demasiado lactas?
9. Houve algum atraso do projecto na parte que esteve sob a sua responsabilidade?
- 9a. Quais foram os principais factores que causaram atrasos?
10. Que outros factores causaram impactos negativos na execução do projecto?
11. Realisticamente, que medidas podiam ser tomadas para melhorar a execução do projecto?
12. Dentro do ideal, que medidas podiam ser tomadas para melhorar a execução do projecto?
13. O fluxo da documentação neste projecto foi normal, mais lento ou mais rápido do que outros projectos de que é responsável?
14. Respostas aos seus pedidos feitos a outros Ministérios ou Departamentos chegaram-lhe no periodo normal de tempo, demasiado lento ou mais rápido do que de costume?
- 14a. Que Ministério/Departamento foi responsável?
15. Que medidas específicas recomenda para o melhor funcionamento de semelhantes projectos em que cooperam vários Departamentos e Ministérios?

APPENDIX B

QUESTIONÁRIO PARA PROFESSORES

1. Há quanto tempo que é professor? _____
2. É professor nesta escola há quanto tempo? _____
3. Ensinou antes em algum outro lugar?
(Caso SIM, indique:))

Lugar(es)	Data(s)
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
4. Que classificação de professor tem actualmente? _____
5. Já teve alguma outra classificação como professor antes?
(Caso SIM, indique)

Monitor	_____
Profess. de Posto	_____
Outra	_____
6. Há quanto tempo que recebeu a presente formação? _____
7. Considera que tem a formação adequada para a função que desempenha? _____
8. Considera que a sua posição actual requer outro grau de qualificação além daquilo que possui? _____
(Caso SIM, indique)

Maior	_____
Menor	_____
9. Qual é o grau mínimo de formação que considera necessário para esta posição? _____
10. frequentou algum estágio ou curso de férias de formação? _____
(Caso SIM, indique) Quando _____ Onde _____
" " " "
11. Como considera a qualidade de formação que recebeu?

Superior	_____
Bom	_____
Regular	_____
Inferior	_____

12. Considera que está bem preparado para exercer as suas funções neste lugar de serviço? _____
13. Quais são as 3 recomendações que faria para tornar a formação mais adequada ao meio ambiente desta escola?
1. _____
 2. _____
 3. _____
14. Quais são os 3 problemas principais do ensino nesta escola?
1. _____
 2. _____
 3. _____
15. Quais são os 3 aspectos positivos da escola onde trabalha?
1. _____
 2. _____
 3. _____
16. Na sua opinião, o que é que representa esta escola para esta comunidade?
- _____
- _____
17. Além de sala de aulas, que outro uso tem esta escola?
- _____
18. Quantos alunos frequentam esta escola? _____
19. Indique a localidade da escola. _____, _____
20. Indique abaixo qualquer outro comentário que julgue útil para este inquérito.
- _____
- _____
- _____
- _____

APPENDIX C

SITE VISIT CHECKLIST

1. Location of school _____, _____
2. Level of completion _____
3. Date occupied _____
4. Number of Teachers _____ Number of Pupils _____
5. Number of Shifts/day _____
6. General condition of school: Good _____ Fair _____ Poor _____
Comments _____
7. Condition of playground: Good _____ Fair _____ Poor _____
Cement _____ Earth _____ Other _____

8. School Enclosure: Yes _____ No _____
9. Fixtures: Lavatory _____ Toilet _____ Sink _____ Other _____
10. Facilities: No Classroom _____ Bathroom _____ Kitchen _____
Water tank _____ Cistern _____ Other _____
11. Utilities: Electricity _____ Water _____ Other _____
12. Vegetation: Yes _____ No _____
13. Furniture/Equipment _____
14. Modifications from original plan: Per original _____
Expanded _____ Reduced _____ Other _____
15. Problems:
 Construction _____
 Fixtures _____
 Furniture _____
 Vandalism _____
 Other _____
16. Upkeep:
 Need repairs _____
 Improvements _____
 To be completed _____

APPENDIX D

EVALUATION OF THE CONSTRUCTION COMPONENT OF THE
PRIMARY AND NON-FORMAL EDUCATION PROJECT (655-0008)

I. SUMMARY

The Primary and Non-Formal Education Project (655-0008) was designed to improve primary and vocational education facilities on the islands of Santiago, Fogo and Brava, Cape Verde, upgrade the professional skills of teachers and school administrators responsible for Cape Verde's elementary education program.

Direct beneficiaries of the project include approximately 7,000 students per year.

The project was authorized on June 20, 1978 with an anticipated term of three years. AID grant funding for the project was \$3,000,000. of which approximately \$2,700,000 was allocated to construction. Project Assistance Completion Date was originally established on September 30, 1981 but it was extended up to February 28, 1985.

The focus of project implementation has been on:

- (1) the construction of 51 primary schools with 102 classrooms, 48 kitchens, 33 cisterns, 14 toilet facilities and 6 administrative/teachers offices in the islands of Santiago, Fogo and Brava;
- (2) the construction of 13 housing units for teachers in the outlying areas of the islands of Santiago, Fogo and Brava;
- (3) the construction of one vocational education workshop at São Filipe, Fogo island;
- (4) the provision of furniture for 70 classrooms; and

(5) the provision of carpentry tools for the vocational workshop.

The principal purposes of the project were achieved as indicated below. As of March 15, 1986, subprojects reached the following status of construction:

100 % completed	61 sub-projects
90-99 % completed...	1 school, 1 house for teachers and 1 workshop in Fogo and 1 school at Assomada, Santa Catarina, Santiago island.

Large school at Assomada is expected to be completed by April 15, 1986. Major problem was the lack of roof tiles which have not been locally manufactured during two years. This school will be put in operation after Easter vacations o/a April 20. Out of 3 unfinished sub-projects in Fogo island, only the school at Campanas de Cima is being completed. The remaining is the house for teachers at Chã das Caldeiras which shows various deficiencies that need to be repaired and the workshop at São Filipe whose electrical installation is still missing. According to the Government Delegate of Fogo, full completion of sub-projects is expected to take place by the end of April 1986.

As of March 15, 1986, out of 51 schools, 48 were in operation, providing planned services for over 6,000 students. This figure, however, will increase considerably with the operation of the 8-classroom school at Assomada. Designed beneficiaries of the project - 7,000 students per year - will be exceeded upon the operation of these schools. Out of 13 houses for teachers, 11 have been occupied. The vocational

workshop is functioning as a regular classroom due to lack of carpentry tools which were late procured in the US and have not yet arrived to Cape Verde. The furniture for 70 classrooms was manufactured by the non-profit Capeverdean Institute of Solidarity. All the furniture was delivered by February 28, 1985 to the Ministry of Education which, in turn, has distributed them to the AID-financed schools.

The project has suffered from various problems which led to serious implementation delays, construction stoppages, shortage of funding, misunderstanding of the implementation agencies but overall progress at PACD date was considered good.

Problems encountered are outlined as follows:

- (1) Inadequate group staff at the Ministry of Public Works for project's designing, planning, procurement, supervision, bookkeeping and accounting.
- (2) Lack of a plan for the procurement of project's commodities in a timely and adequately manner.
- (3) The Implementation Agencies - five Administrative Councils - were not aware of project's details, such as inputs to be provided by GOCV, disbursement mechanism, bookkeeping and accounting procedures, project assistance completion date and reporting requirements.
- (4) Method of disbursement was cumbersome and led to a slow pace of disbursements to GOCV. REDSO/WCA turned down AID/Praia suggestion for use of "Fixed Amount for Reimbursement" (FAR) system because REDSO/WCA/RLA said that progress payments could not be made by AID under FAR financing procedures.
- (5) Ministry of Finance has delayed payments up to 3 months

from the special account in the Bank of Cape Verde to the 5 Administrative Councils. This procedure led to construction stoppages, low productivity, cost overruns and salaries in arrears.

(6) The technical, accounting, bookkeeping and management capabilities of the Administrative Councils were not commensurate with the responsibilities of the project.

On the other hand, coordinating group staff within Ministry of Public Works was not prepared to take these responsibilities because it was understaffed.

(7) Actual cost of sub-projects in remote areas of Santa Cruz, Terrafal and Fogo far exceeded the estimates done by the Ministry of Public Works. Cost estimates were developed by the Ministro of Public Works for each type of sub-project without taking into account the local conditions, such as cost of transportation, availability of water, aggregates and materials, productivity and site adaptation requirements.

(8) Submittal of documents to AID for recovery of advances were very often seriously delayed due to difficulties of the Administrative Councils and/or the Ministry of Public Works in putting together the documents needed.

Major recommendations:

(1) The life of this project should have been originally established for a period of 5 years and divided into 2 or 3 phases:

(2) The conditions precedent to disbursement with regard to evidence of the assignment of specific personnel necessary for implementation of the project should have not been deleted through Amendment No. II to the Project Grant Agreement

- (3) A plan for the procurement of all project commodities should have been developed by both the Ministry of Public Works and AID before the initiation of construction activities.
 - (4) Project Implementation Letters should have been issued to GOCV with copies to all Administrative Councils involved in the project detailing the GOCV and USAID inputs, disbursement mechanism, procurement plan, accounting procedures, reporting requirements, problems encountered, etc.
 - (5) The services of a Portuguese speaking experienced civil engineer should have been arranged for the initial period of six months on a full-time basis and subsequently during rest of the life of the project at 50 % time.
 - (6) Design a "Fixed Amount for Reimbursement" (FAR) mechanism with advances and progress payments.
 - (7) Payments to the GOCV should be deposited into a special bank account to be drawn by the coordinating group staff within Ministry of Public Works (MHOP) without the interference of the Ministry of Finance.
 - (8) Cost estimates should be adjusted to each construction site, taking into consideration remoteness of site, cost of transportation, availability of water and aggregates, physical conditions of terrain and productivity of skilled laborers. These individual cost estimates should be agreed upon by the Administrative Councils concerned.
 - (9) Technical assistance should be provided to both MHOP staff involved in the project and the Administrative Councils. This technical assistance should cover planning techniques, construction management, bookkeeping and accounting procedures.
- 61

II. PROJECT BACKGROUND

Project Grant Agreement was signed on August 19, 1978. Project implementation began in January 1979 with construction of schools in Praia and was later extended in October 1979 to the other Administrative Councils. From January 1979 through December 1979 the project was financed by the GOCV Ministry of Finance which released funds in the amount of over CVE 10,000,000. First advance of CVE 6,300,000 was granted in December 1979. USAID engineer's report of April 9, 1980 indicated that transportation of project materials was a matter of concern and GOCV had not completed listing of materials. Very little work was accomplished from July 1, 1980 through January 31, 1981 as all work except in Praia and Santa Cruz was at a complete standstill for lack of funds. First disbursement was paid to GOCV in January, 1981 and construction resumed in February 1981 at a very slow pace. As of February 28, 1981 approximately 12 % of work had been completed. As of September 30, 1981 the status of construction was (a) 12 classrooms fully completed; (b) 50 classrooms at late stage of construction; (c) classrooms at early state of construction; (d) 38 classrooms not yet under construction; (e) workshop near completion; and (f) all the houses for teachers were under construction. As of November 30, 1981 disbursements represented 40 % of the construction progress which was at about 45 %. It was reported on December 4, 1981 that (a) construction was one year behind schedule; (b) AID project monitoring had been sporadic; (c) disbursement control procedures had been complex and difficult to carry out; (d) GOCV complained about the slow pace of disbursements; (e) GOCV bookkeeping was a nightmare; and (f) there

62

was a fear that the construction budget was insufficient. An USAID contract engineer was assigned to the project at 25 % time on April 19, 1979, 8 months upon the signing of ProAG, during a period of approximately two years but there was friction between him and GOCV project coordinator. From early 1981 through October 1983 USAID had been unsuccessfully trying to get an engineer on board for monitoring and inspecting construction. During this period an USAID/Lisbon engineer traveled 3 times to Cape Verde on short TDYS. His first assignment conducted in August 1983 was to propose a shift from cost-reimbursable method of payment to the fixed amount for reimbursement (FAR) system. An implementation letter was drafted with the FARs of each type of school, house for teachers and workshop, disbursement mechanism, reporting requirements, etc. but this proposal was turned down by REDSO/WCA in terms that progress payments were illegal under FAR financing procedures (cable 82 Abidjan 12719) and that such procedure should have been set before the construction activity began. Subsequently, REDSO/WCA approved a system of advances subject to USAID presenting a new implementation plan based on advances. REGCON/Dakar agreed upon to grant 90-day advances to GOCV based on the implementation plan prepared by USAID engineer. From October 1983 through the end of project, USAID/Prais entered into a personal services contract with an USAID/Lisbon engineer at 50 % time. An implementation plan was worked out with the GOCV coordinating engineer. Estimated total advances amount to CVE 53,558,000 (approximately \$630,000) which were planned to be paid to GOCV on 5 tranches at 90-day intervals. Final configuration of project was agreed upon with the

Secretary General of Ministry of Education on November 4, 1983. Total number of houses for teachers was brought down to 13, rather than 15, and the workshop at Achadinha was deleted. Number of schools was 51 with 102 classrooms. As of October 31, 1983, construction reached the level of 70 % completed.

Ground breaking of large school (8 classrooms) at Assomada, Santa Catarina took place on October 1, 1985. Construction of four schools and one teacher's house in Fogo island began in January 1984 but the Administrative Council experienced serious difficulties due to shortage of transportation, and laborers. As of May 1984, there was all kind of delays in collecting the documents required for recovery of 1st advance, despite period for this advance had expired on November 30, 1984. The accounting is more complex and there was a tremendous added workload on the USAID.

USAID sent a letter on February 28, 1984 to the Secretary of State for Cooperation requesting prompt delivery of funds from the Ministry of Finance to the Administrative Councils. Late disbursements from the Ministry of Finance to the Administrative Councils was causing various problems to the construction of sub-projects. In general, the Administrative Councils could not make advances to the project due to limited availability of funds. As of May 1984, construction reached the level of 85 % completion. Contract between the Ministry of Education and Culture and the Cape Verdean Institute of Solidarity for the supply of furniture for 70 classrooms was signed on 1984. PIO/C for the carpentry tools was forwarded to the selected US supplier in June 1984.

64

As of PACD date - February 28, 1985 - project reached the following level of completion:

100 % completed	31 sub-projects
95-99 % completed	25 sub-projects
90-94 % completed	2 sub-projects
80-89 % completed	3 sub-projects
70-79 % completed	3 sub-projects
65-70 % completed	1 sub-project

Out of 51 schools, 47 were in operation providing education for approximately 6,060 students. Out of 13 houses for teachers, 6 were fully completed and occupied. The vocational education workshop in São Filipe, Fogo island was near completion only missing the electrical installation. It cannot, however, be put into operation due to lack of carpentry tools which had not arrived from the US.

Furniture for 70 classrooms was being shipped from the Ministry of Education and Culture to the sites.

Final configuration of AID-financed sub-projects is referred to Annex I.

Due to cost overruns, GOCV has raised approximately CVE 3,400,000 (\$40,000) which was required for completion of construction after termination of project.

III. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The End-of-Project evaluation focuses on the following:

- (1) Gain understanding of overall project implementation from GOCV perspective
- (2) Analyse problem encountered during project implementation
- (3) Quantify project impact

- (4) Measure construction progress
- (5) Make recommendations for future course of action to be taken by both GOCV and AID to maximize utilization of project inputs

Methodology used for this evaluation:

- Data collection through (a) some of the basis documents, such as the Project Paper Grant Agreement and Amendment Project Implementation Letters, and (b) other relevant documents, such as project status reports, field trip reports, memoranda from AID/Prais and REDSO/WCA engineers and pertinent cables
- Meetings with host country officials identified in Annex III
- Personal project's knowledge of evaluator
- Field trips: inspect progress and operation of most of the sub-projects
- Quantifiable indicators: number and types of sub-projects completed, percentage of completion for unfinished sub-projects, number of students benefitting from the project, operation of vocational workshop and occupancy of houses for teachers.

IV. INPUTS

As outlined in the Project Paper, construction inputs from GOCV involve the supply of all sand, gravel, crushed rock, stones for building walls and foundations and water needed for construction. In fact, the cost of aggregates and water were charged to AID by most of the Administrative Councils. Government Delegates indicated that were not aware of arrangements made by the Central Government with AID. Nevertheless they stated that they had acted as the implementation agencies and nobody from the Central Government has ever negotiated the

price of aggregate and water with them for recovery of funds. Administrative Councils reported they could not bear these costs due to budget constraints. Cost of transportation was also paid by AID despite the P.P. reflects that all trucks and personal transportation should be a GOCV input. Construction inputs from AID include the services of a top-level engineers for a period of three months to work in close liason with the executing agency's engineers to assist in the orderly organization and prosecution of the project. The selected AID engineer started working in the project 8 month upon the signing of the Project Agreement at 25 % time. There is evidence that these services were insufficient to meet the requirements of the project at the onset of construction. Project Paper recommended that PIO/C's be issued immediately upon the signing of the Project Agreement. There was no single material purchases in the US for the project. One of the main causes of delays and cost overruns was the lack of materials on the construction sites.

V. OUTPUTS

Construction outputs targets outlined in the project design are measured against the actual output in the following table:

<u>Project Outputs</u>	<u>Actual Outputs</u>
Construction and furnish	Construction
30 one-room elementary schools	27 one-room elementary schools
20 two-room elementary schools	15 two-room elementary schools
10 three-room elementary schools	3 three-room elementary schools
	2 four-room elementary schools
	2 six-room elementary schools
	2 eight-room elementary schools

Project Outputs	Actual Outputs
100 classrooms (total)	102 classrooms (total)
15 teacher housing units	13 teacher housing units
2 workshops	1 workshop
	Furnish:
	70 classrooms

Comments:

102 classrooms were actually constructed against target output of 100 classrooms. Cause for this minor change is due to GOCV decision to provide education facilities in the three largest towns in Santiago island. One 8-classroom and one 6-classroom schools were built in the town of Praia, one 6-classroom school in the town of Pedra Badejo and one 8-classroom school in the town of Assomada. Therefore, two teacher housing units were deleted from the project to permit construction within the grant funding. At request of MEC, one workshop in Praia was withdrawn from the project because MEC's desire is to use the first workshop in São Filipe, Fogo island as a pilot facility to learn more about its goal of providing vocational learning experiences which are essentially non-existent.

The construction phase was carried out by 5 Administrative Councils which are headed by the Government Delegates. Project Paper called for construction to be implemented by EMEC, a public construction company. It is considered unrealistic expectations to contract EMEC for construction of small facilities in the remote areas of Santiago and Fogo islands or in the island of Brava.

VI. BENEFICIARIES

Direct beneficiaries of this project are approximately 7,000 students per year who were generally utilizing rented facilities which were seriously inadequate for both teachers and students and, in some cases, also pose health hazards. The 13 teacher housing units have attracted qualified teachers to outlying areas where it is different to rent a house. The single vocational workshop will enable GOCV to move toward its goal of providing non-formal education. This project will indirectly promote greater equality in income as a higher number of students have access to better facilities and thus will raise the general level of education.

VII. TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

a. Evaluation of GOCV Plans and Costs

The plans and the cost estimates for the one classroom, Kitchen building, the patio and the outside perimeter walls were developed by the GOCV in sufficient detail and are deemed to be adequate and reasonable except for the following:

- (1) The plans for the one-classroom comprise a reinforced concrete round column, variable-section beam and slab which roofs partially the classroom. This reinforced concrete work was deemed inadequate for the schools constructed in the remote areas of the island of Santiago and Fogo where there are shortage of skilled laborers and no access roads to the construction sites.
- (2) Despite MEC deemed necessary to construct cisterns in all schools, 12 schools were not provided with a cistern.
- (3) Five kitchen/pantry room were not constructed. These rooms are badly needed to provide a light meal of milk, bis-

cuits, etc. to the students who live far from the schools.

(4) Only the schools with water supply include toilet facilities with washbasins, showers and toilets.

(5) Although most construction is done using basaltic stones with or without cement plaster, cement hollow-blocks could be applied more often for partitions and non-bearing walls, particularly where basaltic stones are not available and there is no access road for the transportation of stones.

(6) The plans for the teacher housing units include a reinforced concrete slab and beam on top of hallway. This reinforced concrete work was deemed different in some cases as indicated in the paragraph (1) above.

The cost estimates were adequately developed by the Ministry of Public Works. Estimates, however, reflect the normal conditions of the site, specifically flat terrain, access road, availability of water and aggregates, etc. In some cases, in the outlying areas of Santiago and Fogo islands, where there are steep slopes, no access roads and local unavailability of water and aggregates, construction costs increased considerably and far exceeded the estimates. It is recommended in the future to adjust the costs to the local conditions of each site before the initiation of construction.

b. Method of Construction

Most construction was done using basaltic stones with or without cement plaster. Floor was of bare cement. Cement tiles roofing on wooden purlins and wooden truss system was the most commonly used construction. A reinforced concrete column, beam and slab was also used in the classroom. Millwork was made with pinewood, mahogany or other woods. Glass is unbreak-

able plastic.

C. Personal Availability and Capability

There was a shortage of supervisory personnel, engineers, estimators, superintendents and foremans. MHOP coordinating group was staffed with one part-time engineer and one superintendant who were insufficient for the tasks that this group was supposed to execute for the project.

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The project should ensure that Cape Verdean architects and engineers receive training in order to make the best use of local materials, facilitate construction using simple technology and less costly architectural elements.

Justification:

Although some GOCV architects and engineers have good background in designing buildings, they have not been trained to design prototype low-cost schools using the highest possible percentage of local materials and lowering the norms and standards. There are some criticism of few Administrative Councils regarding the use of reinforced concrete work in the classrooms (one round column, a variable-section beam and a roof slab). Also, the hallway in the house for teachers is roofed with a reinforced concrete slab. On the other hand there are a few esthetic architectural elements, specifically in the external arrangements, which were considered useless and very expensive.

2. The life of this project should have been originally established for a period of 5 years. The project should have been divided into two or three phases. An interim evaluation of the project should have been conducted at the end of each

phase, as outlined in the Project Paper.

Justification:

The construction of 65 sub-projects is not feasible within the anticipated term of 3 years.

Under normal circumstances, the construction should have been phased out to permit (a) central and local Government officials to gain experience on project's specific and financial conditions; (b) adjustment of the Administrative Council's overall capabilities to construction programming and (c) project's interim evaluation. The GOCV data available on cost estimates, overall capabilities of the Administrative Councils, commodities procurement, capacity of MHOP to carry out the supervision; disbursement mechanism and accounting procedures should have been evaluated upon termination of project's first phase for the design of the second phase.

3. The Conditions Precedent to disbursement for this project should have not been deleted (Amendment No. II to the Project Grant Agreement) with regard to evidence of the assignment of specific personnel necessary for effective implementation of the Project.

Justification: The capability of the GOCV to provide the necessary engineering services was a matter of concern in the project paper. Section 4.1 of the Project Grant Agreement sets forth that GOCV should have evidence of a plan for assignment of other specific personnel, equipment, office space and resources necessary for project implementation. It indicated one engineer at 25 % time, two engineers full-time, one architect at 20 % time and one architect full-time. This section was deleted in its entirety in the Amendment No. II to

72

the Grant Agreement.

There is evidence that one major cause for construction delay is that MHOP's supervision and coordination was sporadic. From the onset of project up to mid-1983, the project's coordinating group staff within MHOP included one engineer at 50 % time, two superintendents and two clerks. From mid-1983 until the PACD date the project's engineer has worked at approximately 10 % time. This engineer was the Regional Director of Public Works for the Leeward group of islands, who was unable to (a) inspect construction; (b) give technical support to the Administrative Councils; (c) procure the commodities in Praia in bulks primarily for Fogo and Brava; (d) accompany the USAID engineer to project sites beyond the area of the Administrative Council of Praia due to heavy daily workload as a Regional Director.

4. A plan for the procurement of project commodities should have been developed by both MHOP and USAID before initiation of construction activities. MHOP coordinating group should have been responsible for the purchase of materials which were not available at EMPA.

Justification: Generally, materials for the project have been purchased in Praia in relatively small quantities subject to unidentified import duties. Project Paper called for GOCV to submit a plan for procurement of all project commodities as a condition precedent to disbursement. The plan submitted by GOCV should have been later developed in-depth to permit the purchase of materials in bulks, both locally and from the U.S. through PIO/Cs. The Project Paper recommended that PIO/C's issued and firm orders placed immediately upon the signing of

the ProAg. There was no single material purchased in the U.S. for the project.

The lack of materials was one of the main causes for delays. The major meaningful case is the situation which occurred on school at Assomada. School has been without roof during 10 months due to lack of purchase of roof tiles outside Cape Verde. Problem was solved in January 1986, 27 months after commencing of construction.

5. Other than aggregates - sand, stones, gravel -, cement, reinforcing steel, doors and windows all the construction materials should have been purchased in the U.S.

Justification: The local market is relatively small and is unable to bid responsibly and commit himself to a schedule for sale of large quantities of materials. Purchase of materials have been generally made by the Administrative Councils for a specific sub-project or group of sub-projects as it was necessary for the continuation of construction. This method led to delays in construction and increased considerably the prices of materials due to purchase of relatively small quantities and unidentified duties have been charged to project.

6. Project Implementation Letters should have been issued detailing the GOCV and USAID contribution, disbursement mechanism, procurement plan, reporting requirements, accounting procedures, etc: with copies to all Administrative Councils involved in the Project.

Justification: All sand, gravel, crushed rock, stones and water should have been a GOCV contribution to the project. In fact, these materials turned out being an AJD contribution due to lack of information conveyed to the Administrative Councils.

74

Also, the Administrative Councils were not aware of the provisions of the Project Grant Agreement and Project Implementation Letters.

7. The services of an experienced civil engineer who has Portuguese language capability should have been arranged for the initial period of 6 months immediately upon the signing of ProAg on a full-time basis and subsequently during rest of the life of the project at 50 % time.

Justification: AID furnished the services of one well experienced Portuguese speaking engineer during a period of approximately 2 years at 25 % time. These services started in April 1979, 8 months after the signing of the ProAg (August 19, 1978) rather than in September 1978, as indicated in the Project Paper. There is evidence that these services were insufficient to meet the requirements of the project, particularly (a) in organizing the labor and procurement of materials for execution of the works; (b) assist the GOCV staff in the planning, management and supervision of the construction; (c) give full details of the project to the implementation agencies - Administrative Councils, - namely GOCV and AID contributions to the project, accounting procedures, required forms to be filled out, estimates for each sub-project and construction components for each sub-project; and (d) assist the Administrative Councils on site adaption of the prototype designs.

8. Design a "Fixed Amount for Reimbursement" (FAR) mechanism with advances and progress payments rather than a direct reimbursement with provisions for 90-advances.

Justification: The method of disbursement has been cumbersome and led to a slow pace of disbursements to GOCV. Disbursement

75

control procedures have been complex, difficult to carry out entailing extra work for both the Administrative Council and MHOP. In fact, these procedures have not been fully adhered to and have led to bad feelings on both sides. An AID engineer conducted in August, 1982 a broad study to shift the cost-reimbursable contract to the fixed amount for reimbursement concept. An implementation letter was drafted by the AID engineer who established the FAR amounts for each of the financed sub-projects, the disbursement mechanism based on progress payments, and reporting requirements. GCCV had informally agreed to the new mechanism but REDSO/WCA turned it down saying that such procedure must be set before a constructor activity begins, not three quarters of the way through a construction activity. Also, REDSO/WCA RLA did not believe that progress payments could be made by AID under FAR financing procedures. On the other hand, AFR/TR/ENG. indicated that partial reimbursement in the form of a fixed percentage of the total agreed FAR, made at specified points of construction completion, had been used very successfully on similar projects by USAID/JORDAN and on earthquake re-habilitation projects in Europe. This FAR method of payment was successfully used by AID/Lisbon in various projects totalling over \$50 million. These partial payments help the host government maintain project liquidity, assure more constant construction progress, and establish points at which time AID will better manage the project. We believe that a FAR financing mode with progress payments and an initial advance would be the method to be pursued in similar projects. This procedure still maintains assurance of quality in construction by assigning an USAID

engineer to inspect construction on a regular basis and approve the final payments for each sub-project.

Summary of advantages of this system:

- (a) It is clear and simple.
- (b) It puts minimal paperwork requirements on the GOCV.
- (c) It puts minimal monitoring requirements on the USAID.

9. Payments to the GOCV should be deposited into a special bank account without direct control of the Ministry of Finance. Ministry of Housing and Public Works should be able to draw funds from this bank account to pay the Administrative Councils, etc: without interference of the Ministro of Finance.

Justification: The payments to GOCV have been made by a check payable to the Ministry of Finance for deposit into a special account in the Bank of Cape Verde. The Ministry of Finance has delayed payments up to 3 months to the Administrative Councils which have maintained the laborers at the construction sites despite the lack of funds to pay the salaries and purchase the necessary materials. Productivity decreased dramatically and sometimes was virtually nul, when salaries had not been paid in a monthly basis. Salaries in arrears sometimes lasted for 3 months. This led to cost overruns which could have been applied in the construction of additional schools.

10. Role of the Administrative Councils in the construction should be restricted to a mere intermeúiate agency responsible for recruiting and paying the laborers, and provide aggregates, water and transportation under agreement with MHOP and build the sub-projects in strict observance of plans and specifications.

JUSTIFICATION: The technical, accounting and administrative capabilities of the Administrative Councils are reasonable but the staff of the Administrative Councils is minimal, who is headed by the Government Delegate who has a full-time assistant - the secretary - a foreman, and a few clerks/bookkeepers. Generally the bookkeepers need to be trained and controlled which gives a tremendous burden to the Government Delegates. Construction management is generally done by the general foremen who are not prepared to perform these functions and the Administrative Councils tend to overcrowd the construction to give employment. Thus, school construction turns out to be a labor intensive work. The Administrative Councils have delayed the submittal of documents for recovery of advances due to difficulties in setting aside the documents required. The documents for recovery of the outstanding advance of over CVE 13,000,000. have been submitted to AID on September 16, 1985 despite the terminal date for submission of disbursement documents was June 30, 1985.

11. Cost estimates should be adjusted to each individual sub-project taking into consideration the local conditions, such as cost of transportation, availability of water and aggregates, local productivity of skilled laborers and site adaptations.

JUSTIFICATION: MHOP has developed the prototype designs and cost estimates for the schools with 1, 2, 3, 6 and 8 classrooms, housing unit for teachers and vocational workshop. These estimates were prepared in Praia for construction to be performed under normal conditions. This, however, has proved to underestimate the local conditions which were too tough in some cases in Santa Cruz, Terrafal and Fogo. Individual

cost estimates should be developed with the assistance of the Administrative Councils. On the other hand, the Administrative Councils should commit themselves to the agreed cost estimates rather than to adhere to them without any close involvement in the procedure. The unit prices for transportation, aggregates, water, and salaries of Administrative Councils' staff involved in the project should be negotiated with each of the Administrative Councils prior to initiation of construction.

JUSTIFICATION: Transportation was provided by the Administrative Councils on a cost-reimbursable basis. However, transportation in Fogo island was insufficient due to availability of only one truck to carry all the materials and the remote location of sub-projects. The MHOP's coordination group was unable to utilize a jeep on a full-time basis. A jeep was released by MEC for the project at approximately 50 % time which proved to be inadequate for the requirements of construction supervision and provision of technical assistance to the Administrative Councils.

13. Project's accounting should be centralized at MHOP's coordinating group which should be staffed with appropriate officials.

JUSTIFICATION: Project's accounting has been done by the Administrative Councils which have reported directly to the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF). Payment and accounting procedures are as follows:

- (a) The Administrative Councils put together the invoices of materials, payroll sheets, receipts of transportation, etc. and submit them to the MEF regional offices;
- (b) the MEF regional offices pay the Administrative Councils

the amount corresponding the expenditures incurred on construction on a monthly basis;

(c) the MEF regional offices send all the documents mentioned in (a) above to the Ministry of Finance in Praia, which does the overall project's accounting;

(d) the Administrative Councils send later to the MHOP coordinating group a copy of all the documents for submittal to AID for recovery of outstanding advances.

The poor procedure is evidenced on point (d) above because the Administrative Councils either forget to send the documents on a continuous basis or don't keep track of what has been sent to MHOP.

This recommendation should be coupled with recommendation No. 9. 14. The Administrative Councils should have received technical assistance on bookkeeping and accounting procedures from AID prior to commencing of project.

JUSTIFICATION: Most materials have been purchased through general GOCV purchasing program. Trying to sort out and trace specific materials to specific sites is just about impossible. The Administrative Councils have many times charged the transportation and provision of aggregates and water to a single site rather than charged to each site. Materials have been sometimes charged to a single site when the same truck was utilized to distribute materials to various sites. It would be a wasteful and cumbersome task just try to evaluate the actual cost of each sub-project. Costs are meaningless because the same type of construction would have costs with great variations.

40

ANNEXES:

- I - Final configuration of schools, housing units for teachers and vocational workshop
- II - Evaluation scope of work
- III - Agencies and key-individuals contacted during evaluation

PRIMARY AND NON-FORMAL EDUCATION (PROJECT 655-0008)
FINAL CONFIGURATION OF SCHOOLS

Number	Type of school	Sub-project location (Concelho, Locality)	Nature of school							Estimated amount disbursed for each school (in CVE)
			No of CLASSROOMS	Kitchen and Pantry	Cistern	Toilet facilities	Teachers room & administrative office	Electricity		
		<u>PRAIA</u>								
01	6A	Achadinha	6	+		+		+	7,169,000\$00	
02	8A	Achada de Santo António	8	+		+		+	7,893,000\$00	
03	1A	Salineiro	1	+					1,483,000\$00	
04	1B	Cidade Velha	1						1,338,000\$00	
05	1C	Fontes	1	+					1,483,000\$00	
06	1C	Prsia Abaixo	1	+					1,483,000\$00	
07	1A	Portal	1	+	+				1,552,000\$00	
08	1A	Mendo Faleiro	1	+	+				1,552,000\$00	
		<u>SANTA CRUZ</u>								
09	3B	Pedra Brãjejo	6	+	+	+		+	7,100,000\$00	
10	4A	Chã de Vaca	4	+		+		+	4,064,000\$00	
11	2A	Serelho	2		+				1,868,000\$00	
12	1C	Achada Laje	1	+					1,483,000\$00	
13	1C	Saltos Abaixo	1	+					1,483,000\$00	
14	1B	Rebela	1						1,288,000\$00	
15	1D	São Cristóvão	1	+					1,337,000\$00	
16	1B	Boca Larga	1	+	+				1,552,000\$00	
17	1B	Matinho	1	+					1,337,000\$00	
18	1C	Achada Ponta	1	+					1,483,000\$00	
		To be carried over							49,528,000\$00	

Number	Type of school	Sub-project location (Concelho, Locality)	Nature of school					Estimated amount disbursed for each school (in CVE)
			No of classrooms	Fitchen and Pantry	Cistern	Toilet facilities	Teacher's room & administrative office	
		Carried over						49,728,000\$
		<u>SANTA CATARINA</u>						
19	8B	Arcanuda	8	+	+	+	+	12,498,000\$
20	2B	Volta do Monte	2	+	+			2,247,000\$
21	2B	Achada Falcão	2	+	+			2,247,000\$
22	2B	Mato Góçé	2	+	+			2,247,000\$
23	2B	Chã Grande	2	+	+	(teacher)		2,247,000\$
24	2C	Boa Entradinha	2	+	+	+		2,400,000\$
25	1A	Achada Iém	1	+	+			1,552,000\$
26	1A	Achada Igreja	1	+	+			1,552,000\$
		<u>MADRANET</u>						
27	3A	Ribeira Principal	3	+	+	+		4,000,000\$
28	2B	Achada Bolanha	2	+	+			2,247,000\$
29	2D	Chão Bom	2	+		+		2,741,000\$
30	2B	Achada Longueira	2	+	+			2,247,000\$
31	2B	Monte Vermelho	2	+	+			2,247,000\$
32	2B	Achada Moirão	2	+	+			2,247,000\$
33	2B	Flamengos	2	+	+			2,247,000\$
34	1A	Mato Brasil	1	+	+			1,552,000\$
35	1E	Achada Lagoa	1	+	+			2,332,000\$
36	1F	Gongon	1	+				2,080,000\$
37	1A	Achada do Meio	1	+	+			1,552,000\$
38	1A	Monte Pousada	1	+	+			1,552,000\$
		To be carried over						110,482,000\$

Number	Type of school	Sub-project location (Concelho, locality)	Nature of school					Estimated amount disbursed for each school (in CVE)
			No. of classrooms	Fitches and Pans	Cistern	Toilet facilities	Teachers room & administrative office	
		Carried over						110,482,000\$
		<u>FOGO</u>						
39	3E	Curral Grande	3		+		+	3,040,000\$
40	3C	Relva	3	+	+	+	+	5,890,000\$
41	2E	Ribeira Filipe	2		+			2,247,000\$
42	2E	Roçadas	2	+		+		2,847,000\$
43	1A	Campanas de Cima	1	+	+			1,852,000\$
44	1A	Atalaia	1	+	+			1,852,000\$
45	1H	Figueira Pavão	1	+	+			2,602,000\$
		<u>BRAVA</u>						
46	4E	Vila Nova Sintra	4	+		+	+	5,874,000\$
47	2F	Nossa Senhora do Monte	2		+	+	+	3,067,000\$
						(teacher)		
48	1C	Cova Rodela	1	+		(teacher)		1,483,000\$
49	1G	Mato Grande	1	+	+	+		2,055,000\$
50	1A	Cachuço	1	+	+			1,552,000\$
51	1A	João da Noly	1	+	+			1,552,000\$
		TOTAL	107 48	33	14	6	7	151,598,000\$
							or	UB\$2,579,830.

PROJECT No. 655-0008

FINAL CONFIGURATION OF TEACHER'S HOUSES AND VOCATIONAL WORKSHOP

Location (Municipality, Village)	Estimated amount disbursed for each sub- project (Bsc. VC)
<u>TEACHER'S HOUSES:</u>	
01 Santa Cruz, Serelho	960 000\$00
02 Santa Cruz, Boca Larga	960 000\$00
03 Santa Cruz, Achada Ponta	960 000\$00
04 Santa Catarina, Mato Gégé	960 000\$00
05 Santa Catarina, Chã Grande	960 000\$00
06 Santa Catarina, Pingo de Chuva	960 000\$00
07 Terrafal, Achada Bolonho	960 000\$00
08 Terrafal, Achada Lagoa	960 000\$00
09 Terrafal, Mato Brasil	960 000\$00
10 Terrafal, Achada do Meio	960 000\$00
11 Fogo, Ibeira Filipe	960 000\$00
12 Fogo, Chã das Caldeiras	960 000\$00
13 Brava, Cachaço	1 260 000\$00
<u>VOCATIONAL WORKSHOP:</u>	
01 Fogo, São Filipe	1 114 000\$00

Annex IIIAgencies and key-individuals contacted during evaluation

Secretary General within the Ministry of Education and Culture
 Dr. João Quirino Spencer

Project coordinator MROP engineer Eng. Antero Galina Barbosa

Mr. Orlando Semedo, Secretariat of State for Finance

Government Delegate of Santa Cruz

Government Delegate of Santa Catarina

Former Government Delegate of Santa Catarina, Mr. Januário
 Fernandes

Government Delegate of Tarrafal


Government Delegate of Fogo

former Government Delegate of Fogo, Mr. Zucca


Government Delegate of Brava

Project Officer Mr. August Hartman, AID/Praia

APPENDIX E



8-classroom complex in Santa Catarina, Santiago



View from central playground of the Santa Catarina complex




1-room school, Interior of Santiago



2-room school and kitchen, Santa Catarina, Santiago




6 classroom complex in Pedra Badejo, Santiago



2-classroom school, interior of Santiago



2-classroom & teacher housing complex, Interior of Santiago




Separate teacher housing, interior of Santiago

29



Shack, once 1-room school in Ribeira Principal, Santiago



The 4-classroom school in Ribeira Principal, Santiago



Recess at a 2-classroom school, Interior of Santiago



Shack still used as a 1st grade classroom, Interior of Santiago


04




A makeshift classroom, Gongón, Santiago



High Costs due to difficulty in access & location, Gongón, Santiago




Retaining wall to reinforce lot, Fogo




Major retaining wall double cost of school, Fogo




A 3-classroom teacher housing complex, Fogo



A 2-classroom & teacher housing complex, Fogo



Chappel formerly used as school, Fogo




The 2-classroom complex which replaced chappel above, Fogo



A house and former school in Fogo


The new school which replaced house above, Fogo




2-room school built in 1960's, Fogo

1-room school and kitchen, interior Santiago


63




4-classroom complex, Vila Nova Sintra, Brava



1-classroom & kitchen built next to 2-room school, Mato Grande, Brava



1-classroom & kitchen, Joao de Feli, Brava



1-classroom & cistern, teacher housing complex, Carhaço, Brava




View of typical kitchen school




Women preparing hot meal for pupils R. Principal, Santiago




Bathroom in final stage of construction




A concrete water tank




Interior view of semi-rural classroom, Brava



Interior view of rural classroom, Praia, Santiago



Interior view of urban classroom, Praia, Santiago



Vocational school, S. Filipe, Fogo