

SOUTHERN AFRICA MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (632-2069) AUGUST 31, 1984

Lesotho

EVALUATION OUTLINE

20

- I. RECOMMENDATIONS (SUMMARY OF SECTION XI)
- II. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
  - IIA: Workplan and Procedures
  - IIB: Scope of work
  - IIC: Coverage, Completeness of Evaluation
- III. BACKGROUND
  - IIIA: Summary of Project
  - IIIB: Summary of Inputs
  - IIIC: Mission Approach to Project Implementation
  - IIID: External Factors
- IV: INPUTS
  - IVA: General Note
  - IVB: Technical Assistance (OPEXers)
  - IVC: Training
  - IVD: In-Country Training
  - IVE: Special Support
  - IVF: Construction
  - IVG: Contract Support -- New Transcentury and Phelps-Stokes
- V. OUTPUT MEASURES
  - VA: Staff Development/Placement
  - VB: OpeX Positions and Roles
  - VC: Project Impacts
  - VD: Organization Impacts
- VI: PURPOSE ACCOMPLISHMENT
- VII: GOAL ACCOMPLISHMENT
- VIII: UNPLANNED EFFECTS
- IX: LESSONS LEARNED
- X: SPECIAL COMMENTS
- XI: RECOMMENDATIONS
- ANNEXES

I: RECOMMENDATIONS (Summary of Section XI) 2

RECOMMENDATION 1: Whether or not additional funding is allocated to the SAMD project, the mission should explore ways to sustain a general purpose OPEX recruitment and participant trainee placement mechanism

RECOMMENDATION 2: The priorities for further OPEX assistance should be personnel management, financial management and perhaps manpower planning/needs assessment.

RECOMMENDATION 3: Most technical assistance needs in the sectors to which USAID is giving priority should be provided through sectoral projects.

RECOMMENDATION 4: Greater training priority should be given to middle management and mid-career technical staff. With few exceptions, SAMD training should be limited to individuals who have already served in the targeted organizational unit for at least 2 years, preferably more. With few exceptions, undergraduate training should be limited.

RECOMMENDATION 5: More use should be made of short-term technical assistance and short-course training. More training should be offered in-country through IDM, LIPA, NUL, LAC or other training institutions.

*What about  
conditions  
short-term  
training  
can it be done  
gradually?*

RECOMMENDATION 6: Changes in support arrangements are needed if the recommendations to provide more short-term TA, to make greater use of short-course training and to offer more training in-country are accepted.

*should be  
reviewed  
by  
me  
...*

RECOMMENDATION 7: The contracts between OPEXers and TransCentury and between OPEXers and GOL institutions or organizations should be reviewed for consistency with AID administrative guidance and project goals.

## II. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

### IIA: Workplan and Procedures

This report represents the 2nd external evaluation of the SOUTHERN AFRICA MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (632-0069). A PES evaluation was made in August 1981 (see 80-632-9). The findings and recommendations made at that time provided the initial point of reference for this evaluation.

This evaluation was conducted by two people from AID/Washington (Jim Hoxeng of S&T/ED and Frank Method of PPC/PDPR) with assistance from Pat Nelson on a personal services contract basis for USAID/Lesotho. Both Hoxeng and Method had previous experience in Lesotho including familiarity with other projects (Lesotho Distance Teaching Centre, Instructional Materials Resource Centre, Institute of Extra-Mural Studies) which made use of the TransCentury/Phelps-Stokes contract mechanism for OPEX personnel and participant training placements.

Prior to the field visit, Hoxeng and Method reviewed management files in Washington, including the 1981 PES evaluation, and met with TransCentury and Phelps-Stokes representatives (Richards for TC; Cowan and Wells for P-S). The Mission Director (Boorady) hand carried other materials including lists of participants and OPEXers and met with the evaluators in Washington to discuss the Scope of Work. In addition, the SOW and arrangements for the field visit were discussed by phone with the WDO (Layne) and Deputy Mission Director (Friedkin).

Hoxeng arrived Lesotho Friday 8/17 and departed Tuesday 8/28. Method arrived Tuesday 8/21 and departed Friday 8/31. Combined, the two external evaluators had 13 full workdays, plus 6 weekend days spent writing and the arrival/departure days. This was minimal time for the evaluation and necessitated relying on files and secondary sources for much of the information, particularly on the accomplishments and impact of OPEX personnel in the early years of the project. Fortunately, the USAID files were reasonably complete and detailed.

Upon arrival, the evaluation procedure was as follows:

Nelson, with assistance from the USAID training officer, Celestina (Moholo) Mahahleha, gathered files and prepared lists for all the OPEX personnel and participant trainees under the project.

Nelson and Mahahleha then attempted to contact a sample of participants, using file information on last known address or employer. They were able to verify the status of most of the 53 returned participants.

Interviews were arranged with 6 participants and conducted by Nelson. While this was not a random sample, it represents those who were most accessible during the period of the evaluation and is judged to be a reliable sample. In the course of other meetings, the team met with 8 additional participants trained under 632-0009 and approximately 10 participants trained under the same mechanism with funding from other projects.

Nelson also contacted and arranged interviews with OPEXers and their supervisors. Of the 11 OPEXers currently supported under the contract, 10 were interviewed. One was on leave. Each interview was conducted privately, and lasted from about 1 hour to 3 hours. The team then followed up with phone calls and informal contacts for further clarification as the evaluation progressed. Each of the 3 team members conducted 1 or more of the interviews. All but one of the interviews was conducted prior to the interview with the OPEXer's supervisor.

Interviews were arranged with supervisors of 9 of the current OPEXers and of 4 of the 17 OPEXers previously under the project. The interviews lasted from 1 to 1 1/2 hours and were conducted in most cases by 1 team member (Method or Hoxeng). Each interview was private, without the presence of other staff or the OPEXer. In most cases the interviews were remarkably candid, the supervisors obviously having given previous thought to most questions.

[note: The format for interviews with the OPEXers and the supervisors was the evaluation questionnaire used in the previous PES evaluation, attached as Annex 1. The team found it useful to use the same questionnaire to facilitate comparison with the 1981 findings. The questionnaire is more appropriate for OPEXers than for the supervisors, and some questions such as those relating to the developmental importance of the role are too subjective for meaningful or consistent answers. For supervisors, more precise questions of how the OPEX or training assistance contributed to institutional development, strengthening or management objectives appear needed. For OPEXers, more precise questions of how or whether their positions may be institutionalized or filled by Basotho professionals appear needed. The simple question of whether a counterpart is being trained is too narrow and avoids exploration of the possible alternatives to counterpart participant training as effective means of transferring skills or ensuring that the need for continuing expatriate assistance is reduced or obviated.]

The team met with the Ministry of Planning, Employment and Economic Affairs (MPEEA), jointly with the Permanent Secretary along with the heads of the planning division and the manpower secretariat and individually with the heads of these two units. The joint meeting was mainly to discuss overall satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the program and to discuss priorities and strategies for future needs. The individual meetings were mainly in their roles as supervisors of OPEXers.

The team also met with the Permanent Secretary of Cabinet Personnel and key members of his staff, including the head of the National Manpower Development Secretariate (NMDS). A separate meeting was held with the head of NMDS and with the staff analyst responsible for a study of staffing needs for public sector accountants and financial managers.

Note: Cabinet Personnel is responsible for all public sector staffing and manpower policy matters and includes the unit responsible for expatriate employment as well as NMDS. The P.S. and the four key staff were all participants under SAMD, with 3 of the staff under 632-0069.

Finally, the tentative findings and recommendations for the report were discussed informally throughout preparation with the HRDO, Mission Director and Deputy Director, all of whom were familiar in detail with the program, most of the OPEXers and participants, and their supervisors. This was extremely useful in providing additional detail and contextual background. The report was discussed as a working draft prior to Hoxeng's departure and as a penultimate draft prior to Method's departure.

IIB: Scope of Work

The team began with only a draft scope of work and refined it as work progressed. The main difficulty in establishing a more formal SOW was that it was unclear whether the evaluators would have time to go into any depth on a) the use of the SAMD mechanism for OPEX positions or participant training placements for other projects and b) SAMD activities prior to the 1981 PES evaluation.

The mission draft SOW indicated that the evaluation should assess the overall effectiveness of the SAMD, emphasizing 632-0069 but including other funding of SAMD activities to the extent feasible. The team was instructed to seek both objective measures and subjective judgments or opinions. Activities should be assessed from the point of view of: a) the GOL supervisors, b) the GOL counterparts, c) the OPEX personnel, and d) Transcentury/Phelps-Stokes.

1. Specific questions for OPEX technical assistance were:

- were the tasks of the OPEXers clearly defined and understood?
- did each advisor have at least one counterpart?
- to what extent was the advisor able to train the counterpart?
- to what extent will the counterpart be able to assume the duties and responsibilities of the advisor upon his departure?
- what systems, manuals, procedures, etc. did the advisor institute?
- was the relationship between the advisor and his Basotho counterparts and other Basotho productive/appropriate?
- were the delegations of authority clear?

2. Specific questions for participant training were:

- did the participant obtain the desired degree?
- did the participant have the necessary support (financial and otherwise) during training?
- did the participant return to the position to which (s)he was bonded and for how long?
- did performance improve as a result of the training?
- was pre-training preparation/orientation adequate?
- does the participant feel properly utilized following training?

3. Other elements for evaluation:

- effectiveness of contractor support
- appropriateness/relevance of training to GOL needs
- general operation and management of the project
- institutional strengthening impacts of TA/Training
- current plans for TA/Training for remaining 2 years

IIC: COVERAGE, COMPLETENESS OF EVALUATION

The team was able to address most of the scope of work for the OPEXers and the participant training under 632-0069. While the findings and recommendations in this report are thought to be generally applicable to other OPEX assistance and training provided through SAMD for other projects, time did not permit detailed analysis of these other projects. Instead, the team relied on background knowledge from previous familiarity with most of these other projects.

The objective data on participants and OPEXers is complete, current and reliable. Expenditure data by purpose and line item is difficult to untangle, given the use of SAMD for activities funded from several accounts and given the fluctuations in exchange rates. They should be treated as reasonable estimates, particularly for COL contributions.

Progress indicators were difficult to measure, due to the lack of baseline measures. Statements regarding improved effectiveness and efficiency or the moderation of staffing constraints are based mainly on subjective impressions formed by the evaluators during interviews with the OPEXers, their supervisors and other GOL officials.

Subjective opinions and suggestions for changes or reallocations in future SAMD activities are included only when they appear to the team to be widely held. In most cases, the suggestions were vetted within USAID and at high levels of the GOL, particularly the Cabinet Personnel, NMDS and MPEEA. Where suggestions are more speculative and mainly the opinions of the team, they are described as hypotheses.

III BACKGROUND

IIIA: SUMMARY OF PROJECT

The Southern Africa Manpower Development (SAMD) Project was designed to reduce critical manpower constraints in areas relevant to the 1973 Congressional Mandate, and to strengthen institutional capability in Lesotho's public sector. The project provides a mechanism for the recruitment and support of OPEX personnel ("Operational Experts" who work under direct contracts with the GOL) and for the placement and support of participant trainees.

SAMD began in FY 78 and the projected EOP is 9/86. The project is a bilateral outgrowth of two predecessor regional projects, the Southern Africa Development Personnel and Training (SADPT) Project of 1973, and the Southern Africa Academic and Skills Training (SAAST) Project of 1978. The first project provided OPEX technical assistance along with participant training and the latter was limited to training. These projects were on a regional basis and provided assistance to Botswana, Swaziland and briefly to Zimbabwe as well as to Lesotho. Swaziland continues along with Lesotho to use the SAND mechanism on a bilateral basis for OPEX recruitment and participant training placements.

Total planned AID obligations under the project were \$9,970,000, all of which has been obligated. Approximately \$865,000 remained uncommitted as of 7/84, with most earmarked for OPEX extensions and new training starts this fall. This budget was to cover inputs for:

U.S. technical assistance in the amount of \$7,320,000, divided between long term (90 person years, \$6,930,000) and short term (65 person months, \$390,000);

participant training estimated at \$968,000 (90 person years of long term training divided equally between U.S. and African institutions, \$900,000, and 24 months of short term training, \$68,000);

other costs estimated at \$972,000 (mainly the construction of 10 houses for occupancy by OPEXers) and a small discretionary support fund for OPEXers \$32,000), and;

an inflation allowance of \$710,000

The COL's inputs were projected to be \$1,518,000 (\$871,000 for technical support, \$252,000 for participant training support, \$180,000 for other costs and \$215,000 for inflation).

IIIB: SUMMARY OF INPUTS

As of 8/84, the project is fully obligated and most funds are expended or committed. The housing has been constructed as planned. Participant training has exceeded planned levels and OPEX inputs will be near planned levels by end-of-project. Other planned inputs (short-term OPEX, short-term training) have been less than planned. With two years remaining, GOL inputs are estimated at the equivalent of \$1,345,000 as of 8/84, 89% of the projected local contribution of \$1,518,000.

A total of 53 individuals have returned from long-term training and 20 are either still in training or scheduled to begin in the next few months. 21 of these have completed and 3 are pursuing Master's-level training. 31 have completed and 16 are pursuing BA/BS degrees. 1 has completed and 1 is pursuing diploma-level training. Most of the training has been in the U.S., with 6 individuals studying in Lesotho or 3rd countries (2 in Botswana, 1 in Swaziland, 1 in Kenya, 1 at NUL/Lesotho). A limited amount of short-course training was provided, primarily through the Institute of Development Management (IDM) in Botswana and in Lesotho. A total of 1284 personmonths of long-term training has been completed and a further 259 personmonths are projected. This compares with 1104 originally estimated.

Since 1978, 28 OPEXers have served under the project for a total of 864 personmonths (72 personyears) to date and 80 projected over the next year. Some contracts may be extended further. This compares with 90 personyears of long-term TA originally estimated. The 28 OPEX individuals represent 25 positions in 12 different institutions and Ministry branches, with 3 replacing earlier OPEXers. No short-term OPEX assistance has been provided under SAMD, though several other projects have arranged short-term technical assistance through the SAMD mechanism.

### IIIC: MISSION APPROACH TO PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

The project paper emphasized the training of Basotho as the primary purpose. OPEX personnel were primarily to fill on a temporary basis the positions of key GOL personnel while they were away for training. The OPEXers were in the interim to function in-line (i.e. replacement) positions and, by example and by professional accomplishment, contribute to increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the organizational unit to which they were assigned. Where possible, in-service and counterpart training would be provided on-the-job.

The project set five criteria, which applied both to the OPEXers and to the training:

1. clearly within AID's development mandate and GOL development priorities
2. strategically placed in a key development oriented institution
3. precisely defined as to purpose and duration
4. within an established GOL post
5. associated with available, qualified Basotho prepared to participate

The 1981 evaluation restated the mission's implementation approach as:

- a) selection of sectors where prospects were favorable for significant impact in areas important to AID's CDSS strategy;
- b) concentration on a select number of "thematic groupings" to increase the probability of sustained improvement in institutional capability;
- c) in-service and external training of a "functional unit" of Basotho to correspond to each OPEX placement, and;
- d) direct supervision by a GOL supervisor, with the OPEXer submitting up to 3 reports annually to ensure the work was understood by the supervisor and consistent with the organization's work plans and development strategy.

While the basic approach of linking OPEXers with counterpart training and concentrating on key organization units within priority sectors remains unchanged, the approach has shifted from that originally envisaged.

First, the mission's program is concentrated in fewer areas than before. The major emphases (both for OPEX and for training) are agriculture and education, along with road building (including the large Southern Perimeter Road project) and training in financial and personnel management for key ministries.

Second, the primary use of the OPEXers has been, and continues to be, the provision of high level expertise to strengthen key organization units. In most cases, the OPEXer was selected and in place before the Basotho counterparts were identified and sent for training. Thus, the training component has shifted to counterpart training to replace the OPEXer.

Third, a significant amount of the training is not keyed directly to OPEX positions. In effect, the project has evolved to having two distinct objectives: OPEX provision to strengthen key organization units; training to increase the pool of Basotho managers and technicians in positions related to but not directly counterpart to the OPEX assignments.

Finally, while the USAID recognizes needs for assistance in other key Ministries, institutions and administrative units, it has been forced to place its bets on those sectors and organizations where the need for strengthened planning and administrative systems are most critical for the success of its current program strategy. This has led to the SAND project being used more as a means of strengthening systems in advance of or as complements to project activities than was originally intended, with consequent lower priority for strengthening institutions in sectors for which USAID does not anticipate project assistance.

Note: These shifts are not necessarily inconsistent with the project purpose. The project was originally designed to be flexible and to evolve as needs changed, initial training priorities were met and the project shifted attention to different organization units. However, it is important to note these shifts and (see Section XI, Recommendations) to consider whether the project is approaching the point at which redesign, rejustification and reorganization of the administrative and support systems is needed.

No more funds remain to be allocated for training under this project, and funding for OPEX technicians is running short. The mission is giving priority to continued support for those functional units most closely connected to projects and is providing bridge funding for OPEXers who will be picked up under the two new multi-faceted projects in education and agriculture. In other areas, discontinuities are being experienced as OPEXers complete their tours and leave, in some cases before participants have completed their training and/or have had time to settle into counterpart roles and gain necessary experience. No assessment is possible at this time of the effects of gaps and discontinuities on the assisted entities. However, it is apparent that unless additional funding is obtained the original objective of using SAMD to address institutional weaknesses in areas beyond the project portfolio concentrations will be limited.

IIID: EXTERNAL FACTORS

The external factors which were cited as problems at the time of the 1981 PES evaluation have largely disappeared. Late startup caused by slow approval in AID/W did not cause permanent delays and the project is now on track with both participants and OPEX personnel. Key assumptions -- GOL support for a moderate and realistic localization policy, and willingness to provide counterparts within the limits of feasibility -- have largely been borne out. AID's technicians, for the most part, have been competent and well received.

The assumptions of OPEXers generating spin-off projects was questioned in 1981; the evaluation called it a valid concept in principle, but doubted whether spin-off projects would constitute a valid measure of project success. In fact, current AID policies and practices require projects to be anticipated in CDSS and ABS cycles. While in some cases the OPEXer may be (as several have been) an important resource for project design, the level of effort and time required for an OPEXer to be responsible for initiating a project make the idea of spin-offs unworkable, and in most cases undesirable. Some small activities were funded by other donors as a result of OPEXer efforts, but the numbers and resources involved are small and these efforts, while commendable, are in most cases a part of the OPEXer's regular position responsibilities rather than spin-offs.

The more significant external factor may be the proliferation of donor-assisted projects providing resources to the organization units to which the OPEXers are assigned. In several cases, this appears to have had the effect of badly confusing staff planning, workload allocations and the development of staff training strategies.

The brain drain from Lesotho is an external factor of increasing importance. The greatest lure is not the U S or other western countries but the newly-created "homelands" in South Africa. They offer salaries much higher than can be earned in Lesotho, reportedly up to 3 times in some fields. Given the financial inducements, it is notable that few of the SAMD trainees have sought positions in the homelands. One individual under 0069 whose whereabouts could not be confirmed may have done so and several trained under other projects are reported to have gone. A hypothesis is that relatively few of those trained for the public sector are likely to go. Those who have invested several years in public service have acquired both service years counting toward seniority or retirement and a degree of institutional loyalty, along with peer pressure. While data is not available, it is speculated that willingness to work in the homelands may be greater for those a) who are either relatively young and with few years of service or who are recently retired and seeking a second career, and b) who are trained in technical fields (medicine, engineering, accounting) in high demand and/or which are applicable outside public service. This hypothesis, if confirmed by further observation, suggests the desirability of biasing training toward mid-career and mid-level public service technicians and managers and of being very selective in any training provided at the first degree level or for individuals not currently employed in the public sector.

An external factor noted in 1981 is the lack of a coherent GOL manpower policy. While there are definite improvements in planning and assessment capacity (e.g. NMDS) there continue to be general weaknesses for specific Ministries and organization units. A large part of the problem may be due to the dependence (noted earlier) on donor support. Another is the difficulty of planning for additional needs while maintaining tight discipline on the establishment of additional public sector positions.

IV INPUTS

IVA: GENERAL NOTE

Though the following accounting of project inputs is limited to inputs provided through SAMD 0069, it is important to note that SAMD also facilitated other inputs and was complemented by other inputs which may not have been possible without the "seed capital" and "head start" which was provided by SAMD. [see Annex 5 for summary of other SAMD inputs.]

As discussed previously, SAMD was preceded by two related projects (SADPT and SAAST) and in the initial stages continued OPEX and participant training placements started under these other projects. During SAMD implementation, several of the OPEX placements were complementary to other projects supported by USAID and other donors (particularly roads and agriculture projects). At least 6 of the participant trainees who started training under 0069 received partial support and finished their training with funding under other project accounts. It is probable that at least 2 of the current OPEXers will be picked up under other projects, possibly prior to the expiration of the projected SAMD contracts.

Finally, the recruitment and trainee placement mechanisms for SAMD through New Transcentury Corporation (TCC) and Phelps-Stokes (PS) have been used for recruitment and training for other projects. Nearly as much use has been made of the SAMD mechanism for other project purposes as has been made for SAMD purposes.

The results are: a) that it is difficult to sort the inputs which are attributable solely to Project 0069, and; b) though it is clear in an accounting sense which inputs have been provided through 0069 funding, it is misleading to attribute the outputs and impact of SAMD solely to those elements funded through 0069. In effect, the outputs, impact and utility of SAMD are greater than those measured by the 0069 input accounting.

IVB: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE (OPEXers)

The SAMD project was to provide 90 person years of long term technical assistance and 65 person months of short term assistance. Total costs were estimated at \$7,320,000, plus inflation.

AID has filled 25 positions with 28 OPEXers. 864 PMS (72 PYs) have been provided. 11 persons remain with a projected additional 80 PMS (6 2/3) committed between now and 8/85. After 8/85, there may be no OPEXers continuing under 632-069, though the SAMD mechanism may continue to be used for OPEX placements through TransCentury for other projects.

Positions were filled from 19 to a projected 66 months. Median time per position and per OPEXer is 26 months. Average time per position is 37 months. Average time per OPEXer (including projected completion dates) is 33 months. Average time per completed OPEX assignment is 27 months. Only one OPEXer served less than 24 months and 10 contracts were extended for 1 or more years. The longest contract will be 66 months as of the projected completion date. At least 2 OPEXers are expected to bring into continuing contracts of 2 years or more under the LAPIS (1 position) and the BNPLS (1 or more positions) projects.

Virtually no short term technical assistance has been provided under this contract. [The 1981 evaluation mentioned two consultants who provided a total of five months assistance, but these appear to have been under another funding account] No clear explanation is offered for the lack of short term assistance. Since there seems to have been no negative reaction to the use of short-term personnel, the most likely factors are:

- a) that most of the specific needs were addressed by other projects, and;
- b) that the staff effort involved in identifying the need, preparing the PIO/T and recruiting the short-term consultant made it prohibitive. The SAND project differs from some of the other projects which have made use of the TCC mechanism for short-term TA in that it has no resident team leader or full time coordinator to undertake the necessary staff work.

Another factor is that the OPEX positions were viewed in large part as line positions to be filled during the period of long-term training. Given the strong bias toward long term training, the natural effect is to bias toward long-term technicians. Training for the "functional unit" (FU: the group of trainees corresponding to each OPEX position) has taken somewhat longer than anticipated, especially in the hard sciences and engineering. [check this: what is average time? what was anticipated? Is it a problem of length of time or of phasing of training with OPEXers?]

Note: recommendations for increased emphasis on short-term training and on short-term TA, as well as for strengthened local-hire staff support to make short-term TA and training more feasible, are made in Section XI, Recommendations.

A major problem is the time required to identify and train Basotho counterparts. In about half the cases this appears to have been accomplished. In the other cases, the nature of the OPEX position and the process by which an individual must acquire the professional skills and experience to fill such positions means that there is not a precise match between the OPEX position and the training. See discussion under Section IX, Lessons Learned, and XI, Recommendations.

The absence of short term technicians has lessened the project's flexibility to respond to more narrowly defined specific needs. Short term technicians could provide in-country training for selected trainees, targeted to specific applications. They could assist trainees in putting the training into practice as the course was completed, or return after a time to monitor use of the new practices. Rather than extending OPEX positions for additional years, the OPEXer might be enabled to return periodically to reinforce practices or provide training workshops. This format could lend itself especially well to the needs of top-level government officials and women for whom long-term training is not an option. Also, it is likely parastatal and private sector managers would be willing to participate in management training offered locally. Finally, the ability of local institutions to offer this training could be established. See Section XI, Recommendations, for further discussion.

In summary, the provision of long-term technical assistance appears to be directly aiding the project to achieve its purpose. The OPEXers appear to be appropriately qualified, well motivated and well utilized. However, there continue to be problems with the time required for counterpart replacement, resulting in OPEXers being continued longer than may be appropriate or necessary.

IVC: TRAINING

The project estimated 90 PYs of long-term external training (45 PYs in the U.S.; 45 PYs in African Institutions), 24 PMS of external short-term training and 18 PMS or \$90,000 allocated for in-country training. A covenant in the ProAg required the GOL to identify two individuals for long-term counterpart training within one year of the arrival of an OPEXer.

As of 8/84, 53 individuals had been sent for training and had returned, for a total of 1284 PMS of long-term training. An additional 20 individuals are in training or about to depart, for a projected 259 PMS. The total long-term training expended or projected under the project is 1543 PMS or 128 1/2 PYs. Average time in training is almost exactly 24 months, with BA/BS taking somewhat longer and Master's somewhat less.

Of the 53 trained to date, 21 have been sent for Master's programs (MA, MS, MPA, MBA, MML), 31 for BA/BS programs, and 1 for a diploma (in workshop management). Of these, 3 did not finish and 3 got lesser degrees or diplomas. 4 individuals were trained in 3rd countries (2 BS nursing in Botswana, 1 BS more economics in Swaziland, 1 MS Econ. in Kenya).

21 participants were female, including 5 of the 21 Master's candidates. All finished their courses, 18 in the U.S., 3 in 3rd countries. A general impression is that the women did exceptionally well and had relatively fewer problems than did the men sent for external training.

Of the 20 in training or about to depart, 16 are in BA/BS programs, 3 in MA/MS/MPA programs and 1 in a diploma program (in mechanical technology). Of these, 5 are female. 18 are in the U.S., 1 at NUL and 1 at Kenya Polytechnic.

Two shifts are noted between the trainees who have completed and those currently in training: a) the MA/MS level training has declined from 21/53 or 40 % to 3/20 or 15%, and; b) the female participation has declined from 21/53 or 40 % to 5/20 or 25%. No obvious factor explains these shifts. Hypotheses include:

elimination of some fields such as nursing and home economics and increased emphasis on civil engineering may bias training toward men and toward BS programs

as the program has evolved to target fewer entities with longer-term manpower development strategies, it has in effect trained the first cadres of middle and senior management and is now training more personnel for support positions and staff expansion

changes in GOL personnel policies are limiting the establishment of new positions at senior levels. Other policies are to provide only partial salary continuation and to require both bonding and partial payback of the costs for long-term external trainees. While the team did not analyse the effects of these policies in any depth, there are indications they may have the effect of discouraging long-term training for middle- and senior-level personnel and concentrating training on junior and entry-level personnel.

IVD: IN-COUNTRY TRAINING

Essentially no in-country training has been provided under U069, though a substantial amount has been provided under other projects using SAMD. Some individuals have been sent to the Institute of Development Management (IDM) for short-courses and 1 individual is studying at the National University (NUL). Several OPEXers reported considerable informal counterpart training on-the-job, though the team could not verify independently the extent or quality of this training. Three OPEXers are in teaching positions and two reported teaching courses at the university or elsewhere additional to their main assignments.

There seemed general agreement more in-country training is needed. It would be cost-effective, enabling more specific skills and training needs to be addressed. GOL officials expressed strong interest in short-course in-country training to enable training for key middle and senior officials who cannot be spared for long-term training. Two OPEXers advocated providing "parallel training" in-country for junior technical and administrative staff to complement the work of the OPEXers and the counterparts. Several of those interviewed suggested short-course in-country training as a very appropriate use of short-term OPEXers.

At least two factors need to be addressed if in-country training is to be increased under SAMD. First, more detailed analysis is needed of the needs for specific types of management or technical training across Ministries and organizations. This requires more inter-ministerial cooperation and a stronger role for MDS. Second, some provision must be made for more substantial local staff assistance to handle the planning, organization and administrative details of a larger short-course training and short-term TA component.

IV E: SPECIAL SUPPORT

\$32,000 was included for special support activities for the OPEXers. This was intended to provide for small-scale funding for materials, workshop expenses, publications and similar unanticipated inputs which would increase the productivity or impact of the OPEX personnel.

Little use of this fund has been made, and most OPEXers were only vaguely aware that it existed. One individual had requested and received funds for secretarial assistance. Another request was for funds to ship additional materials to Lesotho and one was for funds to purchase sample test materials while in the U.S. on home leave. These were not approved.

The lack of use of this fund appears initially to have been largely an oversight. No procedures or criteria were established and the existence of this discretionary fund was forgotten about. Today, though the authorized funding has not been expended, there are higher priority needs for the funds and little inclination to encourage its use.

Though there is some frustration among OPEXers that such support has not been more readily available, most seem not to have expected much support other than that available through their organization under regular procedures. A suggestion of the evaluation team is that, if such support is included in future SAMD activities, that it be made available to the organization rather than exclusively to the OPEXer. This appears to have some advantages in providing support through the organization unit and maintaining the OPEXer's primary relationship with the supervisor.

IVF: CONSTRUCTION

The project provided funding on a FAR basis for the construction of 10 houses. These were finished and approved for 90 percent reimbursement by USAID. They continue to be used for contract personnel, including SAMP OPEXers. They appear to have contributed substantially to alleviating the housing complaints which were prominent in 1981.

IVG: CONTRACT SUPPORT, -- NEW TRANSCENTURY AND PHELPS-STOKES

There is little consensus on what the level or type of support should be. Reactions among OPEXers ranged from expectations of having the same level and type of institutional support as is available to other contract personnel to a comment from one OPEXer that he "expects none and gets none."

Until Sept. 1983, Transcentury maintained a field coordinator in Botswana. A part-time coordinator now works from the USAID offices, but with little delegated decisional responsibility. This support is essentially administrative, dealing with invoices, travel, leave, etc..

The role of Transcentury is mainly that of recruitment and orientation prior to arrival in Lesotho. Following arrival, Transcentury's contractual agreement with the OPEXers makes clear that all further support is subject to the contract between the OPEXer and the COL and that Transcentury is responsible only for the dollar portion of the salary and benefits.

In practice, there has been substantial correspondence dealing with administrative matters but little or no involvement in field support of the work of the OPEXer. While this is contractually correct, the opinion of the evaluation team is that the contracts are exceedingly narrowly drawn to the extent that a) they may prevent more substantial involvement of TCC even where it may be mutually desired and b) they contain a number of contradictions, exclusions and seeming inconsistencies with AID administrative guidance. Matters to do with calculation of leave, local salary equivalencies and travel requirements seem to have been the most frequently disputed.

Phelps-Stokes is in a sub-contractual relationship to Transcentury, with responsibility for handling the placement and supervision of trainees in the U.S.. Few complaints were heard from returned trainees about Phelps-Stokes administration. However, there were some disputes with USAID over inconsistencies between Phelps-Stokes policies on allowances and those of AID Handbook 18. These were resolved. The main continuing problems seem to be a) a persistent difficulty in USAID/C getting progress reports and grades on a timely and accurate basis and b) a tendency for Phelps-Stokes to protect some of the trainees having major difficulty. On the other hand, Phelps-Stokes maintains, apparently accurately, that by going the extra mile it has been able to ensure that most trainees obtain at least a partial degree before returning.

An unanswered question is what the unit costs of training and CPIX recruitment would be were the core contract support mechanism maintained for other project purposes and general mission flexibility after the 632-306 funding is exhausted.

V. OUTPUT MEASURES

VA: STAFF DEVELOPMENT/PLACEMENT

A total of 53 individuals have received training under #069. Of these all but 2 (both B.S. agronomy) have returned as of 8/84. Another 20 are still in training. An additional \_\_\_ placed under SAMD were funded under other accounts. Table 1 gives the current status of the 53 individuals.

The return rate is excellent, with most working in Lesotho in fields appropriate to their training. 2 are still in the U.S. and 1 may be working in the homelands. 1 has been assigned to foreign affairs, 1 is with WHO and one has become press secretary to the Prime Minister. While these 3 are not working in the positions for which they were trained, it is difficult to say that they are not working in fields for which their training is appropriate and which represent GOL priorities.

There is a notable difference between the utilization of BA/BS and MA/MS participants. The BA/BS participants are mainly in lecturer/trainer or engineer/technician roles while the MA/MS (including MBA,MPA) are mainly in senior management/administration or planner/analyst roles. Thus, the primary function of the 1st degree training appears to be manpower development and the graduate training appears to be mainly institutional strengthening and organization development. Note also that there has been no Ph.D. training and minimal short-course or certificate training.

TABLE 1

CURRENT STATUS OF RETURNED PARTICIPANTS

(based on mission records)

	<u>BA/BS/CERT.</u>	<u>MA/MS/MBA/MPA</u>
Lecturer/Trainer	11	1
Administrator/Manager	2	6
Planner/Analyst	2	8
Engineer/Technician	9	--
Scientist	--	3
Others	5	1
Deceased	1	1
Non-Returned	2	--
Unknown	--	1
<u>Total</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>21</u> = 53 Returned

VB: OPEX POSITIONS AND ROLES

There is general agreement that the OPEXers have functioned professionally in all cases. The supervisor interviews, which were very candid in most cases, included comments ranging from fully satisfactory to highly laudatory. While the files and other sources indicate several experienced a variety of frictions over role definition, personality conflicts and other adjustment problems, there is nothing to indicate that this was other than would be expected in any set of 28 professional appointments. In fact, the record is better than would be expected.

One of the interviews (referring to 2 OPEX placements at LAC) suggested that the main problem is that the OPEXers functioned at too high a level of competence and personal initiative, making it difficult to replace them and causing junior faculty to be discouraged from thinking of themselves as plausible counterparts. Similar comments were heard from other supervisors, though most felt the setting of high standards of performance and productivity was healthy and perhaps the most important aspect of counterpart training. In any case, no solution was suggested for the "rate breaker" problem.

In one and perhaps 2 or 3 cases, the OPEXer may in fact have been overqualified for the position. Several are likely to be replaced by people with lesser formal qualifications or experience, but who are judged likely to be able to handle the position.

About half the OPEXers appear to have functioned in "line" technical or administrative positions, e.g. the lecturers and most of the engineers. The others combined line functions with substantial advisory roles or responsibilities for designing and implementing specific reforms or new practices (e.g. the financial controllers and the personnel management advisor).

Most reported at least informal counterpart training, but only about half appear to have had a formal or structured approach to on-the-job training. OJT training for counterparts appears to have been mainly by osmosis and example. In most cases, the training on-the-job was directed to support staff and junior personnel. Note: several OPEXers suggested that this should be the priority for future training.

#### VC: PROJECT IMPACTS

The initial OPEX assignments were mainly in line positions in which they worked as needed according to GOL organization priorities. Increasingly, in addition to their line responsibilities, they have become important resources for the planning and/or implementation of donor-assisted projects, particularly USAID. 4 positions relate directly to the implementation of roads projects, 1 to the implementation of self-help food-for-work schemes (primarily access roads) assisted through CRS and WFP, at least 1 to the development of the LAPIS project and 1 or 2 to the development and implementation of the BNFES project.

While it is difficult to prove the point, it appears that OPEXers have been very important to the development of these projects through direct roles and indirectly through improving key systems such as financial management which have increased donor confidence in the ability of the organization units to administer and implement additional projects.

#### VD: ORGANIZATION IMPACTS

The project was intended to contribute to organizational efficiencies, which is difficult to measure, especially given the lack of baseline data. While the evaluation team is not able to judge efficiency changes, it did note a number of organizational changes which appear to contribute to improved organizational effectiveness.

At the level of individual organization units, the most important impact may be the improvements in financial management systems, with financial controller positions now established in two of the OPEX-assisted organizations and increasing attention to accountancy training throughout.

In the case of the Ministry of Cooperatives and Rural Development, the OPEXer task has been to assist a fundamental reorientation of purpose from essentially job-creating relief activities to a more developmental strategy using self-help construction and food-for-work to strengthen road systems and other development infrastructure. This task, only partially achieved, illustrates that before efficiency objectives can be pursued, it may be necessary to change effectiveness criteria.

Other organization impacts are more purely technical, such as the strengthening of testing systems and competencies for NCDC, which enable the organization to function with much more objective data. Other examples are the shaping of new courses and departments for LAC and MTTC and the improvement of engineering project designs and contracting specifications for the roads projects. Note: OPEXers as well as training under other projects such as LDTC, IEMS and range management have had mainly technical impacts.

At the level of national systems and overall Ministry effectiveness, the impacts have been more modest. The most important impact is in the area of manpower planning and personnel management. These functions have a long way to go -- e.g. there is still a lack of an adequate national manpower plan or training strategy for high-level manpower development. However, the capacities of the Cabinet Personnel, Planning unit of MPEEA, and NMPS appear substantially strengthened, in large part due to the return of about 18 individuals trained under SAND to key personnel management and planning positions. A number of changes in personnel policy, a revised pay system, the procedures for establishing new posts, and the financial guidelines for training are in place or in progress. NMDS appears likely to take a much stronger role in personnel needs assessment, placement and allocation of available training resources.

A remaining problem is that the ability of GOL to develop manpower plans and allocate staff and training resources according to its priorities is a function of donor decisions on projects and training funds. The team encouraged NMDS and other GOL officials to take a stronger role in setting out GOL priorities and in bringing about some coordination and coherence among donor-funded training. The suggestion was well received.

## VI. PURPOSE ACCOMPLISHMENT

The Logframe project purpose is " to reduce critical manpower constraints to development, mainly in the fields selected by the US Congressional Mandate, while strengthening the public sector's institutional capability to meet the development needs of the country." The length and diffuseness of this statement illustrate the difficulty project designers faced in fitting this project into AID's standard framework. It is clear that the project was intended to serve a variety of purposes which could be identified only notionally at the time the project was approved. As a result, the purpose indicators are difficult to examine objectively.

The variety of assistance provided under this project reflects its inter-sectoral nature. Technicians have worked in at least eleven public organizations and OPEXers have been involved informally in assistance to a number of other institutions. Functional Unit trainees have come from 15 departments, plus a number from NUL or other institutions who have been bonded to work for these departments following training. Virtually all who have completed their training have returned to work in Lesotho.

Indicator one: "Increased numbers of nationals in positions of responsibility with substantive inputs into the planning, design and implementation of the Government's programs," seems on the surface to be fairly straightforward. However, no baseline numbers are available and no definitions are offered for what constitutes a responsible position or a substantive input. Our judgment is that most returned participants are in relevant professional positions and that at least half are in positions with middle or senior management, planning or technical responsibilities.

The remaining indicators, "maintenance of high-level operational efficiency of GOL offices with OPEX staff while counterparts are being trained to ultimately assume responsibilities" and "improved GOL project preparation and planning capability for funding by AID and other donors" are also not objectively measureable.

In general, the OPEXers have been effectively utilized, making solid professional contributions. At the same time, Basotho staff are being trained. Some OPEXers have "lost" their counterparts to other Ministries or organizations, but those seem to be isolated instances and to be explained more by problems in establishing the position at the necessary grade and salary level than by unwillingness of the individual to accept work in the field for which training was provided.

The 1981 evaluation was quite upbeat on the likely achievement of purpose. This evaluation agrees that the purpose of the SMD is being achieved. Critical manpower constraints are being addressed, in areas highlighted by the Congressional mandate, and the public sector is stronger as a result of the project's inputs. There is general agreement that most of the organization units in which OPEXers have worked and for which Basotho staff have been trained are stronger today and most of the organizations have received increasing amounts of donor assistance. However, it would be an overstatement to attribute this solely to the SMD inputs.

VII: GOAL ACCOMPLISHMENT

VIIA: GOAL STATEMENT

The project's goal statement is appropriate: " to increase the Government's capability and efficiency in planning, designing and implementing national economic and social development programs." This appears to be happening, at least in those Ministries and institutions benefitting from the return of qualified participants, and from service of OPEXers during the training period.

A caveat on the goal statement is that impacts on technical or managerial capacity and on organizational effectiveness are more measurable and offer more operational targets than do efficiency criteria — which assume the organization goals are appropriate.

The full impact of these inputs on goal achievement may not be realized during the life of project. Many participants are either still studying or are so recently returned as to make it impossible to estimate their full impact with any certainty. However, if returned participants continue to remain in Lesotho, and to apply themselves to the country's problems, as our investigations indicate they are, the effects should accumulate into a creditable legacy for the project's investments.

VIIIB: BENEFICIARIES SUMMARY STATEMENT

SAMD goals are too diffuse for conventional measures of beneficiaries. The benefits of SAMD are the aggregate effects of improved COL organizational effectiveness, which appear to be happening.

VIII: UNPLANNED EFFECTS

There have been relatively few unplanned effects. The OPEX appear in most cases to have worked within their position descriptions and trained counterparts appear in most cases to have returned to positions related to their training.

In some cases, products have been produced which were not anticipated in the position descriptions. For example:

- improved information system for book supplies to primary schools
- improved system for speedy processing of primary school exams
- textbook on land-use in Lesotho for use in agriculture education.

The OPEXers have played stronger roles than anticipated in providing links to donors and in assisting with the preparation of major assisted projects -- particularly the Perimeter Road project, LAPIS, UNFES.

An unanticipated effect of the improved accounting and financial management practices in Roads and other units has been to give some donors greater confidence in absorptive/contract management capacity, resulting in greater delegation and faster disbursement of funds.

1. If OPEXers need to be kept on to avoid discontinuities, the cost to the project will be over \$10,000 per month. Training will take more time than estimated, especially in the hard sciences, engineering and undergraduate degrees. B.S. architecture tends to be the longest, requiring a 5 year degree in most cases.

2. The phasing of training with the arrival of the OPEXer is critical to costs management as well as to the early achievement of project goals. The average time in training is approximately 24 months, the same as the OPEX contracts. However, in most cases the training was not initiated until well after the OPEXer was in place, often a year or more, necessitating extension of the OPEXers. While in some cases the extension was due to delays in the trainee returning, in more cases the extension was foreseeable from the beginning. One OPEXer suggested that 3-year contracts may be appropriate. This may be appropriate for some cases, but in general more appropriate phasing and earlier training starts are likely to result in more certain cost savings.

3. Placement of individual OPEXers in line positions within Ministries should not be expected to produce overall improvements in efficiency of Ministry operations, in the short or even medium run. Anticipated project outputs should be geared to tangible contributions OPEXers can be expected to make. Effectiveness in performing specific functions or providing specific goods or services may be a more appropriate evaluation criterion than organizational efficiency.

4. The linkage between OPEXers and their FU counterparts is not as close as was envisioned. Even though the project's record is very good in terms of bringing participants back to work in Lesotho, they have often not moved directly into the OPEXer's position. The people on whom the OPEXer depends for reinforcing and advancing innovations or administrative and procedural changes are in most cases junior staff and colleagues other than the counterpart trainees. If this observation is correct, the Mission may not need to worry unduly about discontinuities; concentration could be on encouraging the technician to seek more direct means to ensure that system improvements are institutionalized. The result could be budgetary savings and possibly improved effectiveness.

5. The direct linkage between OPEX TA and key local staff as counterparts being groomed to replace the OPEXer may not be appropriate in all cases, particularly as training emphases focus on middle- and senior-level staff and as TA is provided to institutions over as much as a decade. As one OPEX supervisor, who had been a participant trainee and who expects to have high-level TA under LAPIS, put it, "I don't want to spend my whole professional life as a 'counterpart.' At some point I want to be a professional in my own country." In short, in some cases a more collegial relationship without the subordinate/understudy role implied by the term "counterpart" is needed and desired by key Basotho professionals.

6. This project is viewed very favorably by the GOL and they are strongly interested in continuing similar assistance. They will, however, press for a larger proportion of the fund to be spent on training, rather than on OPEXers. The P.S./Planning has suggested a 75:25 split training:OPEX.

7. Top-level officials will not take time away from their jobs for long-term training -- whether because the GOL will not release them, because of uncertainty regarding tenure and reinstatement or simply because they are dedicated and overworked. Other training options, particularly shorter courses and local training workshops, must be created if they are to benefit from a follow-on project.

8. Satisfactory housing for OPEXers appears to be a necessary (and possibly a near-sufficient) condition for ensuring good morale. Increasing the pool of contractor housing under SAMD clearly has helped. Whereas housing was one of the major topics of the 1981 evaluation, it was barely mentioned during our investigations. In fact, morale has been a minor part of our discussions. OPEX comments regarding dealings with the bureaucracy and backstopping from TransCentury and AID have been mild and generally positive. A hypothesis is that this is more a consequence of most OPEXers having been in place for some time and having either worked out their problems or decided to live with them than a result of dramatic improvements in working or living conditions.

9. GOL suggestions for increased emphasis include: a) management procedures and practices, particularly financial and personnel; training of trainers, and increasing emphasis on industrial technology and the water works programs.

10. The bonding systems for trainees are not working and are likely to be changed (in effect, if not formally) in favor of some form of loan scheme. Suggestions from the evaluation team of ways to use student loans, including forgiveness provisions and access to loan funded scholarships for the private sector, were well received. The GOL (MPLER) would welcome detail on existing schemes and perhaps WA in this area.

X: SPECIAL COMMENTS

(random thoughts which are not part of the evaluation per se)

Morale improves with time -- the team observed that many of the problems of which OPEXers complained remain real, but the individuals have accepted them as reality. Most of the current OPEXers are experienced individuals, and most of them have extended their contracts. A related thought is that most seem to feel productive and well-utilized in their positions, which usually compensates for many frustrations.

High proportion of TCNs -- the team observed that almost half the OPEXers at times are Third-Country Nationals. While these individuals appear very competent and fully appropriate to the OPEX positions on technical grounds, the mission needs to watch the proportion to ensure that the SAMD activities also reflect the implicit project objectives of representing U.S. expertise and transferring technology and institutional or personnel linkages with U.S. entities.

Currency fluctuations, how to handle? -- Lesotho has experienced a significant devaluation of its currency through exchange rate fluctuations, declining from about \$1.40 per Maluti in 1978 to about \$.70 per Maluti at present. Some OPEXers felt their local equivalent salary should be adjusted to reflect this change, but they were not inclined to set this against the increased local purchasing power of the dollar portion.

Grading may not reflect position -- A more constructive suggestion was that the local salary be set in nominal terms, either a modest token sum or a figure approximating the first step of the senior service, grade 8. This may have the effect of avoiding the pattern of OPEXers being undergraded but functioning at higher grades, and/or working with counterparts graded substantially higher.

U.S. flag carrier hassle -- several OPEXers complained about the requirement to use U.S. flag carriers. The main difficulty is that the availability of the direct PanAm flight from Johannesburg to New York means that they cannot stop en route for home leave. No suggestion is made for how to resolve this, but it is noted as a problem.

XI: RECOMMENDATIONS

[NOTE: As the argument for most of the following is contained in the text, recommendations are made as bullet points, with elaboration only where one recommendation is contingent on another.]

RECOMMENDATION 1: The SAMD mechanism appears as important to the mission as is the specific OPEX and participant training which is funded through the SAMD project, 632-0069. Whether or not additional funding is allocated to the project, the mission should explore ways to sustain a general purpose OPEX recruitment and participant trainee placement mechanism for the purpose of providing technical assistance and initiating training in advance of or as an alternative to contract project management. Note: Maintenance of such a mechanism does not necessarily require maintenance of the current support contract with Transcentury and Phelps-Stokes.

RECOMMENDATION 2: The priorities for further OPEX assistance appear to be mainly in the areas of personnel management, financial management and perhaps manpower planning/needs assessment (though this might be most appropriately provided under the rubric of personnel management). Additional fields in which specialized technical expertise may be requested include hydrology and industrialization.

RECOMMENDATION 3: Most line position technical assistance needs in the sectors to which the mission is giving priority should be provided through the sectoral projects. There will continue to be needs, to which the mission may want to respond, for technicians in line positions necessary either for project implementation or as substitutes for technical assistance projects. However, such OPEX placements should be justified separately from the more general SAMD goals of improving public sector organizational effectiveness and efficiency. If a follow-on SAMD project is developed, the mission may wish to include the provision of technical assistance for selected technology transfer or system design purposes as a sub-goal.

RECOMMENDATION 4: Greater priority in training should be given to middle management and mid-career technical staff than has recently been the case. <sup>corollary</sup> Corollary Recommendations:

— With few exceptions, SAMD training should be limited to individuals who have already served in the targeted organizational unit for at least 2 years, preferably more. This is likely to help ensure a degree of institutional loyalty, overcoming some of the weakness of the current bonding system. It is also likely to result in improved selection, with supervisors making better informed judgments of who among their staff would make best use of training, and in relatively more mature trainees with more precise insight to their training needs and career prospects.

— With few exceptions, undergraduate training should be limited. Where individuals nominated for training have not completed a first degree or at least a substantial part of the course requirements for a first degree, the preferred option is for them to obtain undergraduate training at NUL. The second option would be undergraduate enrollment in a 3rd-country university. The main exception would be for promising individuals already employed by a Ministry or other organization for several years, but who for one reason or another have not been able to complete a BA/BS.

RECOMMENDATION 5: For cost-effectiveness reasons as well as to focus SAMD on more specific needs, more use should be made of short-term technical assistance and short-course training. Correlary Recommendations:

—relatively more use should be made of short-course professional training offered by U.S. universities, USG Departments, and professional organizations keyed to specific needs such as financial or personnel management, information systems or specialized technical fields (e.g. in engineering, health, communications). These are most appropriate for mid-level and senior personnel who cannot be spared for long periods and who in any case are not motivated by need for additional degrees.

—relatively more of the training should be offered in-country through IDM, LIPA, NUL, LAC or other training institutions. An appropriate and cost-effective use of OPLX personnel (including OPEXers with previous experience in Lesotho) may be short-term assignments for short courses, seminars and workshops.

RECOMMENDATION 6: If the recommendations to provide more TA on a short-term basis, to make greater use of short-course training and to offer more training in-country are accepted, changes in the support arrangements both in the U.S. and locally are needed to enable SAMD to respond to more specific needs more quickly. Specific Options:

— expand the part-time local coordinator to a full-time position and increase the responsibilities to include liaison with NNDS, the planning unit of MPEEA and the supervisors of the organizational units to which OPEXers are assigned or from which trainees are drawn. Note: no recommendation is made for changes in the administrative support or liaison responsibilities vis-a-vis long-term OPEXers. It is appropriate that these individuals continue to function under contractual commitments as employees of the GOL and that they not be treated by USAID as significantly different from other senior GOL officials.

— formalize the criteria and administrative procedures for allocations of a local support fund. Alternatively, eliminate this fund. The impression that the fund is arbitrarily allocated may cause more problems and dissatisfaction than the allocations solve. The most appropriate uses of such a fund would be for small grant support of local staff training activities, training materials or professional reference materials and similar inputs which are difficult to anticipate in the project budget but which may be critical to the technology transfer objectives associated with OPEX placements. A suggestion is that requests for such imprest fund grants might most appropriately come through the supervisor rather than direct from the OPEXer.

— there is need for facilitating the taking of GRE, SAT, TOEFL and other qualification examinations locally. Facilitating these would be an appropriate role for the local coordinator and would be an appropriate use of SAMD resources.

RECOMMENDATION 7: The contracts between the OPEXers and Transcentury and between the OPEXers and COL institutions or organizations should be reviewed for consistency with AID administrative requirements and the project goals. In addition, every effort should be made to ensure that the support and benefits provisions are standard for all OPEXers. Finally, the mission should examine carefully, with advice from REDSO GC or elsewhere as needed, the implications of narrowly drawn OPEX contracts which leave OPEXers exposed to master contract or AID administrative changes to which they are not a party, as well as acts-of-god and force majeure which could leave them marooned without financial, administrative or legal support. Note: the evaluation team members are not lawyers but raise these questions due to our confusion and uncertainty over how the contracts and support provisions might be interpreted under a variety of circumstances.