EVALUATION

OF THE

AFRICAN EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 1984-85

SYNTHESIS REPORT

Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance
Agency for International Development

May, 1986

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Contract No.: PDC-1406-I-05-4162-00
(No. 5)

May 12, 1986

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The overall Evaluation Team would like to express its sincere gratitude to the many persons who gave of their time, experience and know-how in helping it carry out the evaluation of the 1984-1985 Emergency Food Assistance program in Chad, Mali, Sudan both in Washington and in the field. Their frank assessments of their work and the problems encountered have been most valuable in enabling the overall team to make practical, positive recommendations for the future. Our special thanks also to Judith Gilmore, the AID Project Officer for her effort. Her hard work and many contributions have helped shape the results in many important ways.

The Governments of Chad, Mali and the Sudan, the USAIDs, the US Embassies, Private Voluntary Organizations, and UN agencies in those countries all gave generously of their time, in spite of their heavy work loads.

Without the help of the responsible host government officials, USAIDs, PVOs and UN headquarters and field staff, it would have been impossible to cover the ground necessary in the three weeks spent in each country.

Annex 2 contains a list of the individual team members. We would also like to thank Corrine Whittaker for her research work on Chapter I of the report. To Esther Robb, who served as Production Manager, we express our great appreciation for her many extra hours and the spirit with which she gave them.

Dennis H. Wood
Project Executive Officer

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFRICARE	United States Nongovernmental Organization
AID	Agency for International Development
AID/W	Agency for International Development/Washington
CCAV	Coordination Committee for Emergency Aid
CDSS	Country Development Strategy Statement
CILSS	Permanent Inter-State Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel
CNAVSV	National Committee for Aid to Drought Victims (Mali)
CONCASED	Inter Ministerial Coordinating Committee (Chad)
DOD	Department of Defense
EEC	European Economic Community
ESF	Economic Support Fund
FANA	Food Aid National Administration
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FEWS	Famine Early Warning System
FFW	Food for Work
FY	Fiscal Year
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GOC	Government of Chad
GOS	Government of Sudan
GRM	Government of Republic of Mali
LICROSS	League of International Red Cross
MLCCN	Ministry for Control of National Disasters (Chad)
MSF	Médecins san Frontiéres
MT	Metric Tons
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid (PVO)
NGO	Nongovernmental Organizations
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OPAM	National Grain Marketing Board (Mali)
ONC	National Cereals Office (Chad)
OXFAM	Oxford Famine Relief Organization
PID	Project Identification Document
PRMC	Mali Project for Grain Trade
PVO	Private Volunteer Organization
REDSO	AID Regional Economic Development Services Organization
RRC	Research and Rehabilitation Commission
SECADEV	Secours Catholique et Développement
TA	Technical Assistance
TDY	Temporary Duty
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Plan

UNDRO	United Nations Disaster Relief Organization
UNEOS	United Nations Office of Emergency Operations - Sudan
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Educational Fund
UNRESREP	United Nations Resident Representative
UNIWFP	United Nations World Food Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USG	United States Government
WFP	World Food Programme
WVRO	World Vision Relief Organization

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A. African Emergency Food Assistance: Policy Context, US Response and US Objectives for the Future

At the height of the drought in January 1985, President Reagan announced a major African Hunger Relief Initiative and, as part of this initiative, a "Food for Progress" policy. Both were aimed at solving Africa's long-term food and agricultural problems--while also dealing with short-term food problems--through economic policy reforms, research, training, improved rural infrastructure and private sector involvement. His action sharply focused renewed attention on the great problems facing many African countries. It recognized clearly that declining per capita food production over the past twenty years and the prevalence of drought in the broad band of low and erratic rainfall south of the Tropic of Capricorn and in southern Africa are problems that will require long-term development efforts to resolve.

The closely interrelated problems of declining per capita food production, persistent drought, and emergency food crises in sub-Saharan Africa are among the most difficult development challenges facing our generation. The major drought experienced by sub-Saharan Africa in the period 1982-85 severely affected twenty one countries, set back the development process by years, and critically affected the lives of millions of people--particularly in the isolated rural areas of those countries. Although, in the decade between the drought years of 1973/74 and 1984/85, the capacity of many African governments and societies had improved to some extent, they were faced with a crisis of millions of hungry and starving persons in 1984/85. The world community responded with emergency food and supporting assistance which saved millions of lives. In an extraordinary effort, the United States through public and private initiative shipped over three million tons of food, matched by another three million tons provided by the rest of the world. This immense response saved millions of lives and reduced the suffering of millions more. Despite the heroic effort, however, many died and hundreds of thousands suffered severely.

In 1986, AID commissioned evaluations of the 1984-85 US response to the African food emergency to identify lessons learned in responding to this disaster, to suggest ways for the US and other donors to respond more effectively to food emergencies in the future, and to relate emergency food aid programs better to the longer term development effort in Africa. Several key lessons have emerged from these evaluations.

First, it is clear that the widespread droughts and emergency food crises which affected large parts of Africa in 1968-74 and 1982-85 are not extraordinary episodes separate from the development process taking place on the continent. The problems and setbacks caused by drought among rural populations can and should be seen as a syndrome of inadequate income growth and not--as is usually the case--just as

drought induced manifestations of hunger, malnutrition and ill health among vulnerable population groups.

A second lesson is that development programs must take into account the problems of drought-prone areas and must anticipate and pre-plan for food emergencies, particularly those which may affect isolated, hard-to-reach rural areas. Development programs must focus on the need for information to track the food and agricultural situation of rural areas more closely and reliably. Such information is essential both for development planning purposes as well as food security and emergency food assistance planning.

Third, African nations can, with early information, anticipate the need for and pre-plan emergency food assistance programs, taking into account the development context in which they occur. With external help, African nations can cope with existing chronic food deficits and prevent them from developing into critical emergencies. Flexibility in the use of food aid, as is available to a considerable degree under PL480, will be necessary to provide for multi-year programming such as Title II, Section 206--in concert with other donors--to address the needs of individual countries in ways which fit in well with their specific development situations.

While these efforts to manage and focus information-gathering and pre-planning and the capacity to manage drought-caused emergencies are underway, African governments, the US and other donors can expect food emergencies to continue for the foreseeable future. Key US objectives for the future, then, must be to:

- Help ensure that food emergency situations are anticipated and responded to effectively before they assume crisis proportions;
- Achieve equitable donor and host government sharing of the responsibility for dealing with food emergencies;
- Realize the desired impact from emergency food assistance efforts--saving lives, reducing suffering and fostering additional longer term development;
- Attain cost effective results from emergency food assistance efforts; and
- Know, document and report the results of emergency food assistance programs.

A specific strategy and recommendations for achieving these objectives are suggested later in this overview.

B. Evaluation Results

A tremendous contribution was made by the US emergency food assistance effort in Sudan, Mali, Chad and 17 other countries in Africa in 1984-85. US emergency food assistance was of critical importance to most of the 30 million people seriously at-risk on the African continent. In only the three countries evaluated in depth, six million people in Sudan, two million in Mali and over a million in Chad were assisted in coping with the worst food crisis of written record. Moreover, the effort was undertaken in the context of a continent-wide disaster requiring a careful weighing of priorities, a stretching of available resources and their rapid mobilization.

The massive US food emergency assistance response resulted in numerous positive program features that can be built upon in fashioning programs during future food emergencies. The evaluation also identified program areas which can be improved to enhance the impact of such future efforts. This review of program elements that can be improved should not detract in any way from the critically important contribution made by US famine relief efforts in 1984-85.

1. Food distribution--channels and modes

US success in providing food to hungry rural people in Sudan, Mali and Chad resulted in part from identifying channels--PVOs, government, international organizations, private sector, etc.--to distribute massive amounts of food in each country to remote rural areas. Developing successful efforts in Mali required intensive collaboration by the host government at all levels, by PVOs, USAID, other donors, international organizations and the private sector. Although the mix varied, the successful ingredients in these three countries were PVOs, the private sector and regional/local government. Much of the attention of these entities was focused on removing or working around logistic constraints.

All distribution modes--FFW (Food for Work), monetization, general distribution, etc.--were used to achieve impact objectives effectively in certain circumstances in Sudan, Mali and Chad. However, as illustrated in Chad, FFW and specialized feeding programs--which are targeted on individuals or households--enabled beneficiaries to be reached more regularly with needed food. General distribution was effective in numerous circumstances, including many areas in both Mali and Sudan, but sufficient monitoring was needed to make it so. Monetization can be very effective (Mali and Chad), especially in urban areas.

Use of commercial markets to monetize emergency food assistance in urban areas was successful and a key component of the overall impact achieved in Sudan, Mali and Chad.

2. Host governments

Host governments can be very effective in coordinating emergency food responses, as was the case in Chad, but most have limited capability to manage such efforts or to carry out operational activities such as food distribution effectively. Strengthening this capability, especially in chronic drought countries, helps foster government commitment to deal with food emergencies; the existence of a more capable host government, such as Mali, can result in its undertaking more responsibility for coping with the emergency.

3. Donor coordination

Fully effective coordination among donors was not achieved in all cases (e.g., Sudan), but where it was best the impact of emergency food assistance programs was enhanced (e.g., Mali and Chad). Donor coordination was most effective when begun prior to or early in the drought cycle and, as in Mali, when donors were collectively involved in identifying and assessing a food emergency. Donor coordination is maximized when both USAIDs and AID/W play active roles and when the host government is the principal coordinating agent at central, regional and local levels (as in Chad).

4. PVOs

PVOs--both indigenous and foreign--played a vital role in emergency food assistance efforts in Sudan, Mali and Chad. They were a major factor in enabling successful distribution of massive volumes of food in rural areas. Their role included, but was not limited to, identifying groups and areas in need of emergency food, targeting and distributing food, monitoring the distribution and end use of food, and collaborating with government, donors and international agencies. These activities involved several modes of food distribution--e.g., general feeding, resettlement, FFW, and supplemental feeding. The participation of PVOs with host governments, USAIDs, other donors and international organizations, enhanced cost effectiveness and overall program results. Their work in increasing the developmental impact of emergency food assistance could be substantial.

5. Private sector

The private sector played an effective role in Sudan, Mali and Chad, principally in the logistics area. The contribution of the private sector can be expanded--as a means of lightening the burden of public sector institutions and increasing the impact of emergency food assistance programs. Increased USAID authority to contract for private sector resources and more experience in using them will increase the contribution of this sector to emergency food assistance efforts.

6. Targeting

Targeting on individuals, households or areas in need of food increased the impact and cost effectiveness of emergency food assistance as was especially apparent in Chad which used rapid nutritional surveillance extensively. The use of both socioeconomic and nutrition/health data for targeting throughout a food emergency cycle maximizes program impact and cost effectiveness.

7. Preparedness and key information

In Sudan, Mali and Chad in 1984-85, there was a striking lack of preparedness despite its being the third or fourth year of the drought. Host governments, USAID and other donors had done virtually no pre-planning for another year without rain. Dealing with a severe drought cost effectively and in a timely manner was extremely difficult in all these countries.

Key information--needed for baseline development, early warning, needs assessment, targeting, and impact assessment--was unavailable, untimely or inaccurate in Sudan, Mali and Chad. As a result, for example, needs assessments in each country were far off the mark, a factor that affected all aspects of planning and implementation. In addition, accurate impact assessment was impossible due to the lack of baseline data. Lack of key information contributed to the untimeliness of responses to the drought in all three countries. Without adequate and accurate information neither the host government nor donors were willing to act decisively.

Traditional coping mechanisms, such as sharing of food, using famine foods, moving cattle to different locations, sending family members out to find wage work and migrating, greatly reduced suffering and saved many lives in Sudan, Mali and Chad. These mechanisms extended distribution of emergency food over time (e.g., by supplementing it with famine foods) and to others (by sharing). Traditional paternalistic relationships whereby village leaders allocate food among those in the villages also was an effective form of sharing of emergency food, especially in Chad and Sudan. Because coping mechanisms were very effective, shortfalls in reaching target levels of emergency food distribution did not have the negative impact some had feared. For example, many people in all three countries depended solely on famine foods for extended periods of time. Better information about these coping mechanisms will assist in the design and implementation of emergency food assistance programs.

The African famine occurred in stages in Sudan, Mali and Chad and people affected responded differently in coping with each stage. If understood in the context of the stage of famine in which they occur, these responses--e.g. selling jewelry, sending a family member away to find work, moving in with relatives or moving the entire household--can be used to guide famine relief planning and as a trigger for appropriate food aid interventions.

8. AID Management

Given the limited staff resources applied to the emergency, USAIDs in Sudan, Mali and Chad achieved a great deal. However, the management of emergency food assistance programs by USAIDs and AID/W was attempted in Sudan, Mali and Chad within normal development channels and mostly by persons with little or no food emergency management experience. USAIDs were understaffed as well. Thus, while food emergencies are particularly amenable to good management and experience, USAIDs and AID/W used less of both than was immediately available to them. This lack of personnel experience, lack of special administrative and funding procedures, and understaffing reduced program impact and cost effectiveness.

9. Linkage between emergency food assistance and development

In Sudan, Mali and Chad the same problem, lack of adequate income, is at the root of both underdevelopment and food emergencies. Thus there are two key links between development and food emergencies--whether development programs are designed to preclude such emergencies and whether emergency food assistance is designed to be developmental--i.e., aimed at increasing income immediately and in the longer term. Development programs in these countries were not aimed at increasing the economic well-being of groups most vulnerable to drought (e.g., Mali). When drought occurred, the income of these groups collapsed, leading to famine and necessitating emergency food assistance for them. Nor were most emergency food assistance programs (except for resettlement efforts in Chad and minor FFW projects in Mali) designed to meet immediate food/income needs while also producing household, local or national assets that could increase income over the longer term as well. Thus, as valuable and important as both development and food emergency programs were in these three countries, neither type program focused effectively on the linkages between development and food emergency situations.

10. Packaging of resources

Emergency food assistance alone was not enough in Sudan, Mali and Chad. Other resources--e.g., money, transport, tools, seed, and technical assistance--were necessary to make effective use of the emergency food. Certain distribution modes such as resettlement in Chad required a broader mix and larger amount of these additional resources than did general distribution in Mali and Sudan. Where these resources are available and appropriately packaged with food, the impact of the emergency food program will be enhanced.

In Sudan and Mali, general feeding was carried out for an extended period without being complemented with supplemental feeding related inputs. This substantially reduced the impact of the overall effort on the most vulnerable of those affected by the drought--especially children.

Health inputs were not provided initially with emergency food assistance in Sudan, Mali or Chad. In Chad this was because the health infrastructure was so limited. In Sudan and Mali, the lack of integration of health inputs with emergency food assistance was due to poor program design. This lack of health related inputs also reduced the effectiveness of emergency assistance efforts, especially in meeting the needs of the most vulnerable groups.

11. Measurement

In Sudan, Mali and Chad, initial lack of monitoring resulted in not knowing what the programs were achieving and what changes were needed to improve their impact. Monitoring, which was implemented very late in all three countries, was used primarily to ensure that specific procedures were being followed. Because evaluation was not built into the three programs initially, there was no attempt by any of them to establish baselines or obtain or develop information that would enable program impact to be determined and assessed.

C. Strategy and Recommendations for Achieving US Emergency Food Assistance Objectives for the Future

1. Strategy

The evaluation of the African emergency food assistance program suggests ways to realize US emergency food assistance objectives over the next decade[1]. First, a reinforcement of the US policy aimed at solving Africa's long-term food and agricultural problems is needed. Second, this reinforcement can be achieved by a redirection of US strategy to help vulnerable African low income countries--pending such development--to avoid or contain widespread food emergencies by a conscious effort at pre-planning and anticipation of food shortfalls so they do not build up to crisis proportions. Third, this strategy of focusing on the most food vulnerable of African low income countries should be based on a partnership approach with other major donors, country governments and PVOs.

The findings of the evaluation of the US response to the African famine point, fourth, to six strategy elements for helping African governments concerned and for realizing US emergency food assistance objectives in the future:

[1]A much more complete discussion of recommended actions is found in Chapter II.

a. Pre-plan and develop key information as a central basis for emergency food assistance responses and for early identification of impending emergency situations;

b. Ensure excellent management of emergency food assistance efforts--from preparedness through evaluation;

c. Reinforce linkage between emergency food assistance and longer term development;

d. Build host government capabilities and commitments to deal with food emergencies;

e. Strengthen donor coordination in this effort; and,

f. Monitor and evaluate the effort and food emergency responses closely.

2. Recommendations

a. Pre-planning: Develop sound pre-plans and key information as a central basis for emergency food assistance responses

- AID/W, should select ten most vulnerable countries[2] for pre-planning and early warning systems emphasis;
- For selected countries, USAIDs and other key actors should document the state of pre-planning, design a pre-plan system, and establish the elements of the pre-plan;
- USAIDs in selected countries should include in their CDSS a section on drought planning:
  - -- showing the relationship of planned development assistance to at-risk groups and drought-prone areas;
  - -- specifying existing pre-plans and action plans for responding to drought; and
  - -- showing how emergency food assistance will be used developmentally if it is needed;
- AID should continue efforts in selected countries to expand USAID capability to carry out needs assessments;

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[2]In 1984-85, ten countries in sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 80 percent of US food shipments: Burkina Faso, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Somalia, and Sudan.

- o USAIDs should assist host governments to strengthen or create systems for providing information necessary to assess needs and for making the needs assessment;

- o AID should urge and help host governments to:

  -- institute standard periodic surveys of drought-prone areas;

  -- provide for at least an annual scrutiny of relief and emergency food needs of their rural communities and the evolving development situation;

  -- undertake, simultaneously with the needs assessment, a detailed analysis of the country's logistical capacity;

- o AID/W should work with USAIDs immediately to document stages of drought responses to develop appropriate indicators for an early warning system in the selected countries. These efforts should concentrate on identifying socioeconomic indicators that reflect the income and wealth status of at-risk households. These should trigger appropriate food aid interventions.

b. Management: Ensure excellent management of food emergency assistance efforts--from preparedness through evaluation

1) AID

- o AID/W should establish a computerized roster of Agency personnel and private sector firms who have had previous experience in managing emergency food and nonfood assistance programs. Special procedures should be developed to permit transfer and use of these resources as needed;

- o AID/W should pre-establish special procedures and administrative channels for carrying out the food emergency action plans of USAIDs, especially incremental shipments of food to meet impending emergencies; the Africa Bureau, with OFDA and FVA, should pre-plan for the eventuality of another big multi-country and multi-year drought in sub-Saharan Africa, including standby arrangements for fast track decision making and mobilization of resources;

- o AID/W should increase its delegation of authority to USAID missions once there is an emergency to reduce administrative delays. For example, an allocation of three to five million dollars to each USAID in affected countries to be used to accelerate the response to the emergency would enable early action. Such an allocation should be complemented by

temporary duty assignments of necessary contracting and legal assistance;

- o AID/W should prepare and issue a new operational manual and guidance for USAIDs to include guidelines for:

  -- pre-planning, early warning systems, program identification and design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation;

  -- strengthening host government capability to manage drought disaster and food emergency situations, particularly in the rural areas;

  -- cooperation/coordination with other donors;

  -- involvement of the private sector and PVOs in emergency food assistance programs;

  -- linking drought planning and emergency food assistance programs to development.

2) Host governments

- o Host governments should play a pivotal function in managing and coordinating food emergency assistance efforts. USAIDs should not bypass the host government (even those with limited capabilities) in the decision making process. This is especially important in chronic deficit countries to build up public sector capacity to respond to future food emergencies;

- o Central governments of host countries should be encouraged to extend their emergency food assistance coordinating efforts down to regional and district levels, drawing on help from PVOs, international organizations, and donors;

- o AID and PVOs should encourage local government participation in and/or implementation of food allocations, food for work projects, and other local aspects of food emergency programs;

3) PVOs

- o PVOs (indigenous and foreign) should be key actors in all stages of emergency food assistance programs--identification, planning, implementation, and evaluation. Their efforts should be supported jointly by the host government, other donors and USAID and monitored by the organizational structure agreed upon to manage the emergency food effort;

- o USAIDs should cooperate fully with and finance as appropriate PVOs as channels to help the host government develop distribution systems and manage distribution of food to rural areas;

- o AID/W, for the most vulnerable countries, should work out preset standby arrangements with one or more PVOs to ensure their rapid response when a food emergency is identified.

4) Private sector

- o Private sector resources--e.g., transport companies, etc.--should be used to help meet emergency food assistance needs wherever feasible to lighten the load on already seriously overburdened governments;

- o USAIDs in the most at-risk countries should prepare, as part of their pre-planning effort, an inventory of private sector resources that could be used during a food emergency. Specific means for using such resources should be included in each USAID's preliminary action plan.

5) Program design

- o USAIDs, in working with host governments and other donors on the kinds of food distribution mechanisms to be used, should emphasize modes which target beneficiaries specifically given the circumstances involved; while general distribution can be targeted effectively, FFW, supplemental feeding, resettlement and similar programs usually are better targeted on specific households and should be the preferred modes; where general feeding is used, USAIDs should work with the host government, PVOs, and other donors to target and monitor such efforts carefully;

- o USAIDs should select distribution modes most appropriate both to enhance development and meet emergency food needs; first preference should be given to FFW, cash for work and other modes that directly increase household, village or national productive assets; special consideration should always be given to converting free general distribution into locally managed FFW or cash for work activities; adequate resources for materials, supervision and technical assistance should be provided;

- o General and supplemental feeding and health care should be programmed together as part of USAIDs' preliminary action plans; mechanisms for providing supplemental feeding and health care in rural areas should be identified and preset as a part of the pre-planning process in the most at-risk countries;

- Targeting of emergency food assistance should be a priority and based on nutrition/health and socioeconomic criteria. Socioeconomic criteria should be used when the impact of drought has not reached the stage of severe malnutrition and to complement health/nutrition criteria whenever possible;

- Traditional coping mechanisms should be understood so that responses to drought can be interpreted accurately and to enable these factors to be accounted for in program planning and implementation and to avoid creation of dependency.

c. Linkage to development: Link emergency food assistance and longer term development

- Emergency food assistance efforts should aim to increase beneficiary income both in immediate terms and the longer run. Emergency uses of food that increase household, local or national assets while meeting immediate nutritional needs should be preferred;

- Food emergency activities should be used to deliberately retain beneficiaries where their development potential is highest. This will usually be in situ, but that is not a panacea. Resettlement sites, as in Chad, or even camps may provide better opportunities to use food for development than would an in situ approach;

- Where appropriate in chronic drought countries, development activities should focus on groups vulnerable to drought-caused income collapse as one direct means of avoiding recurring famine;

- USAIDs in the most vulnerable countries should increase FFW or cash for work (in conjunction with monetized food assistance) efforts in chronic drought-prone areas prior to and as part of emergency food responses; USAIDs in each of these countries should experiment with local or village management of such projects to identify ways to expand them quickly during food emergencies; specific FFW, cash for work and other projects that use food to produce household, local or national productive assets should be developed as shelf projects for drought-prone areas.

d. Host government: Build host government capabilities and committment to deal with food emergencies

- USAIDs should work with host governments and other donors to design emergency food assistance programs to support the development process by building central and regional government capability and competence to plan for and manage emergency food and disaster relief programs and by involving

local and district government institutions in planning and implementing such programs;

- USAIDs in chronically food deficit countries should work as closely as possible with the host government and other donors to develop a national food strategy and integrated food and agricultural development programs; a joint plan for emergency food assistance should be prepared in light of the national food strategy and on-going food and agricultural programs.

e. Other donors: Strengthen donor coordination

- USAIDs should give priority to donor coordination by the host government even if its administrative capability is weak. Full support from USAID, other donors, and the UN should be provided to assist the government in fulfilling this role. If this is not feasible, an international agency (e.g., WFP) is the second choice;

- Donor coordination should be started at the pre-planning/drought proofing stages, and all major donors should participate in the needs assessment from the outset to obtain more rapid agreement on the magnitude of the problem;

- AID/W should assume primary responsibility for coordination between capitals/headquarters of donors, particularly as it concerns level of support. USAIDs should assure coordination at the country level to avoid duplication, encourage sharing of tasks, establish priorities, etc.;

- AID/W and USAIDs should work with host governments, United Nations, major donors, PVOs, and the private sector to develop integrated emergency food assistance plans with firm time schedules for delivery of the materials, equipment, manpower and food needed to mitigate the effects of the emergency.

f. Measurement: Monitor and evaluate continuous emergency food assistance activities

- Detailed monitoring and evaluation of AID's continuous effort to improve emergency food assistance programs should be undertaken during actual food emergencies; USAID staff should be expanded when necessary to achieve good monitoring results and programs should include a provision for evaluation;

- USAIDs and other donors should help host governments strengthen their capability to monitor food emergency assistance programs.

I. PURPOSE AND CONTEXT OF THE EVALUATION AND THE AID RESPONSE

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the general scope of the evaluation and to set the context for a synthesis of the individual country studies. It includes a summary of the purpose and methodology of the evaluation, and a description of both the extent of the problem and the US response for all of sub-Saharan Africa.

A. Purpose, Scope and Methodology: The Evaluation Was Designed to Bring Out Practice Suggestions for Future Action

The principal objectives of the evaluation were to:

- Assess the timeliness, appropriateness and impact of emergency food aid programs in Africa and suggests ways they can be improved;
- Assist USAIDs, PVOs, host governments and other donors in the programming of future emergency, rehabilitation and disaster prevention activities; and
- Provide AID and the donor community with lessons learned regarding the planning, design, implementation and evaluation of emergency aid programs with emphasis on how they can more effectively foster long-term development initiatives and contribute to increased food security.

The generic scope of the evaluation (see Annex 1) illustrates the many issues dealt with during the course of the preparation, field work and writing of the country and synthesis reports. (Executive Summaries of the three country reports are included in Annex 2.)

Methodologically, an overall team divided up to carry out country evaluations in Sudan, Mali and Chad. Each country team depended on secondary source review, interviews and observations in Washington and in its respective country. Upon completion of the three country evaluations, a core team prepared this synthesis report. It synthesizes the central lessons learned from the three countries (Chapter II), then draws upon them and from other sources to develop some generic lessons learned (see Chapter III). The lessons learned are designed to bring out practical suggestions for dealing with food emergency situations in the future.

B. Nature and Scope of the Emergency: The Famine Was One of the Most Severe in Africa's History

In November of 1984, sub-Saharan Africa suffered the effects of the most severe drought and famine in its history. Harvests in 1984-85 were below average in nearly every country and many countries were experiencing their third, fourth or more consecutive years of

drought.[1] Twenty-one countries were listed by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) as most severely affected.[2] Although total food production in sub-Saharan Africa dropped only three percent between 1981/82 and 1983/84, per capita food production dropped eight percent during the same period[3] as population growth averages 3.1 percent a year. Those countries most severely affected by the drought in 1983 had experienced an average fall in grain production per capita of two percent per year between 1970 and 1984.[4] This decline was aggravated by factors such as war and civil strife.

Out of a total population of approximately 380 million in the sub-Saharan region,[5] between 150 and 200 million people were at risk--at least 30 million of them being seriously threatened.[6] Figures on populations and death rates due to the famine are very difficult to obtain, although an indicator is the estimate that 100,000 persons died of starvation in Mozambique alone in 1984.[7]

The affected population was particularly susceptible to drought complications due to severe poverty and relative isolation. An average of eighty percent of the sub-Saharan African population lives in rural areas and is comprised primarily of subsistence farmers and low income households. Today, four out of five Africans depend on agriculture for their livelihood. Nevertheless, agriculture's average contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of most sub-Saharan African countries declined from 42 percent in the 1960s to 22 percent in 1980.[8] Approximately 20 percent of the African population consumes less than the diet needed to remain in good health--100 million people are estimated to be severely hungry or malnourished. The World Bank estimates that between 65 and 80 percent of Africans will be living below the poverty line by 1995 due to an estimated 0.7 percent annual fall in per capita GDP for sub-Saharan Africa over the next decade. In

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[1]US Department of State. Agency for International Development, Report to the Congress, September 30, 1985.

[2]FAO, Situation in African Countries Affected by Emergencies: Special Report, FAO, 1985 reports.

[3]US Department of Agriculture, World Food Aid Needs and Availabilities, July 1984, USDA, 1984.

[4]World Bank, Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, World Bank, Washington, DC, 1984.

[5]Ibid.

[6]USAID, Report to the Congress.

[7]Africa News, Volume XXIV No. 4. February 25, 1985.

[8]Ibid.

addition, in 1984, Africa had approximately 400,000 refugees.[9] This figure is undoubtedly higher following the population displacements resulting from the drought.

Actual food imports in sub-Saharan Africa in 1984 totalled 20,099.043 million MT--a 240 percent increase over 1981 imports and a 95 percent increase over the 1981-1984 imports average. Actual food imports in 1985 totalled approximately 12.273 million MT (of which 48 percent was non-commercial food aid). This represents a 114 percent increase over 1981 imports and a 19 percent increase over the 1981-1984 import average.[10] Initial estimates of 1984/85 food aid needs by United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)/USAID called for approximately 4.5 million MT of food from the world donor community for the 1984/85 crop year.[11] These tonnages were to be distributed on a continent of 8.574 million square miles[12] (slightly over 3 times the area of the US) which lacks the necessary port, inland transportation, communication and social services infrastructure and therefore required substantial additional assistance in areas such as transportation and health care.

C. Extent of the US Response: The US Response was Massive

The US Government's (USG) response to this crisis in fiscal year (FY) 1985 was very large, amounting to over three million metric tons (MT) of which nearly two million MT was emergency food aid and over one million MT was regular food aid. This represented a 130 percent increase in food aid contributions from 1983/84 for the sub-Saharan region. The total value of the food aid was $1.09 billion, 60 percent of which was emergency or grant assistance targetted at people severely affected by the drought. The emergency aid was furnished through the PL-480 Title II and Section 416 programs, supplemented by the release of the Food Security Wheat Reserve. The total emergency food contribution was valued at over $ 770 million including freight.[13] Additional contributions were provided through carryover commitments from FY 1984. A substantial portion of this assistance was provided to

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[9]World Bank, Toward Sustained Development.

[10]FAO, Cereal Import Requirements of Food Aid Priority Countries, FAO, Rome, Reports for 1980-1984; and FAO, Food Supply Situation and Crop Prospects in Sub-Saharan Africa, FAO, February 1986.

[11]USDA, World Food Aid Needs and Availabilities (July 1984 and July 1985). (Figures are for status quo, not nutrition based, calculations.)

[12]World Bank, Toward Sustained Development.

[13]Memo from AID/FVA/FFP/POD, Herbert Smith, P.L. 480 African Approval Status -- FY 1985, January 29, 1985 (sic) and USAID Report to Congress.

Mali and Chad. Table 1 illustrates the relative country and contribution size.

Total food contributions from the US government to sub-Saharan Africa represented nearly 50 percent of the overall tonnage provided by the donor community as a whole and twice as much as was provided by the second largest donor--the EEC.[14] US government food aid was supplemented with food distribution assistance provided by OFDA in the amount of $90 million for transport and $1.8 million in services provided by the Department of Defense (DOD).[15] In addition, approximately $125-200 million in emergency aid was provided to sub-Saharan Africa by the US public through private and voluntary organizations, churches, schools, corporations and individuals.[16] The private sector contribution amounts to 18 percent of total US government commodity and non-commodity food assistance. This illustrates both the generous efforts of the US public and the critical role of the USG programs.

The total value of food and non-food emergency assistance to Africa in FY 1985 (including all OFDA funds) was roughly twice the value of development assistance (excluding ESF) to sub-Saharan Africa during the same period.[17]

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[14]USAID, Report to the Congress.

[15]Memo from AID/FVA/FFP/POD

[16]Telephone interview with Interaction NYC, NY, 10 April 1986.

[17]US Department of State. Agency for International Development. Congressional Presentation FY 1987.

AFRICAN EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE EVALUATION

Table 1: Emergency Food Assistance Provided in 1984-85 (FY 1985) to Sudan, Mali and Chad and the Rest of sub-Saharan Africa by USAID and Other Donors

	Size (square miles)	Population (million) (estimated)	1984-85 Emergency Food Assistance (000's MT)			Committed*
			U.S.		Donor	Total
			Titles I & III	Title II		
Sudan	986,000	21.5	319	591	391	1301
Mali	478,000	8.3	None	95	177[a]	272
Chad	496,000	4.0-5.0	None	75	135	210
AFRICA WIDE (sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa)	8,574,000[b]	380[b]	918,423[c]	1,770.500[c]	3,713.300[c]	5,483.800

*As of October 3, 1985.

Source: Devres Team Sudan, Mali and Chad African Emergency Food Assistance reports.

[a]FAO, Food Supply Situation and Crop Prospects in sub-Saharan Africa, FAO, 26 February 1986.

[b]World Bank, Toward Sustained Development in sub-Saharan Africa, World Bank, Washington, DC 1984.

[c]US Department of State. Agency for International Development. Congressional Presentation FY 1987. (AID CP amount covers FY 1985 Title I and II Total food aid to Africa in 1985, including Section 416 and Food Security Wheat Reserve Commodities, was over 3.0 million MT).

II. THREE COUNTRY REPORTS -- A SYNTHESIS OF CENTRAL LESSONS LEARNED

A. Introduction: Sudan, Mali and Chad Were Chosen For Field Evaluations

Sudan, Mali and Chad were selected for evaluation of their emergency food assistance programs for 1984-85. These three countries accounted for 40 percent of US food aid to Sub-Saharan Africa in 1984-85. The countries were representative of the drought and famine situations which faced many countries in the Sahel and, more generally, in the broad band across Africa south of the Tropic of Capricorn. 1984-85 was the fourth year of drought for Sudan and Chad and the fourth in five years for Mali.

Sudan is the largest country in Africa geographically (a little less than one million square miles--the size of the United States east of the Mississippi) with a population of 21.5 million. In normal years it is a food surplus country exporting sorghum to the Middle East. Sudan has had little history of drought. Therefore, adequate mechanisms for dealing with the drought were limited on the government side. The change of government in early 1985, civil unrest in Southern Sudan, substantial numbers of refugees from Ethiopia and Chad and budgetary problems added to the difficulties of responding to emergency food assistance needs. In FY 1985 the United States provided 67 percent of emergency food assistance.

Mali is the size of Texas, New Mexico and Kansas (478,000 square miles) with a population of 8.3 million. It is a chronic food deficit country with mechanisms in place for dealing with drought. Mali is landlocked which increased the lead times required to deliver emergency food shipments and generally made logistics difficult. In FY 1985 the United States provided 35 percent of emergency food assistance to Mali.

Chad is the size of Texas, New Mexico, and Colorado (496,000 square miles) with a population of 4 to 5 million. In recent years it has required food imports and is likely to continue to need them for the next few years. Impressive coordination mechanisms were set up by the government of Chad between itself, PVOs, and major donor countries. The recent civil war, Libyan troops occupying the northern third of Chad, a newly reestablished civil service, and damage and deterioration to the limited infrastructure made implementation of the program difficult. Chad is also landlocked. In FY 1985 the US provided 36 percent of emergency food assistance to Chad.

B. Analysis and Synthesis: Lessons Learned and Specific Recommendations

This chapter presents lessons learned as distilled from the three country evaluation reports (See Annex 2), together with a brief discussion of relevant country findings followed by a number of specific recommendations. The lessons learned and recommendations are presented under the following subject matter areas specified in the scope of work for the evaluations:

- o Preparedness--Pre-planning and contingency planning;
- o Donor coordination;
- o Needs assessment;
- o Project design;
- o Distribution mechanisms;
- o Management;
- o Timing;
- o Impact (Elements that affect it);
- o Monitoring and evaluation; and,
- o Development--emergency food assistance linkages.

Under these ten headings, a total of 48 lessons learned have been drawn from the detailed findings, conclusions and recommendations of the country evaluations. (See Annex 2). These lessons learned have in turn been used to frame specific recommendations under each heading, addressed in the main to AID. In working with these ten headings it has been found useful on occasion to repeat information set out in earlier points. For example, some issues related to Timing are also important in Project Design. Donor coordination is important in considering Pre-Planning and Needs Assessment and well as Program Design.

1. Preparedness: pre-planning and contingency planning

a. Lessons learned

- o **Pre-planning is essential to more effective emergency food distribution programs and must be undertaken before there is a food emergency problem;**
- o **Stages-of-drought analysis is an important but generally unrecognized tool for pre-planning and identification of impending food emergencies;**

- o Baseline information and data is essential. Pre-planning is required to collect the key information needed to assist the at-risk population in disaster areas;

- o Selection of key decision makers ahead of time is important;

- o Early warning is critical and necessary for preparedness but not yet reliable, and not sufficient for emergency food planning and pre-planning. Early warning systems (EWSs) need to incorporate periodic reviews of the food and agricultural situation in drought-prone areas by regional, district and local government personnel backed up by specialists provided by the central government; and

- o USAIDs should ensure that the information available to them prior to and at the beginning of a food emergency is linked directly to the guidelines for deciding when a food emergency exists.

b. Discussion

After many consecutive years of drought in Sudan, Chad, and Mali, the lack of preparedness in all three countries for the drought and for emergency food shortages in rural areas--whose traditional village stocks had been exhausted--was striking. This was true despite fairly good early warning information (as was the case in Mali). Pre-planning and contingency planning would have improved preparedness, reduced the response time and improved the impact of the programs carried out to deal with the massive food shortages which faced the rural populations in Sudan, Mali and Chad in 1984-85.

Key information was lacking in all three countries. A particular lack in all countries was that of reliable data on the population in disaster areas and on food production and stocks, including the availability and use of famine food. Better pre-planning and more timely and adequate responses would have also have occurred in these countries if the stages of drought had been better understood and more carefully monitored.

In Sudan, going into 1984, the GOS had done little or no pre-planning. This meant that as the magnitude of the famine became evident--with the failure of the 1984 crop--there was very little preparedness. The exception was in planning for the urban areas: at the GOS request in 1983, USAID/Khartoum increased the size of the Title I/III program providing wheat for sale in urban areas. USAID/Sudan had done good planning for the US emergency food assistance program in 1984-85, but little was done in the way of contingency ("what if") plans.

In Mali, preparedness and planning for widespread rural food shortages were insufficient despite early warnings because: a) information on the extent and character of these food shortages in

rural areas was deficient; and b) because systems for dealing with emergency food distributions in rural areas--in contrast to those for urban areas--were underdeveloped and unable to cope with the large-scale distributions required for isolated rural communities in the disaster zones. The limited grain supplies available through National Food Security Stocks were geared primarily to urban security.

In Chad, almost no early warning or emergency preparedness planning capability existed. When the rains failed in 1984, donors followed their customary practice (given the lack of an EWS and pre-planning) of waiting until the 1984 harvest data were actually in hand before acting. More timely action would have been possible had donors and the GOC recognized the validity of stages of drought analysis. Characteristics of each stage and specific distribution modes have been identified for the Chad situation in the Chad report (See Table 1)

c Specific recommendations[1]

- Pre-planning and preparedness should be seen as a way for African Governments to anticipate and deal more easily with impending food emergencies and famines before they build up to crisis situations;

- Pre-planning should begin early by concerned governments, with USAID and other donor assistance; it should cover such matters as:

  -- Identifying potential "at-risk" groups;

  -- Ascertaining the kinds of food that might need to be provided in a drought situation;

  -- Obtaining baseline data;

  -- Assessing logistic capabilities;

  -- Identifying food distribution modes and channels;

  -- Establishing an early warning system and pre-disaster planning nucleus group; and

  -- Setting up criteria for declaring an emergency.

[1]See section on needs assessment for specific recommendations concerning the collection and analysis of key information.

Table 1: Stages of 1981-85 Famine and Its Effects in Chad[a]

Stage	Characteristics	Remedies
1	Food will not last till next harvest; married men leave for urban jobs to get food; women sell goods, services, jewelry, household effects	In situ Food for Work
	Pastoralists take herds farther afield; milk production drops	Wells and boreholes for pastoralists
2	Malnourishment begins, especially among poor and pastoralists; people sell goods, services, last of possessions	In situ feeding Food for Work
	Pastoralists move family and dwindling herds south or abroad	Resettle pastoralists in better areas
3	Rich remain in villages; Urban areas flooded by severely malnourished, displaced persons, beggars; camps spring up	Resettlement schemes Food for Work Targeted feeding for worse off
4	Advanced aggravated malnourishment; camps with more disadvantaged and vulnerable groups; those who can leave towns for famine foods in rural areas	Resettlement Food for Work Feeding centers General distribution Seeds, tools, etc.
5	Rains return; wealthy have means to cultivate and reestablish herds; many stuck in camps and urban areas; poor are destitute, unable to begin again without help.	Targeted feeding and Food for Work Seeds, tool, etc. Resettlement or transport home

[a]Although these stages appear to be linked with the years of the famine, in fact they are tied to amount of rainfall, the ecology of each area, the social constitution and condition of the populations, etc.

- o AID/W, given the limited resources available, should select ten "most vulnerable"[2] countries for special pre-planning and FEWS (Famine Early Warning System) emphasis, in terms of people and funding;

- o AID/W should work with USAIDs immediately to document stages of drought responses in sub-Saharan countries and to develop systems for gathering such information as part of each country's early warning mechanisms;

- o AID should assist USAIDs in preparing internal guidelines for deciding when a food emergency exists;

- o For the sub-Saharan countries considered most vulnerable, AID should ask USAIDs to:

  - -- document with the Government the state of pre-planning;

  - -- establish, in concert with others, the elements of the pre-plan.

  - -- develop a specific preliminary action plan for dealing with a food emergency. This plan should account for early warning data, needs assessment, logistics, funding, management, government and donor coordination and distribution modes and channels;

- o USAIDs should support work by host governments to localize[3] the early warning data network in each country. Given limited resources, the focus of early warning efforts should be on known at-risk groups and drought-prone areas in each country;

- o AID/W should pre-establish special procedures and administrative channels for carrying out the food emergency action plans of USAIDs;

- o AID/W, and in particular, the Africa Bureau, with OFDA and FVA, should pre-plan for the eventuality of another big multi-country and multi-year drought in sub-Saharan Africa, including standby arrangements for fast-track decision-making and mobilization of resources. This contingency plan should

[2]In 1984-85, out of twenty countries in Sub-Sahara Africa which received US emergency food assistance, ten accounted for 80 percent of US food shipments: Burkina Faso, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Somalia and Sudan.

[3]Localize in the sense of nationalize, that is, base it more on local assessments and collection of data.

have appropriate inter agency and NSC clearance, and should be vetted with key Congresspersons;

- In at-risk countries where AID is not engaged in a bilateral aid program (such as Ethiopia), the Africa Bureau in cooperation with OFDA and FVA should prepare contingency plans for emergency food assistance programs; arrangements for early warning should be made with the host governments, international organizations and PVOs;

- AID/W should require USAIDs in the most at-risk countries to include in their CDSS a section on drought planning. This section should show the relationship of planned development assistance to at-risk groups and drought-prone areas, relate existing pre-plan and action plans for responding to drought, to the development strategy and show how emergency food assistance will be used developmentally if it is needed; and

- USAIDs should consider and take advantage of developmental uses of food which can be expanded to help meet food needs in times of emergency food shortages.

2. Donor coordination

a. Lessons learned

- Donor coordination is critical in ensuring a more rapid and concerted response to food emergencies. Coordination involves the donor community consulting together and with the host government; both aspects are desirable and usually necessary for effective decision making and implementation;

- A way to strengthen donor collaboration in food emergencies and ensure positive linkages between food emergency programs and development activities is to encourage donor cooperation in food strategy formulation, food and agricultural development and in regular food aid programs; and

- Donor coordination works best when the host government takes the lead in the coordination, albeit with substantial help, as needed, from international organizations and donors.

b. Discussion

Chad and Mali had strong donor coordination mechanisms; Sudan's was the weakest. In Mali and Chad major donors and international organizations met regularly together and with the host governments to share information and cooperate in firming up analysis and assessments of need. This coordination and general sharing increased credibility in their home capitals and helped produce a more rapid and concerted response. With the US furnishing 67 percent of all emergency food assistance in Sudan, perhaps the limited donor

coordination under a UN coordinating committee appeared sufficient. However, the strong USAID lead in implementing the program caused some tensions with the GOS.

In Chad and Mali the governments chaired the donor coordination committees. Mali's committee operated at the central government level. It did not function at the regional and district level.

Chad's food action coordinating committees were particularly effective and could serve as a model for some countries. In spite of limited administrative capacity of the Government, through its Ministry for Control of Natural Disasters (MLCCN), it involved donors, PVOs, and international organizations directly--not only at the central, but at the prefecture (state) and sub-prefecture (county) levels as well. This cooperation worked well, both in the capital and in the field, and included assessment of need, targeting, distribution, monitoring and evaluation.

Linkage between donor countries on regular development programs laid the groundwork for effective donor coordination in Mali and Chad during emergencies. This was not the case in the Sudan.

c. Specific recommendations

- USAIDs in chronically food deficit countries should work as closely as possible with the host government and other donors to:

  -- Develop a national food strategy and integrated food and agricultural development programs; and

  -- Prepare joint plans for emergency food assistance in the light of the national food strategy and on going food and agricultural programs;

- USAIDs should coordinate US support for improved and "localized" early warning systems with that of other donors in order to avoid duplication of effort and strengthen host government capabilities;

- Major donors should participate in the needs assessment from the outset to ensure more complete understanding of the situation, increase credibility, and obtain more rapid agreement on the magnitude of the problem;

- AID/W should issue guidance to USAIDs to give priority to donor coordination by the host government even where central government administrative capability is weak. Support from USAID, other donors, and the UN should be provided to assist the government in fulfilling this role. If this is not feasible, an international agency (e.g. WFP) is the second choice.

- Joint emergency food committees chaired by the government should:

  -- Have full participation by government, donor, international agency, PVOs, and the private sector; and

  -- Go beyond the national to the regional and district level;

- On the US side, AID/W (rather than USAIDs) should assume primary responsibility for coordination among capitals of donors, particularly as it concerns level of support. USAIDs can help assure coordination at country level so as to avoid duplication, encourage sharing of tasks, establish priorities, etc., but they are not well-placed to obtain larger contributions from other donors.

3. Needs assessment

a. Lessons learned

- Needs assessment is a critical element of planning for emergency food assistance programs. Planning without an accurate assessment of need tends to poor design and inadequate responses;

- The quality of needs assessment is usually constrained by the lack of reliable and unambiguous data on the food situation and drought in particular disaster areas:

  -- In such situations, decisions to declare a food emergency and undertake a needs assessment and a food emergency assistance effort are usually better when made early;

  -- Needs assessment can be greatly improved by improving the quality of available data through pre-planning development of benchmark data and on-site surveys of the food and agricultural situation in disaster zones;

- Traditional coping mechanisms, including the use of famine foods and African traditions of sharing, need to be accounted for in needs assessment, program design and implementation; and

- Inadequate assessment of in-country logistics and logistical capabilities is a common weakness, as demonstrated by the Mali and Sudan experience; it indicates the need to give increased priority to logistics of food delivery and distribution, including the early use of qualified and experienced personnel to assist in such assessments.

b. Discussion

In the three countries surveyed, needs assessment placed a great deal of reliance on country-wide food balance sheet analysis--usually without the benefit of local knowledge and understanding of the needs and circumstances of the local population or of local food production and stocks. In general, estimation of food requirements proved not to be a difficult problem for urban areas and a very difficult one for rural areas.

As a result, needs assessments were generally off target in all three countries. Lack of baseline data and of reliable information on the food situation and drought in particular disaster areas prevented accurate assessments of needs for rural areas. Local surveys of the situation during the needs assessments phase of planning are required. In Chad, nutritional and medical surveillance proved effective in identifying target groups and defining needs in rural areas.

In Sudan, the assessment of the at-risk population in the rural areas went from one million in early 1984 to 6.5 million in early 1985. Lack of data on population in the rural areas made assessments difficult. A lesson learned was that a needs assessment was required as early as possible.

The very late arrival of emergency deliveries of food for the Western Sudan raised the question why more persons in the at-risk population did not perish. The evaluation concluded, on the basis of limited information, that the most plausible answer lay in the effectiveness of traditional coping mechanisms which are imperfectly understood.[4]

In Mali, the system for assessing national, regional, district and local emergency food requirements proved completely inadequate. Not all drought areas were identified. The assessment used by the GOM and donors in Mali for rural areas missed the mark by at least 100 percent. Demographic data as well as data on rural food stocks and district food production were weak, unreliable or nonexistent. No attempt was made to ground-truth assessments using local surveys of food requirements in the various districts and arrondissements of the drought zone.

In Chad, the needs assessment came very late. Although the Government had asked for help from the international community twice (on September 7 and 24, 1984), this was prior to a full needs assessment. The FAO/WFP needs assessment team did not arrive until October, and its preliminary findings were not available until

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[4]Devres, Evaluation of the African Emergency Food Assistance Programs 1984-85, Sudan, (Draft), p. xxix, Washington, DC, November, 1985.

November. The US Ambassador's declaration of emergency was made on November 4, 1986. This meant that there was not sufficient time to bring in more than 50 percent of the estimated needs of the at-risk population from November 1984-March 1985.

The logistics assessment in Mali failed to identify key problems in time resulting in delays in and increased costs of deliveries to vulnerable groups. In Sudan the logistics assessment failed to gauge correctly the transportation difficulties of in-country distribution of food.

In the Sahel, and in other African countries facing chronic food deficits, the lack of reliable forecasts and data on grain production and pasturage for drought prone regions as well as the entire country has been a problem for 25 years. It has become a problem which can be remedied cost effectively by a combination of high technology--e.g., remote sensing and agrimeteorogical forecasting--and classic on-the-ground estimates of acreages cultivated and yields. Improvement of such data will support better needs assessment as well as better development planning and programming.

c. Specific recommendations

- AID should work to improve host Governments' and USAIDs' capabilities to carry out needs assessments;
- AID should continue its efforts to improve productivity and cost effectiveness of global early warning systems and to link the information from these systems to localized early warning data;
- In the most vulnerable countries, USAIDs should seek to assist host governments in strengthening or creating systems for providing information necessary to assess needs and for carrying out the needs assessment;
- Decision-makers should be given support and authority ahead of time to switch gears from development to emergency status when deciding whether a food emergency exists and whether to begin the needs assessment process:
  - -- They should be encouraged to shorten their decision time, foregoing information to gain essential time when necessary;
  - -- Specific data points--such as rain failure and migratory movements--should be directly related to USAID guidelines for deciding when a food emergency exists;
- Simultaneously with the needs assessment, a detailed analysis of the country's logistical capacity should be identified;

- AID should encourage and help finance on-site needs assessments of disaster areas, involving local participation:

  -- These would assess the food and agriculture situation in particular districts using national and regional specialists as well as district and local officials;

  -- In drought prone areas, the practice of reporting on the food and agricultural situation can be institutionalized on an annual basis and used to assess the development situation as well as relief and emergency food needs;

- AID should recognize concerns within the Agency on the cost, effectiveness and feasibility of collecting food and agricultural data in sub-Saharan countries for development purposes and for emergency food assistance planning:

  -- Notwithstanding such concerns, the time is long overdue in the most at-risk countries in sub-Saharan Africa to get the basic data on food and agricultural production right, at least in countries where the governments and other donors will cooperate to develop reliable data on grain acreages and production and on pasture conditions and extent;

  -- AID should continue efforts to establish the technology of an approach which marries cost effectively "high tech" remote sensing data collection with locally-managed on-ground estimates of acreages cultivated, yields and production;

  -- In addition, AID/W should charge USAIDs in the countries most at-risk to work with the host governments and other donors to find cost-effective ways of achieving reliable data over the next five to ten years;

- AID should support host government decentralization of emergency food assistance and drought planning, including needs assessment, in the most at-risk countries:

  -- In these countries, AID should urge and help host governments to institute a standard practice of periodic surveys of drought-prone areas, by administrative districts, to provide for at least an annual scrutiny of relief and emergency food needs of their rural communities as well as the evolving development situation;

  -- Such surveys should involve the participation of regional, district and local authorities as well as representatives of central government;

- Rapid nutritional and medical surveillance techniques should be used in potential food emergency situations to help assess the nature and magnitude of the emergency and the location of affected groups;

- AID/W should commission a series of studies immediately on traditional coping mechanisms to understand them better and to determine their influence on the impact of emergency food assistance programs. AID/W should charge USAID with accounting for the role of coping mechanisms in their preliminary action plans; this accounting should indicate how these mechanisms will diminish needed emergency food assistance and how emergency programs can be designed so as not to undermine them. Country governments should consider how policies on grain marketing, food production and food aid interface with traditional mechanisms and how the latter can be supported; and

- USAIDs should encourage country governments to document famine food knowledge in a form that can readily be disseminated to rural households in the event of other food emergencies.

4. Project design

a. Lessons learned

- Emergency food assistance efforts are time sensitive and require a time-phased action plan;

- Clear objectives established during the needs assessment phase provide the means for focussing, guiding, monitoring and evaluating emergency food aid programs:

  -- clearly defined purposes and objectives foster more timely and better coordinated donor support;

- For low income countries in sub-Saharan Africa, programming for food shortages for rural areas--which normally or traditionally are self-sufficient or self-reliant--is a much more difficult problem than programming for urban areas:

  -- Programming for urban supply poses fewer difficulties because systems for planning and managing urban supplies are usually well established;

  -- Part of the problem in rural areas is the difficulty of assessing the needs and targeting at risk groups correctly; and

  -- Most important is the lack of established mechanisms or systems for delivering large scale supplies of food to

rural areas, where transportation facilities are limited and marketing and distribution systems undeveloped or non existent.

- Various distribution modes and channels have been found effective for targeting and managing rural distributions to needy persons;

- In major crises, involving famine situations affecting large numbers of persons over widespread rural areas, the main recourse will need to be general distribution programs[5]; in such programs:

  -- Impact and cost effectiveness are increased when food is distributed and pre-positioned before the rainy season (when difficulties and costs of food distribution soar);

  -- In the low income countries most vulnerable, supplemental feeding and health care should be programmed to accompany general feeding programs;

  -- General distributions will work best when care is taken to target carefully, to provide ample management and monitoring of distributions and to ensure local transport for them;

  -- General feeding programs for rural areas can be effectively targeted and well managed, particularly if transport and monitoring capacity is mobilized;

- In many situations, including major crises, distribution modes and channels other than general distribution should be included in the program design, either as options or as supplements. These will depend on pre-planning, the country situation and the character and magnitude of the emergency and include food for work, resettlement programs and monetization. Programs such as food-for-work, child feeding and resettlement have the advantage of being beneficiary-specific and development-oriented;

- The assistance of PVOs in partnership with host governments and donors has proven particularly useful in helping these governments address emergency needs in rural areas. PVOs can play a dual role of assisting on emergency relief and supporting local development. The private sector can also play key roles, particularly in transportation;

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[5]General distribution programs in rural areas surveyed worked on the basis of free distributions of a cereal--such as sorghum, corn or corn meal--to families according to a pre-determined ration.

- o A key element of program design is targeting. Targeting specific households comes closest to ensuring that those who need food actually receive it. Health/nutritional criteria, which depend upon identifying diminished health or nutritional status, can be used to target areas, specific individuals, or groups to receive emergency food;

- o Where data for needs assessment are weak and the at-risk population constitutes a moving base (as was the case in Sudan), programmers can resort to early incremental programming--permitting adjustments in the design of the program as the nature and magnitude of the emergency becomes clearer; and

- o For low income countries, an integrated package of food, financial support, material support and technical assistance, usually involving several donors, is usually required to respond adequately to widespread emergency food shortages.

b. Discussion

Emergency food assistance efforts are time sensitive as was shown clearly in Sudan, Mali and Chad in 1984-85. For example, all three countries had one critical program and management issue in common--the need to get food for needy people into rural areas before the beginning of the rainy season. This was not achieved adequately in any of the three countries. Emergency food assistance efforts require a time-phased action plan, adhered not to only in Washington and by USAID but also by the host governments, other donors, international organizations and other players. Such plans were not developed in 1984-85, a period in which lack of timely responses was a central factor in undermining program impact and detracting from the major effort undertaken.

In order to accelerate responses before needs assessments could be carried out, AID resorted in Mali and in Sudan to an incremental approach to programming. In response to requests by the USAIDs, AID authorized early in the fall of 1984 initial allocations of emergency food. These initial allocations provided food earlier than would otherwise have been possible, but did not solve the problem of late deliveries.

AID's normal project and program planning requires the careful definition of objectives, purpose, outputs and inputs in the "logical framework". AID does not use the logical framework as a guide in the design of emergency food aid programs. As a consequence there is not usually available in a single document, as in a project paper, an analysis of what the goal(s) and objectives of the program are, how the problem is perceived and assessed, what strategy is proposed to address the problem and how outputs and inputs relate to purpose and goal. Nor does the documentation on the program establish verifiable

objective indicators to be used to assess results and performance. This was the situation observed in Sudan, Mali and Chad, suggesting strongly the need to establish during the needs assessment phase clearly defined objectives and purposes as well as estimates of required inputs and outputs.

General feeding programs for rural areas were required in all three countries. Experience with general feeding varied from country to country. In Sudan much of the distribution was general; the PVOs worked with the provincial and local governments to identify the most needy counties and villages. Capacity to monitor was limited. In Mali, the system proved very effective once food became available. In Chad general distribution was for the most part targeted only to the county (canton) level without adequate records of how the food was finally distributed. More monitors could have been used.

In the Sudan, USAID's strategy for implementing general feeding programs in rural areas was to use the private sector and PVOs (emphasizing the role of provincial/local government). This strategy was effective and would have worked even more efficiently and cost effectively had sufficient emergency food arrived before the rainy season. A weak point in the program was the tardy development of supplemental feeding. Supplemental feeding did not start until the fall of 1985 due to delays in requests and in shipment. It would have been much more effective if it had been requested and started up at the same time as the general feeding.

In Mali, considerable success was achieved in designing an effective system to target and manage large scale distribution of food to drought victims in rural areas. For these areas, the program design called for PVOs to manage distributions of donor-donated GOM grain from the grain marketing board's (OPAM) warehouses to rural recipients in accordance with preestablished specific distribution plans. The program was simple in design and effective in execution. The system of collaborating with PVOs to manage emergency distributions in isolated rural areas is a model with potential wide applicability. It was instrumental in distributing substantial rations to an estimated two million Maliens at risk in hard to reach rural areas. Several weak points in the design grew out of an under-assessment of the problem. For example, not enough food was provided early enough. In addition, much of the distribution was programmed during the rainy season when transportation in rural areas is most difficult and costly. The program also did not provide for sufficient supplemental feeding and health care for vulnerable groups. There was also lack of programming of transitional assistance for rehabilitation and recovery. The evaluation in Mali also suggested that the program could have had more impact through increased participation of local organizations and structures in program planning and implementation.

In Chad, the central problem paralleled that of the Sudan and Mali: how to get food out to needy people in isolated rural areas. PVOs and international organizations were of major importance in

Chad in helping the GOC manage distribution programs, with the WFP taking a strong leading position. Program design included general distribution by WFP/UNDRO and PVOs, and development-oriented distributions via FFW and resettlement. As noted above, while Chadian Government's operational capacity to deliver food was extremely limited, the GOC played an important role in targeting the needy and establishing priorities through its food action committees and mobile assessment teams utilizing PVOs, donors and international organizations operating at the prefecture (regional) and sub prefecture (district) levels. This successful approach merits consideration in the design of programs in other countries with limited administrative capacity. The Chad evaluation also brought out that more extensive use of food for work in the earlier years of the drought would have provided a basis for more rapid expansion of targeted emergency assistance after the 1984 harvest failure. The same can be said of Mali and Sudan.

In the three countries, it was found that components for a successful emergency food assessment program include not only accurate needs assessment and food, but also technical assistance, material aid (such as trucks) and financial support. Under the supplemental appropriation for the African Hunger Relief Initiative, non-food supporting aid was provided by AID's Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) to Sudan, Mali and Chad. In Mali, for example, $3.9 million was used to fund a CARE Emergency Food Transport Grant, a Department of Defense Airlift and Operations of a 60-ton ferry at Gao, cholera supplies and a food monitor. Local currency from Title II monetization was an important source of funding for in country transportation and distribution costs. In Mali, Title II proceeds from 1983-84 Title II sales were augmented by a local currency loan from regular food aid local currency generations and later by the proceeds of 1984-85 Title II sales (20,000 mt). The early availability of Title II local currencies and non-food aid support from OFDA was important in initiating early action in all three countries.

A food emergency usually requires a "surge" in logistical activities. It is during this period of pressure on the logistical system that its weaknesses appear most prominently, causing program needs to go unmet. In planning and programming, logistical capabilities need to be assessed realistically as required by the emergency. For example, if private sector trucking is to be used, it will lead to greater freight rates as happened in Sudan unless there is important surplus capacity in the transport sector.

There are potential development aspects of infrastructure improvement which program design should take into account. For example, a new bridge can be a national asset for further development as happened in Chad. Private sector involvement in logistics may strengthen the program and can also improve private sector capacity for later development activities. Some logistic improvements--such as rehabilitation of rural roads--can be developmental and, via FFW, use the very food aid the road improvement is intended to facilitate. Development aspects are discussed further in Section 10.

c. Specific recommendations

- In cases of emergency food needs, USAIDs should work with the host Government, United Nations, major donors, PVOs and the private sector to develop timely, integrated time-phased plans with firm schedules for delivery of materials, equipment, manpower and food needed to mitigate the effects of the emergency;

- AID/W and USAIDs should work to assure more clearly defined statements of project goals, purposes, outputs and inputs;

- Where general feeding through free distribution in rural areas is required to respond to emergency food shortages, AID/W should require the advance preparation of a specific distribution plan identifying the target population (e.g., communities, families, sedentary population, migrants), criteria for targeting at-risk groups, the proposed ration and the system of monitoring and evaluation. The preparation of the plan should as a rule involve regional, district and local authorities;

- USAIDs should program food assistance deliveries for rural areas for distribution and pre-positioning before the advent of the rainy season. Pre-positioning should be based on specific distribution plans, including contingency plans for the use of the food;

- USAIDs should as a rule plan - in concert with the host government and other donors - supplemental feeding and health care for vulnerable groups as an integral component of emergency food assistance programs in sub-Saharan Africa;

- USAIDs should build on FFW or other development-oriented food programs (school feeding, resettlement) to help meet emergency food needs;

- USAIDs should include in project design:

  -- Plans for recovery and rehabilitation of drought victims;

  -- Provision for management resources (food monitors, collaboration with local and expatriate PVOS, local and district indigenous management resources);

  -- Consideration of drought stages and additional monitoring required to assess the food situation and requirements for recovery of drought victims in the countryside;

-- Effective targeting of at-risk populations. Socio-economic criteria can be used where household income collapses have not yet led to major health or nutritional status declines, or to complement health/nutrition criteria;

-- Plans for in-situ feeding in rural areas and other support for early recovery of crop production; and

-- Provisions for end-use checking, monitoring and evaluation.

o Based on early assessment of logistical requirements and capabilities, USAIDs should prepare a logistics plan for in-country distribution with particular attention to the hard-to-reach rural areas and opportunities to use and strengthen the private sector.

5. Distribution mechanisms (modes and channels)

a. Lessons learned

o The impact of various distribution modes[6] used in Sudan, Mali and Chad in achieving the objectives of emergency food assistance programs differed primarily as a function of how well they were designed and managed.;

o A combination of distribution modes is usually necessary to achieve desired program impact. In particular, general free distribution for rural areas and supplemental feeding of vulnerable groups belong together;

o Linkages between emergency food assistance and development are much better served by some modes--e.g. monetization, FFW, resettlement--than by others--free general distribution;

o Triangular transactions--involving Title II barter in a food surplus country for emergency food--provide opportunities to promote regional trade, reduce port congestion and accelerate food deliveries, but require experienced management to organize;

o Monetization was found to be a useful and efficient means of generating financial support for emergency food programs and observed to work better where the agencies used, such as National Cereal Offices and marketing boards, have benefited

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[6]The Scope of Work defines distribution modes to include community free distribution, MCH supplementary feeding programs, food for work, monetization, triangular transactions, rehabilitation activities, etc.

from technical assistance and where use is made of private marketing channels;

- Multi-year monetization programs involving major food donors, as in Mali, can provide resources and policy leverage for addressing structural problems of food and agriculture development--so as to make unnecessary future emergency assistance, as well as resources to help country governments pre-plan and manage food emergencies; and

- Distribution channels[7] available are central to program impact:

  -- PVOs and international agencies can be effective in developing distribution mechanisms and managing distribution channels for emergency food supply for rural areas.

  -- PVOs prove more effective where their interface with local and district governments is more structured.

  -- Established systems for urban food supply, which use private grain marketing entities, are effective channels for emergency assistance to urban dwellers and rural migrants.

  -- Where the internal distribution system is weak, it can be improved by establishing regional logistical bases for storage of food and fuel as well as truck repair facilities.

b. Discussion

The three countries utilized a variety of channels (PVOs, international organizations, private sector, government, etc.) for distribution, and several modes of activity (general feeding, FFW, child feeding centers, wadi resettlement, monetization, triangular trade, etc.) to reach the rural areas and assist those at risk. All countries found PVOs and international organizations essential for carrying out major distribution programs--(CARE, Save the Children, WFP, League of International Red Cross Societies (LICROSS), Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), and UNICEF to name a few).

General feeding was the main distribution mode in Sudan and Mali but in Chad more food reached beneficiaries on a more regular basis via FFW, special feeding and resettlement than via general distribution. Under field conditions, programs that target specific households (including general distribution) appeared to provide most impact.

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[7]The Scope of work defines distribution channels as WFP, PVOs, host government, etc.

The private sector proved to be an important resource in the organization and management of food shipments and distribution. In general, the Sudan used private sector contractors effectively in getting food out to rural areas and repairing infrastructure essential to deliveries. However, in spite of its good overall record, the major private contractor, Arkel-Talab, was roundly criticized by some PVOs because, it did not distribute food to some of the harder to reach/isolated areas, which were in great need, until after the rainy season. This was possible because the contract prepared by the GOS was loosely drawn. Mali's experience in contracting with a private transporter to supply region VI demonstrates the need to contract early and to include safeguards in such contracts. PVOs involved in the program in Mali made good use of the private sector; for example the World Vision Relief Organization used a private firm to organize and manage the delivery of corn (under the Title II barter arrangement) from Ghana into Regions II and VI.

In evaluating modes of distribution used in rural areas, it was generally easier to track the use of food where the assistance was targeted (e.g. FFW and child feeding programs or specific distribution plans as in Mali). More food reached the recipients on a regular basis under targeted distribution than under general distribution; more monitoring and better local transport would have improved the latter mode.

Food distribution systems for urban areas were well established and worked well in the three countries. Monetization worked well in Sudan (Title I/III), Mali (Section 206) and Chad (Title II emergency food) where food was sold in the urban areas using commercial marketing channels, and the local funds generated were used to support their respective emergency food assistance programs. However, sales of Title II emergency food in market towns in the Sudan did not work well because of organization and preparation problems.

Multi-year food sales programs, such as the Mali program that has been operating for several years and the proposed Chad Section 206 program--under consideration by Washington--are useful in providing the local currency needed to support the use of food for development related activities, as well as necessary policy changes.

The triangular trade program carried out for Mali and involving the barter of Title II rice for Ghanaian corn for regions II and VII in Mali encountered administrative delays but demonstrated the feasibility of such operations in the future.

c. Specific recommendations

- USAIDs, in working with host governments and other donors on the kinds of distribution mechanisms to be used, should emphasize modes which target potential beneficiaries carefully given the circumstances involved;

- o Given their past record of usefulness and know how, PVOs should be involved early and their participation requested in developing and carrying out emergency food assistance programs. Host governments and USAIDs should support development of local PVOs which can mobilize indigenous private resources for disaster relief as well as for development;

- o In situations where needs assessments establish the requirement for a general feeding program, USAID's should insist that there be prepared, in advance, an approved, specific time-phased plan of food distribution; and

- o USAIDs should consider monetization of a portion of the emergency food assistance, either through PL 480 emergency Title II sales or Title II Section 206 programs:

  - -- In addition to use of Title II sales proceeds to support costs of emergency food program distributions, proceeds should also be available to support pre-planning (including necessary studies) and needs assessments (including on-site surveys);

  - -- In countries where there are Title I/III programs, governments should be asked to allocate some of these funds to support emergency food pre-planning and programming as well as the programs themselves.

6. Management

This section is divided into six sections covering lessons learned, USAID management, Washington management, country government management, the role of PVOs and the use of the private sector.

a. Lessons learned

- o Considering the huge volume of US resources involved in emergency food assistance programs, USAIDs are generally under-resourced in their staffing, in terms of both person-years and experience;

- o The Washington--USAID decision-making track--even as altered to meet the needs of the African food emergencies of 1984-85--is too slow and inflexible for desired impact;

- o Central and local government management capability is critical for effective program planning and management. The ability of country governments to manage emergency food programs is in itself a real measure of development; and

- o PVOs and international organization can play a vital role in assisting the country government in organizing and managing emergency food assistance programs and in moving to a development phase.

b. USAID management

(1) Discussion

Emergency food assistance was a large and valuable resource ($2.0 billion in food and supporting nonfood assistance for Africa alone in FYs 1984 and 85), and food assistance programs were carried out under severe time pressures. Food emergencies--because they tend to be chaotic, fast moving problems--are highly amenable to good management practices which impose discipline and a strong sense of timing and resource organization and control on situations.

In this context, USAIDs were generally under-resourced in their staffing in terms of person-years and experience in emergency food assistance programs. For example, in the Sudan in 1984 only two middle grade officers were assigned full time to management of the emergency food assistance program during the first year although it grew to the size of $250 million during that period. In Mali only a fraction of the USAID staff was assigned full-time to the drought emergency, although emergency assistance in 1984-1985 was triple the size of the development assistance program. US assistance in Mali was decisive in helping the GOM organize an effective system for rural distribution in collaboration with PVOs. However, lack of management resources among USAID, other donors and the Government contributed to a gross under-assessment of rural food shortages and failure to anticipate logistical problems. In Chad, the fortuitous emergency food program experience of USAID staff contributed to a well-organized program.

In its other program efforts, AID is meticulous about matching experienced personnel with the task or job to be carried out. It does sometimes understaff programs, which is not always obvious in development. Such understaffing or lack of experience can become glaringly apparent in food emergencies. In Sudan, for example, it led to lack of supplemental feeding when needed most, inadequate monitoring and little contingency planning. In Mali, timing of food arrivals was scheduled without sufficient regard to the rainy season which caused serious difficulties in distribution to rural areas.

Lack of sufficient and experienced personnel was a factor in all three countries in the failure to prepare time-phased action plans and in assessing correctly logistic capabilities and requirements (see Section 4 on project design).

(2) Specific recommendations

- o AID/W, given the limited resources available, should select ten countries (e.g., those that received over 80 percent of food assistance in FY85--Burkina Faso, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Somalia, and Sudan), for special pre-planning and EWS (Early Warning System) emphasis, in terms of both people and funds;

- o AID/W should establish a computerized roster of Agency personnel--retrievable by discipline or technical skill--who have had previous experience in managing emergency food and nonfood assistance programs. This would provide AID with the information needed to take full advantage of personnel within the Agency with valuable past experience in countries and at headquarters in this kind of work;

- o AID/W should establish special procedures to permit transfer and use of these personnel as needed in a flexible and easy-to-use system. For example, not all USAIDs have contract officers or resident legal staff, nor do they have sociologists, nutritionists or logistics specialists, etc. Safeguards should be built in to avoid prejudice to personnel in their annual performance evaluations when they are transferred for relatively long TDYs (three to nine months);

- o A roster of contractors and consulting firms with special competence in emergency assistance programs should be established and kept up-to-date by AID/W. This should shorten the time required to locate qualified firms or individual skills outside the Agency;

- o AID/W should include a personnel section on food emergency technical expertise and management in its Agriculture IQCs as a means of collecting and quickly accessing talent outside the agency; and

- o AID/W should support USAIDs when it is necessary for them to use "special procedures" to attain emergency program objectives. Contracting, for example, may need to be accelerated if desired program results are to be realized.

c. Washington Management

(1) Discussion

The evaluations of the Sudan, Mali and Chad food emergencies programs showed that the Washington-USAID decision-making track, even as altered to meet better the needs of the major food emergencies in Africa in 1984-85, was too slow and inflexible to deal effectively with the extended emergency situations being faced. The food emergency situations were often volatile in their demands on AID

and other donors. AID's normal administrative mechanisms did not always provide the quick and flexible responses needed where information flows were erratic and major crises would arise with little advance warning.

AID/W and PVO headquarter delays in reaching agreement over a contract led to the need to air freight trucks to Chad and delayed arrival of badly needed monitors. Similarly, the time required to conclude a grant agreement with CARE for emergency food transport and distribution in Mali delayed urgently needed operations there. In the Sudan, delays in funding and shipment of supplemental foods caused the food to arrive after the rainy season which caused further delays in moving food out to at-risk populations.

(2) Specific recommendations

- A fast decision track headed by a full charge decision maker in Washington should be pre-planned in support of emergency food assistance activities. It should be developed with White House and Congressional participation. This fast track approach should be designed to shorten the time of Washington's responses to USAIDs; it should however carry out its work with full cognizance of the development context of food assistance efforts;

- AID/W should pre-establish special procedures and administrative channels for carrying out the food emergency action plans of USAIDs; in particular the Africa Bureau, with OFDA and FVA, should pre-plan for the eventuality of another big multi-country and multi-year drought in sub-Saharan Africa, including standby arrangements for fast track decision making and mobilization of resources. The cost effectiveness objective is clear--faster action so that use of airlifts and helicopters will be unnecessary;

- AID/W, as part of the measures to reduce administrative delays, should consider increased delegation of authority to USAIDs once there is an emergency. For example, an allocation of three to five million dollars to a USAID to be used to accelerate the response to the emergency would enable early action. Such an allocation should be complemented by TDY assignment of necessary contracting and legal assistance;

- The Africa Bureau and AID/W should prepare and issue a new operational manual and guidance for USAIDs to include:

  -- Guidelines for pre-planning, early warning systems, program identification and design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation;

-- Guidelines for strengthening host government capability to manage drought disaster and food emergency situations, particularly in the rural areas;

-- Guidelines for cooperation/coordination with other donors;

-- Guidelines for linking drought planning and emergency food assistance programs to development;

-- Guidelines for participation/involvement of private sector and PVOs in emergency food assistance programs;

-- Guidelines on use of leverage from emergency food assistance programs for policy dialogue with host governments;

- o AID/W should provide food emergency briefings and training to those likely to be in leadership positions during food emergencies--e.g., Mission Directors and others. This should include briefings at Mission Directors meetings and special sessions in AID's normal training programs (e.g., the Senior Seminar);

- o AID/W should develop a computerized simulation training program for use by all staff--e.g., an interactive emergency food assistance program "game" for a microcomputer--that illustrates the principles involved in food emergency management in detail, including the consequences of decisions made by the person using the training game; and

- o The Africa Bureau should work with REDSO/ESA and REDSO/WCA to provide increased support to USAIDs for planning and design of Emergency Food Assistance Programs (EFAPs), including support for logistical needs assessment and coordination of port arrivals; FVA should explore the opportunities of using the private sector for through bills of lading which provide for delivery of food to specified in-country locations, thereby freeing regional FFP advisors for consultation and assistance to USAIDs.

d. Host government management

(1) Discussion

If the host government can coordinate the implementation of the national food emergency action plan and the local government can also be involved, program effectiveness is likely to be greater than if they are bypassed. In Chad, the Government was very effective in coordinating the emergency effort and local-level governments were actively involved. Despite its many constraints of human and financial resources, the Government was seen as a major

player in determining the policy framework and allocation of food assistance. It set the policy of in situ feeding which avoided the establishment of camps and massive migration to Ndjamena. It chaired the Food Aid Action Committee, made up of all bilateral, multilateral and PVO donors in Chad and took an active role in formulating issues and resolving problems. Mechanisms were developed to monitor, to the extent possible, food delivery and to institute appropriate sanctions in cases of abuse.

The donors believed it was essential to consult with and bolster Chad's public sector. As a result, the food assistance activity was well-coordinated, relationships between donors and Government and also among donors were strengthened, and the capabilities of the Government--both nationally and regionally--were enhanced. The infrastructure now exists to improve the planning and implementation of development programs and to respond more effectively to future emergencies.

Local government and village involvement in food emergencies should be encouraged. This has been actualized to different degrees in different countries--less in Sudan than in Chad, for example. Malians were young, inexperienced, and little-involved in food emergency activities in 1984-85. Rather, mostly Europeans implemented the effort, taking all their experience with them when they returned home.

Local government involvement can help with three functions: information, decisions and leadership. Information transmission by local government can be to beneficiaries--e.g., What is happening?--or from those working on the food emergency--e.g., the "grain" price of pastoralist livestock has fallen sharply. Building up the capability of local government (and nongovernmental organizations too)--to identify and report such information--contributes to drought preparedness and emergency food assistance program implementation.

Decisions by local government dealing with food allocations, food for work projects, etc., often provide an important imprimatur of authority with beneficiaries that PVOs or donors operating by themselves do not possess.

Leadership from local government officials helps in program implementation. For example, persons considering migration may be encouraged to remain in situ by local officials or FFW efforts may be organized by these officials such as was the case in Chad. If the emergency food assistance program can be concentrated on directly supporting development related projects, the number of "projects" will be large. The role of local government (and other leadership) then becomes central to success because donors cannot support such extensive programs with sufficient management and technical assistance.

Central and local government involvement is especially important in chronic drought countries where institutional emergency preparedness needs to be built up to enable stronger responses to future

emergencies. No matter the exact role of the host government, the creation of a strong management structure to implement food emergencies at the country level will contribute to the success of the program. The United Nations and other international organizations can make important contributions to the design and operation of this structure.

(2) Specific recommendations

- USAIDs should encourage central governments to extend their emergency food assistance coordinating committees from central down to regional and district levels, drawing on help from PVOs, international organizations, and donors;

- USAIDs and PVOs should encourage local government to be the principal advisor about food allocations, food for work projects, and other local aspects of food emergency programs; and

- USAIDs should work extensively with local government to implement FFW and other developmental uses of food during a food emergency.

e. Role of PVOs in management

(1) Discussion

PVOs participated as important operational managers of food distribution in Sudan, Mali, and Chad. They provided personnel and helped target those in need, assisted in getting food to them, established development efforts in the middle of the emergency, and carried out food end-use checks. Thus, they were involved effectively in planning, logistics, impact measurement, development programming using food, and many other activities.

Maintaining a state of PVO readiness to handle food emergencies would provide an important reservoir of capacity in chronic food emergency countries. Supporting PVO efforts to drought proof vulnerable groups using food aid during nondrought periods is one way to do this while also linking development and food emergency assistance more closely during future emergencies.

(2) Specific recommendations

- USAIDs should support involvement and collaboration of PVOs and international organizations to help the host government develop emergency distribution systems and manage distribution of food to the rural areas;

- USAIDs should encourage the host government to involve in-country PVOs as a means of obtaining more private sector and administrative support; and

- AID/W, for the most at-risk countries, should work out preset standby arrangements with one or more PVOs to ensure their rapid response when a food emergency is identified; AID/W should assist PVOs, if necessary, to improve their management capability to respond to such identified emergencies.

f. Use of Private Sector

(1) Discussion

Use of private sector entities and resources is often an excellent means of achieving emergency food assistance objectives. Transport and distribution of food by the private sector, for example, may be the only way to assure delivery in a reasonable amount of time in some circumstances. This was true in Sudan where the use of private trucks to deliver food to PVOs and from PVOs to beneficiaries was essential to program success. Other areas where the private sector might help are accounting, reporting systems, fuel supplies and food processing.

Constraints are involved in using the private sector. In Sudan, private sector firms took advantage of loose contract provisions to benefit themselves financially at the expense of hungry people. (Though there were some difficulties with the private contractor in the movement of food to the isolated areas during the rainy season due to looseness in the contract, this does not void the major role played by the private sector in moving the over one million MIT of food distributed in the Sudan in 1984/85). During a food emergency market forces tend to drive up prices for some goods and services provided by the private sector such as trucking or petrol. In Sudan and Mali, AID and host government procedures precluded them from accepting such price changes quickly, resulting in slower program responses.

(2) Specific recommendations

- USAIDs in the most at-risk countries should prepare, as part of their pre-planning effort, an inventory of private sector resources that could be used during a food emergency. Specific means for using such resources should be included in each USAID's preliminary action plan;

- AID/W should prepare specific model contracts for use in employing private sector resources during food emergencies drawing upon the experiences of USAIDs during the 1984-1985 African drought; and

- AID/W should develop special administrative procedures for procuring private sector assistance during food emergencies and pre-determine the extent of the authority to procure such assistance to be provided to USAIDs during food emergencies.

7. Timing

a. Lessons learned

- Programmers need to balance the need to generate early responses (which help ensure program impact and cost-effectiveness) with the time required to (a) identify and assess the problem in rural areas correctly, and (b) design practical programs in concert with other donors and the government;

- Decision-making for food aid in Washington--which normally tends to follow the more deliberative processes used for development projects--can be speeded up by a systems approach for responding to food emergencies; improved communication, better guidelines and pre-planning can reduce lengthy administrative review in Washington; and

- Widespread droughts--causing emergencies in many countries at the same time--may result in extended delays in establishing priorities and in mobilizing additional resources unless extraordinary measures to generate timely US responses are taken.

b. Discussion

Substantial amounts of the food aid programmed to meet the emergency arrived late in all three countries even though it was the fourth year of the drought. Sufficient food was not available when most needed to feed the hungry in the rural areas. Arrivals after the beginning of the rainy season resulted in increased costs and further delay in delivery of food to the vulnerable populations.

In Sudan, C-130s and helicopters had to be brought in to reach isolated areas. This form of transport greatly increased the cost per ration of food delivered. In Chad, trucks had to be air-lifted due to administrative delays.

When the three emergencies were announced, decision makers in the donor and international organizations still needed more solid information. Once the rains failed and the crops were ruined in the fourth year of the drought, there was an immediate dramatic need for food assistance. Use of routine--and cumbersome--administrative procedures, resulted in delays when prompt decisions were needed to respond on a timely basis. These experiences indicate the need for a faster, more responsive decision making track modified to meet emergency needs.

Experience in Sudan, Mali and Chad linked the question of better timing to the need for more timely, precise and complete information earlier. This would enable donors to act more quickly with assurance and thus reduce the time needed for decision-making.

c. Specific recommendations

- USAIDs in pre-planning or needs assessments should consider the stage of drought involved when working out plans. For example, if the country is in second or third consecutive year of drought and the crop again fails, food will be needed in early fall of the same year. In this case incremental shipments--without waiting for production data or a definitive needs assessment--should be planned;

- USAIDs, in designing emergency food assistance programs, should build into their time-phased action plans responses to time constraints caused by such things as the rainy season, port congestion due to non food exports, stage of drought requirements for early arrivals, etc. If possible, some allowance for the unforseen delay should be included;

- AID/W should pre-establish special procedures and administrative channels for carrying out the food emergency action plans of USAIDs; and

- AID/W as part of the measures to reduce administrative delays should consider increased delegation of authority to USAID once there is an emergency. For example, an allocation of three to five million dollars to USAID to be used to accelerate the response to the emergency would enable early action. Such an allocation should be complemented by TDY assignment of necessary contracting and legal assistance.

8. Impact

a. Lessons learned

- Impact is greatly enhanced by early coordination and cooperation of donors and international organizations with host government during needs assessment, project design and implementation;

- For increased impact in Sub-Saharan countries most at-risk, emergency food assistance programs need to include financial, material and technical assistance as well as food aid;

- Impact is largely dependent on how well the needs of at-risk populations are targeted, and how effectively emergency programs are managed to address these needs;

- When households are targeted, emergency food assistance programs can achieve significant impact without addressing the totality of needs, assuming significant rations are provided. Such food assistance at the margin provides critical support complementing traditional coping mechanisms

such as community and extended family sharing and use of famine foods;

- o Impact is reduced when supplemental feeding and health care are not provided; and

- o Impact is enhanced when monitoring effectively feeds back information into the management system to identify problems during program implementation and permits management to take remedial action.

b. Discussion

The food delivered to rural beneficiaries in all three countries was very important and made a critical difference in keeping many of them alive and in their villages. However, not enough food was provided early enough. In the Sudan and Mali, impact of the programs was decreased significantly by the failure to provide food in time for distribution and pre-positioning in rural areas before the rainy season. In Chad, food was urgently needed beginning in November of 1984, and sufficient food was not available until May/June 1985. In the three countries, lack of baseline data prevented quantitative measures of impact.

In Sudan and Mali the slow start of supplemental feeding and lack of health inputs as companions to general feeding lessened the positive impact of the program, particularly on vulnerable groups. In both countries in situ distributions did help many farmers regain or maintain strength to plant a crop when the rains came (starting in June 1985). In Chad, specialized FFW and resettlement programs generally targeted needy families better and with greater impact than did general distributions.

In Chad, vigorous efforts were made to bring in health inputs and have them distributed throughout the country. However this was not possible due to lack of rural health infrastructure. This was not done in the Sudan, and only to a limited extent in Mali.

Traditional coping mechanisms, including use of famine foods and sharing within extended families and communities, was very important in helping people make it through the drought. Such coping mechanisms are poorly understood by decision makers and were not adequately taken into account in planning for the 1984-85 emergencies in Sudan, Mali and Chad. More information is needed on these mechanisms.

c. Specific recommendations

The degree of impact achieved in a particular emergency food assistance program will depend on donor coordination, needs assessment, project design, management and distribution mechanisms. Specific recommendations for improving performance in those areas have been formulated in other sections of this chapter. In addition,

specific recommendations are presented concerning program content, targeting, and coping mechanisms:

- o USAIDs in their pre-planning, needs assessments and project design should plan and provide for, in cooperation with other donors, financial support, material aid, and technical assistance as well as food;

- o USAIDs should normally plan with the host government and other donors for supplemental feeding and health care for vulnerable groups as an integral component of emergency food assistance programs;

- o For maximum impact, USAIDs should target emergency food assistance, particularly in rural areas, to reach at-risk individuals and families;

- o Emergency food supplies for rural areas should be programmed for delivery for distribution or pre-positioning before the rainy season, based on specific distribution plans including contingency plans for the use of the food;

- o USAIDs should where possible build on FFW or other development-oriented food programs to help target and meet emergency food needs; USAIDs should use monetization when beneficiaries have or can be provided (through extended family or work) with sufficient income to purchase required food;

- o AID/W should commission a series of studies immediately on coping mechanisms to understand them better and to determine their influence on the impact of emergency food assistance programs;

- o AID/W should charge USAIDs with accounting for the role of coping mechanisms in their preliminary action plans; this accounting should indicate how these mechanisms will diminish needed emergency food assistance and emergency programs can be designed so as not to undermine them; and

- o USAIDs should encourage country governments to document famine food knowledge in a form that can readily be disseminated to rural households in the event of other food emergencies.

9. Monitoring and evaluation

a. Lessons learned

- o **PVOs can be effective for monitoring the use of emergency food assistance in rural areas;**

- o With proper guidance, USAID food monitoring staff can be used to help gather the data needed for analysis of overall program impact in drought areas and for forward planning;

- o Monitoring is facilitated by advance preparation of specific distribution plans and by careful targeting of beneficiaries. In the absence of such plans and targeting there is a need to reinforce monitoring capability;

- o Lack of baseline data contributes to unfocused or faulty design and inability to evaluate impact; and

- o Monitoring can be used to feed back information into the program system to improve performance and impact, as well as to establish accountability.

b. Discussion

Monitoring in Mali was carried out by USAID staff, including full-time food monitors, and by the PVOs and international organizations participating in the program. In general, it proved possible to keep careful track of the food; monitoring was facilitated by the availability of specific plans for food distribution. In Sudan monitoring was slow in getting under way. Chad's food action committee with their mobile assessment teams also played an effective role in monitoring the results, but more monitors were needed to evaluate the general feeding program.

In all three countries the PVOs were able to recruit native speakers who could help monitor food distribution. International organizations (WFP, UNICEF, LICROSS, etc.) had fewer resources available for monitoring but did well where the beneficiaries were targeted.

While some very good micro studies were done in all three countries by voluntary agencies (CARE, OXFAM, LICROSS, MSF, Save the Children, etc.). Broader based evaluations with quantitative measurements were stymied due to lack of reliable baseline information. Chad, in addition to using mobile teams directly as a monitoring resource, was particularly effective in using monitoring reports to set priorities, adjust programs, and correct errors where necessary. In Mali (beginning in the fall of 1984) and Sudan (especially beginning in mid-1985), USAID hired its own monitors. They provided direct informational links which were very helpful in solving operational problems, as well as in monitoring the programs.

c. Specific recommendations

- o USAIDs--in working out arrangements with PVOs and international organizations (e.g. WFP or LICROSS) to help distribute emergency food--should ensure adequate funding for monitoring. This is particularly true where PVOs are

assisting host governments in general distribution where the at-risk groups may not be as well targeted as in FFW and child feeding;

- o USAIDs and other donors should work with host governments to strengthen their monitoring capability. Sometimes judicious use of Title II emergency sales funds or possibly Section 206 funds can provide resources need for training, transport and per diem of government monitors;

- o USAIDs in chronic food deficit and drought prone countries should give priority to longitudinal economic/social/ population studies needed to measure quantitatively effects of droughts and to focus emergency assistance to better alleviate the drought; and

- o USAIDs should build into emergency food assistance programs funds to provide for additional USAID monitors and to carry out micro level evaluations and punctual surveys to assess the success/failure of the program and make mid course adjustments as necessary.

10. Lessons learned: Development--emergency food assistance linkages

a. Lessons learned

- o Linkages between development and emergency food assistance has been very limited;

- o There is substantial scope for improving these linkages, particularly if a greater effort is made to pre-plan for food emergencies and to deal with drought and food shortages before crisis situations emerge;

- o Development oriented uses of food can be an important element in "drought proofing" of drought-prone areas; and,

- o The most effective emergency food assistance programs are designed to integrate with regular food aid and a national food strategy.

b. Discussion

Prior to the occurrence of a food emergency, beneficiaries, governments and donors are usually concentrating on attaining development objectives--e.g., a sustained increase in real per capita income, equitable income distribution and a better quality of life. For households in rural areas, increased income and quality of life depends mostly on growth in agricultural productivity and output.

During the 1984-1985 drought, and for several years before, some vulnerable groups lost their ability to grow or purchase food. For many, their income was nonexistent in that year, and their reserves were already exhausted from the effects of prior years. Consequently, their food purchasing power in 1984-1985 collapsed, leading directly to malnutrition or even starvation. Donors and country governments treat this situation as an emergency and separate their response to it from their normal development activities.

This is unfortunate because the same problem, lack of adequate income, is at the root of both underdevelopment and food emergencies. Thus, an essential linkage between development and emergency activities for those affected by drought is household/individual income. Development activities are deliberately and carefully conceived and operated to increase ultimately the income level of the poor household. Emergency activities usually are designed simply to feed people and reduce their suffering. Thought is not always given to dealing with longer-term income development. Ideally, the movement from development to emergency activities and back by government and donors would rely on many identical modes of intervention--those aimed at increasing the income and quality of life of the poor household quickly, as well as over time. Thus, if an emergency food assistance program can address immediate and longer term income needs, it is correctly focused and developmental.

In Sudan, there was little linkage between the emergency food and development programs, except for the use of the PL480 Title I Program already in place to meet urban needs. The lack of existing or planned development activities that could be supported with food, and the loud and sudden nature of the 1984-1985 emergency virtually precluded detailed thought about emergency- development linkages. As a result, even simple rehabilitation responses such as the provision of seed were initiated very late, and potential linkages were not explored. For example, one emergency-development linkage that could have received attention was whether in situ feeding that retained people in arid, agriculturally margin areas was appropriate or whether emergency feeding programs should be designed to draw volunteers into more productive areas. The program did retain most affected persons in situ, a result that had some development value by keeping people where they could return to farming easily once the rains returned.

In Chad, the GOC and donors lacked an overall strategy in 1985-86 for moving from the food emergency to development and for using food to facilitate the transition. However, the GOC certainly understood the linkage between emergency food programs and development and the importance of moving in this direction. The mandate of the food action committees was changed to include development activities. For example, the name was changed from the Ministry for the Control of Natural Disasters to the Ministry of Food Security and Disaster Victims. The name of the Food Aid Action Committees were changed to the Action Committees for Food Security and Support for Development, and their mandate broadened accordingly. Local currency is required,

possibly using Title II Section 206, as in Mali, to help fund programs during this transition.

In Chad, several emergency-development linkages developed fortuitously rather than purely by design. When the GOS decided to stop people from immigrating to Ndjamena, it needed places for them to go. The locations identified were wadis which ultimately were shown to have some agricultural potential even during the drought. Exploiting this potential and meeting the immediate food needs of the people resulted in FFW and training (e.g., in special irrigation techniques) which combined emergency food with activities directly related to longer term development objectives. As the emergency has abated in Chad, the emergency food and action committees have been directed toward ensuring that drought victims can make the transition back to development activities.

In Mali, the linkage between the emergency food assistance program and development efforts was very close in the sense that the emergency program was designed to take into account objectives of the important national grain market restructuring project to avoid disruption of local markets.[8] In addition, regular food aid was combined with emergency food in the meeting of the overall food national deficit and the needs for urban distribution.

Little was done, however, to link emergency and development activities in rural areas. Existing FFW activities for example, were not expanded much and relief and rehabilitation activities were given too little attention. One reason for this lack of linkage is that USAID/Mali's development program focused on the more productive South and did not include activities among the groups and areas in the North most affected by the drought. While this did not preclude using emergency food more developmentally, it did contribute to the tendency to treat the emergency as something to be put behind, in order to give full attention to the ongoing development effort in the South. The USAID Country Development Strategy Statement (CDSS) did not take enough account of measures for drought proofing and restructuring agriculture, livestock and rural economics in drought zones.

In Sudan there was little linkage between the food emergency and longer-term development in the original emergency food assistance program design (except in meeting urban needs through PL 480 Title I programming). This led to very late rehabilitation responses. The scope for development linkages in Sudan (which is normally a food surplus country) was less than in countries like Mali and Chad.

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[8]In fact, the GOM appeared too conservative in programming emergency distribution for rural areas because of this concern.

c. Specific recommendations

- The capacity of country governments to manage drought and emergency food shortages should in itself be viewed as development;

- AID/W should provide guidance to USAIDs establishing the principle of linking AID development planning and programming with drought planning and emergency assistance pre-planning and project design;

- Much of the information required for emergency food assistance pre-planning, needs assessment, targeting and project design is also required for development planning. Since this key information is essential and can be obtained, efforts to collect and analyze it should be incorporated in drought preparedness and development programs by host governments and donors;

- USAIDs in the most at-risk countries should be charged to work with the host Government and other donors to devise cost effective systems for collection of food and agricultural and rural income data needed for both emergency food assistance planning and development programming; the approach normally should be one of helping the Government decentralize the collection of reliable food and agricultural and rural income data in drought prone regions cost effectively by reliance on local and district organizations and authorities working under the coordination of regional or central government;

- AID/W should ask USAIDs to increase FFW or cash for work (in conjunction with monetized food assistance) efforts in rural chronic drought-prone areas prior to and as part of emergency food responses; USAIDs in each of the most vulnerable countries should experiment with local or village management of such projects to identify ways to expand them quickly during food emergencies; specific FFW, cash for work and other projects that use should be developed as shelf projects for drought-prone areas;

- USAIDs in the most vulnerable countries should take into account the need for drought planning and emergency food assistance pre-planning as part of its country development strategic planning;

- USAIDs should work with host Governments and other donors to support systematic studies of drought prone areas in the most vulnerable countries to increase knowledge of local conditions facing rural populations and of opportunities for local development and drought proofing; such studies should be seen as an integral part of planning for drought and for

development; they should be carried out as far as possible by indigenous institutions and specialists;

- o USAIDs should work with host Governments and other donors to design emergency food assistance programs to support the development process by, among other things:

  -- Building central and regional government capability and competence to plan for and manage emergency food and disaster relief programs;

  -- Involving local and district government institutions in planning and implementing such programs;

  -- Improving the management capability of indigenous PVOs;

  -- Enhancing the capacity of the private sector, particularly in transport and food supply, to help meet unusual demands for emergency food supply in rural areas;

  -- Assisting affected populations to recover and move back to a development mode as soon as possible; and

  USAIDs in the most vulnerable countries should be prepared, if political and other factors permit, to work closely with the host Government and other donors on the provision of regular food aid (possibly under section 206, PL 480) as structural support for national programs to effect the changes and economic reforms--including provision of real economic incentives to producers required to restructure food and agricultural production and distribution and realize long term development objectives for food self-sufficiency in the framework of rural as well as urban development.

III. GENERIC LESSONS LEARNED FOR IMPROVING US FOOD EMERGENCY RESPONSES

A. Summary: Guidelines for Successful Emergency Food Assistance Responses

Responses by the US and others to emergency food situations have five main parts--pre-planning or preparation for an emergency; identification of an emergency; preparation to respond to it; implementation of the planned response; monitoring and evaluation of the results. This sounds suspiciously like the normal project cycle. The framework is similar, but the concept and practice are not. Food emergencies, for example, have an existence of their own. Unlike a development project, they occur whether or not they are discovered (taken cognizance of) and planned for (in terms of a Program Identification Document). Food emergencies move at a faster pace than project development and provide less time for identification, planning or implementation. Thus, program preparation for food emergencies is done more quickly and with much less formal documentation. Given the faster pace and less rigid planning requirements for food emergencies, generic lessons learned (or "handles") for policy makers and practitioners dealing with emergency food assistance are especially important because they provide helpful guidance for those faced with these emergencies. Because guidance is most helpful and easily incorporated into the stream of action when it is in familiar form--this pre-planning, identification, preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation format is used to organize the generic lessons learned in this chapter.

Based on the generic lessons learned, guidelines for successful emergency food assistance responses were developed. Box 1 presents these guidelines, organized in terms of pre-planning, identification, preparation, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. The guidelines are directive--intended to guide practitioners in <u>what to do</u>. Thus, they are framed as instructors: e.g. provide adequate resources, use PVOs, act early. A summary of principal generic points specific to Sudan, Chad and Mali are presented in Annex 5. A checklist of activities that need to be carried out in most food emergency situations is included as Annex 4. It suggests things that might need to be done when following the guidelines.

The <u>guidelines</u> and <u>checklist</u>, plus the <u>generic lessons learned</u> which follow in this chapter, can be used by <u>experienced AID staff</u> as beginning points in dealing with food emergencies. If the AID staff has access to a <u>fast track for decisions</u>, future US emergency food assistance responses could be even more successful than past ones.

Box 1: Guidelines for Successful Emergency Food Assistance Responses

A. Pre-planning

1. Begin before there is a problem
2. Develop a baseline
3. Establish early warning capability
4. Appoint central decision makers ahead of time

B. Identification

1. Obtain early warning and other important information
2. Make decisions early

C. Preparation (4 key decisions)

1. What response will be made?

- o Assess needs accurately;
- o Establish clear program objectives;
- o Target carefully; use health/nutrition and socioeconomic criteria;
- o Aim emergency interventions at the income problem, especially for the longer-term (this will root emergency activities in the development context);
- o Keep people where their development potential is best
- o Provide adequate resources--food, personnel, money and material; and
- o Package general and supplemental food and health inputs together.

2. How will the response be made?

- o Seek host government coordination and local government involvement;
- o Obtain donor coordination;
- o Create a fast decision track in Washington headed by a full-charge US decision maker;
- o Target food through existing development mechanisms--e.g., FFW, monetization;
- o Prepare contingency plans;
- o Pre-position in rural areas prior to the rainy season; and
- o Ensure satisfactory logistical support.

Box 1: Guidelines for Successful Emergency Food Assistance Responses (cont.)

3. Who will make the response?

- o Involve the public sector--local and national;
- o Use the private sector;
- o Guarantee excellent management at USAID; and
- o Use PVOs.

4. When will the response be made?

- o Act early (based on early warning/stages of drought data);
- o Stay late (if necessary).

D. Implementation (11 critical ingredients)

1. Objective

- o Clear program objectives.

2. Organization and management

- o A fast decision track in Washington headed by a full charge decision maker;
- o Good, experienced USAID management and sufficient staff;
- o Adequate host government support;
- o Effective donor coordination; and
- o Timely decisions and actions.

3. Program content

- o Key information;
- o Adequate resources;
- o Proven delivery mechanisms;
- o Good logistics; and
- o Integrated emergency/development activities.

E. Monitoring and Evaluation

1. Establish monitoring capability
2. Monitor and evaluate for impact

B. Pre-planning--the Ounce of Prevention in Food Emergency Situations--Is Crucial

Pre-planning is, in major part, the advance consideration of important elements of an as yet undefined food emergency--what these elements are, how they interrelate and how to intervene effectively with respect to any or all of them to resolve a food emergency situation successfully. Once pre-planning has been carried out, the country is in an improved state of food emergency preparedness.

In Sudan, one of the principal reasons the 1984-85 food emergency effort was not as successful as hoped was the lack of preparation for dealing with the consequences of another year of drought. Although 1984-85 was the fourth year of drought, there still was a dearth of information about its impact and the capacity of the country to deal with it. Without having thought through such things as the capability of the logistics system, the GOS entity to be given authority to meet the demands of the food emergency, etc., no solid basis existed for donors or the GOS to respond rapidly to the food emergency situation.

Which countries should pre-plan? Any country with a history of drought, even if spotty, should pre-plan. Also, any country with even faint reason to suspect that a food emergency is occurring or might occur should pre-plan. Finally, countries already experiencing drought should pre-plan, even in the face of great optimism about the coming rains. The extent of pre-planning and of institutionalized pre-planning capability can be made proportionate to the degree of risk that food or other emergencies will occur. Thus, a country with no drought for many years might have less institutionalized pre-planning capability than one in which droughts recur. If drought recurs from year to year, this capability should grow in proportion to the risk of still another year of drought.

Several lessons have been learned with respect to pre-planning from the 1984-85 experiences in Africa:

1. Lesson learned: Pre-planning must be undertaken before there is a food emergency problem

If the elements of pre-planning are taken up only when a food emergency becomes evident, the pre-planning stage is mostly lost, collapsing into the identification stage and disappearing in the rush to identify the problem and do something about it. Pre-planning should establish an early warning system, pre-identify key decision makers, assess the logistics system, pre-identify vulnerable groups, develop agreed upon criteria for declaring an emergency, and so on. Such disaster preparedness pays very large dividends in speeding up program response and increasing program impact and cost effectiveness. In some cases it will help overcome a government's difficulties in declaring a food emergency by putting in place agreed upon means for warning of an emergency and criteria for defining one.

2. Lesson learned: Baseline information is essential to enable accurate early warning and good program design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation; it needs to be developed before an emergency occurs because it is difficult and too late to do so once an emergency is underway.

Baseline information needed for program impact assessment includes the size of the population by area, the nutritional and medical condition of different population strata, the birth and death rates of the population by age groups, the economic situation of different types of households, how households deal with food versus money, what food people prefer, and so forth. For program administration and management assessment, baseline data would include the capacity of the logistic system, the amount and location of grain storage, the personnel strengths and financial capacity of executing institutions--government, PVOs, etc.

Obtaining all desirable baseline information is not necessary or possible. However, a continuing effort to build a baseline as suggested above is an important aspect of pre-planning.

Developing baseline data can be costly. However, emergency food programs are very costly, amounting to one-quarter billion dollars in Sudan and three times the development budget in Mali in 1984-85. These are huge resource transfers and efforts to document and improve their impact (such as baseline development) would pay dividends in planning, implementation and political terms. Moreover, the baseline data needed for emergency purposes is identical to that needed for development programs. Developing such data will create information about and relevant to vulnerable groups and households that will help in planning, and implementing both emergency and development efforts.

3. Lesson learned: Early warning can greatly increase emergency food program success, but the information provided by early warning systems is not reliable or timely enough yet to enable early definitive decisions agreed upon by all concerned parties.

Early warning systems need to obtain and interpret climatic, crop, livestock, market and individual and group activity (different responses to drought over time) data so as to forecast and warn of a food emergency. These systems are not developed fully, even in chronic drought countries. Improving them could increase the impact and cost effectiveness of emergency food assistance efforts. The improved outputs--e.g., data--of these systems also would provide important information for ongoing development efforts.

Early warning systems do not yet provide the timely reliable information that decision makers insist upon. Stages of drought indicators are not yet an operational feature of country early warning or drought response efforts. Needs assessment activities are not timely in most cases and targeting depends mostly on judgments (not

data made well after the emergency food response is underway. As a result, bilateral donor and other decision makers are sometimes slow to decide that a food emergency exists and slow to decide what response to make.

Much effort already is flowing into satellite and other higher technology approaches. In addition, local capability and efforts to obtain critical information should be expanded. Regular local government reporting on market prices, for example, could be arranged. As more information about known vulnerable groups becomes available tell-tale signs of drought-led income or other potential problems can be spotted more easily.

4. Lesson learned: Selecting key decision makers ahead of time within the host country, AID and other organizations as part of the preparedness effort helps achieve a more rapid, effective emergency response.

Information has been available but not acted upon in some food emergencies for want of a person charged with the responsibility of deciding. If relevant decision makers are known prior to the identification of a problem, the issue is likely to be dealt with sooner and more decisively. This selection of decision makers during the pre-planning stage also serves as a device to identify a formal or informal nucleus of leaders "ahead of time" should there later be a need to move from the pre-planning stage toward implementation.

Recommendation: Pre-planning should begin early by concerned governments perhaps with USAID or other donor assistance. It should include such things as:

- Identifying the potential "at risk" segments of the population in the event of a drought;
- Undertaking studies to ascertain the kinds and type of food that might be needed in a drought situation;
- Obtaining baseline data on nutrition, health, population and other variables in potential emergency areas. Without this information it is almost impossible to evaluate needs and success or failure of any program in terms of the number of lives saved or lost;
- Assessing the logistic capabilities of transport systems such as: port capacity, railroad, road and water transport (capacity per day available to transport food), government contracting ability, and financial arrangements;
- Identify food distribution modes--free distribution, FFW, monetization--and food distribution channels--PVOs, government--and develop plans for the use of those thought to be most appropriate;

- o Establishing an early warning system and predisaster planning nucleus group, perhaps drawing on the key ministries for personnel. (Use of local government resources to provide early drought warning information should be part of this effort. The US working with the UN should be prepared to help countries develop these systems);

- o Selecting key decision makers and charging them with the responsibility of deciding when an emergency food response is necessary should be done ahead of the actual emergency as a part of the preparedness effort. This should include host country, USAID, AID/W and other decision makers as required; and

- o Setting up criteria for determining when to declare an emergency. Such a process would make it easier for governments to admit a food crisis exists and enable them to declare a national emergency earlier.

C. Identification: Early Discovery of a Food Emergency Is Still an Art. It Can and Should Become a Science to Speed Up and Make Initial Emergency Food Assistance Program Planning More Effective.

Early definitive discovery of a food emergency is the first step in providing effective assistance. The initial planning ("PID") phase of a food emergency assistance program is the next step. Both steps in this identification process involve key information and key decisions. The timeliness of the information and the decisions made also is important.

1. Lesson learned: Key information is essential to identify the need for emergency food assistance and to begin planning for it, but is seldom readily available or accurate.

The information needed to identify a potential or emerging food emergency and to carry out the program identification effort for dealing with it can be classified as early warning, stages of drought, needs assessment and targeting data. Early warning data involves items such as rainfall patterns, potential harvests, and price changes. It includes the physical manifestation of a drought, which--if the government or donors are paying attention--can be identified and even forecast with substantial accuracy.

When droughts are prolonged, peoples' responses to them differ over time, producing longitudinal patterns which can be separated loosely into stages. These stages of drought data includes such things as sales of household stocks--food, jewelry, cattle--or movements of family members to obtain food or work. These are responses of people affected by the drought, responses which reflect and can be correlated with the physical manifestations of a drought--especially if it is prolonged. The responses of people differ by virtue of their

income/wealth levels. Thus, certain responses of vulnerable groups are indicative of the degree to which they are coping successfully with drought. Numerous efforts have been made to specify responses that serve as indicators of the impact of drought on the people affected.[1] Whether they occur in a short or long time frame, specific "indicator" responses, if identified early, can trigger timely action that will keep a situation from getting worse. Moreover, the action taken can be more developmental rather than strictly relief oriented.

Other key information for initial program planning includes needs assessment--estimates of overall food shortfalls and localized food requirements--and targeting which encompasses data enabling identification of disadvantaged persons as individuals, households, by group or by geographical area.

These types of data are generally not available as an outgrowth of ongoing development programs, but they could make a direct contribution to those programs as noted earlier.

Recommendation: Since this key information is essential and can be obtained, efforts to collect and analyze it should be incorporated in drought preparedness and development programs by host governments and donors.

2. Lesson learned: Central decisions to declare that a food emergency exists and undertake an emergency assistance effort are usually better when made early even if the information in support of the decision is not complete.

Decisions about food emergencies are needed in the host government, in USAID and in AID. Usually decision makers among other donors and elsewhere in Washington also become part of the process.

Decisions can seldom be made with certainty at the point where a food emergency is just being discovered or suddenly emerges. The "right" information may not be available. Responsibility for the decision is not posited with any decision maker at each of the key decision points. The host government may not want to admit to the possibility of an emergency. AID may not be certain enough of its facts to defend a decision to proceed with emergency food aid programming or to step in and push the system along even faster. USAID may see the problem as needing a more development oriented solution such as FFW, but lack the resources to prepare such a program. Despite these data problems, decisions can--usually must--be made if the need is urgent. Thus, the general magnitude of the problem can usually be determined, the at-risk groups can be roughly identified in the most severely affected areas, and the general level of the crops (good, bad,

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[1]See, for example, the work of Ellen Brown in the companion study to this report Chad: Emergency Food Assistance Evaluation, cited in Annex 4.

nonexistent) can be assessed. Specifying key decision makers early as part of drought preparedness efforts helps overcome some of these problems. Likewise, development programs aimed at "drought-proofing" (making groups who are vulnerable to drought better able to cope with drought before it occurs) sometimes make these decisions easier because the emergency food assistance can flow through the drought proofing infrastructure already in place.

Not all food emergencies are "hidden" or sudden. Many cumulate quite slowly into the vast emergencies they ultimately become. Timely decision making--not data availability or accuracy--is the critical factor in these situations.

Recommendation: Decision makers should be given support and authority ahead of time to switch gears from development to emergency status when deciding whether a food emergency exists and whether to begin program identification steps. They should be encouraged to shorten dramatically their decision time line, foregoing information to gain essential time whenever necessary.

D. Sound Preparation of Emergency Food Assistance Programs is Essential. Four Key Decisions are Required.

Emergency food assistance program design criteria are not as strict as other AID design efforts. The reasons for this vary. The emergency may be too sudden, many others are involved (host government and other donors), USAID may give the emergency low priority as a program or may not even view it as an activity with program components, or the nature and dimension of the emergency may not be known sufficiently to plan.

Planners of emergency food assistance programs may not be held to strict criteria, but the quality and effectiveness of their design work is important. Many millions of dollars are involved in these efforts, sometimes much more than the total development assistance effort for a country. Such large resource transfers should be planned as carefully as possible.

This evaluation provides some lessons learned that will improve emergency food assistance planning.

Four key decisions are needed to move from the point where a food emergency has been discovered and a program tentatively identified to deal with it, to initiating actual emergency food assistance. These are:

- What response will be made?
- How will the response be made?
- Who will make the response?
- When will the response be made?

1. What response will be made?

This decision can range from "no response at all" to "feeding every at-risk person 430 grams per day" (Sudan). If a response is to be made, several generic lessons learned should be considered when framing it:

a. Lesson learned: Needs assessment is a critical element of planning; donor and host government involvement in carrying it out helps solidify agreement on the accuracy of the assessment and the magnitude of the problem.

The assessment of need in a country is central to the planning of an emergency response. As planning moves to the preparation stage, detailed needs assessment can serve several purposes. It can heighten the accuracy of need estimates, increase donor concurrence on the nature and extent of the need, help attain the host government's agreement on the existence of an emergency, assist in targeting, and generally help in formulating the remainder of the emergency food program.

Recommendation: The needs assessment capabilities of AID, host governments and other donors should continue to be strengthened as an element of emergency food assistance. Special emphasis should be given to improvement in logistic capacity assessment, identification and assessment of stages of drought responses, and medical/nutritional and economic assessment for targeting purposes.

b. Lesson learned: Clear program objectives are the principal means by which emergency food assistance programs are focused and guided; in fast paced food emergency situations it is easy to lose sight of objectives, resulting in less effective and efficient program activities.

Food emergencies may creep up on decision makers, but by the time they begin to be dealt with definitively they often are fast paced chaotic events. If the objectives of the program do not remain crystal clear, the press of wants can result in operations that are not directed toward those objectives. If objectives are sharply in focus, they can be used as guides for program activities--e.g., we know what our objectives are and how this activity contributes to them.

Program objectives shape most aspects of planning and implementation. If emergency conditions cause an objective to change, then program activities are likely to change also. If an objective of a program is to feed people so as to save as many as possible, certain distribution modes (e.g. free food distribution) and channels (e.g., local government) may be selected. If the objective of the program then changes to using food more to enhance the development aspects of a

situation (e.g., during the transition from the emergency to normal development activities, the initial distribution modes and channels need to be examined too. The latter case may require more nonfood resources, alternative distribution channels, and different levels and kinds of governmental involvement.

Recommendation: Specific emergency food assistance program objectives should be established to help guide program activities. These objectives should be altered when conditions dictate at which time program activities may need to be altered too.

c. Lesson learned: Targeting is critical for impact and cost-effectiveness and should be used in the pre-planning of needs assessments, preparation and implementation phases of emergency food assistance programs.[2]

Targeting is an important mechanism for ensuring that resources go to those areas and population groups that need them most in a timely manner. Effective targeting increases the cost-effectiveness of both development and emergency programs and helps ensure that resources are not wasted.

Recommendation: In the context of emergency programs, targeting is critical and should be considered in the pre-planning, identification, preparation and emergency implementation phases in the following manner:

- Pre-planning--Development projects should be targeted to drought-prone areas and to those groups most severely affected by drought to increase their capacities to combat drought and overcome the causes of famine situations;
- Preparation--In the early stages of a drought, resources should be targeted to population groups beginning to experience serious loss of income or detrimental changes in consumption, living patterns, etc. An early warning system should include indicators sensitive to changing socioeconomic status and patterns that suggest the potential for serious food and nutrition problems; and
- Implementation--In the later stages of a drought, both micro-level socioeconomic data and nutrition/health data should be used to target resources and food to the worst-affected areas. Within these areas, household economic data and individual nutritional status data along with other at-risk indicators should be used to target households and/or

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[2]Hope Sukin, AID/FVA/PPE, made a major contribution to this section.

individuals experiencing serious health and nutritional problems.

d. Lesson learned: Where food emergencies are chronic, development always take place in a potential emergency context, but this is seldom accounted for in planning and implementing development assistance. Development programs need to concentrate on drought proofing groups most vulnerable to loss of income from drought. Such programs will provide ready made mechanisms for making emergency food assistance more developmental.

There is little linkage in either direction between emergency food programs and development programs in drought prone countries. It is probably more important for development efforts to concentrate on the income problem of drought vulnerable and prone people than for emergency food assistance to do so. In Mali, for example, USAID's development program is little focused on the geographic areas where most of the 1984-85 drought victims were located. If no effort at all is made to deal with the development problems of people in drought prone areas, famine with its huge associated costs is likely to revisit them periodically. Drought proofing to avoid this may become the central development issue in Africa if recurring drought-caused income collapse and famine on a major scale is to be avoided.

Recommendation: In chronic drought countries, development activities should focus on groups vulnerable to drought caused income collapse as one direct means of avoiding recurring famine. If drought does occur, these development programs should be the first mechanisms for providing emergency food assistance.

e. Lesson learned: Emergencies always take place in a development context but it is seldom accounted for in planning and implementing emergency food assistance activities. However, emergency food programs need to deliberately keep beneficiaries in their highest order development "plane"--be that in situ, in resettlement schemes or in camps--to be most effective.

Prior to the occurrence of a food emergency, beneficiaries, governments and donors are usually concentrating on attaining development objectives--e.g., a sustained increase in real per capita income, equitable income distribution and a better quality of life. Thus, AID's development assistance is a set of activities focused principally on the poor in the country and designed to help them achieve development objectives. Stated in simple economic terms at the household level, development activities seek to increase and stabilize the income of poor households. Where these households are in rural areas, much of the needed income increases must come from growth in agricultural productivity and output levels.

During a food emergency, such as the one related to the drought in Africa in 1984-85, some vulnerable groups lose their ability to grow or purchase food. Governments and donors tend to assist these groups by concentrating on relief--reducing human suffering and helping save lives in danger from lack of food. Thus, some poor people and some government donor and international agencies will move from a development to an emergency situation and, over time, back to development activities as the emergency recedes. Invariably, emergency activities are treated independently from development activities.

This is unfortunate because the same problem--lack of adequate income--is at the root of both underdevelopment and food emergencies. Thus, an essential linkage between development and emergency activities for those affected by drought is household/individual income. Development activities are deliberately and carefully conceived and operated to increase ultimately the income level of the poor household. Emergency activities usually are designed simply to feed people and reduce their suffering. Thought is not always given to dealing with the emergency via activities that lead to immediate and longer-term income development. Ideally, the movement from development to emergency activities and back by government and donors would rely on many identical modes of intervention--those aimed at increasing the income and quality of life of the poor household quickly, as well as over time.

Figure 1 helps illustrate the fundamental linkage between the development problem and the usual food emergency problem. It shows development and emergency "planes" for a typical rural household dependent upon agriculture for its income. Operating above line AA development activities in years 1, 2 and 3 enable the family to increase its food output and income. In these years, surplus output enables the household to "save," perhaps in food stocks, but also in money, jewelry, etc. In year 4, food output and income fall--the result of the first year of a drought. To meet its current food consumption requirements, the family would use part of its savings, send a family member elsewhere to work, etc. Years 5, 6 and 7 show the continuing damaging effects of the drought on the family's food output and income. If the family's reserves are inadequate, as they are for most poor people, its lack of purchasing power results in inadequate nutrition or starvation--i.e., it cannot purchase enough food to return its consumption to the AA' level. (The response of the household to these various years, and within years, corresponds to the stages of drought data mentioned earlier.)

Programming that confronts directly this income problem--lack of effective demand for food--and helps solve it for the longer run most deals with the food emergency in development terms. Figure 1 illustrates this concept. A drought induced food emergency creates income loss that can be replaced by FFW, cash for work, capital input and technical assistance for productive projects aimed at improved development. Food or cash for training or new enterprise initiation also encourages productive activity and immediately replaces lost



AFRICAN EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE EVALUATION

Figure 1: Schematic of Development and Emergency Planes

income. Wadi resettlement in Chad is an example. Seed distribution provides current income supplements and has potential longer-term productivity payoff. General and supplemental feeding, free health care and defense of local terms of trade for pastoralists (i.e., purchase of cattle they are forced to sell at "normal" grain/cattle price ratios rather than the distorted one resulting from drought-caused high grain prices) also confront the income problem, but they are less developmental.

As implied in Figure 2, normal development activities aimed at increasing income and quality of life in the longer term are directly relevant responses to a food emergency, especially if the emergency is discovered early. In such cases, development program mechanisms and interventions can be expanded and redirected toward meeting emergency needs. Thus, an emergency in many circumstances can be viewed as a more severe state of the same problems as exist in the "development plane" and can be dealt with using existing interventions aimed at the same constraints. FFW efforts in the emergency would still aim to expand agricultural water availability, fuelwood supplies, cattle dip tanks and on-farm or in-village crop storage. Skill training in brick making or agricultural implement repair could still be done on a cash for work basis. Road or bridge repair or building might continue as normal development activities to assist in curbing the emergency. Food sales would continue, nationally and locally, to stabilize the terms of trade for pastoralists and others. Monetized emergency food could be added in some cases. Livestock upgrading, seed improvement and supply and agricultural implement distribution efforts could go on as appropriate during the emergency and be increased as the drought abates.

This extension of development activities into the emergency can make good use of food for development purposes. As the emergency abates, food uses can be maintained as development efforts and continue to be used to diminish existing constraints, or they can be reduced or eliminated. Thus, it is possible to go into and out of the "emergency plane" using only developmental activities. This obviates the need for labeling stages as development, emergency, and recovery and rehabilitation. It emphasizes developmental interventions to track the income problem into and out of food emergencies. It uses food, one of the US's most important and plentiful development tools, as a key ingredient in handling an emergency in the context of development.

Income supplements using food can be added in this schema to meet the immediate needs of those without income or the means to attain it. This might include providing pastoralists with a food-for-cattle exchange or feeding families without excess labor or unable to work. Food sales might also be needed to resolve a local or national food supply problem.

Recommendation: Food emergency activities should be firmly rooted in the development context in which they are undertaken. They should aim to increase directly beneficiaries income both in immediate



AFRICAN EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE EVALUATION

Figure 2: Activities Supporting both Development and Relief Activities

terms and for the longer run. Emergency uses of food which build up individual/household, community or national assets should be preferred. These uses should be linked directly to development needs so that they can serve emergency or development goals.

Food emergency activities should be used to deliberately retain beneficiaries where their development plane potential is highest, whether in situ, resettlement, or camp.

f. Lesson learned: Adequate resources are necessary for every emergency food response and have maximum impact when packaged together--food, money, material, and technical assistance personnel.

Under-resourcing one or more of the key inputs necessary for successful emergency food assistance efforts is common. This may lead to negative rather than positive savings. Lack of additional USAID personnel, for example, to help integrate the very large food assistance resource flows with the ongoing development program may diminish the potential development impact of emergency food resources, resulting in unnecessary waste from a development perspective.

The reasons for providing inadequate resources are multiple. Funding was not available; other donors did not do their share; adequate information was not available to justify additional resources; schedule slippages led to cutbacks in the program, and so forth. Nevertheless, high quality and effective emergency food assistance cannot be achieved without adequate resource levels packaged appropriately.

Recommendation: Every effort should be made to ensure that adequate food, personnel and other key inputs needed for a successful emergency food program are available and packaged together; and

AID should establish a system which would enable it to draw on its most experienced and capable talent quickly and efficiently throughout the Agency to help deal with droughts or other emergencies when they occur.

g. Lesson learned: General and supplemental feeding and emergency food and health inputs belong together and their complementary packaging helps to maximize the success of emergency food assistance efforts.

When general feeding is planned and implemented separately from supplemental feeding (as was the case in Sudan and Mali), the emergency program does not meet the needs of many of the most disadvantaged nutritionally as effectively as possible. Health inputs are very seldom integrated with in situ feeding efforts. This leaves badly undernourished children susceptible to death from normally nonlethal diseases such as measles and diarrhea.

Recommendation: General and supplemental feeding shipments should be planned and implemented as joint programs unless there are obvious reasons not to do so; and

Basic health care and medicines should be integrated with efforts to meet minimal food requirements.

2. How will the response be made?

This key decision deals with organizations and substantive mechanisms for making the desired emergency food response. Examples of the former are: How will the policy framework and food allocations be established? How will food be moved into rural areas? Examples of substantive mechanisms are: What mode of distribution will be used--monetization or free distribution? How will food be packaged with technical assistance and other complementary resources? Necessarily some of these organizations and substantive mechanisms are integrally involved with "who" questions--i.e., food allocation will be established on the basis of nutritional criteria as interpreted by the local government and PVOs.

a. Lesson learned: Central government coordination of organizations carrying out an emergency food assistance program leads to better overall results; local government involvement also increases the effectiveness of emergency food assistance.

Overall coordination of food emergency efforts is one element of how emergency food responses should be made. This "coordination of" does not imply "management of" the food emergency, although it can where a national government or other lead agency is capable of doing so. Nor does it require direct control of emergency food supplies. Coordination does involve the cooperation and support of everyone helping deal with the emergency. In Chad, for example, WFP and USAID shouldered large parts of the organizational and administrative burden for the Government, which was overall coordinator, but the Government established policies and remained in control of the overall effort.

Government coordination is to be preferred because it builds government capacity and institutional memory, sustains governmental dignity, and better positions all parties to support longer term government efforts to prepare for and handle a drought if it occurs again. Coordination by the central government is not essential (as witnessed by the Sudan experience). Where food emergencies are extremely loud and sudden, the government can be bypassed by donors and others for a time.

Local government and village involvement in food emergencies is another organizational aspect of how to respond to food emergencies. It has been actualized in different degrees in different countries--less in Sudan than in Chad, for example. Malians were

little involved in food emergency activities in 1984-85. Rather, young, inexperienced, mostly Europeans implemented the effort taking all their experience with them when they returned home. Local government involvement can help with three functions: information, decisions and leadership. Information transmission by local government can be to beneficiaries--e.g., What is happening?--or to those working on the food emergency--e.g., the "grain" price of pastoralist livestock has fallen sharply. Information of these kinds includes early warning, needs assessments, targeting, food delivery, FFW project identification, logistical bottlenecks, monitoring, publicity and so on. Building up the capability of local government (and nongovernmental organizations too) to identify and report such information contributes to drought preparedness and emergency food assistance program implementation.

Decisions by local government (even if they only ratify the preparatory work of donors or PVOs) dealing with food allocations, food for work projects, etc., often provide an important imprimatur of authority with beneficiaries that PVOs or donors operating by themselves do not possess.

Leadership from local government officials often helps in program implementation. For example, persons considering migration may be encouraged to remain in situ by local officials or food for work efforts may be organized by them. If the emergency food assistance program can be heavily concentrated on directly supporting development related projects the number of "projects" will be large. The role of local government (and other leadership) then becomes central to success because donors cannot support such extensive programs with sufficient management and technical assistance.

Recommendation: Centralized coordination of food emergency assistance efforts should be the norm. AID, other donor and international organization efforts should support the government in creating an organizational structure with sufficient authority, resources and expertise to manage the effort. This structure should include US and other outside resources to supplement agreed upon host government capabilities and contributions.

Local governments should be involved in planning and implementing the emergency food effort. Their capacity to contribute should be expanded during the emergency and via development related activities carried out afterwards.

b. Lesson learned: Donor coordination, especially if it is under the auspices of the national government or an agreed upon lead donor or agency, contributes substantially to effective program planning and execution. When coordination occurs between the capitals of donors as well as in the country involved it yields better results.

Donor coordination is very helpful in the planning and implementation stages of emergency food assistance programs. During planning, donor coordination is necessary to agree on the nature and magnitude of the problem. If important donors are not brought along early, their disagreement or uncertainty can diminish the rapidity and effectiveness of an emergency response. Donors also agree during the planning stage on what role each will play and what resources each will provide.

During implementation, donor coordination also is important to smooth program operation and achievement of overall objectives. In Sudan, for example, some donors did not fulfill their pledges. This ultimately required extra US resources but they were programmed late because donor coordination was inadequate. As a result, the impact and cost effectiveness of the effort were diminished.

Recommendation: Donor coordination among capitals and in country should be assured under the leadership of the host government or an agreed upon lead international agency or donor.

c. Lesson learned: The slow and inflexible decision making process in the US Government slows emergency responses; and flexibility of response and new approaches to rapidly changing emergencies helps produce good program results.

A less fragmented response by Washington to food emergencies is another important element of how a response should be made. Washington response time to field requests is often too slow, making the eventual US response inadequate. The multiple agencies involved and the lack of effective control of them by those responsible for US emergency food assistance efforts creates this difficulty. Within the executive branch some centralization of control was used effectively in 1984-85. With the help of clear policy guidance from the President, this speeded up US responses and heightened their impact.

A full charge Washington decision maker with the time to devote to the issues that arise in dealing with food emergencies, supported by a fast decision track would make the US bureaucracy more responsive to the needs of USAIDs managing emergency food assistance efforts. Explicit public Presidential and Congressional support would make this decision making structure even more effective. Such a decision making

apparatus would help USAIDs manage program planning and implementation better and would improve program impact.

Flexibility is a central aspect of how food emergency responses should be made. Food emergencies often are volatile in their demands on AID and others. AID's normal administrative mechanisms sometimes do not provide the quick flexible responses needed where information flows are erratic and major crisis can arise with extremely short advance warning. (The earlier recommendation to establish a full charge decision maker in Washington will help achieve this flexible response.)

Recommendation: A fast decision track making structure headed by a "full charge" decision maker in Washington should be developed in support of emergency food assistance activities. This fast track approach should shorten the time of Washington's response to USAIDs; it should, however, carry out its work with full cognizance of the development context of emergency food relief efforts; and

AID should establish a special administrative and funding (and personnel) track once a valid emergency has been identified and a policy decision made regarding US help. This should include, but not be limited to:

-- Simplified administrative procedures should be established for the approval, processing, contracting and execution of requests for assistance once an emergency has been declared; and

-- Policy guidelines for the application of these procedures should be prepared;

-- Full authority to approve use of counterpart, sign contracts, call on AID financed resources already in the field, etc., should be delegated to USAID when appropriate according to local circumstance.

d. <u>Lesson learned: Development type programs--FFW; specialized feeding efforts--make excellent targeting mechanisms, enabling beneficiaries to be reached regularly with needed quantities of food</u>.

These programs tend to target food to families and groups rather than to geographic areas. In Chad, for example, food was delivered via PVO or WFP programs directly to families. These recipients received larger quantities of food more regularly than those reached through general distribution. Such programs, if they exist at the time the emergency begins, can contribute a great deal to targeting, distribution and developmental aspects of food emergency programs. As appropriate, such programs can be started as one response to meeting emergency food needs.

Recommendation: Where possible, emergency food assistance should be provided via programs targeted to individuals and families. Where general distribution is used, it should include substantial monitoring and transport capacity at the local level.

e. Lesson learned: "What if" contingency plans for key elements of the emergency food assistance program are necessary to maximize success.

Experience has shown that even the best laid plans can go astray and usually do. Unforeseen events such as changes of government, civil disorders, shifting governmental priorities, etc., can throw a time table off and call for flexible, quick, imaginative action. To help remedy this situation, it is desirable to have a backup plan.

Contingency plans dealing with critical elements of the emergency plan and its implementation need to be developed in advance. This advance contingency plan preparation is frequently not done in food emergency situations. When something truly unlikely goes wrong during an implementation effort contingency plans need quickly to be made to correct the problem. This type of contingency plan often is completed and carried out quickly, because the program will falter if it is not.

Recommendation: Emergency food assistance plans should have strong "what if" advance contingency plans for key elements of the program so that planners and implementors have in mind alternate solutions if the preferred selection does not work.

f. Lesson learned: Pre-positioning in rural areas prior to the rainy season greatly increases program impact and cost effectiveness.

Pre-positioning emergency food on an international or regional basis to meet potential needs of countries is costly and not always effective. However, transport is difficult or impossible in some rural areas during the rainy season. Therefore, pre-positioning food in rural areas where emergency food needs exist prior to the onset of the rainy season may be necessary. Doing so in a timely manner is a consistent problem, as witnessed by the 1984-85 efforts in Sudan, Mali and Chad. Careful planning for this activity will assist in achieving program objectives.

Recommendation: Within each country, emergency food should be pre-positioned in hard to reach rural areas prior to the rainy season. Plans, including contingency plans, should be made for this pre-positioning prior to the beginning of the rainy season where this will improve program results.

g. Lesson learned: Logistical bottlenecks frequently reduce program results and increase program costs.

A food emergency usually requires a "surge" in logistical activities. It is during this period of pressure on the logistical system that its weaknesses appear most prominently, causing program needs to go unmet. In planning, logistical capabilities need to be assessed realistically and actions specified to use and improve these capabilities as required by the emergency. For example, if private sector trucking is to be used, it will lead to greater freight rates unless there is important surplus capacity in the trucking industry. Timing is important. If logistical capabilities need to be expanded it is wise to plan to do it before crisis needs develop that engender superhuman efforts and great costs.

There are potential development aspects of infrastructure improvement. For example, an improved bridge to handle a drought caused food emergency can be a national asset for further development as happened in Chad. Private sector involvement in logistics may strengthen the program and can also improve private sector capacity for later development activities. Some logistic improvements, such as rehabilitation of rural roads, can be developmental and, via FFW, apply the very food aid the road improvement is intended to facilitate.

Recommendation: Logistical capacity should be assessed early and carefully in every food emergency. Its improvement to enable an emergency food assistance effort to be successful should be planned for and linked directly to the development effort in the country. This plan should provide for a package of inputs--infrastructure improvement; additional rolling stock; spare parts; technical and managerial expertise; money, fuel. Explicit contingency plans for ensuring adequate logistical capacity to support the food emergency should be developed and maintained.

3. Who will make the response?

Planning for who will carry out the emergency food response is frequently a global effort, although centered in the country of concern. The US, host government, other donors, PVOs, UN and other international organizations usually become involved. The lessons learned in this area are:

a. Lesson learned: If the government plays a positive pivotal role in managing and coordinating an emergency effort, the program is likely to have greater impact.

For example, the Government of Chad, despite the many constraints of human and financial resources, was seen as a major player in determining the policy framework and allocation of food assistance. It set the policy of in situ feeding which avoided the establishment of camps and massive migration to Ndjamena. It chaired the Food Aid Action Committee, made up of all bilateral, multilateral

and PVO donors in Chad and took an active role in formulating issues and resolving problems. Government infrastructure was used for the distribution of over 50 percent of emergency food aid. Mechanisms were developed to monitor, to the extent possible, food delivery and to institute appropriate sanctions in cases of abuse.

The donors believed it was essential to consult with and bolster the public sector. As a result, the food assistance activity was well coordinated, relationships between donors and government and also among donors were strengthened, and the capabilities of the government, both nationally and regionally, were substantially enhanced. The infrastructure now exists to improve the planning and implementation of development programs and to respond more effectively to future emergencies.

Recommendation: The government should play a pivotal function in managing and coordinating the emergency effort. Even if it has limited resources at is disposal, it should not be bypassed in the decision making process. This is especially important in chronic deficit countries in order to build up an institutional emergency preparedness capacity to respond to future disasters.

b. Lesson learned: Government may not be the best implementing agency. Private sector resources, such as PVOs and transport companies, can be used effectively to meet emergency food assistance needs too.

Many governments are already overburdened financially and administratively in discharging their normal duties. Their system of administration may not be designed for the fast, flexible action often required when facing drought or other natural calamities. The use of private sector entities and resources is often a better means of achieving emergency food assistance objectives. Transport and distribution of food by the private sector, for example, may be the only way to assure delivery in a reasonable amount of time in some circumstances. This was true in Sudan where the use of private trucks to deliver food to PVOs and from PVOs to beneficiaries was essential to program success.

Other areas where the private sector might help are accounting, reporting systems, fuel supplies and food processing.

Recommendation: Use of private sector resources--e.g., transport companies, etc.--to help meet the emergency food assistance needs should be explored and used wherever feasible to lighten the load on already seriously overburdened governments.

c. Lesson learned: USAIDs customary practice of managing emergency food assistance programs using persons with little or no experience in planning and implementing them and understaffing these efforts as well reduces program effectiveness.

USAIDs' lack of prior experience in managing emergency food situations is a critical factor influencing program success. This contradicts AID's own practice in most other areas where it carefully matches experienced people with their tasks. It results in less well-managed programs with reduced impact and higher costs than necessary.

Moreover, food emergencies--because they tend to be chaotic, fast moving problems--are highly amendable to good management practices which impose discipline and a strong sense of timing and resource organization and control on situations. These emergencies also are susceptible to experience. If a person has worked on the logistical aspects of food emergencies, s/he will be better at dealing with logistic problems again than a person who has not drawn up a food emergency logistic plan before.

Recommendation: AID should assess the management of each food emergency situation. Additional experienced personnel should be supplied if needed and sound management practices should be required; and AID should establish a system which would enable it to draw on its most experienced and capable talent quickly and efficiently throughout the Agency as droughts or other emergencies occur. The following recommendations are made with this objective in mind:

- AID should establish a computerized roster to Agency personnel by discipline or technical skill who have had previous experience in managing emergency food and nonfood assistance programs. This would provide AID with the information needed to take full advantage of personnel with the Agency with valuable past experience in countries and at headquarters in this kind of work;

- AID should establish special procedures to permit transfer and use of these personnel as needed in a flexible and easy to use system. For example, not all USAIDs have contract officers or resident legal staff, nor do they have sociologists, nutritionists or logistics specialists, etc. Safeguards should be built in to avoid prejudice to personnel in their annual performance evaluations when they are transferred for relatively long TDYs (three to nine months); and

- A roster should be established and kept up to date of contractors and consulting firms with special competence in emergency assistance programs. This should shorten the time

required to locate qualified firms or individual skills outside the Agency.

d. Lesson learned: With few exceptions, the involvement of PVOs in planning and implementing emergency food assistance programs was an essential factor in the success achieved by those efforts.

PVOs served as important operational managers of food distribution in most emergency food programs. They helped target those in need, assisted in getting food to them, established development efforts in the middle of the emergency, and carried out food end-use checks. Thus, they were involved effectively in planning, logistics, impact measurement, development programming using food, and many other activities. Some were reluctant to shift from development to relief efforts; some shifted back too soon.

PVOs most frequently hired staff or used volunteers from developed and other third world countries rather than from host countries. This pattern was particularly striking in Mali. They could do much more to build up country capacity to handle drought situations if they used local personnel more extensively.

Maintaining a state of PVO readiness to handle food emergencies would provide an important reservoir of capacity in chronic food emergency countries. Supporting PVO efforts to drought proof vulnerable groups using food aid during nondrought periods is one way to do this while also linking development and food emergency assistance more closely during future emergencies.

Recommendation: Use of PVOs (local and foreign) should be considered in all stages of emergency food assistance programs--identification, planning, implementation, and evaluation. Their efforts should be supported jointly by the host government, other donors and USAID and controlled by the organizational structure agreed upon to manage the emergency food effort.

4. When will the response be made?

a. Lesson learned: Emergency food assistance efforts are time sensitive and require a timed-phased action plan; decisions made in developing or implementing emergency food assistance programs nearly always contribute more to program success when made sooner rather than later.

This lesson learned highlights the need to make key decisions in a time frame that will allow food distribution to be made to people when they need it. If decision makers would run their emergency food programs by the clock and the calendar, their performance from the viewpoint of beneficiaries would always improve, almost regardless of the quality of their decisions. Thus, in dealing

with food emergencies, program managers should decide as far back on the time line for that decision as possible.

Recommendation: Decision makers responsible for emergency food assistance programs should:

- Establish a time-phased action plan taking into account any seasonal impediments to prompt action and other issues or roadblocks which must be overcome in order to maintain the time-phased action plan;

- Work with the host government, United Nations, major donors, PVOs, and the private sector to develop integrated plans with firm time schedules for delivery of materials, equipment, manpower, and food needed to mitigate the effects of the emergency; and

- Ensure proper implementation of the time phased action plan and amend it as unforeseen events and new impediments occur and encourage major donors to do the same.

b. Lesson learned: Movement of affected households from the emergency plane to the development "plane" may take longer than anticipated and require a special blend of emergency food programming.

An emergency is not over when the drought has been broken by ample rainfall. Crops, while in the ground, are not harvested when the rain first falls and the human and financial reserves of people harmed by their drought-caused precipitous drop in income are not yet rebuilt. A drought in the year after the first year of rains may still create grave problems for many of affected people. Governments and donors seldom plan for such a contingency.

Moving from an emergency to a development pattern will involve different actions for different people. Pastoralists may leave a temporary resettlement scheme and attempt to reconstitute their herds. But, semi-sedentary people may not leave the resettlement area at all, preferring it to their former area and way of life. Some younger generation family members, if they have been taught a skill while in a relief camp, may use it in an urban area rather than return to their village. These shifts all constitute a movement toward what the individuals believe will be a higher order development "plane." However, the full shift in any direction is seldom accomplished in even a year. In Turkana, it took most pastoralists 10 years after an emergency food situation was over to fully recover their economic position.

The existence of a long time frame for some to move from an emergency situation back to a normal development situation highlights the importance of emergency development linkages. During this transition, food assistance can be useful, especially if it is

programmed using development objectives and mechanisms. This is easiest to see when beneficiaries are moving from a situation where they desperately need food to stay alive (an immediate income supplement with no developmental benefits) to a situation where they can now grow some food but need additional food as well to meet nutritional and annual income needs. Using FFW in the latter situation to direct energy to creating drainage ditches for irrigated land (food/income for work aimed at creating an individual income increasing asset) is a more cost effective and developmental way to solve the income problem of the beneficiaries than to continue to distribute free food. When they are finally able to grow enough food, the FFW activity can be stopped. Perhaps a development project which upgrades the skills of the agricultural extension agent working with beneficiaries (an off-farm development input to increase the productivity of agricultural assets) can take its place. The relative cost effectiveness of the technical assistance for extension agents is potentially much higher than FFW; and FFW is much higher than free food.

Thus, during the transition, as well as during all other stages of a food emergency, emergency food assistance needs to be aimed at solving the long run income problem of at-risk people--i.e., at being developmental. This will maximize the cost effectiveness of the assistance and help preclude the return of famine. Also, droughts will recur and again require emergency food. The US, which has major food surpluses, sometimes finds it easier to provide food than cash assistance (especially for development). If food and even emergency food can become more developmental, it may become possible to structure global cooperation to achieve more development--i.e., we will provide more food if you (e.g., Japan) will provide more cash.

Recommendation: Emergency food assistance should be provided for as long as it helps cost effectively solve the income problem of the at-risk people being helped. This time frame should be established independently for each situation and cannot be determined automatically by the same event (e.g., rainfall).

E. Successful Implementation of Emergency Food Assistance Programs: 11 Critical Ingredients

Preparation of an emergency food assistance program is one thing; implementing it is another. Foreshadowed by all the issues dealt with in program design, successful implementation should deal effectively with the most important of those issues. Our experience in Sudan, Mali and Chad suggests there are 11 critical ingredients to successful implementation of emergency food assistance efforts. These 11 ingredients are shown in Box 2 and examined below briefly. Each ingredient must be viewed statically and over time. That is, effective donor coordination is not a one time state of affairs, but an ingredient that must be maintained over time--throughout the food emergency.

Box 2: Eleven Critical Ingredients For Successful Implementation of Emergency Food Assistance Programs

- Clear program objectives;
- A fast decision track in Washington headed by a full-charge decision maker;
- Good, experienced USAID management and sufficient staffing;
- Adequate host government support;
- Effective donor coordination;
- Timely decisions and action;
- Key information;
- Adequate resources;
- Proven delivery systems;
- Good logistics; and
- Integrated emergency/development activities.

1. A clearly defined program objective for a food emergency assistance program is one key to its success.

Emergency food assistance programs need well defined program objectives to guide planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Sometimes, the objectives of these programs are not specified. For example, if it is not clear that a program objective is to assist very vulnerable groups such as children and lactating mothers, appropriate foods and supplemental feeding mechanisms may not be packaged together with general food distribution.

Specified objectives in food emergency assistance programs are important. Emergency circumstances frequently change, and these changes sometimes require new program objectives, approaches and activities. When program alterations are made under pressure and with limited information, new specific objectives may not be defined and existing objectives may not be focused upon as intently as before. The fast pace and less rigid planning and operating procedures of most food emergencies can foster activities that are not well related to program objectives. The conflicting results and inefficient resource use that results will reduce program effectiveness.

2. The management and organization of an emergency food assistance program is another key to its success.

a. Establish a fast decision track in Washington headed by a full charge decision maker

Every set of lessons learned cites the same problem: slow response time in Washington, turf battles, and decent people differing on the issues. A generic principle here is that timing is everything. The bureaucracy still needs to organize as if it is.

b. Ensure good and experienced USAID management and sufficient staffing

AID runs its emergency food assistance programs in the field with whomever happens to be resident in the mission at the time. It usually does not add management staff to run these programs but peels some of its development cadre away to manage the emergency effort. These may be good people and experienced development staff. However, most USAID personnel are not experienced in running emergency food assistance programs, and they do not manage them especially well.

AID persists in under-resourcing food emergencies in terms of its own staff complement. In fact, effective emergency food assistance efforts require large amounts of staff time. Food monitors, for example, are necessary in many cases to supplement USAID personnel and government capabilities.

Using AID personnel experienced with food emergencies and expanding USAID staff when necessary will add expense. Emergency food

assistance programs often are larger than the normal development program of a mission and they represent large resource transfers. Some additional expenditure to make these huge programs more successful can be justified.

c. Arrange adequate host government support

Emergency food assistance programs can be undertaken in a variety of ways. Some of these approaches require major host government involvement and support, while others do not. In planning an assistance effort, the government support needed for specific program elements will be identified and contingency plans developed to control these elements (in case the host government does not go along or does not perform as agreed). During implementation, the actual garnering of host government support needs to be both an operational and policy level affair. Program managers, especially at the USAID level, will have to define the level of support needed, arrange for it and monitor to see that it is being provided.

The monitoring of host government support and development of contingency plans in case things do not go as expected are important. For example, the government may agree to expand its fuel supplies and supply fuel inland. If it does not perform, donors may have to supply the fuel, perhaps even by airlift. If the actions of the host government are being monitored, it may be possible to identify the fact that they have not placed forward orders for fuel or that they have inadequate foreign currency to purchase it. If these problems are identified early, "adequate" government support may be able to be encouraged/arranged in time to avoid a major fuel shortage problem. Even if adequate government support cannot be obtained in this instance, early warning of the problem may enable fuel to be arranged for by others before a major crisis arises.

d. Develop effective donor coordination

Effective donor coordination, and if achieved early, helps ensure a rapid emergency response. During program planning it greatly reduces uncertainty--e.g., who is going to do what? When? Because different donors agree to undertake various parts of the program, donor coordination during implementation reduces duplicate effort, eliminates some mistakes, and increases program efficiency. Trading food between donors, for example, can reduce transport requirements and meet beneficiary needs in a more timely manner.

Coordination is best when the information available is best. Standardized and frequent reporting of key information to involved donors during implementation is an important element of donor coordination. As noted in the prior section on preparation, the coordinating mechanism and the way decisions are reached within it also are important aspects of effective donor coordination. A joint government/donor/international agency/PVO coordinating mechanism is

more effective than leaving every donor or operating entity to deal independently with the host government or lead coordinating agency

e. Make timely decisions/undertake timely action

Emergency food assistance programs must move at a much faster pace than development programs. To ensure that this pace is achieved, decisions and actions must be timely. Usually, they must occur within a specific and fairly narrow window of time if program effectiveness is to be maximized. Consistently making decisions and taking actions according to such a time phased action plan will require special procedures--e.g., the delegation of certain legal a contracting authority to USAIDs and clear lines of authority in Washington. These procedures should be worked out ahead of time.

Even where special procedures are not available, timely decisi and actions are possible. Quality planning helps, as does experienced management, good host government support and effective donor coordination. Obtaining key information and ensuring the existence of the other critical ingredients in Box 3 enables greater timeliness too. With these ingredients present in adequate measure, the decision maker/actor will usually have a basis to decide and act within the time dimension of the emergency if s/he is willing to risk doing so without the protection of special procedures. In such cases, as occurred in Sudan, it is important that support be given to the rule or protocol-breaker after the fact by top officials in AID/W and other agencies.

3. The substantive content of an emergency food assistance program is another key to its success.

a. Obtain key information

"Key" information in emergency food situations is always insufficient, but it is important. Often little effort is put into obtaining this important information, making its insufficiency a self fulfilling prophecy. Only if it is valued, insisted upon and worked hard (and intelligently) for, will key information become available. In Mali, for example, special studies were used to set relevant information and more are planned. A required reporting format and frequency for key variables is one way to pin down what data is available and what is known and unknown; it also helps allocate resources toward providing key information.

Some key information needed to make decisions and take action in emergency food programs is situation specific. However, most "key" information will be the same for different food emergencies, falling into two categories: problem data and solution data. Examples of key problem information are:

- Who is affected by the drought?

- Where are they?
- How many are there?
- How has the drought affected them? Loss of income? Lack of food supplies locally?
- How are people responding to the drought (stages of drought response)?

Examples of key solution data are:

- What is available to meet the income/food needs of the affected people--food, money, materials, personnel?
- Can available food meet the needs of the affected groups--e.g., children?
- What delivery mechanisms are available? Which would be most appropriate/developmental?

b. Ensure that adequate resources are available

The resources needed for an effective emergency food assistance program include much more than food. As noted in the 11 critical ingredients, management staff, systems and procedures, and key information are essential parts of the resource mix. In addition to these "soft" inputs and food, there will be need for money, transport, technical assistance, equipment, supporting material for FFW activities (e.g., seed and hand tools) and infrastructure such as housing, improved bridges and food storage facilities. These have to be available in the proper proportions and at the right times to maximize program success.

c. Use proven delivery systems/mechanisms

The means by which food is distributed to end users has a great deal to do with program impact and cost effectiveness. After incurring all the effort and cost of moving food thousands of miles and over difficult terrain, its delivery by one means--e.g., general distribution--may have much less impact on the needs targeted than distribution by another means. Where available, existing organized programs of PVOs and others (e.g., FFW; other development activities; supplemental feeding efforts) had more impact than general distribution. The food was better targeted on nutritional/medical needs of individuals and used more developmentally too.

Where the income of the affected population is not the problem but a local or national supply shortage is, monetization will be a preferred distribution mechanism. Funds generated could be used via cash for work to reach groups for whom drought has caused major income shortfall and wealth depletion.

In some situations, such as Sudan in 1984-85, "proven" delivery systems will not exist. Judgments about which to try should be followed up with intense monitoring of actual end-use and adjustments made based on the information obtained.

d. Organize a good logistics system

Logistics are fundamental to the successful operation of emergency food assistance programs.[3] The logistical system invariably will need special attention--repair, fortification, expansion. Use of the private sector to meet the special needs the food emergency placed on the logistical system worked well in Sudan. Good planning, contingency planning, and the use of personnel experienced in the logistical aspects of food emergency implementation will help in organizing and using a good logistics system.

e. Carry out integrated emergency/development activities

Food emergency programs should be planned to fit smoothly into development efforts. They should aim directly at the income problem of affected people and solve it in the most developmental way possible. Where farmers incomes have disappeared due to the drought, food can replace it and, at the same time, keep them located in situ where they can begin crop production immediately when the rains return. Exchanges of food for cattle at reasonable exchange rates may be the most developmental way to help pastoralists convert their wealth into income/food. FFW, monetization and other mechanisms should be used as extensively as possible to ensure that the emergency program is not seen as an isolated event to be disposed of as rapidly as possible so as to get back to development. Rather, programming for food emergencies needs also to be viewed as development. Then the structure of the solutions proposed can be measured not only by medical/nutritional and social/humanitarian criteria, but also by development criteria--e.g., to what extent did our emergency food programming help solve the low income problem of those affected by the drought in the longer term?

F. Monitoring and Evaluation: Guidance Mechanisms for Improving Success

End use impact and cost effectiveness determine the success of emergency food assistance programs. To validate and improve these program results requires baseline data, staffing up for monitoring, and the monitoring and evaluation of program impact and cost effectiveness.

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[3]At one point during the evaluation in Sudan, the Devres Team's Landrover ended up in the desert miles from anywhere with only three good tires, two flat ones and no more tube patching compound. Having had three prior flat tires that day, the Team developed a generic principle: Logistics are everything--be sure you have enough.

Baseline data needs to be developed before a food emergency becomes apparent, ideally during the pre-planning stage. Where this has not occurred or the baseline developed does not adequately frame aspects of the food emergency that do arise, some baseline data may be able to be gathered during the initial stages of the emergency--e.g., the identification and preparation stages. This will be more possible when the emergency develops slowly as is often the case. The key baseline data needed was noted earlier in the discussion of pre-planning activities.

1. Lesson learned: Food monitors are essential in many countries to supplement host government, USAID and PVO monitoring capabilities.

Detailed monitoring of emergency food assistance implementation and impact has been very helpful in improving program management/cost effectiveness and program impact. Monitoring can be carried out by a combination of the government, PVOs, AID direct hire and contractor employees. Where many organizations are involved, consistency of results and reporting of results tend to be problems. Governments sometimes lack the capability to monitor fully the situation and PVOs themselves need monitoring. Expanding USAID staff to do this monitoring in these cases has produced good results.

Recommendation: Detailed monitoring of emergency food assistance programs should be a part of implementation and USAID staff should be expanded when necessary to achieve good monitoring results.

2. Lessons learned: Monitoring and evaluating for impact provides useful feedback on the effectiveness of emergency programs and how they can be planned and implemented better in the future.

The impact of emergency food assistance programs is often difficult to assess. Baseline data is seldom available, no "controls" exist, persons are too busy to develop good data, etc. As a result, it is usually not possible to determine how well a program did in terms of saving lives, meeting a proportion of individual diets, reversing severe or serious malnutrition, or curbing the incidence of malnutrition-related medical difficulties. However, to improve emergency food assistance, such assessments are needed. This requires conscious attempts to establish monitoring and evaluation efforts or systems as a part of emergency food assistance programs to detect and measure impact.

Recommendation: Mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating impact should be made a part of emergency food assistance efforts and additional data should be collected to enable the impact of emergency food programs to be determined. Pre-planning should include data collection for baseline purposes that will enable program monitoring and evaluation to assess impact accurately.

ANNEX 1

Scope of Work

African Food Emergency Assessments

Scope of Work

I. Background

Emergency food aid shipments to Africa have reached unprecedented levels. Between FY 83 and 84 U.S. emergency food aid more than tripled in tonnage and value; by June of FY 85 approved emergency levels for Title II, Section 416 and food reserve combined have again more than tripled in tonnage [1.8 million metric tons] and quadrupled in value [$738.4 million]. For Sub-Saharan Africa alone, the U.S. government has supplied more than 50 percent of total food aid requirements. In light of the particular chronic nature of the "emergency" in Africa, this substantial commitment cannot be viewed as a one-time event. Not only will continued emergency relief be required in the short-term, but given the magnitude involved, this assistance will have significant impact on the future of African development. How we program this food aid in the short and medium term can be an important determinant of whether we have positive or negative effects.

It is in this context that the assessment of our emergency food aid programs is conceived. Based on an evaluation of current operations, we will be exploring options for organizing emergency food aid to alleviate immediate distress while, at the same time, setting the stage for longer-term development. This means looking at the larger picture when designing emergency interventions - the interrelationships between micro projects and macro policies, the linkages between emergency and regular food aid programs as well as with dollar-funded development assistance activities, and the effects of different distribution mechanisms. It means understanding better the smaller picture - the perceptions of beneficiaries, their socio-economic and cultural environment, their decision-making processes, and how we can provide for their material needs while preserving a sense of self-worth and human dignity and fostering appropriate changes in behavior patterns. This assessment will provide the opportunity to take stock of our successes and failures to date with a view to programmatic changes and improvements. Hopefully, this review will contribute to the improved effectiveness of our food aid programs in the short and long term but also to developing new models or documenting existing ones which can be used by other donors and host governments.

As a first step in preparing for this review, FVA canvassed all AID Missions in Africa with emergency food aid programs regarding their experience during the 1983/84 drought. An exhaustive list of questions was cabled to the field and the

response formed the information base for the Lessons Learned paper presented at the Food for Peace Officers Conference in Abidjan in April 1985. A primary purpose of this assessment will be to verify, supplement and update this information with field visits, independent data analysis, and the perspective of program participants. Ultimately, we would like to develop guidelines for the design of future emergency food aid programs.

II. Objectives

1. To assess the timeliness, appropriateness and impact of emergency food aid programs in Africa and suggest ways they can be improved.

2. To assist USAIDs, PVOs, host governments and other donors in the programming of future emergency, rehabilitation and disaster prevention activities.

3. To provide AID and the donor community with lessons learned regarding the planning, design, implementation and evaluation of emergency food aid programs with emphasis on how they can more effectively foster long-term development initiatives and contribute to increased food security.

III. Scope of Work

The following questions are illustrative of the kinds of issues that should be examined in depth by the evaluation team in carrying out the objectives of this assessment. Emphasis, of course, will vary from country-to-country and will depend on the particular type of intervention being examined and the degree of severity of the emergency situation. Priority should be given to information gathering and analysis leading to improved programming, redesign and exploration of new options for the formulation of emergency food aid programs.

A. Causes of Emergency

- What is the nature of the problem [both immediate and underlying causes].

- To what extent is the country's food problem related to agricultural and macro-economic policies that may discourage local agricultural production and marketing?

- How can the basic food problem be best addressed with emergency food aid?

B. Preparedness and Contingency Planning

- Do national procedures exist for responding to emergencies? Are they followed when an actual emergency occurs?

- Describe the types and levels of public and private sector security stocks, distribution mechanisms, and how they can be used in a disaster situation.

- What planning activities could be undertaken to strengthen the government's capacity to respond more effectively to structural and emergency food deficit situations? [Consider the political will and financial capability of the host government to handle emergencies in this context.]

- How do local people normally deal with food shortages and how can this traditional coping behavior be reinforced?

C. Donor Coordination

- Were adequate mechanisms in existence or established to coordinate assessments of donor requirements and implementation efforts?

- Did these function effectively and how might they be improved?

- Assess AID's role in relation to that of the host government and other donors in initiating and sustaining coordination functions.

D. Needs Assessment

- Describe the type of information [i.e., rainfall analysis, nutrition surveillance, etc.], collection system, analysis procedures, and use of data for early warning, assessment of requirements, declaration of disaster, design of programs, estimation of food input, etc.

- Has the logistical capacity of the government and the private sector been adequately taken into account in determining food aid levels?

- Assess the accuracy, rapidity and appropriateness of the needs assessment process and AID's contribution.

E. Project Design

- How were target areas and groups of beneficiaries selected?

- How did the host government, USAID, other donors and PVOs decide what type of emergency program would be most appropriate in terms of food delivery mechanisms, logistics, commodity size and composition, implementing organizations, and cost-effectiveness.

- Describe the basic characteristics of the beneficiary population [nomads, sedentary farmers, urban poor, displaced person/refugees], and their relationships to each other. How do these factors influence the food distribution mode selected.

- Have local food preferences and food consumption patterns of the target population as well as local market prices been adequately considered in the choice of commodities and the selection of distribution systems?

- Were necessary complementary inputs [i.e., seeds, vaccines, materials, technical assistance] incorporated into the food emergency program?

- To what extent have participation of beneficiaries and utilization of local organizational structures/resources been built into the project design?

- How were costs a factor in the design of the program?

- Have provisions for termination of emergency food aid and/or transition to rehabilitation and longer-term development been foreseen during the planning stages?

- Have linkages with regular food aid programs and other complementary resources been explored?

F. Management, Monitoring and Evaluation

- Did the host government, USAID, the PVOs, and local community groups organize themselves effectively to manage the emergency? Discuss in terms of relief planning, organization, resource allocation, post-crisis rehabilitation, and longer term sustainability.

- What systems are in place for effective commodity accountability and program monitoring? Describe the information generated, costs, manpower, etc.

- What are the respective roles of the host government, USAID, PVOs, community groups?

- How can management, monitoring and evaluation be improved?

G. Timeliness of Emergency Response

- Discuss the effectiveness and quantify the exact time frames for the following:

  - needs assessment and project design;
  - approval process;
  - procurement of commodities;
  - delivery of commodities to the country;
  - internal distribution of food to the target population;
  - arrival of technical assistance.

- Describe constraints and how they were overcome. Suggest ways of expediting these procedures in the future. How can the private sector be used more effectively in the movement of food commodities?

- If food commodities did arrive late, were appropriate actions taken to avoid disincentive effects on local production and marketing?

H. Program Results

To the extent possible, and taking into account the constraints inherent in disaster situations, the evaluation team will present evidence of the effectiveness/impact of emergency interventions in terms of:

- Targeting: to what extent are the areas and/or victims with greatest need being reached?

- Coverage: what percent of the affected population is being assisted [by U.S., by other donors]?

- Increased availability of food in target areas and consumption by vulnerable groups.

- Incentive/disincentive effects on agricultural production/prices/incomes.

- Improved nutritional and health status of target groups.

- Decreased infant and child mortality.

- Demographic effects: population movements to centers and urban areas, age/sex distribution, etc.

- Dependency/Self reliance: Have relief programs weakened the self help capacity of individuals and community groups? How can programs be better organized to reempower individuals and strengthen local decision-making and resource generation/ productivity?

- Policy and institutional reform: How has the emergency affected ongoing food strategy plans and price restructuring efforts? How has the emergency intervention strengthened the capacity of the government to respond more effectively to future emergencies?

I. Policy Issues

The following issues are complex and deserving of separate studies in themselves. Yet they are extremely important in thinking about programming options and provide a useful backdrop for discussions. As appropriate, the team should address these concerns in the context of recommendations for program improvement/redesign and lessons learned:

- Relative effectiveness [impact and costs] of various distribution modes [community free distribution, MCH supplementary feeding programs, food for work, monetization, triangular transactions, rehabilitation activities, etc.] and consideration of alternative distribution mechanisms.

- Comparative advantage and cost-effectiveness of different food distribution channels [WFP, PVOs, host governments] and criteria for selecting among them.

- Linkages with regular food aid programs and other development assistance activities.

- How food emergency programs can be planned to support sector and macro-economic policy reforms, strengthen food self-reliance, disaster prevention and longer term development initiatives.

- Criteria for determining when and how emergency programs should be phased in and out?

- Opportunities and constraints presented by the "chronic food emergency syndrome" with regard to funding mechanisms, multi-year planning, program design, conditionality requirements, etc.

Evaluation Approach and Duration

All team members will meet in Washington, D.C. during the first week of the assessment to review and clarify the scope of work, develop field protocols for site visits and interviews with local officials and program participants, and hold discussions with key AID, USDA, State, OMB and PVO officials.

After this pre-field analysis is completed, the study teams will proceed to the country to carry out field investigations, reviewing additional documentation, interviewing key U.S. Mission, host government, PVO and other donor officials and inspecting appropriate field sites. Specific attention should be devoted to capturing the perceptions of program participants, either through structured interviews or informal conversations in their own language. The field work will be carried out in approximately 18 working days per team member. If feasible, country studies should be scheduled in an iterative manner so that the approach can be tested and refined throughout the evaluation process.

Upon return from the field, each team will review its findings and prepare a draft country report. When all the country studies have been completed, Mission comments received, and the final reports prepared, the Contractor's core technical staff will prepare a synthesis of findings and recommendations, drawing out lessons learned about what works, doesn't work and why, from both the operational and policy perspective.

USAIDs would be expected to collect all existing data and reports, and other relevant records for the team before their arrival. In those instances where in-house or local contractor capability were available, AID Missions might conduct interviews with program participants in advance of the team's arrival. To the extent possible, USAIDs should provide logistic support for the team while in-country.

V. Country Selection

Up to four countries will be selected on the basis of data availability, mix of distribution mechanisms and implementing organizations, type of beneficiary population, and government approaches/policies. The receptivity of USAIDs/host governments, the ease of travel and the representativeness of the emergency situation should also be taken into account. Because of the difficulty in operationalizing concepts such as "recovery", "rehabilitation", and "transition from relief to long-term development", the selection of programs and countries

is critical to capturing the range of existing or potential experience.

VI. Team Composition and Level of Effort

In conducting these country assessments the contractor will provide at least three specialists per country. Given the range of skills required to carry out this scope of work and the short time frame, the background of these specialists will vary according to the case in question, but must include all of the following areas of expertise:

- language skills and country-specific experience.
- agricultural economics
- public health/nutrition
- social anthropology
- food logistics
- policy analysis/program design/evaluation

At least one of the team members, most probably the team leader, will be on the Contractor's core technical staff. While continuity in the evaluation team is assumed, it is not essential for the same consultants to go to all countries.

VII. Reports

The team will submit a report on each country study as well as a synthesis containing an analysis of those factors that appear to determine program effectiveness, recommendations on how AID can improve its programming of emergency food aid, and lessons learned. Before departure from each country the team will have engaged all concerned parties [AID, WFP, other donors, host country, PVOs] in a dialogue concerning their findings and recommendations. The draft country reports are due in AID/W no later than two weeks after each team has returned to the U.S. Five copies will be delivered. Missions will be asked to complete their reviews and respond with comments by cable within two weeks of receiving the draft. The final report [including an executive summary and synthesis of findings, recommendations and lessons learned] will then be prepared and ready for print within two weeks of receiving all Mission comments. Ten copies of this report will be delivered. Any translation of the report will be the Missions' responsibility.

ANNEX 2

Executive Summaries

A. Sudan

B. Mali

C. Chad

A. Sudan

EVALUATION

OF THE

AFRICAN EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 1984-85

SUDAN

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(No. 5)

November 1985

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. Purpose, Scope and Methodology: The Evaluation Was Designed to Bring Out Practical Suggestions for Future Action

The principal purposes of the Sudan evaluation were to: assess the timeliness, appropriateness and impact of the 1984-85 food emergency assistance efforts; recommend measures to improve future US emergency food assistance and disaster relief programs; and consider measures to improve the design of emergency food programs in Africa to relate them more closely to national food strategies, including rehabilitation and longer-term development.

The generic scope of the evaluation (see Annex 1) illustrates the many issues considered during the course of the preparation, field work and writing of the evaluation report.

Methodologically, the Team depended upon secondary source review, interviews and observations, both in Washington, DC and in Sudan.

B. The 1984-85 Food Emergency in Sudan Took Place in a Very Difficult Setting with Important Constraints

Sudan, a huge underdeveloped country, was ill-equipped to respond to major food emergencies. The size of the US east of the Mississippi, Sudan has a population of 21.5 million. Its literacy rate is only 15 percent (25 percent males and 5 percent females). Sudan's climate is difficult. In the past few years, it has led directly to lack of adequate food supplies in vulnerable regions of the country.

Extremely weak communications and transport are major barriers to development and to emergency responses. It has only 1,396 miles of paved road--Washington, DC has 1,100 miles--and a system of unpaved roads and marked tracks, much of which is impassible in the rainy season (June through September).

Deeply in debt (about US$ 9.0 billion), Sudan has faced an acute shortage of foreign exchange during the last few years. Exports were down 50 percent in 1985. Inflation has been about 15 percent annually for the last four or five years. The Government of Sudan's (GOS) financial condition has not been good.

The GOS has been weak and unstable. (There was a political coup on April 7, 1985.) This and some civil disorder hindered its ability to respond to development and emergency needs. Moreover, the management and administrative capability of the GOS has been inadequate to deal effectively with the problems of such a vast, poor nation. Recent decentralization increased the difficulty of Central Government coordination with the Regional Governments.

C. The 1984-85 Food Emergency Was Severe

The 1984-85 crop year was the fourth year of a drought that grew in severity each year. In 1981-82, food grain production (sorghum, millet and wheat) was 63 percent of the good 1980-81 crop year, 1982-83 food grain production was only 57 percent of 1980-81; in 1983-84 it was 40 percent of the 1980-81 level. (See Figure 4.) In the 1984-85 period, estimates by USAID of the "at risk" population seriously suffering from lack of food moved from 1.0 million to 6.0 to 9.0 million people. (See Figure 5.) The rural population was particularly vulnerable to food shortages going into the fourth year of the drought.

This was an unusual circumstance for Sudan which, in normal years, is a food surplus country with exports of sorghum. It had not had a continuing drought of major magnitude for 20 to 25 years. As a result, there were no early warning systems, food emergency pre-planning units or other famine relief mechanisms in place with past drought experience.

D. The US (and Others) Undertook a Massive Effort to Feed Those Affected by the Drought

The 1984-85 emergency food problem in Sudan constantly increased until a truly massive effort had been undertaken. In March 1984, USAID alerted AID/W to the emergency food problem. In June 1984, USAID requested 67,000 MT of Title II emergency food. By March 1985, just ten months later, USAID's total requests for emergency food amounted to 837,000 MT--817,000 MT of sorghum for general feeding and 20,000 MT of supplemental feeding food. AID/W approvals followed a similar pattern, rising from 82,000 MT in September 1984 to 507,000 MT in April 1985. In addition, AID/W approved Title I shipments of 315,000 MT in FY 1985 to meet urban food needs.

Coordination with other donors led to the US taking responsibility for the food emergency in the Kordofan and Darfur regions in the West where a large portion of the at risk population was located. USAID's goal for its emergency food assistance effort was to feed an adequate ration to all those at risk in their villages in a timely manner. Its strategy was to pre-position food near those at risk prior to the beginning of the rainy season in June 1985, using a private sector trucking contract, the Sudanese Railroad Corporation (SRC), and PVOs (CARE and Save the Children UK) to transport and distribute the food. GOS involvement was limited to the provision of a contracting mechanism for private sector transport and counterpart funds to finance that transport. At the local level, village leaders were depended upon to allocate food.

E. Evaluation Results: While AID's Food Emergency Assistance Effort Made a Critical Difference for Millions of Hungry People, It Could Have Had Even Greater Impact and Been More Cost Effective

AID's emergency food assistance made a critical difference in the lives of millions of Sudanese who, in 1984-85, did not have enough to eat. A massive program undertaken in a country where food emergencies are infrequent, USAID's effort deserves much praise for having overcome many major constraints as the emergency situation unfolded. As a result, over 1.0 million MT of emergency food was brought into Sudan and sold in urban areas or distributed to rural people, some in very inaccessible areas. Many, many lives were saved and much suffering was alleviated by this food assistance. Overall, AID undertook a large job and did it very well under the circumstances.

The Evaluation Team's main task was to determine how such an immense emergency food assistance undertaking could be done even better if there is a next time in Sudan or elsewhere. This required a review of achievement and shortfall and a sharp eye for ways to improve upon past performance. This bias toward improvement should not detract from the major services achieved by AID in Sudan in 1984-85.

AID's emergency food assistance program did not achieve its goal fully as to quantity of food distributed, its timeliness, or its appropriateness. Its program could have had even more impact and been more cost effective had timing, management, preparation for unforeseen events, and impact been dealt with more successfully. Lessons learned in these areas can fruitfully be applied in dealing with Sudan's 1986 food emergency.

1. Timing--The 1984-85 emergency food program was not carried out in a timely manner.

a. Findings

- In particular, AID was unable to pre-position needed food prior to the rainy season. This led directly to USAID having to move large quantities of food in the rainy season, an extremely difficult task, and to serious delays and shortfalls in getting food to needy people;

- AID's request-approval cycle did shorten during the 1984-85 period, but it still took nearly 12 months between the time of each USAID request and the time when full distribution of the approved emergency food was made in Sudan. (See Figure 6.); and

- The timeliness of the overall emergency food effort was diminished because other donors, international agencies or the GOS could not do their planned and agreed upon share on time.

b. Conclusions

- The timeliness of AID's emergency food assistance in Sudan can be improved, especially by pre-planning, earlier needs assessment, development of a planned critical path (action plan), pre-positioning food prior to the rainy season and effective donor coordination; and

- AID's problems in resolving the timeliness issue lessened the positive impact of emergency food because it decreased the overall volume distributed when needed, resulted in less food getting to people in difficult to reach areas, and slowed the initiation of supplemental feeding and health activities.

c. Recommendations

- Timeliness should be at or near the top of AID's priority list when dealing with the 1986 food emergency because it is central to effective program impact. It should be improved for AID and the GOS through: pre-planning; earlier and more detailed planning, including donor coordination, at the first sign of a food emergency; and pre-positioning of food in at risk areas prior to the rainy season. GOS capability to carry out early warning and pre-planning activities should be strengthened; and

- Within AID, timeliness should be improved by making key decisions quickly. A separate AID emergency decision/action track should be established to achieve this.

2. Management--Emergency food assistance program management by USAID and AID/W was good given the circumstances, but it could be improved.

a. Findings

- The food emergency in Sudan was an unplanned, complex and chaotic problem situation requiring quick and decisive action to be solved. It was particularly amenable to the application of good management practices and experienced personnel;

- USAID management was by a small cadre of existing Mission personnel who had no experience in implementing emergency food programs;

- AID's normal management system did not allow sufficient flexibility and speed to deal with the emergency successfully;

- The bulk of AID's efforts to coordinate with other donors took place at the country level, a tactic that burdened USAID

with primary coordinating responsibility, even though most of the decisions by other donors and international agencies were made in their own capital cities;

- o USAID's use of the private sector, local governments and PVOs to help manage and implement parts of the program was successful; and

- o USAID did not try to link the food emergency with long-term development activities in a substantial way.

b. Conclusions

- o AID management of the Sudan food emergency could have been improved by using sufficient experienced personnel and a more flexible, speedy decision-making process;

- o The performance of other donors and international agencies was an important determinant of AID's overall success and too much responsibility for ensuring it was left to USAID/Sudan;

- o The strategy of using the private sector, local governments and PVOs by USAID was effective and would have worked even better but for the rainy season. It resulted in important side effects--increased private sector, PVO and local government activity and strengthening, as well as development of capacity in indigenous individuals assisting in the feeding programs; and

- o The lack of linkage between the food emergency and longer-term development led to very late rehabilitation responses (such as provision of sorghum seed) despite in situ feeding.

c. Recommendations

- o AID/W should refine its management of food emergencies in Sudan and stop trying to get by with existing management personnel, practices and systems. It should focus, via an early-on management review, upon the sufficiency and experience of management personnel and adequacy of intended management practices in each food emergency;

- o AID should provide sufficient experienced personnel to USAID/Sudan when it must deal with food emergencies. A computerized AID roster from which such personnel in the agency could be drawn should be developed;

- o AID/W should take major responsibility for the coordination of donors and international agencies involved in assisting Sudan with its food emergency in 1986;

- o USAID should extend and improve its strategy of using the private sector, local governments and PVOs to help manage and implement its emergency food program in 1986; and

- o USAID should plan its emergency food assistance in 1986 in the context of longer-term development from the very beginning. Particular attention should be given to FFW and the long-run issue of whether people should be encouraged to remain in the arid North.

3. Impact--The 1984-85 emergency food assistance made a critical difference for beneficiaries, but food arrived later than needed and in insufficient amounts to meet minimum needs.

   a. Findings

- o Sudan was already experienced in handling Title I and III assistance which readily expanded to meet the needs of city dwellers during the 1984-85 drought;

- o Rural people got too little food to meet their needs and did not get it when needed. Those in easy to reach areas got more food sooner than those in inaccessible areas;

- o The program, by November 1985, had reached even remote villages with some food. Reaching some of these villages during the rainy season was possible only by helicopter;

- o Inadequate data was available--especially longitudinal data--to enable rigorous assessment of program impacts;

- o To stay alive, people used many different strategies. They ate famine foods, sold all their jewelry, cattle and farm implements and purchased food in urban areas, sent household members to town to work so they could buy food, depended on their extended families for food handouts, lived temporarily with extended family members to get food or migrated to towns or camps where food was more available;

- o As the 1985 drought year drew to a close, most people seriously affected by the drought had exhausted their reserves--jewelry, seed stocks, extended family welcome, famine foods and in many cases, their own nutritional status. The extent of their 1984-85 harvest plus emergency food supplies will determine how they fare in 1986;

- o With the advent of rehabilitation efforts, a better 1984-85 crop and some people still in need of food, Food for Work programs by PVOs could be initiated. Numerous FFW projects would be consonant with AID's long-term development program;

- General feeding was not programmed jointly with supplemental feeding or health inputs. Supplemental feeding was initiated late in the 1984-85 period and health inputs never were introduced in a serious way, amounting to only two cents per person in the serious at risk category;

- Monetization of Title II did not work well because of lack of distribution and financial controls which led to diversions of free distribution food from other rural beneficiaries to town markets, and lack of accountability for sale proceeds;

- The rations used were consistent with the diet of the beneficiaries;

- PVOs were important to good program impact because they effectively identified needy people and distributed food to them on a consistent basis;

- The private sector helped ensure program impact by getting major quantities of food to beneficiaries. It diminished program impact by delivering food to easy-to-reach sites first and avoiding inaccessible ones. The private sector trucking company contract, as written, allowed it to operate in this way; and

- Rural people did stay in their villages, and the emergency food program contributed substantially to the achievement of that result.

b. Conclusions

- The food delivered to rural beneficiaries was very important and made a critical difference in keeping many of them alive and in their villages. It was not adequate to meet their entire requirement, but it met the short-run needs of many just as their other reserves were exhausted. Thus, its marginal value was extremely high;

- Beneficiaries had much deeper reserves or better traditional coping systems than anticipated. Thus, even though AID arrived late with too little food, fewer appear to have died than expected;

- Some of the at risk population needs to catch up--to overcome some of the negative impacts of inadequate food deliveries during 1984-85 and of draining down excessively on their reserves of all kinds. Supplemental feeding and FFW are appropriate mechanisms to assist in this process;

- The slow start of supplemental feeding and lack of health inputs as companions to general feeding lessened the positive

impact of the program, especially on disadvantaged groups--children, lactating mothers, and the aged;

- Targeting of particular groups in need, even during the worst of the pressure caused by the emergency, would have improved the impact of the program;

- The lack of timeliness of the program diminished its impact by reducing overall food availability when needed, precluding meeting the needs of those in inaccessible areas adequately, and delaying the introduction of supplemental feeding;

- USAID developed an appropriate ration which people were used to eating, a selection which increased the impact of the program;

- Additional data is necessary to adequately assess program impacts;

- Being fed in their villages did enable farmers to take immediate advantage of the June to September 1985 rains and re-enter economic activity quickly; and

- Management of in situ free distribution programs by PVOs and local governments in 1985 was good. This provides a basis for better targeting of beneficiaries, experimental monetization and some FFW projects. The latter would explicitly link emergency food assistance to long-term development and encourage USAID to plan accordingly.

c. Recommendations

- Improving the timeliness of food emergency assistance should be a high priority as a means for improving program impact in 1986;

- Aggressive donor coordination should be undertaken in 1986, especially by AID/W, to improve overall program impact;

- Private sector participation, while exceptional as a strategy element, should be better controlled in 1986 to enable continual targeting of the most needy by the emergency food assistance program manager;

- General and supplemental feeding and health inputs should be planned and implemented together in 1986 to increase the impact of the program on the most vulnerable and needy in the at risk population;

- Supplemental feeding should be continued in 1986 until USAID is assured that the severely at risk population being fed has sufficiently recouped its reserves, including some on-farm food stocks, to leave the at risk category;

- o PVOs should continue to be used in 1986 to distribute food as a means of ensuring good program impact;

- o In situ feeding should be continued in 1986 as a means of achieving program impact. It should be subject to careful targeting, including targeting for FFW projects run by PVOs in cooperation with village leaders that are linked directly to USAID's long-term development strategy in Sudan;

- o The attempt to monetize Title II in 1984-85 should be examined by USAID and lessons learned distilled from the experience. On the basis of the lessons learned, monetization should be experimented with again in 1986; and

- o Two studies should be undertaken in 1986. First, baselines should be set down in the areas where PVOs are to be working. Second, the phenomena of famine foods and the other traditional coping methods that allowed Sudanese to survive beyond USAID's most optimistic assessment should be studied.

4. Unforeseen situations--Numerous unanticipated events impacted upon the effectiveness of AID's emergency food program, some of which could have been better planned for and responded to.

a. Findings

- o Substantial planning went into the 1984-85 emergency food assistance effort in support of the scenario of pre-positioning the food prior to the rainy season. Little useful contingency planning was carried out. Another action plan never emerged after pre-positioning became impossible; and

- o Once pre-positioning was not possible, Murphy's Law seemed to take effect and USAID's strategy began to unravel.

b. Conclusions

- o Substantial planning was done by USAID at the beginning of the 1984-85 period. Despite this, a lot went wrong anyway, which shows that if it can go wrong it always will.

- o It would have been possible for USAID to control for some of the unforeseen events by developing contingency plans, installing better management practices, improving available information, providing extra time and funding in the program, and involving others (such as other donors, the private sector and PVOs) to share the risk of the implementation tasks;

c. Recommendations

- o USAID should develop contingency plans for key events that would substantially affect program impact in 1986 if they changed;

- o The information base for planning and decision making should be improved in critical areas--e.g., baseline nutritional status, logistics capacity;

- o A fudge factor should be applied to 1986 program areas where full contingency planning is not undertaken; and

- o Local control should be expanded whenever possible and local people/organizations given enough resources to carry out their responsibilities effectively.

5. 1986--AID's strategy for emergency food assistance in Sudan in 1986 is appropriate, but accomplishing it successfully in terms of the interests of the US and Sudanese beneficiaries will be difficult.

a. Findings

- o The US has made known to the UN and through them to the other donors that it only plans to provide up to 50 percent of the help needed in 1986;

- o There is a serious danger of repeating in 1986 one of the major causes of difficulty in 1985--i.e., not pre-positioning food before the rainy season began;

  -- First, there is lack of certainty on everyone's part about the size of the Sudanese 1985-86 harvest. This has delayed USAID and AID/W's actions in setting and approving firm food import targets; and

  -- Second, the UNEOS may not be able to find sufficient food and financing to meet its 50 percent target.

b. Conclusions

While the shift of central responsibility for emergency food assistance to the UN is appropriate, accomplishing this change successfully will require donor cooperation and early decisions about Sudan's emergency food needs in 1986. The UN also must carry out its role and share of the 1986 activities effectively or the US will have to come back into the situation in a major way or stand by while a large number of Sudan's poorest face food emergency conditions without help;

- The US role in assisting the UN to be successful in Sudan will be central to the success of its own strategy for dealing with the anticipated 1986 food emergency; and

- The inability, technically, to resolve the extent of each annual harvest before the harvest is in creates intense timing problems in Sudan's food emergency assistance implementation because donors are unwilling to make decisions based on incomplete crop information.

c. Recommendations

- AID should prepare a time phased action plan immediately to successfully deliver, before the rainy season in June, the "up to 50 percent" of the food needs the US has indicated it is prepared to provide in 1986;

- AID/W should approve as soon as possible the PVO programs for 1986 already submitted by USAID;

- AID/W should consider without delay the USAID proposal to turn over to the WFP the 100,000 MT of Title II sorghum sent out under the 1984-85 program;

  -- If it approves, it should work with UN headquarters to assure that the funding necessary to distribute the sorghum is made available to WFP; and

  -- If AID/W does not transfer the sorghum, it should be used for feeding with any excess pre-positioned prior to the rainy season;

- The UNEOS in New York should be urged to develop immediately a time phased action plan to obtain its 50 percent of 1986 emergency food needs from other donors. AID/W and State, through appropriate diplomatic channels. should help the UNEOS persuade major donors to respond adequately and in a timely fashion;

- USAID should work with the GOS and UNEOS to produce, by the end of December 1985, agreed upon crop estimates, and a firm recommendation on local purchase of sorghum, or any appropriate variation--for example, the appropriate mix of sorghum and millet; and

- The UNEOS and USAID should start now to develop an operational rehabilitation/long-term development plan for 1986.

E. Generic Principles for Planning and Implementing Emergency Food Programs

Box 1 presents tentative generic principles for planning and implementing emergency food assistance efforts. They are drawn from the Sudanese context.

Box 1: Generic Principles for Planning and Implementing Emergency Food Programs

1. Pre-planning is Crucial--Once an Emergency is Evident There is Never Enough Time to Prepare
2. Timing is Everything--Decisions Should be Made Early and be Definitive
3. Information is Always Insufficient--Decide Anyway
4. Adequacy is Central--Be Sure Not to Under Resource
5. Flexibility is Necessary--Do Not be Afraid to Try a New Approach
6. Emergencies Take Place in Longer-Term Development Context--Account for It
7. The Government May Not Provide the Best Implementing Agency--Try the Private Sector
8. General and Supplementary Feeding and Health Inputs Go Together--Package Them Appropriately
9. Droughts have Stages--Plan and Implement Accordingly
10. Even Best Efforts Sometimes Fail--Have a Back Up Plan
11. Impact is Ephemeral--Monitor and Evaluate It Carefully
12. Management is Fundamental--Be Sure It Sparkles

B. Mali

EVALUATION

OF THE

AFRICAN FOOD ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 1984-1985

MALI

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February 1986

A. Purpose, Scope and Methodology--The Evaluation Was Designed to Bring Out Practical Suggestions for Future Action

The purposes of the evaluation were to: analyze the impact, timeliness and appropriateness of emergency food aid efforts in Mali in 1984-1985; from this analysis derive and recommend practical measures to improve future programming and impact; and at the same time, consider ways to program emergency food aid in Mali to support national food strategies, including rehabilitation and long term development.

The generic scope of the evaluation (Annex 1) illustrates the many issues considered during the course of the preparation, field work and writing of the report.

Methodologically, the Team depended upon secondary source review, interviews and observations both in Washington DC and in Mali.

B. The Country Setting: A Food Deficit Country, Drought-Prone with a Chronic Dependence on Food Aid and a Well-Established Pattern of Cooperation Among Major Donors for Food Aid

- o Mali has been dependent on imports of cereals to meet its food requirement since the early 1970s;
- o Most of the country lies in the Sahelian and Sahelian-Guinean Zones where short and highly variable rainfall results in frequent droughts and where grazing and farming are high risk occupations; and
- o Since the beginning of the decade, major donors have participated in a common project (PRMC) in which "structural" food aid is provided in exchange for policy and program measures by the Government to restructure the cereals market, improve operations of the Grain Marketing Board (OPAM) and provide increased incentives for food production.

C. The 1984-1985 Drought Was Severe.

Overall, the 1984-1985 drought was the worst of record. Famine threatened much of the rural population; the country faced the largest food grain deficit in its history. The rural population was particularly vulnerable because farm food stocks and other resources of herders and farmers were close to exhaustion after four to five successive years of drought.

Disaster areas extended to all of Regions VI and VII, most of Region V, and the northern portions of Regions I, II and III. These areas include the country's traditional breadbasket in the inner delta of the Niger river. The delta area (20,000 km^2) was affected not only by poor rainfall in the fall of 1984 but by the extremely low levels of river flooding. Region III in the favorable Sudano-Guinean rainfall belt did not suffer crop or pasture failures but a large number of migrants entered the area for food, shelter and work.

Mali as a food deficit country was not unused to the need to seek food aid to meet both its structural deficit and emergency food for free distribution. But the severity and widespread occurrence of the drought combined with the exhaustion of rural resources presented the Government with a problem of major dimensions: how to organize a massive effort for distribution in difficult-to-reach rural areas.

D. The US Focused Its Effort On Helping Mali Plan and Carry Out An Effective Program of Free Distribution in Rural Areas

The AID goal was to help the Government provide sufficient food to ensure social stability in the urban areas, to preserve the rural structure and to avoid famine among the needy. The strategy adopted by USAID was 1) to use the well established mechanism of OPAM public distribution for sales in urban markets; 2) use in-country private voluntary organizations (PVOs) to manage free distribution to needy populations in rural areas; and 3) work for close donor cooperation with the government. Specific objectives were to:

- Provide cereals to those with purchasing power at reasonable prices without disrupting the market for local production;
- Provide cereals to those without purchasing power especially in rural areas;
- Permit people to stay in their villages and grazing areas; and
- Provide sufficient food over a long enough period to enable farmers to attempt a crop in 1985.

Ensuring food supplies for the urban population even though it was swollen by migrants from the countryside was relatively easy. Mechanisms developed in prior years for distribution of commercial and food aid imports for sale were well established and reliable. US food aid for urban distribution in 1984-1985 amounted to 35,000 MT: 15,000 mt of rice under the Title II Section 206 program (FY 83-85) for structural food aid and cereal market restructuring (PRMC); 20,000 MT was rice provided under Title II and authorized for sale to help meet urban food needs and generate local currency to cover costs of the free distribution program.

Providing food for the rural areas was more difficult. It required targeting and managing distribution plans covering hundreds of thousands of persons in widely scattered, difficult-to-reach and difficult-to-supply communities. At USAID/Bamako's urging, the Government decided in the fall of 1984 to use PVOs already in country to manage distribution of government grain from OPAM warehouses to recipients. It programmed 60,000 MT for such distribution. The US provided 40,300 MT for this program as government-to-government grants. In addition, the US provided grain through Title II grants to PVOs and through its annual support to the World Food Program (WFP).

AID financed the costs of grain delivery to OPAM storage/distribution points in-country, the local currency costs of PVO grain distribution, and other non-food aid support. In all, the US provided 103,000 MT of food to Mali between November 1984 and October 1985 representing--with the non-food aid supporting component--a $46 million dollar investment, compared to an annual development program of about $15 million per year.

E. The Bottom Line

The evaluation shows that US intervention and assistance was decisive in helping Mali avert massive famine and rural exodus and. sufficient to achieve substantially the objectives cited above. Despite these achievements, there were serious shortcomings. A number of practical measures are recommended to improve the impact and cost-effectiveness of future AID food emergency programming.

F. Evaluation Results

Findings, conclusions and recommendations are presented under the headings: timing, management and impact.

1. Timing was a critical factor--not enough food was available for emergency distribution in the period March-June before the heavy rains or during the first part of the rainy season, July-September

a. Findings

- As a result of the severity of the drought and the exhaustion of village food reserves and other resources, emergency food was required throughout the northern areas starting in February-March 1985;

- Requirements for large scale emergency distribution starting in February-March 1985 were not anticipated by the GRM, the US or other donors;

- The bulk of emergency food from the US and other donors arrived for distribution starting June-July and extending through October-November 1985;

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- o Mali's National Food Security Stocks (SSN) were limited and more readily available for urban distribution (sale) than for emergency free distribution in rural areas;

- o Not enough food was available for emergency distribution to populations facing famine conditions in March-June before the heavy rains, and not enough was available and/or distributed to meet needs during the first part of the rainy season, July-September 1985.

- o Transhipments from Lomé, to Region VII in Mali via Niger, were delayed several months, March to June, by poor road conditions on the highways from Niamey to Gao and Ménaka;

- o Airlifts and other costly transport measures were required to supply Regions VI and VII during the rainy season;

- o Some areas could not be supplied during the rainy season because of impossible or difficult road conditions; and

- o It is feasible for the US and other donors to ship and deliver substantial supplies of food to Mali in the period February-May for distribution and/or prepositioning in the period March-June before the heavy rains.

b. Conclusions

- o The needs assessment system was inadequate and failed to provide the GRM and donors with the information required to plan and program timely delivery and distribution of emergency food for rural areas;

- o Costly operations to supply Region VI could have been avoided by preplanning and earlier supply; and

- o The expensive Gao ferry operation could have been avoided by early arrangements to repair the Ansongo-Gao highway at much less cost; early repairs of the roads from Niamey to Gao and to Menaka would have expedited deliveries of badly needed grain from Lomé in March to June.

- o The action by AID in October 1985 to augment SSN stocks for emergency distribution in Regions VI and VII was a positive step;

- o As a general rule, in Mali, and in the Sahel, food aid for free distribution in rural areas can be supplied most cost-effectively by delivery for prepositioning and distribution in the period March-June.

c. Recommendations

- In the event of severe drought and emergency food aid needs, for more timely and cost effective programs, AID should ship the bulk of its food aid for free distribution in rural areas in February to May for delivery and pre-positioning/ distribution in March to June before the onset of the rainy season;

- AID should join other donors to help the Government maintain its national food stocks in readiness and to make them readily available for free distribution as well as for sale when needed; and

- In the event of a food emergency affecting Region VII, the US should be prepared to assist in emergency early repairs to highways linking Niamey with Ménaka and Gao to permit heavy truck traffic from African ports of Cotonou, Lomé and Tema during the dry season.

2. Management was the critical issue in the 1984-1985 US program: The issue was how to manage effectively emergency distributions for hundreds of thousands of families in thousands of isolated communities

a. Findings

- The critical problem facing AID and the GRM was that of managing free food distribution for hundreds of thousands of farmers facing famine conditions in thousands of isolated communities;

- USAID played a decisive role in helping Mali address this critical management problem. USAID's organization and planning resulted in a US program effectively targeted to help significantly relieve the threat of famine for several hundred thousand rural families;

- PVO programs of local distribution in 1984-1985 were well executed; distributions were well targeted on needy persons in hard hit areas. Losses and misuse of food were small;

- Beneficiaries of emergency distributions were often unaware of GRM planning and purposes. Local and district governments were not involved sufficiently in planning and carrying out the program;

- The needs assessment system failed to provide the GRM, AID or other donors with the information needed to plan, organize and manage the program for maximum and cost-effective impact;

- o USAID had only limited management resources available to plan and carry out a major disaster relief program. Personnel had to be diverted from development activities. USAID management could have been improved by use of experienced personnel earlier in the planning cycle;

- o REDSO FFP staff was fully occupied with managing transhipments from West African ports to Mali and other Sahelian countries and was unable to provide guidance or assistance; and

- o Efforts of donors for free distribution were not fully coordinated. In particular, planning for emergency distribution in disaster areas (i.e., administrative cercles) was largely ad hoc and uncoordinated.

b. Conclusions

- o The strategy of using PVOs to manage local distributions was effective but tended to by-pass local government and local institutions;

- o An improved needs assessment system is a critical requirement for management of improving emergency food and disaster relief programs in Mali;

- o Increased access by USAID to experienced personnel to design and manage emergency food programs will improve program impact and cost effectivness and help USAIDs maintain management on-going development activities;

- o REDSO palyed a valuable and strategic role in coordinating and expediting transhipments of food aid. Increased availability of REDSO staff to provide advice and guidance to USAIDs would help improve management of US food emergency programs in Mali (and West Africa); and

- o Closer donor-GRM cooperation could have avoided some duplication of effort and provided better integration of resources to meet emergency food and other disaster relief needs.

c. Recommendations

- o USAID and the GRM should in the future design emergency food aid programs to utilize the capabilities and local knowledge of regional, district and local institutions/authorities to help plan and carry out the program, with assistance and guidance from PVOs;

- o AID and USAID should give high priority to help Mali improve its system of needs assessment. (See Chapter III for detailed recommendations.)

- o AID should gear up to provide experienced personnel to assist Sahel AID Missions in food emergency and disaster relief planning and programming. Such personnel should be available early in the planning cycle; a computerized AID roster of such personnel should be prepared. Indefinite Quantity Contracts to provide such personnel from the private sector when needed should be negotiated;

- o AID should test the option of shipment and transhipment by "through bills of lading" (using bulk shipments with bagging on arrival at West African port) as a means of: (a) transferring the work of transhipments from REDSO to the private sector; (b) reducing delays and costs; and (c) enabling REDSO personnel to provide guidance and assistance to West Africa, Mali and other Missions;

3. Impact: The US program was decisive in helping Mali avert massive rural famine and exodus; but not enough food was made available to those in need.

a. Findings

- o The system for supplying food aid through commercial markets worked well to meet the needs of urban dwellers;

- o Commercial marketing was important in helping meet needs of migrants from rural areas;

- o Monetization of Title II food grain worked well to augment supplies for urban consumers and migrants to the cities and to generate local currencies to cover costs of free distribution;

- o Needs for emergency distribution in rural areas were grossly underestimated by the GRM, the FAO/Multidonor mission and donors;

- o Data, particularly longitudinal data was not available to permit a rigorous assessment of impact;

- o Emergency food supplies were not programmed in time;

- o Supplemental feeding of vulnerable populations was ad hoc and insufficient;

- o US food was effectively targeted. Rations were appropriate and sizeable enough to make a significant contribution to relieving the threat of famine. Free distribution of US food reached several hundred thousand families, an estimated two million persons;

- o US food did enable rural dwellers to remain in their villages and grazing areas and did enable many farmers to plant a new crop in 1985;

- o The US effort accounted for about half the free distribution program carried out by the CNAVS and PVOs with donor assistance;

- o The US helped Mali establish an effective system of Cholera control and treatment. US participation or support of other health efforts (vaccination programs) was minimal;

- o The US financed important studies to assess the drought situation in the country and forecast the agricultural situation in 1985-1986; and

- o Only limited resources for rehabilitation and recovery were programmed in 1984-1985. Food for Work (FFW) program support was largely limited to US donations to WFP.

b. Conclusions

- o US and other donor response was effective in meeting needs of urban dwellers;

- o Monetization of Title II sales was an appropriate and useful technique to augment urban supplies, help meet needs of migrants to the cities and generate local resources to cover costs of free distribution;

- o Because of the inadequate system of needs assessment, the GRM and other donors grossly underestimated needs for emergency free distributions and the urgency to supply rural areas much sooner;

- o However, US and other donor emergency food aid did enable the CNAVS and PVOs to distribute significant supplies of food to rural populations which were critically important in relieving famine;

- o There is no way to calculate the impact of shortcomings in the program. Overall, however, the goal and objectives of the program were essentially met;

- o As noted under the section on timeliness, US emergency food programs in Mali and in other Sahel countries will have more impact and be more cost effective when programmed for arrival in the period February-May for distribution and planned prepositioning in the period March-June;

- o In Mali and in other Sahel countries, supplemental feeding should be programmed as a matter of standard procedure to accompany programs of emergency distributions in order to protect vulnerable populations and reduce immediate suffering and long-term irreversible effects of malnutrition among the very young;

- o A more cohesive program of studies is needed to illuminate the problems and potentials of drought-prone areas in Mali; and

- o Programming for recovery and rehabilitation should be carried out during the emergency relief phase of emergency food distribution programs and not be delayed or put off until the end of the emergency relief effort. Important opportunities exist for FFW programs in the drought-prone areas.

c. Recommendations[1]

- o For more effective programs, the US should work with the GRM and other donors to respond earlier and to achieve timely delivery of food aid for emergency distribution in rural areas (as opposed to commercial distributions of food aid which can be programmed uniformly throughout the year);

- o As a standard operating procedure, the US should design emergency food aid programs in Mali to include supplementary feeding programs in cooperation with other donors and PVOs. The operations manual should be revised accordingly;

- o AID and USAID/Bamako should support with other donors a more comprehensive GRM program of studies designed to increase knowledge of local conditions facing populations in drought prone areas and opportunities for local development and drought proofing. Such studies should be seen as an integral part of a system of planning for drought.

- o AID should revise its guidance and operational manuals to clarify understanding that short-term food emergencies are not simply episodes spanning nine months but normally involve recovery and rehabilitation efforts extending at least through the following year, which should be planned for as soon as possible and during the relief operations;

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[1]An attempt has been made to avoid repetition of recommendations derived from the sections on timing and on management; for example, the recommendation for overhauling the needs assessment system of Mali.

- o AID and USAID/Bamako should support multi-year food for work programs in Region VI and other drought-prone areas to be managed with the assistance of PVOs in close collaboration with the Governors and cercle administrators.

F. General Recommendations for Planning and Implementing Emergency Food Assistance Programs in Mali to Relate Them More Closely to National Food Strategies Including Rehabilitation and Development

- o View the emergency as a disruption in the development process; design the emergency food assistance or drought relief program to help the country move back to the development track;

- o Design the emergency food assistance and drought relief programs to assist affected populations recover from the disaster/emergency as soon as possible;

- o Use the experience to improve development programming: to increase practical knowledge about local conditions, needs for rehabilitation, drought-proofing possibilities, and local development potential;

- o Build efficient/effective systems for drought detection and needs assessment. Note that basic data food needs assessment (crop yields, acreages, production, food consumption, stocks and nutritional status) are also essential for development planning and programming;

- o Design emergency food assistance and drought relief programs to reinforce institution building (national, regional, district) and local/popular participation in relief, rehabilitation and development;

- o Integrate rehabilitation and recovery programs with local and regional development programs and plans;

- o Design emergency food assistance and drought relief programs to support private sector development, including the development of local private voluntary organizations; and

- o Ensure that the national food and development strategy is properly addressing the problem of "drought prone" areas and of drought-proofing such areas through appropriate structural and other adjustments in food and agricultural production and marketing.

C. Chad

EVALUATION

OF THE

AFRICAN EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 1984-1985

CHAD

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March 1986

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. Purpose, Scope and Methodology: The Evaluation Was Designed to Bring Out Practical Suggestions for Future Action

The principal purposes of the evaluation were to: assess the timeliness, appropriateness and impact of the 1984-85 food emergency assistance efforts in Chad; recommend measures to improve future US emergency food assistance and disaster relief programs in Chad; consider measures to improve the design of emergency food programs in Africa to relate them more closely to national food strategies, including rehabilitation and longer term development.

The generic scope of the evaluation (see Annex 1) illustrates the many issues dealt with during the course of the preparation, field work and writing of the evaluation report.

Methodologically, the Team depended upon secondary source review, interviews and observations, both in Washington, D.C. and Chad.

B. The 1984-85 Food Emergency in Chad Took Place in a Very Challenging Setting With Important Constraints

- Chad is a large landlocked, underdeveloped country that was badly equipped to respond to a serious food emergency on its own.
- Communications were a major problem and the transport network was extremely weak. Both constituted important barriers to Chad's development and food emergency responses.
- Chad's financial and economic situation was very difficult, leaving little capacity to meet emergency requirements.
- Politically, although the situation in 1984-85 improved compared to earlier years, substantial uncertainty remained.

C. The 1984-85 Drought Was Severe

Estimates by the FAO/WFP assessment mission in late 1984[1] put the Chadian population seriously suffering from lack of food at about 1.5 million people, with 500,000 people displaced. The rural population had experienced four poor rainy seasons and, by late 1984, four inadequate harvests.

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[1]FAO, Evaluation de la Situation de l'Alimentation de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage au Tchad, OSRO Rapport No. 03/85/F (Rome: FAO, Novembre, 1985).

Cereal production in the Sahelien Zone of Chad dropped steadily from an average for 1976-78 of 220,000 MT to a record low in 1984 of 82,000 MT, or 37 percent of the 1976-78 average. Production in 1984 in the Sudanian Zone was somewhat better, but reached only 86 percent of the 1976-78 average. Civil strife and a scorched earth policy also left many homeless and hungry, unable to benefit from their land.

D. The US and Other Donors Undertook a Massive Effort to Feed Those Affected By Famine in 1984-85.

Emergency food aid pledged for 1984-85 amounted to 210,000 MT. This was more than emergency food aid from all sources for the three previous years. Food and other emergency assistance actually provided totaled $113 million. Total development assistance for all donors was an additional $90 million, with France providing 37 percent.

Emergency food aid distributed during 1984-85 was 126,828 MT (60 percent of the amount pledged). This was more than double the total distributed for the two previous years combined. Of the total 210,000 MT pledged, some 75,000 MT or 36 percent was of US origin. Other major donors were France, EEC, Italy, Germany, Switzerland and Saudi Arabia. About 75 percent of total emergency food aid was delivered to the North and 25 percent to the South.

AID's emergency food sales program in Ndjamena and later in some of the provincial cities via the National Cereals Office (ONC) provided funds (some 2.0 billion CFA francs or US $5.7 million equivalent) to help run the emergency food assistance program.

In the fall of 1985, there were 104 expatriates and 535 Chadians working directly on emergency assistance programs supported by international organizations, bilateral donors and PVOs.

E. External Assistance Was More Effective Because of the Success of the Coordinating Mechanism Used.

An effective operational level coordination mechanism was put in place by the GOC with the strong support of the World Food Program (WFP), USAID and the United Nations Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO). It provided for action committees at the national and prefecture levels chaired by the Government with full membership of donors and PVOs active in the emergency food assistance program. Distribution committees were also set up at the sub-prefecture and the canton levels where major distributions were to take place. These committees, utilizing mobile evaluation teams, determined priorities and worked out problems that arose concerning food distribution.

A special ministry was established in 1983 to oversee the operation of the emergency food programs. Called the Ministry for Control of Natural Disasters (Ministère de la Lutte Contre les Calamités Naturelles) or MLCCN, it chaired the National Action

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Committee in Ndjamena. Thus, the Government of Chad maintained policy control of the emergency food assistance effort.

F. Evaluation Results: Overall, the 1984-85 Emergency Food Assistance Program Was Carried Out Effectively, but There Were Shortcomings That Reduced the Impact and Cost-Effectiveness of the Effort

AID's emergency food assistance effort in Chad was of critical significance to hundreds of thousands of Chadians who did not have enough food to eat. The efforts of those in the GOC, AID and other organizations to initiate and carry out the emergency program were, in many ways, extraordinary and are to be commended. However, this evaluation is intended to identify both achievements and shortfalls so that the latter can be corrected and food emergencies dealt with even more successfully in the future.

1. Timing: The failure to have sufficient food in the right place at the right time diluted the effectiveness of the generally successful effort.

The timing problems experienced by the GOC, AID and other donors are attributable to several factors. First, almost no early warning or emergency preparedness planning capability existed, even though 1984 followed three earlier drought years. Second, no one prepared contingency plans for a worst case scenario under which Chad would have another bad harvest year. Third, when the 1984 rains did fail, donors followed their customary practice (given the lack of early warning and pre-agreed emergency preparedness actions) of waiting until harvest data in October/November were in hand before declaring an emergency. Fourth, once a major emergency was declared, there were few mechanisms (PVOs, etc.) sufficiently committed and prepared to distribute the amount of food needed. As a result, responses to the food emergency were slow. Fifth, these four factors combined with the scarcity of food in the country in late 1984 and early 1985, resulting in November 1984 to March 1985 emergency food distributions that were only 50 percent of the minimum amounts needed. However, despite this slow start, a substantial portion (71 percent) of the estimated emergency food required by July 1985 was distributed prior to the 1985 rainy season.

The severe food shortages and lack of rain in mid-1984 triggered substantial movement of rural Chadians in search of food by October/November 1984. When it realized the magnitude of this movement, the GOC initiated policies and actions to curb it, assisted by PVOs, WFP, USAID and other donors. These efforts included evacuation of people from the environs of Ndjamena, the establishment of interim food distribution points on main routes to the capital, and the initiation of resettlement efforts and more in situ feeding. By December 1984, these efforts had eliminated most spontaneous camps, but continued food shortages resulted in still more people migrating to resettlement areas.

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The early warning system and emergency preparedness planning in Chad should be strengthened to help avoid the problems that occurred in 1984-85. USAID's planned financing of a Food Early Warning System (FEWS) should be supported and an early warning system manager ought to be appointed by the GOC.

To help deal with the problem of late arrival of food when drought years occur in succession, the GOC and donors should agree upon "at risk" criteria which would trigger food call forwards prior to or at the time the rains fail, rather than when the extent of the harvest is know with substantial certainty.

WFP and CARE headquarters should review their procedures together with AID to identify ways to shorten the time they need to act upon requests from their field offices.

2. Management: The GOC, USAID, other donors and PVOS managed their portions of the emergency food assistance effort well under difficult circumstances, but problems did arise that reduced the effectiveness of their efforts.

As the 1984-85 crisis emerged, USAID and other donors realized that the GOC would need help in dealing with it effectively. The GOC and the donors agreed to use the UN/WFP and PVOs to implement the emergency food program. The GOC, with the strong support of the WFP, established and controlled a network of action committees in which donors and PVOs were full members at the national, prefecture (state) and local levels. These committees were effective in resolving issues, organizing food distribution and generally ensuring better management of emergency food assistance activities. GOC involvement in food emergencies should be expanded by building on its role in managing these committees.

The logistics management of the program was good, especially key actions such as the construction of the Bailey Bridge and sharply increasing food arrivals from Douala when Nigeria closed its borders. The regional logistical bases also were important to the success of the effort. The operation of these bases should continue and their services should be enhanced to cover recurrent costs. Truck fleet expansion was achieved, but not all the trucks brought into Chad served well in its rough terrain. Also, some delays in ordering trucks and lack of spare parts created extra expenses and diminished the timeliness of logistics support.

The US emergency food sales program succeeded in Chad and caused other donors to use the same mechanism in support of the overall effort. These programs, or a Title II Section 206 program, should be used to provide needed local currency for Food for Work and other development efforts in 1986.

The provision of personnel and transport by AID in support of emergency activities was slowed by headquarters deliberations. More delegation of authority should be given to USAID to reduce this delay.

3. Impact: Emergency food assistance was very helpful to beneficiaries and saved many lives.

Emergency food assistance, although it was insufficient in late 1984 and early 1985, was targeted successfully geographically and to needy individuals and families. Where food was delivered via PVO or WFP programs directly to individuals and families, the recipients received larger quantities of food more regularly than those reached through general distributions. Thus, where possible, emergency food assistance should be provided via programs targeted to individuals and families. Where general distribution is used, it should include substantial monitoring and transport capacity at the local level.

Resettlement programs were used successfully to keep people from creating spontaneous camps. They had a major impact on farmers and nomads, as well, some of whom appear to have adopted a new way of life. For example, new agricultural techniques were taught to beneficiaries which made them productive in the midst of a relief effort. Thus, these programs were a resourceful way to limit the formation of camps and to care for displaced persons. They should be used in the short run to assist families who continue to be displaced in Chad.

Mortality increased significantly in Chad during the 1984-85 food emergency. Emergency food distribution, sharing of food, and a large yield of famine foods, did curb this elevated mortality. However, it was impossible to determine the extent of the crisis or the impact of emergency food assistance because adequate baseline data were not available.

The Chad famine occurred in stages, and people responded differently to each stage. These stages and peoples' response to them are important elements of famine relief planning and execution and should be taken account of by the GOC and others in dealing with future food emergencies.

4. Health and Nutrition: The GOC depended on PVOs and donors to assess, monitor and help remedy the health and nutrition impacts of the famine.

The GOC depended upon PVO and donors to determine the health and nutrition results of the 1984-85 famine in Chad. PVOs did an excellent job identifying priority geographical areas for emergency food distribution. Technical assistance and donor coordination helped mitigate some of the detrimental health aspects of the famine. However, lack of infrastructure greatly inhibited health assistance efforts. For example, vitamin A deficiency was neither assessed or treated and ORT could not be used extensively. Measures to deal with

vitamin A deficiency should be implemented if it is determined to be a problem in future food emergencies. Likewise, child survival services such as vaccinations and oral rehydration therapy should be supported. Supplemental rations were sometimes the only food available. They should be used with a general ration.

Rapid nutritional surveillance results played a central role in determining the extent and severity of the Chadian famine. These techniques should be institutionalized as part of a national surveillance system.

5. Transition to development: The shift from emergency relief to development was facilitated by mechanisms such as FFW and resettlement. The transition needs to account for persons still at risk and the possibility of drought recurring in 1986.

The possibility of drought recurring in the year in which the transition is being made from emergency relief to development always exists. Pre-positioning of food will help protect against this contingency. If the rains do fail again, a call forward of food may be necessary before the availability of complete harvest information. Donors should agree upon criteria to trigger food call forwards in such situations.

Special programs, such as FFW and wadi resettlement, are needed to facilitate the transition to development. These efforts should be encouraged, but their particular problems should be recognized and remedied. Thus, FFW programs should receive not only food, but complementary resources for supervision, technical assistance and equipment. Questions related to the longer term viability of wadi resettlement efforts, such as salinity, irrigation techniques and market access, also should be studied carefully.

The GOC and donors lacked a strategy for moving from the food emergency to development and for how to use food to facilitate that transition. Such a strategy should be developed and implemented, using Title II Section 206 and other planned and ongoing projects to support it.

G. Generic Principles and Recommendations: Some Concepts Are Applicable to Nearly All Food Emergencies

1. The Public Sector has a Critical Role to Play--Be Sure to Involve It

The government should play a pivotal function in managing and coordinating the emergency effort. Even if the government has limited resources at its disposal, it should not be bypassed in the decision-making process. This is especially important in chronic deficit countries in order to build up an institutional emergency preparedness capacity to respond to future disasters.

2. An Emergency Situation Provides Opportunities for Innovation and Rebuilding--Take Advantage of It

The pressure of an emergency situation can galvanize the energies of donors and governments alike to work together in imaginative and highly constructive ways that are not always possible in normal circumstances. This innovation should be encouraged. As the emergency situation abates, efforts should be made to ensure that these initiatives are solidified and carried over to the longer term development scene.

3. Keep People at Home--Intervene Early

An early warning system should be sensitive to socioeconomic indicators, such as migration patterns, changes in livestock and cereal prices, and herd movements. Monitoring this information on the ground can supplement remote sensing technologies, crop assessment methods and nutritional surveillance techniques to help predict disaster with enough advance notice to take preventive action.

4. There are Many Ways to Distribute Food--Choose Them Wisely

The type of intervention will vary depending on the stage of the famine, the timing of food and transport, the availability of non-food inputs, the type of implementing organizations, and the level of monitoring required. All of these considerations need to be carefully analyzed in designing the most appropriate mix of assistance. While logistical constraints are important, they should not determine alone the nature of the delivery mechanism. With sufficient advance planning, all of the critical factors can be adequately taken into account.

5. Food Alone is Not Enough--Get Adequate Funding

The timing and appropriateness of these complementary resources is as important as the arrival of the food component and should be given adequate planning. Despite the different funding spigots and organizational structures, better coordination between food and cash resources is imperative.

6. Development and Emergencies Move at Different Speeds--Remember to Switch Gears

For emergency programs to respond quickly and efficiently, normal bureaucratic requirements designed for longer-term development activities must be expedited or adapted. Special procedures, such as delegations of authority to USAIDs in the field, need to be considered to allow for the immediate mobilization of resources and appropriate delivery mechanisms.

7. Transition from Emergency Relief to Development is Tricky--Do Not Rush It

In making the transition from emergency to development, it is essential to take into account the cumulative effect of several years of disaster, to understand the coping mechanisms individuals have used to deal with severe deprivation, and to assess adequately the possibilities for future self-sufficiency. Food and other assistance should not be withdrawn too quickly but organized in ways that are appropriate to the evolving situation. In this context, Food for Work can provide a necessary cushion while ensuring important linkages with longer term development objectives and avoiding unwanted disincentive effects.

8. Emergencies Tend to Build Up a Large Infrastructure--Do Not Let It Go To Waste

When investing in substantial infrastructure, the recurrent costs of these operations should be planned for during the design phase and alternate uses of these facilities during normal periods clearly defined. Food for Work infrastructure, if properly planned and financed, can be used to provide supplementary income to the unemployed or underemployed, create valuable long term assets for the country, such as wells or roads, and, most importantly, can serve in future emergency situations as a way of channeling food aid quickly and effectively at the village level.

9. Impact is Elusive--Try to Capture It

Mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating impact should be made a part of emergency food assistance efforts. Using these mechanisms, additional data should be collected to enable the impact of emergency food programs to be determined. Preplanning should include data collection for baseline purposes.

10. There is No Substitute for Experience--Find It

Managing food emergencies efficiently increases the potential for impact and reduces costs. AID should conduct an assessment of the management of each food emergency situation as it is declared. Additional experienced personnel should be supplied if needed and sound management practices should be required. If adequate staff and financial resources are not available, alternative strategies should be explored.

ANNEX 3

Bibliography

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Bibliography

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