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**FINAL REPORT**  
of  
**The UNITED STATES TEAM**  
on  
**BRAZILIAN HIGHER EDUCATION**  
to  
**The Midwest Universities Consortium**  
for International Activities

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Final Report of Higher Education Team of  
the Midwest Universities Consortium for  
International Activities (MUCIA)

In conformance with USAID contract No. Ia/380, this is the final report of the higher education team and represents a summary of its accomplishments; the procedures and methods it used; recommendations, including its unfinished work; and suggestions for program continuation.

Contractual Basis of the Project

On June 23, 1965, the Brazilian Ministry of Education, acting for the Government of Brazil, and USAID-Brazil, acting for the United States Government, signed an agreement whose general purpose was to expand and improve Brazil's system of higher education. (See Exhibit 1)

On May 11, 1966, USAID signed a contract with the Midwest Universities Consortium for International Activities, Inc. (MUCIA) to have it provide the counsel and advice of U. S. educational advisors to Brazilian educational planners on the development and implementation of goals designed to bring about needed improvements and expansion of the higher educational system. (See Exhibit 2). Since MUCIA assumed responsibility for meeting the terms of the contract, its board appointed a project advisory committee to represent it in matters related to the contract. One representative from each of the Consortium's institutions was appointed, as follows:

Samuel E. Braden, Vice President and Dean for Undergraduate Development, Indiana University, subsequently replaced by

Dr. George Stolnitz, Professor of Economics and Director of the International Development Research Center, Indiana University;

Eldon L. Johnson, Vice President, University of Illinois;

Charles A. Engman, Vice President for Administration, University of Wisconsin; and

Milton E. Muelder, Vice President, Michigan State University.

On September 15, 1966, MUCIA signed a subcontract with the University of Wisconsin to run until June 30, 1968, for the purpose of providing the administrative services required to carry out the terms of the prime contract. (See Exhibit 3). To assist in this matter, Dr. John Solon, Assistant Chancellor, the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, was appointed by the University of Wisconsin to serve as Campus Coordinator.

#### The Purpose of the Project

Within the framework of expanding the system of higher education in Brazil, the project was designed:

1. To study conditions of Brazilian higher education and to develop a comprehensive plan for its improvement.
2. To make recommendations to appropriate Brazilian authorities on the reform and restructuring of Brazilian higher education.
3. To train and develop a corps of Brazilian educational planners whose training and experience of working with

the U. S. team would enable them to carry educational planning forward on a continuing basis.

To achieve these objectives a highly qualified senior team of U. S. educators, designated and appointed by MUCIA, was to work with a comparable counterpart team of Brazilian educators appointed by the Ministry of Education, seeking to develop overall planning competence of the Brazilian educators so that this group could continue its planning activities after USAID assistance was withdrawn. The failure to develop and leave behind a competent, continuing, Brazilian team was without doubt the greatest single disappointment of the project.

### Operating Principles

The MUCIA team operated under the following principles:

1. Higher education is critical in the social, economic and political development of any society. Universities have demonstrated that they can change society, and universities in developing countries are no exception. The direction and course which a country follows can be strongly influenced by its universities, but a prerequisite to this is an examination of university goals and objectives in relation to the nation's developmental objectives.
2. Higher education in the U. S. has provided relevant experiences for other countries with respect to both the types of problems it has encountered and the manner in

which it has dealt with them.

3. The educational system is the product of society, only to be understood in its social, political and economic context. Since an understanding of the society in which higher education operates as well as a thorough knowledge of the historical development and operation of Brazilian universities was a prerequisite to useful and productive effort by the U. S. team, much of its activity, especially in the early period of its operation, involved familiarization with the language, with the society, and with the universities and their structures. The team felt that little useful "advice" or "assistance" would be possible--with a high degree of confidence--without a prior knowledge of strengths and weaknesses of Brazilian universities, the forces behind university reform, and the identification and acquaintance of key persons in higher education. An effort to understand therefore was considered an essential prerequisite to giving advice on needed changes in the system.
4. Reform and change are long range and continuous and require more than a single injection of U. S. technical assistance. Traditions are deeply imbedded in Brazilian higher education as they are in many U. S.

universities, and the possibility of quick and sudden changes in the system is not high. A five or ten year program seems minimal to bring about any major changes even with optimal conditions. The abandonment of the effort after 18 months, in spite of all of its difficulties, was in contradiction to this principle and the understanding under which MUCIA undertook this commitment in the first place.

#### U. S. Team Participation

The following educators, representing the Midwest Consortium were appointed to the higher education team:

1. J. Martin Klotsche, Chancellor, the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Chief of Party for the project, who initially agreed to spend 75 per cent of his time in Brazil during the 18 month period from January 1, 1967 to June 30, 1968. Failure of the Brazilian team to materialize and his continuing responsibilities in Milwaukee caused a reassessment of his situation after the first eight months of the project. With his earlier visits to Brazil in the fall of 1966 and his shorter trips in late 1967 and 1968, his total time spent on the project in Brazil was about eight months.
2. John D. Ryder, Dean of the College of Engineering, Michigan State University. He arrived in Brazil early in January, 1967, and served as Deputy Chief of Party until he left the project in February, 1968, 13 months later.
3. John M. Hunter, Professor of Economics, Michigan State University, who joined the team in February, 1967, and remained until June 30, 1968.
4. Henry Hoge, Professor of Spanish and Portuguese, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, joined the team in March, 1967, and stayed through for the duration of the project.

A fifth position, authorized by the contract, was never filled. It was originally planned to appoint such a person after a canvass had been made of gaps in the experience and training of members of the U. S. and Brazilian teams. However, the delay in appointing a Brazilian team resulted in a decision not to add a fifth U. S. team member. It also led to a phasing-out of the U. S. team beginning in August, 1967, with Chancellor Klotsche's substantially reduced participation and Dean Ryder's withdrawal from the project in February, 1968. Professor Hoge and Professor Hunter continued their full-time participation and made a substantial contribution once a Brazilian team was appointed in late January, 1968.

In addition, Mr. Augustus Rogers III, a graduate student of Professor Hunter, served as research assistant under a special grant from the Midwest Consortium for a little over a year, doing research on the returns to investment in higher education. The nature of this research and its results are referred to below.

#### Brazilian Participation

The difficulties encountered in getting full Brazilian participation in the project were many and complicated. Since the functioning of a Brazilian team was so critical to success, a detailed account of this matter needs to be set forth.

The assurances given by USAID and the Ministry of Education to the Midwest Consortium on the matter of a full time Brazilian team were clear and unmistakable. In September, 1966, at a meeting in

Milwaukee, Wisconsin, the Chief of the Human Resources Office of USAID-Brazil, assured Consortium representatives that five full time Brazilians were in the process of appointment. The record shows that in August, 1966, the Federal Education Council had approved a slate of names for Brazilian team membership, but the Ministry was not able to solve the difficult problems of salary and full time service. On two trips to Brazil in the fall of 1966, Chancellor Klotsche, who had agreed to serve as Chief of Party, was assured by both the Ministry of Education and USAID that a Brazilian team would be appointed and would be ready to operate as soon as the U. S. team arrived on January 1, 1967.

Dean Ryder and Chancellor Klotsche, when they arrived in Rio on January 4, 1967, were surprised to discover that little progress had been made in the selection of the team and that appropriate offices for the project had not yet been found. In an early January conference with Minister of Education Aragao, grave doubts were raised about the possibility of finding a full time senior team of Brazilians. He expressed considerable concern that USAID was persisting in its demands that a full time team of high level Brazilians be appointed. After a number of conferences a modified plan was developed calling for the appointment of a full time team of more junior members, supplemented by a group of top level, but part time, Brazilian advisors.

The points that emerged very early in these discussions were these:

1. The concept of "full time" was completely foreign to the part time system which pervades the whole

structure of Brazilian higher education, and, indeed, that of government employment.

2. There were so few highly qualified Brazilians and their talents needed in so many places that it was unlikely that top full time Brazilians could be recruited for the team.
3. No mechanism had yet been found to provide adequate full time pay for qualified Brazilians under existing governmental regulations.

Had an adaptation been made to these points early in the period, the appointment of a viable team of Brazilians might have been possible. The position of the Human Resources Office of USAID made it virtually impossible, however, to shift from the original notion of a group of senior Brazilian educators--this in spite of the Ministry of Education's insistence that such a position was unrealistic and unattainable. Thus when the Castelo Branco government left office in March, 1967, the problem of the Brazilian team was still unresolved, although eight Brazilians had been approached and appointments made, but with the matter of pay and full time service still unresolved.

With the inauguration of Costa e Silva on March 15, 1967, there began a 10-month period of vacillation, procrastination and frustration. During this period the following developments occurred:

1. Two Directors of Higher Education were appointed in rapid succession. The first announced (March 23) the dismissal of the former Brazilian team members,

who first read of their dismissals in the paper. This was followed by the appointment (May 9) of a new group of five, several of whom first read of their appointments in the paper. The Director of Higher Education resigned on June 23, 1967, presumably because of failure on the part of the Federal Education Council to approve of some new engineering and medical faculties. The new Director, in spite of his announced expectations, did not form a new team of Brazilians during the next six months.

2. Student opposition to the project reached major proportions. There had been opposition voiced by the students even before January, 1967. But the opposition assumed a new intensity and bitterness resulting finally in the Minister of Education yielding to the demands of students that the agreement be re-examined.
3. The Minister of Education, yielding to a variety of pressures, made several public statements to the effect that if the MEC-USAID agreement was detrimental to Brazilian national interest, it would not be continued. He announced that the original agreement would be renegotiated, which it was early in May, 1967, without, however, substantive changes, except for the elimination of the training of young, educational planners. (See Exhibit 6)

4. The U. S. Ambassador took an increasingly firm position, demanding evidence of serious support of the project by the Brazilians. He insisted that if such support were not forthcoming, the United States should then give serious consideration to either withdrawal or a phasing-out of the project, preferably the latter.

During this period of uncertainty, the U. S. team had a clearly defined position and made its views known in a series of meetings and conferences. (See Exhibit 4). At this time (August, 1967) both President Fred Harvey Harrington, University of Wisconsin, and Vice President Milton E. Muelder, Michigan State University, were in Brazil and participated in many of the discussions. The U. S. team's position is summarized as follows: (See Exhibit 5)

1. That further efforts to create a viable senior Brazilian team as envisaged by the contract, should not be attempted.
2. That it was not desirable to discontinue the project in spite of lack of sustained interest on the part of the Ministry of Education.
3. That the activities of the U. S. team should be re-examined in light of 1. and 2. and that a new set of activities for the team be agreed upon until there was a clarification of the project's direction.

In a letter dated August 14, 1967, Minister Van Dyke suggested to Minister Dutra ways in which the U. S. team could operate while Brazilians proceeded with efforts to assemble a team, even though the U. S. team had advised against such further efforts. It specifically referred to work in the area of accrediting Brazilian universities and continued research on the economic returns to Brazil from its higher education system as topics that the U. S. team could profitably concentrate upon until such a time as either a full time or part time team of Brazilians was appointed. Should a curtailed or revised project appear to be the most feasible, Minister Van Dyke advised that a phasing-out of the U. S. team would be undertaken. Minister Dutra verbally agreed to the contents of this letter and instructed his Director of Higher Education to prepare a reply. Yet a written reply was never received by the USAID office.

For the next five months the project was at a standstill. On January 10, 1968, Minister Van Dyke wrote another letter to Minister Dutra notifying him that the failure to appoint a Brazilian team no longer made it possible to achieve the original objectives of the project and that as of June 30, 1968 USAID-Brazil planned to terminate its agreement. A reply to this letter was not received until May 29, 1968, at which time Minister Dutra denied the claim that the Ministry had not made efforts to cooperate and that in spite of bureaucratic impediments a Brazilian team had been appointed in January. He urged that USAID reconsider its decision to terminate the agreement and suggested that failure to do so might be considered as a retreat from the traditional

policy of cooperation between Brazil and the United States.

It is a matter of record that on January 23, 1968, two weeks after Minister Van Dyke's letter informing the ministry of USAID's intention to terminate the contract, a Brazilian team of five educators was appointed. Why Minister Dutra did not reply earlier to Minister Van Dyke's letter is not clear. His own explanation was that he answered the letter with actions rather than words. In any event, four of the five men appointed in January continued to serve until the end of the project and on July 31, 1968 submitted their final report and recommendations to Minister Dutra.

#### Evaluation of Project

The objectives of the Higher Education Planning Project, as originally specified in the contract, called not only for the formulation of recommendations for the reform of Brazilian higher education, but also for the presentation of a specific plan for the implementation of the recommendations. It was expected to culminate in the development of a long range planning function in the Ministry of Education. For a number of reasons the project did not develop along the lines envisaged in the agreement.

1. Its objectives were too far-reaching and unrealistic. As stated in the agreement, it was the purpose of the project to develop a dynamic planning process for higher education, to determine a better higher education system and to arrive at a long range university development plan in the context of Brazil's overall needs. In addition, the

project called for recommendations on financial and legislative requirements to achieve the necessary academic and administrative changes. It also assumed working relations with university administrators and faculties, student bodies, community leadership groups and a wide variety of governmental agencies. It was obviously unrealistic to assume that such broad objectives could be reached in a short period of time.

2. Equally unrealistic were the operational procedures set forth to govern the project. The appointment of a group of senior Brazilians to work full time was inconsistent with the strong part time tradition of Brazilian higher education and civil service salary limitations. USAID insistence upon the original objectives and operational procedures of the project demonstrated a lack of sensitivity to Brazilian realities.

In the face of overwhelming evidence of deficiencies in the agreement, not enough attention was given the views of the American team with respect to the proposals for modification and revision of the original plan. Eventually the U. S. team did proceed along selected productive paths of collaboration with Brazilian counterparts. Yet at the moment when positive results were beginning to be developed, the project came to an end.

3. The failure of the Ministry of Education to assemble a Brazilian team was critical. During the early period of the project - to March 15, 1967--the Ministry was not able to overcome the fiscal or personnel problems associated with the appointment of a team. The Ministry in the new government--after March 15, 1967--responding to

political pressures and wavering in its own support of the project, was unsuccessful in assembling a team in its first nine months, in spite of considerable prodding from the U. S. government. When it finally did, the U. S. team had already been reduced in size and USAID had officially communicated its intention to discontinue the project. Without a viable Brazilian team during the first thirteen months of the project, the activities of the U. S. team were clearly limited.

Yet certain accomplishments can be pointed to as concrete and positive.

1. The Arturo Rios Survey

During his trip to Brazil in November of 1966, Dr. Klotsche arranged for a contract between the Ministry of Education and the independent research organization of Arturo Rios for a survey of Brazilian universities. This survey included visitations to all federal universities and the on-site completion of a questionnaire covering faculty, courses, buildings, and facilities including detailed comment by Rectors and Deans.

Profile reports on each university were supplied to the U. S. team by June of 1967, and gave much data, previously unavailable, about many aspects of Brazilian universities. While a summary of the data was never compiled, and while an important parallel study of isolated faculties in Brazil was never authorized by the Ministry, the profile studies prepared by the Rios research organization proved of value to both U. S. and Brazilian educators, and will have value to anyone intending to carry on research on Brazilian universities in the future.

## 2. The Accreditation Workshop

In the absence of a Brazilian counterpart team, U. S. personnel held meetings and conversations with many Brazilian educators. A fruitful association developed with several members of the Federal Education Council, especially with Drs. Newton Sucupira, Rubens Maciel, Valnir Chagas, and Roberto Santos. The problem of "accreditation" --the development of standards for the approval of new institutions and the examination of existing ones--was identified as one of great interest to them as Council members, since it has accrediting responsibilities. Here also was a specific area where the U. S. contribution could be substantial. When the MEC-USAID agreement found itself in trouble in the middle of 1967, a plan of collaboration in this area was proposed by the U. S. team. After many delays funds were finally made available in March, 1968 to carry forward plans for an accreditation workshop.

The objective of the workshop was to develop a comprehensive set of guidelines and/or standards which would be useful to the Federal Education Council in evaluating requests for the establishment of new educational institutions. It was intended that the resulting questionnaire or check-list be complete, explicit and demanding so that it, in itself, would serve as a barrier to frivolous applications. Largely by chance the library was selected as the area for initial effort. A draft of a questionnaire was submitted to the critical approval of Drs. Edson Nery da Fonseca and Rubens Borba de Moraes, two of Brazil's most distinguished bibliographers.. After their critical comment, the revised check list was

submitted to the Workshop as an example of one portion of the general document. The Workshop then recommended that a research design be prepared for the accumulation of an empirical base from which realistic Brazilian standards could be determined for libraries as a component in the accreditation complex. This work was just begun and had to be discontinued in June, 1968. (See Appendix A)

Among the positive results obtained from the accreditation workshop were these:

- a) Regular contacts were established and maintained with key people on a specific topic of professional interest.
- b) Valuable work was started in library evaluation which hopefully can be continued.
- c) A start was made toward the establishment of basic minimal lists of books and periodicals for specific types of libraries.
- d) The value of hiring Brazilian consultants was clearly demonstrated.
- e) The nature and difficulty of mounting a serious, objective program in accreditation was highlighted.

The library is, of course, but one element of the larger accreditation procedure. Eventually standards for university finance and administration, faculty qualifications, student composition, curriculum development and physical facilities need to be developed. We urge that USAID continue to support this effort. The members of the Federal Education Council, with whom the U. S. team worked on this project, occupy key positions in the Council (Newton Sucupira is chairman of the

Higher Education Committee; Valnir Chagas is a member of this committee, and Rubens Maciel is a member as well as secretary of the subcommittee on accreditation). These Council members are convinced of the value of the accreditation project and have accepted the methodology employed. The circumstances are most favorable at the present time for its continuation, the results of which could represent an extremely important contribution in the field of Brazilian university planning. USAID authorities should explore this possibility without delay.

### 3. Returns to Investment in Higher Education

Research on returns to investment in higher education was undertaken by Midwest Consortium Fellow Rogers. He used newly available data from the 1960 census to study the relationships between incomes of university and secondary school graduates and several factors such as age, curriculum completed, sex, race, family composition, religion, class of occupation, position in occupation, migration history, and urban/rural environment.

The work, which should be finished by November 1 (to be submitted separately) will include data from six states with about thirteen per cent of Brazil's total population. Ranging from the Amazon region in the north to Santa Catarina in the south, the study should reflect much of the diversity in the Brazilian economy. The pressures of time and many difficulties in securing data precluded the inclusion of a larger proportion of the states. Yet the results in themselves will have value, and the methodology is established for continuing the study as data become

available.

The initial results now available have already generated considerable interest among several Brazilian organizations. Most important of these is the Centro de Estudos e Treinamento em Recursos Humanos (CETRHU) of Fundação Getúlio Vargas. After a presentation of the preliminary results, CETRHU agreed to support a continuation of the study to include the entire country by financing data procurement and processing as the 1960 census becomes available over the next twelve months. Rogers, who will be working with the Latin American Studies Center of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, will continue to oversee the research and perform the necessary analysis. Another unit of Fundação Getúlio Vargas, the Instituto Brasileiro de Economia (IBRE) has also expressed its wish to use the results of the study in conjunction with several of its current manpower studies. Thus, there will be an immediate and concrete impact on planning for Brazilian higher education.

The execution of this project has been a cooperative one. The Midwest Consortium made the services of Mr. Rogers available through a sizeable study grant. The Ministry of Education, through the efforts of the Brazilian team, contributed both monetary and advisory support to the research. USAID provided funds primarily for data processing costs. The Catholic University of Rio (PUC) also donated a substantial block of computer time during the experimental phase of the computations. The Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) provided valuable assistance through its Regional Field Offices at the time that

interviews were carried out in the states to verify results. Future participation by Fundação Getúlio Vargas and the facilities of the Latin American Studies Center at UWM will provide a continuing program of research in this important area of educational planning.

#### 4. Commentaries by U. S. team members

There inevitably were many discussions, interviews, and conversations with Brazilians about a variety of aspects of higher education. An examination of existing statistics and literature also occupied a considerable portion of the time of U. S. team members. These activities led to a number of written commentaries by members of the U. S. team and appear in this report as Appendices C-W.

Dean Ryder surveyed existing literature on educational statistics in Brazil and synthesized and summarized the extant data. He also studied space utilization and the Brazilian entrance examination. Frequent questions or inaccurate impressions about various aspects of U. S. education encouraged the writing of several papers to explain and clarify. Prof. Hoge's commentaries on "The Department" and "Faculty Structure in the U. S." fall in this category, as do those of Prof. Hunter on "The Credit System" and "The Structure of the U. S. University." Still another set of papers analyzes problems of Brazilian higher education. One on Brazilian higher education places the problem in historical perspective and outlines some of the major problems facing Brazilian universities today. A paper on the objectives of education focuses on the kind of questions that must be answered in the setting of

educational goals. Another analyzes some aspects of the use of "the foundation" as a university form, an important public issue in Brazil. Still another suggests the importance of heterogeneity in the educational system. Other papers examine the teaching of economics in Brazil and "the excedentes" problem. Originally prepared to assist the U. S. team in understanding and defining problems of higher education in Brazil, these commentaries may help to cast some new light on certain aspects of higher education. Several of these papers have already been published in Brazil and others will be published.

##### 5. Visitation Program

From the beginning of the project, travelling to universities throughout Brazil and establishing contacts with educational organizations was considered desirable and essential. Language classes by U. S. team members in the early stages of the project and the absence of a Brazilian counterpart team delayed this part of the program. However, beginning in July of 1967 and continuing for the next twelve months a number of universities were visited. While time did not permit a visit to all universities in Brazil, at least one team member spent considerable time in each of the following federal universities: Bahia, Ceará, Santa Catarina, Espírito Santo, Paraná, Goiás, Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, and Brasília. An extended visit was made to the state-operated Universidade de São Paulo and more cursory visits to many of the State's isolated faculties. In addition, the following private universities were visited: Católica do Rio de Janeiro, Católica de Salvador, Mackenzie, and Gama Filho. The purposes of visiting these institutions varied

somewhat, but generally the team was anxious to get a "feel" for the university community, and to begin to understand its structure and operation. After the appointment of the Brazilian team, contacts with the academic world increased through daily discussions with its members and through a series of seminars with invited "outsiders."

In addition, it was of course important to know the work of many other agencies: Conselho de Reitores, IPEA, Conselho Federal de Educaçao, Ford Foundation, Fundacao Getulio Vargas, CAPES, Centro Brasileiro de Pesquisas Educacionais, INEP, Conselho Nacional de Pesquisas, etc. Contacts with these organizations provided the team with information about the function and activities of each institution.

In view of the negative publicity given the project from the beginning, it is worth noting that without exception, the members of the team were hospitably received. Everywhere there was a willingness to meet with team members and great interest was manifested in discussing Brazilian higher education and its problems.

#### 6. The Work of the Brazilian Team

Once a Brazilian team was appointed in January, 1968, contact between it and the remaining members of the U. S. team was continuous and productive. Unfortunately by this time the U. S. team had already begun its phasing out, but Professors Hoge and Hunter continued to work and consult with the members of the Brazilian team.

On July 31, 1968, an advance copy of the final report of the Brazilian team was delivered to Mr. Tarso Dutra, Minister of Education

and Culture. This report will presumably be brought to the attention of the special presidential committee, the Grupo de Trabalho, for use in its final deliberations.

Prepared during more than a month of intensive work, and based on the activities of the Brazilian team since its appointment in January of 1968, the document contains the following sections: a) Education and Development; b) Educational Resources; c) The Foundation; d) Higher Education and the University; e) The Faculty of Philosophy and the University; f) The University and the Lei de Diretrizes e Bases; g) The Expansion of Higher Education; h) The Exame Vestibular; i) The Revision of the Curricula; j) The Establishment of the Department; k) The Organization of Integrated Courses; l) The Creation of Vocational Guidance Services; m) Redefinition of the Academic Calendar; n) The Role of the Trinomial; State-University-Industry; o) The Introduction of Post-Graduate Courses; p) The Educational Labor Market; q) The Faculty of Philosophy and Teacher Training; r) A Permanent Planning Team; s) Summary of Activities of EPES and EAPES (including texts of agreement); t) Recommendations and Conclusions; and u) Annexes.

The report may be described as a historical summary of the Brazilian University; a specific consideration of the major current problem areas; and a summary and critique of the activities, participation and contributions of the U. S. team. Approximately 20 major studies and work papers produced by the U. S. team are to accompany the report as annexes, in both English and Portuguese.

On July 29, at a meeting with the U. S. and Brazilian team members, Minister Tarso Dutra reaffirmed his intention to give wide circulation and publicity to the report, possibly in the form of a book to be published by the Documentation Section of the Ministry of Education and Culture.

Prominent among the 18 recommendations submitted by the Brazilian team are:

a) A thorough revision of the exame vestibular system, to feature coordination with the secondary school curriculum, emphasis on vocational interest, intelligence and aptitude rather than on factual knowledge. A single exam (exame único) is proposed, according to the type of school, for all such schools of the region, and for the entire university. A national entrance exam administered by the Ministry of Education and Culture is described as an undesirable alternative (Recommendation III).

b) A revision of the curricula, in order to permit a more flexible course program for university students and to facilitate the introduction of new courses in accordance with technical advances. The subject matter offerings, however, should not be established exclusively according to market demands, since the university has an obligation to preserve all knowledge and make it available to society, even in low-demand areas (Recommendation IV).

c) The wide introduction of the departmental system, with required adjustments to make it more workable (open-ended rank structure, budgetary identity, course-articulation responsibility). The faculty

government structure should be revised to a proportional representation based on course-load of school, number of students and number of professors. (Recommendations V and XV).

d) A redefinition of academic study periods, calling for three or four academically equivalent terms per year. Academic progress is to be measured by "effective academic load" (Number of credits) rather than days of attendance. The adoption of the credit system is judged to be an indispensable element of this recommendation (Recommendation VIII).

e) More efficient use of increased government funds, primarily for the expansion of the capacity of the present higher educational system. Present isolated faculties should be merged into regional universities or function as basic-studies centers and feeder units for existing universities (Recommendation II).

f) The establishment of a systematic structure of post-graduate programs, to include fixed course and thesis requirements, M. A. and Ph. D. stages of six semesters each, and to be initiated in strong departments according to exacting quality standards. The collaboration of the National Research Council, the Federal Education Council and the Commission for Advanced University Training (CAPES) is envisaged for this program (Recommendation IX). A related program of scholarships and incentives for the training and up-grading of professors is also proposed (Recommendation X). The combined efforts of the state, the University and industry is required for the stimulation of research activities related to the graduate program (Recommendation XI).

g) Improved efficiency in the distribution of funds is recommended,

by the establishment of a special fund for higher education. This agency will control scholarships and study grants (both of which will be given in the form of repayable student loans) and will assign loans for buildings, books, equipment and staff expansion at the university level.

h) A preliminary or provisional accreditation system is proposed. Students from such institutions would be examined for professional certification at certain officially accredited institutions designated by the Federal Education Council. Subsequent full accreditation would be determined primarily on the basis of the results obtained by the "graduates" of these institutions. There appears to be no legal obstacle to this proposal in the existing legislation. (Constitution and Lei de Diretrizes e Bases). (Recommendation XVII).

i) A final recommendation, the exact text of which is still to be formulated, will call for the designation of the EAPES (Equipe de Assessoria ao Planejamento do Ensino Superior) as a permanent advisory committee (Comissão Permanente de Assessoramento: CPA) of the Ministry of Education. It is noted that the final revision of the MEC-USAID agreement (May 9, 1967) designated the EAPES as a "Permanent Planning Group" (Grupo Permanente de Planejamento). Such a planning group was also envisaged in the Plano Decenal (Educação e Mão de Obra, p. 83) The permanent advisory committee could assume certain duties of the Specialist Committees, (Comissões de Especialistas), as well as of the Council of Rectors (Conselho de Reitores).

In its report, the Brazilian team made frequent references to the

assistance of the U. S. team and at many points in its report referred to material and commentaries of U. S. team members. The U. S. team is aware of and agrees with many of the recommendations of the Brazilian team. Many of the items in the report were discussed with U. S. members individually, but it was written without the consultation or approval of the U. S. team.

### Conclusions

We make no pretense in this report of presenting definite solutions to the specific problems. It is, of course, easy to identify problem areas in Brazilian higher education. Any number of Brazilian educators can supply such a list. In previous surveys and projects, these problems have been thoroughly identified and extensive listings have been compiled.<sup>1</sup> There is little point in duplicating these lists here with perhaps minor modifications and changes in priorities.

Although we advance no recommendations for the solution of specific Brazilian problems, it is appropriate to make suggestions related to future AID programs in Brazilian higher education. Two members of the team had the opportunity of addressing themselves intensively and exclusively to the study and analysis of the Brazilian university for an appreciable period of time; the two other members, for a still appreciable, but lesser, period. Each member possessed a long and intimate identification with U. S. universities, and all had considerable experience with the

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<sup>1</sup>For example, see the UNESCO report of a brief visit to certain Brazilian universities (Lussier, I.; J. Lawryns and D. J. Krienen: Brazil Advisory Mission on Development of Higher Education, Paris, UNESCO, 1966, 29 pp; and see the study by Jayme Abreu: "Problemas Brasileiros de Educacao," in the book by the same title (Rio de Janeiro, Editora Lidador, 1968) pp. 13-38.

foreign university in several areas of the world.

We started the project with the premise and ended it with the certainty that all aspects of Brazilian higher education developed from and are tied directly to uniquely Brazilian social and historical circumstances. Such a system cannot be suddenly transformed into a new and different structure. It will change by some slow process of evolution, presumably in response to the general needs of the society of which it is a part. With careful and deliberate planning, however, it is possible for outside sources, such as U. S. technical assistance, to participate in and to facilitate this evolution.

The team could have proposed many changes in the Brazilian system of higher education. Specific solutions for some of its educational problems, such as administrative structure, basic studies, the academic department, could have been advanced. Yet, in the absence of any substantial Brazilian input, it was the view of the team that such an approach would have been ineffective and little contribution to the reform and transformation of the system.

We see more benefits arising from an extended association of U. S. and Brazilian educators in joint endeavors to cope with problems. We believe, therefore, that USAID-Brazil should undertake to support a prolonged and continuous collaboration of American and Brazilian educators. By themselves, short term consultants imported to study specific problems are of limited value, unless they are adjuncts to a well established, pre-existing permanent mission.

It is the view of the U. S. team that future U. S. efforts in behalf of higher education should include collaboration with governmental agencies that have responsibilities for educational planning as well as with individual universities who seek U. S. assistance.

Collaboration with the Ministry of Education was admittedly difficult in implementing the objectives of the project. It unfortunately has a highly political orientation, and changes at the level of the Minister and Director of Higher Education, of which there were many during the life of the project, and the absence of a professional staff in the Ministry, make long range planning difficult. In spite of these difficulties, the team believes that USAID should continue to give attention to the development of planning efforts through the Ministry of Education. The Ministry is charged with planning functions and exercises them in fact through budgetary decisions. It is therefore an important body that will continue to hold these responsibilities in the future.

The Federal Education Council, created in 1961, is another agency with important responsibilities. The 1961 law gave the Council authority to prepare a national education plan, to control curriculum and courses, to determine qualifications for federal aid, and to intervene in higher education institutions. While it has not exercised these powers to the fullest, its responsibilities are nevertheless substantial, especially in the areas of approval of new institutions and faculties. USAID should, therefore, continue to explore areas of cooperation with the Federal Education Council, and work, where necessary, with the Ministry of Education.

The team also believes that inter-institutional relationships between individual Brazilian and U. S. universities or groups of Brazilian and U. S. universities (such as the Midwest Consortium) provide great promise for collaboration in the future in such areas as curriculum development, structural relationships, research activities, public service programs, and faculty up-grading. Such efforts should be undertaken at the same time that continued attention is given to working with the Ministry of Education, the Federal Education Council, and other governmental agencies concerned with educational planning.

The team believes that the U. S. should continue to have an important role in assisting Brazil in its higher education effort. The American university, through its teaching, research and public service commitment, has been a major instrument for activating change in our society. Our state universities and land grant institutions have something unique to contribute to Brazilian higher education. They have special experience in such fields as agriculture, engineering, business administration, education, health and medicine, important to Brazil. They are committed to educating large numbers of students, an idea relevant to Brazil's needs. They are oriented to service to society through research and extension, an important consideration for Brazil's future development.

We close with this expression of our general position. We endorse and recommend the policies for aid to foreign universities advanced by Burton Friedman of the Kettering Foundation. Summarized, these are:

(a) It is in the national interests of the United States to study, to cultivate,

and to support universities of the new or developing lands. b) These are long-range tasks. They do not lend themselves to crash programs. The tasks require the uninterrupted support of reliable patrons. c) The private and public colleges in the United States are the indicated "performers." d) The study and cultivation of foreign universities is not a task which, with propriety, can be performed by agencies of the federal government of the United States. e) The Government of the United States and private foundations in the United States are the indicated patrons that can, with propriety, underwrite the recommended tasks.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>The complete rationale of this policy should be studied. See Burton D. Friedman, "Needed: A National Policy Toward Universities to the Underdeveloped World," in Public Administration Review, Jan. - Feb. 1968, pp. 39-46.

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