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EVALUATION OF THE
CENTRO COOPERATIVO TECNICO INDUSTRIAL/
CIVIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

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FINAL REPORT

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PREPARED FOR: Office of Private Development
U. S. Agency for International Development
Tegucigalpa, Honduras

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Social Anthropologist

CONTRACT NO.: AID 522-214 - Task Order No. 1
Project No. 522-11-999-000

CONTRACTOR: Development Education Corporation
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Saint Cloud, Minnesota

Tegucigalpa, D. C.
Honduras, Central America
May 15, 1971

On December 15, 1970 Contract AID 522-214 and Task Orders 1 and 2 were signed between Development Education Corporation and USAID/H for a five month evaluation of three projects. The Contract and Task Orders stated that an anthropologist would conduct the three evaluations.

Under Task Order No. 1 Gretchen R. Eoff, social anthropologist, prepared the following report on the Centro Cooperativo Técnico Industrial/Civic Development program.

The anthropologist accepts sole responsibility for analysis of the data and the report on the CCTI/Civic Development (CCTI/CD) program that follows.

The Office of Private Development has agreed that the "logical framework" prepared as part of the evaluation program of the Civic Development project shall be included as an introductory page to this report. At the time the final stencils were prepared the framework had not been approved by USAID/H. It is expected that copies will be attached to this report when it becomes available.

I

INTRODUCTION

Honduras as a nation has the natural and human resources to expand, change and modernize its economic, political and social systems. The Government of Honduras (GOH) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have primed various sectors with financial aid to Honduran agencies and institutions in the areas of agrarian reform, education, health, industry and communication-transportation systems. The dollar input introduces changes which proceed at unequal rates among the economic, political and social spheres in the traditional culture.

The Office of Private Development, USAID/Honduras, has provided technical assistance and financial support for various socio-economic development programs in Honduras during the decade 1960-1970. The knowledge accrued from working with these programs, e.g. Acción Cultural Popular Hondureña (ACPH or radiophonics) food, training and education, etc., strongly indicated that economically induced cultural changes create only a partial setting for rural modernization processes without providing for the technical and educational preparation of the human resources that are expected to utilize and obtain optimum benefits from the changing conditions. The Office of Private Development was aware that the dollar input would be successful to the extent that the target population was prepared to utilize the changed resources

It was also known to the Office of Private Development that the change programs that had had the most impact, carry-over and support with the rural population were those that emphasized active participation in the educational and organizational processes with continued follow-up activities. It was decided that a program should be developed that would promote an increase in participation

of the rural population so that they would actively enter the planning and decision making processes involved in the socio-economic and political development programs underway in Honduras.

The Civic Development Program, as it was called, was planned with the knowledge that the following were key points in the program if the socio-political changes were to be brought within the scope of economic changes available to the rural Honduran population:

- a. Given the limited technical resources within GOH agencies every outside assistance should be given to the institution building aspect of the Civic Development Program.
- b. Professionals in development program work, in quantities proportionate to the target population, should be hired, trained and put into the field.
- c. The traditional complex of social characteristics that define the rural population should be evaluated, modified and/or changed in comparison to the technical and material changes available to them.
- d. Given the present campesino value system, the emphasis on follow-up activities and projects would be vital to the success of the program.
- e. Contacts should be established with existing agencies and institutions so that maximum coordination and cooperation would be achieved. Priority should be given to minimizing the duplication of economic and human resources.
- f. ACPH (radiophonics), the adult education program, should provide an ideal rural population base for a civic development program. The proposed new program would make maximum use of the ACPH organization and education base.

The Office of Private Development was allocated \$77,808.00 (U.S. dollars) to develop and implement the new program in February, 1970. Of the funds allocated, \$53,000.00 were actually used.

Honduran society is stratified into a large, uneducated, low economic rural sector; an emerging professional, skilled and semi-skilled technical sector; and a small elite sector composed of old landowning families and nouveau riche who have acquired money through developing and expanding industries. Ideally, GOH agencies and institutions are organized for the benefit of the entire society, but in reality few socio-economic benefits filter down to the rural population.

Approximately four-fifths (1,421,595) of the total (2,581,896) Honduran population live in a rural environment outside of the ten urban¹ areas of the republic. The people who make up the population bulk (4/5) are primarily occupied in low level agricultural pursuits and have few associations outside of the rural environment. They are not capable of intelligent, objective or realistic decision

1. The cities which the writer refers to as urban are:

El Progreso	19,300
San Pedro Sula	102,516
Puerto Cortés	23,032
Choluteca	19,501
La Ceiba	36,863
Tela	14,250
Comayagua	12,123
Distrito Central (Tegucigalpa)	232,276
Siguatopeque	10,653
Santa Rosa de Copán	<u>9,412</u>
Total	479,926

Urban areas were determined by services and facilities available. The figures presented are from the 1970 census data of the Dirección General de Estadística y Censos, Tegucigalpa, D. C.

making in regard to the socio-economic and political changes occurring within the traditional culture. The central problem for this rural majority group is their lack of organization and failure to communicate and interact with other levels of the national society. The result of the problem is that economic benefits tend to flow in a closed circular pattern favorable to the minority population. The factors of geographic isolation, lack of development of human resources, underutilized natural resources, adult illiteracy, highly skewed land-money distribution and limited transportation and communication systems have all contributed to keep the rural population socially, economically and politically depressed, inactive in national affairs and ignorant.

The rural agricultural population (campesinos) display a certain homogeneity throughout the republic in a complex of characteristics, behavior and values. Variations which naturally occur are mainly variations in intensity of the characteristic rather than in kind. The following list defines some aspects of contemporary Honduran campesinos:

1. Subsistence corn/bean farmers.
2. Preoccupation with land use, tenure and distribution.
3. Show a preference for individual land ownership as opposed to communal/cooperative farming.
4. Prefer free unions to legal marriages.
5. Profess to be Catholic with casual and infrequent participation in religious services and activities.
6. Personalistic in their attitudes toward and knowledge of national and local institutions, agencies and leaders.
7. Place emphasis on the rights, duties and privileges of the individual.

8. Display machismo-ism, i.e. accent certain behavioral patterns as indicators of manliness.
9. Show mistrust and suspicion of officials and representatives of governmental institutions and agencies.
10. Display little initiative in self-help activities.
11. Believe that education and money are used to control individuals.
12. Have a high rate of adult illiteracy.
13. Are suspicious and fearful of future oriented plans or programs and prefer immediate material objectives.
14. Dependent and ego-oriented, in part a result of the traditional system of latifundia.
15. Desire to imitate latifundistas as evidenced by the growing incidence of minifundistas.
16. Work an average of five months out of twelve by preference and habit.
17. Display neither interest in nor knowledge of voluntary service outside the kinship networks.
18. Have little knowledge of places, people or systems outside their immediate locale.
19. Depend upon folk medicine and curing. Medical doctors and hospitals are regarded with a suspicion coupled with the lack of money to pay for modern medical facilities and treatments.
20. Desire children and large families and regard them as an insurance asset for the parents' old age and as an economic asset to the family during the child's adolescence.

The campesino population has been the target for various agrarian reform programs as well as being the recipient population for social, educational and medical reform-relief programs. The decade 1960-1970 saw development programs sponsored in rural Honduras by such agencies and institutions as CARE, CARITAS, ANACH, FACACH, Banco de Fomento, INA, Junta Nacional de Bienestar Social, and ACPH (radiophonics). The campesino responded to these overtures with interest and participation as long as his dependent role was supported. The campesino programs which died altogether or failed to reach their stated goals were those which provided intensive "course" work in a brief time span and then pulled the program out and left the campesinos to function alone. The failure to plan a directed follow-up phase in these programs resulted in wasted economic and human efforts.

II

The Centro Cooperativo Técnico Industrial, CCTI, was founded in May, 1960 with the help of United States funds. The purpose for founding the institution, as stated by the institution director, was to have "...CCTI coordinate the various economic resources directed toward improving the standard of living of Hondurans". The institution offered technical assistance, consultation and advisory services and seminars in administration, human relations and cooperatives to professional and managerial level personnel. A branch of CCTI handled loans to small industries and established the Artesania Hondureña with its associated craft and skill school.

The CCTI director, Benjamin Membreño, was approached by Mr. Andrew Gregg, Chief, Office of Civic Development, with the proposal that CCTI be the institution to administer and implement the new civic development program until the institution could maintain an autonomous position. CCTI had administrative personnel and space and the director was receptive to the plan. A one year contract and budget was signed between CCTI and AID in February, 1970. The contract established the CCTI/CD program as an entity.

A series of meetings were held in March and April, 1970, between various of the AID and CCTI/CD program administrators. The organizational structure was comprised of four people:

CCTI

Benjamin Membreño
Institution Director

Antonio Suazo
Program Director

AID ADVISORY COUNTERPARTS

Andrew Gregg
Chief, Office of Civic Development

Eugene Skelton
AID advisor to program (contract)

The meetings had two major purposes: 1) to establish policy and procedure; and 2) to contact and meet with private and governmental organizations.

The CCTI director, the CCTI/CD director and the AID program advisor arranged meetings with individuals and groups who represented private and governmental organizations. The meetings were used to present the civic development project to the organizations, to assess the degree of interest and cooperation that could be anticipated and to establish contact with individuals who would be asked to form a board of directors at a later date. The organizations contacted were:

Acción Cultural Popular Hondureña (radiophonics)

Escuela de Servicio Social

Fundación para Desarrollo Comunal

Junta Nacional de Bienestar Social

FACACH (Cooperative Credit Association)

CARITAS (Catholic Relief)

CTH (Labor Union)

COEP (Industrial Commission)

Consejo de Planificación Económica

Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras

The meetings were only partially successful in that interest in the program was not strong at the time. Mr. Skelton felt the program needed to be more clearly structured so that the presentation of the program by Ing. Membreño and Prof. Suazo to the public groups would be more meaningful. Selection of individuals for a program board of directors was not pursued at this time and the administrators concentrated their efforts on program organization.

The Consejo Superior de Planificaci6n Econ6mica is the national organization that has charge of and approves all training programs in Honduras. The Consejo appointed Haydee Martinez to act as liaison with the CCTI/CD program. She asked that curriculum vitae on all program staff be filed with the Consejo and that all plans be submitted to her office for approval. Miss Martinez is an intelligent woman with strong nationalistic feelings. She is of the opinion that teaching and course work are the important media for development programs even though she acknowledges these media have not had carry-over impact when used alone. Miss Martinez would like to see all development programs under national control through a development institution but stated that the existing government community development program is not the answer because it is essentially non-functioning at the present time. Miss Martinez has negative personal feelings toward CCTI and the director, is very nationalistic and is in a position to block program activities if she desires to do so.

CCTI/CD hired three Hondurans in April, 1970, who accepted the responsibilities of field work and promotion. The promoters are:

1. Antonio Canelas Diaz : South Zone, Departments of Valle and Choluteca
2. Rodolfo Rosales Abolla : North Zone, Departments of Cort6s, Atlántida, Col6n and part of Yoro
3. Ana Ruth Zuniga : Central Zone, Departments of Olancho, part of Yoro, Comayagua, Intibucá, Francisco Morazán and El Paraíso

A fourth promotor was hired in December, 1970.

4. Jos6 Pinto Maldonado : Central Zone, Departments of El Paraíso and Francisco Morazán

There are plans to hire 5 additional promoters during 1971

Hondurans tend to base their decisions about geographic divisions on urban population concentrations and accessibility with a resulting standard approach. It is most common for Hondurans to specify north coast, south coast, western and interior or central regions. The work zones suggested by Mr. Suazo for the three initial promoters follow the norm. Mr. Skelton realized several ways could be used to assign work regions but indicated his agreement to start with this division since the Honduran staff approved it and it was workable. A map is attached that shows the work zones and population for each promoter.

The organization chart that follows shows the 1970-1971 program structure. There will be changes as staff are added. The latest CCTI/CD evaluation meeting pointed to some differences of opinion as to whether the structure should increase horizontally by adding to the promoter level or vertically by adding extensionists to work under promoter direction. The final decision has not been made but should be carefully considered prior to any action. The present projected plans call for an increase of five promoters per year until thirty-five are on the staff. Each promoter anticipates adding ten new community organizations to the program each year. The overall program features are expressed in the following summary statements.

Goal

To increase local citizenry participation in the planning, execution and benefits of socio-economic development in Honduras.

Purpose of CCTI/CD

The formation of viable campesino organizations oriented toward specific change activities at the local level.

Institution

An autonomous National Civic Development Council (NCDC) that will function as a legal entity should be formed by 1973. The NCDC will be


capable of raising funds, developing and administering policy and programs and it will employ a full time staff.

Requirements

The requirements to accomplish the above goal, purpose and institution statements are: continued but diminishing U. S. budget support through 1975; two U. S. advisor years; technical advisory services; purchase of vehicles and related commodities; continuing research to assess program impact and effectiveness. No direct financial support is required by the GOH as the institution will raise funds from the private sector on an increasing scale through 1975 and will be autonomous in 1976.



		<u>Population</u>		
		<u>Total</u>	<u>Urban</u>	<u>Rural</u>
South Zone	Antonio Canelas	309,150	19,501	289,649
North Zone	Rodolfo Rosales	486,894	176,661	310,233
Central Zone	Ana Ruth Zuniga	1,104,868	263,699	841,169
	José Pinto			



III

The field work for an evaluation of the CCTI/CD program was organized on a 3 by 3 matrix: program planning, implementation and impact; and administration, operation and participation . levels. The evaluation study was spread over a five month period during which time certain program activities did not occur, therefore no direct observation data could be obtained on all activities.

Background information concerning each of the four promoters, the Honduran program director and the AID advisor was obtained from curriculum vitae, office records and interviews.

CCTI/CD Director: Antonio B. Suazo

Mr. Suazo's educational background includes studies in primary education and titles as a bookkeeper (Perito Mercantil) and a public accountant. He has taken courses at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras in management and administration and short term¹ training courses in Central America, Mexico, Spain, Italy and the United States. Mr. Suazo has worked as personnel manager at the Banco Central and the Honduras Sugar Company, as a sales manager for an insurance company and as an instructor for industrial courses at the Centro Cooperativo Técnico Industrial. Mr. Suazo was named director of the CCTI/CD program in 1970 by the CCTI director. The director of the civic development program should divide his time equally between administrative duties and field work with the promoters. The performance of this job calls for objective decision making in regard to policy making and establishing program procedures and is a key role in the organization's communications system.

1. "Short term" includes a range of from 3 days to one year per course listed. Information on the curriculum vitae could not be standardized in a more acceptable way. Practically all short term study is accomplished through scholarship and training programs.

AID Advisor to CCTI/CD: Eugene A. Skelton

Mr. Skelton holds the degrees of B. A. and B. S. in biology. He completed all requirements except writing a thesis for an M. A. in education. He has taught science and mathematics at the secondary level in the United States and came to Honduras as a Peace Corps Volunteer in 1963. AID contracted to have Mr. Skelton act in an advisory capacity to the radiophonics program in Honduras from 1966 through 1969. Mr. Skelton was hired to act as AID advisor to the CCTI/CD program in 1970. The advisor's role calls for Mr. Skelton to demonstrate all administration and operation program features to his Honduran counterpart, the program director. The job calls for the advisor to have technical and managerial knowledge, a sensitivity and understanding of the host culture and sufficient authority to follow through on policy making and program procedures.

CCTI/CD Promoters:

Antonio Canolas Diaz

Mr. Canolas has studied primary education, law and community development. He acquired his education in La Ceiba and the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras. He has participated in short term training programs in Venezuela, Chile, Germany, Switzerland, Mexico and the United States. He has participated, as an officer, in student organizations and groups who were directed toward anti-communism. He is a member of the Honduran press association and was director of the official publication, TRABAJO, of the Ministerio de Trabajo y Provision Social. Mr. Canolas was director of public relations in the labor ministry. He was hired in April, 1970 to work as a field agent in the CCTI/CD program and is assigned to the south coast zone.

Rodolfo Rosales Ahella

Mr. Rosales obtained a degree (licenciatura) in law from the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras. He has a special interest in agrarian reform law. Mr. Rosales was assistant director and director of the Instituto Nacional Agrario, he was political governor (an appointive post) of the department of Gracias a Dios and was assistant director of the IADSL-IESCA (an international institution for developing free labor organizations, funded by AFL/CIO). He was hired as a field agent by CCTI/CD in April, 1970 and assigned to work the north coast zone. Mr. Rosales was later named by the CCTI/CD director as advisor to the course planning-course content section of the CCTI/CD program in addition to his field agent work.

Ana Ruth Zuniga

Miss Zuniga obtained a degree (licenciatura) in economics from the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras. She has participated in short term training programs in Puerto Rico, Italy and the United States. She has worked as assistant in cooperatives and inspector of cooperatives for the Dirección de Fomento Cooperativo. She held the job of director of the cooperative department of the national agrarian institute (INA) and worked as an economist for the institute. She was a professor and field agent for the IADSL-IESCA in the department of socio-economic research. She was hired in April, 1970 to act as a field agent for the CCTI/CD program in the central zone.

José Pinto Maldonado

Mr. Pinto is certified as a primary school teacher after completing the study requirements for normal school (6 years primary plus 5 years secondary). He has completed short term courses in textiles, life insurance and agrarian reform in Honduras. Mr. Pinto was director of a school, supervisor of primary

education and has taught sociology in four week teacher seminars. Mr. Pinto worked as a member of a field team for the national agrarian institute (INA) in the Jamastrán Valley. He was hired in December, 1970 by CCTI/CD to act as field agent. His zone of work was not specified until March, 1971, when he began work in the central zone.

The selection of a program director was an obviously crucial role in the success of the program. The administrator role calls for an organized individual capable of executing the decision making, authoritative and administrative aspects of the job and, equally as imperative, he should spend about one half his time working with the promoters in the field. The only way the director can obtain reliable information about promotor/program strengths and weaknesses is by observing, participating and advising in the field situation.

It is unfortunate that a capable and respected CCTI professor was selected for the administrator-director position. Mr. Suazo does not have the motivation or experience for an executive role and is functioning at a low performance level. Recorded incidents of behavior during the evaluation period show that he:

- a) makes appointments with staff and public agents he does not keep;
- b) makes infrequent short trips to the field and is not up-to-date on successful or difficult aspects of promotor field work and impact;
- c) arranges staff meetings and fails to cancel them when he cannot appear;
- d) judges the staff on a personal basis as opposed to objective judgment in relation to program goals;
- e) desires to form a hierarchical organization by adding staff vertically through extortionists. This is an indication of poor judgment since all

- promoters are not capable of coordinating extension work;
- f) does not understand the global program view and therefore emphasizes the teaching, rather than the follow-up activities;
 - g) is unwilling or incapable of making and defending his own decisions and depends upon the CCTI director to determine attitude and behavior precedents which he then uses to secure his own position;
 - h) accepted a CCTI seminar teaching assignment (3 weeks) that prevented his functioning in the civic development administrator capacity. This occurred at a time when decisions had to be made and was detrimental to the program.

The AID advisors have both talked to Mr. Membreño about the strengths and weaknesses of the program director. Mr. Membreño told the evaluator he felt Mr. Suazo could learn to be a good program director, but that if he did not perform well, changes could be made. The situation is complicated by Honduran personalistic and authoritative values. It would appear from Mr. Membreño's behavior that he may not want a program director who would be a direct challenge to his authority and that he places more value on personal friendship and family ties than he does on program success and impact.

The director problem becomes even more urgent and serious because the director is moving the program away from its intended goal and channeling program resources toward a restricted teaching-training level that has been repeatedly shown to be insufficient for true long-term change. The director is insecure in his position and is pointing the entire program toward the area where he is secure and performs well.

Field work by the evaluator showed that all of the field agents were aware of the director's weaknesses although hesitant to verbalize their knowledge because of

obvious reprisal possibilities. The field agents resented the director's inability to function properly in his job, i.e., checks for expenses were unduly delayed; changes in policy without any notice; following Mr. Membreno's line of thinking without defending the promoters; habitual cancelation of plans at the last minute; habitually being late for appointments; lack of awareness or first hand knowledge of the field situation. The director was observed to work with those promoters who do not challenge him in any way, i. e. he worked more with the new promotor and the promotor he knows Mr. Membreno dislikes than with the others.

Another indicator of the need for rapid solution to the problem is the program director's desire to add extension agents. All promoters do not agree that they want extension agents to coordinate and supervise. The one promotor who is in agreement and is capable of managing extensionists is being under-utilized in his present position. If the program director is allowed to establish extensionists in a hierarchy, he will be strengthening the program director's role and expanding program director responsibility. This would be a serious mistake if he maintains his position since he is already functioning at a very low level and could not supervise extensionists in addition to his present load.

The final point of concern is related to the plans to move the civic development program structure away from CCTI to an autonomous position. The present program director could not move with the program and successfully fulfill job demands and meet the program's goals and purposes. The program would either change to a teaching program under his direction or fail to meet goals and collapse. The program director does not fully understand the global aspects and is politically naive. His naivete could be the means to program take-over by undesirable leadership.

The weak program director gave rise to a secondary parallel situation with the AID advisor. The overall initial planning for the program was not detailed,

explicit nor well structured and this resulted in the assumption that CCTI staff were adequate for the program, therefore, no thorough review of the program director was made until he was well established in his job. The initial fuzziness of the program led to a failure to explicate the rights and duties of each staff member before the operation began and this resulted in misconceptions and misunderstandings of the functions and authority of both the program director and the advisor.

It was pointed out on page 18 that Mr. Membreño gives continuous support to Mr. Suazo despite awareness of the poor performance. Mr. Membreño takes the position that Mr. Skelton has failed in his role as advisor and is "practically useless" because it is the advisor's responsibility to train Mr. Suazo in the weak areas. The combination of support by Membreño and undefined function and authority led to antagonistic behavior by Mr. Suazo toward the advisor and resulted in delay to operational program aspects.

The promoters, all Hondurans, understand the personalism, power and family status aspects of the Membreño-Suazo situation. The advisor role was also known to all promoters but by Honduran definition it indicates authority and decision making rights and duties coupled with expertise in performance. The promoters expected the advisor to "buck the establishment" for them. No clearly stated function-authority limits for the advisor were made to the promoters and the result was they formed independent internal opinions and attitudes in regard to Mr. Skelton. These were positive or negative depending on his fulfilling or failing to fulfill the "authority-expertise" assesser role they understood.

The AID advisor is a culturally perceptive and politically astute man. He has lived and worked in Honduras eight years and knows key individuals in Honduran institutions and agencies. Mr. Skelton is devoted to democratic principals and ideals and naturally non-authoritarian in his working relationships. The

knowledge and experience needed for his work were excellent but his role also called for an authoritarian approach. He did not use authority because a) he depended on AID/CCTI to set the limits of his authority; b) he is naturally non-authoritarian; c) he miscalculated the strength of the authority aspect in the Honduran definition of his role.

Mr. Skelton was aware of some aspects of the difficulties by the resentments and hostilities displayed by the staff members. The advisor wrote memoranda and had discussions with Mr. Gregg, Mr. Membreño and Mr. Suazo but despite his efforts the situation did not seem to be improving.

A function of this evaluation was to help CCTI/CD become aware of weaknesses in the program that could develop into problems. The evaluator discussed the ill-defined AID advisor position with the administrative group. Action, in the form of a written statement and discussions between all four administrators, have partially resolved the problem and increased administrative cooperation to some extent.

The CCTI/CD program at the field level is designed to complete a series of four stages: exploration/motivation; selection seminars; basic course; and follow-up.

I. EXPLORATION

Pre-study of a community for purposes of obtaining survey data on the social, economic and political aspects of the area. The field agent learns who the local leaders are and their sphere of influence. Programs by other agencies or institutions in progress or completed are noted. The exploration stage provides the promotor with the opportunity to meet many community residents and to assess the degree of program receptivity and the felt needs of the community. The promotor uses this stage to establish contacts among community

members. The information gathered is recorded on a standardized "Community Fact Sheet" and filed in the central office.

II. SELECTION SEMINAR STAGE

The exploration stage is followed by a time interval during which the promotor analyzes the data about the community. The promotor may elect to return to the community to offer a motivation seminar based on two principle factors;

- 1) contacts established with recognized local leaders (1-5);
- 2) receptivity of the community to the CCTI/CD program.

A seminar theoretically is open to all community members. In actuality, only a part of the community responds. This seminar is used by the promotor to observe the performance of leaders who were tentatively selected in the exploration stage. The community members decide whether they will or will not participate in the program in part on the basis of the contacts made by the promotor, i.e. if the promotor selects leaders A, C and D, but not B, then the family-friend groups of A, C, and D will participate but none of the B group will attend. It is possible that B's group will offer resistance and negative behavior that will create obstacles for the field agent and the program. It is also possible that B's group will simply not participate and that groups A, C and D will not be sufficiently cohesive or strong enough without the cooperation of B's group to follow through to reach program activity goals, i.e. initially strong but not sustained over time.

The following example from the evaluator's field data illustrates the significance of the promoters' performance at stage one to results at stage two. The information comes from a comparison between the evaluator's pre-study of a community site and the promotor's exploration and motivation performance.

The field site was selected by the promotor from a map in the central office. Three communities were closely grouped together on the map, but a departmental boundary divided communities A and B from C. Community A was a municipal center. The promotor had never been in the site area but based part of her selection on the fact that the communities were somewhat isolated and it was assumed by the promotor that there had been few development programs offered in the site zone.

The evaluator, using anthropological field methods for community survey information, spent one week working alone collecting demographic, socio-economic and political information. Records were kept for each community of: community leaders and their sphere of influence; officials and government agencies in the communities; self-help projects completed or in process; time and distance factors that controlled campesino and community interactions; community problems as stated by residents; work patterns and local use of time; authority-power structures in the communities; attitudes of local residents toward development projects. The information collected in the pre-study was not discussed with the promotor but was reserved for later comparison with the field agent's results.

The CCTI/CD promotor, a new program promotor and the evaluator returned to the site several weeks later. The promotor and assistant spent four and one-half days in the zone during which time both the exploration stage and the seminar stage were completed. The two CCTI/CD promotors spent one and one-half days in exploration. This consisted of driving to communities B and C for short visits. Community A had a small pension where the field agents stayed. The promotor stated she had one contact in community B (from former work with ANACH) and another ANACH contact in community D (not part of the original promotor work plan but close to community B).

The promotor visited community D and talked with the ANACH contact. She made the following decisions:

- 1) She would not work with community C as it fell in a different department and there were conflicts between communities B and C.
- 2) Community D would replace community C.
- 3) The promotor made no attempt to locate local leaders. She went directly to her ANACH contacts for their advice on community organization. The ANACH contact per se is completely acceptable but promotor efforts to make additional new contacts with several local leaders will increase the probability of a more representative community group at the seminar, thus offering a greater selection basis for leadership training in the basic course stage. The promoters all know the negative image many campesinos hold toward the ANACH organization. Promotor bias to this group will: reinforce community division where it exists; eliminate persons who do not understand ANACH so an opportunity is lost to change negative attitudes; provide an opportunity for negative attitudes toward ANACH to be extended to CCTI/CD.
- 4) Objective decision-making by the promotor will be reflected in community response and activities. The decision to hold the seminar in community D was a personal preference of the promotor. The hour-schedule of the seminar was a personal promotor decision made with the knowledge this was the time for the bean harvest. The results were daily delays in starting the morning session and lowered attendance by community B due to time/distance factors. The community preference for electricity as the follow-up activity was re-channeled to latrines because of promotor preference. Community response was weak and disinterested. Autocratic decision making has merit in some instances but does not promote democratic procedures being expressed in the CCTI/CD program.

- 5) The promotor did not want to make 2 trips to the area so she decided to do both Stage I (exploration) and II (seminar) at the same time. The stages of exploration and seminar are much more successful when they are separate rather than combined processes. Adequate pre-study information in the case illustrated would have resulted in much higher attendance (100 or more), fewer changes in promotor work schedule, broader community representation, and greater interest in community follow-up activities.

III. BASIC COURSE

The basic course level is devoted to teaching campesinos selected from the motivation seminar. The courses include instructions in: governmental processes; human relations; agrarian reform law; social improvement (health, education, etc.); cooperatives; constitutional rights and duties; and parliamentary procedure. The initial basic course lasted fifteen days but this proved to be unnecessarily long and incompatible to campesino living patterns. The basic course has been shortened to one week which is satisfactory. The participants live and eat at a center which allows an intensive teaching schedule to be fulfilled. The central locations used for the basic courses have been the Catholic Center in Comayagua; SITRATERCO in Puerto Cortés; and La Colmena, Choluteca. The CCTI/CD program director and one promotor attended a ten-day seminar at Loyola, New Orleans related to establishing in-country training centers. Both the director and the promotor, Rosales, would like to see CCTI/CD buy an available abandoned building in Comayagua that could be remodeled to serve as a permanent Civic Development Training Center. No action has been taken. No basic course was scheduled during the evaluation period. Promotor Rosales has suggested that the CCTI/CD program schedule all basic

course programs during the rainy season. This would permit promoters to do intensive field work during the dry season when conditions were best for travel and program work in the rural areas. The suggestion has much merit.

IV. FOLLOW-UP STAGE

The follow-up stage carries the primary impetus of CCTI/CD program impact. This stage maintains the promotor-community interaction relations while allowing application of leadership training and organization principles at the community level. The follow-up activities selected by the communities vary with local needs but tend to fall in categories such as: farm-to-market road construction or improvement; water systems; primary and vocational schools; clinics; bridges; libraries; cooperatives; small industries; latrine projects; and land reform activity.

The function of the promotor in the follow-up stage is variable:

- 1) The promotor provides information and support to community organizations and their leaders. He attends meetings, advises on parliamentary procedure and encourages organizational independence.
- 2) The promotor is the direct communication agent with outside private/government agencies or institutions that the community organizations have never known or used.
- 3) The promotor acts as arbitrator or mediator in instances where a community divides into opposed factions.
- 4) The promotor obtains technicians or specialists who can provide information to answer community questions.

Promoters desire to maintain support for organized community change activities without being the change leaders. The transfer from a dependent to an independent community organization is a gradual process. The promotor position is delicate,

requiring skill, tact and knowledge if he is to successfully establish a new, organized democratic community process to replace the traditional (patrón) pattern.

The chart, page 28, summarizes the follow-up activities of three of the four field agents. Mr. Pinto is omitted because he is a new field agent who has been assisting other field agents and only recently was assigned a separate zone.

The reader will notice that the chart is incomplete. This is due to the field agents' inconsistent reporting on field data. The AID advisor has been trying to standardize report forms so that comparable categories will be consistently reported to provide performance statistics. Mr. Suazo and Mr. Skelton were still in the process of revising data sheets when the evaluator terminated field work.

Certain trends appear on the chart that were supported by the evaluator's field work.

1. A greater time spent in Stages I (Exploration/Motivation) and IV (Follow-up activities) result in a greater number of new organizations.
2. Emphasis on Stages II (Selection Seminar) and III (Basic Course) fill information lacunas but do not assure community organization.
3. Promotor contact bias leads to lowered community participation.

FIELD AGENT:	Canelas-South coast		Rosales-North coast		Zuniga - central	
		<u>Participants</u>		<u>Participants</u>		<u>Participants</u>
Stage I Motivation/ Exploration	12	525	15		6	
Stage II Selection Seminar	5	200	5	547	7	297
Stage III Basic Course	1	30	1	30	1	27
Stage IV Follow-Up New Organ- izations	26		2		6	
Reorganized Community Groups	7					
Roads	1					
Bridges	1					
Schools	1				2	
Street Repair	2					
Electricity	1					
Water Systems					1	
Small Industry	2					
Short Lectures	282					
Community Federations	3					
Latrines					1	

Data based on CCTI/CD records from June 1970 to April 1971

IV

The CCTI/CD program is organized into four distinct stages for implementation with the rural population: exploration/motivation; selection seminars; basic course; and follow-up activities. The program is well planned with each stage fulfilling a program need. The most important program aspect for campesino impact is Stage IV - Follow-up activities.

The CCTI/CD program proposed to make use of the educational/organizational background provided by ACPH (radiophonics). The south coast has had radiophonics in action for the longest period of time which may account in part for the CCTI/CD success in that zone. Results in the north coast zone indicate that the radiophonic program is not a requirement for civic development success since other agencies or factors (ANACH, Fruit company, etc.) may have prepared an equally suitable CCTI/CD program base. The evaluator's field work indicates that the CCTI/CD program can be implemented in areas where little educational/organizational information has been provided, but that the civic development programs develop more rapidly in zones where a base has been established.

The initial organization of the civic development program stated that program implementation would be leveled at the rural and municipal levels. Municipal participation would include local governing officials (alcaldes, auxiliares, municipal treasurers, etc.). To date, little effort has been expended to include this segment of the population.

The evaluator found that CCTI/CD field agents are encountering increasing demands from the professional and municipal segments. It appears imperative for the CCTI/CD Administrators and staff to begin planning ways to meet the interest of these groups and incorporate them into the growing community organizational structures. The municipal officials are usually influential in campesino community

plans and activities. These officials can have positive or negative effects on the program depending upon contacts established by the field agent and their understanding of the program goals.

Overall policy for the civic development program is relatively structured up to the present program needs. Certain difficulties have occurred which indicate that policy should be clearly stated so that there will be fewer opportunities for misunderstanding and conflicts. One recent example is related to establishing policy in regard to leave of absence. Ana Ruth Zuniga requested vacation plus leave-of-absence at a time when field work for program objectives is most easily accomplished. The AID advisor felt she placed personal over program objectives. The Honduran administrators felt she should be given leave-of-absence. This sets a precedent which will work to program disadvantage over time and should be carefully considered prior to making a decisive policy statement.

The serious problem of the poorly functioning program director needs immediate resolution for optimum long-term program impact. The evaluation data show the director to be: insecure; status directed; making decisions about personnel on a non-objective personal bias basis; trying to focus the program at the teaching level; inadequately informed on field work because of failure to spend time with field agents; and politically naive resulting in a misconception of the program goal. Given the program director's interest and ability in the teaching aspect of the program, a reevaluation of his position should be conducted and action taken to put him at the level of competence where he will be secure and perform well.

The resentment and tensions generated by the AID advisor's position have been partially remedied. It is not to be expected that all hostilities will disappear given the growing nationalism throughout Honduras. It is advisable that definite and firm statements of the rights and duties of the AID advisor be periodically

reviewed and discussed for maintaining smoothest cooperation and giving tangible AID support to the advisor's role.

The field agents or promoters for the CCTI/CD program have direct, prolonged contact with the target population. The importance of the background and training of this staff level is obvious. The program plans to add five new promoters per year until there are a total of thirty-five. Careful selection and screening of job candidates is necessary and critical to the success of the program. Honduras does not have an unlimited human resource pool from which these staff members may be drawn so that consideration of alternatives should be started in the immediate future.

The variation in results of the four present field agents may well predict on a small scale certain aspects that will be amplified with an increased staff.

Mr. Canlas, the south coast field agent, has a varied educational background: primary teacher training; law; community development; and journalism. His job background indicates an unsettled career choice with two consistent trends:

- (a) "cause" orientation (anti-communism, land reforms, labor organization) and
- (b) preference for campesinos as the primary population for socio-economic revolution.

The south coast field agent is intelligent, able to establish excellent, enduring rapport with campesinos and displays insightful understanding of the campesino life-style. Mr. Canlas is capable and knowledgeable about the forces for organization. He is adroit in his use of campesino attitudes to accomplish CCTI/CD purposes. His major weaknesses are his unwillingness to assess middle and upper-social sectors objectively and an inherent disregard for a systematic, organized consistent plan of work.

Two follow-up activities are unique in the south coast zone: the three federations of communities, and an organized, legal approach to land redistribution involving three communities and one latifundista (large landowner). These two activities are a direct result of Mr. Canelas' understanding of change forces and how to channel them toward CCTI/CD program purposes.

It is a fact that a good field man does not necessarily make friends or adhere relentlessly to rules. Change is not based entirely on predictable factors but, in part arises from combinations of individual variable responses to a given situation. Mr. Canelas has an aptitude for utilizing the spontaneous campesino forces at work in a given situation. This means the field agent must make decisions on the spot. It is this "situational decision-making" which has resulted in personality conflicts between CCTI/CD administrators and the field agent, coupled with serious personal and program repercussions.

Mr. Suazo and Mr. Membreño are directly responsible to public criticism for acceptance of the program. They tend to view Mr. Canelas' field decisions as "rash, irresponsible" acts when the result is quite the opposite. Mr. Membreño has responded on two occasions by accepting Mr. Canelas' "situation decision" and doing what the program director felt appropriate to avoid conflict or criticism of CCTI/CD by public sectors. The action Mr. Membreño took was in positive support of Mr. Canelas, but the resentment toward Mr. Canelas as an "agitator" trying to "create social revolution" left negative feelings and personal dislike of Mr. Canelas, i.e. Canelas put Membreño on the spot and it was not appreciated. Mr. Suazo, as pointed out earlier, is quite incapable, inept and completely unaware of the field agents' work so that instead of supporting or evaluating the situation independently he relies on Mr. Membreño to assess the situation then reacts as he is told to react. The two Honduran administrators would like to work Canelas out of the program because he "is a nuisance and a trouble maker."

Equally effective, but more patient, and tactful, is the north coast promotor, Rodolfo Rosales. Mr. Rosales is a politically astute man who was director of the national agrarian reform institution (INA) and an appointed political governor. He has been director of the Central American free labor organization (IESCA). Mr. Rosales is a lawyer with special interest in agrarian reform and national development. He told the evaluator he has ".....no interest in another government position as government controlled programs are not oriented to true Honduran development".

The evaluation data show that Rosales is capable of quick, accurate decision making; conscious of the overall program responsibility; up-to-date on activities, policies and plans of Honduran agencies and institutions; inherently orderly and organized in work habits; capable of enduring personal discomfort to reach program target groups; and being under-utilized by CCTI/CD in his role as field agent. Mr. Rosales is aware that he threatens the role of the program director but manages to present his personal views in regard to policy issues in such a way that he has to date avoided personal conflict between himself and the program director. The program director has been careful to work with other field agents, reducing the probability of friction.

Ana Ruth Zuniga was assigned to work the Central Zone. She has a background in economics, cooperatives and socio-economic reform work. She taught as a field agent for ANACH and IESCA. She is well liked by the rest of the staff, intelligent and interested in Honduran socio-economic change. She told the evaluator she feels "....nothing will change without campesino organisation and revolution. I would be proud to be a part of such change." Her former work with ANACH permitted her to form friendships with the leaders which she maintains. She was nominated as one of the three candidates for director of INA by the ANACH campesino meeting at SITRATERCO. (The three nominees were Rodolfo Rosales Abolla, Jorge Jiménez and

Miss Zuniga). She is unqualified as director of INA but the incident shows her influence within the ANACH organization.

Miss Zuniga has the largest zone in the CCTI/CD program, with the largest campesino population. The central zone has had the least influence from other agencies and institutions such as radiophonics, ANACH, INA, etc. Miss Zuniga equates the exploration-motivation stage with teaching courses. Her orientation to program purposes is primarily education/teaching. The follow-up activity record reflects this interest and is weak in comparison to the other promoters.

The central zone promotor is not particularly devoted to the CCTI/CD program. She told the evaluator she had intended to rest a few months but took this job because Mr. Suazo is a family friend who asked her help. She has chronic anemia and tires easily. She does not drive a car. Her job as field agent is complicated by both her health and her transportation problems. She stated she is working at less than her salary with IESCA and this is a source of dissatisfaction. She applied for an OEA scholarship to Italy which did not materialize. Miss Zuniga asked for, and received, a two week vacation plus one month's leave of absence in mid-April. Her attitude, behavior and performance show her to be the weakest field agent in the CCTI/CD program while she has been assigned to the largest zone with the greatest target population. This again reflects poor initial judgment and lack of field situation knowledge on the part of the program director.

Mr. Pinto does not have a strong educational background. His experience with an INA training team gave him an orientation for CCTI/CD program work. Mr. Suazo has recently concentrated his attention on Mr. Pinto and his field work in El Paraiso. The evaluator saw Mr. Pinto at work assisting other promoters but did not see him work in the field alone. The information and reports Mr. Pinto made of fourteen possible target communities were well rounded, showed he had spent time plus

effort in the exploratory-orientation stage and indicated his ability to conduct field work alone.

Campefino reaction to the program is essentially positive and is reflected in:

- The numbers of new organizations formed;
- follow-up activities in progress or completed;
- the federation of thirteen communities which formed spontaneously;
- the example of the two communities which followed an orderly process toward solution of land reform problems;
- willingness of community leaders and members to hold group meetings;
- ability of communities to determine by themselves a problem and its solution.

Interviews with program participants showed that the impact level is closely correlated to promotor skill and availability and is dependent upon the leaders selected for training. There is to date a high correlation between leaders trained by CCTI/CD and community organization leaders. The few instances where resistance to the program occurred among campesinos were related to strong local caciques or isolation, ignorance factors.

Based upon interviews, observation and analysis of CCTI/CD records, the evaluator proposes the following program recommendations:

1. The poorly functioning program director is detrimental to the entire program. A solution to the problem must be reached in the immediate future.
2. The conflicts between the administrative staff and the south coast promotor need consideration. The program would make a serious mistake by ignoring Mr. Canolas' abilities and results in an effort to make him conform to hierarchical authority. CCTI/CD could tighten field supervision and provide objective counseling before determining the necessity of eliminating his services.
3. Ana Ruth Zuniga is very weak and performing at a low output level. Health problems coupled with a preference for teaching suggest Miss Zuniga might have more program value as a mobile program lecturer rather than as a field agent.
4. Consideration of the limited human resource pool for drawing field agents indicates the staff must plan alternatives for program expansion if qualified personnel at the promotor level are not available.
5. Plans should be made to provide CCTI/CD program activities for the municipal/professional population. The program will be strengthened by enlarging the target population. It is possible volunteer program help will emerge from such action.
6. Mr. Rosales is an excellent field agent but is being under-utilized in the program. His administrative abilities should be channeled to program benefit.

7. Mr. Skelton's advisory role should be under continuous review so that periodic written statements and verbal discussions will keep his authority and responsibilities clearly defined for the entire staff.