


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Summaries of 1978-80 Evaluations for AID in ASIA



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October 1981
Bureau for Asia
Agency for International Development

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INTRODUCTION

Background

The purpose of evaluation in AID is to provide information on project and program performance to decisionmakers. In recent years, the concern with channeling project performance information to decisionmakers has increased considerably. Pressures for increased information stem, in part, from three developments.

Shrinking Resources Limitations on resource availability require that resources have maximum impact at minimum cost. Within AID, there have been increasing requests for information on ways to maximize impact with available resources and on the efficacy and costs of alternative development strategies.

Questioning of AID's Impact Both foreign aid advocates and critics alike have raised questions concerning the impact of AID-assisted projects on beneficiaries and AID's longer term contribution to institution building and human resource development. Thus, project performance information is increasingly sought and used to provide evidence of program impact and effectiveness and to present more persuasive justifications for various programs and funding levels.

Concern with Learning the Lessons of Development Concerns have been raised that AID is not learning from past mistakes or building on clear successes. Project designers and project officers are now increasingly asking "what works?" and requesting information that identifies project and program elements critical for success.

All of these developments have presented a single challenge to AID -- the challenge of providing concise, timely, and accurate information on project performance to decisionmakers.

The Asia Bureau has tended to approach this challenge primarily through two means.

One approach has been through the use of the ST/DIU data base (DIS -Development Information System) which provides abstracts of all project or program evaluations. The other more common approach is the ad hoc use of a single, recent evaluation for guidance in decisionmaking concerning the future of an individual project.

For reasons too well known to need discussion here, both of these approaches have particular deficiencies. In short, the use of the ST/DIU data base frequently results in an abundance of irrelevant information, while the use of single evaluations for decisionmaking fails to provide a broader contextual or comparative perspective concerning project impact and effectiveness.

Thus far there has been no systematic attempt to compile project performance information for decisionmakers in a way that represents the middle ground between these two approaches. This compilation of evaluation summaries is an effort to begin to address this need.

Purpose This volume is a compilation of summaries of 50 evaluations and studies conducted for the Asia Bureau between 1978 and 1980. The purpose of bringing together summaries of recent evaluations is to provide concise and accurate information on project performance to Asia Bureau decisionmakers at all levels -- from project designers and project and program officers in the missions, to project reviewers and senior decision and policymakers in Washington.


Contents The summaries are arranged by sector so that needed information on recent experience in any one particular functional area can be quickly reviewed. In addition, for each evaluation summary, a project identification data sheet has also been prepared in order to bring together essential project information. The summaries are bound with loose-leaf rings so that copies of the material from individual sectors can be made available to technical and project officers responsible for that sector, while the entire collection can be used by program and policy planning offices. Copies of the full reports are available for consultation from the Asia Bureau Office of Development Planning (Room 3208 NS) or can be ordered from ST/DIU.

Assembling this first collection proved more difficult and the present result less satisfactory than originally anticipated for a number of reasons. First, the summaries included here are not "executive summaries." At the time the 1978-1980 evaluations were undertaken, there was no requirement in the Asia Bureau, as there is at the present time, for evaluation reports to include executive summaries. Each report, therefore, had to be reviewed individually to extract the information which most closely approximated an executive summary. Unfortunately, in many cases, even the pages extracted still do not present a self-contained overview given the loose organization of some of the reports in question. Second, many of the evaluations undertaken during this time period do not provide quantitative or qualitative data on issues of current concern to decisionmakers: impact on beneficiaries, institution building, human resource development or technology transfer. Finally, few summaries address the policy implications of the conclusions reached nor identify

specific elements of project or program design and implementation that are critical to project outcome. All of the above categories of information are particularly useful -- if not essential -- at various levels of decisionmaking.

Despite these deficiencies, it is still hoped that this initial compilation will provide useful evaluation findings on recent AID-assisted projects - especially to those involved in project design and review. The deficiencies of the summaries, moreover, underscore the importance of the Asia Bureau guidance (conveyed to Asia Missions via State 63232, attached, and re-emphasized during the 1981 Asia Bureau Evaluation Workshops) that, to facilitate distribution and broaden utilization, all evaluation reports should include a two-page executive summary, followed by a succinct statement of major conclusions and recommendations. This guidance has been supported by all Asia Missions. To facilitate adherence to this guidance, a sample format for the executive summary, project identification data sheet, and conclusions and recommendations has been developed by the Asia Bureau and is attached to this report. Closer adherence to the recommended format will permit the Asia Bureau to make more thorough summaries and concise conclusions of Asia Bureau evaluations available to all missions and bureau offices in the future.

EVALUATION
of
AID LOAN 489-T-088



Suwon, Republic of Korea

June 6, 1978

Team Members: Dr. R. Desrosiers, USAID Ret.
Dr. K. Kopf, USAID Ret.
Dr. J. M. Yohe, AID/Washington

FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Korea	B. Project Title Crops Improvement Research Center (CIRC) Project	C. Project Number not stated	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>74</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY <u>78*</u>
E. Life of Project Funding 1. AID: (Loan or Grant) <u>\$5,000,000 (1974)</u> Other Donor _____ Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director <u>not stated</u> 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) 3. Other	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) <u>not stated</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) <u>not stated</u>		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) Office of Rural Development (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry), as well as CIRC 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) <u>not stated</u>	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date) <u>not stated</u>			

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title <u>Evaluation of AID Loan 489-T-088</u>	B. Evaluation Date <u>June 6, 1978</u>	C. Type of Evaluation <u>on going project</u>	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire <u>not stated</u> travel _____ per diem _____ Contract _____ 3. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation <u>(SEE attached sheet)</u>	G. Initiated By <u>not stated</u>

H. Evaluation Team Composition

1. Direct Hire			
a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise	
Dr. R. Desrosiers, USAID Ret.			
Dr. K. Kopf, USAID Ret.			
Dr. J.M. Yohe, AID/Washington			
2. Contract:			
a. Name of Organization (if any)	b. Contract No.		
c. Name(s) of Persons	d. Area(s) of Expertise		

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position) William E. Paupe, USAID/K
Neboysha R. Brashich, Program Officer, Ed Gales, Chief, Office of Development Loans USAID/K. Also, Dr. Kim, In Hwan, Director al, ORD. Mr. Shin, Dong Wan, Director, / Dr. Paul C. Lippold, Co-Director, CIRC. Mr. Kim, Joon, Director, Saemaul Leaders

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____
Typed Name _____
Position _____
Date _____

F. Purpose: Assess the USAID loan in increasing the quality of life through increases in crop production as well as farmers' incomes. Purpose(s) of the evaluation are to describe major accomplishments of CIRC project and the Office of Rural Development (ORD's) major goals, weaknesses, and problems, with an eye toward the imminent ending of foreign assistance.

* Project Activity Completion Date FY 78 according to page 15. However page 77, authors state that the current AID Loan is scheduled to terminate on September 30, 1980.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

- A. Improve the salaries of research personnel to make them competitive with those paid to university staff of comparable status. This should have the highest priority possible.
- B. Revise the personnel system of ORD to provide two parallel ladders for advancement, one for active research workers and the other for management. The system should provide for the advancement of research workers to grades and salaries equal to those of management personnel.
- C. Start an all-out program for the training of research personnel in the use of the English language, beginning with people newly-inducted into the ORD Service.
- D. Start a crash program for the training of subject-matter specialists in plant pathology and entomology in order to alleviate critical shortages in these specialities. Provide for wider cooperation at the project level between discipline and crop-oriented scientists.
- E. Provide for a centralized biometrics unit which: (1) will supply advice and assistance to all research workers on design, data collection, and interpretation of the results of the experiments, and (2) will provide a computerized data analysis service.

- F. Provide for the close coordination of all ORD libraries under the leadership of the central ORD library facility and provide an adequate and guaranteed budget to ensure the exchange of knowledge within ORD.
- G. Organize the management of several support service facilities (library, centralized biometrics/computer service unit and centralized laboratory) under the office of the Deputy Director General.
- H. ORD budget be increased by December, 1978 to include CIRC supplementary budget for research, apartment house operation as appropriate, and cover salaries and administrative costs of CIRC supplementary personnel appointed and regularized to full ORD status.
- I. Continued emphasis should be placed on soybeans and potatoes. The program on soybeans has not been emphasized within ORD to the degree of its importance as a food crop in the country.
- J. The cropping systems activity should be formally established in ORD as a section within the Research Bureau or as a Division in the Crop Experiment Station.
- K. The remaining recommendations of the KASS Report pertaining to livestock improvement in Korea, with assistance from ORD, should be implemented.

- L. Korea should be recognized as a middle-income country that can now assist developing countries in some technical fields.
- M. Korea should seek participation in the Title XII Program on an innovative triangular cooperation basis involving institutions in the United States, Korea and other LDCs. This proposal should be presented to the BIFAD Board.
- N. All I.D. Committee deliberations must be presented in both English and Korean, or else the contribution of the expert consultants may be lost.
- O. All CIRC research program changes after I.D. meetings and steering committee approval should be approved through the respective I.D. Committees.
- P. Upon termination of this project, CIRC personnel should be regularized and given permanent status. All research projects should also be continued by the ROKG.

THE INTEGRATED CEREALS PROJECT

- NEPAL -

Report

of

Mid-term Evaluation

October - November, 1979

A.I.D. - ASIA
FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country NEPAL	B. Project Title Integrated Cereals Project	C. Project Number not stated	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>76</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY _____
E. Life of Project Funding ID: (Loan or Grant) <u>2,699,000*</u> Other Donor _____ 3. Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ _____ *Budgeted for 1st 3 years of 5 year project		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director not stated 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) 3. Other	
G. Project Design 1. In-house (Name, Position) not stated 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not stated		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MFA) 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not stated	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date) 1977 and 1978 annual reviews			

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title INTEGRATED CEREALS PROJECT -NEPAL-	B. Evaluation Date (Oct 22-Nov. 2) Oct-Nov. 1979	C. Type of Evaluation Mid-term (3rd year of 5 year project)	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation 9/76-9/79
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire not stated travel _____ 2. per diem _____ 3. Contract _____ 3. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____	F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation (SEE attached sheet)		G. Initiated By not stated

H. Evaluation Team Composition

1. Direct Hire
- | | | |
|---------------|----------------------------|----------------------|
| a. Name | b. Present Position | c. Area of Expertise |
| D.R. Pickett, | Agriculture Officer, | USAID/N |
| Jack Ryan, | Assistant Program Officer, | USAID/N |
2. Contract:
- | | |
|---|-------------------------|
| a. Name of Organization (if any) | b. Contract No. |
| IADS: International
Agricultural Development Service | (SEE attached sheet) |
| c. Name(s) of Persons | d. Area(s) of Expertise |

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position)

D.R. Pickett, Ag. Officer, USAID/N
Jack Ryan, Assistant Program Officer,
USAID/N
S.B. Nepali, Director General, Department
of Agriculture and Project Director

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____
Typed Name _____
Position _____
Date _____

F. Purpose: The current evaluation concentrated more attention on technical aspects of the project with less consideration of operational matters. It measures current progress toward project objectives: 1) cropping systems research, 2) national rice improvement program, 3) national maize development program, 4) national wheat development program.

H. Evaluation Team Composition:

HMG

K.P. Khatri, Ministry of Finance
Jagdish Upadhyaya, Planning Commission
B.K. Thapa, AIC
S.B. Nepali, Director General, Department of Agriculture, and Project Director
A.M. Pradhanang, Deputy Director General, Crop Science
A.N. Bhattarai, Deputy Director General, Extension and Training

International Institutes

E.E. Saari, CIMMYT Regional Wheat Representative, Cairo
T. Izuno, CIMMYT Regional Maize Representative, New Delhi
H.G. Zandstra, IRRI, Head Cropping Systems Program, Los Baños

IADS

D.S. Athwal, Program Officer, New York
A.H. Moseman, Representative, New York, Review Team Leader
C.C. Gray III, Assoc. Director for Agricultural Sciences, The Rockefeller Foundation, New York
W.H. Freeman, ICP Project Supervisor, Kathmandu

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Agriculture in Nepal provides about 66 percent of the gross national product and 75 percent of the export earnings for the Kingdom. Approximately 94 percent of the 13 million people of Nepal depend on agriculture for their livelihood.

An estimated 60 percent of Nepal's population resides in the Hills, on small farms that are intensively cultivated for a subsistence-level production. Farmers are now extracting a maximum output from their land, labor and other input resources. Production of food grains and other agricultural products in Nepal has been increased in the past through expansion of acreage, primarily in the Terai but also in the Hills. The latter has caused serious deterioration of the nation's agricultural resource base, through excessive deforestation, accelerated erosion, and irreparable damage to the already limited arable soils resource base.

Agricultural productivity in Nepal, as measured in terms of yields per hectare, is declining for a number of major crops. It has become clearly evident in the past decade that improved production technology must be utilized if Nepal is to meet future needs for food grains and other agricultural commodities. This is true for the Terai as well as for the Hills.

Agriculture in the Hills of Nepal presents formidable limitations to improvement because of the varied and complex growing conditions. The numerous microclimates--with highly variable soil, moisture, temperature, and solar combinations prevailing within small farming areas--requires new production technology specifically suited to each farming site. This limits the usefulness of technology introduced from external sources, whether from international agricultural research centers or from neighboring countries.

Nepal has no alternative other than to establish a strong national capability for modern agricultural research, to generate a continuous supply of improved technology that will increase output from present arable lands. This was recognized in the planning of the Integrated Cereals Project (ICP) by His Majesty's Government (HMG) and USAID in 1973-75. In view of the need to improve production in the Hills the ICP is set up on a "farming systems" approach, to develop technology that will provide the fine tuning for already intensive farming practices. The Project is designed to work closely with farmers, to develop a better understanding of the biological, economic, and social constraints, in order better to plan research and develop technology to fit what farmers need, want, and can use.

Of the five cropping systems research sites that have been established four are in Hill areas, at Khandbari, Lele, Pumdri Bhumdi, and Chauri Jahari. The fifth, at Sukchaina and Dhobini, is in Parsi District in the Terai. This is consistent with the strong emphasis by HMG in recent years to improve productivity and levels of living for the 60 percent of the nation's people that live in the Hills.

The ICP is strongly production oriented, with attention to the generation of technology; its verification, testing and adaptation at the five cropping systems research sites, and evaluation—with cooperating farmers—in farmers' fields.

A major continuing deficiency in Nepal's agricultural research capability is the lack of experiment station facilities in the Hills. The four cropping systems research sites are helping to fill this gap, by furnishing an essential link in the process of evaluating and fitting new technology to the numerous agroclimatic conditions in the Hills.

The present evaluation of the ICP is essentially the mid-term review, in the third year of the five year term project. Considerable progress has been made in developing facilities, training manpower, staffing, establishing the cropping systems sites, and in realigning research objectives. The current evaluation, therefore, concentrated more attention on technical aspects of the project, with less consideration of operational matters.

The members and key participants in the review are listed in APPENDIX I, and the schedule of visits is presented in APPENDIX II.

1. Current Status—Progress Toward Project Goals

The ICP has been under way for only three years, a brief period in which to put into operation a system that is nationwide in scope and that embraces all functions from the research to produce new technology through its verification and adaptation to ensure its value and acceptability by farmers. This mid-term review of the Project took into account the magnitude of the task of putting together the staff, facilities, operational concepts and procedures, geographical linkages, and the multidisciplinary and multi-institutional relationships that must combine into a working system. The review also considered the soundness of the basic concept—to integrate attention to major commodity improvement programs and a more comprehensive farming systems approach.

Substantial progress has been made in establishing facilities and the five cropping system sites—which have been operating for two years—and the Project is beginning to function as the continuum that was intended. A minimum of three to four years is necessary to develop improved technology and to test its adaptation to specific farming conditions, to ensure that the new technology can be depended upon to improve productivity with minimum risks to farmers. The confidence of farmers in the new technology offered to them is critical not only to the ICP but, more important, to the HMG.

The concentration on the farming systems research and information base as the central point for identifying the kinds of new technology that will be useful—and for furnishing well tested, reliable materials and practices

to those responsible for extension--is a system that was conceived for Nepal. It is unique in agricultural development, and results to date provide assurance that the system will be effective. The studies on physical and socio-economic environments of the sites have led to land use classification within the sites that relates clearly to variations in farmers' cropping practices. This classification, together with the growing understanding of existing cropping patterns, their productivity, management practices used by farmers, and the potentials and constraints for use of improved technology, furnishes a base for agricultural growth and for accelerated production programs hitherto not available in Nepal.

There are continuing constraints with respect to manpower, the establishment of the cropping systems research in the institutional structure of the DOA to ensure its stability and permanence, and the inadequate research attention to improvement of varieties and production practices for crops such as grain legumes, oilseeds, finger millet, barley, potatoes, and others. However, the cropping systems component of the ICP is well launched, it is becoming the focal point for guiding the development and use of improved technology--as was intended--and it should be of increasing benefit to Nepal's agricultural development from this point onward.

The national commodity research and development programs for rice, maize and wheat have been strengthened substantially during the three years of the project. Facilities at the respective central research stations are coming up reasonably well on schedule and the improved multidisciplinary staff teams are producing research results that are markedly superior to those of only two years ago.

Four new rice varieties, ranging in maturity from 110 to 140 days offer greater potential for yield, disease resistance, and insect resistance than varieties now grown by farmers. Expanded breeding and testing programs for temperate zone rice varieties appear especially encouraging in providing new varieties for the Hills. The review team observed substantial spread of new rice varieties, not only in the Terai but also in the valleys and Hill localities between Bhairawa and Pokhara. The farmer field trials, cropping systems site research, and the minikits (distributed in 1979 to 3200 farmers), have combined to accelerate farmer interest and use of the new varieties.

The national maize program has been strengthened appreciably with improved facilities and manpower. Constraints persist with respect to completion of the laboratory building, staff housing, irrigation and drinking water supplies at Rampur--but good work is going on. There is a recognized need for shorter duration varieties and the task of breeding for resistance to downy mildew and other destructive diseases is being emphasized. Research on production practices is showing that a 45 to 90 Kg. application of nitrogen is sufficient and that the maize crop generally does not respond to phosphorus and potash applications during the Kharif season. Phosphorus is not needed for the Kharif maize crop, and potash is also unnecessary. The maize minikit program appears to be particularly well conceived and operated,

and the response from farmers is exceptionally good, with 70 percent or more of the farmers reporting back on their evaluation of the improved technology distributed in the minikits.

Wheat production has essentially doubled in Nepal in the past decade, from 233,000 metric tons ten years ago to the estimated current production of 454,000 metric tons. However, this results from expansion of acreage, and yields per hectare have remained low and relatively constant at about 1.2 tons over this ten year period. The introduction of early, disease resistant varieties has permitted expansion of the wheat area, particularly in the Terai where farmers sow wheat after the rice crop is harvested in October or November. One factor, however, that contributes to the constant low yield of wheat is the frequently delayed planting of the crop when rice harvest is late. It has been determined that wheat yields are reduced by about 20 percent if sowing is delayed to December 15 and by as much as 50 percent if sowing occurs on December 30.

There is an urgent need for further strengthening of the wheat research program to meet well recognized and particularly stubborn constraints to production. The high sterility of the wheat crop in the Eastern Terai persists and is particularly damaging to the improved variety NL 30. The causal factors are not understood and must be tackled through more intensive, multidisciplinary team investigations. The discovery of the Karnal bunt disease in the Western and Far Western Terai in 1979 poses a new serious threat to wheat production in Nepal since the variety UP 262 and many other promising new varieties are susceptible to the disease.

Progress in selecting varieties better suited to the Hills has been limited due to the lack of suitable research station facilities in the Hills, where selections can be made. This constraint is not unique to wheat but continues to limit effective development of improved crop varieties and management practices also for rice, maize and the numerous other crops important to Hill farmers.

In summary, the review team found the status of the program and the progress toward project goals to be good. The generation of new technology, its evaluation through the newly established cropping systems sites, and the potential extension of adapted, reliable new technology into appropriate channels for prompt farm use is becoming systematized to a degree that is very satisfactory for a project in the third year of operation. There are still growing pains and constraints but none that are unusual or that would be difficult to resolve. The base is being well established for a system that will be increasingly beneficial to agricultural production in Nepal in the next two years of duration of the project and that hopefully will provide for an expanded program to serve farmers throughout Nepal more effectively in succeeding years.

2. Recommended Immediate Emphasis of the Project

It is recognized that a period of five years, the time span of the ICP, is an inadequate period for establishing a fully operative and well staffed

research and development system. The term required for training and building a complement of qualified multidisciplinary manpower usually extends over 10 years or more. The information that is being developed through the cropping systems research sites is indicative but not sufficiently replicated over time to be fully reliable. At least two to three more years of results will be needed to build a base for recommendations with reasonable confidence.

Although the technology evaluation process is still in the development and early maturity stage the review team and ICP personnel are aware that there is urgent need to utilize the best information and materials now available to support efforts to increase Nepal's food grain production. The limited pre-monsoon showers and subsequent light monsoon in 1979 have caused serious food grain deficits. As HMG moves forward with accelerated crop production programs in the 1979-80 crop seasons the ICP should be expected to be involved in a supporting role to the agencies responsible for the production campaigns.

The report of the review team presents information on some of the types of technology inputs that might be furnished by the respective rice, maize and wheat research programs and through the cropping systems sites. The early use and application of technology that is still in the evaluation and verification stage--with respect to specific farming conditions--presents some risk, but risk that would be justified under the current critical food supply situation.

3. Future Directions of the Project

Many of the substantial investments to improve agriculture in Nepal during the past 25 years, by HMG and external agencies, have not had the impact or continuing benefits anticipated because the individual projects were not covered into the institutional structure of Nepal. Also, projects tended to be established and operated at a funding level that could not be continued with HMG resources as external support was diminished and withdrawn.

The review team feels that the ICP is conceptually sound, well designed to meet Nepal's unusually complex and varied farming conditions, and should be seriously considered as a continuing base for agricultural technology generation and use. The current project will conclude its five year term in 1981. In order to ensure maximum effective continuity of a program for improving farming systems and productivity in Nepal through a sound, technology-based system it would be desirable for attention to be given promptly, jointly by HMG and USAID, to actions to be taken to ensure effective continuity of activities along the lines of the ICP.

4. Recommendations

The review report identifies a number of constraints to the Project as well as opportunities for redirection of research and accelerating the impact of the ICP on agricultural production in Nepal. The following actions should be considered for priority attention:

- a. Actions should be taken to bring the ICP to its intended level of effective operation by expediting construction of facilities, the scheduling of manpower development, and provision of permanent HMG staffing for the project.
- b. Give special emphasis to the strengthening of the Cropping Systems Research Program (CSRP) at the five sites now established, to further improve the procedures for testing and adapting new technology to ensure its suitability for different agroclimatic situations and acceptance by farmers. The possibility of adding a new cropping systems field site in the Inner Terai, in the Chitwan Valley, also should be explored.
- c. Expand the CSRP by establishing more effective linkages with selected area development projects, such as those at Lumle, Pakhribas, Gandaki, Janakpur, and others.
- d. Expand the studies on soil fertility and agronomic research in the CSRP to relate fertilizer use more precisely to site requirements and to efficient fertility management in various cropping sequences.
- e. Include attention to livestock in a broader approach to farming systems research, recognizing that animals are an integral component in farming throughout Nepal.
- f. ²⁷ Set up a national coordinated Farming Systems Research Program (as a successor to the CSRP) with the same permanence as the national commodity research programs, with full-time coordinating leadership and full-time, permanent positions for the staff.
- g. Give attention to research for improving varieties and production practices for barley, millets, grain legumes, oilseeds, potatoes, and other crops that are important in cropping systems in different areas of Nepal.
- h. Concentrate greater attention on pilot production programs in a few selected farming areas, to determine the potentials for new technology to increase production and to gain further experience in working relationships with farmers, Regional Directors, DADO's, the AIC, ADB, AMS, IAAS and other concerned agencies.
- i. Consolidate the information and experience of the ICP, and especially the CSRP site results, to furnish the base for accelerated crop production programs.
- j. Place increased emphasis, and support, on the recent initiatives by the rice, maize, and wheat programs to develop varieties better suited to temperate zone conditions and to the various microclimates of the Hills.

k. Develop multipurpose regional stations for breeding, selection, and critical evaluation of new varieties and production practices for rice, maize and wheat, to serve farmers in the Hills. Guidance with respect to needs and potential sites is furnished in the report "A Study of Hill Agriculture in Nepal," of November 1974.

l. Continue to develop the interactions and cooperation between the CSRP, the National Commodity Programs, and the Discipline Divisions of the Department of Agriculture to maximize cross references with respect to critical problems and to new technology developments.

m. Strengthen those aspects of the national commodity programs as required to tackle continuing stubborn, high priority constraints, including the high sterility of wheat in the Eastern Terai, the threat of Karnal bunt of wheat, the downy mildew and other diseases of maize, and other problems as identified in the review report.

n. Take positive steps to ensure close collaboration with the Seed Production and Input Storage Project that is being established in the AIC, to ensure expeditious production of high quality seed of improved crop varieties adapted to the various farming areas of Nepal.

o. Arrange for prompt joint consideration, by appropriate representatives of the HMG and USAID, of actions to be taken for continuation of the ICP, with such modifications as may be desirable, to ensure maximum benefits from the experience and investments in strengthening Nepal's capabilities for technology-based agricultural development.

p. Give further careful consideration to the establishment of a Nepal Council for Agricultural Research, to provide the kind of national institutional capability that is serving effectively for agricultural development in India, Indonesia, the Philippines and other countries of Asia. These organizations provide for active involvement of all agencies concerned with agricultural development in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of research to increase agricultural production, and its prompt and effective use by farmers.

Philippines:

Joint GOP-USAID Evaluation

of the

Agricultural Research Project

October 31, 1979

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A Country Philippines	B Project Title Agricultural Research	C Project Number 192-0280	D Active Life of Project 1 Project Agreement Signed FY <u>75</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY <u>80</u>
E Life of Project Funding 1. AID. (Loan or Grant) <u>5,000,000*</u> 2. Other Donor _____ Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ <u>24,553,000</u> * Loan # 492-T-039		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director Anthony Schwarzwalder 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) William H. McCluskey, Chief, Research Division 3 Other _____	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) (not stated) 2 Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) _____		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) Philippine Council for Agriculture and Resources Research (PCARR) 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) _____	
I Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date) (not stated)			

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title Joint GOP- USAID Evaluation of the Agricultural Research Project	B. Evaluation Date Oct. 31, 1979	C. Type of Evaluation regular	D Project Period Covered by Evaluation May 1976-November 1979
E Evaluation Cost (not stated) 1. Direct Hire a travel _____ per diem _____ contract _____ 3 Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____	F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation To measure progress of implementation, identify constraints to implementation and to recommend corrective measures.		G. Initiated By (not stated)
H. Evaluation Team Composition			
1. Direct Hire			
a Name	b Present Position	c. Area of Expertise	
W. A. Fraser	USAID		
W.H. McCluskey	USAID		
S.J. Walworth	USAID		
2 Contract			
a Name(s) of Persons	b Name of Organization (if any)	c. Contract No.	
P.A. Batugal, PCARR			
Z.M. Buan, PCARR	S.M. Miranda, PCARR	G.D. Torres, PCARR	
J.S. Montero, NEDA	F.B. Tetangco, PCARR		
E L. Morales, NEDA	R.M. Tomas, MOB		
I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position) (not stated)		J Evaluation Coordinator	
		Signature _____	
		Typed Name _____	
		Position _____	
		Date _____	

I. Summary

A.I.D. Loan 492-T-039 provided \$5.0 million to assist in partial financing of infrastructure, research equipment, references, training and technical assistance to help improve and expand indigenous research capability at 4 of 17 identified research centers. The Philippine Council for Agriculture and Resources Research (PCARR) is the implementing agency.

Although implementation of the project was retarded during the first 1.5 years, the rate of implementation has accelerated and the overall level of accomplishment is now 83 percent (Table 1).

Table 1. Loan I Overall Accomplishment *

	Cost (In Million) (\$)	% of Loan	Percent of Accomplish- ment	Overall Accomplish- ment
1) Infrastructure	2.25	45	100)
2) Equipment	1.41	29	95)
3) Manpower		9	100)
a) In-country	0.44	11	37)
b) International	0.56)
4) Technical Assistance	0.30	6	23)
5) Uncommitted ^{1/}	<u>.04</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	
	\$5.00	100		

^{1/} To be committed for additional equipment.

* Accrued expenditure basis.

Only the international training and the technical assistance components remain seriously behind schedule at this time. However, as a result of the development of program guidelines for the use of Technical Assistance, it appears likely that the remaining funds in that component can be used as designed. The outlook for utilizing the international training funds remains poor unless the GOP procedures can be modified to reflect current costs. Reprogramming of some funds is under discussion.

Details as to the status of project inputs are as follows:

A. Infrastructure

1. Loan financed - Reimbursement of \$2,194,399 has been made for 92 units completed with 2 units eligible for reimbursement of \$55,050 now 98% complete. Overall completion is 99%.
2. GOP Financed - ₱19.44 million of ₱52.16 million scheduled for support of infrastructure has been disbursed; ₱24.99 million is under construction and ₱5.31 million bid and/or ready for construction.
3. Of the total infrastructure scheduled at an estimated cost of ₱68.96 million (approximately \$9.32 million), 89% has been completed and/or is under construction.

B. Equipment

1. Loan Financed - of \$1.410 million allocated for commodity procurement, \$1.404 million or 99% has been committed in contracts. Approximately \$1.28 million of equipment has been delivered to Manila and research centers with additional items in transit.
2. GOP Financed - 82% of the ₱4.69 million allocated has been used. The ₱0.864 million balance still subject to bidding is awaiting the release of funds.

C. Manpower Development

1. In-country Academic

Of the \$440,000 scheduled, all has been committed to training of 26 Ph.D. and 106 M.S. candidates. There will be a shortfall of approximately \$76,369 as a result of increased costs. It is anticipated this will be made up from uncommitted funds in the international training component.

2. International training

Of the \$560,000 scheduled for Ph.D., refresher/upgrading and short term observation/workshop training, approximately \$225,000 has been committed and \$209,000 disbursed, leaving a balance of approximately \$335,000 uncommitted.

D. Technical Assistance

Of the \$303,000 allocated, two contracts have been executed for a total of \$66,663 or approximately 23%. A number of additional consultants have been identified in the Technical Assistance Program recently formulated by PCARR and draft contracts for \$52,000 have been reviewed and approved by USAID.

II. Evaluation Methodology

The purpose of this evaluation was to assess the progress of implementation, identify constraints to implementation, and recommend measures to eliminate and/or minimize identified constraints rather than to attempt an in-depth overall assessment emphasizing attainment of project purpose and goals given the long-term nature of developing research capability.

Therefore, this methodology was limited to measurements of progress versus the original timetable, the actual financial support received by the project versus the approved project budget and assessing the timeliness and adequacy of supplies, materials, equipment versus the project timetable. Also, there was a general examination of other problems/difficulties encountered in the project implementation.

The evaluation was carried out by a joint GOP-USAID team consisting of representatives from PCARR, the Ministry of the Budget, the National Economic and Development Authority and USAID. PCARR prepared an initial report which was reviewed, discussed, and modified by the evaluation team during three working sessions in September and October, 1979. Data sources were project planning, commitment, contracting and other relevant documents. Since by-monthly site visits had been made, the team determined the time and costs for additional visits were not justified.

III. External Factors

There have been no major changes in project setting except those in GOP priorities strengthening the implementing government agency.

- A. To begin with, PCARR's position as the lead agency responsible for developing, coordinating, programming and evaluating research programs has been greatly strengthened by the GOP through the issuance of the following Presidential Decrees:

1. P. D. No. 451 which attached PCARR to NSDB for better coordination of national scientific program in the country;
2. P. D. No. 1249 which expanded the functions of PCARR to include mines research;
3. P. D. No. 1249 which granted authority to PCARR to generate foreign funds for research; and
4. P. D. No. 1502 which provided for incentives and administrative reforms to promote productivity and efficiency in scientific and technological research.

The first two decrees enabled PCARR to:

- (a) Review all research program proposals in agriculture and natural resources (refer to Annex C).
- (b) Recommend research proposals to the Ministry of the Budget for funding.

In addition PCARR has established a program whereby the research priorities were developed and are updated at three year intervals in consonance with all relevant GOP agencies at both the regional and national levels as well as educational institutions and the private sector. Over 600 scientists, policy and implementing representatives participate in this exercise. *Annex 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100*

The GOP has demonstrated their support by increasing PCARR's budget to support their expanded functions (Table 6) and PCARR was one of the few GOP agencies to successfully cope with the new budget process which was a factor in obtaining increased budget support.

IV. Inputs

1. Infrastructure

As a whole, there was minimum change in the research related infrastructure so that what was originally programmed has been fully implemented. The major constraint was a 16 month delay in the initial release of funds thereby delaying both loan and GOP-financed structures for one year. Other delays were due to PCARR's unfamiliarity with FAR Agreements and USAID approval procedures, a shortage of PCARR and USAID engineers, inclement weather and short-term shortages of materials. These problems have since been resolved.

2. Commodity Procurement

Here there were also delays amounting to two years against the original schedule due to AID's underestimation of PCARR's and the centers' capacity to cope with myriad details and steps involved with procurement under AID regulations. These problems ranged from lack of reference catalog at research centers necessary for commodity identification and specification, PCARR's unfamiliarity with IFB's and to inadequate coordination between planning entities and the Ministry of the Budget. Nevertheless, nearly all loan financed procurement has now been committed in contracts and due to experience gained, it is believed that future loan funded procurement will proceed with a minimum of delays.

3. Manpower Development

In-country training has proceeded with only minor modification of the original schedule. Four Ph.D. slots were converted to six M.S. slots, changing the total of 130 to 132 scholars. There will be a small number of scholars yet enrolled at the PACD since the academic year terminates 4 months after the PACD.

International training has continued to lag behind schedule for a number of reasons. It was not possible to identify qualified Ph.D. candidates that could be released for 3 years by the end of the second year of the loan because an IERN loan which was approved earlier had provided the opportunities necessary for available candidates. Short-term and refresher type training has been restrained by the lengthy nomination, approval and documentation process required by the GOP and the inadequate GOP-approved levels of per diem/living allowance which has discouraged a number of candidates from participating and which represents a level below that adequate to provide basic needs.

4. Technical Assistance

PCARR has been unable to take advantage of this component because trained and equipped staff have only recently been established as a result of delays mentioned. But now PCARR has been able to initiate consultancies for identified research areas and project evaluations which should all be contracted and completed before the PACD.

V. Outputs

1. The planned outputs for the project were:

- a) Consolidation of PCARR as the COP agency for developing, coordinating, programming and evaluating research policy and programs.

b) The four centers adequately staffed and equipped and carrying out well planned research programs.

c) An information system for PCARR in cooperation with UPLB, SEARCA and IRRI to provide timely access to researchers at the various centers.

d) Improved quantity and quality of output in related organizations, such as other centers and training institutions.

Significant progress has been made in upgrading facilities and limited personnel from the four centers are in training and/or recently returned from training. All centers have initiated research programs in the commodities assigned to them under the priorities established with their participation (see table 9). Development of those activities planned for the centers are nearly complete but it is recognized that envisaged development will continue to evolve over several years as staff gain essential experience and additional needs are addressed.

Since its establishment in 1973, PCARR's Scientific Literature Service (SLS) has expanded to service 30 libraries in the PCARR Research Station Network. Journals provided by the SLS include Asian as well as other foreign editions. To further intensify scientific information dissemination, PCARR has produced many publications and has conducted seminars, workshops and conferences utilizing books, journals and library reproduction equipment provided through the Loan Project which amounted to approximately \$250,000.00 (see Table 8).

Research priorities have been established for other centers and cooperating stations and research is underway (see Table (9)). Staff from other centers are receiving training, both in-service and in the academic program. Working agreements have been developed with private sector research units as well. Altogether, the quantity and quality of on-going research projects have increased as well as being focused upon priority problems. However, it is recognized that development of experienced research personnel will require years and that the conduct of replicated and duplicated field trials require several growing seasons to obtain valid results. Although significant progress has been made, it would be premature to anticipate impact at this time.

VI. Purpose

Although progress towards EOPS cannot be concisely determined at this time, there are indications of progress supporting the validity of the project design. For example, in-service training for staff at regional centers and cooperating stations in the preparation of research proposals and statistical analysis of research data have improved the ability of staff to submit better research proposals as well as to analyze agricultural results for improved reporting.

The prioritizing of research efforts to meet regional and national needs, increased research funding support and an expanded and improved scientific literature service to regional centers have all contributed to improving research efforts at the target centers as well as at other centers.

VII. Goal

Evaluation of project goals is also not pertinent at this time but a modest surplus has been achieved in the Philippines' rice production and near self-sufficiency in corn production and some of these gains are recognized as the direct result of research coming in part from PCARR's efforts. An accelerated program of research on root crops is underway, directed to food, feed and alcohol production. Many other expanded efforts could be cited but are properly left for a more in-depth evaluation.

VIII. Beneficiaries

Experience in both developed and developing areas has demonstrated a significant lag time between research findings and wide scale adoption by producers, e.g., hybrid corn in the U.S. 12 years; and terracing and contour farming in the U.S. 18 years. It would be extremely premature to expect wide-spread development and acceptance of new technology by small producers at this stage. Nevertheless, it is widely acknowledged that new and improved technology is neither transferred or developed in the absence of an indigenous research capability. Efforts under this project are directed to developing that capability.

There are good reasons to assume that given the necessary time and other essential conditions (market incentives, credit, supplies), a majority of the small Filipino producers, and in time consumers, will benefit.

IX. Unplanned Effects

Not pertinent at this time.

X. Lessons Learned

1. Plan a realistic time frame for achieving research results and for development of research capabilities. It is irrational to anticipate any significant research findings in less than 5-10 years and even in a well developed environment, there is usually an 8-12 year lag time between initial research findings and a significant impact at the farm level. It will likely take longer

developing areas characterized by low educational levels poorly developed marketing systems and limited communication networks to achieve impact.

2. Indigenous research capability cannot be developed more rapidly than the development of the research personnel. Therefore, training should be one of the first tasks undertaken as both training and experience are essential to research competency.

- Handwritten: 3. Recognize that the AID procurement regulations contain a myriad of details and that host-country implementing agencies will need 1-2 years to become familiar with them before being able to move in a timely manner on procurement. Allow about a year of additional time for host-country procurement over direct AID procurement.*
3. Recognize that the AID procurement regulations contain a myriad of details and that host-country implementing agencies will need 1-2 years to become familiar with them before being able to move in a timely manner on procurement. Allow about a year of additional time for host-country procurement over direct AID procurement.

- Handwritten: 4. Recognize that the AID review and approval procedures are much more time consuming than commonly believed and that the time required is exponentially related to the number of offices involved in the review and approval procedures. Every effort should be made to minimize paper work, to limit reviews and approvals to an absolute minimum both within AID and the host-government, and to seek other measures to streamline the system in order to avoid unnecessary costs resulting from non-productive delays.*
4. Recognize that the AID review and approval procedures are much more time consuming than commonly believed and that the time required is exponentially related to the number of offices involved in the review and approval procedures. Every effort should be made to minimize paper work, to limit reviews and approvals to an absolute minimum both within AID and the host-government, and to seek other measures to streamline the system in order to avoid unnecessary costs resulting from non-productive delays.

5. Eliminate loan funding for international training unless the host-government can present a system that provides adequate subsistence levels for participants.

6. Provide a procedure whereby loan funds can be used for support of critical research studies in the developing country on an ad hoc basis.

7. Project officer should maintain contact with budget/financial personnel of host-country implementing agency through his counterpart to identify potential counterpart funding problems. Contacts are most important during the budget request preparation period and again during period of finalizing the work and financial plans.

XI. Special Comments

There are no significant policy or program management implications at this time.

The following are titles of relevant Tables attached:

Table 2. Fund Requirement Per Implementation Plan (Thousand Pesos)

Table 3. Overall Accomplishment of the Infrastructure Project.

Table 4. Comparison of Loan I In-Country Manpower Development Program Against Actual Implementation.

- Table 5. Comparison of Loan I International Manpower Development Program Against Actual Implementation.
- Table 6. PCARR Budget (1972-78)
- Table 7. Summary of Research Proposals Submitted to PCARR Evaluation Mechanism (1972-78) by PCARR Divisions
- Table 8. PCARR's Major Publications (As of 1978)
- Table 9. Research Responsibilities of Loan Assisted Research Centers.

END-OF-PROJECT EVALUATION
OF THE
AQUACULTURE PRODUCTION PROJECT

USAID No. 492-11-180-266

by

Dr. James Avault, Jr., Louisiana State University
Dr. Wallace Klussmann, Texas A&M University
Dr. R. O'Neal Smitherman, Auburn University

September 9-23, 1978

FORMULET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Philippines		B. Project Title (APP is a follow-up to Inland Fisheries Project) Aquaculture Production Project		C. Project Number 492-0266	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>74</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY <u>78</u>
Life of Project Funding 1. AID: (Loan or Grant) _____ 2. Other Donor _____ Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ PARTIAL TOTAL \$ _____ BUDGETS, p. 7 and 11 for FAC and BAC				F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director not stated 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) 3. Other	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) not stated 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) Auburn University				H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) Freshwater Aquaculture Center (FAC) Brackishwater Aquaculture Center (BAC), Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) Auburn University	

I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date)

Evaluation of Aquaculture Production Project, midterm evaluation (inferred), May 3-27, 1976, F.J. Lebeau and S. Bravo

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title <u>End of Project</u> <u>Evaluation of the Aquaculture Production Project</u> USAID No. 492-11-180-266		B. Evaluation Date Sept. 9-23, 1978	C. Type of Evaluation End of Project	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation 1971-1978 (also takes into consideration IFP of 1971-1974) APP is a follow-up of IFP
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire not stated a. travel _____ b. per diem _____ c. contract _____ d. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation (SEE attached sheet)		G. Initiated By not stated

H. Evaluation Team Composition

1. Direct Hire			
a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise	
2. Contract:		a. Name of Organization (if any)	b. Contract No.
c. Name(s) of Persons		d. Area(s) of Expertise	
Dr. James Avault, Jr., Professor of Aquaculture, Louisiana State University			
Dr. Wallace Klussmann, Fisheries Extension Program Leader, Texas A & M University			
Dr. R. O'Neal Smitherman, Professor of Aquaculture, Auburn University			

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position) Johnie (sic) Grance, Fisheries Advisor, USAID, President Campos FAC, Abraham Gaduang, Chief, BFAR Extension Division	J. Evaluation Coordinator Signature _____ Typed Name _____ Position _____ Date _____
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F. Purpose: "This report is an end-of-project review to evaluate project accomplishments and failures relative to stated goal, purpose, and expected outputs of the project as per the project design summary (logical framework). In addition, suggestions are made regarding methods for evaluating USAID projects. Finally, suggestions are made for USAID support for future aquaculture projects in the Philippines."

I. SUMMARY

The Aquaculture Production Project (APP) was undertaken by the Government of the Philippines (GRP) with assistance from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It was initiated July 1, 1974, and terminated September 30, 1978. The APP was a follow-up to the Inland Fisheries Project (IFP) that started in 1971 and ended in 1974. All told, a total of 27 participants received training (see Appendix B). When the project is considered in whole from 1971 to 1978, and when all factors are considered, the project was highly successful, and the GRP and USAID should be commended.

The physical plants of both the Freshwater Aquaculture Center (FAC) and Brackish Water Aquaculture Center (BAC) are excellent. Major problems at the BAC such as a poor access road and bridge, lack of potable water, and the necessity to generate electricity at the station are in the past. A considerable amount of effort was needed in developing both facilities, and progress in research was somewhat curtailed initially. With facilities at both FAC and BAC now virtually finished research should progress as planned.

The personnel at both FAC and BAC are very capable, highly motivated, and are doing a commendable job in research. Their salaries are still low but are now competitive with their peers in certain other organizations. A major concern is that staff at both FAC and BAC are overloaded and that they are spreading themselves too thin. Additional staff should gradually be added.

It should be emphasized that research should be continued to meet the needs of the fish farmer and increase the nutrition of the poor. There may at times be a tendency for research to follow the interests of an individual. For the most part, however, research is definitely on target. Examples are rice/fish and survival of milkfish fry. Publications and extension bulletins have been produced that are filling a real need; the importance of publication, especially extension bulletins, cannot be overemphasized. Important data must continue to be published and not be lost in annual reports.

Funding of both FAC and BAC is on solid ground. Both Centers, because of their good reputations, are attracting grant funds from other organizations such as PCARR, ICLARM and SEAFDEC. The BAC has a semi-autonomous budget from the University of the Philippines (UP). Support of the FAC by Central Luzon State University (CLSU) is good. The NSDB, which has given grant funds to FAC and BAC, is now also giving institutional (block) funding.

Graduate training has been a very productive spin-off from the APP. The CLSU College of Inland Fisheries was founded in 1976. FAC staff teach the courses. It offers graduate training in fisheries/aquaculture. The UPCF instituted a graduate program in November 1974 with BAC/SEAFDEC staff as teachers.

Training sessions held by FAC, BAC, and BFAR have been frequent, varied in subject matter, and have served the needs of a wide range of people, particularly farmers.

Extension has progressed in Regions V and VI. Extension workers are motivated and have good rapport with cooperators and farmers. Fish farmers interviewed spoke very highly of the extension workers and were most happy with results in their ponds. A major problem listed by farmers is a lack of fingerlings for stocking. Other problems are shortages of fertilizer and financing. Extension workers list lack of adequate transportation as their major problem. BFAR plans to assist extension workers to obtain motor bikes. There are good research/extension linkages at the regional level but stronger and formal linkages are needed at the national level.

The educational background of extension workers varies considerably. Extension workers are not always well qualified and have received their training from various places. They do, however, take refresher courses as new technology develops. The Freshwater Fisheries Development Project, which has training as a major element, should help greatly to upgrade competence.

The BFAR plans to use the model of extension in Regions V and VI for expansion of its extension program of the other eleven regions. It is suggested that extension be expanded to one region at a time rather than all regions at once because of the high cost and shortages of resources. Extension programs now exist in the regions but at a low level.

Project Accomplishments

According to the logical framework in the APP project paper the project accomplished only part of its stated goals. There are two reasons for this. First, current data were not available on which to make an adequate judgment. In some cases 1976 data were the latest available. Therefore, it is suggested that final analysis of the log frame with future projects be postponed until data are available. Since the log frame is objective in nature, final evaluation of it could be made by USAID personnel. Second, it is assumed that new technology would move quickly to the farmer level. This did not occur because much of the new technology was generated only two years ago. This period of time is not long enough for new technology to move from researcher to farmer. In future studies it is suggested that evaluation of new technology be made at the cooperator level. Such evaluation should be a good indicator of the acceptance of new technology and whether or not it is successful. In our evaluation of the APP, we relied on interviews with a few cooperators to make an assessment.

While the goal and purpose were difficult to assess in the log frame, outputs and inputs were not. Generally, they were met as outlined in the log frame.

Transferability of techniques and procedures from the APP is possible to other developing countries. However, the sequence of the project components and the intensity of each effort must be studied carefully for each country. For example, if available technology exceeds application, then the extension component might be given first priority or vice versa.

The GRP through BFAR should continue to play the leadership role in administration of fisheries. Extension techniques learned from the pilot studies in Regions V and VI are programmed by BFAR in the other regions. It is

suggested that other regions receive strengthened extension services one at a time to have the most impact. It is doubtful that BFAR has the funds and extension workers to begin full-fledged extension programs in the other eleven regions at once.

BFAR should make every effort to improve research/extension linkage at the national level. This linkage seems adequate at the regional level.

USAID correctly assessed that lack of fry and extension workers trained in hatchery management are major limiting factors in rice/fish culture and aquaculture in general. The Fisheries Sector Study for the Philippines (1977) documents this in detail. The Freshwater Fisheries Development Project is most timely and its implementation is highly recommended.

USAID's involvement in an artisan fisheries (municipal fisheries), with elements of mariculture, is also recommended. The GRP has emphasized time and time again its desire to help the artisan fisherman.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Overall Evaluation of Project

The project was a definite success. High output and achievement were obtained relative to AID funding. GRP outputs have greatly increased during the last two years. This can best be shown by additional inputs of money into the overall project, exemplified by the increased NSDB funding.

The GRP has demonstrated its support in many other ways. Examples include recognition of the FAC and BAC as the national centers for freshwater aquaculture and brackishwater aquaculture, respectively. The Presidential Decree 704 further strengthened the government's role in fisheries. One component of the decree placed extension as the responsibility of BFAR.

The project has several very desirable spinoffs not programmed in the PROP. Among them were the formation of the College of Fisheries at CLSU and the graduate training program of the UPCF at BAC. Both programs were due to the vision of the FAC, BAC, UP, and others. This graduate-level training will help to provide badly needed personnel for fisheries/aquaculture in the Philippines.

Further interest in fisheries began--the formation of other fisheries/aquaculture programs such as SEAFDEC and ICLARM. Most important is the linkage established between the FAC and ICLARM and the BAC and SEAFDEC. ICLARM is providing major funding for FAC in cooperative research in agro-aquaculture (i.e., pig/fish and duck/fish). SEAFDEC likewise has a major input of funds to the graduate training program involving BAC and SEAFDEC staff.

Both FAC and BAC are well staffed, and the staff are well qualified and motivated to produce effective mission-oriented work. The only concern is that the staff may be overworked. Originally FAC and BAC staff were concerned mainly with research. Concomitant with this duty was the time expended in facility development. It is suggested that as the research and graduate-training programs expand additional staff will be required.

Facilities of both FAC and BAC are truly excellent and virtually completed. It is suggested that emphasis be placed on utilization and maintenance of existing facilities. With completion of facilities, research outputs should increase significantly.

Research is being conducted that is germane to the APP--to increase nutrition of the poor. It cannot be overemphasized, however, that a strong research/extension linkage must exist for this to be accomplished.

Research and extension personnel interaction and coordination at the worker's level is satisfactory. This can be increased by formalizing the coordination at the central administration (Manila) level and at the field level. Research proposals should not only be reviewed by professional peers but also by the extension staff with responsibilities that relate to the particular research effort. This could be achieved by a rather specific memo of agreement at the agency level and by establishment of a program review committee.

Major limiting factors affecting the economic growth of the fish farmers are: 1) inadequate financing, 2) supplies of fingerlings for stocking, 3) supplies of fertilizer and other materials, and 4) access to available technology.

The planned GRP/USAID follow-up Freshwater Fisheries Development Project focuses upon the major limiting factors and should be very effective in gaining application of the available technology which can result in widespread opportunities by fish farmers for increased profits and better family nutrition. The Freshwater Fisheries Development Project is well conceived; application is feasible and all contacts with extension staffs in the pilot regions indicate strong support for the planned follow-up effort.

The APP included a strong extension dimension that was to be implemented after establishment of the research center. Thus, the extension function really became functional only in 1976. The basic concepts and program directions of the extension function are sound. The fact that the extension function is in one agency (BFAR) and its research base (BAC and FAC) is in another organization will demand continued attention toward effective coordination.

It is difficult to determine the number of extension workers that are needed in a given region; it seems, however, that program effectiveness is presently more limited by opportunities for adequate training of extension workers and by limited mobility of extension workers than by the number of extension workers. Attention should be given to more intensive, practical training of extension workers. The morale, dedication and enthusiasm and attitude of each extension worker contacted was very high and is certainly commendable. There has been less than one percent annual turnover in the extension staff. A promotion system or career ladder is in place.

Extension activities at the BAC and FAC should be encouraged but limited to "on-site" training activities for extension workers and farmers. However, research scientists should be encouraged to travel and participate in BFAR coordinated farmer and extension worker training efforts. Research scientists should be encouraged to author and co-author (with extension specialists) extension publications. Writing of such publications should be viewed as "publications" and be equal to journal articles in staff evaluation.

No attempt to duplicate extension efforts carried out by BFAR should be attempted by the BAC and FAC or SEAFDEC.

Extension specialists should be actively involved in applied research when possible and should coordinate effective field testing efforts in the various regions with the scientists at the BAC and the FAC.

The extension publications available at this date are well written but kinds and number are very limited because of budget constraints. The publication on milkfish culture is out of print and it is not being reprinted presently because of costs.

Considerations for giving publication a higher priority in the budget seems appropriate. The one published extension newsletter is well done and useful. Two more have been written but have not been printed as of this date. Support for publication could be met by simple low-cost outline type production guidelines. This publication need should be addressed in the new Freshwater Fisheries Development Project.

There is considerable variation in regional climatic and production conditions in the Philippines. Extension specialists and workers should be encouraged to do effective and thorough field verification of research data produced in the centers and elsewhere. Minimum public facilities or adequately controlled private cooperator facilities will be needed to achieve such research verifications.

Documentation and reporting of extension activities are adequate. A program for evaluating the effectiveness of extension activities is needed. Methods for effective evaluation of regional and national extension efforts should also be given priority.

Equipment for water analyses, for use by extension workers, is limited and needs prompt attention.

Many of the supplies and vehicles supplied by USAID were reported to be in poor condition when received and maintenance costs have been excessive.

Emphasis on adequate training of extension workers before deployment in the field should be continued. A structured plan for such training should be developed and adhered to. To date some workers have received only 10 days with others receiving as much as 30 days. The teaching outlines that have been proposed for training sessions seem well designed and adequate.

B. Suggested Methods for Improving the Project Evaluation Process

1. Strict interpretation of successful project completion with respect to the variable indicators was not possible in some instances because of the lack of available data.
2. Final evaluation of the APP log frame output could be made by AID and GRP officials when data are available and added as a supplement to final reports.
3. Firm scheduling of a review team far enough in advance to allow for a total of 3 weeks time for travel, information gathering and report writing is needed.
4. Agencies should continue to gather pertinent needed information and reports in advance of team arrival.
5. The time it takes for new technology to go from researcher to extension worker to cooperator to farmer is probably much longer than most people realize. It may take ten or more years before new technology is practiced by farmers. It is suggested that increased production in kg/ha and other tangible evidence be evaluated at the cooperator level. This then will be a good indicator of whether or not new technology is successful. Further, reliable data will be much easier to obtain when compared at the cooperator level. Long-term evaluation of a project could be made at the farmer/consumer level after the project has had sufficient time to function.

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C. Transferability of Techniques and Procedures of the APP to Other Developing Countries

1. The model of the APP focused upon development of (a) research capabilities, (b) manpower training, (c) extension programs, and (d) administrative support..

2. In the Philippines, the APP appropriately placed initial emphasis on the development of the research capability and on manpower development. This was followed by implementation of the extension component.

3. Application of the APP procedures and components should be applicable to most developing countries with fisheries and aquaculture potential. However, the sequence of the project components and the intensity of each effort must be studied carefully in each country. For example, if available technology exceeds application, then the extension component might be given first priority, or vice versa. Effective administrative support will always be a key to effective implementation of project components.

In the transfer of APP procedures to other countries, ample initial studies should be made with the people to be affected (current and potential fish farmers) in order to determine problems, identify priorities, and establish the sequence of emphasis for establishing the desired components of a development project.

D. GRP's Continued Effort/Direction in Aquaculture

The GRP's role in aquaculture has good focus. Particularly evident is continued support of FAC and BAC.

BFAR is the designated agency to administer fisheries programs in the GRP. Its role in extension is a particularly important one. Gradual expansion of extension programs in other regions (besides Regions V and VI) is now a part of BFAR's plan. It is doubtful that full-fledged extension programs can begin in all regions at once. It is suggested that strengthening of extension be done to one region at a time to more fully utilize available resources (funds, personnel, etc.).

BFAR should continue to play a leadership role, melding together all aspects of fisheries, particularly research/extension linkage.

USAID has correctly assessed that the lack of fry and inadequately trained extension workers are the most important limiting factors for providing the needs of freshwater fisheries development. The follow-up GRP/USAID Freshwater Fisheries Development Project should alleviate these major obstacles.

E. USAID's Future Role in Aquaculture in the Philippines

The proposed follow-up Freshwater Fisheries Development Project focuses upon two of the major existing problems in aquaculture and should be implemented.

The presently conceived outputs of the new Freshwater Fisheries Development Project are achievable under the GRP and USAID operational framework. The basic output will be (1) a strengthened and expanded freshwater fish fry production and distribution system, (2) a strengthened and expanded extension effort in the target region (Central Luzon), (3) stronger research-extension coordination, and (4) a coordinated freshwater fisheries production and marketing information collection and distribution system.

USAID should keep abreast of problems and opportunities to help the most disadvantaged fish farmer or segments of the aquaculture industry. Specific examples in which USAID assistance may be needed include: (1) milkfish fry collection and survival; (2) clam, oyster and mussel culture; (3) tilapia production; and (4) acid soil problems in brackish water fishponds.

Another area defined again and again by the GRP as a major interest is the artisan fisheries (municipal fisheries). The interest of the GRP in artisan fisheries is well documented in the 1977 report, "The Philippines: Fisheries Sector Study." It is suggested that USAID consider support to artisan (municipal) fisheries, especially with elements of mariculture.

EVALUATION
OF THE
INTEGRATED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
AND MARKETING PROJECT (IAPMP)

AID PROJECT NO. 492-0302 (PHILIPPINES)

BY

DR. FERNANDO A. BERNARDO
DR. GELIA T. CASTILLO
DR. JAMES W. COBBLE*
DR. JOSE D. DRILON, JR.*
DR. LEHMAN B. FLETCHER
MR. MANUEL LIM
MR. HOWARD REAM
MR. WILLIAM J. WREN

*Co-Chairmen

FEBRUARY - MARCH 1979

FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Philippines	B. Project Title Integrated Agricultural Production and Marketing Project (IAPMP)	C. Project Number 492-0302	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>77-78</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY <u>82</u>
Life of Project Funding 1. AID: (Loan or Grant) _____ 2. Other Donor _____ Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director _____ 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) John Foti 3. Other _____	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) not stated 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not stated		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) National Econ. Dev. Authority, Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), Univ. of Philippines (UPLB), Central Luzon State Univ. (CLSU) 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) Kansas State University	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date) not stated			

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title Evaluation of IAPMP	B. Evaluation Date Feb-March 1979	C. Type of Evaluation Second Year Evaluation of proposed 5 year program	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation not stated
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire a. travel _____ per diem _____ contract <u>34,300*</u> other _____ TOTAL \$ _____ * For 3 contractors		F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation (SEE attached sheet)	G. Initiated By not stated
H. Evaluation Team Composition 1. Direct Hire a. Name _____ b. Present Position _____ c. Area of Expertise _____ (SEE attached Sheet)			
2. Contract: a. Name of Organization (if any) _____ b. Contract No. _____ c. Name(s) of Persons _____ d. Area(s) of Expertise _____			

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position) Peter Cody, Director, AID/Manila; Arturo Taneo, Minister, Ministry of Agriculture; Bienvenido Villavicencio, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA)	J. Evaluation Coordinator Signature _____ Typed Name _____ Position _____ Date _____
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ASIA/DP/E: 8/80

E. Life of Project Funding:

AID: For First 3 years \$9,715,000 = \$6,715,000 (grant) + \$3,000,000 (loan)
(loan # 492-T-044)

Host Country Counterpart Funds

For first 3 years \$11,600,000
\$20,250,000 for 5 years

F. Purpose: Assess overall progress and to see whether opportunities exist for improvement during the remainder of the life of the project. (SEE Block 19 of PIO/T): Evaluate progress, analyze constraints, assess corrective action needed, assess social and economic impact on beneficiaries (to extent possible), recommend modifications, and provide information useful for future project/policy planning.

H. Evaluation Team Composition:

Dr. Fernando A. Bernardo, President, Visayas State College of Agriculture
Dr. Gelia T. Castillo, Professor, Rural Sociology, University of the Philippines,
Los Baños
Dr. James W. Cobble, Dean Emeritus, Resource Development, University of Rhode
Island
Dr. Jose D. Drilon, Jr., Director General, Philippine Council for Agriculture
and Resource Research
Dr. Lehman B. Fletcher, Professor, Economics, Iowa State University
Mr. Manuel Lim, President, JVA Management Corporation
Mr. Howard Ream, Professor, Agronomy, University of Wisconsin
Mr. William J. Wren, USAID, Washington

THE INTEGRATED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
AND MARKETING PROJECT (IAPMP)

Introduction

This is an evaluation report on the Integrated Agricultural Production and Marketing Project (IAPMP) of the Republic of the Philippines. Launched in 1977-78, the Project is expected to run for a total of five years. It is funded jointly by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), through grant and loan funds, and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). The Kansas State University serves as a contractor to assist in the implementation of the Project.

Recently, a number of American and Filipino consultants was asked by the GRP to serve as a Team to evaluate the IAPMP, essentially to assess overall progress and to see whether opportunities exist for improvement during the remainder of the life of the Project.

The Evaluation Team members were as follow:

Dr. Fernando A. Bernardo
President, Visayas State College of Agriculture

Dr. Gelia T. Castillo
Professor, Rural Sociology
University of the Philippines at Los Baños

*Dr. James W. Cobble
Dean Emeritus, Resource Development
University of Rhode Island

*Dr. Jose D. Drilon, Jr.
Director General, Philippine Council for Agriculture
and Resources Research

Dr. Lehman B. Fletcher
Professor, Economics
Iowa State University

Mr. Manuel Lim
President, JVA Management Corporation

Mr. Howard Ream
Professor, Agronomy
University of Wisconsin

Mr. William J. Wren
USAID, Washington

*Co-Chairman

Although behavioral and personality problems were perceived, the Team concentrated its attention on program dimensions. This was its interpretation of its mandate. Moreover, the team recognized that any organization tasked to implement complex a program as IAPMP is bound to have behavioral and personality problems and that such problems are better resolved or minimized internally as the organization proceeds with implementation.

The team first attempted to understand IAPMP in order to obtain a reading of legitimate project expectations. It then appraised the progress and the problems, made observations and formulated recommendations.

For these purposes, the team was furnished by the IAPM Project staff with ample documents. The information derived from these was supplemented by interviews conducted at the Ministry of Agriculture, the Central Luzon State University and its project area, and the University of the Philippines at Los Baños. (A list of persons interviewed appears in Annex A.)

Considering the time available to it (roughly 2-1/2 weeks), the Team limited itself to the examination of four areas:

1. Policy Thrust,
2. Technological Packaging and Extension Thrusts,
3. Academic Thrust, and
4. Overall Project Management.

This report partly reflects this approach. Initially, it presents comments on the project design--the project concept, components, linkages and objectives. It then proceeds briefly to offer observations and recommendations which are grouped into (1) observations and recommendations relative to the project thrusts and (2) observations and recommendations which cut across all thrusts.

On March 15, 1979, the team verbally reported to the IAPM Project staff, USAID officers and Minister Arturo R. Tanco, Jr. of the Philippines. The exchange of information and ideas which resulted, contributed additional perspectives which have been included in this report.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The team concluded that the original design of the project is still highly relevant to the present state of agricultural development in the Philippines and that if it is successfully implemented, the project can make an important contribution to the institutionalization of a complex system which is designed to improve the lot of the country's small farmers.

Although initial delays were encountered and project implementation is therefore slightly behind schedule, good progress is now being

made in all of the four "thrust" areas (national policy, academic, tech pack, and extension/outreach). It was noted that there had been some tendency on the part of the various thrusts to pursue their programs more or less independently. The team sees an urgent need for even much more time and attention to the integration of and coordination among the thrusts. However, the team recognizes the benefits, on the whole, that accrue to the project from having the Overall Project Coordinator also performing other important jobs in the Ministry of Agriculture. The latter provides him a strategic leadership position, administrative access to and communication linkage with relevant cooperating agencies and institutions. In view of these advantages, the team recommends that he be relieved of responsibilities which are unrelated or marginal to IAPM Project so that greater attention could be focused on the overall implementation and integration of the Project.

Initial delays in the staffing of the Kansas State University (KSU) contract have now been overcome. The evaluation team hopes that KSU will be able to provide a suitably-qualified replacement for the current team leader, whose tour of duty will be over this coming August, and that no hiatus in project activity will be permitted to develop.

A summary of the team's detailed recommendations follows.

RECOMMENDATIONS

NATIONAL POLICY THRUST

1. Crystallize the plans for institutionalizing a two-pronged policy development system both for short-term crisis management and for long-term policy research needs.
2. Identify the indicators which will be used to evaluate progress towards that system.
3. Define total sector data needs for policy and program formulation.
4. Develop a staff development program for the information sub-system.

ACADEMIC THRUST

1. Review the need for developing separate curricula for master and bachelor degrees in "Food Systems" as against "Food Systems" simply being major fields in existing degree programs.
2. Seek inputs from private agribusiness and cooperatives (the targeted job markets) in curricula development.
3. Decrease target output of MS Ag Econ graduates with major in agricultural marketing from 50 to 30.
4. Increase target output of BS Ag with major in marketing from 25 to 35/40.
5. Expand thrust to include training of extension students and agents in technological packaging.
6. Where possible, training at the MS level should be done at UPLB or any other university in the country.

7. Where possible, training at the Ph. D. level should be done at the UPLB or any other university in the country, but with an opportunity to take a year of course work abroad, credited towards the Ph. D. degree, to minimize inbreeding.
8. Increase time allotment for international training to 16 months for MS and 36 months for Ph. D.
9. Increase stipend from \$300 to \$700 per month for post-doctoral fellowships abroad, reducing number of slots if necessary.
10. Inventory current and proposed in-country degree and non-degree training programs of UPLB, CLSU, BAEcon, BAEx and others, and check the fit of these programs within the objectives and activities of IAPMP.
11. Consider in-country short-training programs involving local and foreign trainers in lieu of some foreign fellowship slots.
12. Encourage and support field trips, observation tours and first-hand exposure to places and projects in-country, which will provide experiences relevant to IAPM Project purposes.

TECHNOLOGICAL PACKAGE THRUST

1. Activate the tech pack advisory committee to provide overall policy and technical guidance.
2. Examine once again the conceptualization and operating plan for the Food & Feed/Grains Processing Center in the context of IAPMP's objectives and CLSU's expected capabilities and plans for the future.

3. Determine soon the future consultant needs for CLSU in view of the forthcoming completion of the incumbents' tour of duty.
4. Review the feasibility of the proposal for students' cooperatives' to operate the university farm and processing center, and study alternative approaches.
5. Consider other sources of technologies suitable for the four (4) pilot areas of BAE_x and relate these to the work going on at CLSU.
6. Include in the technology packaging some technologies suitable for subsistence purposes as a cushion for the small farmer against market failure.
7. Strengthen the integrative aspects or linkages among production, processing, and marketing in any tech pack.
8. Instead of the term tech pack, adopt the term technology packaging to emphasize the process rather than the commodity.

EXTENSION/OUTREACH THRUST

1. Appoint a specific coordinator for the entire thrust.
2. Conceptualize and operationalize as one thrust, the sub-project activities of the extension delivery system, the agribusiness and market assistance centers and cooperatives development which are now being pursued independently of each other.
3. Expand the Extension Delivery Systems Committee to include representatives from the Academic and Tech Pack Thrusts and from KSU.

4. Consider greater functional fusion of the Tech Pack and Extension/ Outreach Thrusts with respect to identification, development and pilot testing of potential technologies.
5. Develop staffing pattern for both thrusts particularly for the operating manpower of the food, feed and grain processing center.

OVERALL

Planning

1. In a host country contract, a different pattern and quality of relationship among AID, KSU and GRP has to be developed. This would require on the part of the contractor, an acute cross-cultural sensitivity and conscious seeking of opportunities to play their technical assistance role in a more imaginative manner. Given this new era in the host country-contractor relationship, all parties must face up to these new demands. Since the term of the KSU Team Leader is to expire in August, the search for and recruitment of the next KSU Team Leader has to be initiated immediately with these above considerations in mind. The leader has to take an active professional and programmatic role. Likewise, the consultants where applicable, could be more effective if they were to take greater initiative in the exercise of their technical expertise role.
2. Where it would be advantageous to do so, IAPMP should tie in with PCARR, and other projects such as the National Extension, Aquaculture Production/Fisheries Development, Small Farmers' Irrigation, etc., for reasons of possible input from or output through them.

3. Build in a regular feedback mechanism from small farmers to the institution and agencies within Tech Pack, Extension/Outreach and Academic Thrusts.
4. Develop a monitoring and evaluation scheme which will identify and define suitable indicators and appropriate methodology to measure progress at the impact level.
5. Review support operations in the spirit of giving maximum support from available peso and dollar resources to project implementation.
6. For an early spin-off, consider the possibility of replicating IAFMP at the regional level utilizing regional universities as a base.

ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING

1. Make appropriate arrangements in order that the Overall Project Coordinator may devote more time not only to provide leadership for project implementation but also to strengthen organizational and functional linkages.
2. Reorganize the Executive Committee on two levels:
 - a. Retaining the present structure to discuss project policies, meeting quarterly or as the need arises;
 - b. Creating a working group of task forces to tackle operating problems, meeting at least monthly.
3. Analyze the functions of all committees in the project to identify unnecessary overlaps.

4. Hire a capable Filipino administrative officer for the KSU Office to take care of the tedious, but essential complexities of administrative details, in order to permit the Team Leader and his assistant to assume a more active professional leadership role.
5. Hire additions to the MA Management Staff with expertise in fruits and vegetables, cereals and other crops.

DIRECTION AND CONTROL

1. Solve whatever problems remain so that KSU can establish formal relationships with other US universities to augment the scope and quality of expertise available for long-term and short-term consultant positions.
2. Do whatever is necessary to facilitate placement of participants sent for graduate training at a variety of US institutions.
3. Settle all questions of costs (direct and indirect) between KSU and GRP, with appropriate AID concurrence, on a business-like basis.
4. All parties involved in the IAPMP should now concentrate their energies on working together in a professional collaborative manner to achieve the success of the project to which all are committed.

GSL/AID/IRRI

RICE RESEARCH PROJECT

2 YEAR REVIEW

MAY 21 - 25, 1979

FORMSHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Sri Lanka	B. Project Title Rice Research Project Loan # 383-T-016	C. Project Number	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed F.Y. 76 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY 81
E. Use of Project Funding 1. AID: (Loan or Grant) 4,200,000 2. Other Donor _____ 3. Host Country Counterpart Funds 3,400,000 * TOTAL \$ _____ _____ from development loan committee's review		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director _____ 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) not stated 3. Other _____	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) Jeffrey W. Evans, ASIA/PD and Chas. H. Antholt, ASIA/TR 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.)		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) Department of Agriculture 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) International Rice Research Institute	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date) not stated			

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title Rice Research Project <u>GSL/AID/IRRI</u>	B. Evaluation Date May 21-25, 1979	C. Type of Evaluation mid-term (2 year review)	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation 1977-1979
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire not stated a. travel _____ b. per diem _____ Contract _____ 4. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____	F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation Assess progress made and modifications that might be made to effectively increase rice production, (the main project goal).		G. Initiated By not stated
H. Evaluation Team Composition			
1. Direct Hire			
a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise	
G. Hickey, ASIA/TR/SHRD/AID/W			
Mr. Richard Kriegel, Rural Development Officer, USAID, Colombo			
Mr. Charles H. Antholt, Agricultural Development Officer, USAID, Colombo (SEE attached sheet)			
2. Contract:			
a. Name of Organization (if any)	b. Contract No.		
c. Name(s) of Persons		d. Area(s) of Expertise	

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position)

not stated

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____

Typed Name _____

Position _____

Date _____

ASIA/DP/E: 6/80

REVIEW TEAM:

Dr. C.R. Panabokke, Deputy Director Research and Project Director
Mr. A.S.Ranatunge, Senior Research and Training Officer, Agrarian Research and Training
Institute
Mr. M. Jayapalan, Deputy Director, Ministry of Agricultural Development and Research
Dr. Marcos R. Vega, Deputy Director General, IRRI
Dr. J. Ritchie Cowan, Regional Liaison Scientist, IRRI
Dr. Walter L. Griffeth, IRRI Field Trials Specialist
Mr. James E. Wimberly, IRRI Team Leader
Dr. Wayne H. Freeman, IADS, Nepal and Chairman of Review Team

I. Summary and Recommendations

A. Summary:

The review team met from 21 to 25 May for the purpose of reviewing the project on Rice Research of the Department of Agriculture, financed by USAID under loan No. 383-T-016 and implemented by IRRI through an agreement between GSL and the International Rice Research Institute. The project has completed 2 years of a 5 year period. The review team was requested to review the work that had been underway during this period; assess the progress made; modifications that that might be needed to achieve objectives; and consider new directions that might be pursued in order to more rapidly or more effectively increase rice production in Sri Lanka.

The team strongly endorsed the project and proposed that the project be continued essentially in its present scope. Deficiencies and delays in implementation of the project were recognized especially in technical assistance to the Field Trials program, degree training, staff recruitment, and equipment procurement. Appropriate corrections and actions and appointments have been made and it would appear achievement of project objectives can be realized. The team considered the various inputs to the project and suggested that some minor modifications would be desirable in technical assistance, training and commodities. These modifications would need to be reflected in allocating funds for the remainder of the project period.

The team feels that the project has made substantial progress in Rice Research. The problems farmers have had with insects like brown plant hopper require the development of varieties with built-in plant protection to these insects. The team observed materials in the final stages of testing that would offer farmers an opportunity to reduce costs of insect control by combining insect resistance with other pest control measures.

The Resource Capability Survey program has made substantial and significant progress in developing land characterizations that will enable the varietal improvement group to more effectively tailor varieties to fit specific conditions, by utilizing these classifications in the process of varietal identification. Such classifications will also be useful to the Cropping Systems research team as they conduct research in farmers' fields to identify new patterns to increase production through new crops and greater cropping intensity. The system will be of tremendous assistance to the extension personnel as they can relate recommendations to the capabilities of a farmer's lands.

Cropping Systems research on rice-based cropping systems has made an excellent beginning in generating information which could be of value in increasing cropping intensity by the introduction of new crops

in cropping patterns or by increasing production of existing patterns. Constraints to production have been reported back to research stations where problem-oriented research can seek solutions to these problems. Whenever possible the Cropping Systems program as well as extension should be used as a primary resource in identifying the kinds of varieties needed.

The team recognized a need to involve rural sociologists and economists in identifying constraints to rice production and the exploitation of new cropping systems. Means to implement these studies should be explored and linkages with IFRI's network on agro-economic research should be made.

Decentralization of Field Trials and linking them to regional stations seeks to relate such trials to more location-specific environments in the process of identifying varieties for farmers' use. These trials form an important component in the evaluation process for the identification of varieties and develop packages of practices to exploit their potential.

Lack of sufficient staffing of posts for the project have been a factor to slow the research effort of the project. This has been true of resident specialists to be supplied by IFRI as well as local staff where suitable personnel could not be identified for a number of posts and locations. Nevertheless, the research program as conceptualized has made significant progress in implementing the work plans developed for the four research areas. Appropriate expansion in staffing should be made to provide for a concentrated breeding effort in the Eastern rice growing region and a better balance to the program at Maha Illuppallama.

The technical assistance for Rice Research as projected for the balance of the contract should be continued as originally planned. Technical assistance to the Field Trials program should be extended for 36 person months which will require an extension of 12 person months for this position.

Procurement of commodities have been delayed for various reasons, but the team was gratified to note that most of the funds available had been committed and orders placed for the equipment.

The long term training component has been slow to be implemented and consideration needs to be made to possibly extend the period in order to fit the long term training into the contract period.

The team views with sympathy the question of support to dependents to enable them to accompany staff members on long term study programs. USAID should seriously consider means of providing support for this purpose.

Short term training is well on schedule and even more funds could be utilized in this activity.

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The team visited research stations at Bombuwela, Batalagoda, Maha Illuppallama and the Central Agricultural Research Institute at Peradeniya. The team observed Field Trials plots in the wet zone and had an opportunity to be briefed on land classifications as we travelled from one place to another.

The team was briefed by staff at the various locations and at Maha Illuppallama they had an opportunity to get reports from the site coordinators from the cropping systems sites.

Important discussions were held with the Director of Agriculture, Mr. Earl Jayasekera, on May 24 regarding project activities and achievements related to projects and programs of the Department of Agriculture.

B Recommendations:

From these observations, discussions and study of reports provided to the team, the team has made the following recommendations.

1. A closer linkage between breeders and the regional adaptive trials agronomists should be developed and the lines of operation and responsibility clearly defined in order to identify varieties for unstable environments of bog soils, half bog soils, rainfed chena and rainfed uplands.
2. In order to increase the effectiveness of the varietal improvement team, provision should be made to provide adequate and appropriate facilities at CARI for mass rearing of gall midge.
3. Because of the great potential for increasing rice production in the dry zone through improved agronomic crop management, the department should intensify its research efforts by the identification of strong leaders and new additional personnel in agronomic research. More agronomic assistance is needed in the varietal improvement program. A stronger agronomic program is needed to better utilize and maximize the efforts of the varietal improvement program.
4. The Field Trials program is an integral part of the process of developing recommended practices for the use of new varieties on specific land elements as identified by the Resource Capability Survey. To more effectively utilize these trials it is recommended that the policy decisions taken in August 1978 should be implemented to make Field Trials the responsibility of each regional station on a phased basis beginning with Bombuwela, Batalagoda, Maha Illuppallama and CARI in the Maha season 1979/80. In order to implement this change, present staff, vehicles and equipment would be reassigned, new staff needs assessed and

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recruited, and an agronomist assigned to work with the IRRI resident specialist.

5. The project is generating an abundance of valuable research information that needs to be analyzed, summarized and presented in literature of use to extension personnel and farmers. It is recommended that the project provide for the design, programming and implementation of a system of disseminating this information. The information system should also include audio-visual facilities and activities. IRRI should supply a communications specialist on a consultancy basis to develop these plans.
6. The revised approach to Field Trials coupled with the expanded adaptive research program envisioned in the World Bank Agricultural Extension and Adaptive Research Project provides an opportunity for developing more effective linkage between GSL/IRRI and the GSL extension program. Similarly, linkages and research support should be developed with the integrated water management projects being sponsored by AID.
7. The team endorses the training schedule which has been developed. It does however recommend that appropriate budget arrangements be made to accommodate additional training.
 - a. In view of the experience obtained during the first two year of the project and of other changes which provided opportunities not existing at the time the project was developed and signed, the team recommends that the GSL/IRRI contract be amended to permit MS as well as Ph.D candidates to pursue their degree training in Western or Asian universities. Selection of personnel for degree training and choices of institutions and courses of study will be the mutual responsibility of the Project Director and the IRRI Team Leader. Special consideration should be provided to staff in leadership roles. In the meantime, however, in keep with IRRI's current policy, MS degree training to be done in developed countries will be removed from IRRI's responsibilities. It is recommended that GSL employ other avenues to utilize AID funds for MS degree students already identified for training in countries outside of Asia.
 - b. In order to more effectively support the research efforts it is recommended that non-degree training should be provided to lower level staff such as farm superintendents, farm manager, agricultural instructors, research assistants, laboratory technicians and statistical assistants. Because of additional efforts in adaptive research additional short term training is required for the Field Trials personnel. Extension personnel should be among this group to receive training so that linkages with extension may more easily be

established and implemented.

8. The review team noted the need for additional clerical, secretarial and accounting assistance in the office of the Project Manager in order to insure smooth management of the project. Provision for such was not anticipated when the original budget was prepared. The committee recognized the need for consideration of such support staffing. It is recommended that those responsible for the project management take into account this need when evaluating the mid project budgeting and priorities.
9. It is recommended that the technical assistance as projected and budgeted be continued. The above recommendations will require modifications and re-allocation of funds to provide for the extension by one person year the Field Trials consultant, additional staff assistance for the Project Director, commodities and additional training.
10. Rural sociologists can significantly contribute to the Rice Research and Cropping Systems program. It is suggested that consideration be given by the project to utilize rural sociologists as part of the research team in support of the constraints studies program and an identification of technological packages desired by farmers.

THAILAND SEED DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

Second Year Evaluation

By

Dr. Lloyd Frederick, et al

September 5 - October 10, 1978

FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Thailand	B. Project Title Seed Development Project	C. Project Number 493-0270	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>76</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY <u>81</u>
E. Life of Project Funding 1. AID: (Loan or Grant) <u>\$3,700,000 (PES)</u> Other Donor _____ Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ _____ SEE p. 3E "project financing is from two sources" (RTG and AID)		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director Donald Cohen 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) Thomas L. Cooper 3. Other _____	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) not stated 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not stated		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC) 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not stated	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date) not stated			

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title Thailand Seed Development Project	B. Evaluation Date Sept 5-Oct. 10 1978	C. Type of Evaluation Second Year Evaluation	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation July 1977-September 1978
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire a. travel _____ per diem _____ Contract _____ 3. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____	F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation (SEE attached sheet)		G. Initiated By not stated
H. Evaluation Team Composition			
1. Direct Hire			
a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise	
2. Contract:			
a. Name of Organization (If any)	b. Contract No.	c. Name(s) of Persons	
		d. Area(s) of Expertise	
(SEE attached sheet) Joint Thai-U.S. Evaluation Team			

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position)

not stated

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____

Typed Name _____

Position _____

Date _____

F. Purpose: "The objective of the evaluation was to make a comprehensive assessment of the accomplishments of the Project against purpose output and input schedules set in the Project Paper (PP)." page 1E

H. Evaluation Team Composition:

Dr. Lloyd Frederick, Soil Microbiology Specialist, DSB, AID/W

Mr. Oliver A. Knott, Professor of Agronomy, Iowa State University

Dr. Roe Borsdorf, Food and Feed Grain Institute, Kansas State University

Mr. Nit Sammapan, Associate Dean, School of Business Administration,
National Institute of Development Administration

Dr. Phiphit Suphaphiphat, Associate Dean, School of Development Economics,
National Institute of Development Administration

Dr. Bunloe Sutharomn, Assistant Professor, School of Development Economics,
National Institute of Development Administration

Mr. Sombhong Pattamavichaiporn, Technical Services Division, Department of
Technical and Economic Cooperation (Observer)

Mr. Prasit Utchin, Economist, Office of Fiscal Policy, Ministry of Finance
(observer)

Mr. Det Trisahd, Assistant Project Officer, Office of Rural Development,
USAID (Coordinator)

THAILAND SEED DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

Second Year Evaluation

Summary

The evaluation of the second year's operations of the Thailand Seed Development Project was conducted during the period of September 5, 1978 through October 10, 1978. The Evaluation Team found that the overall achievement of the Project so far has not been up to expectation. The progress to date fell short of the planned implementation target in most aspects of the Project. The actual outputs of the Project in terms of the amount of seed produced, processed, and distributed as well as the training of the Project personnel and farmers were below planned targets. The construction and procurement aspects of the Project were one to two years behind schedule. It was also doubtful that the existing seed distribution procedures could benefit the majority poor farmers on a continuing basis.

The Evaluation Team found that the achievement of the Project was hindered by three main obstacles: the government bureaucratic red tape; the lack of a good coordination system among the implementing agencies; and the lack of experience in the seed business on the part of the Project personnel. Recommendations of the Team to help improve the performance of the Project focus on the areas of forward planning of production, decentralization of decision making, and adoption of business-like procedures. In view of the dedicated and hard working personnel at the implementation level together with their gradually built up experience, the Evaluation Team

believes that a lot of improvement is feasible especially if recommendations by the Team are seriously considered and efforts are made to carry them out. However, in order to enable the continued development of the use of good seed to bear effects on the increase in agricultural productivity, private investment in the seed development project of similar nature should be promoted.

XII. Conclusions

The Evaluation Team found that the SDP has failed to achieve the purpose output and input schedules outlined in the PP. The progress to date fell short of the planned implementation target in most aspects of the Project. Delays were due mainly to the bureaucratic red tape and the inexperience of the SDP personnel. Though the slow progress of the SDP may be acceptable based on the government standard, it is far from being totally satisfactory when viewed from the commercial perspective.

The Team believes that the SDP personnel at the implementation level are dedicated, conscientious persons who are desirous of making the Project a successful one. The progress can be sped up if the Seed Executive Committee and the Seed Implementation Committee address themselves to the more serious problems as the Team views them. Of all the recommendations the Evaluation Team is of the opinion that the following items must be given immediate attention:

(1) Delegation of authority to key personnel responsible for day-to-day operations to make decisions and see that they are carried out.

(2) Insist on regular Executive Committee and Implementation Committee meetings, at least on a monthly basis, to find solutions to problems.

(3) MOF should be given help in terms of both trained staff members and money in developing and carrying out a sound seed sales program which can get the seed to farmers effectively.

(4) Selection of candidates for training abroad, especially for those who will receive degree training, must be done as funds provided by the AID Grant must be committed within less than 18 months from now.

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Review/Redesign

of the

Thailand Seed Development Project

By

**A. David Lundberg
James C. Delouche**

FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Thailand	B. Project Title Seed Development	C. Project Number 493-0270	D. Active Life of Project 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>75</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY _____
E. Life of Project Funding 1. AID (Loan or Grant) <u>3,924,000*</u> Other Donor _____ Host Country Counterpart Funds <u>5,296,973**</u> TOTAL \$ _____ *\$299,000 in grant funds ** thru FY 81		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director <u>Donald Cohen</u> 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) 3. Other _____	
G. Project Design (not stated) 1. In-House (Name, Position) 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.)		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) <u>Department of Agricultural Extension</u> <u>Department of Agriculture</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.)	

I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date)

July, 1977
 September-October, 1978
 July, 1979 project audit

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title <u>Review/Redesign of the Thailand Seed Development Project</u>	B. Evaluation Date March 1980	C. Type of Evaluation <u>Review/redesign after four yrs of implementation</u>	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation 1976-present
E. Evaluation Cost (not stated) 1. Direct Hire a. travel _____ per diem _____ contract _____ 3. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____	F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation <u>To examine the progress and problems of the project, and recommend necessary changes in the project design.</u>		G. Initiated By (not stated)

H. Evaluation Team Composition

1. Direct Hire

a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise
A. David Lundberg	Agriculture Adviser, Asia/TR/ARD	Agriculture

2. Contract

a. Name of Organization (if any)	b. Contract No.
Mississippi State University	

c. Name(s) of Persons	d. Area(s) of Expertise
James C. Delouche	Seed Technology

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position)

(not stated)

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____

Typed Name _____

Position _____

Date _____

I. Over-View of Progress of the Seed Development Project

The Seed Development Project has been faulted in both project evaluations, one in July 1977 and one in September-October 1978 as well as a July 1979 project audit for failure to develop in accord with the implementation schedule and some descriptive specifications in the original Project Paper (PP). Much of the delay in implementation has its origins in the bureaucracy in the RTG and AID.

The Seed Development Project was the first loan project in Thailand requiring host country procurement of technical assistance and equipment. There were no precedents. Technical assistance contract negotiations were prolonged and exasperating. Equipment procurement and construction contracts were delayed, some as much as two years. Much has been learned in the RTG and USAID at the expense of the Seed Development Project.

The evaluations and audit of the Project judge progress against projections in the PP. The various components described in the PP were and remain valid and the Project has followed these descriptive segments in essentially all the major details, save for the role of the Marketing Organization for Farmers (MOF), marketing of seed, and implementation timing. The PP took an optimistic view. It did not expect that all the delays that could happen would happen. There were delays and progress was disappointingly slow judged against the optimistic projections in the PP, especially at the time of the September 1978 evaluation.

Judged against the status of the seed program/industry in Thailand at the start of the Project, and against seed projects funded by AID, World Bank, UNDP and FAO in a host of other countries, progress in developing a seed program/industry in Thailand has been exceptional.

- (1) Some 3,000 MT of seed of six crops are being produced in FY 80. 173 tons were produced at the start of the Project in FY 76.
- (2) Farmers have confidence in the seed as evidenced by 300 MT sales in small lots (1-10 bags) at the Phitsanulok Center in 1979. Many of the farmers traveled to the Center by bus and bought seed 3 months in advance of the planting season, because they were afraid the seed supply would run out if they waited longer. All corn seed, approximately 1,000 tons, is now sold out some two months before planting begins. Demand is now far exceeding production capacity.

- (3) Some 3,500 contract farm families are organized in groups to produce seed, receiving supervision and advice, and greater income than if they were grain producers as they were before the Project in FY 75. Some 200 contract farm families were organized at that time.
- (4) A Seed Division with a dedicated staff of some 250 in the Department of Agricultural Extension (DOAE) has been established under the AID Seed Development Loan to manage RTG seed activities and promote the seed industry in Thailand. There was no Seed Division in 1977.
- (5) Four very exceptional Seed Centers have been established and are operational. Minor improvements will be needed but the Centers are in place and are operational showcases of the DOAE and AID assistance.
- (6) The Project has provided a base for assistance from other donors. The Japanese have financed a 5th seed center with a capacity of 500 tons, mainly for corn. It is also under operational control of the DOAE Seed Division. This assistance has complemented the Project. EEC is negotiating to provide a 6th seed center or a series of small Centers in the South, an area not covered by present project activities.
- (7) Private companies are emerging, two are in operation, two are constructing facilities and two more are in the advanced feasibility stage, undoubtedly as a result of the examples in the Seed Development Project. Still other private companies are looking into the feasibility of establishing seed businesses. The Seed Development Project has assisted the private companies in technical matters, training and in providing information needed to determine the feasibility of a private seed business in Thailand. No private companies were willing to enter the business at the time of Project initiation. It is projected that the private sector will be producing at least 5,000 tons of seed by FY 1982.
- (8) The Project has served well as a mechanism for supply of seed for special projects, especially during emergency situations (floods, drought, etc.) and its potential contributions in this area are enormous.

- (9) Experience has been gained, people trained, that will be reflected in improved efficiency and effectiveness in both the public and private segments of the emerging seed industry.
- (10) The program/industry being established as a result of the Project greatly increases the flexibility of the MOAC to shift crop production in accord with changes in climatic and economic (internal and world market) conditions through the introduction of new varieties and crops.

Within the elapsed time of the Seed Development Project, Thailand has made more progress in establishing a seed program/industry than any of the developing countries we are familiar with, many of which were assisted by a much higher level of funding and more concentrated technical assistance. The RTG and USAID can and should be pleased with what has been accomplished. Given even the same rate of progress in the next 2-3 years as in the past 2-3 years, Thailand will have the outstanding seed program/industry in the region, save perhaps for India where a program was initiated in the mid-1950's. FAO and others are already looking at Thailand as a base for regional training and workshops in seed program/industry development.

The outstanding progress made should not lead to complacency. Many problems - some serious - confront the developing seed program/industry in Thailand: problems such as waste disposal, management, and seed distribution and marketing. These problems, however, are solvable and must be dealt with expeditiously.

The most serious dilemma for Thailand's seed program/industry would be for the RTG, USAID and other donors to consider that the establishment of a seed program/industry is complete at the end of this Project. A seed industry does not develop in 6 or 10 years. It is always developing in accord with the changing situation in agriculture which the seed industry serves. High level RTG interest and support of the seed program/industry in Thailand must continue. And, continued interest in the program by international donors, including USAID, is equally important for long term success of the effort.

II. Major Problems Confronting Progress of the Seed Development Project

1. The disposal of waste material and cull seed, particularly at Phitsanulok where processing has been underway for a number of years, is a critical problem. Waste material, cull seed, out of condition seed that must be sold as grain is not being disposed of. Rather it is occupying badly needed storage space, encouraging rat and insect infestation and causing a severe drain on the working capital account because the non-sale of waste seed (grain) has eliminated one source of replenishment for the Working Capital Account. This problem is becoming acute now that four other seed centers are operational.

2. The marketing and distribution of processed seed has not been a major problem to date since the level of seed production has not "strained" the rather ad hoc distribution system. This has led to some complacency that could be disastrous now that five processing plants are operating. Seed must be promoted and marketed through a planned system of distribution. The MOF was expected to play the lead role in this effort but has not. Alternative arrangements must be made immediately.

3. The price of seed is an issue that requires immediate attention. Costs of production are exceeding returns from seed sales causing a severe drain on the working capital account. The working capital account cannot be maintained long at present prices. In addition, the emerging private sector cannot compete with the highly subsidized DOAE seed prices. Low DOAE seed prices will discourage private sector expansion. It has been shown that farmers will pay premium prices for quality seed.

4. Rapid expansion of the seed program now that some degree of success is being achieved may be tempting. The Seed Division could be "pushed" into producing 1,500 to 2,000 tons of processed seed annually at each seed center. This would be a mistake. A one to two year period will be necessary for the Seed Division staff to gain experience and knowledge in the management and technical aspects of seed production, processing, and distribution operations. Rapid expansion of production at this point would be at the expense of seed quality and this, in the long run, would be a great disservice to the seed industry. Farmer confidence in improved seed must be developed and it cannot be done with low quality seed. Rather than rapid expansion in the public sector, private sector expansion should be promoted.

III. Project Design Changes

1. The Role of the Marketing Organization for Farmers (MOF)

Original project design envisioned a major MOF role in the Seed Development Project. This has not and, it now appears, will not come to pass. The Department of Agricultural Extension (DOAE) Seed Division will be the primary agency involved in the development of a seed program/industry in Thailand. Components of the project including multiplication of foundation seed through contract growers, management of the Working Capital Account, processing of multiplied seed, and marketing and distribution of seed will be responsibilities of the DOAE through the duration of the project and we expect thereafter. The Department of Agriculture (DA) will be responsible for production of foundation seed and inoculum. The MOF will continue to participate in the project but only as one of the primary agencies involved in the seed distribution system.

2. Seed Production Targets

Based on experience to date and projected demand for seed the production targets for processed seed for Year VI will be revised as follows.

Rice	from 3,000 to 2,050 MT
Corn	from 1,600 to 1,300 MT
Soybean	from 2,200 to 450 MT
Peanut	from 1,200 to 525 MT
Mungbean	from 450 to 150 MT
Sorghum	from 200 to 75 MT
Totals	from 8,650 to 4,550 MT

Other donor (Japanese and EEC) funded Seed Centers and the private sector will more than make up the target "shortfall" caused by this revision.

3. Increased Emphasis on Seed Promotion/Marketing

As previously noted there is a potential major problem with distribution of seed produced now that five plants are operating. To deal with this a Seed Promotion/Marketing Section should be established at each Seed Center. This section, probably one or two seed technologists at the start, would promote the use of good seed through extensive field activities in Provinces adjacent to the Center by working closely with and training Amphoe and Tambon Agents. Promotional activities could include the use of radio, TV, newspaper, leaflets, field days, farmer meetings, etc. The Seed Promotion/Marketing Section of each Seed Center could work with the field extension staff

to plan seed needs one year in advance so the Center Chief could schedule his production in an orderly manner.

A similar section should be established at the DOAE Seed Division headquarters to deal continuously with other agencies such as the MOF, ARD, Social Welfare Department, Crop Promotion Division, Cooperative Federation, etc. to establish and project their seed requirements in time to permit proper planning of Seed Division production. The DOAE Seed Division's Promotion/Marketing Section would also coordinate and support the Seed Promotion/Marketing efforts of each Seed Center.

4. Increased Emphasis on Seed Program/Industry Management

Emphasis to date has correctly been placed on establishing an institutional arrangement for management of a seed program/industry, e.g., contracting for technical assistance and equipment, getting approval for and recruiting staff, construction of facilities, etc. These activities will continue but at lesser intensity. Now that the "system" is, to a large extent, in place it must be managed to function effectively. DOAE management, training plans and technical assistance must focus on development of an effective management system for the seed program.

5. Private Sector Emphasis

The private sector is beginning to participate in seed production and supply operations--the seed industry. This involvement should be encouraged and promoted by the RTG and particularly by the DOAE Seed Division.

6. Working Capital Account (WCA)

This fund will be controlled by the DOAE. Procedures developed for implementation of the WCA, e.g., accounting procedures, inventory control, seed sales, etc., must be developed to serve the needs of the Seed Division and, more importantly, the various Seed Centers rather than to simply meet the requirements of the AID Loan. The WCA should be developed and established as a permanent fiscal mechanism to serve the needs of the DOAE Seed Division.

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IV. List of Recommendations

The following recommendations are made to the Royal Thai Government and the USAID to assure progress of the Seed Development Project and the seed program industry in Thailand.

A. General Recommendations

1. That all waste material, cull seed, out-of-condition seed, etc. (much of which presently has no value) that have accumulated at the Seed Centers be disposed of immediately by establishing easily implemented procedures. Waste material, cull seed, etc. produced in the Centers should be disposed of on a regular basis, at least every two months. Existing waste material should be disposed of and disposal procedures operating by June 30, 1980.
2. That the Marketing Organization for Farmers (MOF) be disengaged from the Project but continue as a primary outlet for Project Seed. The DOAE Seed Division will have primary responsibility for Project implementation including ownership and operation of the Seed Centers.
3. That a Seed Promotion/Distribution Section be established at each Seed Center and in the Seed Division's central office.
4. That seed production costs be compared with seed prices and prices raised to cover costs, particularly in the case of corn and soybeans.
5. That Project seed production targets be revised downward to take into account delays in facility development, relative inexperience of personnel and management, the entry of the private sector and to permit scheduling of production based on market forces rather than project targets. Original targets will be met easily by the total Seed Division operations and the private sector.
6. That the Seed Division's management style be altered, now that the "building" phase of the Project is essentially complete, to deal with the "operating" phase into which the Project is now moving. A reorganization of the Seed Division may be appropriate.
7. That RTG (DOAE and DA) continue to encourage and assist private sector participation in the seed industry.

8. That the RTG and USAID document the economic benefits of the Project to contract seed producers and seed users to produce information and data needed in planning for the future development of the seed industry in Thailand.

B. Seed Production Recommendations

1. That for the duration of the Project, all seed production activities including seed procurement from contract seed producers be the responsibility of the DOAE rather than the MOF.

2. That the DOAE should as a matter of policy select seed growers as near to the Seed Centers as possible to reduce transport costs, facilitate supervision and inspection and assure that seed quality is maintained.

3. That a new and more reasonable set of quality standards for purchase of seed from contract growers be developed.

4. That the DOAE should no longer require contract farmers to rigorously "hand pick" the seed before it is purchased, and that all seed produced by contract growers that meets established standards be purchased by the DOAE.

5. That a trial system of installing "official purchasing" at the Seed Center truck scale be tried and that the present system which requires two "committees" be reviewed and simplified as possible.

6. That the DOAE buy high quality foundation in an "unclean" state from the DA for processing in DOAE plants prior to distribution to contract growers so as to relieve DA of the tedious task of hand cleaning seed and maximize use of DOAE's seed facilities.

7. That the DOAE produce an extra generation of peanut and soybean seed to reduce the requirement on DA for foundation seed of these low multiplication ration seed kinds.

8. That the production of seed be done through contract farmer growers as is presently being done and not through the establishment of government operated seed farms.

9. That in addition to the four established seed centers, two sub-centers, one at Chiang Mai and one at Kalasin, be established.

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C. Implementation Recommendations

1. That a full-fledged seed certification program not be implemented at this time but rather emphasis given to establishment of a basic seed control system that would protect both the farmer and the legitimate private sector seed companies.

2. That implementation of the new accounting/management procedures for the DOAE as designed by SGV Na Thalang Company be implemented as rapidly as possible and extended to include all DOAE Seed Division activities.

3. That the DOAE continue its programs to make quality seed available to the smaller farmers.

4. That in-country training programs on management, quality control and seed marketing/production be implemented in CY 80 and CY 81, the latter with assistance from Mississippi State University AID technical assistance cooperative agreement.

5. That a study tour (two weeks) of four to five Seed Division, high-level officials and the Senior Seed Industry Consultants to DOAE be made to Indonesia to observe the operations of Indonesia's National Seed Corporation, particularly its network of private dealers and packaging of seed in small containers. The remainder of the third country training should be cancelled permitting use of funds for more in-country training or other suitable training programs.

6. That implementation of the participant training program be continued until it is completed.

7. That the project consultant program be revised to provide for a 2nd inoculant consultation and a seed marketing/promotion consultation with the other consultations programmed as needed for handling under the Mississippi State University-AID/DSB centrally funded cooperative agreement.

8. That Dr. Billy R. Gregg, MSU Senior Seed Specialist, be extended through December 1981 and that Mr. George Dougherty, Seed Processing Specialist, be extended until June 1981.

9. That the SGV Na Thalang management/accounting contract continue at least through December 1980 to assist the DOAE to firmly establish the newly designed management and accounting system.

10. That funds presently committed by USAID for the Seed Development Project be expended as planned including that

earmarked for the Working Capital Account and that following review of the Working Capital Account in late CY 1980 a decision be made regarding the need for additional funding beyond the present loan.

11. That the RTG increase staffing of the DOAE Seed Division particularly at the Lampang and Chai Nat Seed Centers.

12. That the Seed Executive Committee consider establishment of a small operational sub-committee to assist with day-to-day project implementation problems--this in addition to the existing Seed Implementation Committee.

13. That a system be established for periodic involvement of USAID top management in review sessions with the Director General of DOAE and the Director of the Seed Division.

14. That the terminal disbursement date for the project be extended to December 1982 to allow for installation and initial operation of all equipment, particularly that for the inoculation component.

15. That USAID maintain an interest in seed program/industry development in Thailand even after termination of the project and continue to support development through (1) provision of additional training opportunities for Thai seed workers as funds are available, (2) support of DOAE and DA requests for technical assistance and initiating actions needed to obtain technical assistance under relevant centrally funded AID contracts and cooperative agreements, (3) assistance given to the seed program/industry in the event of the surfacing of serious problems or impediments to progress.

D. Inoculum Recommendations

1. That the inoculum production targets be reduced to coincide with projected seed production and farmers demand.

2. That procurement of the inoculum production equipment be expedited.

3. That a close relationship be established between the DA Soil Microbiology Division and the AID centrally funded NIFTAL program.

THAILAND SEED DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(AID Loan 493-T-017)

Status Report - Juny, 1979

By

T. L. Cooper

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Thailand	B. Project Title Seed Development Project	C. Project Number 493-0270	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>not stated</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY _____
E. Life of Project Funding 1. AID: (Loan or Grant) Loan #. <u>493-T-017</u> 2. Other Donor _____ 3. Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director _____ 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) <u>T.L. Cooper</u> 3. Other _____	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) <u>not stated</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) <u>not stated</u>		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) <u>Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC)</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) <u>not stated</u>	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date) 1978, no other information stated, but inferred that this refers to; <u>Thailand Seed Development Project</u> evaluation, 9/5-10/10/78, 2nd year evaluation, joint US.- Thai team.			

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title <u>Thailand Seed Development Project</u>	B. Evaluation Date July 1979	C. Type of Evaluation status report	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation since 1976
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire <u>not stated</u> a. travel _____ b. per diem _____ Contract _____ other _____ TOTAL \$ _____	F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation "Review past history of the seed project, outline current status, discuss problems and propose possible solutions, and to suggest some future actions."		G. Initiated By USAID
H. Evaluation Team Composition			
1. Direct Hire			
a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise	
T.L. Cooper	Project Officer	AID/Bangkok	
2. Contract:			
a. Name of Organization (if any)	b. Contract No.		
c. Name(s) of Persons	d. Area(s) of Expertise		

L. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position) <u>not stated</u>	J. Evaluation Coordinator Signature _____ Typed Name _____ Position _____ Date _____
--	---

E: 8/80

THAILAND SEED DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(AID Loan 493-T-017)

STATUS REPORT - JULY, 1979

----- This report is an attempt to review the past history -----
of the Seed Project (both successes and failures), to outline
the current status, to discuss problems and propose possible
solutions, and to suggest some future actions. It was
initially prepared for use in an internal USAID review of
the Seed Project and subsequently expanded. The report was
finalized following the USAID review.

I. BACKGROUND

The Seed Project has suffered more than its share of problems, delays, bureaucratic hang-ups, etc. And, it has not lived up to the goals proposed in the Project Paper. This is largely because of unrealistic planning. The goals of the Project were set forth assuming (or so it would seem) that full staff would be available for each segment of the Project as needed. However, at the time the Loan Agreement was signed there was not even, officially, a Seed Division. The Project, in reality, did not have a home. Because there was not a Seed Division, no personnel allocations could be made from the Civil Service Commission nor could permanent personnel assignments be made.

For some time the Seed Project was run, on the Thai side, by one person - the current Seed Division Director. In time personnel from other Divisions of DOAE were assigned to work, on a temporary basis, on Seed Project activities. Many of them have remained.

Establishment of a Seed Division was not a condition precedent to disbursement as it probably should have been. For many reasons, mostly internal-political factors in both the MOAC and other RTG Agencies and the Thai bureaucratic process, the Seed Division was not officially established by the Cabinet until late 1977. Only at this time could the Project actually start to function.

DRAFTING OFFICER: O/RD:TH/cooper:ps

INITIAL DRAFT: 6/29/79

FINAL DRAFT: 7/16/79

During this same period, USAID was in a phase-out status and primarily concerned with completing Project Papers and entering into Loan Agreements for projects yet to be obligated. The "official" USAID attitude was that the RTG had reached the point that it was capable of implementing projects including all necessary procurement actions. USAID's role would be mainly an approval process. For some parts of the RTG, e.g., DTEC, USAID's attitudes might have been partly valid; but not for the great majority of agencies. Present implementation problems in most projects, especially those involving outside procurement actions, substantiate USAID's error.

What USAID was doing, in the case of the Seed Project, was expecting the impossible. DOAE, and more particularly the Seed Division, was facing a task, in terms of procurement, which makes up a major part of the Loan, that they had no idea how to deal with. USAID Project Officers were only slightly more skilled. The MOAC does not have a central procurement office, at least not for the type involved in this Project. That leaves each Department, in reality each Division, on its own. Lessons learned have little carry over. This is exemplified by the fact that the Special Projects Division of DOAE now is going through the same process and learning the same lessons.

Also to be taken into account is the fact that the Seed Project was one of the first Loans to be implemented. Neither USAID nor the MOAC had any idea what they were facing. In the past clearances were easily obtained. It was USAID money. Now it was RTG money and subject to all the RTG bureaucratic processes. Few people knew what they were. As an example, DOAE officially advised USAID that it would be ready to sign the contract with MSU almost immediately upon conclusion of negotiations. However, when it reached the Office of the Under-Secretary for approval, he insisted it be approved by Department of Public Prosecution. Public Prosecution will only review contracts in the Thai language. DOAE spent considerable time and expense on translation. Then came the problem of clauses in the Loan Agreement which USAID requires but which are contrary to Thai regulations. The list could go on and on. The Chief of the Seed Division spent literally days for a period of more than six months moving contract approval along. This obviously took time away from other activities. Equipment procurement approvals are almost as time consuming.

As a final note, the MSU Senior Seed Specialist advised shortly after his arrival, and later in an official report, that had the personnel and procurement actions envisioned in the PP taken place as planned the Seed Project goals were obtainable, in a developing country - over a period of ten to twelve years.

II. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND CURRENT STATUS

During the past several months the Project Officer and Assistant Project Officer for the Seed Project have visited all of the Seed Processing Centers at least once and have observed seed multiplication and seed buying activities in areas both adjacent to and far from the Centers. In all cases Seed Project activities were discussed with Seed Division personnel, other Extension officers and participating farmers. Observations made and results of discussions will be contained in subsequent sections of this report.

During the same time period the Seed Project has undergone an exhaustive audit by AAG/EA. USAID has just received a copy of the final draft and the report itself should be issued by the end of July. This report will also address some of the points and recommendations contained in the audit report.

After a review of the 1978 Evaluation Report, AID/W has raised several questions and made requests for information (STATE 145353). An interim response (BANGKOK 21277) was sent advising that this report was to be prepared and would be addressing many of the points raised. Those which would not be addressed were answered in the interim reply.

The Seed Project is a highly complex undertaking involving many different activities, some of which are very sophisticated. Each of these, as well as some elements, e.g., staffing, which affect all Project components, are discussed below.

A. Foundation Seed Program

The Foundation Seed Program is one of the less problematic Project components. The primary problem has been one of coordination between DOAE and DA in terms of both ordering and taking delivery of seed on time. The situation has improved as the Project implementers have gained experience. In the past lack of adequate storage space was one reason for DOAE not taking delivery of foundation seed as scheduled. Completion of the Seed Processing

is on its way and a processing plant is being constructed. Seed Project personnel assisted with the equipment specifications and building plans. Staff will be trained at the Project Seed Centers. Like in the Seed Project, the firm will contract with farmers in the vicinity of the processing center to produce the seed. The farmers will be provided with seed, credit, etc. by the firm. —

Five other companies, some multinational, are seriously considering and are currently investigating prospects for involvement in the seed business.

III. GENERAL COMMENTS

The Seed Project has been plagued by problems. But, this is not just the fault of the RTG. AID shares the responsibility. RTG failure to supply personnel, budget and other resources, etc. as scheduled, has been well documented. AID lack of attention to the Project has not, except for mentioned in the MSU Senior Seed Specialist's annual report and more recently by the AAG/EA.

The PP, prepared by AID, imposed an impossible implementation schedule considering RTG capabilities in several areas and the AID attitude of minimal participation.

Also not documented, with the exception of some mention in the MSU advisor's reports, are Project successes. Both Evaluation Reports and the AAG/EA Audit do not mention them. Failure to do so in the 1978 Evaluation Report was called to the attention of the rest of the team by Dr. Lloyd Frederick but the team members finalizing the Report decided not to include a "success" section. It will be included as a part of the 1979 In-House Evaluation. The past year has shown tremendous improvement. Things are moving!

The quality and dedication of most of the Seed Division staff is very high. Long hard work has produced results.

Activities in the field have gone very well considering what there has been to work with. The problems have been and will continue to be bureaucratic and mostly at the national level. The Project will be able to produce and process the seed. The rest is up to the bureaucracy.

The importance of seed in any agricultural development activities is high enough to justify extension of the current Project in order to provide all Project inputs.

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IV. IMMEDIATE ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN^{1/}

1. Extend the TDD for up to one year to cover not only the MSU contract, which is scheduled to terminate March 21, 1981, but also the inoculum production equipment yet to be ordered. The current TDD is December 11, 1980. Final payments for the inoculum equipment cannot be expected to be made before early 1981. Final payments for some seed processing equipment may also extend beyond the TDD. (Between the time of the initial draft of this report and the USAID review, USAID received an official request to extend the Project for one year.)

2. Extend the funding period for the training grant to cover Master's degree candidates who will begin training this year and in August or September, 1980. If they do not begin this year funds should be switched to short-term training - both U.S. and Third Country.

3. Discussions and resolutions of current problems, especially marketing, between RIG and USAID officials above the implementation level.

4. Continue increased USAID participation in the Project.

5. Complete the IFB for the inoculum production equipment.

6. Work with the Seed Division to establish a system whereby information on numbers of farmers participating and number of rai planted is available at the Bangkok level as well as in the field.

7. Make a determination as to how the Project should be restructured or revised (as recommended by both AID/W and AAG/EA) and complete the necessary documentation.

V. DECISIONS MADE DURING USAID REVIEW

1. USAID and DOAE should jointly review the current progress of the Project and consider necessary revisions to the Project design and implementation plan, particularly with regard to the most important recommendations of the 1978 Project Evaluation. (This has been proposed to DOAE and USAID has received indication of interest.)

^{1/} As of June 29, 1979 - the date of the initial draft.

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2. Extend the TDD to April 11, 1981 to cover the MSU contract. The decision to extend to the requested December 11, 1981 will depend on the outcome of the Project review.

3. Extend the funding period for the training grant to cover the M.S. candidates who are scheduled to depart in August or September, 1980 with the understanding that they will depart at that time.

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Final Evaluation

Thailand: Agricultural Development Loan
AID Loan No. 493-H-015

Prepared By:

Glenn G. Browne

Consultant

For Submission To:

U.S. Agency For International Development

Contract No. AID/ASIA-C-1383

March 16, 1979

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F. Purpose: Two part evaluation: 1) primary purpose to review and assess all phases of the loan, e.g., implementation, achievement of purposes/goals and meeting USAID requirements; and, 2) an overall look at BAAC operations and internal administrative problems. Both parts are to address the extent to which both AID loan funds and BAAC policies reach low-income farmers.

B. Comment

During November and December of 1976 a large joint Thai-US evaluation team undertook to assess the progress of the loan, to identify causes of the many delays which had been encountered and to provide observations and recommendations aimed at improving planning and implementation of future development projects. Careful study and observation by the present, much smaller, evaluation group confirms the 1976 findings and fully supports the conclusions and recommendations which are contained in a January 1977 report attached hereto as part of the evaluation.

It appears redundant to repeat statements of fact as contained in the 1976 evaluation, for that report did indeed pinpoint causes and effects for delays in loan approval and subsequent implementation. In essence, it seems clear that:

1. Flaws in initial planning and implementation of the project by the US and RTG brought on problems of baht generation, program coordination and communication.
2. Rigid procedures of both the US and RTG engendered their own special problems.
3. Lack of understanding on the part of MOAC and BAAC regarding loan requirements, difficulty on their part in designing acceptable projects and lack of coordination resulted in further confusion and delay.
4. The US and RTG planned and agreed to a loan that was poorly designed and initially, at least, poorly implemented.

settling landless people on small tracts of land and assisting them in cattle raising, received ₦400,000 (\$19,700) from MOAC loan funds. The money was used to clear 500 one-rai blocks of land from forest, to clear an additional 500 rai for the cooperative itself and build a fence around the headquarter's compound. An inspection of the 500 rai of cooperative land revealed that only 100 rai had been seeded to grass, with the remainder beginning to grow back to forest. There was no evidence of cattle, equipment was standing idle and quite obviously the whole operation had ground to a halt. The Land Resettlement Co-op officer in charge of the project explained that as yet no operating funds had been made available for 1979, but that his budget request was under consideration in MOAC. The Evaluation Team, while recognizing that this may be an isolated case, nevertheless point it out as an example of poor planning and follow-through with the result that funds from the loan have not had the favorable impact intended.

E. Conclusions

It has been said by earlier RTG and US observers that this loan should not have been implemented. While there is no doubt that the loan has had a rather troublesome history, and little doubt that some of the loan funds have been poorly used, it would have been counterproductive to have backed away from implementation once the Loan Agreement was signed. In this type of undertaking it must be recognized that material progress in implementing long-term development projects may not be discernible for some period of time.

In this case it is evident that the bulk of the loan funds was used for productive purposes and that some of these funds did reach down to very low income farmers.

It is not clear that the intent of the loan to expand and improve MOAC capability to prepare and implement long-term agricultural projects has been fully achieved. The Evaluation Team believes, however, that the ability of BAAC to design and implement development projects and carry through with effective lending programs has been considerably enhanced. To that extent, the loan has successfully achieved a major goal.

F. Recommendations

1. That any future loan intended for long-range agricultural development purposes not be authorized prior to having in hand a full and comprehensive project plan with supporting data, including disbursement schedules and a time frame for project completion.
2. That any future loan which contemplates release of funds to more than one user have a clearly established mechanism to insure adequate coordination and cooperation between the users.
3. That a loan whose funds are to be used by an institution (such as BAAC) for relending purposes be designed so that funds can be advanced on a scheduled basis thus minimizing complicated internal budget problems for the user.
4. That any loan, the implementation of which requires services of outside specialists or consultants, contain provisions to insure that such services are adequately funded either from loan proceeds or other sources.

5. That loans to support long-term development projects whose completion dates extend over several years be planned in such a way that standard time strictures for fund disbursement not force premature use of the loan proceeds to avoid decbligation. Such loans might well be designed so that an initial large committment could be released in timed stages under separate approval as specific phases of the project reached completion.

Evaluation Team

1. Miss Tatsnee Srikiijkarn, Office of Fiscal Policy,
Ministry of Finance
2. Mr. Suphot Srisa-ard, Manager, Research and Evaluation
Division, BAAC
3. Mr. Uoychai Vatttraphoudej, Assistant Project Officer,
USAID
4. Mr. Glenn G. Browne, Consultant, AID/W

G. Conclusions

The foregoing narrative indicates the far reaching changes and improvements in BAAC during recent years and outlines several areas requiring some additional attention. Under present management it is reasonable to anticipate that necessary corrections will be made and that further improvement in Bank operations will take place more or less as a matter of course.

The Bank has the potential of tapping large new fund resources domestically, as well as from external sources, possibly including the United States. Commitment of such funds, particularly from external donors, will require well-developed fully-planned and scheduled projects, the preparation of which is well within the Bank's capabilities.

In addition to loan funds, BAAC can continue to utilize effectively the services of outside specialists and short-term consultants. Fields in which professional help may well be needed include electronic data processing, computer operations, training, research, development banking and management. The record of present BAAC management in making use of and implementing recommendations of outside specialists is good.

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THAILAND SERICULTURE/SETTLEMENTS PROJECT

Joint Mid-Term Evaluation

January 24 - February 21, 1979

Public Welfare Department

USAID Evaluation Team

FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Thailand	B. Project Title Sericulture Settlements	C. Project Number 493-0271	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>76</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY <u>81</u>
Life of Project Funding 1. AID: (Loan or Grant) (493-T-018) <u>2,600,000</u> Other Donor _____ Host Country Counterpart Funds <u>2,600,000*</u> TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director Donald Cohen 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) Wayne Slotten 3. Other _____	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) not stated 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not stated		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) Field Implementation, 1.3 million, Public Welfare Department. Credit, 1.3 million, Ba for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) 2. Other (Name, Position, Contract No.) Technical responsibility, Sericulture Division, Dep of Agriculture, Ministry of Agric. and Cooperatives	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date) not stated			

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title Thailand Sericulture/ Settlements Project	B. Evaluation Date Jan. 24-Feb 21 1979	C. Type of Evaluation Joint Mid-term	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation 9/76-2/79
E. Evaluation Cost THOMAS MORGAN 1. Direct Hire a. travel <u>2,000</u> per diem <u>1,620</u> contract <u>3,000</u> 3. Other <u>1,380*</u> TOTAL \$ 8,000		F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation (SEE attached sheet) G. Initiated By not stated	
*passport, insurance, contingency H. Evaluation Team Composition			
1. Direct Hire			
a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise	
Donald R. Mitchell, Agriculture Advisor, Asia Bureau, AID/Washington (team leader)			
2. Contract:			
a. Name of Organization (if any)	b. Contract No.	c. Name(s) of Persons	
		d. Area(s) of Expertise	
Dr. Neungpanich Sinchaisri, Instructor, Department of Entomology, Kasetsart University Dr. Chamniem Boonma, Associate Professor, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration Kasetsart University Dr. Thomas E. Morgan, Social Science Analyst, Northern Illinois University			
I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position) Wayne Slotten, Ass't Agricultural Dev. Officer, Mrs. Thongkorn Hiranraks, Ass't Project Officer, O/RD Mr. Vichit Piyarom, Director of Land Settlements, PWD, Mrs. Panee Sribantao, PWD, Mr. Suvipakit, MOAC, Piroj Lattaphiphak and Sor Sattayanon, BAAC reps.		J. Evaluation Coordinator Signature _____ Typed Name _____ Position _____ Date _____	

F. Purpose: Assess the progress against log-frame end-of-project and output indicators, emphasizing organizational and management aspects and problems of the project as well as silk production, extension/training and technical problems.

* (BAAC, inferred from page 28; this money not yet disbursed; moreover, the RTG is providing such substantial additional subsidies to farmers in this project that a high overall deficit ensues, raising questions of sustainability. page 35.)

SUMMARY

The Sericulture/Settlements Project Loan Agreement between the RTG and USAID was signed September 8, 1976 for \$2.6 million to be equally divided between Public Welfare Department (PWD) and Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC). PWD is the implementing agency for the extension aspects of recruiting, training and counseling silk producers. BAAC provides the credit through local branch banks to project participants. Technical information, training, hybrid silkworm eggs and cocoon marketing services are provided by the Sericulture Division of the Department of Agriculture.

Settlers in ten Northeastern Land Settlements are the target audience. According to a 1977 baseline study, these settlers had seven family members with a combined average income of ₱9,245 (\$462). The goal of the Project is to increase the family income of participants by fifty percent in five years. To do this 1,500 families are to produce silk cocoons according to approved practices.

Project technology includes the planting of four rai of mulberry, building a silkworm rearing house according to specifications and rearing hybrid silkworms following approved husbandry practices. By September 30, 1978, a total of 588 families were either producing silk or in the early stages of training or establishing mulberry plots.

Major technical problems are the production of mulberry leaves by the farmers and the supply of quality hybrid silkworm hatching eggs produced by the Sericulture Division. Both areas are seen as critical constraints to silk cocoon production. Mulberry cultural practices of using mulch, compost, manure, chemical fertilizer and weeding are within the means of the villagers. Lack of water or flooding are problems over which the farmer has less control. However, location and soil type combined with good cultural practices can ameliorate these conditions.

Production of hybrid silkworms is a temperate zone technology where the parent stock produce eggs only two times a year. To hatch silkworms for six or more cycles required in this Project, involves storage and breaking the dormant cycle as needed. The technology and facilities are available, but require more testing and adjustment in procedures to attain a hatchability rate of domestically produced eggs comparable to those imported from Japan.

The silkworm rearing skills of the farmers appears to be good with many members obtaining cocoon yields only slightly less than in Japan. The old silk worm rearing houses facilitate the rearing of worms relatively free of pests and disease. The PWD extension workers appear to be doing an effective job of assisting farmers with mulberry production and worm rearing.

Farmers are receiving a good income from silk cocoon production. The average farmer produced 106 kilograms of fresh cocoons in 5 cycles between May and December 1978, making a gross income of ¥5,485, with an estimated ¥475 net income. Cocoon price has recently increased by ¥38 per kilogram for high quality cocoons and should substantially increase the incomes of members and encourage additional farmers to join.

The Project is behind schedule in disbursement of funds, number of members anticipated and production targets. This reflects more over-optimism at the planning stage than lack of solid progress. A good base has been developed and combined with recent increases in silk prices, the Project should gain momentum over the next three years and should be able to meet planned targets by 1981.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Project, while not achieving the targets originally planned, is meeting the basic objectives of increasing income of poor people in the 10 land settlements areas. The average income in the 10 settlements in 1977 was ¥10,592 and the medium income ¥10,650 with a low of ¥6,315 and a high of ¥21,551 per family.
2. Technical knowledge of mulberry production is available but most farmers do not follow the recommended practices of pruning, applying compost, manure, mulching and chemical fertilizer. Those farmers who follow the recommended practices are achieving good leaf production. We would like to see more innovativeness in planting mulberry to achieve higher production. An adequate food supply is the key to higher cocoon weight and better quality silk. A contest is suggested to stimulate increased use of approved practices.
3. Technical knowledge of silkworm rearing appears to be good, with most people following directions. Many report large losses of worms during the rainy season. Many producers report yields of 20 kg. or more of cocoon per box and are striving for 24 kg. yields achieved in Japan. Producers obtaining high yields appear to do so consistently, indicating they are following good practices. Conversely, low producers are also consistently producing less than the average.
4. We are concerned about the cost of the silkworm rearing houses, usually ¥15,000. Construction materials varied, but all were very sturdy with cement block foundations, wooden, block or brick walls and corrugated or asbestos roofing. Some people built the house themselves, others hired a contractor. The villagers did not think of them as being too expensive, but were proud of this new status symbol. We believe a less expensive house could be built utilizing local material that would still provide the sanitary and comfort conditions required by the silkworms. We would encourage some innovativeness in this area. Perhaps a contest in the schools of architecture would produce some interesting design possibilities.
5. Credit is being extended to farmers in all settlements as fast as members for the Sericulture Project can be recruited and trained. By September 30, 1978 a total of ¥6,934,780 credit was extended out of ¥13,315,000 approved for 588 families in the 10 settlements, with a total loan usually being ¥20,000 to ¥25,000 for the rearing house, equipment and starting mulberry plots.

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6. It is too early in the project to determine the repayment rate, but it is expected to be good since the cocoons are marketed through the Korat Center. The repayment is deducted at the land settlement at the rate of 40% of the total value of the cocoon marketed. As long as the Korat Center pays a good price this system will assure a high repayment rate, but if farmers can earn more selling privately, collection could become a problem.
7. The BAAC provides guidelines but apparently gives the local bank manager some discretion in collateral or number of guarantors needed for loan approval. This is good and we would encourage the bank to be innovative and not overly strict in applying collateral or group guarantee rules to the very poor who have demonstrated industriousness or willingness to produce silk.
8. The extension workers appear to be well trained and enthusiastic. The ratio of one extension worker to 20 families seems rather high and probably could not be maintained in a greatly expanded program. The project does provide a training opportunity for these relatively inexperienced officers; with more experience they could advise more farmers. We believe more women could be employed as extension workers on this Project.
9. The supervisors are knowledgeable and seems to generally be doing an effective job of managing the project within the settlements. Most women supervisors seemed to be effective in their work.
10. While this has been described as a women oriented project it is by no means exclusively the domain of women. It is a family business with all members of the family involved, particularly at busy times. Women and teenage girls were most often responsible for the gathering of leaves and feeding worms, but men did these jobs as well.
11. Trainees are equally divided between men and women. The reason most often given for men attending training is that they could get away for the month long training session. Women, particularly those with small children, could not be away from home for so long a period. If training could be conducted in the land settlements more women would probably be able to attend.
12. Cooperatives have not been a significant component of the project to date. Since the promotion of cooperatives would require a large investment of personnel and financial resources and would divert attention from the more central objective of increasing production and incomes, it is recommended that the cooperative element of the Project be deemphasized for the time being.

13. This Project has the potential for replicability on a broader scale. It has been shown that the technology can be transferred successfully. Scattered incidences of spread-effect have been observed already in the vicinity surrounding project sites. RTG, however, must soon undertake planning for the replication phase in order to be prepared by the termination date of this Project.

14. The Project Coordinating Committee appears to have been an effective mechanism for discussing and resolving problems among the implementing agencies.

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· AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ANALYSIS IN THAILAND:

1978 EVALUATION OF THE FIVE-YEAR REPORT

Bangkok, Thailand

October, 1978

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FACE SHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Thailand	B. Project Title Agricultural Economics Project	C. Project Number 493-11-190-180.4	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>73</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY <u>78</u>
E. Life of Project Funding 1. AID (Loan or Grant) <u>3,285,000</u> 2. Other Donor _____ Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ <u>2,230,000*</u>		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director Donald Cohen 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) Thomas Cooper 3. Other _____	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) <p align="center">not stated</p> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) Earl O. Heady and Arthur Coutu (p. 1)		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) Division of Agricultural Economics (DAE) 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) Iowa State University	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date) January 1975; April- May, 1977 (No other information)			

*inconsistency--copied from PES

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title <u>Agricultural Sector Analysis in Thailand: 1978 Evaluation of the Five Year Report</u>	B. Evaluation Date October 1978	C. Type of Evaluation Special final evaluation	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation Since 1973
E. Evaluation Cost i. Direct Hire not stated a. travel _____ b. per diem _____ Contract _____ j. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____	F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation (SEE attached sheet)		G. Initiated By not stated
H. Evaluation Team Composition			
1. Direct Hire			
a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise	
2. Contract:			
a. Name of Organization (if any)	b. Contract No.	c. Name(s) of Persons	
		d. Area(s) of Expertise	

(SEE attached sheet)

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position) Donald Cohen, Mission Director and Thomas Cooper, Project Officer	J. Evaluation Coordinator Signature _____ Typed Name _____ Position _____ Date _____
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F. Purpose: Judge the extent to which the project has succeeded in developing an independent and self-sustaining capability that will carry on the work; paying particular attention to rural poverty (the proposed three-year extension of the project would have as a primary aim giving added emphasis in this area). In particular, examine how the project has addressed the needs of those on smaller farms, in order to test the hypotheses that improved analytic capabilities in fact benefit the poor; and, finally, make recommendations on how best to meet the needs of the rural poor in the future.

H. Evaluation Team Composition: 17

Joint Thai-U.S. Team:

Dr. Warin Wonghan, chao (Co-Chairman)
Dean of Economics Faculty
Chulalongkorn University

Dr. George S. Tolley (Co-Chairman)
Professor of Economics
University of Chicago

Dr. Tongroj On-chan
Professor of Agricultural Economics
Kasetsart University

Mr. Sombong Pattamavichaiporn
Technical Services Division
Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation of the Royal Thai Government

VI. OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS AND SUMMARY EVALUATION

. In the opinion of the review team, the project has succeeded in its mission of establishing a high caliber operational capability for applying agricultural economics analysis to government policy problems in an action setting.

Evidence of several kinds supporting this conclusion has been cited in the preceding sections. The methodology of the models has been found to be up to date and generally sound. The models have been used in a variety of ways to aid policy making at the national and local levels, and the uses show every sign of continuing to expand. Many project analyses have concerned rural poverty directly. Most of the activities of the project have impacted rural poverty because of the emphasis on incomes in agriculture and low income regions such as the Northeast. The capability which has been developed has been successfully institutionalized, with Thai human and machine resources able to maintain the models and carry on the policy work after departure of the ISU team.

Because an influence on major policies affecting agriculture is achieved by a project of this kind at a low cost, relatively speaking, it is a cost effective way of promoting agricultural and income distribution objectives, and thus is cost effective in favorably affecting the lives of Thai rural farmers. As an example, the analysis of Fourth Five Year Plan alternatives led to identification and choice of a strategy that was more favorable to raising incomes in the Northeast than other strategies.

If the strategy turns out to be only very partially effective, succeeding in raising the incomes of .5 million farm families by \$5 per year, the resulting \$2.5 million gain in yearly income in the Northeast would far exceed the costs of the project which even in its development years has apparently not had costs beyond this range. The foregoing illustration is conservative, applying to only one of myriad uses of the models of the project. Possibly, no other activity concerned with development and rural poverty matches the cost-effectiveness of this project. The project is complementary to other kinds of activities concerned with development and rural poverty since it helps in the choice of policies and programs which importantly determine other activities.

Aside from the uses of the models as such, other products of the project are used including the data generated and the background analyses prepared for the models such as the demand and cost of production studies. Among the most important outputs of the project are the insights developed which contribute to building up knowledge about the agricultural economy of the country and which are used almost unconsciously in answering requests not drawing specifically on the models, in framing policy suggestions and in contributing to formal and informal discussions bearing on the country's future. Considering all the uses of the project outputs, both formal and informal, the benefits of the project can be deduced to include benefits resulting from avoidance of policy mistakes that occur when policies are undertaken which are untried and which have not been subjected to prior quantitative assessment. The avoidance of mistaken policies, which without the project would have been undertaken, but which are not considered

seriously once a stock of knowledge about agriculture is built up, raises the cost-effectiveness of the project above that considered above which concerned only formal analysis of specific visible alternatives.

Compared to other possible policy planning approaches, Agricultural Sector Analysis has several unique characteristics. First, being comprehensive, it forces a total and consistent view of agriculture, helping to maximize the likelihood that all important effects will be included and that estimates will be accurate. Second, Agricultural Sector Analysis gives quantitative answers helping to sort out the important from the unimportant effects of policy alternatives and helping to select policies contributing more rather than less to goals. Third, Agricultural Sector Analysis as developed in the project is an operational policy tool. The results are used directly for policy and not primarily for those in the academic community or others who might or might not take the extra step of making the results policy relevant.

Side effects of the present project may be noted. The project has trained people, adding to the intellectual assets of Thailand. It has contributed to the upgrading of an arm of government through its direct and indirect effects on DAE. Finally, the project has added a new component to the agricultural economics profession in Thailand. The by-product of interactions of Agricultural Sector Analysis personnel with other agricultural economists enhances the agricultural economics profession in the nation and contributes to the ultimate wider development of research knowledge about the agricultural economy of the country.

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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following are the recommendations of the evaluation team, summarizing and elaborating on recommendations contained in earlier sections of the report:

1. Additional assistance will be needed to complete the development of models now nearly completed. This could be done by temporary consulting help. If the full development of rural development and poverty capability is to take place, a full-fledged continuation of the project would be necessary with a resident team.
2. The input-output technique for analysis of local and regional effects is a tool that is very compatible with linear programming. The DAE can and is preparing to obtain data to calculate input-output coefficients for nonfarm activities which are closely farm related, such as farm inputs and agricultural processing. Information on other activities is available from elsewhere in government. On the other hand, the macro modelling suffers from data problems and partially overlaps macro modelling being done elsewhere in Thailand. The problems of linking it usefully with the linear programming models are great. A strategy that emerges, then, is to concentrate the analysis of nonfarm activities in the input-output modelling and de-emphasize the macro modelling. The main variables needed from the macro modelling is income. The feed backs at the national level from agricultural events is a topic to be explored in the future but may well legitimately be de-emphasized in the near term effort.
3. Efforts to relate the modelling to long run factors determining economic development and per capita incomes of segments of the farm and nonfarm economy should be initiated. The reason for doing some work along these lines is to provide a basis for keeping the sector analysis consistent with the long run determinants of developments in the Thai economy. Particular attention might be given to migration and to the course of the general level of wage rates in various sectors of the economy, which change markedly if there is successful development and has implications for the terms on which labor supplies itself to agriculture and for the choice of farm technologies. Fully extending the models to consider credit and other factors is also to be recommended.

4. The elevation of status of DAE which is in prospect will promote two way communication, as DAE will have an increased responsibility for all policies related to agriculture. The two-way communication will be enhanced if the top echelons of the MOAC take steps to formally ensure that the agencies within the Ministry make their views and needs known to DAE and that DAE makes known its capabilities and policy results.
5. Two-way communication will be further enhanced if there is greater communication among agencies both within MOAC and outside MOAC at the working level. This is taking place in many ways. It is recommended that DAE on its part undertake to initiate as much contact and cooperation, particularly among research technicians, as possible.
6. Steps that could be taken to enhance two-way communication with the academic community would be to seek cooperation in developing needed coefficients and analyses used as inputs or extensions of the models. To a significant extent, this could be accomplished by arranging meetings and continuing liaison in which there was give and take about the models and in which the needs for behavioral analyses to give inputs into the model were explored. Beyond this, leaves of absence of various academic personnel to work in DAE for a period might be considered, as well possibly as subcontracting particular assignments to universities. The development of a capability for fully evaluating national farm credit policies is but one example of a possible focus of such cooperation.
7. Consideration might be given to fostering more two-way communication between DAE, particularly as regards its rural development results as they emerge, and those at the provincial level charged with planning, as it is reported that there is a relative inexperience in carrying out the program and project choice procedure that go with the increased emphasis on planning at the provincial level.
8. Elimination of overlap and fostering of greater cooperation between the data collection activities of DAE and the National Statistical Office appears to be proceeding. A data improvement effort that might be more fully explored is for DAE to contribute to increasing the quality of information obtained from the provincial level agricultural offices who, it is reported, sometimes could be more systematic in their reports on acreage, yield, production, prices and other variables. Partly there may be a need to communicate with the provincial offices to let them know how important this reporting is. Partly there may also be a need to offer training on how to obtain the information. DAE would be in an excellent position to offer this training in view of expertise on data collection.

9. It is to be hoped that the enormous strides in the development of DAE will continue in the future. The upgrading of the DAE should enable more high level positions to be available and thus help to retain the personnel who have been trained and who may now find attractive opportunities outside DAE available to them. While they would still undoubtedly contribute to Thailand's development, the particular needs for the analytic capability offered by DAE makes it desirable for them to stay there if possible. It will in addition be important to continue to train people to advanced levels to ensure an ongoing process, whereby those now newly trained mature and move to positions of higher responsibility to be eventually partially replaced by younger technicians in the future who hopefully will be professionally as well qualified. There might well also be a role for re-tread programs to ensure that the staff remains professionally current.
10. One of the most effective ways for helping the rural poor in Thailand might well be for DAE to be charged with responsibility not only for evaluating particular rural programs aimed at the rural poor, but also to undertake an in-depth analysis of policy alternatives aimed at developing effective rural income strategies based on quantitative assessments of their impacts. DAE has almost certainly the only extant capability for undertaking this task. DAE would be charged with working with the responsible agencies, including most preferably a commission charged with making legislative and administrative proposals, to develop the overall strategy and then to translate the strategy into an operational set of programs which would provide the guidelines for allocation and administration of programs concerned with the rural poor. An ancillary effort would be to analyze the effects on the rural poor of policies, such as rice price policy, which are not aimed at the poor as such but which may have an important influence on them. In this way, the interest in helping the rural poor could be given a weight in all policy deliberations, not just those concerned directly with the rural poor--enabling a concerted and consistent attack on rural poverty problems.

Control of Vertebrate Pests

By

Dr. Robert E. Gray
William D. Fitzwater
King L. Lovinger

December 4-12, 1979

FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country (see attached)	B. Project Title Control of Vertebrate Pests	C. Project Number 931-0473	D. Active Life of Project 1 Project Agreement Signed FY <u>67</u> 2 Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY <u>80</u>
E. Life of Project Funding 1. AID. (Loan or Grant) _____ 2. Other Donor _____ 3. Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ <u>7,585,000</u>		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director Tony Babb, DS/DAA/FV 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) 3. Other J. Walker, DS/AGR/L K. Byergo, DS/AGR T. O'Hare, DS/AGR/D M. Mozynski, DS/AGR	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) Not stated 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.)		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) Denver Wildlife Research Center, USDI, PASA/ID/TAB 473-1-67	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date) Not stated			

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title none	B. Evaluation Date 12/4-12/7, 1979	C. Type of Evaluation Special	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation 10/1/78 to 9/31/79
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire a. travel _____ per diem _____ contract _____ 3. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____	F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation Perform a comprehensive analysis of the project's planning, organization, operation, budgeting, and research components.		G. Initiated By not stated

H. Evaluation Team Composition

1. Direct Hire

a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise
Dr. John W. Walker, AID,	DSB/AGR/L,	Project Manager

2. Contract

a. Name of Organization (if any)	b. Contract No.

c. Name(s) of Persons

d. Area(s) of Expertise

Dr. Robert L. Gray, Special Assistant to the Deputy Director of Technical Assistance, Office of International Cooperation and Development, USDA. William D. Fitzwater, Director, Biologic Consultants, Chairman. King L. Lovinger, Director of the Information Division of Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position)

not stated

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____

Typed Name _____

Position _____

Date _____

Control of Vertebrate Pests

PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY (PES) - PART II

#13 - Summary

The need for improved food production systems has led to an increased emphasis on crop protection and a greater awareness of the yield losses in developing countries resulting from animal damage.

At the time the AID/DWRC agreement was initiated, little was known about vertebrate pest biology/control as it relates to food production systems in the developing countries. As a result of AID funded projects, the DWRC has expanded the body of scientific literature relating to the control of animal damage and explored new methodologies for assessing that damage. Research models have been developed and LDC scientists have been provided opportunities to research local agricultural problems.

DWRC has been able to make substantial progress in the attainment of predetermined goals for major projects in the Philippines, Sudan, Bangladesh, and Haiti. The vampire bat control project has been brought to a successful conclusion. As a result of this program's component projects numerous field and laboratory techniques have been developed which will enjoy wide application in other pest biology/control projects.

#14 - Evaluation Methodology

The project was evaluated at this time with the objective of performing a comprehensive analysis of the project's planning, organization, operation, budgeting, and research components.

The project was evaluated by a team of four recognized livestock scientists who reviewed in detail issues relating to project implementation with DWRC staff members. The evaluation team was composed of:

William D. Fitzwater, Director, Biologic Consultants, Chairman

Dr. Robert E. Gray, Special Assistant to the Deputy Director of Technical Assistance, Office of International Cooperation and Development, USDA.

King L. Lovinger, Director of the Information Division of Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA.

Dr. John W. Walker, AID, DSB/AGR/L, Project Manager.

The following DWRC staff members participated in the evaluation sessions:

Clyde Jones

Richard L. Bruggers

Donal S. Balser

Howard P. Tietjen

Richard Curnow

G. Clay Mitchell

R. Daniel Thompson & Staff

William Dusenberry

Michael Fall

John De Grazio

Glenn A. Hood

Charles P. Stone

#15 - External Factors

The need for a greater understanding of the magnitude of food and fiber losses resulting from vertebrate pests and the need to design and implement programs to control those losses has not changed. During the life of this project an increased awareness of food losses during both the production and distribution processes has developed on the part of AID, other donors, and recipient countries. In several countries, as in the case of the Philippines, vertebrate pest control systems have been incorporated into national small farmer rural development strategies. With additional experience on the part of DWRC and recipient countries, the program will develop an increased expertise. A critical mass of knowledge and expertise has been generated which will prove valuable in the development of future control projects.

#16 - Inputs

DWRC has not encountered serious problems with respect to the delivery of project inputs. During 1978 DWRC scientists and consultants spent 435 person days in 24 countries working on evaluations, cooperative studies with host-country scientists, liaison/coordination with international research organizations, and training. Support is continually requested by AID/W, USAIDs, Regional Bureaus, Regional Offices, and cooperating countries.

#17 - Outputs

Some of the program's more recent outputs would include; the demonstration that Rhodamine B is a highly effective marker when used in a grease formulation, the determination that DRC 4575 has the potential for use as an acute rodenticide, the development of an automated computer system which determines the daily feeding patterns of rats, and the demonstration that microtaggant plastic particles can be employed as a bait mark and to topically mark birds and rodents.

In the Philippines, the national government has adopted a series of recommendations which have resulted in the implementation of an effective method of rice field rodent control through sustained baiting with anti-coagulants by small farmers. In a similar action, Philippine rodent control programs were reorganized to incorporate improved methods developed by project personnel. Vertebrate pest control research and training has been incorporated into the Philippine National Crop Protection Center's Program. More than twenty Philippine graduate students have completed thesis work in association with the project.

In the Sudan, the project determined that the widely practiced population reduction bird control programs were ineffective and uneconomical. Indications resulting from project sponsored field trials are that an effective protection of small grain crops from bird damage can be achieved with relatively low levels of methiocarb repellent head sprays.

In Bangladesh the Agricultural Research Institute has formed a Vertebrate Pest Division, which has selected counterpart personnel and established cooperative ties with other institutions. A new laboratory and office facility has been put into operation. The project has sponsored workshops and training sessions for personnel from the Agricultural Research Institute and other government agencies. During 1979 a nationwide survey of wheat rodent damage was completed. The survey placed wheat yield losses at 12 percent or an estimated \$15 million at current domestic prices.

The program's Haitian project gathered information relevant to vertebrate pests and their impact on that nation's agricultural sector. A feasibility study was performed regarding the possibilities of topically treating corn plants with chemical control agents as deterrents to cotton rats (*Sigmodon hispidus*).

#18 - Purpose

The project purpose is to increase small farmer incomes and the supply of food in developing countries by reducing that damage to field crops caused by rats and noxious birds. Project purpose is met in part by; in-country programs, TDY activities by DWRC at the request of AID/W, USAIDs, and cooperating countries, and the continuous research activities of DWRC relevant to rats and noxious birds. A greater utilization of economic impact analysis in future evaluations will provide greater insights into project's attainment of its stated purpose; the increase of both small farmer incomes and food supplies through vertebrate pest control.

#19 - Goal

The project goal is to develop safe, economical, and effective vertebrate pest control methods that are compatible with social and economic conditions existing in developing countries. All methods developed or in development are consistent with scientific principles. Special attention is devoted to those demands that are unique to small farm systems. Progress indications from countries like the Philippines and Nicaragua, where certain types of Vertebrate pest damage have been reduced or eliminated, demonstrate that project activities have been and continue to be consistent with stated goals.

#2 - Beneficiaries

The Vertebrate Pest Control Project has been designed and implemented in such a manner as to generate a positive benefit stream accruing directly to the cooperating countries' small farmers. Additional benefits accrue to urban consumers when food prices tend to stabilize as a result of the increased supplies generated by the reduction of vertebrate pest related losses.

While vertebrate pests are not the only sources of crop losses that small farmers incur, their damage is extensive and costly. It has been estimated that \$25 million is lost each year to rats by Bengali wheat farmers. Vertebrate pests consume an estimated \$100 million of the grain crop annually in affected African countries. The project has had an impact in reducing these losses. Rat damage on 500,000 hectares of small holder rice in the Philippines has been reduced from five to one percent, generating a savings of approximately \$50 million every year for those producers. In the Philippines and Colombia, the project produced control systems that have been effective in the reduction of rat damage to coconuts.

The project has had and is expected to have substantial impacts upon income distribution. Farmers who invest their limited land, labor, and other resources in recommended technological farming packages can expect to receive an increased return from their efforts rather than losing a portion of their production every harvest to pests.

#21 - Unplanned Effects

Due to time and logistic constraints, the Review Committee did not address this issue.

#22 - Lessons Learned

It was the opinion of the reviewers that the Vertebrate Pest Control Project could serve as a model for the development of projects of a similar nature. Some of the factors which have contributed to the success of the project are: an integrated approach which includes research, training, and interaction with local institutions to develop and implement programs to utilize suitable pest control methods in problem situations; a development approach based upon local field trials in each situation to provide not only the necessary scientific proof of technology but also as a major step in the process of developing effective implementation programs which can be sustained by local institutions; and the complementarity of U.S. domestic and international programs.

#23 - Remarks

The Review Team recommended that the Vertebrate Pest Control Project be continued for an additional three years beyond the present termination date of September 30, 1980.

The Review Team also recommended that DWRC researchers working in host countries should be gradually phased out of long-term projects as host country counterparts become fully trained. With respect to the dissemination of information, the team had two recommendations; publications should be prepared with the expressed purpose of familiarizing regional bureau, USAID, and LDCs with the functions and services of the DWRC and that greater attention should be devoted to disseminating DWRC generated information to individual farmers as well as incorporating animal damage control techniques and tools developed through research into LDC farming systems. It was recommended that future evaluations should include a close look at field projects by experienced, knowledgeable reviewers as a means of determining host country acceptance of the validity and usefulness of DWRC research. Finally, the team recommended that a greater use of economic analysis should be made throughout the life of all research projects. Economic data are important for project justification; are needed to motivate farmers to participate in research projects and to utilize solutions found; are a vitally important factor in prioritizing alternative solutions, and are useful in determining whether or not potentially useful lines of research should be followed.

Attachments

Number of Pages

Research Review Report

28

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IRRI Small Farm Equipment

Extension Project

FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Regional*	B. Project Title Industrial Extension of Small-scale Agricultural Equip.	C. Project Number 49S-0265	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>75</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY <u>80</u>
Life of Project Funding 1. AID (Loan or Grant) <u>1,412,000</u> Other Donor _____ Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director _____ 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) <u>not stated</u> 3. Other _____	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) <u>AID/csd-2541</u>		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) <u>IRRI</u>	

I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date)

"March 1977 evaluation"

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title (see attached)	B. Evaluation Date 11/2-12/19/79	C. Type of Evaluation special	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation 6/75- present
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire <u>not stated</u> - travel _____ - per diem _____ - contract _____ 3. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____	F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation (see attached)		G. Initiated By not stated

H. Evaluation Team Composition

(see attached)

- | | | | |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------|--|
| 1. Direct Hire | (see attached) | | |
| a. Name | b. Present Position | c. Area of Expertise | |
| | | | |
| 2. Contract. | a. Name of Organization (if any) | b. Contract No. | |
| | | | |
| c. Name(s) of Persons | d. Area(s) of Expertise | | |

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position)

not stated

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____

Typed Name _____

Position _____

Date _____

Evaluation Title: Evaluation Report-- IRRI Small Farm Equipment Extension Project

F. Purpose. The team was instructed to evaluate whether AID should continue funding IRRI's industrial extension program. All major aspects were investigated including machinery design and extension, overall cost effectiveness, management, and social effects. Under social effects, particular attention was paid to labor displacement, one of the most controversial features of the program.

II. Evaluation Team Composition:

Main Team:

Gerrit Argento, PhD Economist and Team Leader, AID, Asia Bureau, Washington, D.C.
Marvin Parker, Agricultural Engineer, USAID, Cairo, Egypt
Mervin Yetley, PhD Rural Sociologist, Texas A & M, College Station, Texas (consultant)

Thailand Team

Cliff Barton, PhD Anthropologist, AID, Development Support Bureau, Washington, D.C.
Vansantha Narendran, PhD Anthropologist, (consultant)
Dow Mangkolsmai, PhD Economics Professor, Thammasat University (consultant)
Chesada Loohawenchit, PhD Economics Professor, Thammasat University, consultant
Rapeepun Taissard, PhD Agricultural Economics Professor, Chiangmai University, consultant.

IRRI Small Farm Equipment Extension Project

CHAPTER I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Scope of Work and Itinerary

In June 1975, AID and IRRI began the Industrial Extension of Small Scale Agricultural Equipment Project (498-0265). Upon termination in April 1980, \$1,412,000 will have been obligated for this project.

The team was instructed to evaluate whether AID should continue funding IRRI's industrial extension program. All major aspects were investigated including machinery design and extension, overall cost effectiveness, management, and social effects. Under social effects, particular attention was paid to labor displacement, one of the most controversial features of the program.

Between November 2, 1979 and December 19, 1979, the team visited the Philippines (Manila, Central Luzon, and Ilo Ilo), Thailand (Bangkok, central plains and Chaingmai province), Pakistan (Islamabad and Punjab province), India (Delhi, Punjab and Harayana provinces) and Indonesia (Jakarta, West Java and West Sumatra provinces). In this evaluation we were able to apportion our time roughly equally between three groups:

- 1) IRRI - host government - USAID officials,
- 2) fabricators,
- 3) farmers.

The team was composed of the following:

Main Team

Gerrit Argento, PhD Economist and Team Leader, AID, Asia Bureau, Washington, D. C.
Marvin Parker, Agricultural Engineer, USAID Cairo, Egypt
Mervin Yetley, PhD Rural Sociologist, Texas A & M, College Station, Texas (consultant)

Thailand Team

Cliff Barton, PhD Anthropologist, AID, Development Support Bureau, Washington, D. C.
Vansantha Narendran, PhD Anthropologist (consultant)
Dow Mongkolsmai, PhD Economics Professor, Thammasat University (consultant)
Chesada Loohawenchit, PhD Economics Professor, Thammasat University (consultant)
Rapeepun Taissard, PhD Agricultural Economics Professor, Chaingmai University (consultant)

These people were divided into two groups. A main team of Argento, Parker, and Yetley was to visit all countries and conduct the overall evaluation while the remaining members were to interview farmers and fabricators in Thailand and study social effects in that country. Due to their importance, social effects were singled out for special study and Thailand was chosen for this study because among the three outreach countries it has the longest experience with small scale mechanization.

With two exceptions, the evaluation was conducted according to plan and its purposes were achieved. The agricultural engineer, Marvin Parker, was obliged to join the team in Thailand after it had completed its visit to the Philippines. This late arrival was compounded by an early departure. Mr. Parker was evacuated the day after the burning of our Embassy in Islamabad. The consequent absence of an agricultural engineer's observations in Pakistan, India, Indonesia, and the Philippines was a handicap which fortunately has been mitigated by Mr. Parker's long experience with mechanization in Asia. Mr. Argento was denied both the opportunity of seeing the program in Pakistan and the risk of exposure to terrorists at the Embassy by having to stay behind in Thailand to observe a farm dog that bit his leg. Most of the substance of the report was written during the mission before the team broke up and the major recommendations were presented to IRRI before the team returned to the United States.

We would like to record here and thank IRRI for the openness, good will, and detail with which it presented its mechanization program. Many hard questions were answered thoughtfully, logistical arrangements went smoothly which was very helpful given the busy schedule and the need for time to write, and IRRI seemed to welcome an outside appraisal of its program.

2. Recommendations

The various IRRI components mentioned in these recommendations are as follows: First, there is the Engineering Department funded from the core budget and begun with AID assistance in 1965. Organizationally, it is on a par with the research departments in economics, entomology, or cropping systems. Next, there is the industrial extension office established with AID funding in 1975 to extend the knowledge produced in the engineering department. In terms of permanence and relation to IRRI's primary activities, it has the status of many other project financed activities at Los Banos. Next there are the outreach offices in Pakistan, Thailand, and Indonesia which do most of the extension work. Next there are subcontracts supported by the core budget in India, Burma, and other countries with universities and government agencies engaged in the design and extension of farm machinery. Finally, there is the IRRI country team composed of all IRRI people in a country financed under different projects and contracts and coordinated by a country team leader.

IRRI at Los Banos

- a. The Industrial Extension program should be continued under a five year grant commitment with a review at the end of the third year which if favorable should extend the commitment for two years; i.e., through year seven. This is a long term technical assistance project which requires security of purpose, funding, and employment conditions. If AID is unable or unwilling to make such a commitment, we recommend termination of AID's involvement when current contracts expire.
- b. The Engineering Department should add a core budget funded engineer to design machinery for dry land rice rotations. This addition will match the core program to the expanded outreach program recommended below.
- c. IRRI's core staff, especially the social scientists, and the country teams should participate in preparing more explicit strategies for the outreach programs. A country strategy should include target location within the country, farm operation, machine type, institutional and personnel development, short and long term objectives, and the social and economic consequences to be monitored. IRRI's multidisciplinary strength should contribute much more to the design and monitoring of the country programs. Focusing its various viewpoints on its industrial extension activities should be a routine IRRI function but AID, if necessary, should add a small amount, say \$7,000 per year, to the new project so the extension office can contract for studies within IRRI and the outreach countries.
- d. As a component of institutional and personnel development, the IRRI outreach office and its counterpart should designate candidates for MS engineering training at an Asian center with dissertation research at IRRI. The country government should pay salary and academic costs and IRRI, with AID funds, should pay per diem and materials costs during the dissertation period. Also to foster a practical results oriented viewpoint, IRRI should explore industrial secondment in Asia for its outreach counterparts. If suitable arrangements can be made, AID should share costs, through IRRI, with the outreach government.
- e. In countries like India and Thailand with well established manufacturers needing design ideas rather than help in blueprint reading, production, or marketing, the outreach program should consider charging modest fees for services which approximate those of a consulting engineering firm. This will discipline both patron and client, add to the private sector style of the program, and check an unavoidable bias in favor of the larger manufacturer.

f. The handling of IRRI's contract should be moved from AID/W to the AID contracting officer in Manila. This will reduce the payment period from three months to two weeks and greatly facilitate other contract business.

g. Services provided by the Georgia Institute of Technology were not cost effective and a subcontract for its participation should not be included in a continued project. Social and marketing studies plus assistance to fabricators on shop layout and business practices are an integral part of IRRI's extension responsibility.

Philippines

h. AID should support an outreach program in the Philippines, separate from IRRI and similar to the other country programs, if the GOP so desires. Although IRRI's presence in the Philippines has been longer and more intense than in the outreach countries, there has been virtually no institutional development for research, design, testing or extension.

Thailand

i. The Thai program should continue but at its current relatively low profile. It should concentrate on the pass-through of ideas from Los Banos to fabricators, feedback to Los Banos, the development of design and testing capability and the identification of candidates for training. In these activities it should broaden its emphasis to include machinery for dry land rice rotations in the North and Northeast.

Pakistan

j. This program got off to an uncertain start due to poor planning and the absence of a strategy either understood by IRRI or accepted by the GOP. However, due to the energy and resourcefulness of the IRRI representative, Amir Khan, important achievements have been made in machinery adaptation and institution building. With much adaptation work completed, several trainees due to return, and operating procedures and policies to be established, Pakistan needs continued IRRI support. AID is prohibited by statute from continuing funding for this program. We recommend that other donors be invited to continue the program under an explicit strategy for a period of at least three years. If financially and legally feasible and desired by IRRI, AID should agree to a no cost extension to avoid dismantling the operation until another donor can be found.

Indonesia

k. The program in Indonesia has led a precarious financial existence catching at opportunities, with weakness in strategy and coordination. The achievement of starting a program is due more to the energy and resourcefulness of the IRRI representative, V. R. Reddy, than to overall planning, management, or support. The program should be continued, rationalized, and brought under a unified AID/W project. Two of the IRRI paid local engineers should be assigned to target areas off Java.

India

e. IRRI and the GOI have discussed an outreach program in South India. AID should be receptive to adding India to the project if the two parties can formulate a five year action plan adequately addressing the issues raised in this report.

3. Major Findings

a. The outreach programs have suffered from a weakness in overall planning and management. This has resulted in vague country agreements, the lack of intermediate performance standards, an opportunistic, untargeted approach and the underutilization of IRRI's fund of multidisciplinary expertise.

✓ In the Philippines, little effort has been made, either by IRRI/AID or the GOP, to shift IRRI's functions in research, design, testing, and extension to the GOP.

AID's short term and erratic funding behavior has been a major cause of IRRI's difficulty in planning, managing, and coordinating long term technical assistance. To some extent IRRI has had no choice but to leave program formulation to its lowest level field operatives. While a degree of decentralization to the field level and an opportunistic approach have advantages when starting outreach efforts in very diverse situations, the program would have benefited from wider and more consistent managerial and strategic perspectives. Now that this excessive flexibility has generated some lively country activities, it is time to incorporate these wider perspectives, consolidate what has taken place and plan a more deliberate longer term effort.

b. No problems of labor displacement have been observed in areas hurriedly visited by the team where mechanization by IRRI or non-IRRI machinery has occurred; Ilo Ilo and Laguna in the Philippines, the central plains and Chaingmai province in Thailand and the Punjab in Pakistan and India. From these areas, it appears that mechanization is induced primarily by improvements in water control and cropping intensity and secondarily by increased off-farm employment opportunities.

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c. IRRI has developed machinery for the small farmer and fabricator superior in many ways to existing alternatives and is likely to continue to do so if supported. It is also likely to be able to continue to recruit very effective individuals for its extension program.

d. A major justification for a farm machinery industrial extension program is the need to develop machines and a national capability able to resist expensive unsuitable imports of their domestic copies sponsored by public authorities. IRRI appears to be the only agency with the experience and capability to assist such programs in developing Asia.

e. Although there are many ways in which machines can increase yields, quality, post harvest retention, cropping intensity and cultivated area, our brief visits to five countries did not reveal a strong impact of mechanization on output except for pumps in the Punjab and the central plains of Thailand. In Pakistan, machines may have prevented a decline in production by replacing laborers moved to the Middle East. Our farm surveys in Thailand indicate that farm machinery raised farm income by allowing more time for off-farm employment. Also, machinery made farm work less arduous for many of the Thai respondents and may have inhibited the migration of the younger generation to the cities.

4. Plan of the Report

The remainder of this report proceeds from the general to the specific. We felt it necessary to include in Chapter II an outline of the strongly held opinions on small farm mechanization. The dearth of hard data in this field has not been an impediment to conviction and it is useful for the reader to understand the controversy and uncertainty under which the evaluation was carried out. Chapters III and IV attempt to set out the broad guidelines for IRRI and AID support to mechanization. All too frequently analysis and comment in this field center on the pros and cons of cases or machines with a neglect of what is generally important and unimportant. The final half of the report, Chapters V and VI, presents the country evaluations. It is hoped the general first half and specific latter half are mutually reinforcing.

THE FIRST-ROUND EVALUATION
OF THE HEALTH DEMONSTRATION PROJECT

BY

Ha Cheong Yeon*

Working Paper 7905

Health Loan Project No. 489-U-092

U.S. Agency for International Development

August 1979

National Health Secretariat
KOREA DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE

* The author is a Senior Fellow at the Korea Development Institute. The author is grateful to Professor Kong-Kyun Ro of the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Dr. Chong Kee Park of the KDI for valuable comments and suggestions. He has also benefited greatly from helpful discussions with Drs. Choo Whan Kim and Sung Woo Lee of the Korea Health Development Institute. Finally he wishes to extend his gratitude to Mr. Kun Young Song, the senior researcher of the KHDI and Mr. Jong Duk Hong of the KDI for their assistance during both the field survey and data-processing phases.

A special note of thanks is owed to Mr. Richard Rorvig for his proofreading and to Miss Hae Young Kang and Miss Hyun Sook Kim for typing.

PAGESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Korea	B. Project Title Health Demonstration Project	C. Project Number Loan No. 489-U-092	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>76</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY _____
E. Life Cycle Project Funding 1. (Loan or Grant) <u>not stated</u> Other Donor _____ Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director <u>not stated</u> 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) 3. Other	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) <u>not stated</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) <u>not stated</u>		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) Korea Health Development Institute (KHDI) 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) <u>not stated</u>	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date) <u>not stated</u>			

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title First Round Evaluation of the Health Demonstration Project	B. Evaluation Date August 1979	C. Type of Evaluation Interim evaluation and development of subse- quent evaluation method	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation June 1976-1979
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire <u>not stated</u> Travel _____ per diem _____ Contract _____ 3. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation (SEE attached sheet)	G. Initiated By <u>not stated</u>

Evaluation Team Composition

1. Direct Hire		
a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise
2. Contract:		
a. Name of Organization (if any)	b. Contract No.	
Korea Development Institute		
c. Name(s) of Persons	d. Area(s) of Expertise	
Ha Cheong Yeon	Senior Fellow, economist	

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position) Kong-Kyun Ro (Korea Advanced Institute of Science), Dr. Chong Kee Park (KDI), Choo Whan Kim (KHDI) and Sung Woo Lee (KHDI)	J. Evaluation Coordinator Signature _____ Typed Name _____ Position _____ Date _____
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F. Purpose: To assess the performance of new types of health personnel and to study the operations and management of the health delivery system; to measure consumer accessibility to and acceptance of services in the experimental areas; to measure the efficiency (cost-effectiveness), and to test the economies of scale with respect to the KHDI three tiered system; to measure the impact of services on the population's health in terms of changes occurring in the base-line status indicators over time and to compare planned targets with actual achievements; to assess the financial, --- social and administrative feasibility of replicating the key features of the project.

VIII. . CONCLUSION

The KHDI project is now fully operational. Every effort is being made to assemble the information needed to modify and to strengthen the delivery system for replication throughout the nation. Since many of the questions surrounding the demonstration projects are ultimately empirical, a certain amount of experimentation is inevitable. The strategy of the first round evaluation, then, should stress flexibility, and should not prejudice the results. Therefore, the paper which we present here is not the final version of the external evaluation results, but simply an intermediate evaluation for discussion purposes only. The foregoing discussion outlined a procedure which will enable the NHS/KDI staff to systematically evaluate the demonstration project, leading ultimately to improved rural health care delivery. This is not an easy task: much of the hard data is not currently available, and it will take time to practically apply the theoretical framework. The objective warrants our earnest efforts. We contributing

to a national health policy, a policy that can be only as good as the data which it is based.

The important information obtained through the first round evaluation is:

1. the average monthly number of service contacts categorized by the health facility and by the service function,
2. the average service time spent per 1,000 target population categorized by service function, by health personnel, and by health facility,
3. the variation pattern of time spent to perform one service categorized by service, by health personnel and by health facility,
4. the proportion of time spent on various types of service functions (direct, indirect and unproductive),
5. the annual number of referred cases per 100 service contracts categorized by health facility,
6. the total operating cost in a given fiscal year categorized by service function, and by health facility,
7. the average cost to the Korean government per service contact categorized by service and by health facility,
8. the health expenditure of the Korean government per capita in each of the areas per year broken down by service function,
9. the average cost borne by patients seeking services at the demonstration level.

The following are the summarized results and observations of the performance, cost, and cost-effectiveness studies.

- a) Sufficient evidence exists to suggest that the ratio of direct service time to total personnel time is rather small at the health center level, but the ratio improves as the size of the facility decreases.
- b) It can be seen that the PHUs are delivering curative services reasonably well, treating an average 15-20 patients per day. This seems to be an acceptable utilization rate for a population of this size. The average per capita annual contact rate between 0.6 and 1.5 is also acceptable, bearing in mind other sources of medical care such as herbalists, drug vendors and private practitioners are available. Also, it must be noted that this is the result of the beginning stage of implementation.
- c) Sufficient evidence also exists to suggest that the working pattern of various functions is quite different among demonstration areas. According to the results of field observations, the health facility activity profiles of the different areas are as follows: the ratio of direct service to the total health facility service ranges from about one-fifth in the health center level to almost two-thirds in the substructures.
- d) Even though it is not possible to compute the ratio of service time performed in the field to the service time performed in the office with available data, personnel in the PHU spent a large portion of time working in the field, i. e., community health practitioners and community health aides consistently have larger average travel time

compared to their co-workers in the health center level.

- e) In the substructures, there is a strong contrast between the 32.5% of total annual expenditures used to provide curative services and a mere 6.4% to provide preventive health care. The major portion (53.1%) of the total expenditures in the health centers was used to provide other health related activities and administration, and only 15.9% was used up in curative services. It can be concluded that the substructures paid much smaller attention to the preventive services than to other activities.
- f) The largest portion of expenditures by both the health centers and the substructures (60% to 65%) is spent on salary.
- g) It is seen that the average expenditure per service contact for the health centers is 3.47 thousand won, but a much lower, 1.14 thousand won for the substructures.
- h) The annual average 4,090 won per capita cost of the health centers was observed to be much higher than the community health centers', 2,220 won average per capita cost, or the primary health units 1,580 won per capita cost. 26/
- i) There is evidence that the degree of financial self-sufficiency in the substructures is higher than that of the health centers, i. e., 25.4% for PHU, 18.3% for CHC, and 17.6% for health centers,

26/ Won (₩) is the unit of currency of the Republic of Korea (1978) US \$ 1.00 = ₩485.

- j) It is seen that the total efficiency ratio of the substructures is higher than that of health centers i. e., 1,6953 for the substructures and 1,0234 for health centers.
- k) The combination of both performance and cost analysis indicates that the substructures are more efficient, or had lower cost per capita, than the health centers. Even if these conclusions are tentative, by virtue of the fact that only one year's data was utilized in this first round study, it indicates that the efficiency of different types of facilities (scales) may vary from one case to another. Finally, it was found that both the substructures and the health centers experienced economies of scale in health delivery administration.

To date, KHDI's progress in mobilizing community resources and developing community health practitioners for primary health care is very encouraging. However, there are three major tasks remaining: to inculcate in the general population the concepts of primary health care, to gain the support of national leaders for the organizational changes needed to bolster the primary health care effort, and to develop and to utilize the appropriate technology for primary health care. If these tasks are accomplished, rural people will be helped to help themselves. "If rural people are helped to help themselves.... a genuine development will be

insured."

An Effective national policy on primary health care for the underprivileged will involve a virtual revolution in the health service system. Fundamental changes in rural Korean health care will require similarly far-reaching changes in the organizational structure and the management practices of the health services. The entire health service must be mobilized to strengthen and to assist the primary health workers, providing them with training, supervision, referral facilities, and logistic support including a simplified national health technology appropriate to their needs.

Assessing the feasibility of project replication will be based, in part, on analysis of coverage, performance, cost and other data gathered from all phases of the KHDI experience. The feasibility of replication will be determined by both financial and administrative factors based on both subjective and objective judgements. Part of the KHDI project external evaluation process is to gather both qualitative and quantitative data which can contribute to this decision-making process.

The evaluation will demonstrate the effectiveness, and will show the cost of modifying the health care system in other areas. Project evaluation results concerning salaries, system performance costs, and health behavior and health status impact have a direct bearing on further refinement of the ministry decisions.

Much of the KHDI project experience will be incorporated into the ministry planning process to develop the ministry's expanded primary health care system. This cooperation together with the quantitative and qualitative results of the project, should have a significant influence on rural health care implementation.

From the beginning of project planning, we have emphasized the development of a low cost delivery system, since cost was assumed to be a major factor, influencing both the provision and the acceptance of services. It is assumed that improved cost effectiveness must be clearly demonstrated to convince government of the efficiency of comprehensive health delivery system. As a result, cost factors will be strongly emphasized, both in the project cost analysis study and in the other components.

However, a number of other factors important to the replication process have been indentified.

1. Efforts to remove legal restraints from new categories of community health practitioners (CHPs) and to provide salary incentive scales for them.
2. Ministry of Health and Social Affairs approval and adoption of the comprehensive health care system/health center infrastructure on a country-wide basis.
3. Establishment of health committees or forums for community participation in each local administrative level to facilitate community involvement.
4. Response to the KHDI project by both public and private providers. As yet no formal data collection concerning the response of public and private providers has been carried out.
5. Change in public and private expenditure on non-project health services overtime. Data on this item is not yet available.
6. Incorporation of the key features of the project in the next five year economic and social development plan.

Future Plan

In the period remaining to complete the evaluation, project staff must select only the data most relevant to the evaluation objectives, reduce the follow-up data to be collected, streamline data collection

methods, and reduce the follow-up sample size.

Final data collection will begin in fiscal year 1980 and will be completed in the first half of that fiscal year. Coding and editing of the data by area will begin as the first sets of data become available, and will continue concurrently as data is collected in subsequent areas. Three to four months will be required to complete the data processing and the tabulations. This step is similar to that of the initial analysis but in an abbreviated form. Basic tabulations will be available through the second quarter of fiscal year 1980, and should be completed for all studies by the third quarter of that year. Approximately one year would then remain for integrative analysis, interpretation, report writing and other documentation.

Activities related to the preparation of the analysis will be conducted concurrently with data collection, and will be completed in fiscal year 1980 when all data sets should be available for analysis. The interpretation of the results and the preparation of the final evaluation reports and other project

documentation will be completed during fiscal year 1980
to transfer the knowledge gained in the KHDI project
experience.

GH

**JOINT AID/ROKG
Mid-Term Review**

**of the
Korea Health Demonstration Project**
(AID Loan No. 489-U-092)

July 20-28, 1978

**Consultant Contractor:
The American Public Health Association
Washington, D.C.**

**Korea Health Development Institute
Seoul, Korea**

FACESHET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Korea	B. Project Title Health Demonstration Project	C. Project Number 489-22-590-710	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>75</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY <u>80</u>
E. Life of Project Funding		F. Responsible Mission Officials	
1. (Loan or Grant) <u>5,000,000</u>		1. Mission Director not stated	
2. Other Donor <u>558,600 (UNICEF)</u>		2. Project Officers (Name, Position)	
3. Country Counterpart Funds <u>1,700,000</u>		3. Other	
TOTAL \$ _____			
G. Project Design		H. Implementation	
1. In-House (Name, Position) not stated		1. Host Country Agency(ies) not stated	
2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not stated		2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not stated	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date) not stated			

I. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title Joint AID/ROK Mid Term Review of the Korea Health Demonstration Project	B. Evaluation Date July 20-28, 1978	C. Type of Evaluation Joint Midterm	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation 1975-present
E. Evaluation Cost		F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation	
1. Direct Hire not stated		(SEE attached sheet)	
2. Other _____			
TOTAL \$ _____			
G. Initiated By not stated			
H. Evaluation Team Composition			

1. Direct Hire	a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise
2. Contract:	e. Name of Organization (if any)	b. Contract No.	d. Area(s) of Expertise
(SEE attached sheet)			
c. Name(s) of Persons			

Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position) **William E. Paupe, AID rep. and Kenneth Smith. Hyung Jong Park, M.D., Korea Health Development Institute, Shin, Hyon Track, Minister of Health and Social Affairs, Yang, Jae Mo, National Health Commission, Park, Chong Kee, National Health Commissionariat**

J. Evaluation Coordinator
Signature _____
Typed Name _____
Position _____
Date _____

F. Purpose: "Interim check-up" on the project's operational well-being (page 6) and overall program direction, including: Assessing continuing validity of project purpose and an emphasis on type of service, coverage, priority target population, community participation, and institutional development of KHDI.

H. Evaluation Team Composition:

Carl E. Taylor, M.D.
Professor of International Health
Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Preventive Medicine

Emmanuel Voulgaropoulos, M.D.
Associate Dean and Professor, School of Public Health, University of Hawaii

Helen M. Wallace, M.D.
Professor of MCH and Family Health School of Public Health
Department of Social and Administrative Health Sciences
University of California, Berkeley

Lee Howard, M.D.
Director, Office of Health Development Support Bureau
Agency for International Development

Susi Kessler, M.D.
Director, International Health
American Public Health Association

I. SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS

"It is inherent in success
that it demands greater effort."

Whitman

The Review Team considers that, in general, KHDI has made excellent progress in organizing its staff to develop and implement three different models of project activities in widely different, geographically separated areas of Korea.

The Team commends KHDI for its decision to implement these demonstration models through (and in close coordination with) the local "Gun" authorities, rather than as separate "pilot" projects administered and operated directly by KHDI. While the demonstration effect might possibly have been accelerated by a "pilot" project, the long term prospects for replicability should be enhanced by KHDI's approach in integrating the demonstration model with the existing government structure. Progress in the two areas that we visited (Hongchon and Gunee) is greater than we would have expected under these circumstances, based on our experiences in other health programs and projects in developing countries.

As in any complex social service development program of this nature and magnitude, there are some areas which still need concentrated attention and/or strengthening. These areas were not unknown to the Korean Government, KHDI or its advisors before our visit; however, through intensive discussion with the review team by all participants the spotlight has now been thrown upon them. The Team therefore submits the following broad recommendations which have emerged from this catalytic process, as a constructive contribution to Korea's future efforts in developing primary health care delivery systems for its rural areas.

OVERALL PROGRAM DIRECTION

1. Project Purpose

Although the project purpose will remain consistent with the original loan agreement, namely to plan, conduct, and evaluate low-cost integrated health delivery projects directed towards low income families and to demonstrate successfully a multi-gun, low-cost integrated health delivery system that is replicable, assessment of the achievement of these goals should be based on an analysis of the effect of

selected project components (such as the role of specific category of health workers) rather than a comparison of the comparative efficiency of each of the demonstration projects.

2. Service

Primary attention in the project should be redirected from curative medical care to individuals, and focussed upon providing preventive health services to the community. Specific Maternal & Child Health (MCH) activities should be undertaken for individuals in rural areas by trained Community Health Aides.

3. Coverage

The key indicator proposed for evaluating impact from these projects is percent of population reached by specific services or coverage. Present service, and data are focussed primarily on curative activities. This should be totally reversed with primary attention to getting complete preventive coverage, especially with maternal services and child care through a deliberate extension service to homes.

4. Priority Target Population

Concentrated attention should be given to the poor, and their major health problems; particularly those problems which could be alleviated by appropriate preventive measures. In this regard, we recommend a major focus on preventive measures for women of child-bearing age, mothers, infants and children.

5. Community Participation

Increase community participation through the Saemaul Undong. This represents one of the greatest potential strengths of these projects.

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (KHDI)

6. Internal Organization

The internal organization of KHDI should be retained essentially in its present form for the purposes of loan project implementation.

7. National Health Planning & Evaluation

Beyond the current scope of work, KHDI offers an important potential for national health planning in Korea. In view of the

rapidly changing economic conditions and the need to propose viable health systems which can reach the population majority, efficiency requires that the Republic of Korea establish a health planning and evaluation unit with the capability to recommend appropriate technical and economic solutions within the context of national development. For this purpose, KHDI should receive careful consideration as the nucleus of a national health planning organization which permits assessment of health options in relation to all socio-economic development trends.

8. National Linkages

KHDI should continue to expand and strengthen its linkages with the Economic Planning Board, the Korean Development Institute, the Ministry of Home Affairs, Provincial Governments, National public and private institutes, and professional associations in order to understand and assess the full range of alternatives to improve national health levels.

9. International Linkages

One of the most constructive future roles of KHDI will be to serve as an international center for health planning, research and training. Possibilities should be explored for international support for expanding KHDI's capability to fill this important regional role.

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Further detailed recommendations on specific aspects of the development loan project are contained in Section IV of the body of the report.

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Second Annual Evaluation

of the

Anti-Malaria Campaign

February-March, 1980

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Sri Lanka	B. Project Title Malaria Control	C. Project Number 383-0045	D. Active Life of Project 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>77</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY <u>83</u>
E. Life of Project Funding 1. (Loan or Grant) <u>16,000,000</u> 2. Other Donor <u>8,800,000</u> Host Country Counterpart Funds <u>31,853,000</u> TOTAL \$ <u>56,653,000</u>		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director <u>S.J. Littlefield</u> 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) 3. Other <u>Larry Cowper, Regional Malaria Adviser/USAID/Colombo</u>	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) <u>(not stated)</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.)		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) <u>Ministry of Health-Anti-Malaria Campaign</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.)	

I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date)

Report of the First Annual Review Team, November 1978

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title <u>Second Annual Evaluation of the Anti-Malaria Campaign</u>	B. Evaluation Date <u>Feb-March 1980</u>	C. Type of Evaluation <u>special</u>	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation <u>Second year of operation 1979</u>
E. Evaluation Cost Direct Hire <u>(not stated)</u> Travel _____ per diem _____ contract _____ Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____	F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation <u>To review progress of the AMC since 1978 .</u>		G. Initiated By <u>(not stated)</u>

H. Evaluation Team Composition

(See attached sheet)

- | | | | |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------|--|
| 1. Direct Hire | (See attached sheet) | | |
| a. Name | b. Present Position | c. Area of Expertise | |
| 2. Contract: | a. Name of Organization (if any) | b. Contract No. | |
| | | <u>AID/ASIA/C-1444</u> | |
| c. Name(s) of Persons | | d. Area(s) of Expertise | |

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position)

(See attached sheet)

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____
Typed Name _____
Position _____
Date _____

ANNEX II

I. Assessment Team Members and Program Contacts

A. Exterior Consultants

- | | | |
|----|-----------------------|---|
| 1. | Prof. David Clyde | Senior Malaria Advisor
WHO/SERO
New Delhi, India |
| 2. | Prof. W.H.R. Lumsden | Senior Malariologist
Representative of the United Kingdom |
| 3. | Dr. David Muir | Inter Regional Coordinator/Malaria
WHO/HQ.
Geneva, Switzerland |
| 4. | Dr. K.G. Samnotra | Deputy Director
National Malaria Eradication Program
New Delhi, India |
| 5. | Dr. R. Slooff | Entomologist
Representative of the Netherlands |
| 6. | Prof. H.J. VanderKaay | Malariologist
Representative of the Netherlands |

B. WHO Staff

- | | | |
|----|----------------------|---------------------|
| 1. | Mr. K.H. Notaney | Country Coordinator |
| 2. | Dr. E.C. Haas | Malariologist |
| 3. | Mr. G.P. Joshi | Entomologist |
| 4. | Mr. S. Tarkajosopuro | Sanitarian |

C. Anti Malaria Campaign Headquarters Staff

- | | | |
|----|---------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. | Dr. Abeyesundere | Superintendent, AMC/HQ |
| 2. | Dr. Subramaniam | Deputy Superintendent, AMC/HQ |
| 3. | Dr. T.S. Ruberu | Medical Officer, AMC/HQ |
| 4. | Dr. P.P.R. Dias | Medical Officer, AMC/HQ |
| 5. | Dr. M.U.L.P. Samarasinghe | M.O. Training & H.E., AMC/HQ |
| 6. | Dr. P.J. Herath | Entomologist, AMC/HQ |
| 7. | Mr. M.B. Wickramasinghe | Entomologist, AMC/HQ |

D. Anti Malaria Campaign Field Staff

1. Dr. S. Sri Rajasekaram Regional Medical Officer
Jaffna Region
AMC/Jaffna
2. Dr. K. Kamayasabai Regional Medical Officer
Vavuniya Region
AMC/Vavuniya
3. Dr. R.A.D.W. Bernard Regional Medical Officer
Anuradhapura Region
AMC/Anuradhapura
4. Mr. Pathameswarn Public Health Inspector
Officer in Charge
Trincomalee Region
AMC/Trincomalee

II. Government of Sri Lanka Officials

A. Ministry Contacts

1. Mr. Gamini Jayasuriya Minister of Health
2. Mr. B.C. Perera Health Secretary
Ministry of Health
3. Dr. H.A. Jesudasan Director Health Services
4. Dr. P.U. de La Motte Epidemiologist
Epidemiology Unit
Ministry of Health
5. Mr. S.W.A. de Silva Director of Budget
Ministry of Finance
6. Mr. M.D.P. Wijegunasekera Deputy Director of Planning and
Implementation
Ministry of Planning and Implementation
7. Mr Jerry Hughs Transportation Consultant

B. Other

1. Dr. Shanmugalingum District Medical Officer
Chavakachcheri
Jaffna Region
2. Dr. M.J. Nonis Medical Officer
General Hospital, Anuradhapura
3. Dr. H.R.S. Wijemanne M.D., General Hospital
Anuradhapura

D. United States Mission

- | | |
|-----------------------------|---|
| 1. Hon. Donald R. Toussaint | U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka |
| 2. Ms. S.J. Littlefield | Director, USAID/Sri Lanka |
| 3. Mr. Larry Cowper | Regional Malaria Advisor
USAID/Sri Lanka |
| 4. Mr. Ed Smith | Chief Malaria Advisor
USAID/Washington |

Second Annual Ev. of the Intensive Malaria Campaign

1. Introduction

1.1 Anti-Malaria Campaign :

The Anti-Malaria Campaign is a specialized Campaign which functions under the Deputy Director of Public Health Services and Director of Health Services. The Central Organization consists of a Superintendent, Deputy Superintendent and four Medical Officers in-charge of Training, epidemiology, logistics and laboratories, spraying and transport. There are two (2) Entomologists in-charge of the Entomological Activities. There is an Establishment, Finance and Assessment Branch at the central level together with a Central Laboratory and a Motor Repair and Workshop. The Headquarters is sited at Marahempita. A separate Cross-checking Laboratory and Training Centre function at Dean's Road, Maradana. At the Intermediate Level there are 16 Regional Offices at Jaffna, Vavuniya, Anuradhapura, Futtalam, Vah, Kurunegala, Matale, Kandy, Padulla, Moneragala, Amparai, Batticaloa, Singurakgoda, Trincomalee, Embilipitiya and Matara. These are usually manned by Regional Medical Officers, Senior Sanitarian and their staff. There are 17 sub Regional Offices manned by Sanitariums under the regional offices and at the periphery there are 42 Public Health Inspectors' Vigilance Units which supervise the spraying activities surveillance and treatment activities carried out. Altogether there are over 4,000 employees attached to the Campaign.

1.2 Background of the Review :

The Intensive Malaria Control Programme commenced on August, 15th, 1977. This programme was based on the Plan of Operations signed by the Government of Sri Lanka and WHO on 6th May, 1977. The participating bilateral Agencies are U.S AID, United Kingdom and the Netherlands. According to this Plan of Operations and the loan agreement signed between US AID and the Government of Sri Lanka, the M/C programme has to be evaluated annually by an Independent Assessment Team.

This is the 2nd evaluation. It is important as it is at the end of the second year of intensive spraying with malathion. A decision is required as to whether or not certain areas should be removed from continuous malathion spraying and put on an seasonal basis of spraying. (1)

It will also be important to determine the degree of intensification of surveillance that should be carried out.

1.3 Participants in the Second Annual Review Team :

- | | |
|------------------------------|---|
| 1. Dr Urban De La Motte | - Chief Epidemiologist,
Ministry of Health
(Chairman). |
| 2. Dr David F. Clyde | - Regional Malaria
Adviser WHO STARO |
| 3. Dr Gerald Brooks | - US AID Malaria
Consultant. |
| 4. Mr Larry Cowper | - Regional Malaria
Adviser - ASIA,
US AID. |
| 5. Dr R. Slooff | - Malaria Consultant,
Government of the
Netherlands. |
| 6. Dr Hugo J. Van der Kaay | - Malaria Consultant,
Government of the
Netherlands. |
| 7. Professor W.H.R. Lumsden | - Malaria Consultant,
British High Commission. |
| 8. Mr Arthur Silva | - Director Budget,
Ministry of Finance. |
| 9. Mr K.G. Sarnotra | - WHO Consultant,
Deputy Director (Entomology
ICP, India. |
| 10. Mr D.P.N. Wijegunasekera | - Deputy Director,
Plan Implementation. |
| 11. Dr David Muir | - Entomologist,
WHO Headquarters, Geneva.
(Rapporteur). |

1.4 Terms of Reference of the evaluation team will be :

1. To review the progress of the M/C since 1978, situation analysis and the actions taken on the recommendation made for the M/C programme at that time.
2. To review the present status of the malaria situation in the country and its relationship to the planned activities under approved Plan of Operations.

1.4 Terms of Reference (contd.)

3. To provide an epidemiological review of the malaria programme with a view to determine those areas in the next year which -
 1. require continued intensive anti-malaria activities ;
 2. can proceed with a minimum of malaria programme inputs and
 3. those areas which can be observed through an integrated health service programme.
4. To review the nature and extent of administrative, operational and technical problems affecting the programme, with special reference to decreasing spray coverage in certain areas and to make recommendations to overcome these problems.
5. Review and assess the present research projects being carried out in the AMC programme as well as identifying additional projects which could be implemented in the programme in the coming year.
6. Review the existing programme of village self-help in the malaria control field with a view to recommending activities to increase community participation in the AMC programme.
7. Assess the efficacy of the training of malaria and public health personnel in the various categories and to make recommendations for future training directions.

1.5 Methodology of review :

First 2 days : 6 & 7th February - At AMC briefing and protocol

Mr Arthur Silva - Director Budget

Mr D.P. Wijegunasekera - Ministry of Plan Implementation

were also present.

7.2.1980 - The Team met the Secretary, Ministry of Health, Director of Health Services and the Deputy Director, Public Health Services and briefed them on their mission and the terms of reference of the team.

1.5 Methodology of review (contd.)

7.2.1980 - Preliminary discussions continued at the IIC Headquarters.

Four teams were formed to carry out field inspection throughout the Island, and this took place 8.2.80 to 18.2.80.

The teams consisted of :

Team No. 1Area visited

- | | |
|------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Dr David F. Clyde | |
| 2. Dr R. Slooff | |
| 3. Mr S. Tarkajosopuro | South Eastern Regions. |
| 4. Dr T.S. Ruberu | |

Team No. 2

- | | |
|---------------------------|------------------|
| 1. Dr H.J. Van der Kaay | |
| 2. Mr Larry Cowper | |
| 3. Dr E.C. Haas | Eastern Regions. |
| 4. Mr M.B. Wickramasinghe | |

Team No. 3

- | | |
|-----------------------------|------------------|
| 1. Prof. V.H.R. Lumsden | |
| 2. Dr David Muir | |
| 3. Dr F.E. de La Motte | Central Regions. |
| 4. Dr M.U.L.P. Samarasinghe | |
| 5. Dr (Miss) F.P.J. Herath | |

Team No. 4

- | | |
|---------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Dr Gerald Brooks | |
| 2. Mr K.G. Sarnotra | |
| 3. Mr G.P. Joshi | Northern Regions. |
| 4. Dr F.B.R. Dias | |

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The detailed itineraries are given in Annex 8. From 19.2.1980 to 27.2.1980 - The Administration and Organisational set up of the AIC was reviewed which included a survey of the Central storage of insecticides and other supplies and equipment. Inspection of laboratories, central and cross checking, were also carried out. The programme of work of the Training Centre was revised in February 1979 by a joint Team. A comprehensive report on the AIC activities was prepared and the Draft Report, Recommendations and Observations were presented to the Hon'ble Minister of Health on February 28, 1980.

2. Review of the actions taken on the recommendations of the First Annual Review Team - November 1978:

The reader is referred to the report of the First Annual Review Team, November 1978, Section VII, Page 43 - 50, for the full text of the recommendations put forward at that time.

The following is a summary of the present Team's findings in relation to action taken to implement the above recommendations :

2.1 Entomology

1. Supervision by Regional Medical Officers

R.M.Os are now responsible for administrative support of the entomology teams, technical supervision remaining with AIC/HQ. The R.M.Os have the opportunity of using the teams for special investigations. Many do not have the experience required for supervision.

2. (a) and (b) Suitable redeployment of teams

This has been recently carried out, and the teams are undergoing a period of adjustment.

3. Traps

These are being re-designed and supplied in adequate numbers.

4. Susceptibility testing

This is being done, with simple screening tests where the vector is scarce, and measurement of actual susceptibility level where numbers permit.

5. Malathion resistant bed-bugs

Areas affected by this have not been fully demarcated. It has not been demonstrated however that spraying refusals are primarily due to this factor.

10. Conclusions and Recommendations.

CONCLUSIONS :

The Team concluded that in all but one rural area, and some small urban areas of intensified spraying operations, there should not be any reduction in the coverage and frequency during 1980 and probably also 1981.

Important factors contributing to this recommendation relate to the causes of continuing transmission - large gaps in the surveillance net, the moderate to low spraying coverage actually achieved in some areas, and the doubtful operational quality of the spray being applied. The continuing sensitivity of the vector to malathion is, of course, a paramount consideration in continuing its usage.

Reduction of spray rounds from four to two, the latter related to seasonal transmission peaks, is recommended for Mannar Island where refusals are particularly common on account of bed bug resistance.

There can be no transfer of any transmission area to the control of the General Health Services while the primary goal of the programme is P.falciparum eradication.

It was also concluded that the surveillance mechanism is inadequate and needs strengthening, particularly with reference to P.C.D.

The need for continued development of Community Participation and Community support is particularly stressed. This should be encouraged to the utmost, and full support given to the Range P.H.Is.

Another major recommendation is the formation of an Epidemiological Resource Unit for the programme.

The Team was impressed by the progress made by the A.M.C. under difficult circumstances, and by the willingness shown to develop and utilize new approaches to control measures.

To summarise, continued technical adaptability, community participation at the village level and political will at the top were identified as the outstanding support ingredients which would be essential for success.

(Contd...)

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REPORT OF USAID EXTERNAL REVIEW TEAM
ON THE LAMPANG (DEIDS) PROGRAM

Review Team:

Frank W. Mount, M.D., Dr. PH,
Epidemiologist
Michael D. Maurier, Ph.D International
Systems Development Specialist
Maureen A. Lewis, M.A. Economist

FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Thailand	B. Project Title Lampang (DEIDS) Program	C. Project Number not stated	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>75</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY <u>81</u>
E. Life of Project Funding 1. AID: (Loan or Grant) <u>"roughly 9 million"</u> 2. Other Donor _____ at Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director <u>Donald Cohen</u> 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) <u>Dr. Somboon Vachrotai, Project Director</u> 3. Other _____	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) <u>not stated</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) <u>not stated</u>		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) <u>Some tie-in between the Lampang Project and Ministry of Public Health (implied)</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) <u>American Public Health, contractor. Univ. of Hawaii, subcontractor</u>	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date) <u>apparently none</u>			

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title <u>Report of USAID External Review Team on the Lampang Program</u>	B. Evaluation Date <u>sometime in June 1979</u>	C. Type of Evaluation <u>external review</u>	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation <u>1975-1979</u>
E. Evaluation Cost Direct Hire <u>not stated</u> a. travel _____ per diem _____ contract _____ 3. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____	F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation <u>Assess the proposed 2 year project evaluation plan and the capabilities and needs of the LP staff for the proposed 2 year evaluation and documentation cycle in order to decide the future of the project.</u>		G. Initiated By <u>USAID Mission in Thailand</u>

H. Evaluation Team Composition

1. Direct Hire			
a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise	
2. Contract:			
a. Name of Organization (if any)	b. Contract No.	c. Name(s) of Persons	
		d. Area(s) of Expertise	
<u>Frank Mount, M.D., Dr., P.H., Epidemiologist</u> <u>Michael Maurier, PH.D., International Systems Development Specialist</u> <u>Maureen Lewis, M.A., Economist</u>			

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position) Donald Cohen, Mission Director and Dr. Somboon Vachrotai, Project Director

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____

Typed Name _____

Position _____

Date _____

discussed - a savings of \$20,000. Time and attention should not be taken from the analysis, interpretation of data and writing of reports during the middle of the two year period.

If the above suggestions were adopted there would be a total savings of about \$90,000 (\$82,000 plus 10%). The team does not believe that these suggestions are necessarily the only places in which savings could be made, and recommends that the project staff consider carefully the possibility of other modifications.

On the other hand, the team members agree that the project staff could benefit from the addition of a person skilled in data processing, data analysis and evaluation techniques. It is recommended that serious consideration be given to locating a well-qualified Thai who could be hired half-time for the project. It is further suggested that attempts be made to convince the directors of the Ministry's Rural Primary Health Care Expansion Project to employ this person, also on a half time basis - to assist in planning and implementing the evaluation of this project. It is recognized that given the sensitive relationship that exists between these two projects this may not be acceptable to either or both parties. Nevertheless, we strongly believe it would serve a most useful liaison function if the agreement of the directors of both projects could be secured to establish this position.

Although not charged with considering possible management mechanisms for the continuation of the project, the team would like to suggest that it should be managed by a contracted agency, which would be less costly and hopefully more efficient than past management arrangements or direct management by the Mission.

Summary and Recommendations

A research project in health care is usually designed to answer questions concerning effectiveness. A demonstration project is primarily concerned with questions of efficiency. Studies of efficiency are composed of two parts, the first dealing with the difficulties of setting a project into motion, and the second with its continuing operation. The Lampang Project should be considered a demonstration with added research

orientation. Much information has already been accumulated and presented on how to put such a health care system into operation - selection of personnel, training, record keeping and logistics. That considerable attention has already been paid to the Lampang experience is evidenced by the adaptation of elements of this health care system to other provinces in Thailand.

Among the most important lessons yet to be learned from the Lampang Project are those concerning how to keep such a system running. Continued organized observation of this health care delivery system should identify problems both in personnel and logistics that arise during the first few years of operation. It should point to ways in which they may be corrected or avoided in other projects. It should also identify elements in the program which work particularly well. To curtail this continued evaluation would lose half the value of the project. In addition, without continued observation the modest research elements in the design would come to naught. Little can now be said concerning the effectiveness of this health care training approach and delivery system. Only through collection of additional data and comparison with control districts will any notions emerge as to the impact the system has had on the health and attitudes of the rural people during its first few years.

In the opinion of the review team, it would be unwise to refuse further financial support and not attempt to reap the important benefits which can yet be obtained from the project. The team, therefore, makes the following recommendations:

1. The proposed two-year evaluation should be supported by AID at a financial level corresponding roughly to the intermediate budget submitted by Lampang. The evaluation approach is sound and the activities should be completed within two years.
2. The two full-time foreign technical advisors should be retained, but only one international consultant for two visits annually.
3. The surveys and studies suggested should be conducted as planned, except for the Vital Events Monitoring. This should be dropped unless greatly modified.

4. The project has been managed through a contract with the American Public Health Association (APHA) and a subcontract with the University of Hawaii (UH). APHA's involvement in the Lampang Project is a legacy of its original task of management and coordination of all five DEIDS projects. The role of both institutions in the Lampang project is now obsolete and alternative management mechanisms should be considered.

5. The Rural Primary Health Care Expansion project has drawn on the Lampang experience but has introduced some major modifications. Cooperative studies of these two Thai projects could highlight the relative benefits and identify effective components of each. To facilitate such studies and to assist Lampang in its evaluation, particularly the data analysis, a liaison position between the two projects should be considered. Ideally each project would finance half of the salary for the person selected for this position.

6. The Lampang project has been visited by many persons interested in primary health care. The senior staff members have devoted considerable time as hosts. During the evaluation they should be free to focus their attention on data analysis, receiving few visitors.

7. During the two-year evaluation period the senior staff should curtail outside activities to concentrate on data collection, analysis, interpretation and documentation.

8. The team was provided with copies of all papers prepared and/or presented at conferences since the project's inception. Future written materials should concentrate on documentation and analysis of the Lampang experience and be organized to minimize overlap and duplication. Much of the completed work is descriptively repetitive and contains little data analysis; as the data become available during the next two years, they should provide the focus of the documentation. The team also recommends preparation of a single document that summarizes the Lampang approach to primary health care, analyzes its strengths and weakness and evaluates its potential replicability.

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Finally the team would like to urge AID to make an expeditious decision concerning the future of the project. All members of the project staff deserve this as they have been kept dangling much too long. In addition, if AID wishes the project to continue the staff should be informed before they feel compelled to accept other opportunities. If key staff members should leave, the evaluation program may have to be discontinued.

LUMI Area and
Transmigration Development

by

Steve Cochrane
and
Robert Manley

August-December, 1979

FACESHET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Indonesia	B. Project Title Luwu Area and Transmigration Development	C. Project Number 497-0244	D. Active Life of Project. 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>76</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY <u>82</u>
E. Life of Project Funding 1. AID: (Loan or Grant) <u>15,000,000</u> 2. Other Donor _____ + Country Counterpart Funds <u>27,000,000</u> TOTAL \$ <u>42,000,000</u>		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director <u>Thomas Niblock</u> 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) <u>Ric Machmer, USAID</u> 3. Other _____	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) <u>(not stated)</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) _____		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) <u>LATDP (4 ministries, 5 directorates-general)</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) _____	

I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date)

Luwu Area and Transmigration Development (1977)

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title <u>Project Luwu Evaluation Study</u>	B. Evaluation Date <u>August-December 1979</u>	C. Type of Evaluation <u>evaluation study</u>	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation <u>September 1977-December 1978</u>
E. Evaluation Cost <u>(not stated)</u> 1. Direct Hire _____ a. travel _____ per diem _____ contract _____ 3. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____	F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation <u>To monitor progress, assess socio-economic impact, identify problems and provide feedback.</u>		G. Initiated By <u>Project Luwu and USAID</u>

H. Evaluation Team Composition

1. Direct Hire	a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise
2. Contract.	a. Name of Organization (if any)	b. Contract No.	d. Area(s) of Expertise
	<u>Checchi and Company</u>		
	c. Name(s) of Persons		
	<u>Steve Cochrane</u>		
	<u>Robert Manley</u>		

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position)

(not stated)

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____
 Typed Name _____
 Position _____
 Date _____

V. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

THE PROJECT

The Luwu area and Transmigration Development Project (LATDP) is a multi-sectoral rural development project, located in Kabupaten Luwu in the province of South Sulawesi. The Project is an effort to coordinate the planning and implementation of rural development projects of various ministries to create a development package that will improve the living standards of the rural poor. The basic idea of the project is that a development package which attempts to improve the various factors that affect the income of the Indonesian farmer such as improved irrigation and roads, modern farm technology, availability of agricultural inputs, and access to markets for farm production will have a greater impact on the farmers and the total economic development of the area than if these projects were implemented individually over various time periods.

The LATDP directly involves four government ministries and five directorates general or agencies which have created five subprojects plus the project headquarters which have the following responsibilities :

- I. Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration
 - A. Directorate General of Transmigration
 1. HEADQUARTERS - to operate a headquarters in Palopo with offices in Ujung Pandang and Jakarta, which coordinate the activities of the project and conduct training activities
 2. TRANS-MIGRATION SUBPROJECT - to settle seven hundred transmigrant families in the Project Luwu irrigation areas.
- II. Ministry of Public Works
 - A. Directorate General of Highways (Bina Marga)

ROAD IMPROVEMENT SUBPROJECT - to improve 177 kilometers of trunk road between Palopo and Halili.
 - B. Directorate General of Water Resources Development.

IRRIGATION SUBPROJECT - to rehabilitate and improve the Bone Bone and Kalena irrigation systems to provide technical assistance to 10,000 hectares of land.
- III. Ministry of Agriculture
 - A. Directorate of Agricultural Education, Planning, and Extension.

RURAL MODEL SUBPROJECT - to establish four Rural Model Stations

Centers (REC) in the Luwu area and provide extension services to farmers regarding food crops, livestock, fisheries, and estate crops production.

IV. Ministry of Trade and Cooperatives

A. Directorate General of Cooperatives

COOPERATIVES SUBPROJECT - to establish four Farm Cooperatives Centers (FCC) in Luwu to be supported by local farm cooperatives. The FCCs provide farm inputs to Luwu farmers and purchase their farm surpluses. The Capital Assistance Paper originally planned the RECs and FCCs to be combined into Farm Service Centers. However, they were separated into individual subprojects prior to the signing of the Loan Agreement.

Originally the Ministry of Health had also been planned to participate in the project, to create a health subproject which would combat filariasis. This subproject however has since been canceled due to the lack of incidence of filariasis in the Kabupaten.

Figure 1 illustrates schematically the project and its components. As shown, transmigrants provide the labor to work the land which is being opened by Project Luwu. The transmigrants and the local farmers in the project area are the direct beneficiaries of the project. The land is being improved by the rehabilitation and expansion of two irrigation systems, and modern farm technology is provided to the transmigrants and other farmers by the agents of the Rural Extension Centers in the area. Farm Cooperatives Centers are being established which will help to supply farmers with necessary agricultural inputs and to provide a market for the farmers by purchasing their outputs and providing primary processing before shipping them out of the area. All elements of the project are connected by the main road passing through the project which is being improved to ensure access to markets for the farmers of Luwu. All activities of Project Luwu are coordinated by the headquarters which is located in Palopo, the capital of the Luwu Kabupaten.

The road is of primary importance since it provides the communication links and access to markets, which are vital to the project's success, and about eight percent of the project's planned budget has been allocated to

this subproject. The irrigation subproject accounts for 27% of the planned budget, 9% is allocated to the headquarters and transmigration, and 6% to the RECs and FCCs.

PROJECT LOCATION

As shown in Figure 2, Kabupaten Luwu is on the northern tip of the Bay of Bone, located in the northeast part of the province of South Sulawesi. The Kabupaten has an area of 25,149 Km² and a current population of 446,000. The headquarters of Project Luwu is located in Palopo, and most project activities are spread throughout the kabupaten. The road improvement project extends 177 Km from Palopo to Malili. However, most project activities are situated in the Bone Bone and Kalaena areas where the irrigation improvements are located. In Bone Bone, 3200 hectares will be irrigated, and one REC and one FCC are each located in this area. Kecamatan Bone Bone contains 3239 transmigrant families who have been settled since 1970 under the Ministry of Transmigration's regular transmigration program.

Kalaena is the site of one REC and one future FCC, and 7560 hectares will be irrigated by the Kalaena River right bank system. Seven hundred transmigrant families have been settled in this area by Project Luwu, along with 3100 families who have been settled by the regular transmigration program.

The road improvement sub-project passes through both Bone Bone and Kalaena, as well as through Batusitanduk where one REC is now located and one FCC will be built in the future. South of Palopo, an REC has been built in Padang Sappa, and an FCC will be built in Bolopa.

Figures from the Kabupaten Luwu Transmigration Office indicate that 8300 families have been settled in Luwu since 1970, representing approximately 38,000 transmigrants living in the kecamatans of Masamba, Bone Bone, Notu, and Mangkutana all of whom stand to benefit from Project Luwu.

INSTITUTIONAL COORDINATION

Any project in any country which includes the participation of four government ministries is bound to be a difficult affair to manage, and Project Luwu is no exception. The various ministries of the GOI have

II. FOREWORD

An evaluation program for Project Luwu was one of the original activities planned to be a part of the overall scope of the project, which is outlined in the Capital Assistance Paper (CAP). The CAP defines the purpose of the evaluation as having four aspects :

- 1) To monitor progress towards the attainment of project goals,
- 2) To assess the socio-economic impact of the project,
- 3) To identify problem areas and constraints which inhibit progress, and
- 4) To feed relevant information back into the decision making process of continued planning, organization, and implementation in Luwu, and into the development of similar projects in other locations in Indonesia.

The CAP stresses that the evaluation program will emphasize the assessment of the impact of project inputs rather than the monitoring of the execution of inputs, and will include a broad-based social sector analysis. Three phases of the evaluation program are outlined in the CAP. The first is to assemble information already available, and to refine the evaluation methodology. The second phase is to conduct a baseline study of agricultural production and technology, marketing, credit, level of well-being, and organization for development. The third phase includes data collection, analysis, and reporting.

Hasanuddin University in Ujung Pandang was contracted by Project Luwu to conduct the evaluation program which would be undertaken through a series of annual studies. UNHAS has so far completed two annual studies using data gathered through sample surveys in the project area.

It was felt by Project Luwu and USAID that an additional study was necessary to complement the UNHAS work, particularly to provide baseline data and benchmark figures which appeared to be lacking in the UNHAS study. Therefore Checchi and Company was asked to provide consultant assistance, under its technical assistance contract with Project Luwu, to undertake an evaluation study of the project. Mr. Robert Manly was contracted as a short term evaluation consultant to the project and conducted this evaluation with Mr. Steve Cochran, a long term consultant on the Checchi/DHJM advisory team in Luwu.

TERMIN

During the planning stage of this evaluation study, the scope of the work was not clearly defined by any single document. It was therefore necessary to refer to the CAP and to letter correspondence between Project Luru, USAID, and Checchi and Company, in order to define the scope of this study. UNHCR remains the primary entity responsible for the total evaluation program. The scope of this evaluation study includes the following :

1. BASELINE DATA AND BENCHMARKS

One of the primary objectives of this study is to gather baseline data and determine benchmarks which can be used to assess the impact of the project.

2. MEASURES OF GOAL ACHIEVEMENT

This study identifies appropriate measures of goal achievement which indicate the progress of the project and measure the attainment of its goals.

3. PROJECT IMPACT

This study attempts to measure the impacts of Project Luru, to determine if the project goals are being achieved, and to determine if, in fact, Project Luru with its multi-sectoral approach is responsible for the attainment of the project goals.

4. PROJECT ORGANIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

An attempt is made to study the current organization of Project Luru and to recommend improvements to the existing organization which can improve the implementation of the project.

5. REVISION OF LOGICAL FRAMEWORK MATRIX

A review of the Logical Framework Matrix in the CAP is a part of this evaluation effort, to try to make the matrix a more useful tool for project evaluation and monitoring by Project Luru management and USAID. The revised "Log Frame" is not included in this report, but has been forwarded to the Project Luru Manager and the USAID Project Officer under separate cover.

6. ANNUAL EVALUATION AND REPORTING FRAMEWORK

The final objective of this evaluation study is to set up a framework for evaluation which can be repeated on an annual basis by

Project Luwu staff, which will result in an annual report of the progress of the project and its impact on the Luwu area. In this regard, it should be noted that this is not a final evaluation but only the first of a series of annual evaluation reports.

All three phases of evaluation mentioned in the CAP were included in this study. The evaluation methodology was refined, a baseline study was conducted, and progress data was gathered and analyzed resulting in this report.

This evaluation study was conducted over the course of four months, from late August to early December 1979. All research and analysis was conducted in Palopo at the project headquarters, with one trip to Ujung Pandang to gather data not available in Palopo. It is hoped that this annual evaluation effort may be started soon after April of each year when annual government statistics become available at the beginning of each new 101 fiscal year. As the process becomes refined, the annual study should be able to be accomplished in one to two months.

This report begins with a general description of Project Luwu and an analysis of the project's organization. It then follows the basic outline of the Logical Framework Matrix. The project goal is first analyzed, using baseline data and benchmarks in comparison with progress data for the years since Project Luwu began, to estimate the attainment of the project's goals.

The geographic isolation of Luwu provided a tremendous opportunity to study the impact of the project. It is almost completely surrounded by mountains and sea with access only by two major roads to Palopo, or by sea through Palopo or Malili. With no other major development programs occurring in Luwu and few outside influences affecting the area, it provided a convenient "laboratory" for the study of the impacts of this multi-sectoral development project.

The project goal section is followed by an analysis of the project's inputs, outputs, and purpose. The final section of the report describes the methodology used for this evaluation study. Summaries of the data gathered for the goal analysis are annexed at the back of the report.

All data gathered during this evaluation effort are on file at the project headquarters in Palopo and are open to anyone wishing a more detailed understanding of the figures.

It is hoped that this report will be valuable to the Government of Indonesia and USAID in understanding the benefits of Project Luru as well as the problems which may be encountered in implementing a multi-sectoral development project.

III. S U M M A R Y

The Lusu Area and Transmigration Development Project is a complex multi-sectoral rural development project which coordinates the activities of four GOI ministries and five directorates, general or agencies, to create a development package in Lusu which would have a greater impact on the rural poor than if the activities were all implemented separately over various time periods.

Data indicates that Project Lusu is well on its way to attaining its goal of increasing the well being of the small farmer in Lusu. Almost all measures of goal achievement show quite positive trends, currently increasing at greater rates than during the baseline years, indicating that the project has had a significant positive impact on the Lusu area. The increasing growth rates of the measures of goal achievement in the project areas compared with the rather steady growth rates in areas with few project activities indicate that Project Lusu has been a major cause of the increased economic development seen in Lusu. The extremely high growth rates indicate that the multi-sectoral approach of the project has provided benefits to a wide range of the Lusu population, and these widespread benefits appear to have encouraged a great deal of spontaneous investment which has furthered Lusu's economic development. Major measures of goal achievement for Kabupaten Lusu show average annual growth rates since the benchmark year of 17.5% for food production, 18.6% for food exports, 12.5% for food consumption per capita, and 12.6% for net income per food farm person.

Although the impact of the project already appears to be substantial, records of project inputs show only 34% of total estimated Project costs disbursed as of March 31, 1979. By source of funds, 34% of GOI project costs (DIP Lusu) and 27% of foreign exchange costs had been disbursed, but only 1% of reimbursable rupiah costs prefinanced by GOI (DIP Supplement) were recorded disbursed. Because of contracting and design problems, project implementation is being spread over six years instead of the previously planned four years, but if the current rate of disbursement continues, the time frame of the project may well extend to eight years. The road improvement subproject which accounts for 38% of

project costs is the only subproject seriously behind schedule, with only 14% of its estimated project costs disbursed, due to delays in contract mobilization and redesign problems.

According to project records, the progress of project outputs is proceeding well, with the exception of the FCCs and road improvement activities which have both suffered from under planning and under budgeting. The FCC's facilities have had to be expanded more than ten times the original plan, and the road rehabilitation plan has had to be completely redefined. Both subprojects should be complete in 1983. The Transmission Subproject is now complete, and other subprojects are progressing close to schedule.

The project purpose, defined as the operation of ongoing planning, operations, and maintenance (FOM) programs for the subproject's development activities, appears to have a good probability of attainment for the FCC and RMC activities. The road and irrigation subprojects, with their high capital construction costs, will require fairly high FOM budgets. At the moment, it appears that the irrigation subproject will have available 77% of its estimated FOM budget needs, and the road subproject will have about 25% of its FOM budget needs available.

Project Lura has had a substantial positive impact on the Lura area despite the management difficulties it creates for a government which is organized along strong sectoral lines. Major management difficulties have been created by having one ministry coordinate the activities of other traditionally "equal" ministries, with its project headquarters in Lura where communications difficulties with Ujung Pandang and Jakarta are inherent.

An effective project coordination system has evolved however for the project through various GOI decrees and USAID letters of implementation which provide the Project Manager with several methods of project coordination, through the reimbursement process which require subprojects to keep the project manager up to date on the progress of subproject inputs and outputs, and through project coordination meetings and planning activities. The success of the project provides a good case for examining the GOI's multi-sectoral development efforts into

Other areas of Indonesia. Such future projects should be studied carefully to insure that the same positive impacts which have been found in Java can occur elsewhere as well.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The importance of completing all subproject activities cannot be overstressed, even if cost overruns are incurred. The evaluation data shows that benefits are already beginning to accrue through increased production, increased incomes, increased exports, and increased private investment in Luwu. In carrying the project this far, the expectations of the people in ^{the} area have risen, encouraging immigration and increased development activities. Gains already made must not be lost and the continuing positive growth trends must continue to be encouraged. The completion of all subprojects will allow both private sector and the government to ^{realize} returns on their investments, and will encourage more spontaneous private investment in the area.
2. Agricultural extensification has been a major factor in creating project benefits to date. Stress must now be laid on the proper management of agricultural intensification programs -- irrigation operations, agricultural extension services, and the provision of proper agricultural inputs. Continued increases in the growth of agricultural production will rely more and more on intensification activities as land clearing comes close to completion.
3. The management and flow of funds, particularly in regard to reimbursements and financial reporting has been difficult due to the complexity of the project, and it is recommended that a Coordinating Project Treasurer be appointed within the Directorate General of Budgets of the Ministry of Finance to handle all Project Luwu financial documents. This person would be responsible for processing all the subproject treasurers' monthly reports of expenditures accountability and requests for reimbursement and would forward them promptly to USAID, through the Directorate General of International Monetary Affairs, and to the Project Luwu Manager.
4. To speed the reimbursement process of the project, it is recommended that an appropriate office prepare a meeting to be attended by all project treasurers of the Luwu Subprojects as well as other representatives of the directorates general involved, in order to explain the procedures outlined in Ministry of Finance Decree No. 395/79 and

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USAID Letter of Implementation No. 11, and to duly charge the Treasurers with the responsibility of bringing requests for reimbursement and appropriate documentation up to date.

10/16/57

Subprojects Managers should submit accurate and complete output progress reports to the Project Manager, comparing in verifiable physical quantities the outputs completed to date with total planned outputs. Proper project output reports are essential to the project manager's efforts of project progress monitoring.

6. Subproject treasurers' reports to the Project Manager should include a complete analysis of fund expenditures, including DIP (budget) amounts received to date, amounts disbursed and "carried over", and records of disbursements by type of funds (DIP Murni or DIP Supplement) and by function. Only through proper monitoring of financial inputs of the project can future plans of expenditures be made.
7. All changes in the CAP regarding inputs and outputs should be documented by USAID, through letters, to project management. Although the CAP is not an official binding document, it is a basic reference document with which project monitoring and evaluation data is compared, and the project management should have access to references where changes have been made.
8. All subprojects should immediately prepare studies outlining their future FOM programs. These studies should include future programmed activities for operations and maintenance as well as continuing planning activities including organizational requirements, training needs, funding needs and funding sources. Conditions precedent already require the RECs and FCCs to submit their organizational structures for USAID approval, and operations and maintenance plans are required for all subprojects "when appropriate". Questions still remain, particularly regarding the REC and road improvement subprojects. It is still not known exactly what source will provide the REC's continuing FOM budget. The FOM program and budget for the road subproject is critical since it appears that the new road

will require a great deal of maintenance involving skilled maintenance workers and a high maintenance budget. The life expectancy of the new road is expected to be ten years, with resurfacing work required after about five years. Planning should start immediately to prepare an appropriate FCH program with the necessary budget so that it may be phased into operation as the road segments are completed.

9. It is recommended that other multi-sectoral development projects similar to Luru be implemented in other areas of Indonesia, in order to see if the successful impact of Project Luru may be replicated elsewhere. The data of this evaluation show that the integrated multi-sectoral development approach has been successful in Luru. The final test will come when the same approach is attempted in different areas with differing conditions. Strong evaluation components should be made a part of all new projects to ensure that their impacts are well understood.
10. The Project Luru Evaluation Program should be continued on an annual basis up to the project's completion so that the growth rates of the measures of goal achievement may be monitored over a longer time period, so that a fuller understanding of the project as completed may be possible.

Best Available Document

1979 Evaluation - Bula Integrated Area
Development Project

by

Dr. Raymond A. Bailey
Frank Stipak

June 22, 1979

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Philippines		B. Project Title Bula-Minalabac Integrated Area Development		C. Project Number 492-0310	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>78</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY <u>82</u>
E. Life of Project Funding 1. AID: (Loan or Grant) <u>3,000,000 (PES)</u> 2. Other Donor _____ 3. Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ <u>3,800,000 (PES)</u>			F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director (Acting) Dennis Barrett 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) Ralph Bird 3. Other _____		
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) _____ not stated 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) _____ not stated			H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) _____ Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) _____ not stated		
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date) not stated					

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title 1979 Evaluation Bula Integrated Area Development Project		B. Evaluation Date June 22, 1979	C. Type of Evaluation On going project	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation January 1978-June 1979
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire not stated a. travel _____ b. per diem _____ 2. Contract _____ Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation (SEE attached sheet)		G. Initiated By not stated
H. Evaluation Team Composition				
1. Direct Hire				
a. Name		b. Present Position		c. Area of Expertise
2. Contract:				
(SEE attached sheet)		a. Name of Organization (if any)		b. Contract No.
, c. Name(s) of Persons		d. Area(s) of Expertise		

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position)

Ralph Bird, engineer
Oscar Bermillo

Also, representatives from MAR and
Project Management Office

P/E: 8/80

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____

Typed Name _____

Position _____

Date _____

F. Purpose: "The primary purposes of the evaluation were to (1) determine whether the broader project design is valid or requires modification and (2) analyze and document accomplishments and problem areas and recommend courses of action and realistic time frames. The evaluation was based upon a review of background documents, reports and communications, observations at the project construction site and personal interviews with relevant personnel."

H. Evaluation Team:

Raymond A. Bailey, PhD, is a senior member of the Public Administration Service (PAS) Washington headquarters staff and has broad experience in Asian rural development program implementation.

Frank Stipak is a registered professional engineer #8343, State of California, and is a PAS Senior Consulcant with extensive US. Bureau of Reclamation and international experience in irrigation engineering and water resource development and management.

Bicol River Basin Development Program (BRBDP): Patermucio Calleja and Fernando Alcisto, Jr., Project Coordinators. Francisco Balitaan, evaluation specialist...

SUMMARY

Construction progress for Phase I has been seriously impeded by duplicative administrative procedures in reviewing and signing construction contracts and by delays in funding, i.e., in allotments and the issuance of cash disbursement ceilings (CDC). If the flow of funds is adequate, construction of all phases can be finished by the scheduled completion date (September 30, 1981). Design and construction procedures now being followed will provide facilities adequate to permit long-range irrigation and drainage of the service area.

The organizational structure and staff composition of the Project Management Office (PMO) are adequate to meet current project needs and, with support by an active policy level Composite Management Group (CMG), excellent line agency cooperation has been achieved. The full complement of interagency personnel assigned to the project is successfully implementing all institutional project components. It can be accelerated as construction progresses. As construction and institutional activities are accelerated in 1980, additional supervisory and extension staff may be required.

14. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

This evaluation was conducted by a joint GOP-U.S. interagency team, consisting of representatives of ERBDPO and USAID contractors. The Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) and the PMO provided associate members, Raymond A. Bailey and Frank Stipak were employed by USAID under short-term contract with Public Administration Service to serve as outside members of the joint team and have been primarily responsible for writing the Evaluation Report and drafting this Project Evaluation Summary (PES). In this effort, they have been ably assisted by other members of the team, in particular by Paternuncio Calleja and Fernando Alsisto, Jr., ERBDPO Project Coordinators, and Francisco Balitaan, contract ERBDPO evaluation specialist. No representative was assigned by NEDA.

The primary purposes of the evaluation were to (1) determine whether the broader project design is valid or requires modification and (2) analyze and document accomplishments and problem areas and recommend courses of action with realistic time-frames. The evaluation was based upon a review of background documents, reports and other written communications, observations at the project construction site and personal interviews with relevant personnel.

15. EXTERNAL FACTORS

A subsequent Presidential Directive requiring prior approval by the Presidential Review Committee for contracts in excess of ₱2,000,000 imposed unanticipated delays in contracting for construction of facilities.

One logframe assumption for achieving project purpose, i.e., "The Bicol Secondary and Feeder Roads Project will provide improved all-weather main road access into the entire project area by the end of CY 1979, "will probably not be met before the end of CY 1980. It is recommended that priority in the Bicol Roads Project be given to early completion of the

Santo Domingo-San Ramon feeder roads, servicing the first phases of the Bula IAD II Project of which a 200-meter section is impassable during the rainy season.

16. INPUTS

Scheduled construction activities were not underway because of delays in signing contracts. Delayed release of funds, materials and fuel have caused some work stoppages. Procedures and priorities are needed to insure availability and timely delivery.

17. OUTPUTS

Progress toward attainment of logframe output targets is approximately one year behind schedule, due in some part to delays in fund releases (Assumption C-4-a-6), but primarily due to long delays (as much as 12 months) in the evaluation and award of construction contracts. Contract A&E design work, training programs, land consolidation, institutional development, and force account construction are all progressing as rapidly as physical construction constraints will permit. Outputs accomplished to date do not require modification.

18. PURPOSE

Detailed discussion and quantification of progress toward attainment of End of Project Status is not pertinent at this time in that none of the project area has yet come under the new irrigation system. However, progress in organizational development and training, and in tenurial development in the Phase I Barangays of San Ramon and San Agustin indicate that the set of EOPS conditions is a valid and realistic description of what will exist when the project is completed. A caveat, however: the time-frame is valid only if no further delays occur in contracting and completion of physical construction.

19. GOAL/SUBGOAL

Goal: "To improve the socio-economic situation and the quality of life of the rural poor residing in the project area." Evaluation is not pertinent at this early stage of project implementation.

20. BENEFICIARIES

At this time, serious discussion of impacts is not pertinent. It might be noted that some short term inconveniences have been caused by some construction activities. Generally, beneficiary participation has been active to date in household relocation, institutional development, and training activities.

21. UNPLANNED EFFECTS

One unplanned but desirable effect was reported by private sector members at the regional wrap-up meeting of the project Composite Management Group. That is a growing awareness elsewhere in the region of the project area activities, and interest in the possibility of access to similar opportunities. Particular reference was made to interest in homesite development on the project model.

LESSONS LEARNED

The primary lesson learned to date is that decentralization of central governmental agency authority to the regional and local levels is not easily accomplished. However, as in other Bicol IAD projects, the increased effort required to secure decentralization will pay off in terms of broader participation by different line agencies, local government and local institutions.

23. SPECIAL COMMENTS

Additional details are included in the evaluation team report dated June 23, 1979 (10 pages, 2 tables).

1979 Evaluation Libmanan Cabusa IADI Project

by

Dr. Raymond A. Bailey
Frank Stipak

August, 1979

IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Philippines	B. Project Title Libmanan-Cabusao Integrated Area Development	C. Project Number 492-0275	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>76</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY <u>80</u>
E. Life of Project Funding 1. AID: (Loan or Grant) <u>3,500,000 (PES)</u> 2. Other Donor _____ 3. Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ <u>8,500,000 (PES)</u>		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director (Acting) Dennis Barrett 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) David Smith (PES) 3. Other _____	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) not stated 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not stated		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) Bicol River Basin Development Program Office National Irrigation Administration (NIA) 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not stated	
I. Previous Evaluation (Include Title, Type and Date) "two part joint GOP-US evaluation team report" June 22, 1979 May 1978 (see page 7 of report) 1977 special evaluation (see page 16 of report) Gerald Hickey, Robert Flammang, ASIA/TR/SHRD (AID/W), April 1979, one of six projects evaluated			

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title 1979 Evaluation: Libmanan Cabusao IADI Project	B. Evaluation Date August 1979	C. Type of Evaluation on going project	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation June 1978-June 1979
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire not stated a. travel _____ b. per diem _____ 2. Contract _____ Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____	F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation (SEE attached sheet)		G. Initiated By not stated
H. Evaluation Team Composition 1. Direct Hire a. Name _____ b. Present Position _____ c. Area of Expertise _____ 2. Contract: a. Name of Organization (if any) _____ b. Contract No. _____ c. Name(s) of Persons _____ d. Area(s) of Expertise _____ (SEE attached sheet)			

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position) Ralph Bird, Oscar Bermillo (USAID/Naga), Keith Long, consultant. Also Ramon Caceres, engineer, project manager; Guillermo Rinosa, (National Irrigation Administration)(NIA). Paternucio Calleja (BRBDP); Orlando Olano and Feliciano Berdin of the PMO E: B/80	J. Evaluation Coordinator Signature _____ Typed Name _____ Position _____ Date _____
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F. Purpose: "The primary purposes of the evaluation were to (1) determine whether the broader project design is valid or requires modification and (2) analyze and document accomplishments and problem areas and recommend courses of action and realistic time frames. The evaluation was based upon a review of background documents, reports and communications, observations at the project construction site and personal interviews with relevant personnel."

H. Evaluation Team:

BRBDP:

Francisco Balitaan
Fernando Alcisto, Jr.
Francisco Vargas, Jr., engineer

Public Administration Service: (main authors)

Frank Stipak, Registered Professional Engineer #8343, California, is a PAS Senior Consultant with extensive U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and international experience in irrigation engineering and water resource development and management.

Raymond A. Bailey, is a senior member of the Public Administration Service Washington headquarters staff and has broad experience in Asian rural development program implementation.

13. SUMMARY

There have been further delays in construction of the physical facilities since the last evaluation (May 1978) due to heavy rains, including typhoons, as well as lack of adequate equipment and occasional shortages of cement and fuel. The physical facilities, with changes as jointly recommended herein, are adequate to provide long-term irrigation, drainage and tidal flood protection to the service area. Under a revised construction schedule which appears attainable, facilities should be completed and operational by June 30, 1980. If further delays in completion become evident by February 1980, extension of the terminal dates of request for reimbursement should be requested by the GOP and USAID.

In implementation of the organizational/institutional/training components, previous differences between the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) and the Bicol River Basin Development Program Office (BRBDPO) have been resolved, and an effective project coordination/management structure is now in place. Some difficulties remain in defining specialist and extension personnel needs and in attaining full interagency participation in staffing, but these are apparently moving toward resolution. Structural organization of farmers groups has been largely completed, but substantial work is still required to adequately prepare farmers system operation and management responsibilities.

The NIA is placing higher priority on support and development of the institutional component and is now, at the start of the final year before scheduled water delivery, finalizing the detailed implementation plan for completion of this component. The plan includes definition and scheduling of required interagency staff, the finalization of a water management plan, a water rate schedule, and a phased five-year schedule for system turnover to farmers.

It was the consensus of participants in this evaluation that it adequately reviewed the project's status and progress since the last evaluation. It reconfirmed the existence of unified project policy and direction and facilitated timely, substantive project decisions.

14. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

This evaluation was conducted by a joint GOP-U.S. interagency team, consisting of representatives of the BRBDPO and USAID (by contract). Raymond A. Bailey and Frank Stipak were employed by USAID under contract with Public Administration Service to serve as outside members of the joint team and have been primarily responsible for writing the Evaluation Report and Project Evaluation Summary. In this effort, they have been ably assisted by other members of the team, in particular by Fernando Alsisto, Jr., Francisco Vargas, and Francisco Balitsan (contract) of the BRBDPO. The NIA Office of Special Projects (CSP) Manila and the Project Management Office at Libmanan provided associate team members. No representative was assigned by NEDA.

The primary purposes of the evaluation were to (1) determine whether the broader project design is valid or requires modification and (2) analyze and

Subgoal: "Increased rice productivity per hectare."

Progress toward goal and subgoal achievement cannot begin to be objectively measured until the project has been in operation for at least one year. Assuming construction is completed in June 1980, the first field impact evaluation should be scheduled for June 1981 (or June 1982). This project is also included as a pilot impact evaluation effort under the USAID-supported Economic and Social Impact Analysis/Women in Development (ESIA/WID) Project under NEDA.

and baseline data re. very p. 11-12

20. BENEFICIARIES

Preliminary data indicate that the number of households will prove to be slightly lower, and the average size of landholding larger, than originally estimated. This is possibly due to the common practice in which elderly parents hold title to all of the land worked by the families of their sons and daughters. This then appears to be the single, large landholding of one household. The true number of beneficiary families should be clarified when complete beneficiary data become available.

21. UNPLANNED EFFECTS

Beyond the unplanned effects discussed in previous evaluations, certain adverse (as well as positive) effects were noted in an April 9 summary report^{1/} from interviews with selected farmers in the project area. Five farmers indicated adverse design/construction side effects including local interference with drainage, loss of existing (Handong system) irrigation water, and loss of land to road and canal construction. This evaluation team observes that the incidence of such side effects is small relative to the total population of the area. They are mainly to be of short-term nature, but appear persistent because of repeated construction delays. Most are scheduled for correction once the system is completed and tested.

22. LESSONS LEARNED

Lessons reported in previous evaluations regarding the difficulty of developing and installing regional level organizational structures and management systems for attaining full interagency coordination and participation have been reconfirmed. The increased effort, however, pays in terms of broader participation by different line agencies, local government and local institutions.

The difficulties experienced in excavating the deep excavation sections of the main canal have simply demonstrated the need for adequate pre-construction planning and field data such as topography, horizontal and vertical control and sub-surface explorations.

23. SPECIAL COMMENTS AND REMARKS

Additional details are included in a two-part joint GOP-U.S. evaluation team report dated June 22, 1979.

- I. Evaluation of Physical Facilities (13 pages and 4 figures)
- II. Organization, Management and Operating Systems (12 pages)

^{1/} Gerald C. Hickey and Robert H. Flammang, ASIA/TR/SERD (AID/W), April 1979.

BICOL BIENNIAL EVALUATION
Bicol River Basin Development Program

GOP/BRBDP-USAID

August 1979

Manila, Philippines

FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Philippines	B. Project Title Bicol Integrated Rural Development Project	C. Project Number 492-0303	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>not stated</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY _____
E. Life of Project Funding 1. AID: (Loan or Grant) per PIO <u>126.7 million</u> Other Donor _____ Host Country Counterpart Funds <u>155.6 million</u> TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director _____ 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) <u>Camilo Balisnomo, program director</u> 3. Other _____	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) <u>not stated</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) <u>not stated</u>		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) <u>National Council on Integrated Area Development (NACIAD)</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) <u>not stated</u>	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date) <u>1975, 1977 evaluations</u>			

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title <u>Bicol Biennial Evaluation:</u> <u>Bicol River Basin Development Program</u>	B. Evaluation Date <u>August 1979</u>	C. Type of Evaluation <u>Biennial</u>	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation <u>"Now in its sixth year."</u> <u>(SEE ATTACHMENT F 1974-1977)</u>
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire a. travel <u>6,420</u> per diem <u>4,260</u> Contract <u>31,710</u> 3. Other <u>1,610</u> TOTAL \$ <u>44,000</u> <u>per contract sheet</u>	F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation <u>(SEE attached sheet)</u>		G. Initiated By <u>not stated</u>

H. Evaluation Team Composition

1. Direct Hire		
a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise

2. Contract:		
a. Name of Organization (if any)	b. Contract No.	
<u>(SEE attached sheet)</u>		
c. Name(s) of Persons	d. Area(s) of Expertise	

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position)
 Teodoro Encarnacion, Deputy Minister, MPW;
 Eduardo Corpuz, Assistant Director, NEDA;
 Francisco Balitaan, BRBDPO Evaluation Specialist.

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____

Typed Name _____

Position _____

Date _____

F. Purpose: "This evaluation differed from its predecessors by concentrating on the broader Bicol River Basin Development Program now in its sixth year, as well as the supporting USAID grant technical assistance project." Consonant with the project's evolution, it covers program direction; agribusiness promotion; management, research and training; and organization, administration and staffing.

H. Evaluation Team Composition: Contract Consultants

U.S. Members:

Dr. Thomas T. Weaver, agricultural development, Univ. of Rhode Island
Dr. Gerald C. Wheelock, rural sociologist, Alabama A & M University
Dr. James A. Roumasset, economist, University of Hawaii

G.O.P. members:

Dr. Gelia T. Castillo (UPLB), rural sociologist
Mr. Joaquin P. Cortez III, Planning Consultant, M.S. in urban and regional planning.
Mr. Rolando Tungpalan, NEDA, A.B., economics
Mr. Danilo Alcantara, NCIAD, A.B. mass communications

I SUMMARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Bicol River Basin Development Program (BRBDP) was last evaluated by a joint GOP/U.S. team in 1977. It was also evaluated in 1975. The following report presents the findings of a follow-on 1979 evaluation by a joint GOP/U.S. sponsored team conducted over a period of six weeks. The evaluation team members reviewed project documents, visited the three-province Bicol Program area including individual project sites, and drove down many of the new project roads. Trips were made as far as the Irosin Valley in Sorsogon in search of information and confirmation of concepts. The team interviewed numerous participants and officials in both Manila and the Bicol. This evaluation differed from its predecessors by concentrating on the broader Bicol River Basin Development Program now in its sixth year as well as the supporting USAID grant technical assistance project.

Summary Findings

The team assessment of the joint Bicol Integrated Rural Development Project (Bicol IRD), indicated that it has been successful in providing selected U.S. and Filipino technical consultants, participant training to the U.S. and other Asian countries, and a moderate level of essential commodities (see Attachment F). The emphasis is now shifting from project planning/packaging to technical assistance in support of the implementation of the five on-going Bicol loan projects assisted by AID, agribusiness and rural industry promotion and project monitoring and evaluation activities. Activities are also proposed to facilitate spread effects from the Bicol Program to other IAD efforts in the Philippines.

As detailed in the main body of the report and its attachments, after originally attempting a comprehensive approach to regional development, the operations of the Bicol Program now focus on a package approach to development. In this approach, critical development bottlenecks in an area are identified, taking into account the expressed needs of the local population together with some knowledge of the available resources in the area. The identified bottlenecks are used to pinpoint a complementary set of component projects. The team found that this practice of packaging integrated component projects is fundamentally sound. It has been successful in attracting funding by external sources (see Attachment E). It can be further strengthened in a number of ways, and the team developed a number of recommendations which are presented in this report.

The evaluation team found that decentralization of appropriate planning, coordination and policy-making activity to the regional and sub-regional levels has been effective. When decentralization of the appropriate functions has been employed, local government and popular participation in the planning process is encouraged, Bicol Program Office staff are more productive, and the problem-solving capability of the Bicol Program is enhanced. The reverse is true under a more centralized process.

At the present stage of evolution of the Bicol Program, it would be premature to recommend transfer of the entire concept to other regions or sub-regions. Nevertheless, the potential for replicating the package planning and action strategies is immediate. However to achieve that potential, it seems necessary to fully operationalize the concept of decentralized planning and implementation.

In sum, the overall picture of the Bicol Program test case in Integrated Area Development is mixed. The evaluation two years ago saw reason for considerable optimism primarily on the basis of the Bicol River Basin Development Program Office (BRBDPO) having effectively planned and coordinated a variety of component projects. The promise of two years ago has not yet been achieved. In the interim, changes in personnel and operational approach have tended to mute the full BRBDPO coordinating and planning capacity. New projects recently funded will place pressure on training less experienced BRBDPO staff, and the momentum from yeoman efforts in earlier years may bring yet more projects to the Basin. The brief inspection of individual projects already underway suggests second generation problems ahead that will need priority attention. The very success in designing and funding projects seems to divert attention away from other key development problems which need to be solved if the benefits, particularly from irrigation projects, are to be achieved.

The evaluation team wishes the staff of the BRBDPO every possible success. They are engaged in a very crucial program. The nation is looking to it for guidance. It should not be allowed to be crushed on the rocks by its own momentum.

Recommendations

The main body of the report and its attachments develop a number of recommendations. These are presented here in summary form under the headings of (A) program direction, (B) agribusiness promotion, (C) management, research and training, and (D) organization, administration and staffing.

A. Program Direction

The focus on infrastructure development was an appropriate choice for the first generation of projects in the case of Bicol River Basin. In the first stage, the key was to get the integrated rural development apparatus moving and to achieve some initial successes and impacts. This is still true for project areas outside the physical river basin. The evaluation team feels that for the second generation of projects the focus should be somewhat different and perhaps slightly more narrow. In particular, the area of resource management, broadly understood, would appear to be a strong potential comparative advantage for the Bicol Program. Management of river basin resources includes hydroecology planning, agro-forestation, and water management. The resource management concept should also be extended to include coastal zone resource management and to the design and implementation of cropping systems for smallholders in the non-irrigated areas (e.g., the development and extension of a simple cover crop for coconut areas). Specifically, the team makes the following recommendations:

1. New component projects should be designed and existing plans reviewed in accordance with the principle of providing projects with the least disturbance to the physical-social-economic environment in place. In construction, this means investigating projects with lower capital-intensity. In institutional design, this means building on the strength of existing organizations and contractual arrangements rather than replacing them with fashionable, but unproven, systems imported from Manila or other countries.

2. Second generation projects in the Bicol Program area should include:

- a. agro-forestation
- b. coastal zone management
- c. perennial cropping systems for smallholders
- d. annual mixed cropping systems

Pilot efforts should be continued or initiated now in these areas to provide information and direction for future planning.

B. Agribusiness Promotion

In addition to BRBDPO resources, the Bicol IRD grant project provides resources for BRBDPO, NEDA Regional Office, and concerned line agencies to develop a collective regional agribusiness and rural-based industry strategy and action program to further stimulate a significant increase in private sector investment. Regarding the on-going agribusiness and rural industry promotion effort, the evaluation team makes the following recommendations:

1. Preliminary Bicol Program investment promotion activities have been largely concentrated on the preparation and promotion of pre-feasibility studies on agribusiness and/or agro-industrial projects. Considering that a rational investor will somehow have to undertake an investigation of the project using his own set of assumptions and policies, we believe that this activity is largely unnecessary. Instead, general area profiles depicting the available and abundant resources and business opportunities in the region may be prepared and widely disseminated. The preparation of brochures as general investment guides for interested investors now underway may prove to be more useful.
2. In the area of agribusiness promotion, the efforts of the BRBDPO can only complement the efforts of the private sector. With this in mind, the agribusiness program should focus on areas where private investment may be inhibited because of difficulties in obtaining the necessary information, designing and enforcing contracts, or coordinating investment efforts across enterprises and investors.
3. Recently, the agribusiness staff of the BRBDPO was chosen to serve as the technical secretariat to the Regional Council of Small and Medium Industries (RCSMI). We believe that with the full support of the BRBDPO, the RCSMI could effectively function as a strong coordinating body for private investment promotion and acceleration in the region.

C. Management, Research and Training

Some of the project designs appeared to be affected by engineering and planner bias. In particular, the Libmanan-Cabusao and Bula projects may have been unnecessarily sophisticated. In the future, it may be advisable to more thoroughly investigate cost-saving alternatives which deliver most of the benefits of the original design. Similarly, one should not overload projects with excess institutional baggage. Rather, one should build on the strengths of existing voluntary organizations and contractual arrangements.

The methods of data collection, project selection and monitoring should be streamlined so as to conform with the package approach. A comprehensive survey of the current economic situation is unnecessary, and studies which fully isolate the impacts of projects are impossible. Instead, more intensive data collection efforts are needed in the critical areas where Bicol Program intends to concentrate its efforts. Thus, for example, if irrigation is to be the focus, improved topological maps, hydrological information, and weather statistics should be made available. Similarly, the goals of project evaluation should be more modest. It is important to monitor the more narrow objectives of the projects in terms of the actual operations and in terms of directly related economic activity (e.g., cropping patterns, inputs and yields).

Another potential comparative advantage of the Bicol Program lies in research and extension. In this context, applied research is needed not only to develop appropriate production techniques, but to develop appropriate systems of resource management and appropriate modification of existing institutional structures. Extension is likewise understood to include the implementation of similar management systems and institutional adjustments. An independent center of research and extension activities should be built-up around the consortium of agencies concerned with agricultural research and the complex of research facilities, under the auspices of PCARR, at CSAC and BPI experiment station.^{1/} The proposed research group would be of additional utility at the planning and feasibility stages of project packaging. The following specific recommendations are developed in the text of the report:

1. Field trials should be continued in all IAD project areas by the line agencies concerned under the general coordination of the Bicol Agriculture and Resources Research Consortium and BRBDPO. Such trials should be used to establish the appropriate farm practices which ought to be adopted by farmers given current technology. Further, this effort should be coordinated with evaluation activities, e.g., BAEcon data generation and BRBDPO Farm Records Project for feedback to, and action decisions by, the Composite Management Groups (CMG's) and the Project Management Offices (PMO's) of the respective IAD (component) projects. Much of the machinery for this applied research is already in place. What is needed is the capacity to analyze this data with updated economic methods (incorporating stochastic weather variables and individualized shadow prices of labor and credit).
2. Immediate analysis should be carried out by the appropriate agencies to consolidate all available rice yield data from the region so as to establish reliable statistics on:
 - a. irrigated dry and wet season yields
 - b. rainfed dry and wet season yields

These data should be analyzed with respect to:

- a. variability within agro-climatic areas in the Bicol
- b. variability between years within agro-climatic areas

^{1/} Philippine Council for Agricultural Resources and Research (PCARR); Camarines Sur Agricultural College (CSAC); and Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI). All are located in the vicinity of BRBDPO.

- c. the potential of output growth based on increased inputs of irrigation, fertilizer, insecticides, and other indigenous, but potentially productive cultural practices. In addition to existing line agency and BREDPO staff, highly experienced, senior Filipino consultants should be considered for funding under the Bicol IRD Project.
3. An expert hydrologist should be employed to do follow-up investigation on the soundness of assumptions incorporated in the basic project design, particularly for the lower basin. Adjustments could then be made to the benefit of the farmers who will benefit from the projects and who are being asked to pay for the projects through irrigation fees. The evaluation team understands that hydrologic data collection and analysis as well as the publishing of the results for the complete Bicol River Basin are scheduled to be upgraded. This is essential. The National Water Resources Council (NWRC) can play an active role.
4. U.S. and Filipino water management consultants with proven expertise in rice irrigation and in supplemental irrigation systems should be employed by early 1980. Such consultants would work with technicians of participating line agencies particularly NIA and the Bicol Agriculture and Resources Research Consortium to advise on and monitor the process of the irrigation systems. This would include establishing appropriate soil and water use management needed to gauge the efficiency of the systems.
5. Workshops should be held for project managers and staff and Bicol Program staff on irrigation rotational systems already in place elsewhere in the country, so that experience gained in these systems can be available to the Bicol. Proposed operational training (AID-supported) in another Asian country for the senior staff who will operate the major systems and local line agency staff would also be valuable.
6. Considering all the complexities, controversies and issues associated with rotational irrigation, the viability of irrigation associations, compact farms and Samahang Nayons, the design for institutional development deserves a serious second look before system-wide efforts to implement it get underway. The present design might have to be treated with less sanguinity that is now presently held.
7. Present national policy on irrigation repayment calls for repayment to cover capital expenses and operation and maintenance costs. A fundamental ambiguity in the policy exists, however, according to which farmers who are unable to pay will not be forced to. This introduces a great deal of discretion into the collection procedure. This ambiguity should leave room for the Bicol projects to experiment with a system under which farmers pay proportionately to potential benefits that could be received from irrigation. Potential benefits would be assessed independently for various classes of farmers according to topography, access to and reliability of the water, and economic characteristics of the farm family.

8. There should be a close examination of the land consolidation in the Bula IAD Project with a view to assessing the merits and demerits and the rationale of the entire approach. If land consolidation appears to place unnecessary burdens on many farmers, then the system should be redesigned rather than continue a commitment to a "pilot project."
9. BRBDPO participation in the Bicol Agriculture and Resources Research Consortium (BARRC) should be considered a priority activity as part of research coordination and a monitoring requirement for BRBDPO operations. Similarly, the BRBDPO should become intimately involved with the Soil and Water Management Research and Training Center. This should serve as a means of directing research efforts into problems encountered in project areas and in supplying a source of research results to BRBDPO planning staff and BRBDPO project coordinators. The BRBDPO should strongly support the involvement of UPLB, IRRI, PCARR, BAEcon, NIA, FSDC, MLGCD and others in the Basin research program, through the Soil and Water Management and Research and Training Center.

D. Organization, Administration and Staffing

Based on extensive interviews, current operations of the BRBDPO appear to be unsettled and currently lack sufficient decentralization. In order to decentralize the planning and implementation of projects, the BRBCC should be re-established as the primary policy-making body. Increased funding and contracting authority for projects should be decentralized at the regional level (to project directors). The latter can be accomplished by giving the line agencies more autonomy and by relying more heavily on provincial and municipal offices as implementing bodies. Linkage to the ministerial levels to solve operational problems should be strengthened.

The evaluation team also feels that rebuilding the planning staff of the BRBDPO should be a priority activity. This restaffing should be carried out with a view to assembling the particular expertise required for the identified comparative advantage of the Bicol Program. Specific recommendations in the report include the following:

1. A permanent program director should carefully be selected and appointed following the guidelines of Presidential Decree 926.
2. Appropriate authority should be redelegated to deputy directors and decentralized within the Program Office itself, so that Bicol Program activities can be raised to the increased level of activity required by the increasing demands of accelerated project development, coordinated implementation, and monitoring/evaluation.
3. The role of the BRBCC as a coordinating and policy-making body should be fully restored. As the functions of the BRBCC are restricted, there is in turn less reason for the existence of a BRBDPO.
4. Restaffing should be carried out with a view to assembling the particular expertise that will be required for planning projects such as agro-forestation and mixed fishing/farming (as discussed above) which are within the identified comparative advantage of Bicol Program.

5. Full staffing of the planning section of the BRBDPO must proceed on a priority basis. A high level of capability is essential for planning second generation projects and for technically supervising and assessing the increased level of contractor documents and performance.
6. The BRBDPO should sponsor and coordinate seminar/workshops for BRBDPO professional staff and for the personnel of cooperating agencies to update them on latest research findings and other developments relevant to their planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluating functions. Such interagency meetings would provide a mechanism for discussion of project ideas and plans.
7. The BRBDPO should give all staff members the opportunity to visit and possibly work at project sites to gain first hand familiarity with operations.
8. A special depository for important Bicol Program documents be created to complement existing library facilities. Particular attention should be given to such things as maps and plans. Current maps should be made available to all participating agencies on a cost basis. A special index of all materials should be produced by the BRBDPO for public access.
9. The BRBDPO and national line agencies (with USAID assistance for other Asian countries and U.S. when appropriate) should invest in the training and general upgrading of line agency technical staff capabilities in agriculture and water resources development and related areas, because, in the ultimate analysis, project implementation and farmer support are their responsibility.
10. Although active and quite effective to date, BRBDPO publicity efforts should be carefully designed and monitored to insure accuracy. Misunderstanding and unduly elevated expectations only add confusion and frustration. An updated, accurate, rhetoric-free framework plan capturing the essence of the Bicol Program would be an appropriate public information document.
11. A professional technical level document should be prepared and published on the Bicol Program and the component projects for distribution to Philippine institutions and professionals as well as international professionals involved in integrated area development.
12. In collaboration with NACIAD and NEDA technical staff, the BRBDP monitoring and coordination system for implementing projects should consider installing on an as-needed basis, a formal "special action report" system as backup documentation for the informal action reporting system, through both the lead-line agency MIS and through the Bicol Program vertical MIS. Additionally, the BRBDPO should consider implementing monthly summary progress reporting to the PAC, BRBCC, NACIAD and funding agencies. The exception reports should summarize the "Special Action Reports." The more detailed project status reports currently produced would be submitted quarterly or semi-annually.
13. It is suggested that a Management Committee be established under NACIAD, composed of the deputy or assistant ministers or assistant secretaries

of member agencies and the directors of all on-going major Integrated Area Development (IAD) programs/projects. It would likely be chaired by the chief operating officer of the council.

II EARLIER DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS IN THE BICOL REGION

Prior to the 1973 formation of the national ministerial level Bicol River Basin Council (BRBC) and the Bicol River Basin Development Program (BRBDP), there were some significant development efforts in the Bicol Region.

In 1959, confronted with the problem of credit collection, Jose C. Morano, then Regional Accountant of the Agricultural Credit Administration, developed a concept of compact farms and tried to concretize those in Borongborongan, Minalabac (Camarines Sur). The project, because of some difficulties, did not materialize. However, much later, Morano, who had now reinforced the compact farm concept with inspiration from the Israeli moshav-type of farm cooperative, reintroduced his ideas in an irrigated area in Inginan, Minalabac. This compact farm gave stress to production-marketing linkages.

That same year (1959), the Nueva Caceres Archdiocesan Secretariat for Social Action (ASSA) headed by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez held a Congress at the Ateneo de Naga, to generate self-reliance among the parochial populations by lessening the farmer's stifling overdependence on the government for social upliftment. The Secretariat with the technical help of local bankers and businessmen evolved the concept of joint liability for production credit in compact farm units.

In July 1965, the Bicol Planning and Development Board (BPDB) was created by the President of the Republic under Executive Order 159. This was subsequently followed by Republic Act No. 4690 (C.1966) establishing the Bicol Development Company (BIDECO) which aimed to "promote the balanced and accelerated growth of the Bicol Region within the context of national plans and policies for social and economic development through the leadership, guidance and support of the government." The BIDECO appears to have almost petered out of existence without any sign of accomplishment, while the BPDB among other things, was able to conduct a survey of the resources of the Bicol Region as a foundation for the preparation of a regional development plan. Many of the plans and some of the personnel of the BPDB were absorbed by the BRBDPO and by the regional office of NEDA.

In early 1970, the Archdiocesan Secretariat for Social Action collaborated with Morano in developing compact farms in Inginan partly following the concept which involves grouping adjacent neighbors together and making them jointly liable for their production loans. About ten groups were initially formed.

In October 1970, Typhoon Sining swept over the Bicol Region causing massive destruction to both life and property. Modest developments in compact farming in Inginan were overturned.

In light of this calamity, concerned citizens in Camarines Sur, banded together under the leadership of the Archbishop, carried out rehabilitation work by means of the Food for Work Program with the Catholic Relief Services. Compact farms were also formed in Buhi, Naga, Bula, Pili, and Goa in Camarines Sur Province with the rural banking institutions giving massive capital support, an event unprecedented in the country's banking history.

Meanwhile, Bicol leaders set a series of conferences in Naga with representatives from the National Economic Council (now the National Economic and Development Authority), the Engineering Corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the United States Agency for International Development to solicit support for compact farm projects. Subsequently, in a meeting conducted in Manila, Secretary of Agriculture Arturo R. Tanco, Jr. and then Public Works Secretary David M. Consunji gave assurances of government support. An Interagency Bicol River Basin Team headed by Dr. Ramon Nasol, Dean of the Center for Regional Studies at University of the Philippines in Los Banos, was formed to study the problems of Bicol and submit appropriate recommendations. USAID assistance was led by Douglas Tinsler with the support of Frank Sheppard, USAID/Ag and Director Thomas Niblock. By September 1972 the study, Report on the Province of Camarines Sur and Lower Bicol River Basin, popularly known as the "Green Book," was submitted. This study was further refined by the GOP and presented by Secretary Tanco before the Consultative Group in Paris in October 1972. USAID signified interest in funding Bicol grant technical support and capital loan projects adopting the Integrated Area Development (IAD) approach to rural development.

An expanded study was drawn up in February 1973 by fifty technical personnel representing fifteen national and Bicol Region agencies and a private consulting firm. This study was supported by USAID. The output, Bicol River Basin Development Program, Framework Plan, was to be popularly known as the "Blue Book."

III THE BRBDP DEVELOPMENT MODEL - ITS ORGANIZATIONAL EVOLUTION AND LESSONS

Given the nature of the organization of the various offices of government, the following constraints and problems to effective development administration had been identified by 1973:

1. the difficulty encountered by line agencies in planning and implementing projects aimed to spur development which is multi-dimensional in concept within a defined action area and area of influence;
2. the difficulty encountered by a line agency involved in a project where the synchronized inputs from other line agencies are necessary for the completion of the total project package; and
3. the lack of local perceptions and area specific data (e.g., agro-climatic, hydrological, etc.) used for problem definition and identification that could eventually influence project development.

In response to these constraints and problems, the primarily national level Bicol River Basin Council (BRBC) was created under Executive Order 412. Its main role was to provide coordinated leadership and rational direction to the developmental undertakings within the Bicol River Basin by supporting plans and feasibility studies for domestic and foreign financing. The Bicol River Basin Council (BRBC) constituted a Board of Directors with eight (8) members. The Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communication (David M. Consunji) was Chairman with the following members: Director General, NEDA; Secretary, DOA; Secretary, DLGCD; Secretary, DAR; Secretary, DNR; Governor, Camarines Sur; and Executive Director, BRBC-Program Office.

A Program Office was constituted with an Executive Director, a Deputy Director-Physical Infrastructure Department (PID), a Deputy Director-Plans and Program Department (PPD), Deputy Director-Social Infrastructure Department (SID), and a Deputy Director-Administrative and Finance Department (AFD).

The BRBC was not able to effectively overcome the constraints because of (1) a heavily centralized planning and decision-making process, (2) lack of technical personnel, and (3) budgetary constraints.

1. Centralized Planning and Decision-making Process

Despite the formation of a field office (Program Office), the power and authority to negotiate and pay technical contracts, hire and organize staff, and make fund releases were vested in (1) the Program Chairman, (2) the technical staff in the Office of the BRBC Chairman, and (3) the Operations Coordinator. As a result of the more centralized nature of management and planning (albeit effective up to a point) and due to the lack of an approved functional delineation between the office of the chairman and the Program Office for the operation of the program, much friction ensued between the decentralized Program Office and the Office of the BRBC Chairman.

2. Lack of Technical Personnel

The Bicol Program Office had to draw key personnel from the regional offices of the Department (now Ministry) of Agrarian Reform, the National Irrigation Administration and the University of Nueva Caceres. There were people recruited from the respective service-connected agencies. The three deputies, SID, PID, and AFD, were concurrently Regional Directors for DAR and NIA and the Chief Accountant of NEDA. The unsatisfactory personnel situation had been partly caused by the centralized structure whereby decisions on recruitment was a Manila Office prerogative. On the other hand, many competent, short-term people were assigned to assist the Bicol Program in the early years. Many continued with the program which constituted a competent core group.

3. Budgetary Constraints

Difficulties in budget releases were rampant. NEDA releases and line agency commitments were coursed through NEDA. Delays in the release of BRBC's budget affected operations and caused major delays of many activities. Budget releases for planning and design activities were the major constraint being experienced by the BRBC organization.

Despite the constraints, the BRBC continued the task of institution building. The notable contribution of BRBC was the formation of a Management Council, composed of the regional directors of concerned line agencies operating in the area, and the Private Advisory Council, representing the private sector. Moreover, moves towards the coordination of sectoral activities were started. Much of the BRBC's activities focused on the generation of field data to be used for planning and project development. The Social Survey and Research Unit headed by the late Frank Lynch, S.J. (IPC-Ateneo de Manila) was contracted with GOP and USAID funds to generate planning data for the Program Office. Two major feasibility studies (Bicol Roads and the Libmanan-Cabusao Projects) were also completed.

The aforementioned problems were recognized by the Government, and on April 26, 1976, Presidential Decree 926 abolished the BRBC and created the Bicol River Basin Development Program (BRBDP). This decree spelled out specific guidelines which enhanced a move towards real decentralization. First, a line budget was established with the Budget Commission solely for BRBDP operations. Second, the IAD approach to rural development was adopted. Third, a clear policy was spelled out for management and planning of the Basin area: it was to be comprehensive, decentralized and framed within regional and national plans.

The decree likewise created the Bicol River Basin Development Program Office (BRBDPO) to be under the supervision of the Cabinet Coordinating Committee-Integrated Rural Development Projects (CCC-IRDP) through a Cabinet Coordinator (Department, now Ministry of Public Works). It also specified that the BRBDPO was to be located in Camarines Sur Province. A Manila liaison office under the program office was also created for the purpose of soliciting support and facilitating coordination with the various national line agencies located in Manila.

At the program area level, the decree also created the Bicol River Basin Coordinating Committee (BRBCC) to serve as the policy-making and coordinating body. The BRBCC is chaired by the Program Director of BRBDPO with the NEDA Regional Executive Director as Vice-Chairman. Members of the council include the Governors of Albay, Camarines Sur and Sorsogon (the latter added under PD 1553, issued June 11, 1978) and the Regional Directors (or their duly appointed representatives) of the various line agencies operating in the program area. According to several officials interviewed, the BRBCC, until recently, was highly active and interactive in coordinating the various activities of different line agencies in project areas where line agencies are required to implement their respective project components.

The organizational structure of the BRBDPO includes planning and monitoring and coordinating departments. A mechanism for citizen participation in project identification, development, review and policy was developed through the Area Development Teams (ADT's) and Area Development Councils (ADC's) at the project level and the BRBCC and Private Advisory Council (PAC) at the program area level.

These elements of the Bicol program structure seem to have been working well. Difficulties encountered at the project level were being resolved. The BRBCC members felt they were actively involved in the development process. There was considerable momentum within the Bicol Program Office. The staff and its leadership had been given the responsibility for directing the development process in the Bicol area and they were responding with enthusiasm and commitment. Output accomplishments in data generation, feasibility studies and the first four capital projects were a reflection of this atmosphere.

The causes for what seemed to have been a viable IAD organization were the (1) decentralized structure for decision-making, coordination and problem-solving, (2) purposeful and competent leadership environment that then existed in the BRBDPO, (3) support the Program Office enjoyed from the Cabinet Coordinator with minimal, advance approval from above in terms of management decisions, (4) popular support that (1) and (2) were able to generate, and (5) foreign and local funding for the feasible projects that were designed.

More recently, the BRBDP organization has again been undergoing changes. The creation of the Office of the Cabinet Coordinator and the reshuffling of the Program Office has had the perhaps unintended effect of what appears to be a move toward recentralization. Decision-making authority now seems to emanate more from Manila according to the perception of many persons involved in the Bicol. The mission of the BRBCC has been reportedly changed from that of coordination and policy-making to that of an advisory body. It is likely that the proposed realignment will affect the capability of the BRBDPO to operate in a decentralized manner.

It is the assessment of the evaluation team that the Program Office has reached a critical low in terms of senior technical staff capability although there are knowledgeable younger staff that can be developed. It has become apparent to the team that the Program Director plays a highly critical role in coordinating, integrating and soliciting the cooperation of various line agencies and local groups. He must have a good managerial grasp to build around him a group of competent deputies and section leaders who function with delegated authority.

The operationalization of an IAD organization is a complex task requiring technically competent group of leaders who must exercise sound political judgement in dealing with the directives of Philippine government bureaucracy at the national, regional and local levels. Organizing for IAD operation likewise requires a good technical and legal grasp of the IAD concept and the corresponding abilities to interpret and apply the IAD concept given the parameters of socio-cultural, economic and political realities existing in the area, as well as the techno-political relationships operating among and within government agencies.

Ultimately, the effectiveness of the Bicol Program Office will have to be judged on how and to what extent the program has an impact on the lives of the intended beneficiaries, not on the number of funded projects. The cost and number are only relative input and output indicators of the investment process. The Program Office was set up as a means, not as an end in itself.

Based on these considerations, the evaluation team recommends:


1. That a permanent program director be carefully selected and appointed following the guidelines of Presidential Decree 926.
2. That appropriate authority be redelegated to deputy directors and decentralized within the Program Office itself, so that Program Office activities can be raised to the increased level of activity required by the increasing demands of accelerated project development, coordinated implementation, and monitoring/evaluation.

Decentralization of Authority in the Bicol IAD Area

The pivotal question on decentralization focuses on the exercise of central authority in Manila and field authority in the Bicol. Operationally, this requires a determination on what functions are most effectively carried out in the Bicol and Manila offices. "Effective" here refers to accomplishing most expeditiously those tasks necessary to achieve the overall development goals of the Bicol River Basin Development Program.

One of the policies formulated for the BRBDP under Presidential Decree 926 was the use of the BRBCC (see page 12) as a mechanism for regional line agency involvement and popular participation (through the provincial governors) in the projects and programs of the Bicol Program. Monthly meetings of the BRBCC served several purposes: (1) BRBCC members could be kept informed of programs and projects; (2) the BRBCC could receive reports of difficulties in project implementation and search for regional solutions which may in fact require cooperation between BRBCC members; (3) the BRBCC could act to assist in forming BRBDP policy; and (4) the BRBCC members could comment on project proposals and plans and comment on the roles assigned to them before the projects were submitted to higher authority.

This last activity, which gave the BRBCC a role in the planning process, seemed to be a very important one. It served to develop a sense of project commitment by the line agency directors, and it gave the provincial governors opportunity to speak for the people they were representing. This activity diagrammed below shows the progress of the project proposal outlined by



solid arrows. Recently, there has been a modification in the process. Project proposals are not necessarily passed through the BRBCC but rather BRBCC members are informed after the fact that the project has been sent ahead. This is indicated by the broken line in the diagram.


It is quite predictable that limiting the role of the BRBCC in the planning process would mean a loss of agency commitment, cooperation and integration and a reduction in representative participation.

We therefore recommend that the role of the BRBCC as a coordinating and policy-making body be fully restored. As the functions of the BRBCC are restricted, there is in turn less reason for the existence of a BRBDFO.

Another manifestation of recentralization of decision-making authority has been the recently restricted authority of the program director in matters concerning personnel appointment and in dealing with line agencies above the regional level as part of a problem-solving and BRBDP-project-promoting role. These are important in assessing the overall effectiveness of the BRBDP concept.

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SEDERHANA EVALUATION



IRS
The Water is Flowing
The Rice is Growing

MAY 1978

FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Indonesia	B. Project Title Sederhana (simple) Irrigation and Land Development	C. Project Number 497-0252	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>75</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY _____
E. Life of Project Funding 1. AID (Loan or Grant) <u>20,000,000*</u> other Donor _____ Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ ** TOTAL \$ _____ *later increased to 23.7 million **initially 100% financing (74/75)		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director _____ 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) Walter McAleet (info from PIO) 3. Other _____	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) not stated 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not stated		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) Directorate General of Water Resources Development Directorate General of Food Crops 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not stated	

I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date)
 Evaluation Planning Documents: Sorenson/Thompson: "An Approach to Evaluation for the Sederhana Irrigation and Land Development Program." October 30, 1976

Theody: "Evaluation of the Sederhana Irrigation and Land Development Project: Objectives and Scope of Work." June 28, 1977

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title Sederhana Evaluation: <u>IRS</u> <u>The Water is Flowing, the Rice is Growing</u>	B. Evaluation Date May 1978	C. Type of Evaluation review of ongoing project	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation Basically first of 3 years 1974-1977
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire travel _____ per diem _____ Contract \$20,600 (John Druwe) 2. Other 18,117 (Henry Gembala) TOTAL \$ _____	F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation (SEE attached sheet)		G. Initiated By not stated

H. Evaluation Team Composition

1. Direct Hire	2. Contract:	
a. Name	a. Name of Organization (if any)	b. Contract No.
b. Present Position	(SEE attached sheet)	AID/afr-C-1130 (Henry Gembala)
c. Area of Expertise	c. Name(s) of Persons	d. Area(s) of Expertise

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position) Thomas Niblock, USAID Director, William Larson, Chief, Rural Development Div., Dr. P. Tambunan, Senior Economist, Directorate of Programming, D.G. Resources Development and Ir. N. Agga, Staff member, sub-directorate of Soil and Water Conservation	J. Evaluation Coordinator Signature _____ David Devin Typed Name _____ Position _____ Date _____
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F. Purpose: Assess project success in meeting stated goals: increase rice production; improve well being of poor rural families; and enhance institutional capability of GOI implementing agencies. Evaluation is to be used as major reference for Project Paper for proposed Sederhana II. Note: study of 517 subprojects from 1st 3 years (80% in outer islands, 55% with rudimentary prior irrigation system) provides main data base.

H. Evaluation Team Composition:

Clive Gray, Fellow, Economist, Harvard University Institute for International Development, former director, HIID advisory group, Government of Indonesia (team leader)

Henry Gembala, consultant, Experience, Inc., formerly irrigation engineer, Soil Conservation Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.

John Duewel, Ph.D. candidate in rural sociology, Cornell University, former participating consultant (in Indonesia), Agricultural Development Council

SECTION I - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Sederhana Irrigation and Reclamation Program (IRS) was launched in Indonesia in FY 74/75 with 100% local financing. In June 1975, AID approved a \$20 million loan for the program which was later increased to \$23.7 million. By late 1977, IRS had expanded irrigated rice hectareage by 18,000 hectares and gross crop rice hectareage by 26,000 hectares in irrigation systems scattered throughout Indonesia. In the 1976/77 crop year a subset of 132 "mature" subprojects accounted for an annual production increase of 20-30,000 tons of milled rice. A study of 517 subprojects, 90% of those undertaken in the program's first three years, pointed to an anticipated expansion of 75,000 hectares of rice paddies, 153,000 gross crop hectares and about 400,000 tons of milled rice upon completion of Sederhana I. The 132 mature subprojects are already yielding a net return to labor about equal to the social opportunity cost of labor (62-90 cents per day) after allowing for a 15% opportunity cost of capital invested in IRS infrastructure. This can be expected to increase as more land comes into production in the areas concerned. The return to labor at maturity for the 517 subprojects is even more favorable (\$1.10 per day), assuming an average social cost of about \$1,000 per hectare for clearing and paddy formation on 70,000 hectares required to achieve the full revised hectareage target.

Pari passu with its contributions to increasing Indonesia's rice output, which is one of AID's three main purposes for Sederhana I, the program has clearly also served a second purpose of enhancing income for several hundred thousand farm families, nearly all of them cultivating less than a full hectare of paddy. Progress toward AID's third purpose, strengthening the institutions responsible for implementing IRS, while readily observable, appear nevertheless to have been slower than projected. This can be attributed to the inherent difficulty of administering a program spread over hundreds of sites, about 80% of them in the Outer Islands, where the establishment of functioning irrigation systems and the absence of site feasibility studies put a premium on individual judgment of irrigation officials. A major benefit is the experience gained by these officials in the course of the program. Not surprisingly, recruitment and assignment of staff and administrative follow-ups by the provincial irrigation services has been closer to target than in the case of the agricultural services. The contribution of the agricultural services has been primarily the development of tertiary networks water-user associations, and extension/training programs (focussing on improved water management, operation and maintenance, but including agricultural cultivation activities.)

The evaluation report advances the following principle recommendations:

- I. Improvement of Current Procedures, Project Implementation and Follow Up
 - A. Subprojects Design Feedback. The functionality of many subprojects' design can be improved by requiring contractors to return to the field

to evaluate preliminary design concepts and layouts in consultation with local engineers. The associated costs of such feedback would bring a high return.

B. Operation and Maintenance. Lack of significant movement towards instituting a formal system of O&M for IRS subprojects is not an unmitigated portent of disaster for the system. In the long run, projects on IRS' scale are more likely to succeed if the beneficiaries find themselves obliged to handle O&M of components which are technically within their capabilities. However, the team recommends instituting, on a trial basis, an O&M budget allocation, of which the 1978/79 budget "improvement" allocation for half the first three years' subprojects may be regarded as a precursor, to service major structures in lieu of handling this as new project activity, with its attendant delays.

C. Monitoring. It is desirable to continue both the comprehensive monitoring the IRS subprojects by irrigation and agricultural officials, and the collection of more reliable data on a scientifically selected sample of locations along lines pursued hitherto by the Survey Agro-Ekonomi (SAE).

II. Future IRS Investment Policy

A. Subproject Selection Procedures. There is general agreement on the need to intensify consultations by irrigation officials with local farmers and authorities, as well as with other technical agencies (who already enter at a later stage by having centrally organized Appraisal Teams). The BAPPEDA (Provincial Development Planning Boards) should be involved in the process of clearing subproject proposals before they are considered at the national level.

B. Project Selection Criteria. Planning diligently is a useful way to achieve program objectives. Social benefit-cost analysis is an accepted technique of project evaluation that might be applied systematically in the IRS selection process, to some degree offsetting higher nominal returns perceived by establishing subprojects in previously existing village irrigation schemes.

C. Supplemental Investment in IRS Subprojects. Incremental benefit/cost analysis should be applied in evaluating proposed investments in tertiary network, land clearing and paddy formation. Each extension of development brings benefits, but should not be viewed as invariably required to make initial investments in major works economic. Optimal targets for government activity in these areas cannot be determined without further investigation and experimentation, designed to learn, among other things, how much investment the farmers will realize themselves, once water is available to them.

III. Staff Development

The team received concrete proposals from several provincial irrigation officials as to the further duration and content of training required to remedy shortcomings in the training required for different categories of staff members. In the time available, the team was unable to map out and cost alternative programs for training development but it believes a high return is obtainable here. This should be the first priority for expanded technical assistance.

IV. Future AID Assistance to IRS

A. Technical Assistance

(i) Training. Technical assistance extended so far has been deficient in its concern with fast training. A full time advisor on programming and curricular development of technical training is needed. The curricula of the respective training programs should be reinforced with materials drawn from IRS case studies.

(ii) Engineering. The team supports the proposal to station additional engineering advisors in major provincial offices. The advisors could make strategic contributions, not only to execution of IRS, but also to the sedang/kecil (medium, small-scale irrigation programs) and other programs consistent with the Congressional Mandate. Serious study of the Indonesian language should be made part of the advisors' preparations. The team feels that AID dependence on the consultants' certification of subproject completion places them in a complicated dual role and the possibility of using an alternative mechanism is recommended.

(iii) Agriculture. The team felt the SINOTECH contribution had probably given a favorable return on expenditure up to the present. The Directorate General of Food Crops has indicated his desire that the SINOTECH input continue at approximately the same level.

(iv) Social Science. There would be a constructive role for three social science advisors, including the educator already referred to; an advisor on the institutional aspects of water management, and an economist to assist in subproject selection procedures and monitoring the program.

B. AID Reimbursement Procedures. Reimbursement procedures under Sederhana I have been subject to lengthy delays without any apparent compensating social benefit via increased efficiency of program implementation. The problem arises from trying to match AID's minimum engineering standards with a program necessarily involving widespread field operations. Since the question is essentially one of attributing AID assistance rather than determining which subprojects actually get carried

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out, the team suggests that future capital assistance be met with a subset of projects, chosen on the basis of convenience for AID's inspection and approval and reimbursed at a higher rate than in Sederhana.

SECTION III - CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Conclusion of benefit-cost analysis

Preliminary benefit-cost analysis in Section III, first on 132 subprojects yielding before-and-after data in the Directorate General of Food Crops (Agriculture) survey cited in Section I, then on revised target hectareages for 500-plus subprojects, applying nationwide average yield estimates computed by the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS), provides indicators that IRS is on its way toward covering the social opportunity costs both of the capital invested in it, assuming a 15% discount rate, and the labor engaged in producing rice on its paddy fields, assuming shadow wage rates ranging from Rp. 260 to Rp. 460 (\$0.63-\$1.11) per day.

2. Progress in meeting targets of first AID loan

The following summary comments are offered in regard to progress achieved in meeting the three principal targets of AID's first loan to IRS:

1) Increasing rice production. As indicated in Section III, the 132 "mature" subprojects surveyed by Agriculture appear to have increased annual production of wet unhulled rice by between 37,000 and 49,000 tons already by the 1976/77 crop year. This is equivalent to increased production of 22-29,000 tons of milled rice. Using nationwide yield data the entire set of 517 subprojects surveyed, constituting about 90% of the subprojects undertaken in the first three years of IRS, offer promise of increasing wet paddy output by nearly 700,000 tons, equivalent to about 400,000 tons of milled rice, from project start to completion.

ii) Increasing incomes of the rural poor. As indicated in Section IV, the beneficiaries of the program are peasant farmers the vast majority of whom will cultivate less than one hectare of IRS sawah. Some 80-90% of them fall into income classes below the \$150 per capita level determined by AID as the poverty line. A large percentage of beneficiaries are farmers whose sawahs lie in the lower reaches of existing communal irrigation systems and who therefore prior to IRS faced water shortage in the dry season. With 80% of IRS projects located outside Java, the proportion of landless laborers in the subproject areas is very small--80% of subprojects covered in the Agriculture survey reported few or no such individuals. The socio-institutional analysis indicates, thus that no major income groups are being excluded from the project for structural reasons.

. . . . iii) Strengthening GOI institutional capacity to implement IRS. Recent events suggest that the rate of expansion towards which IRS seemed to be building as AID assistance for the program was agreed was in fact beyond the capacity of the provincial irrigation services to supervise adequately, both as to planning & design and to construction. Thus, according to figures supplied by the Directorate-General of Water Resource Development (hereafter Dit. Jen. Pengairan), the target hectareage of major works completed during 1976/77 was the same as that for 1975/76 (about 49,000 ha.), while during 1977/78 it declined drastically to about 21,000 ha, as execution of many subprojects was stretched out over longer periods than originally planned. Meanwhile the Irrigation Service was subjected to increasing pressure from local populations and government bodies to conduct repairs or extend main canals in earlier-year subprojects that were not meeting their objectives; hence the 95,000 ha. "improvement" category covering 75% of the subprojects included in the 1978/79 program.

Clearly the provincial services are facing considerable stress in reviewing contract designs to ensure their adequacy considerable stress in reviewing contract designs to ensure their adequacy to site conditions while at the same time keeping on top of the building contractors. Still, it was the consultants' impression in the course of field visits to more than 60 subprojects in ten provinces that for the most part the services are responding to this stress and that the manifold increase in man-years of experience accumulated since the start of IRS by provincial office staffs, the kabupaten section chiefs and the field supervisors on irrigation works is beginning to show via better judgment as to what is and is not feasible.

From their perspective of two years of experience in the field the AID-financed engineering consultants, provided through a contract with IECO, report positive changes both in general staff capability and in receptivity to the expatriate engineers' recommendations on subproject planning and design. The enhanced interest in integrating the consultants into the irrigation services' provincial structure (see Section below) is as much a sign of increasing absorptive capacity as it is of recognition of the services' own weaknesses. In some provinces lying on the outer fringes of the "regions" which the foreign consultants are assigned to serve the evaluation team heard what appeared to be sincere complaints about the brevity of their periodic visits.

It has proven unexpectedly difficult to secure data from Dit. Jen. Pengairan's Jakarta headquarters about numbers of staff assigned to IRS activity in the provincial services, and the increase therein since the start of IRS. Data was still being sought at the time this

report was due.

Turning to the agricultural side, one again there are indications of a growing awareness in the provincial services of Agriculture's important role in assisting the farmers, individually and through water users' associations, to make optimum use of new irrigation water supplies. In most provinces agricultural staff have prepared tertiary layouts for a subset of projects and at the very least held initial discussions with farmers about installing them. Like their IECO Counterparts in the irrigation services the SINOTECH advisors in Agriculture cite concrete evidence of enhanced capacity of their counterparts. It is clear that in a number of locations junior agricultural staff have given substantial amounts of time that can exclusively be devoted to Sederhana related activities.

The delay in achieving targets regarding institutional formation and the implementation of tertiary development activities should in part be understood as reflecting these staffing problems. In contrast to Dit. Jen Pengairan which has been involved with the Project for over 4 years, Agriculture's direct involvement has been limited to two years. An important factor in initial delays, was the fact that the construction on major works was sometimes incomplete, delayed or beset with technical deficiencies. Moreover, the carrying out of land development and construction activities at the farm level is a more labor intensive process, involving consultation with farmers. In this regard, while the delay in agricultural follow-up may have slowed the pace of improvements in water management, it has not forestalled the realization of substantial benefits from IRS by farmers using traditional methods to put the water to use.

It appears that USAID expectations with respect to the development of formal institutional capability for operation and maintenance, whether on the part of the provincial irrigation services, water users' associations, or some other agency, have also not been met. It was explained to the team by none other than the Director General himself that any expenditure by his organization on O&M of IRS projects now must be funded within the framework of new project expenditure. Thus, a significant share of the 95,000 ha. of "improvements" on old schemes included in the 1978/79 capital budget should more correctly be regarded as maintenance and repair, and should in theory be covered out of current revenues of the subprojects in question.

Nevertheless, the absence thus far of any special provision for O&M of IRS subprojects in Dit. Jen Pengairan's financial system, on the whole has not prevented these projects from being maintained--where technically and financially feasible--by the communities involved; Lack of O&M by the local irrigation service provides incentives for

on going community initiative which has characterized village systems throughout Indonesia historically. The results may not be as elegant as a western irrigation engineer would want to see in his own country, but the system may be the more economic precisely for that reason.

Where it would undoubtedly make sense to institutionalize some capacity for O&M is in regard to major works, notably those whose construction and repair involves the use of masonry and cement. In some locations visited and studied, imperfections or deterioration in existing structures had complicated maintenance and water delivery, at least temporarily.

3. Improving current procedures of project implementation and follow-up.

i) Feedback on major works design. The evaluation team had reached the conclusion, based on discussion with provincial irrigation officials and engineering advisors, that perhaps the greatest single improvement in the preparation of major works could be achieved by requiring design contractors to return to the field with preliminary layouts and finalize these in their home offices only after consultation in situ with local engineering staff. In many cases this implies raising the design allocation per hectare above the present Rp. 7,000, but the additional expenditure should have an enormous pay-off by way of saving staff time now devoted to correcting the contractors' mistakes, not to mention improving the efficiency of structures and channel.

ii) Operation and Maintenance. Recognizing that it is desirable to leave responsibility for a major share of O&M in the hands of local communities, we nevertheless feel that Dit. Jen. Pengairan should institutionalize a capability for routine handling of maintenance and repair of major works. This would be designed to enable the provincial irrigation service to respond quickly to situations beyond the control of the farmers, in lieu of having to wait to include a subproject in the ensuing year's DIP (Daftar Isian Proyek or project funding document). The team recommends that a general provision for O&M designed to enable a provincial irrigation service to move rapidly on emergency repairs of major works on IRS subprojects (perhaps catering jointly to similar needs on Sedang/Kecil and other types of projects as yet lacking flexible arrangements for such work) be instituted on a trial basis in at least one province during the next fiscal year.

iii) Monitoring and evaluation. The evaluation team was concerned to learn that Survey Agro-Ekonomi's monitoring program of irrigation schemes had been discontinued before it had yet reached the stage of yielding results by way of before-and-after comparisons. They feel that such work should continue under the auspices of one government agency or another, on the basis of return visits to sub-projects for which a good deal of baseline data have now been assembled. SAE's contribution could be improved by focussing their data collection on a small range of parameter that serve as the primary indicators of subproject success or failure, first and foremost these being the change in annual gross cropped hectareage of savah land. Through a scientific sampling procedure SAE could fill the present gap in reliable data on this key measure. We understand that BAPPENAS has taken the position that it is up to Agriculture rather than Pengairan to sponsor such survey activity. Accordingly, we recommend that either Dit. Jen Pengairan or USAID pursue this matter with the Directorate General of Food Crops, in order to prevent a lengthy hiatus in the collection of sample survey data.

4. Future IRS investment policy.

1) Subproject selection procedures. Much thought and effort have gone into establishing the current computerized system, and the continuous evolution of procedures appears to have led to a steady improvement in subproject selection. All agree that there is still room for improvement. In some provinces visited by the consultants Agriculture officials have a largely passive role in the process, although in principle an active input from Agriculture is indispensable. The consultants suggest that Dir. Jen. Pengairan should encourage an expanded role for the BAPPEJAS (Provincial Development Planning Agencies) as a coordinating agency between Pengairan, local government, the Directorate General of Food Crops and other agencies interested in the location of IRS subprojects. Ideally, no proposed location should be accepted for consideration by Dit. Jen Pengairan/Jakarta until the BAPPEDA certifies that the necessary local consultation has taken place.

The consultants also feel that the computerized questionnaire for project selection (latest revision) has become unwieldy, soliciting respondents' impression of a whole range of socio-economic variables where the lack of data is such that a comparison of answers among sub-projects and provinces is more likely to mislead than to promote rational selection. The consultants feel that a revamping and simplification of the questionnaire is called for.

6'

ii) Subproject selection criteria. The team agrees with the basic benefit-cost approach underlying the current selection criteria, however it should be applied in such a way as to allow benefits perceived by different population groups to be weighted differentially, the weights increasing according to the relative degree of socio-economic deprivation currently faced by a given group. It should be noted that weighting of benefits to give preference to activities favoring poor and/or isolated classes of society is supported by modern benefit-cost theory. Adoption of such a weighting procedure implies deviating from the former emphasis given in IRS subproject selection to maximizing production of rice. Following that emphasis, IRS tended to favor locations with pre-existing communal irrigation systems. Now, however, we understand that the goals of social justice and regional equity in growth will receive greater emphasis in Repelita III, starting in 1979. This implies a corresponding change in emphasis for IRS selection.

There is a need to develop special selection criteria appropriate to different classes of subproject investments, (a) extension of existing subproject areas, (b) improvement of old projects not yet functioning properly, (c) continuation of uncompleted projects from the year immediately preceding and (d) new subprojects.

iii) Supplemental investments in existing IRS subproject areas.

a. Introduction. It was indicated earlier that IRS already appears to be giving a favorable return on investment prior to the realization of substantial additional public investment in tertiary/quarternary network development, land-clearing and sawah-formation. We believe that additional investments in IRS subproject areas should not be dictated by an imperative to bring all the initial target hectareage into production within X number of years, within the framework of a complete tertiary/quarternary delivery network. In other words, execution of such investments should not be regarded as an essential condition for making each IRS subproject "functional".

In many areas the data available on water discharge and efficiency of conveyance are too uncertain to guarantee the feasibility of irrigating the full stated target hectareage from the major works as initially planned. In other areas the costs of land-clearing and the availability of manpower to work additional sawahs within a given period of time are uncertain.

We therefore recommend that an incremental benefit-cost approach should be taken in planning such investments. At each point

in time only those investments should be undertaken that will generate sufficient additional net benefits, compared with the situation that would prevail in their absence or under some alternative arrangement, to ensure a positive Net Present Value at the prevailing social opportunity cost of capital (say 15%). As suggested above, these benefit-cost calculations too should take into account appropriate income weights for disadvantaged and isolated groups in society.

b. Land-Clearing. Specially with regard to land-clearing, direct government intervention in a subproject area should proceed only following careful investigation of the question as to why the local population has not previously felt a need to bring the area at least under dry-land cultivation, not to mention rainfed sawah. We question whether in most IRS subprojects with uncleared land included in the target hectareage a justification exists for undertaking mechanized land-clearing. We suggest that any government intervention in this area should be restricted initially to a pilot approach, aimed at experimenting with, and establishing the cost parameters associated with, a series of alternative techniques. (Note: Selection of an area for Transmigrant settlement increases the likelihood that government intervention in land-clearing will give a more favorable return than other alternatives.)

c. Sawah formation. With regard to sawah-formation we suggest that any program of capital assistance from government should take note of the fact that in many IRS subprojects farmers are already shaping sawahs with their own resources, group of farm families helping out successively on each other's plots. In areas where sawah-formation has apparently been delayed notwithstanding the delivery of irrigation water, the causes for this delay should be examined and means sought to remove obstacles to the farmers' own initiative. For example, in cases where questions of land tenure create a bottleneck, the local government authorities and Dit. Jen. Agraria should be pressed to give priority to land titling or some intermediate measure that will give farmers adequate security for their investments. If the delay is attributable to the fact that the local population prefers to stick with alternative means of livelihood, and apparently considers the opportunity cost of sawah formation to be too high, evidence should be sought as to whether manpower will be available to farm the sawahs once they are formed. (The Survey Agro Ekonomi reports testify to cases where prepared sawahs have returned to bush notwithstanding the availability of water, essentially because of the high opportunity cost of the labor required to farm them. In these cases plantation crops typically presented a more attractive source of livelihood to the people.)

Before promulgating a broad program of assistance for sawah-formation the government should consider carefully the possibility that a substantial number of farmers who would otherwise form sawahs with their own resources will not sit back and wait until the government assistance comes through. Without adequate follow-up in terms of concrete assistance such a policy might conceivably slow down the overall rate of sawah-formation, rather than accelerate it as intended. Moreover, the creation of potential dependency relationships is obvious.

d. Tertiary/Quaternary Development. Finally, with regard to tertiary/quaternary distribution networks, it should be kept in mind that Indonesia has already attained higher national average rice yields than Philippines (cf. FAO Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics, Nov. 1975), while growing most of her rice without the benefit of such systems. Tertiary/quaternary systems should be viewed not as an essential link in the chain of investments required to yield a favorable return on the cost of IRS major works, but rather as an opportunity for additional investment aimed at further expanding irrigated area by making limited water supplies cover larger hectareages, as well as enhancing yields by facilitating improved water management and creating a corresponding stimulus to increase the use of modern inputs. Our own observations in the field indicate that many IRS subprojects offer attractive opportunities for public and private (the farmers') investment in this respect, but it should not be assumed that such will be the case in every subproject in the immediate future. Thus, for example, evidence should be gathered with respect to the degree of incline at which the additional cost of canals offset higher yields associated with improved water management, and the target area for completion of delivery networks should be recalculated to eliminate such areas.

The recent government decision to transfer responsibility for design and construction of tertiary/quaternary systems on IRS subprojects to the Directorate General of Water Resources Development (Dit. Jen. Pengairan) poses both an opportunity and a danger: an opportunity in the sense that Dit. Jen. Pengairan has a higher demonstrated capacity than the Directorate General of Food Crops (Agriculture) to implement works on the ground, but a danger in the sense that Dit. Jen. Pengairan has less capability than Agriculture to comprehend local farming systems and determine how to lay out each network with the maximum positive and minimum disruptive impact. Based on experience in the execution of IRS major works (see above), the consultants see a likelihood that design of the tertiary/quaternary systems will be assigned to contractors working under budget constraints that deprive them of the opportunity to develop their lay-out in close consultation with the local population and Agriculture officials. The result is likely to be a set of designs not adequately fitted to local

farming systems and land ownership, whose imposition will face resistance from the local population. The consultants urge that Dit. Jen. Pengairan's design contractors be required to review their preliminary lay-outs in the field, and obtain formal clearances of local village chiefs and Agriculture staff before finalizing the designs in their home offices. Budgets for design work should include liberal provision for such consultation, otherwise far larger sums are likely to be wasted.

The policy of complete subsidization of the construction and completion of tertiary layouts also raises some questions. It leaves out the possibility of voluntary contributions of labor from farmers, and tends to establish the principle of reimbursement for any activity taken. Senior Department of Agriculture policy makers also have expressed concern about the tendency for the government to assume too much of the costs of such activities. Doing so may dampen future community responsibility for O&M. Such policies in large part are based on analysis of major lowland systems which have different organizational parameters in comparison with most IRS locales, and which have less demonstrated capacity to undertake ongoing O&M. Future evaluation of such policies in the Sederhana context would be appropriate, leaving open the possibility of modified approaches tailored more to IRS community capacities and needs.

5. Staff Development.

The consultants were impressed by the detailed evaluation which several provincial irrigation chiefs were able to provide concerning the adequacy of the pre-service education and in-service training obtained by different levels of their staff. These officials gave specific recommendations for lengthening the periods of training provided by the Directorate-General's training institutions and for strengthening various components of different course curricula. The consultants feel that these recommendations add up to a need for an expanded training investment. At the time of completion of this report we were still receiving data needed to draw up a comprehensive training proposal.

6. Principles of future USAID assistance.

The consultants feel that USAID has already made a constructive contribution to the IRS program, primarily by virtue of the technical assistance it has financed, since there is no evidence that the expectation of receiving its capital assistance, of which none has been disbursed thus far, has so far affected the program's scale or content. They regard it as important to distinguish

between the priority attached to a particular activity associated with the program, and the possibilities for AID loan assistance for that activity. For instance, a potential problem arises in the case of institutional development--specifically as it concerns water users' associations. Support for the formation of water user associations is a high priority activity of the greatest social importance, and one in which the ear-marking of external financial assistance may provide useful incentives for internal activity. The procedural constraints within which AID operates, however, may pose some difficulties in allocating capital assistance to this project activity. Essentially, AID usually attributes its money to end-uses that can be followed concretely by its auditors. The question of how effectively a specific water user's association is functioning is a difficult matter for auditors to pursue, if that were to be a measurement criteria. On the other hand, support for the extension and training activities associated with forming and upgrading the capacity of local associations would seem to be a worthy undertaking. It is hoped, therefore, that some means may be found to accommodate this objective.

1) Technical assistance

Engineering. The evaluation team saw indications in the field that the contributions of the IECO/Sinotech engineering consultants to project design and execution are becoming increasingly valued by their Dit. Jen. Pengairan counterparts. In consultation with USAID it has now been tentatively agreed that this assistance be expanded and reorganized in such a way as to amalgamate it more effectively into the Directorate General's own structure. Our team supports this request, and offers two additional points to be taken into account in programming the assistance in future:

1. It is imperative that the engineers to be stationed in Indonesia acquire a working knowledge of the Indonesian language before they arrive in the country. This matter is too important to be left to individual preference, or to be handled via part-time or after-hours lessons while the individual works on another assignment. We recommend that USAID and the contractor accept the principle that substantial resources have to be allocated to language instruction, including the candidate's full salary while he undergoes a full-time course of instruction lasting not less than, and possibly longer than, two months. Before being finally cleared to come to Indonesia each candidate should have to attain an acceptable score on a language test administered by an independent body. A system of financial incentives and penalties should be established to ensure that both the candidate and his employer are motivated to have him complete the language course successfully. Likewise, resident consultants would be expected to undertake such training, to the degree feasible, to bring language skills up par.

2. The contractor's present terms of reference require its staff to inspect completed sub-projects and certify whether or not they meet reasonable standards. An AID Implementation Letter requires that it receive a copy of the engineer's certification along with each application for reimbursement in respect of a subproject. De facto the engineers are placed in a position of certifying projects on behalf of USAID. To the Evaluation team they expressed a wish to have this link between themselves and USAID severed, feeling that among other things the current procedure detracts from the time they can devote to assisting in earlier stages of subproject implementation (i.e. it diverts staff resource from higher-priority "preventive" work to "curative" activity.) Our team feels that the requirement also puts the engineering contractor in a delicate position half-way between two clients in the respective roles of lender and borrower, and thus hampers the engineers' integration into the Dit. Jen. Pengairan organization. We propose that the certification role be dropped from the contractor's terms of reference, and that USAID accept a corresponding burden on its resident direct-hire staff to carry out whatever degree of inspection it considers necessary to ensure that subprojects accepted for reimbursement will stand up to scrutiny by AID auditors. If our recommendation on AID reimbursement procedures (see below) is accepted, the additional staff burden will be less than would be the case under current procedures.

Agriculture. As in the case of the IECO engineers the consultants heard generally favorable reports in the field concerning the contribution of the Sinotech staff assisting the Land and Water Conservation subdirectorate of the Directorate General of Food Crops. There was some concern expressed, however, about the lack of integration of some of the technical staff--in part stemming from communication problems. As in the case of Engineers, resident and prespective staff should be required to reach an Indonesian language proficiency level-sufficient to participate in situations where the usage of English is not an option. ✓

Some major questions were raised by Indonesians about the utility of short-term consultancy assignments. They also noted the need for greater attention and sensitivity to existing community organizational modes. The tendency of the outside consultants has been to push an idealized version of organization not always in accord with Indonesian realities. The short-term consultancies should probably be pressed down. Sino-Tech staff members themselves believe that the agency could profitably use some technical assistance from agronomists, however staff members of the subdirectorate have indicated

to the evaluation team that they do not see the need for such assistance and do not expect to request it. Indications are, however, that Sinotech will be asked to provide another technician to work in the Central Region, considering that the team manager now assigned here is alone and has to devote much of his time to administrative duties.

Training. The consultants feel that far too small a portion of the technical assistance provided thus far has been devoted to strengthening the training institutions involved on both the engineering and agricultural sides of IRS, including preparation of comprehensive proposals for lengthening and upgrading the curricula of several of the courses currently offered. We recommend that the next phase of USAID assistance provide for a full-time training adviser with expertise both in the field of technical education itself and in estimating requirements for and programming expansion of this sector. One of his tasks should be to prepare case studies based on IRS experience for use as teaching materials, consonant with the guided self-teaching approach, in the training institutions involved under both Dit. Jen. Pengairan and the Department of Agriculture. Departin and resident IECO and Sinotech advisers might be brought back on short-term consultancy visits to contribute to this process of case study preparation.

Social Science. Preliminary indications from some of the involved Indonesian parties is that there might be a useful role that could be exercised by a rural sociologist and an agricultural economist. This would be to work on a full-time basis with government officials concerned with 1) institutional development of irrigation water management, and 2) socio-economic monitoring of both IRS and the Sedang/Kecil (medium-and small-scale) irrigation development program. Assistance in the second category would enhance the government's capacity to provide data needed to support future applications for foreign assistance, among other objectives. Experience heretofore with a succession of brief consultancy visits, including that of the present evaluation team, suggests that this is an inadequate approach to the task of helping to monitor such a complex development activity as IRS.

At the same time it is up to the Government of Indonesia to decide whether such assistance would be useful, and no outsiders should try to cajole the Government into accepting it. If the Government agrees with these proposals, the three full-time advisers concerned with training, institutional development of irrigation water management and socio-economic monitoring might be provided as a team by a contractor separate from those now providing assistance on the technical side, although alternative options, should also be explored.

ii) USAID reimbursement procedures.

The consultants agree with views expressed on both the government and AID sides that current reimbursement procedures are so cumbersome as to impose a high opportunity cost in terms of scarce administrative and technical talent that has to be devoted to their implementation. At the same time it is not clear that any corresponding social benefit flows from the current system. Dit. Jen. Pengairan's decisions to return, in 1978/79, to half of the projects from IRS's first three years and conduct "mopping-up" operations clearly results from pressure by local populations, government authorities, irrigation officials and other government personnel to deliver the promised water to the sawahs. It is not clear that USAID reluctance to approve certain subprojects for reimbursement has had a constructive impact on program implementation apart from those pressures.

By way of simplifying the reimbursement procedures we propose that AID capital assistance be attributed to a sub-set of projects involving less complex technical problems, easier access by AID staff for inspection purposes, and/or relatively large investments, with a view to accelerating the process of drawing down/attributing the AID funds. This might be accomplished by targeting AID capital assistance for major works construction on the basis of covering, say, 65% of the cost of two-thirds of the subprojects, rather than the current intended 42½% of capital costs of all subprojects.

Again, it is important to note that the question of how AID's assistance is attributed is entirely distinct from that of what specific subprojects are actually carried out. The fact that it is administratively simpler to attribute AID money to subprojects meeting the conditions listed above need in no way lessen the chances of inclusion in IRS of subprojects aimed at raising the living standards of populations in remote mountainous areas.

SMALL SCALE IRRIGATION
(PHILIPPINES)

BY

Daniel W. Bromley
Reeshon Feuer
Sarah K. Boyd

February 10, 1978

A.I.D. - ASIA
WORKSHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Philippines	B. Project Title Small Scale Irrigation	C. Project Number 492-274	D. Active Life of Project 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>76</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) F
E. Life of Project Funding 1. AID (Loan or Grant) 6,500,000 (loan) + 1,156,000 (grant) Other Donor _____ Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director not stated 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) 3. Other	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) not stated 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not stated		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) Farm Systems Development Corporation (FSDC) 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not stated	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date)			

FSDC's "Study of Impacts of the ISA Program". Impact Evaluation (not an AID evaluation) 1977. Office of Research and Evaluation (REO)

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title No Title, just draft report	B. Evaluation Date Feb. 10, 1978	C. Type of Evaluation Review of ongoing project	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation 1976-1977
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire not stated a. travel _____ b. per diem _____ 2. Contract _____ 3. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____	F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation Evaluate accomplishments in terms of original log frame (goals, purposes, output), and additional criteria based on team's knowledge of rural development.		G. Initiated By Mission

H. Evaluation Team Composition

1. Direct Hire		
a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise
William Jansen	AID/Manila	
William Merrill	AID/Washington	
Marvin Parker	AID/Manila	
2. Contract:		
a. Name of Organization (if any)	b. Contract No.	
University of Wisconsin (Madison)		
c. Name(s) of Persons		
Daniel W. Bromley	d. Area(s) of Expertise	
Reeshon Feuer (IRRI)	Resource Economist	
Sarah K. Boyd (USDA)		

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position)
none named

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____
Typed Name _____
Position _____
Date _____

1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. General

1. The purposes of the FSDC Program are to: (1) assist in the creation of small farmers' organizations (Irrigator's Service Associations--ISA's) around the shared input water; (2) help such organizations plan and construct irrigation systems; (3) help farmers through a variety of training programs; (4) help to finance the irrigation system and various machinery; (5) help to promote better agricultural practices primarily--although not exclusively--on rice; (6) help to improve marketing practices by ISA farmers; (7) help to create regional federations of ISA's; and (8) promote ISA-owned agro-industrial enterprises.
2. In the three years of its existence, 641 projects have been initiated to irrigate approximately 90,000 hectares serving over 30,000 farmer members. The projects are primarily pump systems from rivers, although there are approximately 200 gravity projects. For 1978 FSDC plans to start work on 123 pump projects and 187 gravity projects to serve a total of over 48,000 ha (and approximately 36,000 farmers). Additionally, 438 new ISA's will be organized involving approximately 42,000 farmers. 641 ↑
30,000 ha
1/3 gravity
+ 438
1,079
3. AID has been involved with the program since the beginning of FY 1976 and the first phase terminates at the end of FY 1978. The AID Program consists of \$6,500,000 in loan funds, and \$1,156,000 in grant funds. Grant funds are used by FSDC to finance direct-hire salaries, for contract technical assistance, for participant training, and for research and development support. Loan funds are used for construction of irrigation systems, and for pumps and power sets.
4. The strengths of the program are several:
 - (a) The ISA is an extremely viable concept around which farmers can share a valuable input (water).
 - (b) FSDC has been--to date--an excellent organization in terms of attracting good staff, giving them appropriate responsibilities, keeping channels of communication open, and adjusting management structure and methods in response to perceived needs.
 - (c) The work of FSDC with individual ISA's has been good, especially through the institutional officer (IO).
 - (d) The FSDC Program is targeted for--and appears to reach--the relevant AID target group (the poor and small farmer).

5. There are several aspects of the program about which we were unable to obtain clear impressions. They are:
- (a) The ability of ISA's to survive as organizations of small farmers in the absence of reliable irrigation deliveries to farmer members.
 - (b) The ability of FSDC to continue to attract excellent personnel and then to keep them satisfied as the organization matures.
 - (c) The ability of some ISA's to meet past debt service (amortization).
 - (d) The adequacy of agricultural advice given to ISA farmers.
 - (e) The adequacy (primarily in terms of program scope) of financial advice given to ISA's.
6. The problem areas of the program would seem to be the following:
- (a) The extension of financial management advice to ISA's is probably adequate now, but it will become more troublesome aspect as ISA's move from a pre-occupation with establishment of the irrigation system to enterprise development and modern agricultural practices.
 - (b) The ability of FSDC to act as a catalyst across a broad range of necessary agricultural services as production and marketing take on added significance in the ISA's.
 - (c) The ability of FSDC to adequately monitor the production performance (as distinct from progress in building the irrigation system) of the ISA's. This is related to the previous point and will require special attention by FSDC.
 - (d) The ability of FSDC to adequately work with ISA's on improved water management practices as modern agricultural practices imply better performance from the water distribution network.
 - (e) The ability of FSDC to adequately work with ISA's on the full range of problems facing farmers from harvesting and storing crops through the marketing of same.
 - (f) The willingness of AID to rectify past shortfalls in counterpart technical assistance to FSDC.
 - (g) The commitment of AID to help FSDC in those areas of increased importance: (1) improved agricultural practices; (2) improved water management; (3) improved methods of handling crops after harvest; and (4) improved marketing.
 - (h) The appropriateness of the "Project Goals" and "Project Purposes" in the first AID Project Paper (May 1975). These are listed in Section III-B1 and III-B2 of this report. They should perhaps be redefined as follows:

Project Goals

- (1) Increase income of small farmers.
- (2) Demonstrate value of cooperative action by small farmers through developing farm systems organized around shared irrigation, machinery, other inputs, and marketing.

Project Purpose

- (1) Increase rice yields to 53 cavans/ha with irrigation, and to 70 cavans/ha with production packages.
- (2) Increase yields of vegetables by 30-40 percent over their 1975-78 average.
- (3) Increase intensity of land use through double cropping of rice or reliable (dependable) rotations of rice and vegetables.
- (4) Reduce post-harvest losses.
- (5) Help farmers to learn methods for better utilization of agricultural inputs and improved marketing.

B. Recommendations

AID should:


1. Provide long-term funding for technical assistance in the following areas:
 - a. Project Officer (direct hire)
 - b. Irrigation Engineering
 - c. Financial Management
 - d. Water management
 - e. Training
 - f. Agricultural Production
 - g. Mechanization
 - h. marketing
2. Change title of program from Small Scale Irrigation to "Small Farmer Organizations", "Small Farmer Development".
or
3. Assist FSDC in acquiring office space, transportation, and office supplies and equipment for the 5 area offices.
4. Revise Project Goals and Project Purposes

FSDC should:

1. Develop better methods for monitoring production performance of ISA's
2. Improve its program of assistance to ISA's in financial management, agricultural production, water management, mechanization, and marketing.
3. Improve its ability as a catalyst to bring various GRP agricultural services to the ISA's

A.I.D. Project Impact Evaluation Report No.4

Philippine Small Scale Irrigation



May 1980

Agency for International Development

F. Purpose: To assess the impact of the Small Scale Irrigation, and follow-on project (Small Farmers System). The team visited 23 project sites in 9 provinces. They looked at Irrigators Service Associations (ISA's), at the quality of FSDC's extension workers, at the technical aspects of the system, at yields and production costs, and for evidence of change in the status of the small farmer and his family. Also talked to farmers about the extent to which irrigation had contributed to improving their lives.

Note: Our copy of this evaluation was in draft form and lacked appendices. Other information could presumably be added from the appendices.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 1976, A.I.D. began support of a Philippine Government program to expand village irrigation systems. Since then, over 1000 systems have been built or rehabilitated. Irrigation provided the opportunity to grow two crops each year, increasing rice production and gross farm income. On-farm employment has grown with the demands of double cropping. Local irrigation associations are functioning with support from the national Farm System Development Corporation, the A.I.D.-funded implementing agency. Thus, many of the project's immediate objectives have been met.

The project's sustainability in terms of real income benefits for small farmers, however, may be a problem. Increased gross incomes from double cropping and high-yielding varieties of rice have been substantially offset by increasing costs of production, debt burdens from capital investments, and persistent technological and water management problems. Of crucial importance is the performance of pumps. Floods, electricity fluctuations, and wear and tear have resulted in high maintenance and repair costs; frequent brown-outs interrupt critical water supply schedules.

With more intensive agricultural practices, more family labor is required to produce crops, reducing the opportunities for off-farm employment. Unless the farm is exceptionally profitable, net family income may be lower, as off-farm employment is discontinued. Thus, an anomalous situation results: farm income rises, but family income drops.

National policies are equally important for those moving from subsistence to commercial agriculture. Recognizing that many features of national policy positively affect small farmers, several aspects of Philippine agricultural policy make it difficult for the small farmer to compete. National procurement and price policies are export-oriented, demanding quality standards for rice that most small producers cannot meet. If they cannot, they do not receive the favorable subsidized price and must depend on lower private prices. Since most cost-benefit project assumptions were based on the government-subsidized rice price, farmer income projections have not been met. Small producers remain in a precarious economic condition. To receive the higher price, farmers would have to make additional investments in post-harvest machinery, while energy and other input costs rise. They often cannot afford it. The national credit system has also constrained farmer income, not providing adequate and timely credit. Farmers must often rely on usurious private lenders.

Although progress has been made in land reform, most farmers remain either leaseholders or share tenants without security. These farmers must still pay for and maintain the new irrigation systems. The landlord reaps the benefit from his share in increased production, without sharing in the costs. The share tenant, the most underprivileged, makes the greatest relative investment of capital and labor.

Government policies are clearly focused on increasing total production of rice, assuming increased production will improve the incomes of small producers. Production has increased, but long term, sustained improvement in farmer income will depend on factors beyond irrigation. Increasing the producer rice price, or reducing input costs would immediately improve farmer income. For the present, government policy responds to urban consumer demands, not those of rural producers. This situation is not likely to change. Faced with this rigidity, farmers may pursue three basic strategies to improve their position: reduce their dependency on rice and the rice pricing system and invest in more profitable crops, diversify farm activity by developing livestock or other farm-related enterprises, or seek more lucrative off-farm employment.

The irrigation system leadership works with, and is part of, the established local leadership. Existing authority patterns are reinforced in the short run. The irrigation association seems little used for overt partisan political purposes, and its effectiveness does not extend beyond the irrigation system.

Improved farmer income does not necessarily translate into improved family nutrition. Rather, the farmer's priority is to pay for school fees. Social mobility is seen to be a product of education. Women of farm families have neither benefited from nor been harmed by the project. The Philippine Government has, however, been innovative in using energetic female extension workers. Over half of the Institutional Officers are women and their involvement seems to reflect regional patterns of female participation, which vary considerably throughout the islands. Their role could be emulated in other projects and, perhaps, other countries.

A.I.D. developed this project as a commodity loan, focusing on engineering components and geographic expansion of irrigation, not on maximum gain to the individual farmer. Although gross farmer income has been improved, net income has not, and the system cannot be sustained in its present form. It is recommended that any future support to the competent Farm Systems Development Corporation should concentrate on technical assistance to improve and develop the productive capacity of farms in existing irrigation systems, rather than continuing geographic expansion of what is a fragile undertaking.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

A. Major Findings

1. Providing water to the small farmer to improve production and income has been effective because of its visible and immediate benefit. However, to increase income beyond current subsistence levels to allow farmers to carry their debt, maximum use must be made of the total farm resources. This includes supplementing farm income by raising livestock, i.e., pigs, poultry, and fish, and engaging in complementary off-farm enterprises, maximizing production to improve quality and decrease post-harvest losses by using small farm machinery, and being provided adequate and timely credit for production.

2. The price of rice and the conditions under which it is sold are often inadequate to raise farmer income more than marginally above subsistence levels in many parts of the country. It is, however, sufficient to motivate improved production which

is the primary cause of increases in gross income. It is unlikely that the price paid to farmers for their crop will rise significantly, nor is it likely that farmers can receive the government-subsidized price without additional investment in post-harvest machinery, the credit for which they may not get and an investment they clearly cannot afford. The cost of fertilizer, although subsidized by the government, is draining income, increasing debt, and in some cases decreasing yields when farmers cannot afford to buy adequate amounts. Relief from this price-cost spiral is necessary if personal (farmer income) and national (quantity/quality of crop) goals are to be achieved.

3. Marketing support to small rice farmers provided by NGA has not kept pace with the increase in rice production over the past few years. Its facilities are inadequate, its administrative capacity strained, and its cash flow has shown signs of weakness. It is uncertain whether NGA will be able to purchase enough of the farmers' crops and whether farmers can meet NGA standards for quality.

4. A significant number of associations will not be able to meet their amortization payments because of the cost of continual damage to the pumps. As long as this method of irrigation remains the sole economic means to provide water, repayment problems should be expected.

5. Few farmers can carry existing debts or obtain additional credit given current production income. The delicate balance between investment and debt could easily become negatively skewed if careful financial management is not provided at both the farm and ISA level. The risk of the investment in irrigation must be considered against potential income and debt-carrying capacity, a simple principle which has gone unheeded. A.I.D. projections that ISAs would be at the breakeven point after three years do not now seem accurate.

6. The Irrigators Service Association is valid and effective because it has built on existing local leadership and is focused on a specific and immediate goal that is important to the farmer. It is not perceived by the villagers as having a role beyond improved agricultural production, because other organizations at the village level may be more representative of the village as a whole.

7. Those farmers being assisted under the FSDC program are the appropriate beneficiaries of A.I.D. assistance under the New Directions. Although not the lowest income groups in rural areas, they are--or have been--subsistence farmers whose income in cash and in kind places more than half of them below the

poverty level as defined in the Philippines. They are also the groups able to make best use of development assistance to improve their own lives and the lives of their children. These small-scale farmers are also excellent candidates to contribute significantly to the development of the country itself.

Because most farmers invest in the education of their children, and because primogeniture governs land inheritance, the growth of an educated, young rural population will intensify the need for off-farm employment opportunities as these persons enter the work force.

The beneficiaries did not mention the use of additional income for better food although it would be unwise to conclude that this was never done. Programming which assumes this direct link, however, is unsound. The role which crop diversification could play in nutritional improvement should also be considered.

8. The quality and coordination of GOP extension services will become increasingly important as the program expands both its irrigation and integrated farm systems. These services may not be able to be provided by the hard-pressed Ministry of Agriculture. Coordination of the FSDC program with other agencies of the government occurs at the apex, but there is little evidence that it is effective at the farm level. It is believed that the expansion of the FSDC program into other types of productive activity and its continued and rapid expansion of irrigation may well tax the Corporation's technical and administrative capacity and overburden the talents of its fine and young staff.

9. A.I.D. analysis in project papers has been overly and unnecessarily optimistic and has resulted in unrealistic expectations for performance. These were related to the price of rice, the hectareage that could be double cropped, the internal rate of return, and the efficacy of the ISA as an organization having an impact beyond production.

A.I.D. participation in this project has resulted in needed engineering adjustments. However, there was an overemphasis on commodities and infrastructure and too little on the agricultural technical assistance necessary for improved farm systems. In addition, financial analysis of the elements of farm system development were not carefully and realistically formulated. Project monitoring must be improved, particularly by A.I.D. direct hire staff who can provide the continuity necessary to encourage effective programming decisions.

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B. Program and Policy Implications

The program and policy implications of this study center on three questions of importance to the A.I.D. program in the Philippines, and by inference, to A.I.D. programs elsewhere. These are: (1) Should A.I.D. continue to support the FSDC, and if so, in what way and for what purposes? (2) How might the policies of the Philippine government affecting the beneficiaries be improved? (3) What are the implications of this project for A.I.D. activities in other countries?

1. Should A.I.D. continue to support the FSDC, and if so, in what way and for what purposes?

FSDC has effectively demonstrated its capacity to form ISAs as the first step in the development of farm systems. Their greater need is for technical assistance in developing more sophisticated and complementary elements of farm systems. Therefore, the team recommends continuing assistance to FSDC, but shifting the project focus to consolidation of existing farming systems in operational irrigation areas. (For specific project recommendations, see Appendix B.) Any assistance provided by A.I.D. should not emphasize commodities such as pumps. Innovative possibilities should be explored to allow the Irrigators Service Associations to accumulate sufficient capital to make productive investments. (See Appendix A, Capital Formation.)

Should FSDC consider major new projects outside of the irrigation field in areas of A.I.D. priority, such as energy and ecological programming (tree farming, etc.), then technical assistance might be provided. Such technical assistance should focus on the links necessary to reach the rural poor.

2. How might the policies of the Philippine government affecting the beneficiaries be improved?

The Philippine government has evolved a series of policies that impinge upon farmer income, some of which effectively limit his capacity and the capacity of the rural development process. A.I.D. should analyze Philippine national policies to determine the extent to which these policies may adversely affect the totality of the rural development effort and our A.I.D. program. A.I.D. should then decide whether to approach the Philippine government on any of these policies to discuss what might be done to alleviate rural development bottlenecks, either with or without A.I.D. assistance.

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a. Rice Pricing and Procurement Standards

If the government is interested in improving farmer income, the rice price policy and procurement conditions are obvious foci of reform. Without considering the marketing and pricing of farmers' products, A.I.D. investment cannot achieve their purposes.

b. Fertilizer Pricing Policies

The Philippine Government currently subsidizes the sale of fertilizer. Nevertheless, rice prices over the past several years have not kept pace with increases in the cost of fertilizer. With increasing oil prices, it is likely that fertilizer will continue to rise even if the government subsidy is maintained. Are there ways in which A.I.D. could intervene with the Philippine government to ensure that farmer income is not adversely affected and productivity does not decline? (See Appendix A, Capital Formation.)

c. Land Tenure

The share tenant has no guaranteed right to remain on the land. ISA membership, the team feels, should guarantee security of tenure for share tenants. This recommendation is founded on the need for equal standing for all members of the ISA, the willingness to invest in the long-term effectiveness of the ISA, and the incentive to take risks.

d. Landlord and Rent

The project has resulted in increased yields for the farmers and windfalls for the landlords. The landlord's percentage traditionally remains the same even if the farmer harvests one or two additional crops a year. A change in government policy limiting the rent on land to one crop payment calculated by averaging annual yields would be a more equitable arrangement. Thought should be given to landlord investment in the irrigation systems themselves.

e. Off-Farm Employment

The Philippines is faced with increasing population pressures that have in the past resulted in the fragmentation of agricultural land and reduced the size of farms to near minimum

standards. Yet the population pressures continue, with resulting migration into urban areas, and unemployment and underemployment in rural areas. Improved farmer income cannot be met from increased rice production alone except to a limited extent that is rapidly being approached in parts of the country. Non-rice farm income and other farm-related activities will assist the farmer and should also be the focus of A.I.D. attention. Beyond farm income there is a growing need for a determined government policy to disaggregate light industrial and agro-business employment opportunities. The Korean model is one that should be explored by the Philippine government. Off-farm employment is essential in the Philippines.

f. Credit Policies

Timely amounts of credit with reasonable charges directly affect the farmer's ability to have sufficient production resources and materials. Under the existing official credit systems, obtaining credit may require collateral, e.g., land ownership. Otherwise, it may only be available from private sources at high interest rates.

The subject of rural credit should be analyzed in its entirety as to availability, terms, and repayment scheduling to see if the present system of credit and credit servicing is, as farmers contend, a deterrent to optimal farm production.

3. What are the implications of this project for A.I.D. activities in other countries?

It is too early to draw too many implications from the assessment of this project for A.I.D. activities in other countries. However, some tentative conclusions should be explored as other projects are reviewed.

a. Village-level organizations, to be effective, should only be introduced when they focus around a clear and perceived need of direct benefit to the population.

b. Irrigation systems are not primarily the domain of the engineer. The comprehensive agricultural implications of such systems must be included early in project design if they are to be successful. Although engineering is necessary for effective irrigation, it is not sufficient. Irrigation projects should not be considered quick and easy means to expend program funds. Irrigation projects should not be developed in capital development offices, but in agricultural offices. As long as capital development offices exist in the field, there will be

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pressures to regard the spending of funds as more essential than their effective utilization.

c. Field-level monitoring for rural projects should, whenever possible, be conducted by A.I.D. direct-hire staff, so that the knowledge and insights gained remain within the Agency. Contractors may be required as operating expenses become tight, but the Agency loses in the long run as a result of the lack of continuity in the monitoring process.

d. The intermediate links between any project objective and the goals to be achieved must be clearly identified and included as an integral part of the project strategy analysis. It is clear from this project that assumptions concerning these links in the design phase can very quickly become constraints as the project is implemented.

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TECHNICAL REVIEW OF THE PHILIPPINE
NUTRITION PROGRAM

Agency for International Development
Manila and Washington, D. C.
February 1978

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Philippines	B. Project Title Philippine Nutrition Program	C. Project Number not stated	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>74</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY <u>78</u>
E. Life of Project Funding 1. AID: (Loan or Grant) * <u>12,451.99</u> 2. Other Donor * <u>9,316.6 (UNICEF)</u> 3. Host Country Counterpart Funds * <u>35,181</u> TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director not stated 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) 3. Other	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) not stated 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not stated		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) National Nutrition Council 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not stated	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date)			

Evaluation of the P.L. 480 Title II program in the Philippines 1977, Food for Peace

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title Technical Review of the Philippine Nutrition Program	B. Evaluation Date Feb. 13-24, 1978	C. Type of Evaluation End of Project Eval. but not impact since data not available.	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation 1974-1978												
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire not stated a. travel _____ b. per diem _____ Contract _____ 3. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____	F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation (SEE attached sheet)		G. Initiated By AID/Washington												
H. Evaluation Team Composition (SEE attached sheet)															
<table border="0"> <tr> <td>1. Direct Hire</td> <td>a. Name</td> <td>b. Present Position</td> <td>c. Area of Expertise</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2. Contract:</td> <td colspan="2">a. Name(s) of Persons</td> <td>b. Contract No.</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td colspan="2">c. Name(s) of Persons</td> <td>d. Area(s) of Expertise</td> </tr> </table>				1. Direct Hire	a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise	2. Contract:	a. Name(s) of Persons		b. Contract No.		c. Name(s) of Persons		d. Area(s) of Expertise
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2. Contract:	a. Name(s) of Persons		b. Contract No.												
	c. Name(s) of Persons		d. Area(s) of Expertise												
I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position) not stated	J. Evaluation Coordinator Signature _____ Typed Name _____ Position _____ Date _____														

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F. Purpose: Assess progress achieved to date by interviews, visiting program activities in Manila and eleven provinces and provide AID with guidance for future nutrition program design.

H. Evaluation Team:

The AID Review Team was composed of the following:

Mr. Sol Chafkin, Ford Foundation (Chairman, NAS Committee on International Nutrition Programs)

Mr. James Pines, New Transcentury Corporation (Consultant to AID/W, Office of Nutrition)

Dr. Gerald Keusch, Mt. Sinai Hospital, N.Y.C. (Member, NAS/CINP)

Dr. Barbara Underwood, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Member, NAS/CINP)

Mr. Robert Pratt, Office of Nutrition, AID/W

Dr. James Brady, Office of Technical Resources, Asia Bureau. AID/W

SUMMARY

A.I.D. has provided technical and material assistance to the Philippine Nutrition Program and predecessor programs since 1968. The current USAID project expires in August, 1978 and a follow-on project is being considered. In view of this, AID/W requested that a review be made of the Philippine Nutrition Program, including A.I.D. assisted elements, to assess progress achieved to date and to provide A.I.D. with guidance for future nutrition program design.

The review was carried out in the Philippines during February 13 to 24 by a six person team of two AID/W staff and four outside experts. Team members interviewed numerous individuals and visited program activities in Manila and eleven provinces. The USAID and National Nutrition Council made the review possible by providing complete access to program personnel and information. The team's conclusions are the product of their own observations and extensive dialogue with and feedback from the Philippine and USAID counterparts. Nevertheless the team remains solely responsible for them and for any errors of fact or judgment. The recommendations are made in the hope that they will be useful for our Philippine and A.I.D. colleagues to consider in planning new nutrition activities.

Conclusions and recommendations are included in sections IV and V of this report. The team's overall assessment can be summarized as follows: Excellent progress has been made in identifying malnutrition as a national problem, establishing a sound policy and institutional framework for attacking the problem and initiating imaginative measures for that purpose. Local level commitment to the program appears to be strong. Initially, the program emphasized supplementary feeding to reduce more severe cases of malnutrition but is now placing high priority on local-level planning and preventive, outreach interventions centered in the municipality and village or barrio (barangay). Integration of nutrition concerns into economic and agriculture planning has not yet been achieved.

Notwithstanding the fact that there is much more to be done, the Philippine Nutrition Program stands out as one of the best national nutrition programs with which the team is familiar and AID's support for the program has apparently contributed materially to that success.

IV. Conclusions

A. Excellent progress has been made in identifying nutrition as a national problem and in establishing the policy and institutional framework for attacking the problem. A national coordinating mechanism has been established (the NNC) and provided with an impressive physical facility for its central operations. There remain needs to strengthen ties between NNC and other key agencies and to complete and implement current NNC activities to improve planning and information processing systems.

B. Local level commitment to nutrition appears to be strong, probably as the result of the NNC's efforts to intimately involve local governments in the planning and implementation of nutrition activities and as a result of the support of the President and First Lady. The establishment by NNC of the Barangay Nutrition Scholar (BNS) system provides a unique linkage of national efforts to barangay needs. It also exemplifies voluntarism, but by the same token, raises questions about the viability of the voluntary approach when the program matures and some of the initial enthusiasm inevitably diminishes.

C. The Director and staff of the NNC, as well as the Council members, deserve praise for their success in promoting a national awareness of nutrition problems and operational solutions to these problems. This should not be overlooked in efforts to carry the program on from its organizing and program development phase into the next stage of consolidation and refinement of approaches and the expansion of field outreach efforts.

D. The food assistance effort of AID, the GOP, and the PVO's has been well targeted to malnourished children. The feeding program does appear to have produced some element of dependency among recipients which needs to be addressed by new programs directed toward nutritional self-sufficiency at the community level. The

NNC and others are aware of the problem and are committed to reducing the role played by donated foods, but action to achieve this goal needs to be undertaken on a broader scale. Finally, it should be recognized that the supplemental feeding program has had a significant impact on reducing the prevalence of severe malnutrition among Philippine children.

E. There has been a rather heavy curative bias in the feeding and health activities and more attention now should be given to strengthening preventive activities of the NNC and the DOH. More attention might thus be given to monitoring of growth, immunizations, oral rehydration for acute diarrhea, refeeding for "catch up" growth, improved sanitation and water, etc.

F. Field implementation of programs appears to be generally good, but performance varies according to the strength and dedication of local leaders and the nutrition action officers at various levels. At the provincial and municipal levels, the part-time officials detailed to this assignment from central agencies (DOH, DEC, et.al.) need more training on the leadership and program management aspects of their jobs. The use of such part time action officers has been successful in the initiation of activities in many localities, but like the BNS, there needs to be an assessment of the longer term effectiveness of part-time persons.

G. The technical and financial aid and food support provided by AID has played a significant role in reducing infant and child malnutrition and in establishing the current program. USAID was involved in nutrition activities before these became a major concern of the GOP. It is hoped that USAID will continue to give priority to assistance for the nutrition sector, although the types and styles of such assistance may have to be different from those of the past. The NNC apparently looks forward to close cooperation with USAID on solving some of the current problems facing the program. USAID and NNC should also continue their efforts to piggy back nutrition improvement activities onto other USAID-supported activities in agriculture, provincial development, water systems, health development, etc.

H. While considerable verbal support is being given to the desirability of integrating nutritional concerns into other sectors, such as agricultural production, there appears to have been little real substantive progress in the achievement of this objective. Part of the problem may be a fear of diluting efforts in other sectors if nutritional concerns are added. There also

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appears to be a lack of knowledge about workable models for addressing nutrition problems through macro-level measures. This is inevitable since we are aware of no perfected models to date. Consequently, it may be necessary to test different combinations of models at the micro or community level to find out what might work best for the Philippines.

V. Recommendations:

A. The NNC should continue to strengthen the local nutrition delivery system by such means as: (a) fielding additional Barangay Nutrition Scholars, (b) providing better role definitions and performance criteria for all local action officers, and (c) continuing technical and program management training at all levels.

B. The NNC should continue to strengthen its own central management capabilities by establishing an effective management information system (MIS) which: (a) encourages field personnel to analyze and utilize the data they collect (rather than simply passing it on up to NNC). (b) reduces required field reporting to the absolute minimum required for program planning, implementation, and evaluation, and (c) provides feedback to the field on performance. It is recognized that a new MIS system is now being designed by NNC with the cooperation of Dr. P. Wesselkamper, a USAID/VPI consultant, so this recommendation may have already been taken into consideration by the NNC.

C. Consideration should be given to alternatives for maintaining the viability of the Barangay Nutrition Scholar system over the long run. The NNC has successfully initiated this critical linkage to the Barangay, but field contacts indicated that the very nominal allowance (10 pesos a month) and the other fringe benefits (insurance, T-shirt, bags, etc.) would probably not suffice to sustain the enthusiasm which now exists. Alternatives suggested to the evaluation team include: (a) expansion of the Barangay Scholar's functions and increased remuneration (with appropriate local cost sharing), (b) provide a more stable basis for part-time positions through some type of civil service recognition, and/or (c) use the BNS as the channel for selling certain goods (vegetable seeds, contraceptives, etc.). Consideration must also be given to the possible impact of other proposed Barangay positions on the BNS program. These include the Barangay Health Workers being considered under the IBRD/GOP Population Project and the USAID Panay Unified Health Services Project.

D. The GOP (NEDA, NNC, NFAC, et. al.) should continue to seek more concrete ways of linking nutrition to other development sectors. The general issues here have been identified by the NNC's Technical Advisory Body on Integrated Nutrition-Oriented Development Planning (created in August 1977).

There may be an urgent need to seize special opportunities which now exist for pilot-testing of an integrated approach at the community level. Dr. Solon has indicated that such an opportunity exists in the proposed IBRD-supported rural development project for Samar and Dr. Alba of NEDA suggested that such schemes might be incorporated into its new Integrated Area Development Project for Region VI (Central Visayas). This micro approach would test such alternatives as linking agriculture production to the needs of nutritionally vulnerable groups in an effort to effect nutritional self-sufficiency at the municipal level.

The NNC should also analyze opportunities for macro-level changes through the sponsorship of applied research into existing national policies on agriculture production, food exports, income and welfare laws, etc. While groups such as the new Philippine Institute for Development Studies could conduct the research, the NNC needs to have at least one economist on its staff to provide the essential linkage between external researchers and the officials concerned with policy formulation.

E. There should be consideration given to the establishment of closer formal and informal organizational linkages between the NNC/NCP and agencies such as NEDA, NFAC, POPCOM, and the Population Center Foundation (perhaps through exchange of council memberships).

F. More attention needs to be given to specific action measures to decrease the role played by foreign donated foods. NNC policies have already been promulgated to this effect, but higher priority needs to be given to actual implementation steps. Some communities are already operating on a self-help basis and this pattern should be expanded. The school and community gardening effort being considered for the new USAID/GOP Food and Nutrition Project could be one of the elements in a new initiative to achieve self-sufficiency but team contacts generally doubted that the garden strategy would have a major impact on nutrition. Nonetheless, gardening and multiple cropping are elements that should be considered for inclusion in the pilot projects, mentioned above, aimed at community nutrition sufficiency. It is recognized that some degree of welfare feeding may be required for the poorest element of the community, but the GOP still needs to ascertain the costs of

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continuing such feeding should foreign donations of food be terminated. In this connection, there appears to be a need for more precise data on the relationship between malnourishment and family income. While it was generally felt that a strong correlation exists between malnourishment and low income, some observers felt that there may be a number of families in the feeding programs who could afford to share a larger portion of the costs of such efforts.

G. The NNC, DOH, and other bodies concerned with the delivery of basic health services should review the current health outreach effort with a view to moving toward a more preventive and promotive program and toward an expansion of services to the Barangay level. The Barangay Health Centers established under the IBRD-supported project and the BNS should have a major role to play in the provision of improved health information and services. This effort could incorporate the introduction of the home-based growth chart and health record, use of oral rehydration techniques, and increased immunization coverage. Special programs might also be included to combat goiter and vitamin A problems in affected areas.

H. USAID and NNC should closely collaborate during the coming weeks on the areas where the new proposed Food and Nutrition Project can have the greatest impact. This project's resources can be used to help strengthen the NNC's ability to conduct more policy oriented research and demonstration activities, expand and continue to upgrade the field staffs and operations (including volunteers), and play a major role in the design and testing of new ways to achieve nutritional self-sufficiency at the community level. USAID should also assist the NNC, as appropriate, in devising plans and time tables for replacing foreign food donations with other resources.

I. If the proposed Food and Nutrition Project is to be implemented in a dynamic and maximally effective manner, it appears important for USAID to have a direct-hire nutrition specialist on its staff to serve as Project Manager and, perhaps, as senior advisor to the GOP on nutrition matters. It is recognized that staffing constraints may make the use of contract employees more feasible for this role, but it would seem more appropriate to use contract personnel to provide more direct and specialized advice to the GOP. It is also suggested that any U.S. contract advisors be located at the NNC on a regular basis.

J. The NNC and USAID should agree on the time frame, objectives, and resources needed for future reviews of the new USAID project and related nutritional activities. The team feels that the information from such reviews could be very useful to AID in planning nutrition

projects in other countries. The Philippines does have the institution-building and program experience needed to exercise a positive influence on countries which are only beginning serious efforts to cope with malnutrition.

The
P.L.-480 Title III Program in Bangladesh
An Evaluation of the First 16 Months
August 1978 - November 1979

USAID/Bangladesh
December 13, 1979

FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Bangladesh	B. Project Title P.L. 480 Title III Program	C. Project Number not stated	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY 78 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY _____
Life or Project Funding: not stated 1. AID: (Loan or Grant) _____ 2. Other Donor _____ Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director: not stated 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) 3. Other	
00,000 tons of wheat during FYs 78-80		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies): not stated 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.): not stated	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position): not stated 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.): not stated			

I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date)

1st joint evaluation: January 1979

2nd joint evaluation: June 1979

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title The P.L. 480 Title III Program in Bangladesh: An Evaluation	B. Evaluation Date Oct. 15-26, 1979	C. Type of Evaluation Midterm Evaluation	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation August 1978-Nov. 1979
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire: not stated a. travel _____ per diem _____ contract _____ 3. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation (SEE attached sheet)	G. Initiated By not stated

H. Evaluation Team Composition

1. Direct Hire
- | a. Name | b. Present Position | c. Area of Expertise |
|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| W.T. Oliver, USAID | | |
| Richmond Allen, USAID | | |
| Jon O'Rourke, USAID | | |
2. Contract:
- | a. Name of Organization (if any) | b. Contract No. |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|
| | |
3. Name(s) of Persons
- | c. Name(s) of Persons | d. Area(s) of Expertise |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| David Kunkel, USDA | |
| Richard Newberg, USDA | |

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position)
 Nizam U. Ahmed and Harun-al-Rashid of the USAID Program Office; Messrs. A. Siddiqui and A. Aziz, both Deputy Directors in the Directorate of Supply, Distribution and Rationing, Ministry of

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____

Typed Name _____

Position _____

Date _____

Handwritten mark

F. Purpose: This is the 3rd joint U.S.-BDG evaluation and though broad in scope, it is intended to provide the basis both for significant changes to the current Agreement and for future Title III Agreements. It also includes visits to 8 of the country's 62 subdivisions.

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II. Summary Findings and Recommendations

A. Findings: Production, Food Distribution and Prices

(1) Stability and adequacy of production - Foodgrain Production in Bangladesh is relatively stable on a year-to-year basis. From the Mid-1960's, and excluding the war years of 1971-72, production has not dropped more than a million tons (2 percent) from any one crop year to the next. The more important problem is the perennially inadequate level of production and its failure to increase significantly over time. Per capita foodgrain availability, i.e., production and imports combined, is 6 to 7 percent lower than in the late 1960's. Thus, given the country's marginal subsistence level, even moderate year-to-year production declines can assume a significance of crisis proportions.

(2) Seasonality of production - Unlike the situation in most countries where the total crop is harvested in two or three months of the year, Bangladesh farmers now harvest foodgrains virtually the year-around. Instrumental in this situation has been the rapid growth of boro rice and wheat which are harvested during February-May and now account for about 20 percent of total foodgrain production. (Aman rice, which is harvested during November-January, accounts for about 55 percent of the total and aus rice, harvested during July-October, for the remaining 25 percent.)

(3) Need for crop diversification - Given the year around production potential, small farmers in most (but not all) areas can protect themselves from seasonal shortages and crop risks through crop diversification. The need is for improved cropping systems, including new crops (potatoes, vegetables, oilseeds, etc.), and increased access to inputs, especially irrigation.

(4) Price patterns - Despite the relative stability in the long term production trend, there have been extremely wide year-to-year price swings in which crop shortfalls, low stock levels, and anticipation of reduced stock levels have all played a role. Thus, prices rose by 170 percent between 1974 and 1975, and by 70 percent between 1978 and 1979. On the other hand, as would be expected from the pattern of near year-around foodgrain production, seasonal price variations in Bangladesh have been relatively modest. The natural tendency is for prices to be highest, to about an equal extent, during the "lean seasons" of March-May and August-October. In fact, owing to the consistently higher level of oftakes under the Public Food Distribution System (PFDS) during August-October, prices have been highest during March-July.

(5) Farmers' liquidity - Many farmers are in their best cash position of the year during August-October when they have just marketed their jute and mesta crops. Others have either just sold or are holding for consumption their aus rice.

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(6) Stock levels and offtakes - Decisions with regard to off-take levels have been based mainly on stock availabilities. Thus, distribution has sometimes been high even when crops are good and prices low. As a result, strategic reserves do not accumulate; and since donors tend to base their allocations on stock levels, there is little incentive for the government to seek their accumulation.

(7) Rice demand vs. wheat demand - Cross-elasticity of demand between rice and wheat has been generally strong, with wholesale wheat prices averaging about 65 percent of coarse rice prices. However, the relationship is relatively weak during March-May when both the domestic wheat harvest and substantial supplies from the Food-for-Work (FFW) Program arrive on the markets, and tends to be especially close during periods of generally reduced purchasing power.

B. Title III Program

(1) Incentive prices to farmers - Effective procurement programs, based on generally adequate incentive prices to farmers, were carried out during both the 1977/78 and 1978/79 rice harvests, and in the wheat harvest of 1979. The Government has shown itself to be more interested in procurement for meeting the perceived needs of the ration system than in the more appropriate objective of providing adequate incentive prices.

(2) OMS Program - Evaluation of the OMS Program may be considered in terms both of program performance and of the appropriateness of program objectives.

(a) Performance

1. Although coarse rice prices were well above the target price of rice in most areas during most of 1978-79, OMS sales have not approached the intended levels (total sales of 126,000 tons during Sept. 1978 - Oct. 1979 vs. the 400-600,000 tons allocated for the full 24-month period). Low stock levels were partly responsible (given the Title III provision that OMS need not take place when foodgrain stocks fell below 500,000 tons); yet stocks were adequate to support MR sales of 503,000 tons during the same period.

2. A high proportion of OMS sales was to flour mills. Such sales, while not prohibited by the terms of the Agreement, did not contribute to the main program goal of constraining coarse rice prices.

3. The objective of coarse rice price constraint was not achieved. Low stock levels and highly unusual market conditions had much to do with the program's failure in this respect, but so too did erratic program management and the evident preference of EDG officials for MR as a means of moving foodgrains to the rural areas.

2/6/80

4. Even under favorable conditions, it is unlikely that the rice price constraint objective could have been achieved to any significant degree. Seasonal differences in cross elasticity of demand between rice and wheat required a degree of fine tuning of the rice/wheat pricing structure that was not allowed for in the Agreement and would have been extremely difficult to effect in practice.

5. As market prices of wheat and atta rose far above the OMS price, the BDG established rigid operational controls. Dealers who purchased wheat at Tk.87/md. could resell at Tk.100/md., or in some areas, Tk.95/md. Individual allotments were restricted to from 2 to 5 seers per person, depending on the area. Licensing and selection of dealers became increasingly controlled and even politicized. In some areas, only MR card holders could purchase OMS wheat. Justified as a means of preventing "windfall profits", the effect of these measures was to turn OMS into another ration channel.

(b) Objectives Reconsidered

1. The program was designed to moderate seasonal price swings. As noted above, the more important problem is large year-to-year fluctuations caused by major crop shortfalls or stock shortages.

2. As far as seasonal price swings are concerned, these can and in the past have been influenced by appropriate variations in the pattern of offtakes through the various channels of the PFDS.

3. A long term objective of the program was reduction of the highly subsidized ration system. Constraint of rice prices through OMS would presumably obviate the need for controlled sales at artificially low prices. In fact, given the low, fixed, price of OMS wheat, the immediate result was to add yet another subsidy channel to the existing system.

4. While the Title III Agreement called for the promotion of private enterprise in the wheat trade, the establishment of an OMS price only barely above (later, below) the procurement price operated to preclude attainment of that objective. Private traders were not provided a margin within which to procure, store and later resell wheat.

5. If the basic objective is the increased availability of a reasonably priced foodgrain, wheat (or atta) should suffice for the purpose. From that point of view, the constraint of coarse rice prices should not be a matter of great concern.

(3) Use of Local Currency Proceeds; Loan Forgiveness - Following

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are the principal findings with regard to the local currency use and loan forgiveness aspects of the Agreement.

(a) The BDG has reported depositing the local currency equivalent of \$16,500,000 of Title III wheat sales (OMS and MR) to the Title III Special Account. Further, they have reported "allocating" some \$15.1 million of this amount to USAID's Fertilizer Distribution and Improvement Project. However, there has been no indication that proceeds have been transferred to the Project Account, let alone disbursed from that account for project use.

(b) In allocating funds to the Fertilizer Project, the specific intended use appears to be financing of the fertilizer subsidy, as opposed to construction of fertilizer godowns or other more tangible aspects of the Project.

C. Goals and Objectives

(1) The major objectives of the Title III Program should be to accelerate agricultural development and to help provide food security. The latter may be defined as having a nutritious foodgrain available throughout the country at a price within a reasonable range above the procurement (support) price to farmers.

(2) Major price surges reflect supply shortfalls arising from periodic events (such as the 1979 drought) to a greater extent than seasonal supply variations within the course of a single year. Hence, major emphasis should be placed on responding to year-to-year supply rather than seasonal variations. In meeting the food security objective, fullest emphasis should be placed on wheat (and atta).

(3) Foodgrain production should be encouraged by the establishment of procurement prices announced well in advance of planting seasons. The primary objective in the establishment of procurement prices and their implementation should be the provision of incentives to farmers. As a by-product, the grain being procured by the Government will contribute to the augmentation of its food reserves, but the Government should not seek procurement for other purposes.

(4) In implementing the price support program, full and adequate use should be made of private intermediaries, especially in order to reach small farmers and remote areas that would otherwise not be served.

(5) Farmers, dealers and consumers should be encouraged to store for off-season use to reduce the load on Government facilities. They will undertake to do so to the extent they can foresee a margin between the procurement and market price of wheat sufficient to cover costs of purchase, assembly, storage and resale. The OMS price should be high enough to cover the procurement price plus dealers' storage and handling costs.

(6) Foodgrain subsidies should be reduced and ration operations increasingly directed to the benefit of the poor. To this end:

(a) Distribution to Statutory Rationing (SR) and less essential categories should be reduced, and increasingly shifted from rice to wheat;

(b) Modified Rationing (MR) should be directed to the poorest by making assets and income the sole criterion of eligibility;

(c) Food-for-Work (FFW) should be used when and where it can economically and properly supplement productive employment for the very poor;

(d) Relief should be directed to those unable to earn a living;

(e) Ration prices should be progressively raised. The near-term objective should be ration prices equal to the procurement prices of rice and wheat. The longer term objective should be prices sufficient to cover costs of procurement and distribution;

(f) Food distribution should emphasize low-cost alternatives acceptable to the lowest income groups, products not strongly competed for by people who can afford to pay more, e.g., wheat rather than rice; wheat as atta rather than refined wheat products; gur rather than refined sugar; lower cost oils, etc

(7) Taka proceeds from the sale of PL 480, Title III commodities should be used for development projects which directly impact on increasing foodgrain production in the next five years.

D. Recommended Actions

Following are the principal recommendations for inclusion in the Amendment to the current Agreement. A complete listing appears in Section VI.F.

(1) OMS

(a) Eliminate the rice price constraint objective;

(b) Establish the OMS price of wheat at a price sufficiently above the procurement price to provide private traders a margin for the storage, handling and resale of wheat;

(c) Base OMS sales on an atta trigger price and sell wheat in any subdivision when the trigger price is exceeded;

(d) If the market price rises above the trigger, raise the OMS price accordingly.

(e) Eliminate dealer restrictions and make a positive effort to sell to atta dealers;

(f) Eliminate resale price and volume restrictions on OMS.

(2) Local Currency Use

(a) Permit loan forgiveness upon proof of disbursements from project accounts;

(b) Eliminate the Fertilizer Project from the list of projects qualifying for loan forgiveness.

(3) Supply and Attribution of Wheat

(a) Add 200,000 tons of wheat already budgeted for Bangladesh in FY 1980 to the existing Title III allotment of 742,000 tons, making a new total for FY 1978-80 of 942,000 tons;

(b) Of the 942,000 tons, 400,000 tons may be attributed to MR; the remainder to OMS or, to the extent not needed, to BDG stocks. Provided that terms of the Agreement are complied with, Title III wheat not used (i.e., attributed to MR or sold through OMS) may be treated as having been sold, and that amount of the loan eventually written off.

(c) It is to be understood that the terms of the Amendment to the current Title III Agreement are to apply to all of the wheat supplied - the original 742,000 tons as well as the 200,000 tons being added from U.S. FY 1980 availabilities. Since attributions from wheat already received have not approached entitlements under the terms of the original Agreement, this will not pose a problem in accounting terms.

AN EVALUATION REPORT
OF THE P.L. 480 TITLE II PROGRAM
IN INDIA

Submitted to .

Office of Food For Peace
Agency for International Development

Under Contract Number AID/SOD/C-0082/WO-4

by

Community Systems Foundation
Ann Arbor, Michigan

June 4, 1979

FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country India	B. Project Title P.L. 480 Title II	C. Project Number not stated	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY not stated 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY _____
E. Life of Project Funding 1. AID: (Loan or Grant) not stated 2. Other Donor _____ 3. Other Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials not stated 1. Mission Director _____ 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) _____ 3. Other _____	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) not applicable 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not applicable		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) Coop. for American Relief Everywhere (CARE), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Lutheran World Relief (LWR), Church World Service (CWS) 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not applicable	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date) not stated			

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title An Evaluation Report of the P.L. 480 Title II Program in India	B. Evaluation Date June 4, 1979	C. Type of Evaluation Programs Assessment	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation not stated
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire not stated a. travel _____ per diem _____ contract _____ b. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation (SEE attached sheet)	G. Initiated By Washington
H. Evaluation Team Composition			
1. Direct Hire			
a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise	
Lawrence Flynn, AID/Washington			
Margaret Kalakhina, USAID/Delhi			
2. Contract:			
a. Name of Organization (If any)	b. Contract No.		
Community Systems Foundation	AID/SOD/C-0082/WO-4		
c. Name(s) of Persons	d. Area(s) of Expertise		
David Nelson	Nurtition and Community Development		
David Sahn	"		
Beatrice Lorge Rogers	"		
Shmi Krishnamurty; P. Pushpamma, Agric. Univ, Hyderabad; Charles Zumbro, Am. Council of Voluntary			
I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position)		J. Evaluation Coordinator	
John Withers, USAID/Delhi, Director George Warner, Food for Peace Officer		Agencies	
		Signature _____	
		Typed Name _____	
		Position _____	
		Date _____	

Purpose: Examined the use of the food by four volags (CARE, CRS, CWS, LWR), in the 3 program types (Maternal Child Health(MCH), School Feeding (SF), and Food for Work (FFW)). Emphasized assessing quality and impact of the programs, recommending appropriate changes to increase their efficacy and identifying constraints to program success. "The report examines the often conflicting and confused objectives of the Title II program, as they are perceived, stated and demonstrated by various U.S. Government agencies, Governments of India and the volags. Criteria are proposed for the review of future Title II requests and a strategy is recommended for future program monitoring, management and evaluation activities. The authors suggest that USAID and the volags identify the minimal data needs for these functions." page vii

XI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Before presenting our set of recommendations, we would like to recognize the generally excellent efforts which the volags and their collaborators have made and are making in using Title II food to good advantage. They have been bent by the winds of AID policy changes, sapped by bureaucratic information demands and pecked at by an endless stream of evaluators, auditors, visiting firemen and miscellaneous dignitaries. In spite of these, they manage to operate programs which reach nearly 20 million needy Indians, most of them children. They are usually aware of the deficiencies of their programs as well as their strengths.

For this reason, we are directing our recommendations primarily at AID and USAID in the hope that they will further facilitate volag operations and, like the Title II food itself, act as an incentive for the volags to remedy their own recognized deficiencies. We have already rejected as inappropriate the idea of making recommendations to the GOI. The highly capable and motivated Indian officials with whom we talked were fully able themselves to sort out their priorities concerning feeding programs based on costs and benefits.

Our conclusions and recommendations provided in this section fall into two categories. Some are restatements of the comments found in other chapters concerning the three major program types. The second group are made at the general policy level and reflect upon detailed discussion of issues in preceding chapters.

A. Program Level

1. MCH Program - Our conclusion is that the major objectives of Title II food in MCH programs, that of improving health and nutritional status of the target group, are largely not achieved. The basis for this finding is, that according to our observations, the conditions necessary for the achievement of the health and

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nutrition objectives (see pg. 37) are not consistently fulfilled. A much larger ration would be needed to counteract the effects of sharing, substitution and losses due to poor health. This finding is confirmed by much of the research done by Indian institutions which failed, in most cases, to find any but marginal nutritional impact of MCH programs.

A second conclusion is that the food does have the potential to act as an incentive for receiving other health services. This potential can only be realized if the other services are available.

We therefore make the following recommendations, recognizing that many of these ideas are not new and that some of them are already being attempted.

- a. Programs which provide food alone should be upgraded to provide other health and educational services. Programs which do not do this should be actively discouraged.
- b. It should be recognized that few children under three years are being reached by the program. Either new delivery methods should be investigated, or the emphasis on the objectives of reaching this target group should be reduced.
- c. Beneficiaries should be selected on the basis of economic and nutritional need. (For example if mothers in the program have low birth weight babies, these should be given a high priority for food supplementation.)
- d. Coarse cereal grains should not be provided as a nutritional supplement for children under three. Low bulk, high nutrient-density food should be programmed for this group.
- e. If the food is to be consumed by a given individual, it should be prepared and eaten on site for maximum control.

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- f. A greater consideration should be given to the need for improved environmental sanitation to reduce infection and infestation, along with nutritional supplementation.
2. FFW Program - The existing FFW projects are not neutral in their effects. Those which involve the granting of assets to selected individuals or to a community without requiring their participation in planning their contribution of labor or resources, run the risk of perpetuating a dangerous attitude of dependency on outside charity. Furthermore, if projects promise benefits which are not received because of poor planning and lack of other inputs, or if a project's benefits are clearly allocated unfairly and without regard for genuine need, then people will become cynical, skeptical of the value of development programs.

In contrast, projects which use the availability of food as an incentive to organize the community and educate it in planning and problem solving, as well as to create income-generating assets and skills, can have an important positive long-term effect on economic and community development. The nutritional impact of such an effect may well be greater than that of any direct feeding program.

In order to ensure that FFW projects result in these positive economic and nutritional changes, we have made the following recommendations regarding project design. These suggestions are based on observations of successful existing programs, which means that they are not new ideas and that their feasibility has been demonstrated. While local conditions of unemployment low income or lack of food may justify undertaking some projects which do not fulfill all of the recommended criteria, it is our suggestion that these conditions be given greater emphasis in future FFW projects.

- a. If possible, the project should be one that promotes community-wide self-reliance as well as economic growth. This can be achieved if project beneficiaries are involved in planning and execution of the project, if they take responsibility for it, and if they are required to provide some of the project resources themselves.
 - b. The project should be planned with food as a resource with time-limited availability and with specific criteria for the eventual termination of the food input. (In training programs the time limit could be applied to individual trainees.)
 - c. The selection of project beneficiaries (those who receive assets created by the project) should be based on established criteria of economic need. Ideally, from the point of view of community participation, the recipients (those who receive the food) should be the beneficiaries as well. It would be best if the whole community participated in selection of beneficiaries as well as of the project. Recipients of course should also be selected on the basis of need.
 - d. A project should not be undertaken unless all the resources are known to be available. Otherwise, those resources which are used will be wasted, and people's confidence will be lost.
 - e. A project should address an existing constraint on economic development in the community, responding, if possible, to a felt need of the people.
3. SF Program - We have considered the high priority that the GOI has mandated for the universalization of elementary education and the compelling role played by SF in attracting and retaining children in school, especially from the neediest groups - tribals,

low castes and landless. The team strongly supports any efforts by the GOI, the USAID and the voluntary agencies to continue, improve and expand the primary school feeding program utilizing both Title II commodities and locally produced foods. We also concur with the GOI's perception that basic education and human resources development are essential factors in social and economic development. The use of Title II food as an incentive to contribute to this long range development goal is worthwhile and deserving of support. Furthermore, the ease with which Title II commodities can be targeted in an on-the-spot feeding program persuades us to accept the MDM as a relatively effective (as the infrastructure exists and is functioning) means of providing a nutrient supplement to children to meet the program goals of more education. More specific recommendations are as follows.

- a. Headmasters and teachers responsible for the management of the MDM programs should receive special training to enlighten them on the objectives of the feeding program and to demonstrate to them ways by which the program could be made more effective for the benefit of the target groups. This training should explore the myriad ways that the teacher can play a catalytic role in the village or hamlet in social action and community development. In this way the Title II food could serve as an innocent entre in a whole series of development spin-offs culminating in people learning to solve their own problems.
- b. In any expansion of the MDM program with Title II and local stocks, first consideration should be given to the present client schools to realize a more rational head count for the inclusion of all children in need.
- c. Second order of expansion should be to new primary schools serving children from tribal, scheduled caste, or landless families. Related to this expansion should be a special

focus on the eight states where 70% of the nonenrolled primary school age children live. Other areas which should receive special consideration for MDM intervention are city slums and drought-prone rural areas.

- d. The team recommends that all such expansions of the MDM program should be made conditional on significant local participation in the management and support of the programs. This participation could be spontaneous if the matching nature of the expansion is well publicized. Likewise the training envisaged above should lead to fomenting such local initiative.
- e. Our own observations confirmed what has been noted in several research papers, namely that the school children suffer from vitamin deficiencies. For this reason the team recommends that the responsible authorities explore the possibilities of providing vitamin supplements or vitamin-fortified foods to the MDM program. There was a particular need for vitamin A and the B-complex vitamins.

B. General Policy Level

1. For this recommendation, we refer to a recent background paper of the Presidential Commission on World Hunger. "Eliminate rank priorities: (1) MCH; (2) FFW; (3) SF on a world wide basis and allow greater flexibility for individual programming which coincides with the specific needs of various countries."¹² We do not deny the importance of eliminating childhood malnutrition. We do question the validity of numerous unstated assumptions which underlie these targeted feeding efforts. Until these are verified, it would be inappropriate to continue pushing volags and collaborators to increase MCH feeding, especially at the expense of FFW and SF.

12. Food Aid Discussion Materials, Staff Discussion Paper No. 1. Presidential Commission on World Hunger, 1979.

2. In a hierarchical decision making structure there are decisions appropriate to each level. In the interests of good management, higher, more aggregated (i.e., with less detailed knowledge) levels should refrain from remaking decisions already made at lower, more knowledgeable levels. The corollary is that the higher levels must set the broad policy limits within which programs can be developed.

If the higher level decision-makers feel the need to revise lower-level decisions, it usually means that they were not clear in their objectives or role when they set broad policy and implementation guidelines.

3. USAID and AID should support and encourage the volags to develop alternative methods of programming Title II food. If food aid is used in new ways, they must accept that such experimentation may entail a "risk of relinquishing some control over the programs."¹³
4. As a first step in encouraging experimentation and confining decision making and review to the appropriate levels, AID/W and USAID should review their Title II reporting requirements with the objective of making such reports the minimum, logical products of their own information needs and of volag management systems. Specifically, USAID's intent to undertake such a review with the volags, should be funded and serve as a pre-requisite to development of any management information system.
5. We recommend that Title II program data collection efforts in India be separated according to their two functions: on-going program monitoring and periodic evaluation of purpose and goal achievement. The data collection system for program monitoring should be developed based on the minimal data needs of the three administrative levels (volags, USAID, AID/W) as stated above.

13. Ibid.

The system should be based on random sampling of programs within each major category (MCH, SF, FFW), and geographically stratified. It should be planned as a continuous effort. Spot checking by the USAID and the volags should be a part of the plan.

If further program evaluation is desired, it should start with the identification of all expected benefits of a given program, and of the assumptions underlying the expectation that these benefits will be obtained. A decision can then be made whether it is more efficient and economical to test the assumptions first, or concurrently with the assessment of purpose and goal achievement. Evaluation can be performed on a small sample of programs purposively chosen to be representative of particular variants.

6. We believe that the smooth operation of the Title II program in India depends on a close relationship between USAID and the volags, based to some degree on mutual trust and respect. Feelings play an important part in determining how a person will act in a given situation and thus, what his institution will or will not do. In our qualitative assessment, we have found that some volag people do not feel good about USAID. These feelings were described variously as "being taken for granted," as being viewed as "an extension of USAID," as "suffering from the whims of USAID," and of being the unwilling children in an institutional parent-child relationship. We hesitate to make firm recommendations on this point for obvious reasons. Nevertheless, we feel that it would be useful to deal with these feelings openly and constructively. To deny that such feelings exist and reject this suggestion would probably be a good indicator of the need for just such an effort.

AN EVALUATION REPORT OF THE
P.L. 480 TITLE II PROGRAM
IN SRI LANKA

Submitted to
Office of Food for Peace
Agency for International Development
Under Contract AID/SOD-PDC-C-0003

by
Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc.
Consulting Economists
Washington, D.C.

May 23, 1978

**A.I.D. - ASIA
FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION**

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Lanka	B. Project Title P.L. 480 Title II	C. Project Number not stated	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>not stated</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY _____
E. Life of Project Funding (SEE attached sheet) * AID: (Loan or Grant) _____ Other Donor _____ Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director _____ 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) <u>not stated</u> 3. Other _____	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) <u>not applicable</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) <u>not applicable</u>		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) Ministry of Health Ministry of Education 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) CARE	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date) <u>none</u>			

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title <u>An Evaluation Report of the P.L. 480 Title II Program in Sri Lanka</u>	B. Evaluation Date <u>April 1-23, 1978</u>	C. Type of Evaluation <u>on going project</u>	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation <u>not stated</u>
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire <u>not stated</u> travel _____ per diem _____ 2. Contract _____ 3. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____	F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation <u>Systems approach encompassing nutritional setting as well as policy, operations and management, effectiveness and inter-agency integration of an AID supported CARE Title II program.</u>		G. Initiated By <u>not stated</u>

H. Evaluation Team Composition

1. Direct Hire

a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise
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2. Contract:

a. Name of Organization (if any)	b. Contract No.
<u>Robert R. Nathan Associates</u>	<u>AID/SOD-RDC-C -0003</u>

c. Name(s) of Persons

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Dr. Paul Weswig, nutritionist and consultant (RRNA)
Edwin K. Fox, Evaluation Officer, Bureau of Private and Development Cooperation (AID)

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position) <u>Justin Jackson, Acting Director, CARE</u> <u>Dr. Beatrice de Mel, nutritionist, Ministry of Health</u>	J. Evaluation Coordinator Signature _____ Typed Name _____ Position _____ Date _____
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E. Life of Project Funding: CARE, USAID, World Bank, World Food Program, UNICEF, WHO, High Commissions of Canada, Great Britain and Australia

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Despite Sri Lanka's extensive health, education and transportation systems compared both to other Asian countries and to countries of comparable per capita GNP, malnutrition is a problem documented by most nutrition surveys since 1970. Intakes of calories and proteins are inadequate, particularly for low income groups, while intakes of other nutrients (calcium, vitamins, etc.) are inadequate for all income groups. The problem is pervasive, both geographically and sectorally (urban, rural, estates).

The full eradication of malnutrition requires a combination of health, nutrition, water and sanitation, education and employment programs, with benefits accruing only in the long run. However, for more short or medium run purposes and goals, supplementary feeding programs are warranted. Despite a controversy over whether malnutrition is or is not a serious problem, there is a consensus among all relevant foreign and domestic agencies that the Title II program operated by CARE is adequately fulfilling this need. Thus, no other agencies are considering any involvement in this area, nor is there any need for another voluntary agency to become involved. It is generally agreed that the CARE program is fully utilizing the logistic capacity of Sri Lanka to support such a program.

The Title II program in Sri Lanka is composed principally of Maternal Child Health (MCH) and School Feeding projects. The MCH organizational concept, however, is weak primarily due to weaknesses in the extensive but inefficient health delivery system. Meanwhile, the commodity emphasis is contrastingly strong because of CARE's intensive orientation of the program in this regard. Impressive progress has been made in the very recent but successful introduction of a virtually new blended food product, Thriposha,¹ throughout much of the country.

The School Feeding project has the exactly opposite structural emphasis. The organizational structure is more sound while the total product, a biscuit, requires further improvement.

For program direction purposes, the evaluation team recommends that more time and emphasis be placed on building up the MCH concept as a spinoff of Thriposha, and improving the quality and nutritional contribution of the School Feeding project. The latter is likely to involve not only improvement of the biscuit but also adding more local foods.

The overdependence of the program on Sri Lankan Government and foreign inputs further weakens the Title II program. There is a definite need for more development of the program from the bottom up, i.e., introducing more direct community

1. Thriposha, meaning "three nutrients," is a dry, pre-cooked, fortified food. Originally intended as a weaning food, it is actually consumed by all age groups because it can be prepared so many ways -- hot or cold, as a drink, or mixed with other foods and soups.

involvement. The School Feeding project needs more local participation and funds, and MCH activities could benefit from the assistance of community health workers.

One way of increasing local participation in the MCH operations would be for community workers trained by Sarvodaya, (a leading community development organization) to be used in Title II for organizing local communities in providing more local support and inputs as well as assisting with food distribution. In this way Sarvodaya workers would have viable projects with which to become involved, and Title II would have the local input it needs. This recommendation should be followed up by the CARE director with the aim of strengthening local support, participation and input into the project.

The CARE staff has excellently managed and operated the Title II Program in Sri Lanka. It fully controls and evaluates all aspects of the program and properly monitors all problems and remedies on a regular basis. There was little in the evaluation coverage of their operations and management aspects which they had not also considered and acted upon. They regularly study various program aspects like the distribution network, identify the principal bottlenecks and remedies, and then implement the necessary action. The team was especially impressed with CARE's entire planning process.

Despite the use of an experimental process for producing the Thripasha, CARE has implemented an economically viable production and processing system. The distribution of the

Title II foods from the United States to Sri Lanka and the dissemination of the biscuit and Thripasha are undertaken on a regular basis and are not seriously hampered by anything other than normal daily mishaps. CARE maintains proper financial and accounting records, program statistics and data on number of recipients, centers, geographic distribution, etc. These are updated on a regular basis. Finally, CARE has developed a monitoring and evaluation system for Thripasha which is well integrated into such activities as selection criteria for beneficiaries, and charting recipients' health and nutrition progress. The multi-functional system makes feasible the planning and implementing of several effectiveness studies to be undertaken within the next year or two.

The fact that the program is so impressively good does not mean that there are not problems or areas needing strengthening. Some were already recognized by CARE and included in their MYP while others evolved on the basis of the present evaluation and discussions with CARE staff and others. The evaluation is intended both to corroborate and to criticize program content, and to assist the managers in dealing with some problems so the program can continue to progress. Thus, the team recommended a few management and operations improvements.

The School Feeding project has the most serious weaknesses. An ongoing monitoring and evaluation system should be introduced to enable the identification of a better selection criteria and the charting of each recipient's progress, to assess the nutritional contribution of the

biscuit.' The system is also required to evaluate ultimately the Title II program's impacts at the project level. For the MCH the principal recommendation is to improve the supervision by medical officers of the Thripasha distribution, including a check that growth cards are being interpreted correctly.

It is also recommended that CARE continue to maintain cost information for all Title II program sources on a regular basis. This will serve as a check on program efficiency and become a basis for periodic cost effective assessments.

Program effectiveness has been measured in terms of its outreach, acceptability of products, community attitudes, nutritional contribution of biscuit and Thripasha, domestic production and consumption, and educational improvement.

The Title II program reaches nearly 10 percent of the population. Eighty percent of the population is categorized as poor, however, and an estimated 25 percent malnourished. Among the Title II target groups -- preschool and primary school children and pregnant or lactating women -- the percentages are higher. A coverage of 10 percent is not excessive in terms of need. Moreover, enlarging the program's outreach does not necessarily imply that more Title II foods are required, at least not after the next few years as Thripasha can be made entirely from domestically produced ingredients. The School Feeding project can and should utilize more local food inputs.

The program has been highly acceptable in most communities. In fact, the lack of the Thripasha or biscuit is the principal problem in some areas, not too much of it. Community attitudes have been highly supportive although this now needs to be translated into more community input.

The Thripasha significantly increases the nutritional intake of its target group while the biscuit is not sufficient, even in the maximum ration, to fill the nutritional gap in the primary school children. Additional locally available foods such as bananas or pineapples are warranted.

Title II Imports do not hamper or help domestic production but they have been significant in developing new consumption habits. The shift to ICSM is a step in the right direction when totally local products will be distributed. There has been no study determining the effect of foods on learning and school attendance, but almost all teachers interviewed thought that attendance was higher when biscuits were distributed.

The evaluation team recommends that several studies be undertaken by CARE, MOH and MOE jointly. Conversations with CARE staff indicate these would be feasible in terms of current personnel and budget levels.

Because of the controversy over the School Feeding project, the team recommends that a limited nutrition survey be undertaken to (1) substantiate prevalence of malnutrition; (2) indicate whether recipient levels are currently too high or too low; (3) get a more accurate assessment of which

schools ought to be in the project; and (4) assess to the extent possible the effectiveness of the project in the last few years.


On an even more limited basis there now appear to be sufficient data to assess the nutritional impact of Thripasha. Growth cards have been maintained in enough centers to get an adequate sample and a good cross-section among rural, urban and estate sectors.

Most recommendations can be implemented within the next year. However, the team recognizes that for some, more substantial shifts in program or project direction, a longer horizon is required. The team makes these recommendations, however, in order that a start on the planning and implementing processes for such changes may be made. The team feels especially confident that CARE can handle this. After all, within five years they have successfully developed, produced, processed and distributed a totally new product beginning virtually from ground zero. This is quite an achievement. The CARE program is an excellent example of what can be done when there is a strong commitment to reach program goals.

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A.I.D. Program Evaluation Report No.2

**AID's Role in Indonesian
Family Planning:
A Case Study with General Lessons
for Foreign Assistance**



December 1979

Agency for International Development

FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

cc

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Indonesia	B. Project Title Indonesia Family Planning	C. Project Number not stated	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>since 1968</u> (p.i) 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY _____
E. Life of Project Funding 1. AID. (Loan or Grant) 2. Other Donor Host Country Counterpart Funds TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director <u>Thomas Niblock</u> 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) 3. Other	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) not stated 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not stated		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) <u>National Family Planning Coordinating Board (BKKBN)</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not stated	

I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date)

"Family Planning Program Effectiveness", April 1979, Steven Sinding

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title <u>AID's Role in Indonesia Family Planning: A Case Study With General Lessons or Foreign Assistance</u>	B. Evaluation Date December 1979	C. Type of Evaluation Impact--AID Program Evaluation Report #2	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation since 1968
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire a. travel per diem contract 3. Other TOTAL \$ _____	F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation (SEE attached sheet)		G. Initiated By Population division of AID/Washington's Asia Bureau

H. Evaluation Team Composition

1. Direct Hire

a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise
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2. Contract:

a. Name of Organization (if any)	b. Contract No.
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James R. Heiby, M.D.	

3. Contract:

c. Name(s) of Persons	d. Area(s) of Expertise
Thomas H. Reese III, chief; Michael Philley and Dr. Emmanuel Voulgaropoulos.	
Also, Suwardjono Surjaningrat, chairman, BKKBN	

2. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position)
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Thomas H. Reese III, chief; Michael Philley and Dr. Emmanuel Voulgaropoulos.
Also, Suwardjono Surjaningrat, chairman, BKKBN

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____
Typed Name _____
Position _____
Date _____

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F. Purpose: Through field visits and interviews in Jakarta and rural Indonesia, the team sought to assess AID's assistance to that program and to identify the lessons that can be learned for the improvement of family planning assistance elsewhere. Specifically interested in identifying the reasons for famed program's success, not in evaluating the program itself.

Life of Project Funding:

page 24:	AID	57.9 million	
	Other Donor	45.9 million	
page iii:	AID	43.2 million (grants) + 14.3 million (loans)	
	Other Donor	46.5 million (foreign)	
	Host Country counterpart funds	105.0 million	
		<hr/>	
		208.0 million (?)	

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PART I

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND MAJOR FINDINGS

A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Overview. Since 1968 A.I.D. has provided \$43.2 million in grants and \$14.3 million in loans to the Indonesian National Family Planning Program. During the intervening years, prevalence of contraceptive use in Indonesia has increased dramatically and fertility has decreased far more rapidly than was predicted even a few years ago. The national program has clearly played the determining role in this decline. Program achievements on Java and Bali, the two densely settled islands that contain 90 million of the nation's 135 million people, are referred to by respected authorities as a "success story probably unrivaled in family planning history." It is widely acknowledged that A.I.D. support has been a major element in the program's success to date.

Program Impact. Indonesia's population was 40 million in 1900 and had soared to 117 million by 1969 when the national program was launched. During the 1970-1975 period the annual population growth rate averaged 2.4 percent. It has since been brought down to 1.9 percent. The fertility rate of Java and Bali, where the program has until recently been concentrated, has dropped 15 percent. Contraceptive prevalence on the two islands now averages over 35 percent and reaches over 85 percent in some villages. This has been achieved through voluntary participation and without material incentives for acceptors.

Financial Inputs. Funds provided to the program through 1978 totaled \$208 million. Of this the government of Indonesia provided 50 percent, A.I.D. 28 percent, and other foreign donors 22 percent. In the early years Indonesian contributions constituted only a small portion (e.g., 4 percent in 1968), while A.I.D. contributed the major portion. The Indonesian contribution has climbed steadily to 60 percent in 1978. This indicates growing country commitment but also the great importance of A.I.D. funds in the program's early years.

Country Commitment, Capability, and Context. The Suharto government has been unambiguously committed to fertility reduction as an integral part of overall national family planning coordinating board, the BKKBN. Extra-ministerial yet capitalizing on existing social and political systems, the BKKBN has developed the administrative capability, as well as commitment, to achieve measurable impacts. It has done so by providing services at the village level and by tailoring its program to indigenous village organization, leaders, and cultural values. Program achievements are especially remarkable in view of the conditions usually assumed to militate against family planning acceptance -- a national per capita income of only \$180 per year, an infant mortality rate over 100 per 1,000 live births, 50 percent illiteracy among adult women, and a wide diversity of Islamic and other intensely religious and tradition-minded linguistic and ethnic groups.

A.I.D. Effectiveness. A.I.D. has been successful in helping Indonesia's program to reduce population growth because it was able to provide necessary resources at the right time; this has enabled the national program to meet and create popular demand to reward and further build political commitment at all levels. A.I.D.'s ability to be effective has derived from four essential sets of conditions.

*AID/Washington provided consistent support but delegated authority to the mission for virtually all program decisions. It always made readily available sufficient grant funds, technical assistance, training, and commodities to meet and even anticipate the needs of the program and to permit flexibility in the field.

*The USAID Mission in Jakarta assigned high priority to population, created an Office of Population reporting directly to the Mission Director, and made it possible and attractive for key staff to remain in Indonesia for three tours of duty. Strong goal rather than procedure orientation and effective internal delegation of authority by the Mission leadership permitted the Office the flexibility and support necessary for creative innovation.

*The mission's population office has relied primarily on direct-hire staff who have been individually selected for their population and Asian competency and who have developed facility in the Indonesian language and familiarity with the Indonesian context. The staff has evolved a strategy and mode of close collaboration with the Indonesians that permits them to tailor A.I.D. resources to the specific needs of the program and to direct them to the greatest targets of opportunity.

*A mechanism, based on local-cost programming and project implementation letters, was developed by the mission population office to move resources quickly to provincial and rural activities where there is high probability that the resources will be used effectively. The ability of the Office to provide funding for local initiatives within weeks (rather than months or years) has been highly instrumental in stimulating local participation, promoting innovation, and building political commitment. It is this mechanism, together with the successful management-oriented data system developed by the BKKBN and the A.I.D. Mission, that has permitted effective decentralization. If only one element were to be singled out as most important in explaining the effectiveness of A.I.D. support to this particular program, it would certainly be the use of this funding mechanism.

Lesson Learned. A.I.D. support to Indonesian family planning is regarded as one of the U.S.'s most successful foreign assistance efforts. Many lessons can be extracted and should be transferable to programs elsewhere. Most broadly they derive from putting basic development principles into practice. In particular they concern the mechanism for fast, accurate funding. It is the use of this procedure by a technically competent, culturally sensitive goal-oriented staff that most distinguishes A.I.D. support to the program. Legal and administrative provisions for the procedure are standard in the A.I.D. system. The exact importance of certain host-country conditions to the effective use of the mechanism remains to be determined. Its effective use depends, however, upon having a resident staff and upon that staff being given adequate support and authority to act.

B. MAJOR FINDINGS

Sixteen major findings are presented below as sources of strength and five as sources of concern.

1. Sources of Strength

a. Political Will

The Indonesian family planning program has been successful in large part because it has had strong political support from a president and government unambiguously committed to fertility reduction as an integral part of overall national economic development. AID assistance has helped the program's personnel to sustain and even increase top-level political support by providing political leaders with low-cost program successes. Essential to AID's assistance has been a strong technical office in Washington combined with flexible field operations.

Discussion

The Indonesian government's commitment to fertility reduction as an integral part of economic development reflects a set of dynamic conditions that are the product primarily of internal sociopolitical developments interacting with worldwide forces. The specific form and content of the political commitment are purely Indonesian. There is little the United States did or could have done to bring about this initial set of conditions. Nevertheless, the character of AID assistance helped the Indonesian family planning personnel to sustain and even increase the political support of their national leaders.

The essential element in AID's assistance was the combination of a strong technical office in Washington and highly flexible field operations. Flexibility was provided by the willingness of AID/Washington to delegate operational decisions to the mission's population office. This enabled the mission to use local cost programming to move money and resources rapidly to users and to focus attention on program outcomes rather than on recognition for AID assistance. These conditions enabled the Indonesian program to request presidential support in the form of public statements and to follow these with activities supported quickly and unobtrusively by AID funds without simultaneously demanding additional resources from the president. The net results were program successes that were of low cost to national leaders.

b. Population as Priority

AID's mission directors in Indonesia have taken seriously the Congressional mandate to give priority to population. The creation of an independent office of population reporting directly to the mission director has made it possible to attract and retain high-quality staff; the organi-

zational status of the office has been a major determinant of high staff morale and of the staff's ability to successfully support this high-priority program.

Discussion

The high priority accorded to population by the USAID mission in Indonesia was reflected by establishing a separate office for population with the chief of the population office reporting directly to the mission director. This translated the idea of high priority into effective organizational action in at least three ways. First, the chief was placed in a position equal to other key administrators. He thus had effective bargaining power with financial and legal units, whose natural tendency is to be concerned with administrative procedures rather than program outcomes. Second, population was not submerged under another organizational layer, whose chief would be concerned with a wide variety of different projects and who might have little technical knowledge of or interest in population. Finally, placing population in a separate office gave it access to higher level decision-makers on the Indonesian side. This also gave AID greater credibility in urging Indonesian bureaucratic and political leaders to accord higher priority to population.

c. Goal Orientation

Major AID and BKKBN decision-makers responsible for the program have been intently goal- and outcome-oriented and consistently emphasize that this firm commitment to goals demands flexibility in approaches. Activities are evaluated on the basis of the specific goal of fertility reduction, which is estimated directly or through careful use of surrogate measures.

Discussion

Program managers have clear goals and periodically assess targets for meeting these goals. They frequently admit uncertainty as to what will ultimately be the best means of achieving the goal and accordingly actively experiment with alternative strategies. This is referred to by the USAID population staff as "guided incrementalism."

AID and host-country procedures are respected but not permitted to become ends in themselves. It is recognized that legally binding contracts are necessary for moving resources but that they by no means assure or even promote cost-effective goal attainment. Responsibility is consciously delegated in order to establish performance- and goal-orientation in others. So strong is this goal orientation that both

American and Indonesian personnel alike frequently refer to the program as propelled by a special force.

It is true that population activities lend themselves to quantified measures of outcome, but these are by no means a prominent feature in the day-to-day management of most programs. Examples abound of programs where delays and inaccuracies in data reporting render any cybernetic application virtually impossible. Nor is it unusual for program managers to become distracted by process measures of secondary importance, such as the number of personnel trained or the number of clinics opened. Competing value systems may also reduce the emphasis given to a specific outcome and considerations such as loyalty or status can become distracting factors in a program's management.

In contrast, a BKKBN deputy chairman terms his program's predominant philosophy as management by objective, an orientation consistently apparent in a variety of program contexts. The timeliness and completeness of the data system, for example, is the result not only of a practical design but also of a program-wide, ongoing goal of maintaining an effective system. These data are regarded as essential for outcome-oriented management; budgets, supervision, public recognition, and training all appear to be linked primarily to performance, as expressed in contraceptive use, rather than to friendship, political influence, or any other arbitrary formula.

Certainly, a pervasive political commitment to reducing Indonesia's population growth has also been essential to the present management style. The USAID mission has also played an important role in fostering a program orientation explicitly directed toward measurable outcomes. The very expression "management by objective" is evidence of the impact of the mission-funded long-term U.S. participant training. The data system itself was to a large degree a mission initiative. Similarly, the mission population staff has used its local cost programming mechanism to direct resources to provincial programs largely on the basis of performance. This emphasis on performance has apparently also influenced the manner in which domestic BKKBN funds are budgeted, suggesting that the present management pattern will be sustained beyond the period of large-scale AID assistance.

d. Grants vs. Loans

The fact that most of AID support has been provided through grants promoted success in two ways. First, it permitted activity that the Indonesian government might otherwise have considered unaffordable, and, second, it provided critical speed and flexibility that could not have been achieved through loans alone.

Discussion

For the first ten years of U.S. support to Indonesian family planning, assistance was primarily in the form of grants. Obligations through 1978 totalled \$57,879,000 of which 75 percent was grant and only 25 percent loans signed in 1977 and 1978.

It is highly unlikely that the Indonesian government would have been willing to borrow money for family planning at the inception of the program especially under the extreme economic pressures the government faced at the time. Grant support permitted the government to develop a major family planning program at little cost to its other programs. Grant support has also provided greater flexibility. Loan negotiation is always a more time-consuming process involving the national planning agency, and agreements typically carry rigid specifications for use of funds. Indonesian family planning officers have often expressed frustration over the delays, complexity, and inflexibility they have experienced with other donors' loan arrangements. The availability of grant monies, accompanied by the delegation of virtually all program decisions from Washington to the field, permitted the mission to respond promptly and appropriately to local developments.

e. Fast, Flexible Funding

The mission's population staff has developed an extremely important process, using local cost programming, to move money rapidly -- in weeks rather than months -- to provincial staff. The process necessarily draws mission staff into close collaboration with Indonesians in developing socially sound and cost-effective projects. Although labor intensive, the process is highly rewarding and permits AID staff to respond to the government of Indonesia with confidence. This is perhaps the most innovative and the single most important element in the support AID has given to the Indonesian program.

Discussion

Using local cost programming, the USAID population staff has developed a labor intensive procedure in which it works closely with Indonesian officials to develop sound project proposals for USAID funding. Once proposals are developed, the procedure provides for the movement of money to the provinces that is, by normal bureaucratic standards, unbelievably fast. The procedure relies upon grant funding and the extensive delegation of authority from AID/Washington to the mission and within the mission to the population staff.

The value of this process cannot be overestimated. It provides for intensive interaction with BKKBN officials, in headquarters and provinces, through which AID staff gain a clear understanding of the needs of the program. This permits them to selectively support its

strongest parts. It permits funding to be highly flexible, adjusting activities to the specific field needs, and it fosters a high degree of local initiative. Although the majority of projects funded through this process are based on a standard model of community-based contraceptive distribution, a wide variety of small-scale experimental approaches has also been funded. Many of these innovative projects have proved unworkable. The willingness of the mission to support unconventional projects with a significant risk of failure has been essential in the rapid evolution of the overall program.

If there were only one lesson to be learned from AID support to the program, it would certainly concern the utility of the labor-intensive, fast, flexible funding process the mission has developed.

f. Flexibility, Decentralization, and Local Participation

The fast, flexible funding procedure developed by the mission reflects its own decentralized nature and in turn supports the effective decentralization of the BKKBN program. This lodges both authority to act and credit for performance in the provincial offices. The double support for decentralized programming mobilizes great amounts of human resources by stimulating local initiative and participation through demonstrating that such initiative can bring quick and effective central support.

Discussion

Most development programs attempt to stimulate local initiative and participation but fail because they cannot respond quickly and appropriately to the needs and ideas of local leaders. The Indonesian family planning program and AID's fast, flexible support to it have been unusually effective in eliciting initiative and participation of provincial and the village leaders. BKKBN effectively delegates authority for program management to provincial staff, administrators, religious, and other local leaders. The extensive field travel of USAID population staff together with Indonesians and the staff's ability to commit funds and then move them quickly to the provinces are key ingredients in generating local initiative. This gives local leaders the confidence that their ideas can be quickly translated into action and being able to see quick results encourages local leaders to be more active. This has apparently also helped many of them to resist the lures of the capital and to remain instead in the provinces where their talents are so needed.

g. Selection Training and Tenure of Personnel

The mission and AID/Washington's regional and technical bureaus have exerted important influence on staffing the mission's population

office and the tenure of its staff members has been unusually long compared to AID norms. This has produced a highly competent team and permitted development of the collaborative AID-Indonesian relationship that has been an essential element in the program's success.

Discussion

It is said that AID has been effective because the USAID population office "has had good people." "Good people" are not just circumstance. The population staff have all been hand-picked for their population and Indonesian or other Asian background and have subsequently been given critical support by a mission management.

The mission, the Asia Bureau, and AID/Washington's Office of Population have all been able to play an active role in the appointment of personnel to the USAID population office. On several important occasions this involved overriding decisions made by AID's personnel system and others whose primary concern was not population assistance. The resultant staff has commanded complimentary skills in public health, management and logistics, and social science. Nearly all staff have been direct hire rather than external contractors. Once appointed, all staff have been given Indonesian language training, as have been their spouses. Facility in Indonesian has been indispensable to functioning effectively in Indonesian society and, in particular, to the collaborative program development which is premised on much field involvement and verbal negotiation. The mission management has then helped its key staff to remain with the office for three terms of duty (i.e., six to seven years). This has fostered a cooperative working style, which constitutes the basis of what is widely recognized as the office's successful relationship with the Indonesians. On numerous occasions the team was able to observe how long-term personal relationships between the population staff and their Indonesian counterparts clearly facilitated program development.

No evidence was found to suggest that long-term residence in any way impairs the staff's ability to further U.S. and AID interests. On the contrary, the effective performance of this staff strongly indicates the advisability of AID's assignments precepts being modified to favor three tours of duty when the mission so recommends.

h. Mission Director Support

The active and genuinely outcome-oriented support of the mission director enabled the Population Office to place U.S. money where it could do the most good. The mission director's support has been essential for the decentralization and flexibility that made it possible to adopt the program to local conditions.

Discussion

The ability of the U.S. to assist the Indonesian population program would be severely compromised in the absence of a highly supportive mission director. According to the population staff, this means a mission director to whom they have direct access, who is willing to delegate responsibility to them and then trust it with that responsibility, who is goal- rather than procedure-oriented, and who is willing to get involved in and give time to the program.

i. Program Collaboration and Initiative

The degree to which initiative is lodged in the mission, the central BKKBN office, and local BKKBN offices varies widely, indicating a genuinely collaborative working relationship between the mission staff and their local counterparts.

Discussion

New program initiatives are developed collaboratively and originate, alternatively, in the provinces, at BKKBN headquarters, or with AID. The program's data and logistics system is a major program element based primarily on USAID initiative. The important "village family planning" program was originally proposed by a provincial BKKBN office and was then effectively supported by the mission in the face of initial opposition at the BKKBN central level. In many cases, mission support for workshops and training was largely a response to provincial- or central-level proposals, as was true also for the addition of nutrition and health services to the family planning infrastructure.

The local cost funding mechanism, while stimulating local initiative, does not automatically fund all initiatives. Some proposals are funded in their original form, but in many cases the population office staff negotiates extensive modifications as a prerequisite to funding. Finally, where the staff regards a proposal as unacceptable, even with modifications, it refuses to provide support. Further, the team found no instance in which a proposal rejected by the mission was subsequently supported with Indonesian funds. Although the process leading up to a formal proposal is based largely on verbal exchanges and is not documented in detail, nevertheless there is a consensus among the population staff that the overall acceptability of provincially initiated proposals has steadily increased. This suggests a subtle but important institutionalizing influence of AID on the Indonesian program.

j. Program vs. Project Orientation

The mission population staff is committed to the overall success of the national program and to tailoring AID assistance to meet its

U.S. training have been used to reward BKKBN staff for good performance while building the technical capacity the program needs for self-sufficiency. U.S. training, especially advanced degree programs, has been especially effective. Virtually all trainees have returned to Indonesia and now hold key positions in the BKKBN and other governmental agencies and academic institutions that support the population program.

Discussion

The mission's population office provides approximately \$600,000 annually for short- and long-term population training for Indonesians. Both in-country and U.S. training are used for internal staff development, which provides additional incentives to work well. High quality individual performance can lead to advanced training, which helps individuals to advance in their own careers. Existence of these opportunities helps the program to recruit and retain high-quality personnel and to draw out their full talents. U.S. training, especially for advanced degrees, has been particularly beneficial. The mission reports no loss of overseas trainees to developed countries. On the contrary, approximately 50 individuals who have received advanced U.S. training through the USAID population office now hold key positions in the BKKBN, Ministry of Health, Central Statistics Office, and academic institutions that support the population program. Training has constituted less than 5 percent of the population office's overall budget, yet it has provided much of the high-quality manpower needed for a self-sufficient program. On these grounds, the training is highly cost-beneficial.

It would seem highly advantageous for the U.S. government to continue to support training in the U.S. for promising candidates from those countries that have already demonstrated a high rate of return. The Indonesian program would certainly not be where it is today without this training.

n. Integration of Health and Family Planning

Given the Indonesian context, any attempts AID might have made (but did not) to impose a rigid, preconceived formula for integration of health and family planning services would almost certainly have been detrimental to the program. At best they would simply have failed; at worst they would have obstructed the Indonesians in their own programming. Instead a new alternative for integration has been developed -- the "piggybacking" onto the mature family planning program of health, nutrition, and even income-generating activities.

Discussion

Indonesia's achievements in fertility reduction could not have been accomplished in so short a time had there been insistence on a Washington-conceived prescription for integration of family planning

with health. In fact, at two important junctures decisions were made that have proven critical to program success but that might have been precluded by a rigid formula for integration.

First was the decision to establish an autonomous national family planning coordinating body (the BKKBN) outside and largely independent of the Ministry of Health. While experience from many developing nations indicates that cooperation and coordination with the health ministry is essential for family planning effectiveness, clear evidence also exists that health ministries are often among the weakest of any country's ministries and they tend to be especially ineffective at bridging the gap between the ministry's professionals and the country's poor majority.

The BKKBN was fortunately established outside the Indonesian Ministry of Health, although it has worked very closely with that ministry. It has in fact experienced integration in process without integration in structure. Some observers argue that the cooperation has been achieved because of rather than in spite of the lack of structural integration. In the provinces, family planning services are delivered through the health system down to its lowest existing levels, the sub-district health centers (puskiskas) and the maternal and child health clinics (BKIA's). At the national level, it is significant that BKKBN's chairman since 1970, Dr. Suwardjono Surjaningrat, was appointed by President Suharto in 1978 to simultaneously serve as Indonesia's Minister of Health.

The second decision that defies a rigid integration formula was the decision in 1976 to break out of the static puskiskas and BKIA clinics in order to bring family planning services and information to the villages where approximately 60 to 70 percent of the Indonesian population was not yet effectively serviced by the government health system (and still is not).

USAID and BKKBN decision-makers, when deliberating the optimal relationship between family planning and health, have made certain important distinctions. These are distinctions in function (services as opposed to planning, administration, or data management), in timing (initial start-up as opposed to later expansion or maintenance phases), and in level (urban, where health facilities exist, as opposed to rural, where they are either non-existent or relatively ineffectual).

All those with whom the question of integration was discussed agreed that progress in curbing population growth would have been possible but immensely slower and more difficult had family planning responsibility been placed in the health ministry or had family planning services been restricted to an integrated health care package. The key variable in permitting the vigorous forward movement of a family planning program not formally integrated with health appears to have President Suharto's -- and thus the Indonesian

government's -- active, unqualified, and unswerving commitment to reduction of population growth as a top national priority.

The U.S. Congress has mandated AID to work toward the goal of reducing population growth. Toward this end it has put forth integration, not as a goal itself but only as a suggested means toward achievement of the mandated goals. The Indonesian family planning experience suggests that U.S. decision-makers would do well to remain similarly goal-oriented in their foreign assistance program development and review.

o. Incentives and Voluntary Acceptance

The careful handling of incentives at all levels of the program has been critical to its success. Voluntary participation without material incentives for acceptors has been a key feature of the program. Symbolic and psychological incentives have proven more effective instead for recruiting and maintaining acceptors and, more importantly, for maintaining high staff effectiveness. High staff performance is also elicited through important career development rewards.

Discussion

Considerable attention is paid in AID/Washington to the ethics and utility of incentives for acceptors in family planning. Relatively little attention has been paid to staff incentives for effective programming or to creating non-material incentives for acceptors.

The Indonesian program provides performance incentives at all levels from the president on down through the BKKBN and USAID mission to informal groups in remote villages. These incentives are premised on both cooperation and competitiveness -- cooperation among members of given units to out-perform other units at the same level. This is evident as Indonesians in general have begun to talk about becoming "number one in the world in family planning" and as governors, mayors, village chiefs, hospitals, and clinics and family planning fieldworkers and provincial chairmen seek to out-rank each other in the BKKBN's monthly performance reports.

Staff incentives come in such forms as trips for outer-island midwives to Bali for IUD-insertion training. Similarly, high performing village chiefs in Bali are awarded visits to the successful East Java program. Incentives for program managers exist in the public recognition and the sense of accomplishment that accrue from being able to get funds from Jakarta and to produce immediate results of benefit to the local constituency. It is quite likely that this is one of the most powerful incentives available in the administration, in part because its rewards are so rare. Administrators in Indonesia as elsewhere

commonly grow accustomed to frustrations and delays that sap their energy and initiative. When a program is able to deliver resources rapidly, to help officials generate real activity in their locality, and to help solve the problems they see daily, it provides rewards and incentives that are as certain and powerful as they are difficult to quantify.

Direct material incentives for family planning acceptors have been experimented with and found not effective. Some small community reward systems have apparently been somewhat effective, but these have been locally developed. While some villages are thus proud to have received communal rewards for high performance -- such as sewing machines or television sets -- incentive schemes designed outside the Indonesian context (e.g., the IBRD's proposed community incentive scheme) have made little headway.

It is the policy of both the Indonesian and the U.S. governments that participation in family planning be voluntary. Nevertheless, the sheer rapidity of the program's accomplishments, together with certain observations earlier on, have led to allegations that the program might be achieving its successes through the use of coercion. For this reason evidence of possible coercion was consistently pursued by the study team. The team concludes that the Indonesian family planning program success is based on voluntary acceptance. The Indonesian government has neither the commitment nor the means to achieve widespread fertility reduction through coercive measures.

p. Contraceptive Supply

Fully adequate supplies of oral contraceptives have nearly always been available to the program, including early on before there appeared to be demand. This was a critical precondition for and even stimulus to the village family planning take-off. Abundant supply permitted central managers to keep local distributors well-stocked with contraceptives.

Discussion

Facilities established for the distribution of oral contraceptives appear adequately stocked and provincial personnel at all levels say they have never experienced shortages of oral contraceptives. Mission staff maintain that the large supply of oral contraceptives that AID/Washington's Office of Population recommended and made available in the early 1970s was an essential element in the rapid expansion of village family planning.

An important part of the supply success has been the BKKBN logistical system. This is an example of an important program element created with AID technical and financial assistance but now an independent Indonesian program activity. Because of this system contraceptive

shortages have been infrequent in Java and Bali. More importantly the system appears capable of keeping up with the rapid increase in demand and extension of services now occurring in many parts of Indonesia's outer islands.

The logistical system includes effective linkages between the program's data system, warehousing, inventory systems and procurement procedures. The logistical system is divided into two components, however, one for consumables and one for equipment delivery.

In the outer-island province of South Sulawesi, for example, there is considerable local interest in the IUD and there is also staff trained for insertion; there are very few IUD insertion kits, however, despite a backlog of these kits in Jakarta.

2. Sources of Concern

a. Organizational Memory

The mission's population office faces the imminent prospect of an 80 percent reduction in its memory. Staff turnover implies a reduction from over 7 years to less than 2 years in direct personal experience with the Indonesian program. Despite extensive routine documentation over the years, retrieving information about the past decade of AID population assistance to Indonesia is difficult. A system of brief annual reports might provide an organizational memory that could transcend the personal memories of staff and thus be less subject to the fluctuations that occur with turnover.

Discussion

The current chief of the population office is scheduled to leave Indonesia this month, to be replaced by an officer with no previous experience in the country. The two remaining regular population office staff have 18 and 8 months' experience respectively in Indonesia. Although extensive program files exist, retrieving specific information from more than two years ago is a formidable task. In addition to the official project documents, actual project activities have been recorded in a large body of population office weekly reports, field trip reports, and memoranda of conversations. Many if not most of these, however, have been discarded or made functionally inaccessible by AID's policy of removing documents older than five years. Moreover, there is virtually no way to obtain from the files any descriptive summary of the office's experience in the Indonesian program. Little organizational memory exists, memories are largely personal and thus subject to fluctuations in depth and content with staff turnover. It is difficult to say how detrimental this is, but a simple mechanism for developing such an

organizational memory can be suggested. Annual reports by each office, which would provide summaries of major activities, problems, plans, and yearly expenditure levels, could provide the mission with substantial organizational memory. If the reports are simple and brief they need not be costly. They would induce officers to take stock of plans and progress in a systematic, periodic fashion and provide new appointees with a ready access to some of the more important events in the history of their office.

The Jakarta mission has made a laudable attempt to use AID's evaluation system in a constructive manner and in creating a library of useful documents and reports. The reports suggested above could be one important part of this growing mission memory.

b. Urban Program Failure

Family planning program services have not been effectively extended to the country's urban areas, particularly Jakarta. Extending effective services, especially to the urban poor, poses a serious problem for BKKBN and for AID support.

Discussion

The considerable family planning success in Java and Bali has occurred largely in rural areas. It has not yet been possible to adapt the successful village family planning strategy to the cities and especially not to servicing the urban poor. Unless effective means are found to reach the urban populations there will be a growing service gap that will be costly in both human welfare and social tension. Much of the service gap appears concentrated in Jakarta, whose five million people constitute about 20 percent of Indonesia's entire urban population. Effective attention to the Jakarta problem could provide both a pilot for other urban programs and a substantial solution to the overall problem.

c. Geographic Expansion to the Outer Islands

Family planning success has been largely confined to Java and Bali where program activities have been concentrated until only recently. The 50 million people in Indonesia's outer islands have a low level of contraceptive use (less than 10 percent of fertile age women) and are widely scattered and ill-served by basic health and communication infrastructures. Extending family planning services to the outer islands constitutes a major, immediate challenge for the national program and for AID assistance.

Discussion

There has always been a deep division between Indonesia's Java-Bali heartland and its outer island periphery. With only 7 percent of the total land area, Java and Bali contain about 65 percent of the total population. The consequent differences in population densities are immense: 600 persons per square kilometer in Java and Bali and less than 50 persons per square kilometer in the outer islands. The family planning program has concentrated on Java and Bali until only recently and its successes remain limited primarily to these two small islands with large populations. Services have not yet been extended to all the other islands, although this is a major feature of the program's expansion plan.

The problems ahead are formidable. With less than 10 percent contraceptive prevalence and with population growth at about 2.4 percent per year there is much to be done in basic service provision. Outer island prevalence rates are about the same as on Java when the program began there. Nevertheless, with the other islands' low population densities, widely scattered settlements, and poorly developed health and transportation infrastructure, the monetary costs and organizational demands will be immense.

d. Expansion of Scope: Nutrition and Health

Family planning success in Java and Bali has led to an expanded scope for the program, adding nutrition and health activities to the family planning service delivery system. The rationale for this expansion is sound but the expansion itself will pose serious problems. Management, technical capacity, logistics, and the data system will require sensitive adjustment to meet the needs of the new activities without simultaneously weakening the family planning services.

Discussion

The success of village family planning in bringing effective services to rural Java and Bali has led to an expansion of the program scope. The plan is to add nutrition and health services to the delivery network through which family planning reaches the rural population. It is argued that because this service network has shown capability for reaching the isolated rural population it should thus be used to provide a wider range of services. It is also hoped that the new services will prevent personnel from becoming complacent through increasing routine activity. Finally, it is argued that success in motivating families to reduce fertility makes it incumbent upon the program to protect the smaller number of children acceptor families now achieve.

These are all well-taken arguments, but the expansion of scope will pose major problems. Family planning workers must be trained in

nutrition and health; new logistical problems will arise in the movement of foodstuffs, medicines, and additional equipment; the data system must be extended to include additional forms of information; and management will be faced with new problems of integrating a larger number of activities under one structure. The BKKBN is aware of these problems and is moving to address them through field experiments. However, current plans for rapid extension to broader coverage will constitute a major challenge for both BKKBN and AID.

e. USAID-BKKBN Relations

Relations between BKKBN and the USAID mission have been very fruitful to date. BKKBN's major reorganization, the current increase of other foreign donor funding, and the very success of the program, however, may pose problems for continuing collaboration.

Discussion

The successful AID support of Indonesian family planning has been based upon highly collaborative relationships between USAID and BKKBN personnel. Several new and pending conditions may challenge the future of this relationship. The BKKBN has recently undergone a major reorganization and expansion of top-level professional staff and its chairman has recently been appointed Minister of Health. The full import of these changes is not yet clear, but it will undoubtedly present USAID staff with both new opportunities and new problems.

Both the IBRD and the UNFPA have greatly increased their financial commitments to the Indonesian program. This promises expanded resources to the program, yet it also greatly increases BKKBN administrative work. Even now BKKBN staff express frustration over the complex, intricate, and different accounting demands of these two major donors and the former is already experiencing difficulty in disbursing its obligations to Indonesia. It is unclear how this will affect BKKBN's need for USAID financial and technical assistance.

Finally, program success itself presents its own peculiar problems. It brings both a flood of new participants seeking association with success and a retreat of others who feel support is no longer necessary. It could also bring unwarranted complacency to both program personnel and external associates causing them to prematurely shift concern from expansion to "simple" maintenance. The success to date will undoubtedly present other new problems that will affect USAID - BKKBN relations, and it is not by any means certain what the outcome will be.

**REPORT ON THE EVALUATION
OF THE
POPULATION PLANNING II PROJECT
OF THE
PHILIPPINE POPULATION PLANNING PROGRAM
(OPERATIONAL YEAR ONE)**

Jointly conducted by:

**Commission on Population
National Economic & Development Authority
U.S. Agency for International Development
(Manila and Washington)**

Manila, October 1978

FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Philippines	B. Project Title Population Planning II	C. Project Number not stated	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>77</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY _____
E. Life of Project Funding 1. AID: (Loan or Grant) <u>(see attached) *</u> Other Donor _____ Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director Peter Cody 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) 3. Other	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) not stated 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not stated		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) not stated 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not stated	

I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date)

not stated

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title <u>Report on the Evaluation of the Population Planning II Project of the Philippine Population Planning Program (Operational Year One)</u>	B. Evaluation Date Sept 18-Oct. 16 1978	C. Type of Evaluation Review of ongoing project.	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation July 1977-March 1978
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire a. travel <u>not stated</u> b. per diem _____ Contract _____ 3. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation (SEE attached sheet)	G. Initiated By not stated

H. Evaluation Team Composition:

1. Direct Hire	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise
a. Name		

(SEE attached sheet)

2. Contract:	a. Name of Organization (if any)	b. Contract No.
c. Name(s) of Persons		d. Area(s) of Expertise

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position)

not stated

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____
 Typed Name _____
 Position _____
 Date _____

F. Purpose: Review of first year of operations of the PPII which provides support for the Philippine Population Planning Program. "To provide program managers, policy makers and other concerned parties with relevant information that can be used to improve the program and to facilitate the achievement of program goals." Since the GOP is in the process of making important decisions on the funding levels and future direction of population programs, this review (on instructions of President Marcos) raises broader issues than those of PPII.

H. Evaluation Team Composition:

POPCOM

Benjamin D. de Leon, Deputy Executive Director
Romeo C. Balandra, Outreach Project Manager
Anthony J. Arenas, Associate Director
Flor Mendoza, Associate Director
Ester B. Sy-Quimsiam, Associate Director
Jose Miguel R. dela Rosa, Project Officer
Solina Iglesias, Project Officer
Cora de Castro, Project Officer
Wilma Guinto, Logistics Plans Officer

NEDA

Fleur de lys Torres, Asst. Director, Social Services Staff
Ed Callanta, Social Services Specialist
Josie Villasin, Social Services Specialist

USAID/Manila

William Mulcahy, Program Officer
Ed Ploch, Asst. Program Officer
Sam Haight, Chief, Population Division
William Goldman, Population Advisor
Merritt Broady, Population Consultant
Theresa Van der Vlugt, Population Consultant
Tessie Valdez, Program Assistant

USAID/Washington

Steven Sinding, Chief Population
officer, Asia Bureau
Barbara Pillsbury, Medical
Anthropologist, PPC
Charles Johnson, Chief, DSB/POP/OPS

Organization

Jose Miguel R. dela Rosa (POPCOM Action Officer)
William Goldman (USAID Action Officer).

*Life of Project Funding: AID: OY1 \$2.0 million released of total \$2.9 million...
obligation
Host Country: OY1 p21.9 released of p19.7 obligation
(excess p 2.2)

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I. INTRODUCTION

This report represents a review of the first year of operations (OY 1, July 1977 to March 1978) of the Population Planning II Project, the project under which the U.S. Agency for International Development provides financial support for the Philippine Population Planning Program. Because the project supports the major areas of program activity, this evaluation unavoidably touches upon broad issues of population policy and overall program effectiveness.

Also, because the program activity which was initiated during OY 1 continues into the present, this evaluation has relevance for decisions today and in the immediate future. We make this point because this evaluation report is being issued at a time when the Government of the Philippines (GOP) is wrestling with difficult questions of far-reaching significance for the population program--questions pertaining to levels of financial support and future directions, including program organization and structure. These issues were raised during the course of the current review of the Philippine Population Program per instructions by the President of the Philippines. We believe that the findings and recommendations contained in this report have considerable relevance for the decisions the Government must make in the future. It is for this reason that the report may from time to time appear to reach beyond the narrow confines of PP II.

This evaluation was carried out by a team of 18 people representing the Commission on Population (POPCOM), the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and USAID Manila and AID/Washington; their names are listed in Annex A. The team was divided into four field teams which visited and prepared reports* on the following areas: Northern Philippines (Regions II, III, and IV); Central Philippines (Regions V, VII and VIII);

*The reports follow the outline provided in the "Evaluation Guidelines". See Annex B.

Southern Philippines (Regions IX, X and XI); and Manila (central agencies and Metro Manila Outreach). The reports of the four teams are attached to this opening summary and represent the principal "data" upon which our findings and recommendations are based.* The report was reviewed in its present form by the entire team of 18 and is being presented to the three participating agencies for review and consideration.

Each field team spent two weeks in its assigned region. The teams then convened in Manila where a week was spent preparing and reviewing the individual reports. A fourth and final week was spent reviewing and consolidating the four reports into this final report. The reader will note that the final recommendations may occasionally exclude or contradict an individual recommendation in a field team report. This reflects the fact that perfect consensus is not possible in such a complex undertaking and that some recommendations were too operationally specific to be included in this summary. Nonetheless, we are extremely pleased to note the high degree of consistency between the field reports which gives us confidence that this final report is accurate in its findings and responsible in its recommendations.

II. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Program Support and Local Government Accountability

Findings:

All four field teams found fairly high levels of political support for the population planning program. There are strong additional indications of positive efforts by local governments to assume an increasing share of program

*Also attached as Annex C is a checklist of OY 1 accomplishments. Annex D is a memorandum from the POPCOM Executive Director to Regional Population Officers outlining their responsibilities in assisting the field teams.

costs.** Teams which travelled outside Manila found a particularly gratifying response on the part of local government officials (provincial governors and city mayors). However, there were indications that these same officials do not regard themselves as being responsible for program performance in their areas. Several implied that because they could not afford to assume the full cost of outreach operations, they should not be held accountable for program performance. The evaluation team believes quite strongly that these officials must be made to feel accountable for program performance in their areas if the Outreach Project is to work with maximum effectiveness.

We understand those local officials who argue that they should not be held accountable where they do not have control of the resources through which performance is achieved. Therefore, we urge that steps be taken to assure that the resources are available for local officials to acquire control consistent with the responsibility we feel they should assume for program effectiveness. Hence, to the extent the local governments are unable to provide the resources required to support 100 percent of local costs over the time period stipulated in the original project plans, the National Government should be prepared to make such funds available on grant-in-aid basis. The population effort is so important, that to the extent necessary, the National Government should be willing to divert resources from less essential areas of activity to assure that the population program is adequately funded. Having done so, the National Government, at the highest level, should make clear to local government officials that they will be held accountable for the quality and the impact of the programs in their areas. POPCOM, through its Board of Commissioners, should present a plan for program monitorship which produces information that can be available to political leadership and that can be used to

**See Annex F which provides a detailed breakdown of local and national government contributions and a linear projection to 1980.

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alert local leaders and administrators to the fact that considerable interest exists at the highest level in local population program implementation.

The evaluation team believes it is extremely important for the Government to assume as large as possible a proportion of cost of the population planning program by 1981-82. However, we believe that AID and other donors should be prepared to provide support for specific areas of program activity should there be clear evidence of the Government's inability to shoulder the full financial burden of the program.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that the POPCOM Board of Commissioners should continue to communicate to the highest political level the need for sustained political and financial support for the population program. Furthermore, it is recommended that local political officials should be held responsible and ultimately accountable for program performance.

2. Future of Outreach Program

Findings:

As will be noted in their report, the Manila-based evaluation team reports a fairly widespread view among central policy-makers that the Outreach Project, as presently designed, may not be financially viable in the long run. Due to financial and budgetary constraints, local governments will find it difficult to assume an increasingly larger share of program costs. Members of the POPCOM Board interviewed by the team reported that of the three options*

*See preliminary printed copy, "Report of the Special Committee to Review the Philippine Population Program", (Manila, June 1978), pp. 139-140.

outlined in the Special Review Committee's report, the first one--continuation of the program as planned--no longer appears feasible. Therefore, they said, the Board is considering whether to recommend retrenchment or integration with other barangay-based social service activities-- or some combination of the two. The evaluation team feels that "financial viability" is dependent upon more fundamental resource allocation choices. If the program is important enough, it can be afforded at the expense of other, less important activities. Since few development expenditures can be regarded to have as high an economic rate of return as an effective population program, we suggest the Board thoroughly review data on program impact and effectiveness before a decision concerning the future of Outreach is made. The evaluation upon which this report is based suggests that the program, despite some weaknesses, is being quite effectively implemented. Outputs are being achieved more or less on schedule and it is too early to know whether or not purpose is being achieved-- i. e., whether or not contraceptive use prevalence is increasing and the birthrate declining.

Data on acceptor rates that are presented in the team reports below are encouraging but based on too few cases to be representative. Also, they are based on data from a Management Information System which is of questionable reliability. (See finding and discussion No. 5 below.) Within the next four months, however, preliminary data will become available from the nationally representative Community Outreach Survey and the Philippines portion of the World Fertility Survey. These data will yield reliable estimates of current contraceptive use prevalence and crude birthrates which can be compared with data from the 1977 Area Fertility Survey in order to get accurate information on overall Outreach program effectiveness at the halfway point in implementation.

Recommendations:

Considering that a systematic assessment of program effectiveness in terms of contraceptive use, and perhaps

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demographic impact, has not been completed, it is recommended that the design and field implementation of the Outreach program should not now be substantively changed.

3. Institutional Coordination

There is a consensus among fieldworkers, implementors, managers, and policymakers that there has been inadequate coordination at all levels of operations in the initial stage of program implementation due to the rushed pace of project development and initial operations. This lack of coordination resulted in poor program linkages at the FTOW and clinic levels where major problems were reported. This has considerably hampered the smooth delivery of services.

In spite of the problems in coordination, there is a strong sentiment among the people interviewed, especially POPCOM staff members, that POPCOM should largely remain a coordinating body. One major advantage cited is that POPCOM is able to draw upon resources of the participating agencies to assist in the implementation of a program which is to be integrated into the local government structure.

It is generally acknowledged that coordination can occur at different levels, but most people interviewed were quick to add that it is at the regional level that institutionalization of the coordination process is greatly required.

The Regional Population Offices (RPOs) find it difficult to coordinate program implementation due to the different thrusts and objectives of participating agencies at their level. To answer this problem, the RPOs implement varying strategies ranging from a relatively personalized approach, as in Region IX, to a more formal institutionalized approach as embodied in the organization of functional Regional Population Committees (RCPs), composed of participating agencies in the region, which meet monthly

to discuss policy, program direction, and integration. Problems related to operations are discussed in this forum with the goal of paving the way for smoother implementation of program activities.

From the PPO/CPO down to the FTOW level, integration and coordination takes place in a personalized manner.

It was further suggested that the Regional Population Offices should be given some sort of leverage, such as funding, in working with participating agencies in the region. This is deemed necessary to strengthen the coordinating function of POPCOM and to improve the working relationship with the agencies directly involved in service delivery.

Recommendation:

POPCOM should initiate/continue institutionalization of the coordination process with participating agencies.

4. Planning and Implementation Strategy

The general opinion of the RPOs visited was that the planning and implementation processes between POPCOM/Central and the RPOs needed to be strengthened for more realistic planning and target setting. Clearer policy guidance and improved lines of authority and communication seem to be the most important areas of concern of the regional staffs.

POPCOM is one of the leaders among government agencies in decentralizing operations, yet several problems still exist which are slowing down the development of a more effective planning and implementation strategy. These include inadequate financing, lack of consensus concerning the Outreach program by members of the POPCOM Board, pressures and demands from external donor agencies and other GOP agencies. Each problem is serious enough by itself to hamper increased effectiveness and taken as a

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whole they have caused a certain confusion among regional and local structures. Solutions to these problems should be found as quickly as possible to give increased impetus to the Philippine Family Planning Program.

It is the opinion of the evaluation teams that POPCOM should strengthen and fully implement its present planning and implementation strategies. These include having POPCOM/Central set the broad family planning program directions. These are based upon inputs made by the RPOs from information gathered from the local structures and other regional sources such as the Regional Development Councils, the Regional Population Committees, and regional research studies. The regional inputs are coupled with GOP national policy declarations, national research, and other national and international inputs and developed into a national program strategy. The RPOs are then given the responsibility to plan their programs and set their targets based upon regional needs.

Both POPCOM/Central and the RPOs feel that "top down" planning would place unrealistic demands on the program and would force target-setting and program implementation that would not meet the needs of the Philippine Family Planning Program in general and, more important, the objectives and targets of the individual regions.

Recommendation:

Strengthening of the "bottom up" planning concept is recommended to effect a more realistic planning and target-setting process. This includes clarification of lines of authority and areas of responsibility between POPCOM/Central and the Regional Population Offices (RPOs). It also involves the strengthening of the planning capabilities at both levels.

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5. Program Impact and Management Information System (MIS)

All four field team reports note the questionable quality of the MIS. There were cases where apparent double counting of acceptors was noted and also cases where apparently there was confusion of program employees about how the MIS should operate. In one instance a City Population Officer was unable to properly fill out the basic form that is used for aggregating national data (the OP-6).^{*} Our basic findings are six:

- a) Program employees from the Regional Population Officer/City Population Officer level down to the Barangay Supply Point Officer (BSPO) need basic training in operating the MIS.
- b) This training should include not only "how to" information, but also the "why" explanations.
- c) Outreach and MOH officials at the provincial and national levels need to acquire a better understanding of the meshing of the Clinic Information System and Outreach Information System in order to prevent double-counting of current users.
- d) An internal system of checks and audit needs to be instituted in order to assure MIS accuracy.
- e) MIS data needs to be fed back more quickly than the three month average turnaround cited in the field reports.
- f) Management level Outreach and clinic employees need training in both the management and evaluative uses of the MIS.

^{*}See Northern Philippines team report.

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Overall, the evaluation team urges POPCOM to give serious attention to establishing the integrity of the MIS so that it can be effectively used both to monitor program performance and to identify specific areas in need of short-term attention. Feedback to the field of accurate program data is an important part of insuring the integrity of the entire program.

Recommendation:

POPCOM should take immediate steps to improve implementation of the system of reporting and the flow of information regarding Outreach program and clinic impact and effectiveness. Both the timeliness and the accuracy of the Management Information System need to be improved.

6. Outreach Salaries and Travel Allowances

Findings:

In all structures visited, delays in payment of salaries and travel were reported during the first two quarters of OY 1. The delays were minimized, however, during the third quarter (equivalent to the first quarter of calendar year 1978) because local government support was made available.

Local government auditing regulations caused problems regarding releases of travel allowances. The reimbursement scheme for travel allowances has caused serious delays in the release of travel money. Consequently, the mobility of structure personnel has been negatively affected. In spite of these difficulties, the structure personnel, in most cases, continued to perform their responsibilities.

Information gathered from field visits indicates that field allowances for OY 1 were inadequate. In the provinces visited it is estimated that the FTOWs need from ₱150 to ₱200 per month to cover all expenses related to fieldwork. In areas where there is regular transportation, the ₱115 allowance is enough to cover purely travel expenses but does

not meet the other expenses incurred such as meals and lodging. In areas where there is irregular transportation the P115 allowance is not enough to meet even travel expenses.

It is suggested that standard procedures be discussed and agreed upon among POPCOM, local governments, the Department of Finance, and the Commission on Audit to allow for the smooth disbursement of salaries and field expenses.

Recommendation

To avoid recurrence of delays in salaries and travel, it is recommended that standard operating procedures be established for releases of travel funds. The level of travel allowances should be carefully reviewed with a view toward establishing a more equitable system of travel support.

7. Operational Year 3 Program Funding

Findings:

The financial plan in the Project Agreement, specifically the Fixed Amount Reimbursement (FAR) system, remains a matter of contention. POPCOM has felt the need of working capital to initiate activities which were delayed in OY 1 because of initial problems regarding the workability of the disbursement scheme.

The problem was felt at the field level where there were delays in the release of funds for payment of salaries and travel allowances. These delays ranged from two to ten weeks. Some Outreach personnel had to resort to borrowing money. During the third quarter of OY 1 the delays were not so great because local government support began to be made available.

Recommendation:

To avoid future short-term problems of liquidity, it is recommended that POPCOM and USAID should carefully review OY 3 funding requirements and develop a plan to avoid short-term funding short-falls.

8. FTOW Training

Findings:

During their basic 21-day initial training, the FTOWs' general expectations had been that they would spend more time working in community development than in family planning. In reality, most FTOWs spend more time working in family planning. Because of this, additional training in contraceptive techniques, human sexuality, and family planning program management is needed by the FTOWs for meeting their job demands.

During the initial stages of the Outreach program when the training modules for the basic FTOW training were being developed, it was generally assumed the FTOWs would need community organization skills to help facilitate the acceptance of family planning. Only 25 percent of the training sessions were devoted to family planning skills. This apparently was a carryover from the forerunner of the Outreach Project, the TIDA (Total Integrated Development Approach) Program. Almost immediately it proved to be a misconception.

Almost every FTOW interviewed by the field teams indicated that he or she needed additional training in family planning skills. The vast majority of their time (75 to 95 percent) is spent directly in dealing with family planning or family planning related activities. Because of the lack of training in family planning technology, the FTOWs feel restricted in implementing the Outreach program. They do not fully understand the advantages and disadvantages of the various contraceptive methods and thus cannot pass on to

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perspective acceptors the proper advice. An example of this is the dispensing of pills. The FTOWs cannot yet adequately explain the effects of pill usage on a woman's body and consequently, many users drop out with real or imagined side effects.

Some efforts have already been made to correct this situation. Most RPOs have or are now conducting basic pill-dispensing courses for the FTOWs. On the national level, 11 Family Planning modules were developed and pre-tested. These modules, however, have yet to be approved by the POPCOM Board and cannot be implemented nationwide until Board approval is received. These efforts are laudable but need to be expanded in order to increase the FTOWs' competence and confidence.

Management training is also needed. The RPOs are beginning to decentralize the planning and implementation processes by giving the local structures the responsibilities of planning and implementing their individual programs. The FTOW, being the closest to the target group, has to understand basic program planning and implementation in order to manage the program in his or her area of responsibility.

Recommendation:

Additional training for Full-Time Outreach Workers (FTOWs), particularly in family planning and management skills, is needed to better equip them in fulfilling their roles as family planning program implementors.

9. Side-Effects

Findings:

Information received from all levels indicated numerous types of problems regarding contraceptives. Problems regarding pills were the most numerous, followed by IUDs, and then sterilization. There were also some complaints about condoms.

Side-effects that women reported experiencing or fearing from pills are expressed in terms of physical discomfort such as dizziness and nausea as well as amnesia, sterility, and premature senility. The genuine side-effects are elaborated upon through an active, informal communications network that gives rise to and spreads rumors in the attempt to understand this recently introduced innovation. There are also complaints because the brands of AID-provided pills originally accepted by the clients are no longer available to them. Many such clients have dropped out the program or switched to a less effective method because of the real or perceived side-effects of Norinyl. Availability of Norinyl in two dosage levels does not solve the problem.

The Outreach personnel do not yet appear to have enough understanding of actual pill-induced changes and, therefore, are not yet able to provide adequate information to clients regarding their use. Even the primary-level health personnel (especially midwives) of the rural health units do not appear to fully understand pill-induced physiological changes or to be adequately informing clients regarding their use.

Likewise regarding IUDs, there is not yet sufficient information provided to clients regarding potential complications. Occasionally, improper-sized IUDs are inserted and many clients are not informed of the importance of follow-up. Consequently, many women who do experience discomfort present themselves at clinics to have the IUD removed.

Regarding sterilization, some vasectomy failures have been documented. These and the male worry that sterilization will inhibit sexual performance impede greater acceptance of this method. Problems reported concerning tubal ligation derive from pain experienced by some women upon whom the procedure has been performed under local anaesthetic.

Project personnel are aware of the problems caused by the rumors and are taking steps to counter them within their limited means. Full-Time Outreach Workers use barangay

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assemblies and, to the extent possible, trace back the source of the rumor and undertake face-to-face communication. In Region IX, a booklet entitled "Family Planning Methods: Rumors and Misconceptions" was locally produced and distributed through the Outreach structure. It is the opinion of the review team members that basic IEC campaigns and materials should be developed to counteract the rumors and misconceptions. Additional funding to initiate or improve IEC programs at the regional level should be provided.

Recommendation:

Immediate and serious attention be given to the problems of contraceptive method side-effects. This should include improved training of Outreach workers in dealing with side-effects and rumors about them and the formulation of IEC materials and campaigns that focus on the facts about different contraceptive methods used in the program.

10. Information/Education/Communication (IEC)

Findings:

POPCOM Central Office assistance to the field is both financial and material. Material support is in the form of films, centrally-produced print materials, and equipment. All the regions visited expressed the need for increased general support from the Central Office such as equipment, films, technical staff assistance, and consultants as well as specific financial support for production of easily-comprehended materials in the local dialects.

While IEC capabilities vary from region to region, inadequate funding is seriously hampering IEC activities of regions in planning, developing, producing, and distributing materials to support program needs. Among the regions visited, only three are considered not in a position to develop and produce their own IEC materials.

Participating agencies involved in both the preparation and dissemination of IEC materials have been reported to be generally supportive of the IEC activities of regional offices. For example, major IEC agencies such as the Ministry of Public Information, Ministry of Education and Culture, and the National Media Production Center in coordination with the RPOs, have been conducting seminars and programs integrating family planning messages.

Recommendation:

IEC capabilities at both Central and regional population office levels should be strengthened and additional funding should be provided at the local level for personnel and materials.

11. Incentives for the Barangay Supply Point Officer

Findings:

In the various reviews and evaluations of the Outreach Project that have been conducted in the past several months, the problem of maintaining the interest of the BSPOs has been raised. Since the BSPOs are the key in the whole Outreach service delivery scheme and are expected to work on a voluntary basis, this concern is very real. The question is whether or not it is possible, to maintain a highly motivated group of workers over a long period of time without incurring unsupportably high expenses.

All four field teams recommended that some kind of incentive may be necessary if the Outreach Project is to continue to rely on the BSPOs as the major service delivery point. Several people interviewed by the Manila-based team suggested it would be necessary to provide monetary incentives. All four field teams report that some sort of non-monetary incentives is needed. People interviewed in the field stated that monetary incentives would be too costly and would place an unaffordable financial burden on the national and local governments. One team also reported that providing monetary incentives could be counterproductive because it would

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undermine the spirit of volunteerism and "service to the nation".

Some of the local structures have already developed certain incentives. These include providing the BSPO with a sign-board identifying the BSP, presentation of recognition awards and certificates by local officials, presentation of storage boxes which are brightly decorated with family planning slogans, and the distribution of T-shirts with family planning slogans.

Since the program is now nearing the end of its second year and many individuals are participating as BSPOs, it is important that a committee or task force be organized to carefully study the question of BSPO incentives and make recommendations on types of incentives that are within the financial capabilities of the local and national governments but which retain the basic spirit of volunteerism. Operations research funds should be considered for this purpose.

Recommendations:

A high level task force or committee made up of members from local structures, RPOs, and POPCOM Central, should be organized to study the question of incentives for Barangay Supply Point Officers (BSPOs) and to make recommendations on what forms these incentives, if deemed necessary, should take.

12. BSPO Training

Findings:

Except in a few places where formal BSPO training has been conducted by local structures, there has been no organized POPCOM effort--mainly due to the lack of funding--to formally train the Barangay Supply Point Officers in the necessary family planning skills and management techniques.

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It was observed by the field evaluation teams that the quality of record-keeping is generally higher and the level of motivation greater among BSPOs with formal training than among BSPOs who have not undergone formal training.

Formal BSPO training was scheduled to begin during OY 1. Because of the lack of funds, this plan did not become reality and most FTOWs resorted to training their BSPOs informally on a person-to-person basis. Although this gave the BSPOs some basic knowledge of the program, it was not sufficient to give them an understanding of family planning and the importance of accurate record-keeping. The BSPOs have, therefore, been identified by the RPOs and the local Outreach structures as one of the high priority groups for immediate training. It is important that sufficient funding be made available to meet this need.

Training designs have been developed by POPCOM Central and all RPOs have planned training programs. Some of the innovative local structures have been able to draw upon these resources and have found local funds to implement the training plans. Their funding has come from provincial government sources with municipal governments often contributing a portion. The BSPO training includes some basic family planning technology, records management, motivational skills, and an orientation to the population program as a whole. The local managers who have held this type of training believe it is very effective in increasing BSPO motivation and competence. It also serves as one type of incentive in maintaining the BSPOs' interest in the program.

Recommendation :

An adequately funded training program institutionalizing formal BSPO training should be implemented in order to equip BSPOs with the necessary skills for family planning motivation and promotion.

13. Sterilization Subsidy

A particularly bright aspect of the program is the increasing acceptance of sterilization among eligible women. However, the problem of an inadequate subsidy and the delayed payment of this subsidy unnecessarily hinders this part of the program. It is generally agreed that the present subsidies--92 and 50 pesos respectively for tubal ligation and vasectomy--are not enough to cover the supply and materials costs incurred by the hospital or clinic and the honorarium for personnel performing the procedure. The rising cost of pre and post-sterilization medications has contributed to the expressed need for a higher service subsidy.

Complaints about the delay in reimbursement were also expressed by agencies and physicians participating in the sterilization program. While the problem is procedural in nature, every effort should be made to speed up payment. Prolonged delays in reimbursement may affect performance of participating physicians and diminish enthusiasm and project support.

Recommendation:

Consideration should be given to increasing the subsidies for sterilization. Furthermore, reimbursements should be expedited.

14. Sterilization Certification

Findings:

The certification procedures for sterilization recently agreed upon by POPCOM, USAID and NEDA are producing both confusion and resentment on the part of Ministry of Health personnel.

The four evaluation teams reported that the new FAR procedures are causing many unnecessary problems and tensions

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in most of the regions visited. The Manila-based team was told that the certification of sterilization procedures by the RPOs is not acceptable to the MOH for professional reasons and that the submission of duplicate consent forms to POPCOM is considered a violation of patient privacy, and thus unethical.

The Northern Philippines team was told that regional coordinators of the MOH National Family Planning Office are capable of certifying the requests for reimbursements and that they prefer to maintain the old system (NFPO certification). The Central and Southern Philippine teams did not encounter such direct criticism of the certification procedures but were told the procedures were creating confusion in all but one region, Region IX. In this region there was no problem because of the personal relationships between MOH and POPCOM personnel. In the other five regions visited, the procedures were causing unnecessary delays and problems.

Recommendation:

POPCOM, USAID, and NEDA should seriously consider the modification of sterilization certification procedures to allow the MOH National Family Planning Office to certify procedures performed in MOH-NFPO hospitals and clinics.

15. Variety of Program Contraceptive Methods

Findings:

It has been program policy to offer a "cafeteria" approach in the delivery of family planning services. While this

approach strengthens the non-coercive nature of the program and is seen as a critical element in achieving wide acceptance by the different sectors of the community, it could result in training and logistics complications at the field level.

Although the program makes available to the clientele various methods of contraception to effect this approach, it does not provide multiple brands of orals at the BSP and clinic levels.

The clinic and field personnel interviewed reported a growing demand for other brands of pills and other types of contraception (such as contraceptive jelly and foaming tablets). This may be necessary to minimize the occurrence of pill side-effects and, thereby, also the number of drop-outs from the program.

Ideas advanced by the evaluation team members include exploring the possibility of tapping other donor agencies and the use of the contraceptive loan to be provided by USAID to procure other brands of pills and other contraceptives.

Recommendations:

POPCOM and USAID should jointly study the level of demand and the implication of providing additional brands of orals and other types of contraceptives and the means of acquiring them.

16. Operations Research

Findings:

At the regional level, there is increasing awareness about the need for operations research types of activities to support program implementation. At present, small-scale research activities are being undertaken by the Regional

Population Offices (RPOs) and/or research institutions contracted for this purpose. This was considered to be a good indication that regional capabilities, including the presence of regional and provincial research institutions, are getting stronger.

POPCOM Central Office should respond by providing the necessary direction and financial support to this type of activity and should undertake contracting its own research activities to provide immediate solutions to implementation problems. In almost all regions visited, research leads and projects were identified and formulated with the assistance of Outreach personnel and research institutions. Forums like the Regional Outreach Management Conferences, Regional Population Committee meetings, Secretariat Management Conferences, and consultative meetings with research institutions are being used to discuss ideas related to operations research.

Recommendation:

POPCOM Central Office should provide the direction for Operations Research, strengthen Central and regional capabilities to meet the growing demand for operations research types of activities, and coordinate with the regional staffs in order to assure the program relevance of the research.

17. Transportation Support

RPOs emphatically expressed the need for additional new vehicles. While there are around 300 units in the field, 70 percent are rehabilitated and only 30 percent were new when acquired. Since most of these vehicles were delivered in 1974 after undergoing extensive repairs, continuous operation of the present fleet of vehicles has become uneconomical. Should there be no replacements, nearly the entire secretariat would be immobilized.

With the implementation of the Outreach Project and the fielding of FTOWs, the problem of lack of transportation is becoming more acute. Considering the different places and areas to be covered, demand for different types of transportation should be met. It is the opinion of the review team members that other forms of transportation for the FTOWs should be provided (such as pumpboats and horses) to reduce costs and increase effectiveness. The need for these types of transportation is felt throughout the country.

Recommendation:

POPCOM should develop a transport plan that can be presented to donor agencies as the basis for a request for additional transportation assistance.

18. POPCOM Salaries and Status

The field teams were told that, compared to some other government agencies, or even compared to its participating private agencies, the prevailing salary rates of certain categories of POPCOM personnel are low. Since these salaries are not competitive, it is difficult for POPCOM to retain trained and experienced personnel and to attract highly qualified new recruits.

While attempts have been made consistently to upgrade POPCOM salaries, they have been mostly unsuccessful. Nonetheless, the problem is sufficiently serious to warrant action at the highest levels possible to retain and recruit the best available talent for the population program.

Recommendation

Consideration should be given to salary adjustments in the POPCOM structure where indicated. To this end a salary survey should be undertaken.

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19. POPCOM/AID Coordination


The Manila-based team reported widespread discussion of strained AID/POPCOM relations during OY 1 of the Outreach Project. Several teams noted that these tensions seriously impaired OY 1 project implementation. Without belaboring the point, the evaluation team notes significant improvements in the relationship in recent weeks and expressions of desire to further improve collaborative working relations through the remainder of the project. (Indeed, the team notes that the process of carrying out this evaluation has helped to speed the process of reconciliation.) Such remaining irritants as those relating to certification of sterilizations and the FAR system disbursement of funds can be handled without rancor if the current atmosphere of reconciliation persists. The persistence of such an atmosphere could be facilitated by a regularly scheduled meetings to discuss project problems and issues of mutual interest. A special meeting to deal with special issues should also be held as needed.

Recommendations:

To bring about continuing improvement in the bilateral relationship, POPCOM and AID should resume the convening of regular meetings to discuss program progress and the resolution of specific problems.

A.I.D. Program Evaluation Report No. 3

Third Evaluation of the Thailand National Family Planning Program



February 1980

Agency for International Development

FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Thailand	B. Project Title National Family Planning	C. Project Number 493-0283 current 493-022(70-75)	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>75</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY <u>81</u>
E. Life of Project Funding 1. AID (Loan or Grant) 16,601,000 by end FY 81 Other Donor UNFPA 7,559,000 other-4,443,000 Host Country Counterpart Funds 21,047,000 TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director not stated 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) 3. Other	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) not stated 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not stated		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) (National Family Planning Program) NFPP in Ministry of Public Health (Division of Family Health) 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not stated	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date)			

2nd Evaluation of the NFPP; on-going project; biannual comprehensive project evaluation, 1977

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title Thailand National Family Planning Program Evaluation	B. Evaluation Date June 25-July 20, 1979	C. Type of Evaluation Third Bi-annual comprehensive project eval.	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation mostly since the 1977 evaluation
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire not stated a. travel _____ per diem _____ Contract _____ 3. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation (SEE attached sheet)	G. Initiated By not stated

H. Evaluation Team Composition

1. Direct Hire		
a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise
2. Contract:		
a. Name of Organization (if any)	b. Contract No.	
(SEE attached sheet)	AID/pha/c-1100	
c. Name(s) of Persons	d. Area(s) of Expertise	

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position)

not stated

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____
 Typed Name _____
 Position _____
 Date _____

F. Purpose: The main objectives of the evaluation were:

- A. To determine the demographic impact of NFPP since the previous evaluation
- B. To determine if the NFPP has met all of its targets as indicated in the 4th plan
- C. To determine what difficulties, if any, the NFPP will have in attaining its goals for the 4th Plan (1977-1981) and to give NFPP some guidelines for the preparation of the 5th plan.
- D. To examine the inputs being provided by the Royal Thai Government and all foreign donors to ascertain their effectiveness and needs for further inputs in the future.

H. Evaluation Team Composition:

Faculty of Public Health, Mahidol University

Dr. Debhanom Muangman, Co-team leader, Dean of Faculty of Public Health
Dr. Yawarat Porapakham, Head, Biostatistics Department
Dr. Orapin Singhadem, MCH Department

DTEC (Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation, Prime Minister's Office)

Mr. Pichet Soontornpipit, T.S. Division
Mrs. Sumontha Thanyapon, Ext. Coop. Officer (AID Program)

NESDB (National Economic and Social Development Board, Prime Minister's Office)

Mr. Visuth Kanchanasuk, Chief, Health Planning Section
Mr. Surajit Kaewchingdoug, Plan & Policy Analyst

Bureau of the Budget

Mr. Poonsup Piya-Anant, chief, Public Health Sector
Mr. Aroon Anukrakanond, Budget Analyst

U.S.A. Consultants

Dr. Donald Minkler, Asso. Prof. OB-GYN, Lecturer MCH, Univ. of California, Co-team leader
Mr. Bruce D. Carlson, Management Consultant, Princeton, New Jersey
Dr. John Knodel, Assoc. Prof., Department of Sociology, Research Associate, Population Studies Center, University of Michigan
Miss Kate Lorig, Research Associate, Stanford University, School of Medicine

II. SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

While the complete findings and recommendations are detailed in the text to follow, the essence of this evaluation may be summarized in a few words.

It is clear that the NFPP has successfully achieved its targets to date, and that the resulting reduction in the population growth rate is virtually certain to reach the goal of 2.1 percent per annum set by the Fourth Economic and Social Development Plan. The evaluation team feels, moreover, that if this record of achievement is to be continued through the Fifth five-year plan (1982-86) increasing levels of support both from the RTG and the international donor community will be required.

The major recommendations arising from this evaluation (with reference to the relevant text in each instance) are as follows:

<u>A. General</u>	<u>REPORT SECTION</u>
1. The NFPP should continue to focus its efforts on all regions of the country, including Bangkok.	III.
2. The NFPP should give priority to those geographic areas and segments of the population where family planning acceptance is low and/or availability of information and services are not fully developed.	III.
3. Targets should be set in terms of a combination of new and continuing acceptors in the next five-year plan. (With emphasis on percent of eligible couples practicing contraceptives).	IV.
4. Greater emphasis should be given to management and supervision at the village and health center levels.	V.
5. The international donor community should give full recognition to the necessity of maintaining a level of direct support for the NFPP to assist the RTG in achieving the goals of the Fifth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1982-1986).	VI.
<u>B. Information Education and Communication</u>	
1. IE and C activities of the NFPP should be extended from the present emphasis on providing information to an approach which combines information-giving with a focus on interpersonal communication and assistance in decision making.	V.

2. Health education provided in context of primary health care services should include family planning related IE&C. V.

C. Training

1. There should be more emphasis on training of at least one supervisor at the provincial level in proper procedures for reporting service statistics. This person should ensure that persons in charge of service statistics at all service units are properly trained in reporting and recording procedures. V.
2. The training department of the Family Health Division should undertake operations research on the effectiveness of its various programs, especially those for lower level paramedical personnel, i.e., TBA's, Tambol Doctors, etc. V.
3. The Family Health Division, Training Division, and the Rural Health Division of MOPH should coordinate their training courses, materials, and other efforts in order to maximize effectiveness. V.
4. Formal training in the theory, practice and planning of health education should be assured for all personnel responsible for health education in the expanded rural health and family planning delivery network. V.

D. Voluntary Surgical Contraception


1. The RTG and international donor agencies should continue to support each component of the present package of combined public and private sector activities in the field of voluntary sterilization. Moreover, given anticipated higher annual VSC acceptance in the 1980s, the levels of total support should be increased. V
2. The subsidy to health facilities for Voluntary Surgical Sterilization should be continued, as well as a subsidy differential between urban and rural sterilizations. The subsidy for both male and female sterilization should be the same. Hence, the additional subsidy for vasectomies beyond the target should be dropped. V.

E. Evaluation and Research

1. Frequent assessment of fertility and contraceptive prevalence should continue to be made and greater attention be given to dissemination of the findings. **III.**
2. Evaluation of the impact of the NFPP should be extended from a largely demographic focus to an analysis of its micro- and macro-level effects on the quality of life in Thailand. **IV.**
3. The impact of the NFPP on the health status of the people should be investigated. Specifically, the effect on maternal and infant mortality and morbidity attributable to alterations in fertility resulting from family planning practice should be ascertained. **V.**
4. The evaluation team supports the MOPH policy of carrying out pilot projects in order to determine the use of various categories of non-physician personnel in the delivery of certain family planning services. The team recommends that pilot projects be continued and that careful selection of trainees in reasonable numbers and adequate precautions regarding supervision and medical consultation be given high priority. **V.**

A.I.D. Project Impact Evaluation Report No. 3

The Potable Water Project in Rural Thailand



May 1980

Agency for International Development

A.I.D. - ASIA FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Thailand	B. Project Title Potable Water Project	C. Project Number 493-11-590-186	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>66</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY <u>72</u>
E. Life of Project Funding AID: (Loan or Grant) <u>2,976,185</u> Other Donor _____ Host Country Counterpart Funds <u>1,900,651</u> TOTAL \$ 4,876,836		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director Rey M. Hill (1969-1972) 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) William McQuary (Sanitary Engineer on PASA) and John Neave, P.E. from USPHS (1965-1968) 3. Other _____	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) not stated 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not stated		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) Sanitary Engineering Division of the Thai Ministry of Public Health 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) Tippetts-Appett-McCarthy-Stratton (engineering firm), also PASA with USPHS	

I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date)

"Evaluation of the Potable Water Project", May 1969, Royal Thai Gov't and George Belknap (AID/Thailand) Research and Evaluation Division. Also, one PAR, A-1283 (July 18, 1969) and Audit Reports (a) 8-493-73-3, July 19, 1972 (b) 69-12, June 9, 1969

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title "Water For What" The Potable Water Project in Rural Thailand 1966-1972	B. Evaluation Date Oct. 29- Dec. 4 1979	C. Type of Evaluation Expost Impact	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation 1966-1972
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire <u>not stated</u> travel _____ per diem _____ 2. Contract _____ 3. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation (SEE attached sheet)	G. Initiated By Washington (Bennet Impact Evaluation)

H. Evaluation Team Composition

1. Direct Hire

a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise
Daniel M. Dworkin, AID Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination		
Barbara L.K. Pillsbury, AID Bureau for Asia		

2. Contract:

a. Name of Organization (if any)	b. Contract No.

c. Name(s) of Persons _____ d. Area(s) of Expertise _____

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position)

*Surindr Satchakul, USAID/T, Vernon Scott, Chief of Office of Health, Population, Nutrition and Henry Merrill, Public Health Advisor, USAID/T. Also, Thira Anatheb, Thai Ministry of Public Health, Chit-Chaiwong

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____
 Typed Name _____
 Position _____
 Date _____

F. Purpose: Assess the impact on beneficiaries and continuing effectiveness of 52 village-level AID-built potable water systems in areas of Thailand (especially the NE) that had been threatened by "communist-inspired insurgency" when the project was conceived in 1964. The 52 systems represented a stratified random sample of over 200 AID-built systems.

Note: Our copy of this evaluation was in draft form and lacked pagination and appendices. Other information could presumably be added from the appendices.

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SUMMARY

Overview of Goals and Achievements. The Potable Water Project was implemented between 1966 and 1972 for \$4.8 million (\$2.9 million A.I.D. funds and \$1.9 million Thai funds). Its goals were: 1) to help the Thai government win the loyalty of rural populations in the Northeast and other areas threatened by communist insurgency; 2) to help develop a Thai capacity to plan and administer a National Potable Water Program aimed at providing piped potable water in 10,000 to 12,000 rural communities during the coming 30 years; and 3) to improve health in 600 "security sensitive" communities through provision of potable water. Now, about a decade later, it appears: 1) that insurgency is considerably diminished, although much more due to political changes than to this single project; 2) that an effective organization has planned and built some 800 systems and has proved capable of administering a national piped water program; and 3) that most communities perceive a health improvement, even though many people do not drink the water. For villagers served by the project, however, the greatest impacts are economic benefits, outcomes not anticipated by project personnel.

Project Implementation. The project was implemented by the Sanitary Engineering Division of the Thai Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) through a contract with a New York engineering firm. The water system installed in each community consisted minimally of a water treatment plant with storage tower and piped distribution system; all the systems included chlorination. Systems were installed in two types of communities: villages and "sanitary districts" (rural market towns). Communities selected for the systems were supposed to be willing to assist in construction and to develop a rate structure that would pay for operation, maintenance, and future expansion. In most villages, villagers did make financial and labor contributions; sanitary districts, in contrast, contributed treasury funds but residents did not make direct contributions. In each community a person was chosen to be trained as plant operator and thereafter to maintain the system and collect water fees.

Evaluation Sample. A two-person evaluation team visited a stratified random sample of 52 systems over the course of five weeks between October 29 and December 4, 1979. The 52 systems serve 133 communities with a combined population of approximately 110,000 persons.

Project Effectiveness. Most of the systems built under the project continue to function more than ten years after the first systems were installed. Of those visited, only seven were not functioning. Provincial governments, sanitary districts, and village committees each generally provide the necessary fiscal and operational management for their respective systems. Most systems are financially self-sufficient, with users paying full costs of maintenance and operation. With only a few exceptions, operators appear competent and motivated and have received consistent support and supervision from the Rural Water Supply Section of the MOPH. In nearly all cases where systems have not continued to function, the problem appears to have been

managerial rather than technical. The piped systems installed by this project have been more effective than the handpumps installed by earlier projects, relatively few of which have remained operative.

Health Impact. Given the absence of initial baseline data and of village-specific health data today, no statistics exist to confirm improved health in project communities. Health officials assert, however, that health status has improved, even where villagers do not drink the water because they dislike the taste. Local perceptions are that improvements have resulted in large part because the increased quantity and convenience of piped water permits more raising of vegetables and small livestock for home consumption and for sale, more frequent bathing and washing of clothing and cooking utensils, and increased use of water-sealed privies.

Economic Impact. According to villagers' responses, the project's greatest impact has been economic. Villagers are enthusiastic about ample quantity of water being reliably provided close to their homes. This results in increased water use as well as time-saving, which in turn permit increased gardening, livestock raising, and crafts production.

Benefit Incidence. Initially, community-wide access to the piped water was provided by public taps, with flat fees being charged per household or person. Virtually all socioeconomic groups benefitted equally, but not enough revenue could be collected to sustain operations. Consequently, most systems changed to metered private connections and closed most public taps; they thereby gained financial viability but no longer served all the poorer villagers. There has since been a steady increase in the number of new metered connections. In addition, many systems are extending distribution lines to areas previously unserved. The systems have eased the physical burdens of village women and children--principal bearers of water in Thailand--and have given them more time for income-generating activities. In the sanitary districts, however, it is primarily the commercial sector that benefits.

Spread and Replicability. About 250 systems were installed under the project, and the Thai government has continued to build similar piped systems, about 550 since project completion. Thai authorities say that 17 percent of the rural population is now served by piped potable water as compared to only 3 percent prior to the project.

Lessons and Recommendations. The evaluation found that successful village water systems were characterized by a set of non-technical characteristics. These include: initial community contribution of time, labor and funds; training and subsequent support for local operators responsible for maintenance; and the gradual evolution, on a community-by-community basis, of viable rate structures for delivery of water to individual households. It is additionally recommended: that piped water projects should be planned so that intended beneficiaries perceive them as bringing improvements in convenience, water quality, or water quantity; and that water projects should be considered not just for possible health gains but for their economic benefits as well.

V. SPREAD AND REPLICABILITY

In addition to the above findings, it should be noted that the Thai government has adopted the goal of installing piped water systems in rural villages throughout the country. Since completion of the 250 or so systems installed under A.I.D.'s potable water project, the Thai National Potable Water Program has brought this to nearly 800 systems, of which a large proportion were built according to the A.I.D. contractor's basic designs. As already noted, benefits are now spreading within the earlier A.I.D. project communities as more and more people continue to hook up privately to the now largely financially viable and effectively functioning systems. It is said that 17 percent of rural Thais are now served by piped systems, most providing chlorinated water, in contrast to only 3 percent prior to the project.

VI. LESSONS LEARNED

A. Sources of Success

1. Prior sectoral activity and training. A.I.D.'s previous health activity in rural Thailand, especially its support to village health and sanitation, was a major element in this project's achievements. The participant training in U.S. institutions given to Thais under this and the earlier projects provided an important cadre of highly motivated, well-trained professionals eager to work with A.I.D. and committed to improving health and the

quality of life in rural Thailand. Of Thais sent to the U.S. for training related to sanitation, virtually 100 percent have returned.⁵

2. Community participation. Systems for which communities contribute substantial amounts of money and labor generally succeeded, whereas those for which contributions were only minimal, or were made by government bodies, tended to fail or to meet needs of only the community elite. District officers appear to have played key roles in stimulating the interest of village chiefs, which then resulted in participation of villagers.

3. Supervision and support. The high continuation rate of community operators has been critical. Essential for this have been decentralized support systems. This includes both the regional field headquarters established for systems design, personnel training, water tasting, and warehousing of commodities, and also a hierarchy of district, provincial, and regional health, sanitation, and local government offices with good communication networks from which the operators can secure advice, assistance, and equipment. The Rural Water Supply Section of SED has been extremely effective in providing support and is probably responsible for the improvements that have occurred since previous evaluations.

4. Appropriate Technology. Appropriate technology does not always mean "low-level" technology. Complex water treatment and distribution systems are working while few handpumps provided under a previous project are still functioning. One reason why the relatively complex technology succeeded and a simpler solution failed is perceptions of the users; the piped systems are seen as an improvement over more remote sources whereas few users regard the handpump as an improvement over the commonly used rope and bucket.⁶

5. Local initiative and innovation. Many project villages have demonstrated considerable innovativeness in coming up with and sustaining various credit, sharing, and distribution schemes. Villagers' primary motivation was the potential convenience and economic gain of piped water. Both this innovativeness and the underlying motivation were apparently unanticipated by project planners but were crucial in offsetting the weaknesses in project design described below.

⁵Throughout, the present evaluation was assisted by Thai graduates of U.S. degree programs. Conversation over tea one morning in an outpost north of Bangkok found eight U.S. universities represented by Thais present. They noted that sanitation is a field in which trainees studying in the U.S. return, whereas those sent to the U.S. in medicine frequently do not.

⁶For a more complete discussion of the subject, see Appendix I, "Suggestions to A.I.D. for Future Water Activity in Thailand."

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B. Negative Findings

1. Equipment. The A.I.D.-furnished Onan engines proved to be a disaster. They broke down, and spare parts were difficult to obtain. Many have since been replaced by Japanese or British engines.
2. Maintenance. Failure to include an adequate maintenance component in the project design resulted in failure or inferior performance of systems that were essentially technically sound.
3. Financing. Failure to base project design on any reasonable plan for post-project financial viability also resulted in the inferior performance of systems that were technically sound. The assumption that operating costs could be met by collecting revenues from public facilities proved wishful thinking. It resulted in difficult periods for communities as they converted to private metering to achieve financial viability, which in turn deprived poorer villagers of access to the water that originally had been made available to them by the project.
4. Beneficiaries. In the market towns systems were frequently superimposed by external authorities with the result that the commercial sector and community elites captured the benefits of the systems to the virtual exclusion of the poorer majority. Poorer villagers were also excluded when wealthier villagers captured the benefits during conversion to individual metering.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. General Recommendations

1. Training. The value of U.S. participant training should be assessed according to established "rates of return"--e.g., nearly all Thai sanitation trainees have returned (and are active in the sector) whereas Thai physici-ans have not. At the community level, personnel responsible for sus-taining operations must be adequately trained. Training cannot be a one-time event. Levels of performance after training must be monitored.
2. Community participation. Vague statements in project papers should be replaced by strategies, based on firm socioeconomic analysis of community decision-making and resource allocation, for ensuring that community members will actually perceive there is something to be gained by giving time and money to the project.
3. Supervision and institutional support. Functioning and effectiveness must be supervised at all levels. Supervisors should be equally prepared to praise good performance as to correct inadequate performance. Supervision must be regular and frequent. Given that the Rural Water Supply Section of SED no longer has supervisory responsibility, those interested in the con-tinued functioning of the piped water systems should monitor effectiveness during the transition to management by the Provincial Water Authority.

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4. Commodities. U.S. commodities furnished should be equal to or better than their equivalents manufactured in other countries; otherwise A.I.D. should allow purchase of foreign commodities.
5. Impact. A.I.D. and Congress should recognize that project termination is frequently, if not usually, too soon to be able to see impacts upon beneficiaries. Time lapse is necessary for project outputs to adjust themselves and become part of community life; only then can more definitive impacts be observed, even if not directly measurable. This means recognizing the need for ex-post evaluation.
6. Institutional memory. Missions should be encouraged to develop libraries such as USAID/Thailand's. End-of-tour reports should be reinstitutionalized--not as an onerous requirement, but as a means to improve professionalism and learning from past experiences.

B. Recommendations Specific to Water Projects

1. Convenience. Water provided by A.I.D.-supported systems should always be more convenient than sources already in use. Likelihood of acceptability is otherwise low.
2. Quantity. Abundance of water should be recognized as a major benefit that permits improved diet and sanitary practices leading to better health--even if the water is not used for drinking.
3. Evaluating health impact. While the health of a population may improve as a result of a particular intervention, the difficulties and cost of accurately measuring the improvement are certain to be great. Proving health impact will remain impossible unless data are systematically gathered on a village-by-village basis rather than only at the clinic or health post level.
4. Rationale for water projects. The present A.I.D. rationale for financing rural water supply projects on the grounds of improved health should be reexamined given the difficulty of accurately proving health impact. It may be that economic impact may be a stronger justification and that water should be considered instead as an investment in rural infrastructure.
5. Financing and Equity. All project papers for A.I.D.-installed water systems should include carefully detailed plans that will assure the meeting of recurrent costs after A.I.D. funding has terminated.

These plans should also ensure not only the necessary funds for operation of the system, but also assure that the entire community is serviced. Planners should consider universal metering coupled with an increasing block rate tariff schedule, which would provide the first units of water at low prices and increasing costs per unit for increased volume delivered. The poor of the community would thus receive service at low prices while those who wanted and used larger amounts would pay the major part of the costs.

Credit programs permitting poorer community members to partially defer payment for meter installation should also be considered as should metered water-sharing schemes.

6. Incremental Steps. Planners should seek to develop projects in which the technology represents an incremental improvement over the existing level and can offer the prospect of further step-by-step progress. Any system that would offer an incremental improvement would need to displace a present source and be perceived as offering either better quality, greater quantity, or more convenience. It may be, for example, that hand pumps for shallow wells are not perceived as enough improvement to warrant the effort to keep them functioning--in contrast to the systems installed by this Thai water project.

An Evaluation of Activities

of

Save The Children (USA) in Bangladesh

By

Raisul Awal Mahmood
and
Father Richard W. Timm

May, 1980

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FACE SHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Bangladesh	B. Project Title Community-based Integrated Rural Development	C. Project Number 388-0010	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>77</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY _____
E. Life of Project Funding (not stated) 1. AID (Loan or Grant) _____ 2. Other Donor _____ Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director Frank Kimball 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) 3. Other Ingrid Buxell, PRO, USAID, Dacca	
G. Project Design (not stated) 1. In House (Name, Position) 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.)		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) Save the Children (USA)	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date) (not stated)			

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title An Evaluation of Activities of Save The Children (USA) in Bangladesh	B. Evaluation Date May 1980	C. Type of Evaluation special	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation 1977-1980
E. Evaluation Cost (not stated) 1. Direct Hire a. travel _____ per diem _____ contract _____ 3. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____	F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation To investigate the progress made and the problems encountered during Phase I and to suggest procedures to follow		G. Initiated By (not stated)

H. Evaluation Team Composition

1. Direct Hire

a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise
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2. Contract.

a. Name of Organization (if any)	b. Contract No.	c. Name(s) of Persons
		d. Area(s) of Expertise

Raisul Wal Mahmood (Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies), research economist
 Father Richard W. Timm, consultant, (Caritas)

I. Other Responsible AID or Host Country Personnel (Name, Position) Dr. Kenneth Forman, Director, Bangladesh field office, SCF/CDF	J. Evaluation Coordinator Signature _____ Typed Name _____ Position _____ Date _____
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METHODOLOGY

This evaluation report is based on observations made by the authors during their field visits in March-April 1980. All four areas where SCF/CDF is operating were visited. In each area interviews were conducted in a number of households within each village.

On arrival, the authors first met with the field staff to gain an overview of the area. In these meetings the field staff gave a summary of the program from its inception, including the various activities in each village, the work of the individual sub-committees, their achievements and problems.

Afterwards, the authors visited the VDC office in each village. The objective of these visits was firstly, to talk with the VDC members about the activities of SCF/CDF in their village, their orientation with SCF/CDF principles, and the future of the program. Secondly, to discuss in detail the documentation of the various activities, the accounting procedures, loan repayments, and the self-help component of the different development projects.

After spending some time with the VDC members in each village, house-to-house visits were made: on average 10-12 houses in each village. The purpose of these visits was to obtain the local people's opinion of the program, their grievances, if any, against the VDC, and prospects for the future. These visits proved to be very effective and revealed details which would not have emerged from any other source.

Once all the villages had been covered in a particular area, the authors completed the evaluation by sharing their experiences and observations with the field staff and discussing the future of the program.

In addition to these visits and discussions the authors also made time to meet some thana-level government officials in two different areas. The activities of the SCF/CDF, the field staff, and more importantly, the future of the SCF/CDF in their respective areas were discussed. Many of the ideas that are incorporated in this report originated from these meetings.

INTRODUCTION

This is an evaluation report of Phase I of the Save the Children Federation Community Development Foundation (SCF/CDF)* Program, and not an historical review of the program. Therefore, no attempt has been made to give a description of all projects, their expenditures, self-help contributions or loan repayments. After giving the summary and recommendations the conditions laid down in the internal evaluation of the SCF/CDF program in 1979 are discussed. These conditions are expected to be fulfilled by July, 1980, at the end of Phase I. Then the special issues are examined. This is followed by a brief analysis of the different kinds of projects and other issues.

SUMMARY

1. The structure and organization of the program are now firmly established. VDCs are set up and functioning in all 17 villages and their representative nature is guaranteed by the member-selection process.
2. A sound system of financial management, record-keeping and project monitoring is functioning at all levels.
3. Earthwork and construction projects are the only ones for which a self-help component can be accurately computed.
- ✓ 4. SCF/CDF has demonstrated ability for providing support staff and for introducing appropriate technical inputs. However, agricultural improvements and programs particularly for small farmers, are lacking.
5. No plan has yet been proposed to phase out the program and give legal status to the VDCs.
- ✓ 6. The expense of the program makes the CBIRD model unsuitable for widespread replication. It requires a social motivation on the part of the village leaders which is lacking in present-day Bangladesh and which the program does not provide although VDC technical capability can be and is being developed. Village resources and personnel are gradually being utilized and village funds are replacing SCF/CDF funds.
7. SCF/CDF still has much to learn from other NGO programs, and could also benefit from closer cooperation with government programs, especially

*SCF/CDF is a term which was used earlier for this organization. In Bangladesh it is now identified as Save the Children, (USA).

in adult literacy and irrigation cooperatives.

8. Mirzapur and Rangunia are relatively privileged areas and are not as much in need of assistance as the other two areas. One village in each area could be phased out on a trial basis.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The SCF/CDF is now in a position to begin planning to phase out its activities from some of the areas. This might include all the villages of Rangunia; Rashideohata of Mirzapur; and Kunda of Nasirnagar.
2. In the remaining areas, SCF/CDF presence is needed a little longer. The basic groundwork has already been completed and now more effort is necessary to achieve the desired objectives. Probably two to three more years should pass before the question of phasing out from these areas could be raised.
3. Before phasing out the program an advisory committee should be formed in the respective areas to supervise the activities of the VDCs. This can consist of government officials at district, sub-division and thana levels, union council members and respected persons of the area.
4. In areas where Gram Sarkar or Swanirvar movement is very active, the phasing out of the SCF/CDF activities may be followed by an amalgamation of the VDCs with the Gram Sarkar or Swanirvar movement.
5. Once the SCF/CDF has phased out from a particular village, the respective Field Coordinator may remain there for some time as an observer. During this period he can carry out action research on the functioning of the VDC in the absence of the SCF/CDF.
6. To encourage the VDC sub-committees to be more effective, some financial authority may be given to them. This will not only create more awareness among the sub-committee members, but will also allow an uniform pattern of development of the various sectors.
7. For an uniform and phased development of the various SCF/CDF areas there should be a master plan. The master plan should have two related elements: an overall plan and a separate micro plan for each area. While the former should define the nature of development, sectoral priorities, and a projected time schedule, the latter should utilize and develop the resource endowment of the respective areas, and select the target socio-economic groups.

8. The present system of classifying families as landless is not effective. The notion of landlessness does not necessarily indicate that a family is really poor. Therefore, one possible alternative would be to classify families according to their levels of income, e.g., very poor, poor, rich, very rich, etc. Already, in some of the villages this method is being practiced.

9. To further accelerate the level of development and the degree of uniformity between areas, the Program Officers should specialize in activities rather than in areas, as is currently the case.

10. The training program for POs, FCs, SDCs and the VDC members should be intensified. The VDC members should receive orientation courses in rural development, project management and bookkeeping, and an attitude of awareness should be developed which recognizes the need for equitable development.

11. The experiences of the different voluntary organizations and the analysis of their income generating activities should be studied so that some of these ideas can be introduced in the SCF/CDF areas. Ideas which are being disseminated through the ADAB newsletters could provide a useful and informative discussion between the field staff. Greater emphasis should be given towards mobilizing the personal savings of the various socio-economic groups in the SCF/CDF areas.

A PROJECT TO HELP PRACTITIONERS
HELP THE RURAL POOR
Case Study No. 3

PLANNING FROM THE BOTTOM UP:
COMMUNITY-BASED INTEGRATED RURAL
DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH KOREA

36.

VINCENT S. R. BRANDT
JI WOONG CHEONG

CO-SPONSORS: Financial support for this ICED cooperative international project has been provided by: the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, the Charles E. Merrill Trust, the Ministry of Cooperation of the Netherlands, the International Planned Parenthood Federation, the United States Agency for International Development and the Save the Children Federation/Community Development Foundation.

International Council for Educational Development
P. O. Box 217, Essex, Connecticut 06426 USA

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A.I.D. - ASIA FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

Country S. Korea	B. Project Title Community Based Integrated Rural Development	C. Project Number not stated	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY not stated 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY _____
E. Life of Project Funding 1. (Loan or Grant) _____ or Donor _____ 3. Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director _____ 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) not stated 3. Other _____	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) not stated 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not stated		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) not stated 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) SCF/CDF Save the Children Federation/Community Development Founda	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date) not stated			

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title **PLANNING FROM THE BOTTOM UP: Community-based Integrated Rural Development in S. Korea	B. Evaluation Date August-October 1978	C. Type of Evaluation Qualitative Evaluation	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation not stated
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire not stated Travel _____ u. per diem _____ 2. Contract _____ 3. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____	F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation (SEE attached sheet)		G. Initiated By not stated

H. Evaluation Team Composition

1. Direct Hire	a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise
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2. Contract:	a. Name of Organization (if any)	b. Contract No.
	International Council for Educational Development	
	c. Name(s) of Persons	d. Area(s) of Expertise

Vincent Brandt, Social Anthropologist
 Dr. J. Woong Cheong, Rural Sociologist, Professor of Community Development at the College of Agriculture of Seoul National University

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position) Dr. Melvin Frarey, Director, SCF/CDF field office.	J. Evaluation Coordinator Signature _____ Typed Name _____ Position _____ Date _____
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F. Purpose: Special attention to organizational and interpersonal relationships and environmental adaptations of the six CBIRD rural impact areas. Also includes field observations.

*June 1976 AID Operational Program Grant, Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, Charles Merrill Trust, the Ministry of Cooperation of the Netherlands, International Planned Parenthood Federation, Save the Children Federation. Also, substantial counterpart funds from the six areas themselves. (SEE TABLE In Elliott's Evaluation : Mini Regional Rural Development)

**Note that this is Case Study No. 8 of "A Project to Help Practitioners Help the Rural Poor", the same series in which the "Working with Tribal People: The Institutes at Kosbad Hill (India)" was No. 9 . The series is sponsored by the International Council for Educational Development.

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INTRODUCTORY COMMENTARY*

In addition to explaining the background of the accompanying case study, this introduction attempts to view the experiences and lessons of the CBIRD project in South Korea in a broader international perspective.

WHAT IS CBIRD?

CBIRD (pronounced sea-bird) is the acronym for a development concept devised in the early 1970s by the Save the Children Federation/Community Development Foundation (SCF/CDF) on the basis of their many years of experience with helping the underprivileged in a variety of developing countries. ** CBIRD, though often referred to as such, is actually not a "model" in the strict sense; it is more in the nature of a particular strategy, based on a certain set of principles and goals, that can be flexibly applied in different situations in a wide variety of ways.

The CBIRD idea was first introduced in South Korea where SCF/CDF had operated for many years, but it is not limited to South Korea. In recent years SCF/CDF has sought to introduce the

*Prepared by Philip H. Coombs in behalf of ICED.

**Save the Children Federation (SCF) began as a voluntary children's relief organization in the USA during the Great Depression of the 1930s. After World War II, SCF extended its child relief activities overseas to several developing countries--one of the first being South Korea in the immediate wake of the Korean War. After the mid-1950s SCF expanded its program scope beyond simple relief to individual children and began supporting self-help development efforts by poor families and communities that could bring about more lasting improvements. To promote and implement these broader self-help projects in the field, SCF created the Community Development Foundation (CDF) in 1957 and established the first CDF field office in South Korea--which later became the sponsor and manager of the CBIRD Project. The two names have since been merged--the official name of the parent organization now being Save the Children Federation/Community Development Foundation (SCF/CDF). But since most Koreans still associate the separate CDF name with CBIRD, the authors of the case study have used this shorthand identification except when referring to the parent organization (as SCF/CDF).

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same strategy--though in very different specific forms and on a more modest scale--in 17 other less developed countries in Asia and the Pacific, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. The South Korean version, however, represents the most comprehensive, sophisticated and ambitious application of the general approach thus far.

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS

CBIRD in South Korea held special interest for ICED because it is a living embodiment of the new international consensus on rural development that has evolved since the early 1970s and is receiving wide attention today. This new international consensus advocates a more "integrated" and "community-based" approach to rural development and in particular a concerted effort to improve the condition of the poorest of the rural poor, the status and role of women, and the welfare of young children. This appealing rhetoric has now been adopted and is being actively promoted by virtually all United Nations and bilateral development agencies, by various voluntary organizations, and by top policy-makers in a growing number of developing countries.

The big problem everyone faces at this juncture, however, is how to translate this popular rhetoric into effective actions. This is proving to be much more difficult than the rhetoric itself suggests, and than many people had supposed. The difficulties arise in part from the inherent complexities of traditional rural societies and the stubborn obstacles that stand in the way of transforming them--even in such an economically prosperous and rapidly modernizing society as South Korea. Equally serious difficulties also arise, however, from the fact that the unconventional strategy and goals espoused by the new consensus run directly counter to the conventional doctrines and approaches to rural development that have prevailed almost universally over the past 25 years, and to the way national and international development agencies are structured and accustomed to thinking and operating.

Most government rural programs--ranging from agricultural extension and rural credit to health, nutrition, family planning and educational services--have been and still are operated independently by various specialized agencies, each with its own "delivery system" and cadre of field agents. As a result, rural programs are highly fragmented--the very antithesis of integration--and the bureaucracies that run them are disinclined to yield any of their autonomy in the interest of better integration. Further, these rural programs are structured and operated in a hierarchical, top-down fashion, leaving little room or incentive for participation by the rural people and communities they are meant to serve. Unfortunately, also, these programs--less by design than by force of circumstances--have generally by-passed the poorest segments of the rural population. Such benefits as they may provide accrue mainly to the better-off, thus widening the already large socioeconomic gaps that exist within many villages and often actually worsening the plight of the most disadvantaged. In like manner, what are euphemistically labeled "women's programs" and "children's programs" often turn out on close inspection to be little more than token gestures.

CBIRD'S RECORD IN KOREA

The architects of CBIRD believed that these serious deficiencies could be substantially remedied, if not entirely overcome, by creating an integrated, bottom-up development system, managed by local community committees, that could be linked, close to the grass roots level, with the top-down government services.

In the context of South Korea, the new CBIRD initiative happily coincided with a strong commitment by the central government to promote and invest substantial amounts in rural development under the aegis of the *Saemaul Undong* (New Community Movement). This strongly top-down campaign put great pressure on all the lower echelon administrators of various bureaucracies to coordinate their rural activities. It also, paradoxically, put great pressure on the villages to engage in bottom-up community planning and extensive self-help efforts. The new CBIRD initiative also coincided with an extraordinarily dynamic national economy that provided an unusually favorable climate for rural development.

The promoters of CBIRD took skillful advantage of these circumstances and tailored their strategy to harmonize with the Government's efforts, but going substantially beyond them by establishing much stronger and more sophisticated mechanisms for local planning and development management.

The evidence in the case study portrays an impressive record of accomplishment. The CBIRD community-based system, all things considered, is working remarkably well in the six selected rural "impact areas." It has clearly contributed significantly to increased productivity and income and to improved living standards in these areas. Its largest and most visible achievements have been on the economic side. The main weakness in the performance record, according to the case study's evaluation, are in the area of social welfare services and help to the poorest 20 percent or so of the population. But this, according to the analysis, was not for any lack of trying on the part of CBIRD's sponsors and field personnel. The main causes of the imbalance between income-increasing projects that would benefit mostly the middle and higher level farmers, and social welfare and other efforts designed to benefit the poor, the women and the young children, were rooted in the traditions and social structure of the communities themselves and reflected the felt needs and ordering of priorities as seen by the local decision-makers.

This phenomenon is not unique, of course, to the Korean context; it can be found in a great many rural societies. But it happens to be unusually well analyzed and brought into focus by this particular case study.

SOME WIDELY APPLICABLE LESSONS

The findings of this case study, though confined to South Korea, lend support to the following general propositions that have relevance for rural development planners in many developing countries.

(1) If any externally designed rural development model is to have a reasonable chance of success, its original basic assumptions, goals, and strategy must come to terms with the traditional value system, human relationships and felt needs of the rural society into which it is being introduced. This requires a process of sensitive and skillful compromise and adaptation; otherwise the alien scheme will be rejected like an incompatible heart or liver transplant from the human body. The CBIRD experience in South Korea offers useful lessons on how such a process can be successfully conducted, and on why the necessary compromises are likely to result in a significant gap between the originally proclaimed goals of the imported model and the realities of its actual accomplishments.

(2) It would be unrealistic to expect an intervention of this sort in a few pilot areas to bring about, all by itself, a fundamental transformation of the existing socioeconomic structure, traditional values, and pattern of human relationships in these areas. If properly adapted to locally felt needs, preferences and mores, as well as to prevailing government policies and programs, such an intervention--as the CBIRD experience demonstrates--can result in impressive improvements. But a fundamental transformation of existing village structures and behavior patterns can only be brought about by broader and deeper nationwide economic, political and social changes. South Korea in the 1970s was a textbook example of such broad dynamic changes and provided a highly favorable climate for the CBIRD projects.

(3) The rate and extent of local improvements that can be brought about by an innovative rural intervention--such as CBIRD--also depends heavily on the development potential of the particular rural areas to which it is applied. This potential is determined by a combination of factors such as topography and natural resources, social cohesiveness or divisiveness, physical access to markets, the nature and strength of local institutions and traditions of cooperation, and the availability of dynamic local leadership. The importance of these factors, as well as their geographic variations, are well illustrated by the different CBIRD impact areas.

(4) Achieving a sizeable and permanent improvement in the position of the poorest families in virtually any rural area--as distinct from temporary infusions of charitable relief--is a far more difficult task than the currently popular rhetoric suggests. This proved to be the case even in the unusually prosperous circumstances of rural South Korea in the 1970s, despite the best efforts of CBIRD's sponsors. This in no way diminishes the importance of the goal of helping the rural poor, but it does caution against creating unrealistic hopes and expectations that in the end can only lead to disappointment and disillusionment and to making the task even more difficult the next time around.

(5) The pressures from many quarters on the managers of rural development projects to produce quick, visible and quantitatively measurable results tend to create program distortions and to become a major obstacle to achieving equally important qualitative

changes and improvements. There is a crucial message here for decisionmakers and quantitatively-minded program analysts and evaluators of major funding agencies.

The above observations are in no way intended as criticisms of the CBIRD program in South Korea. On the contrary, the fact that CIBRD's managers were able to cope with the realities of the situation, to take such good advantage of the favorable factors in the South Korean context, and to navigate so skilfully around the obstacles, is a tribute to their sensitivity, ability and devotion.

HOW THE REPORT WAS PRODUCED

This report is the result of a collaborative effort by two social scientists--an American social anthropologist and a Korean rural sociologist--who were exceptionally well-qualified for the assignment. Professor Vincent S. R. Brandt had studied Korean society for many years and just prior to the present case study had engaged in an extensive case study of the *Saemaul Undong* (New Community Movement) mentioned earlier, which forms an important part of the context of the CBIRD program. Dr. Ji Woong Cheong, Professor of Community Development at the College of Agriculture of Seoul National University, had done numerous previous field studies of rural development in both Korea and the Philippines and already had a first-hand acquaintance with the CBIRD program.

These researchers were encouraged by ICED to give special attention to qualitative evaluation of the CBIRD projects in terms of organizational and interpersonal relationships and environmental adaptations. At the same time they have included extensive quantitative evidence of improvements in productivity, income and social welfare in the impact areas. Of the six CBIRD rural impact areas in Korea, four are described here in some detail. Each of the authors, while responsible for writing about two areas, visited all four in order to obtain a general, comparative perspective.

The data on which the report is based comprise extensive personal observations at the village level, numerous interviews with local leaders and ordinary farmers and fishermen, and long discussions with CDF Coordinators in the field and with the Director and Staff of the SCF/CDF office in Seoul. In addition the authors have consulted and drawn upon the large body of descriptive and statistical documentation compiled by SCF/CDF.

The field research was carried out over several weeks between August and October 1978, during which time the researchers worked closely together exchanging data and observations and discussing conclusions. For logistical reasons, however, the report itself was drafted mainly by Professor Brandt, working on his own, after returning to the United States. Thus, while Dr. Cheong contributed importantly to the substance of the report, Professor Brandt has asked that it be made clear that he personally accepts final responsibility for the views and interpretations expressed in it.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is my pleasant duty to record here ICED's deep gratitude to all those who contributed importantly to this study, including the villagers and CDF Coordinators in the CBIRD impact areas; the Director of the SCF/CDF Field Office in Seoul, Dr. Melvin E. Frarey, and his staff; other SCF/CDF officials and staff in Westport, Connecticut, especially our former ICED colleague, Dr. Pratima Kale, now SCF/CDF's Program Director for Asia; and the several organizations listed in the front of this report that have been the co-sponsors and financial supporters of the overall ICED research project on "Helping the Rural Poor," of which this case study is a part. ICED is especially indebted to Professor Brandt and Dr. Cheong, the co-authors of this report. I would like to add a special personal expression of appreciation to Professor Brandt for being so tolerant of my sometimes ruthless editorial pencil.

For the sake of the record it should also be made clear that the views expressed in this document are solely the responsibility of ICED and the authors of the report. These views do not necessarily accord with those of the SCF/CDF or of any of the organizations that have co-sponsored and provided financial support to this ICED project.

Philip H. Coombs
Project Director
Vice Chairman of I.C.E.D.

CHAPTER 9

SOME LESSONS AND OPEN QUESTIONS

In examining the operational record of CBIRD in search of useful lessons, this report has stressed certain special characteristics of the Korean setting that provide a generally favorable context for rural development, as well as certain other characteristics that place practical limits on the CBIRD approach. Both sets of factors--positive and negative--need to be kept in view in considering the future potentialities of CBIRD in South Korea and the feasibility of replicating some or all of its special features.

This final chapter recapitulates some of the special contributions the CBIRD program has made in the Korean context and suggests some considerations that will determine its applicability in other countries. It also addresses two outstanding questions of importance to many countries, and a third concerning the survival and future influence of CBIRD in South Korea.

Since 1971 the pace of change in virtually all of South Korea's 36,000 villages has picked up dramatically, as village economies have become more and more tightly integrated with that of the nation as a whole, and as bureaucratic influences on almost every aspect of farm life have deepened. From this standpoint the CDF program must be seen as an effort to fine-tune and accelerate the process in a few carefully selected areas. The rural populations of the CBIRD impact areas are particularly fortunate in that the kinds of benefits, training, and experience they are receiving will have long lasting effects, enabling them to compete more effectively in the materialistic sweepstakes that are now going on in South Korea.

Korean rural development in recent years has taken place under the influence of the Saemaul Movement with its emphasis on paternalistic guidance and material support from above combined with the mobilization of popular cooperative effort under local leadership. CBIRD has supported the Saemaul efforts but has gone beyond them, enabling farmers, fishermen and others in its impact areas to exercise a greater degree of control over the development process. While

one general effect of both Saemaul and CBIRD initiatives has probably been to reinforce a realization by these local producers of their dependence on outside institutions and the linkage of their livelihood with the national economy, the CBIRD approach has clearly demonstrated better ways to plan, finance, and direct further progress in accordance with villagers' own goals and needs. It has furnished the multi-village area with a set of institutions and a methodology that enables the local population to make the most of their available resources. Most importantly it provides them with a workable means of acquiring those essential factors of production that are everywhere in short supply: capital, technical know-how, and management skills.

So far, particularly in the mainland impact areas, the CBIRD initiatives have produced impressive results in increased productivity, incomes, and local living standards. On the islands there have been some initial problems and delays, but a wide variety of projects is now being implemented, and given the fact that some of the island programs represent much smaller per capita investment by CDF, the benefits already achieved are significant.

APPLICABILITY OF CBIRD EXPERIENCE TO POORER COUNTRIES

In a report such as this it is not possible to reach any firm conclusions regarding the extent to which successful CDF programs in Korea are replicable elsewhere. Nevertheless, it seems useful to ask some leading questions that might help to establish a comparative basis for exploring the possibilities.

- 1) How important is the relatively egalitarian distribution of land ownership in determining the outcome of the CBIRD experiment in Korea?
- 2) Has the strong demand for agricultural and fishery products from prosperous urban centers been a necessary condition for raising farm income?
- 3) To what extent does the success of CBIRD's non-formal educational program depend on popular attitudes towards learning?
- 4) How much has CBIRD depended on the effective operation of local administrative agencies and Korean government inputs in order to achieve its planned goals?
- 5) To what extent does CDF's concentration on areas with a "good potential for development" account for the program's impressive achievements? Or, conversely, would the CBIRD experience be more relevant for less developed countries if there were greater emphasis on "hard cases"?

There can be no doubt that the first four factors listed above--the relatively equitable distribution of land holdings, the profitable and expanding markets for agricultural and fishery products, the

high value traditionally placed on education and learning in the Korean culture, and the aggressive promotion of rural development by the government--have all contributed importantly to the effectiveness of the CBIRD program. It would seem to follow, therefore, that the absence of any one or combination of these positive factors in another country setting--especially a very low income country with a low economic growth rate--would constitute if not an outright barrier at least a serious impediment to replicating the successful CBIRD experience in South Korea.

As to the fifth question concerning CDF's concentration on areas with a "good potential for development," we can give only a speculative answer. CDF was undoubtedly well advised to choose such promising areas as Sanbuk and Chunsong in which to launch its experiment because it required testing out a complicated and untried approach that would inevitably present sizeable problems and risks even under relatively favorable circumstances. To have started with the hardest cases could well have doomed the experiment to failure from the outset. In moving on from these initial areas to the island areas of Wido and Yaksan, CDF did indeed take on some relatively "harder cases." Yet even these areas had a good deal going for them, especially in terms of prospering markets and rising prices for marine products, and the availability of substantial local savings--albeit concentrated in relatively few hands--for reinvestment in development.

There are, however, some much "harder cases" in Korea, particularly isolated mountain villages with only poor to moderate development potential and still lying outside the mainstream of the dynamically growing Korean economy. It is reasonable to suppose that if the CBIRD approach were now to be tried out on some of these truly "hard cases" it would encounter much greater difficulties and would probably have to be modified substantially in certain respects in order to achieve significant results. But the experience thus gained would undoubtedly offer much poorer countries to the south a wider range of useful lessons--both positive and negative--than the present CBIRD experience.

This observation is not intended to imply, however, that the CBIRD approach and the lessons of its experience in South Korea have no relevance to less prosperous countries. On the contrary, it may well be that certain features of CBIRD's strategy and methodologies--for example, its way of dovetailing local planning and implementation with broader nationwide planning and development efforts, its technique of recycling outside grants into local revolving loan funds, and its successful efforts to link rural communities with outside sources of know-how and technical support--may well have considerable applicability to other countries, provided, of course, that they are properly adapted to the quite different circumstances of these countries. Indeed, no one can really know until it has actually been tried.

What is very clear, however, is that CBIRD's unusually favorable environment in South Korea, especially the extraordinary

economic dynamism, cannot readily be replicated elsewhere. Therefore, the expectations of what a modified CBIRD approach might achieve under much less favorable economic circumstances should be appropriately modest and realistic. In other words, inflated rhetoric and false hopes should be studiously avoided.

THREE OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS

The discrepancies noted earlier between CBIRD's more intangible goals--particularly concerning social change and welfare--and the actual program accomplishments pose a few important unresolved questions that merit brief review, especially since they apply to many countries.

1. *Can the Poor Really be Helped?*

It has been pointed out in previous sections that most of the benefits from CDF investment accrue to middle level and well-off farmers, and that relatively little can apparently be done to change this pattern despite the best intentions and efforts on the part of the CDF staff and Coordinators. In the Korean case it seems evident that except for outright charity, attempts to help the poorest sector of the rural population must depend mainly on the trickle-down effect of generally increased village prosperity. The goals of restructuring society so as to change the distribution of wealth, and of establishing a new welfare-oriented mentality among local elites, are simply beyond the capacities of the CBIRD program--or any other program for that matter, short of a thoroughgoing political revolution or an ideological revitalization movement.

The question then inevitably arises; despite the widespread international consensus on the need to improve the lot of the rural poor, to what extent is this goal really practicable? Perhaps there is something wrong with our perceptions of the problems. Have we taken adequate account of the very solid and durable social/structural obstacles to the kinds of change that are so widely regarded as desirable? Or, to put the matter in terms of practical strategies, is it possible to redistribute wealth or focus efforts mainly on aiding the poor, while at the same time promoting self-sustaining rural development? We must conclude here that, in Korea at least, the answer seems to be no. Further, our assessment of the CBIRD programs suggests that, regardless of its statements of basic principles and objectives, SCF/CDF--at the level of actual operating procedures--has implicitly reached the same conclusion.

Unless a rural society is in a state of chaotic demoralization or upheaval, which has not been the case in South Korea, an effective integrated development program must be based on existing traditions, values, and institutions. It may be possible to modify their operation in gradual and subtle ways, but if the change agent's commitment compels him to confront and try to do something all at once about such intractable problems as the role of women, child-rearing practices, village authority structures or hierarchies of wealth and status--all in addition to technical agricultural innovation--then

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truly his program's failure is assured. In Korea, at any rate, effective self-help efforts depend on strengthening and improving village institutions and leadership in accordance with generally recognized, traditional standards--not on undermining or radically transforming them. The community worker can never afford to lose sight of the social mechanisms through which people interact and organize their group efforts, no matter how dedicated he may be to certain overriding objectives.

Hard questions must be asked: Is the ideal of integrated economic and social development always valid as a working strategy? The CBIRD experience in Korea suggests that this issue should be approached through carefully planned stages, with the major push in social welfare projects coming after effective improvement in the economic sector and after extensive indoctrination through non-formal education. Such an approach reflects two particular characteristics of the Korean context. First, while rural health care is grossly inadequate by Western standards, health problems are not so severe as to impair either village morale or work output. Second, the Korean farmer or fisherman gives highest priority to economic development.

CDF Coordinators and Community Committees have arrived at reasonably successful compromises on this issue in the actual working out of a viable mix of projects in the impact areas. The social welfare effort has been concentrated mainly on women's training, day care centers, and actions to reinvigorate and supplement existing family planning programs. Except for the day care centers, however, the amounts invested have been minor compared to other kinds of projects. And, as has been pointed out before, even with these kinds of projects it is the better educated, more confident, and more aggressive women from economically secure households who receive most of the benefits.

Another lesson here, then, is that if "bottom up" participation and decision-making has any meaning, it is that under the CBIRD approach local leaders will determine the direction that development takes in accordance with their own (and the local administration's) ordering of priorities. The Coordinator has considerable influence on the Committee's deliberations, but any serious effort to alter local priorities would be self-defeating, which is to say that any major and direct effort to improve the lot of the landless and help-less poor will have to wait.

2. Will Villages Work Together?

Another major objective of the CBIRD system has been the formation of multi-village communities as the focus for development efforts. Here it is useful to make a distinction between a true sociological community and a set of villages that are able to plan and work together under unified leadership for mutually agreed upon goals. The distinction can be illustrated by differences in the degree of solidarity and the manner in which CBIRD institutions are operated in the different impact areas. Only in Sanbuk does there appear to be a strong and broader sense of community in which

feelings of mutuality and social responsibility--a concern for the common welfare--go beyond village boundaries to encompass the whole impact area. The impression is inescapable in Sanbuk that farmers not only participate energetically, they also take pride in operating the CBIRD machinery for their own purposes. This same sense of proprietorship is popularly reflected in the frequent, everyday use of the Community Center, where, for example, a steady stream of people conduct their business with the credit union.

In the other CBIRD areas the same general formula is being followed, and there is widespread and grateful recognition of the benefits derived from it. But for most people the activities remain something that is being done for them by outsiders in accordance with externally imposed rules and procedures. In terms of their associations, loyalties and economic goals people continue to identify themselves with a particular village or kinship group. Or, where such ties are weakened, they are likely to migrate to the city. In other words, the CBIRD spirit has not yet become an integral, deeply rooted part of the local sub-culture and social system. The lesson here would seem to be that while the advantages of larger scale, inter-village cooperation are self evident, the erosion of village solidarity and the formation of an expanded rural community is likely to be a very slow process.

CDF's goal of establishing multi-village development units on a larger scale is impeded by other factors as well. The idea of the natural village community as the focus of social life and (now) of developmental aspirations is deeply ingrained in Korean mentality. Intimate, long term personal association is regarded as the proper and natural basis for both rural leadership and cooperative effort. Accordingly the Saemaul organizers (reportedly including President Park), while recognizing the importance of planning and coordinated effort on a regional basis, have continued to emphasize the individual village, both as the local decision-making unit and as the basis of labor mobilization. Coordination of larger projects beyond the village level is regarded as the function of local administration.

Is it likely that the demonstrated effectiveness of the CBIRD methodology will change official thinking on this issue? On the basis of the present study it seems highly problematical. The emotional associations of the village as a social and political unit have been mentioned above. In addition there are powerful bureaucratic and political forces influencing the direction of development of rural institutions. The Korean administration's approach is eminently pragmatic: 1) any concessions and adaptations to foreign organizations that are necessary in the short run in order to ensure the continued flow of outside assistance are readily made; 2) there is a genuine eagerness to learn new techniques and technologies, which if useful will probably be incorporated somehow in future practices. In the longer run, however, the prestige, authority, and ubiquity of Korean governmental agencies will determine the form and manner of operation of all local institutions.

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3. What are CBIRD's Long Term Prospects?

Today the social and economic horizons of Korean farmers are rapidly expanding, and CBIRD projects are accelerating the process. Local leaders are actively participating in guiding the development of their communities. But the Korean Government depends on the docile support of the rural population. It does not look kindly on the formation of any independent, private associations at the local level that might be in a position to challenge the authority of official agencies or serve as a rallying point for demands for greater local autonomy. It would be highly misleading to assume, as some have done, that the organization of local decision-making for economic development represents a significant trend in the direction of grass roots political democracy. Korean tradition, current governmental practice, and the geo-political situation in Northeast Asia all oppose such a tendency, at least in the immediate foreseeable future.

Thus it seems unrealistic to expect that a set of model or pilot communities implanted in Korean rural society can eventually transform that society by example in accordance with a particular ideal vision. Rather it is the other way around. As CDF phases out its operation, the model will inevitably be transformed by the particular conditions and popular attitudes of each area and by the ubiquitous and growing influence of the bureaucracy.

But even if the present CBIRD model seems unlikely to spread spontaneously throughout South Korea, will it survive in the present impact areas after CDF withdraws? Without occasional capital inputs and at least periodic encouragement and supervision from the outside, can the CBIRD program sustain itself in anything like its present form? The answer, in our view, will depend heavily on whether by then the CBIRD system has achieved a sufficiently high degree of integration in the sense of being supported and sanctioned by local values and customs, in addition to achieving the sense of proprietorship referred to earlier. Given these conditions, the survival prospects seem promising, but lacking this, there seems little likelihood that it will be perpetuated after the Coordinator and his capital are withdrawn.

One promising possibility that merits consideration, even if it may seem remote at the moment, is that the myon level cooperatives might take over the local CBIRD role of promoting and coordinating integrated rural development. But before this can be regarded as a serious alternative, there will have to be some drastic changes in the structural organization and operating style of the cooperative system, and in the attitudes of its officials. Local branches of the National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation in Korea are cooperatives in name only. The parent organization is a centralized government bureaucracy with a strong "top-down" orientation. It is extremely powerful, with great resources and authority in the fields of rural credit, farm input supplies, and in the collection, storage and distribution of agricultural products. There have been many changes for the better in its operations as a result of the Saemaul Movement, but no one believes that it

represents the farmers' views or interests.

At the time of this case study discussions were reportedly going on at high levels in the Korean Government with a view to restructuring the cooperative system to achieve a greater degree of active local participation and greater responsiveness to local needs. Were this to occur, the national organization would then play more of an advisory and facilitating role than, as at present, a strong-handed directive role as executor of government policy. In such a climate, the seeds of local planning, management and self-help that CBIRD has planted and nurtured would have a real chance to thrive. Whether such a vision is utopian or not, it appears to us that the local cooperative is in fact the logical focus of integration and the most promising successor to CBIRD.

In any event, there can be little doubt that in the long run the CBIRD innovations will leave some useful and enduring impacts on the Korean rural scene. But just what form they will take and how extensive they will be, only time can tell.

Evaluation of
The Mini Regional Rural Development Project
Korea

by
V. L. Elliott
September, 1979

FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Korea	B. Project Title Mini Regional Rural Development Project	C. Project Number 498-13-899-251	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>76</u> (inferred) 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY <u>81</u>
E. Life of Project Funding 1. AID: (Loan or Grant) <u>not stated</u> Other Donor _____ Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director <u>not stated</u> 2. Project Officer (Name, Position) _____ 3. Other _____	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) <u>not stated</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) <u>not stated</u>		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) <u>not stated</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) <u>Save the Children Foundation (SCF) and Community Development Foundation (CDF)</u>	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date)			

"Planning From the Bottom Up : Community Based Integrated Rural Development in South Korea", impact evaluation, August-October 1978, Vincent S.R. Brandt and Ji Woong Cheong

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title <u>Evaluation of the Mini Regional Rural Development Project</u>	B. Evaluation Date September, 1979	C. Type of Evaluation Third year evaluation of what was planned as a 5 year project	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation mainly 1977-1979
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire <u>not stated</u> a. travel _____ b. per diem _____ Contract _____ 3. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation Verification or refutation of the Brandt-Cheong findings, updating their statistics where possible and doing complementary economic analysis. Findings are generally endorsed.	G. Initiated By AID/W (inferred)
H. Evaluation Team Composition			
1. Direct Hire			
a. Name V.L. Elliott	b. Present Position <u>not stated</u>	c. Area of Expertise	
2. Contract:			
a. Name of Organization (if any)	b. Contract No.	c. Name(s) of Persons	
		d. Area(s) of Expertise	
I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position) <u>not stated</u>		J. Evaluation Coordinator	
		Signature _____	
		Typed Name _____	
		Position _____	
		Date _____	

INTRODUCTION

The Mini Regional Rural Development project (No. 498-13-899-251) in Korea is being successfully implemented. Evaluated against its LOGFRAME this project with its Community Based Integrated Rural Development (CBIRD) method, has met or is well on the way to meeting a high proportion of its objectively verifiable indicators.

An excellent impact evaluation of this project has just been published by the International Council for Educational Development of Essex, Connecticut. This report, PLANNING FROM THE BOTTOM UP: Community Based Integrated Rural Development In South Korea, by Vincent S. R. Brandt and Ji Woong Cheong, is an in depth analysis of four of the project's six impact areas. Their study, conducted from August through October, 1978, found this to be a successful project.

Unfortunately, the draft of the Brandt-Cheong study was not available until the current evaluation was already underway. When the Brandt-Cheong study became available the implications for this evaluation were abundantly clear. Therefore, my aim became verification or refutation of the Brandt-Cheong findings, updating their statistics where possible and doing complementary economic analysis.

I generally endorse the findings of the Brandt-Cheong paper and commend their paper to the reader. The Brandt-Cheong findings appear to be currently valid and based on sound research. The insights of the authors, should stimulate discussion and even controversy. Whether or not they are controversial, the findings are indicative of what is actually occurring in Korean participatory rural development.

A caveat on the applicability of the Brandt-Cheong findings to other areas which was consistently discussed has been that working in Korea with Koreans is indeed a fortunate circumstance for those involved in any developmental activity. I can only agree with the caveat for Korea's development effort appears to the marginal observe such as myself to be noteworthy for its success. While the lever for this success has been well directed policy, the fulcrum upon which that lever rests can only have been the people of Korea themselves, whether rural or urban. However, I believe the caveat is an indicator of degree rather than an absolute limitation. Methods used in Korea with Koreans probably can be applied successfully elsewhere, albeit with particular modifications. This remains to be proved and the SCF/CDF activity in Western Sumatra may be a valuable proving ground.

The analyses discussed in this memo are admittedly crude and depend upon data gathered by SCF/CDF's very effective internal evaluation system. The data were discussed in Seoul with USAID and ROKG officials as well as Dr. Cheong. In the impact areas, I received briefings as detailed as I wished them to be by CBIRD participants. I was free to wander about and discuss activities of the program with whomever I wished but, since I do not speak Korean, it is valid to question whether or not I got correct information. I can only reply that what I was told did not conflict with what I saw in the three CBIRD areas which I chose to visit and the Brandt-Cheong findings bore out what I saw and heard. It should also be pointed out that officials of the ROKG and SCF/CDF were quite insistent about pointing out activities and projects which had not met their expectations or, in which there was a great deal more to accomplish. Thus, I did not lack for examples of things which could reasonably be criticized. But I have no reason to suspect these actions as being anything more than effective examples of self-criticism.

The SCF/CDF data may not be entirely accurate but are at least reasonably indicative of what is happening in the CBIRD areas. As to this analysis, it is meant to supplement the far more scholarly work presented in the ICED publication of the study by Drs. Brandt and Cheong. As a suggestion, I would like to see their socio-cultural study followed up in about one or two more years by an interdisciplinary team (hopefully including Drs. Brandt and Cheong) which has an institutional economist among its members. There are further valuable insights to be gained and, given the data base available, an economist could be a useful resource in ferreting them out. If this work can also be pursued in Indonesia with a similar team I believe that important lessons about methods of participatory rural development can be surfaced.

Discussion

In the six CBIRD impact areas the surveyed income per household, according to SCF/CDF and the Brandt-Cheong data, increased significantly faster than those households' share of GNP from 1975 to 1979. The differential in the indexed growth ranged from slightly over 17% in Yanggu to just under 200% on Wido Island (see Table I). This would seem to indicate that the terms of trade between these areas and the rest of the Korean economy are improving. This is consistent with the general trend in the Korean economy (see Brandt-Cheong paper) but further study is needed to determine whether or not the rates of change in the CBIRD areas differ from other rural areas. Knowledgeable observers of the Korean economy and the CBIRD program estimate that these areas are experiencing faster economic growth than surrounding rural areas and are therefore reducing the gap

NATIONWIDE SURVEY
ON
SOCIO - ECONOMIC IMPACT
OF
RURAL ELECTRIFICATION

A.I.D. - ASIA
FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Philippines	B. Project Title Rural Electrification	C. Project Number not stated	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>not stated</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY _____
E. Life of Project Funding 1. ID. (Loan or Grant) <u>75,000 (1/78)</u> Other Donor _____ 3. Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director <u>Peter Cody</u> 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) _____ 3. Other _____	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) <u>not stated</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) <u>not stated</u>		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) <u>National Electrification Administration</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) <u>not stated</u>	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date) <u>not stated</u>			

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title <u>Nationwide Survey on Socio-Economic Impact of Rural Electrification</u>	B. Evaluation Date <u>June 1978</u>	C. Type of Evaluation <u>Exploratory: provide baseline data for future.</u>	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation <u>1977 (time of survey)</u>
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire <u>not stated</u> travel _____ J. per diem _____ 2. Contract _____ 3. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation <u>(SEE attached sheet)</u>	G. Initiated By <u>not stated</u>

H. Evaluation Team Composition

1. Direct Hire	a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise
2. Contract:	a. Name of Organization (if any)	b. Contract No.	
	<u>Bureau of Census (SEE attached sheet)</u>		
	c. Name(s) of Persons	d. Area(s) of Expertise	

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position)
 Willy Baum, USAID Rural Electrification Adviser. Alfred E. Tong, Acting Chairman Management Engineering Dep't, Ateneo de Manila Univ; Managing Director, Computer Center, Technology Resource Center. Jesus P. Magat, Acting Chairman, Economics Dept Ateneo de Manila University

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____

Typed Name _____

Position _____

Date _____

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F. Purpose: This study is the first of a series of nationwide surveys, to be repeated every three or five years, to evaluate the Philippine rural electrification program. While the study is exploratory and primarily designed to provide baseline information for future comparison, analysis also focused on socio-economic and attitudinal differences between identifiable groups, impact of electricity on the household, and the management of electric cooperatives.

H. Evaluation Team Composition: NEA STAFF

Directorate for Franchises and Regulation of Cooperatives, Director, Edmundo J. Bulatao

Socio-Economic Evaluation Section: Acting Chief, Emerita C. Vallanueva,
Edmundo H. Abad, Ma. Perpetua S. Valladares, Adelina Tienzo-Colozo

CONSULTANTS

Foreign: U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Karl Kindel, Thomas Stoterau, Floyd O. Quinn, Jim Ray, Bill Duncan

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PART I

INTRODUCTION

The National Electrification Administration was set up in 1969, replacing the previous Electrification Administration, with a reinforced mandate to provide electric service to the rural population on an "area coverage" basis through rural electric cooperatives.

Under this concept, electric service is to be extended to remote and distant areas, supported by the dense loads and revenues, from more densely-populated central areas. NEA has been assisted in this task by generous budget allocations from the National Treasury as well as by substantial foreign loan assistance, primarily from the United States Government through U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

As of January 1978, NEA had organized 96 electric cooperatives distributed among the country's 72 provinces. The ultimate goal of the program is total electrification of the country by 1990. In June 1976, USAID provided a \$75,000 grant for a series of economic and social evaluation studies of this program, the highlight of which is this nationwide evaluation survey. Inasmuch as the beneficiaries of the program are rural people, the grant provided for a survey to describe and measure the socio-economic impact of electricity on rural households.

A. SURVEY OBJECTIVES

This study is the first of a series of nationwide surveys, to be repeated every three or five years, to evaluate the Philippine rural electrification program. While the study is exploratory and primarily designed to provide baseline information for future comparison, analysis also focused on socio-economic and attitudinal differences between identifiable groups, impact of electricity on the household, and the management of electric cooperatives.

The main areas of investigations are:

1. sociological characteristics of the household;

2. housing conditions and facilities;
3. coverage, use and cost of electricity;
4. substitute power sources and cost in non-electrified and electrified households;
5. availability, accessibility and use of community facilities;
6. household income;
7. perception of the impact of electricity on the community; and
8. attitude towards and reactions to electricity cost and service.

B. SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS

The results of the survey shows that:

1. Households served by cooperatives have a lower socio-economic status than those served by other electric utilities.
2. Electrified households have higher socio-economic status than non-electrified households.
3. Cooperative electric utilities are more successful than private electric utilities in terms of availability of service and the number connecting among those accessible to electricity.
4. Cooperative electric utilities are more successful than private electric utilities in penetrating remote areas and servicing "poor" people. They have also reached a significant proportion of food producers.
5. Rural households use electricity primarily for lighting.
6. The strongest perceptions of indirect benefits of electricity were in improved peace and order and increased educational activity.
7. In cooperative areas, neighborhood-sharing is stronger and the benefits of electri-

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city to non-electrified households are more widespread than in non-cooperative areas.

8. Approximately half of all electrified households feel that cost of electricity is high. The extent of this opinion, however, is less in cooperative areas than in non-cooperative areas.
9. Electric service interruptions were common in both cooperative areas and non-cooperative areas.
10. Households in cooperative and non-cooperative areas have favorable attitudes towards electric cooperatives.

C. STATEMENT OF LIMITATIONS OF STATISTICAL INFERENCES FROM THE SURVEY ESTIMATES


The estimates in this report are based on a "quasi-experimental design" described in Appendix B. A probability sample of cooperative barrios was selected, and each sample cooperative barrio was matched with a non-cooperative barrio of similar size and electrification status. The households in each sample cooperative barrio and matching non-cooperative barrio were listed and categorized into two strata — electrified and non-electrified. In cooperative barrios a sample of 1,013 electrified households and 1,973 non-electrified households was selected and in non-cooperative barrios a sample of 303 electrified households and 694 non-electrified households was selected.

Since the non-cooperative portion of the sample was not selected under scientific rules of probability, the population or universe for the "experimental design" is hence taken to be the collection of households in the sample cooperative and non-cooperative barrios. The observations are inflated to the barrio level to compare estimates in the four "experimental design" strata: cooperative-electrified, cooperative-non-electrified, non-cooperative-electrified and non-cooperative-non-electrified. The non-cooperative portion of the experimental design is not generalizable to the country as a whole.

The standard error described in Appendix B is a measure of the precision of a survey estimate although it does not measure any systematic biases in the data. It should be noted that although the standard error of a survey estimate is a measure of the sampling error, it does not necessarily measure the several important sources of non-sampling error, such as interviewer variability and errors introduced in coding, editing and tabulating the survey data. Standard errors were computed for the "experimental design" estimates in the tables in this report, which are mostly percentages. Table B1 in Appendix B shows the sample size of each "experimental design" stratum and the standard errors for a range of percentage estimates in each stratum. Included in the appendix are the formulas which can be used to calculate the standard errors for the different types of survey estimates. The standard errors for the "experimental design" estimates are small, since each stratum has a fairly large sample size and the over-all sampling rate within the sample barrios is high (7 percent).

A.I.D. Project Impact Evaluation Report No. 15

The Philippines: Rural Electrification



December 1980

Agency for International Development

PN-AAH-976

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FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Philippines	B. Project Title (see attached)	C. Project Number (see attached)	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>1965</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY _____								
E. Life of Project Funding <table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 15%;">1. AID (Loan or Grant)</td> <td style="width: 15%; text-align: right;">92,150,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding-left: 20px;">from Donor</td> <td style="text-align: right;">132,000,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding-left: 20px;">Host Country Counterpart Funds</td> <td style="text-align: right;">158,000,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">TOTAL</td> <td style="text-align: right;">\$ 382,150,000</td> </tr> </table> As of December 30, 1979		1. AID (Loan or Grant)	92,150,000	from Donor	132,000,000	Host Country Counterpart Funds	158,000,000	TOTAL	\$ 382,150,000	F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director: <u>Anthony Schwarzwaldner</u> 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) 3. Other	
1. AID (Loan or Grant)	92,150,000										
from Donor	132,000,000										
Host Country Counterpart Funds	158,000,000										
TOTAL	\$ 382,150,000										
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position): <u>Not stated</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.):		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies): <u>National Electrification Administration</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.):									

I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date)

not stated

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title (see attached)	B. Evaluation Date Field Work: April 10-May 2 1980	C. Type of Evaluation Impact Evaluation	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation 1965 to present
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire: <u>not stated</u> travel _____ per diem _____ 2. Contract: _____ 3. Other: _____ TOTAL \$ _____	F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation To learn what impact rural electrification has had on the rural poor and on development in the Philippines.		G. Initiated By A/AID

H. Evaluation Team Composition

1. Direct Hire			
a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise	
David Mandel	NE/PD		
Peter Allgier	PPC/EA	Economist	
Gary Wasserman	A/AID		
Gerald Hickey	Asia/TR/RD	Anthropologist	
2. Contract:			
a. Name of Organization (if any)	b. Contract No.		
c. Name(s) of Persons		d. Area(s) of Expertise	
Robert Salazar		Social Scientist	
Josephine Alviar		Social Scientist	

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position)

not stated

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____

Typed Name _____

Position _____

Date _____

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B. Project Title and C. Project Number

Power Survey Grant, 1965

Feasibility Study Grant, 1967

VRESCO Loan, 492-H-025, August 1968

MORESCO Loan, 492-H-026, August 1968

Technical Assistance Grant, 492-11-220-248, April 1972

Rural Electrification Loan for Engineering Services, 492-H-027, November 1971

Rural Electrification Loan for Equipment, 492-H-028, May 1972

Rural Electrification Loan II, 492-T-034, August 1974

Rural Electrification Loan III, 492-T-036, March 1975

Rural Electrification Loan IV, 492-T-043, August 1976

Rural Electrification Loan V, 492-T-047, January 1978

Summary

1965 marked the beginning of A.I.D.'s involvement in rural electrification in the Philippines when it financed a power survey which recommended testing the feasibility of extending electricity to the rural areas. Following the feasibility study done by the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA), A.I.D. assisted the Government of the Philippines in creating two pilot cooperatives, MORESCO and VRESCO. Since these first steps, \$382 million have been invested in rural electrification in the Philippines. A.I.D. has contributed more than \$92 million to finance equipment, engineering consultant services and extensive technical assistance provided by the NRECA. This large investment has resulted in the establishment of the National Electrification Administration (NEA), which is planning and implementing an ambitious program with the following targets:

- Completion of backbone (main distribution lines and key lateral lines) systems and energization of all towns and cities by 1980;
- Energization of all barrios by 1985; and
- Total energization by 1990 (recently shortened to 1987).

As of February 29, 1980 the following physical accomplishments had been recorded by NEA:

117	cooperatives registered
101	cooperatives energized
844	municipalities energized (59% of total)
9,088	barrios energized (27% of total)
1,159,434	households electrified (20% of total)

The team found the impact of the rural electrification program on both the process of economic development and the rural poor to be limited. There were, however, enough examples of positive effects to permit the team to draw conclusions about the conditions which must exist and criteria which must be met if a rural electrification project is to have positive impacts on development and the poor.

Those areas where electricity had a positive effect on development were characterized by a concentrated population, diverse markets, availability of capital and technical skills, and proximity to a larger market. These were places such as market towns and areas near to Manila where there were more opportunities to use power productively and which were at a relatively more advanced stage of development. The team also found positive effects on economic development where investments and projects in power-dependent activities were actively promoted.


The team observed that a large segment of the poor were unable to make productive use of electricity. Of this group, a substantial portion could not afford to have their houses wired. They received only the benefits of community lighting such as greater security and increased community and social activity if their barrio had power:

lighting. Another portion could afford the wiring but could only afford the monthly cost of one or two light bulbs. This group received the social and community benefits and also saved money because, in most places, kerosene lighting is more expensive. Examples of the use of electricity to break out of the poverty cycle were found as one moved up the socio-economic scale. The people in this group often had skills and savings or access to family resources to use with the electricity.

Based on these observations the team drew the following conclusions:

- 1) The introduction of electricity does not automatically stimulate economic growth. The contribution electricity can make will depend on the level of development of the area and the programs and projects which utilize power.
- 2) The poor derive social and community benefits from electricity and some obtain cheaper, safer, better lighting. The most important benefits of electricity should be new employment opportunities, higher levels of productivity, and extended and improved public and social services. These benefits will flow to the rural poor only if electricity is used as an element of the development process and the development process, itself, is directed to meeting the needs of the poor.
- 3) The use of cooperatives for distributing electricity does not guarantee democratic participation of the members. The selection of an appropriate organizational form should give greatest weight to the need for effective management rather than other criteria such as the participation of beneficiaries or democratization of the development process.
- 4) The financial viability of rural electric distribution systems is difficult to achieve if they expand rapidly into far-flung, thinly populated rural areas. Financial problems are further exacerbated by rising energy costs. Conversely, encouragement of the productive uses of power and slower rates of systems expansion should improve the chances of achieving this goal.
- 5) Rural electrification does not substantially increase energy demand because the additional demand for energy caused by electrification is small and electricity is often substituted for other fuels.

Based on the above conclusions, the team urges cautious and careful study in programming funds for rural electrification. The availability of alternative projects, the desire and commitment of the host country and other country-specific factors should affect the Agency's decision. Future studies and evaluations of rural electrification should focus on identifying the pre-existing conditions and complementary programs which must exist to ensure that electrification has a positive impact.



**Rural
Roads
Evaluation
Report**

**USAID/PHILIPPINES
PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT**

in cooperation with:

**DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT - RURAL ROADS PROGRAM**

JUNE 1978

FACE SHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Philippines		B. Project Title Rural Roads		C. Project Number Loan #492-T-035		D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>75</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY <u>78</u>	
E. Life of Project Funding 1. AID. (Loan or Grant) <u>15,000,000</u> 2. Other Donor _____ Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ _____				F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director <u>not stated</u> 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) _____ 3. Other _____			
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) <u>not stated</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) <u>not stated</u>				H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) <u>not stated</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) <u>not stated</u>			
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date) <u>not stated</u>							

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title <u>Rural Roads Evaluation Report</u>		B. Evaluation Date June 1978		C. Type of Evaluation Interim Evaluation		D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation October 1975-June 1978	
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire <u>not stated</u> a. travel _____ b. per diem _____ Contract _____ Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____			F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation "Economic and social benefits from the six roads." (Roads representative of the roads built under the project and completed during the first one and half years of implementation.)			G. Initiated By <u>not stated</u>	
H. Evaluation Team Composition							
1. Direct Hire							
a. Name		b. Present Position		c. Area of Expertise			
"Rural Roads Office of the Department of Local Government and Community Development (DIGCD/RRP) and USAID's Provincial Development Division."							
2. Contract:							
a. Name of Organization (if any)		b. Contract No.					
c. Name(s) of Persons				d. Area(s) of Expertise			

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position) William Sommers, Chief, Provincial Dep't; Rick Arnaldo, Connie Canosa for analysis, writing and secretarial services. Also, Lucy Supleo, Director, Rural Roads Office (staff gathered the data). Governors of Ilo, Pangasinan, La Union, Bataan, Negros Occidental and Misamis Oriental		J. Evaluation Coordinator	
		Signature _____	
		Typed Name _____	
		Position _____	
		Date _____	

ASIA/OP/E: 6/80

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memorandum

DATE: July 6, 1979

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: Ted Vialet, PPC/E/PDES

SUBJECT: Summary of the Rural Roads Evaluation Report in the Philippines

TO: Bill Anderson, PPC/E/PDES

This evaluation was done jointly by personnel from U.S. AID Philippines' Provincial Development Division and the Rural Roads Office of the Department of Local Government and Community Development. This report analyzes the impact of six rural roads built as a part of a larger rural roads program in the Philippines that was financed by the Rural Roads I Loan (492-T-035) made to the Philippines government by U.S. AID. The roads evaluated in this report were completed within the first year and a half of the loan construction period, which began in October 1975 and ended in December 31, 1978. This report is an interim report because the period of use of each road was one year or less at the time the evaluation was conducted. The six roads evaluated in this report were selected according to certain criteria:

1. The projects were constructed or rehabilitated with local funds.
2. The project rights-of-way were titled to the province.
3. The projects were part of a continuous road system linking agricultural or fishing areas of predominantly small farmers or fishermen with the closest market town.
4. The projects were linked with a road of equal quality which in turn was connected to a good road leading to the nearest market town.
5. All of the structures (bridges, culverts, etc.) between the project and the nearest market town were of at least equal load capacity or were scheduled for replacement under the Rural Roads Project.
6. The road system was directly connected to at least 2 barangays (smallest unit of local government) within its influence area.

The primary data for the report was obtained from household surveys and interviews with local government officials. (secondary data was gathered from various government offices). The roads' influence area was 8,086 hectares that supported 4,684 households with a total population of 27,953. This area was largely agricultural. Before the Rural Roads Project, the six roads were "narrow, uneven, full of potholes, slippery in the dry season



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

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and often impassable in the rainy season." Moreover, the river crossings were mostly old timber bridgers or coconut trunks. After the road systems were improved: a) the right-of-way was widened significantly; b) side ditches and culvert pipes were installed for better drainage; c) reinforced Derk Girder Bridges were constructed over the river crossings; d) wider shoulders were provided on both sides of the road; e) also, parts of the roads were surfaced with gravel. The cost of constructing or improving the road systems was 7,800,000 pesos; 5,200,000 of which was reimbursed to the respective provincial governments upon completion by the DLGCD and USAID.

Findings of Report

A) Economic Benefits--(resulted from or may have in part been caused by the improvement of the six roads.)

1. Reduction in transport costs and increased availability of reliable transportation services.

"In the six roads, passenger charges fell by 54% between 1975 and 1978. This was in the face of an 87% increase in the legal transport rate set by the Board of Transportation during the same period."

Total no. of transport units	Before RRP	After RRP	Percentage Change
1) Jeepney	15	81	440
2) Tricycles	26	95	265
3) Buses	2	12	500
4) Cargo Trucks	20	55	175
5) TOTAL (all vehicle types)	63	242	284

2. Increase in the Production of Major Crops

"In the surveyed area the production volume of 7 major marketable crops raised within the roads' influence area increased by nearly 40% during the last 2 years." (76-77)
Vegetables increased by 62% and fruits increased by 46%.

"Road improvement, while not the only factor, has been a significant factor in inducing increased production by improving market access, inducing visits by extension workers, and affording easier and cheaper access to farm inputs.

3. Increased in Farmgate (price farmers receive from merchants at the farmsite) and Market Prices of Major Agricultural Crops

"For the 7 major crops raised within the roads' influence area, average farmgate prices rose by 59% while market prices

increased 26% a year after the completion of the project." The decline in transport costs were probably a major cause of the increase in farmgate prices because the farmers would have to pay the merchants less for shipping costs. Also, household-interviews indicated that farmers were able to bring more of their produce directly to the market (nearby town) after the completion of the road projects because of improved roads and faster traveling time.

	Marketing Practices of farmers in project area	Perc. of Production Volume		Difference
		Before RRP	After RRP	
Average figures for all six roads surveyed	a. Sold at farm	69	41	28
	b. Sold at market	31	59	28

4. Increase in Gross Annual Household Income

	Annual Gross Household income	% Increase
Before Road Improvement	5,706 pesos	
After Road Improvement	7,286 pesos	28%

The increases in income are due primarily to increased production within the area. "Also contributing is the farmer's ability to sell at higher prices while paying lower transportation charges."

5. Entrepreneurial Increase

"Data on the 6 roads' influence area show that commercial enterprises have grown from 78 before the road project to 166 after the road project was completed. While a variety of reasons can be marshalled to explain these increases, they are, in one way or another, tied to the road improvement. Sari-sari stores (variety stores), for example, depend on regular and timely shipments of perishables while rice and corn mills grow in concert with increased agricultural production."

Economic Enterprises (No. of units)	RRP Before	After RRP	Difference	Perc. Change
a. Sari-sari stores	35	100	65	186
b. Drug stores	5	6	1	20
c. Tailoring/Dress Shops	4	11	7	175
d. Beauty Shops	2	3	1	50
e. Rice/Cornmills	22	34	12	38
f. Storage Facilities	2	3	1	50
g. Cottage Industries	1	1	0	0

B) Social Benefits

1. Increased Mobility

Road improvement, particularly the construction of stable bridges over rivers and creeks, has enabled people in the influence areas to travel year-round on roads that were frequently impassable during the rainy season before the road project was initiated. As a result of the road improvements, people in the influence areas have increased the number of trips they make per year.

	Outbound trips days/year	Percent Increase
Before (Road) Improvement	58	
After (Road) Improvement	123	114%

2. Accessibility to Health Services

Better roads have made it easier for the rural population in the survey area to travel to obtain Health Services.

by == household average figure obtained from survey taken in all six road influence areas	A. Frequency of consultation with medical personnel	Before RRP	After RRP	Dif.	Perc. Change
	1) doctors/nurses/ dentists	13	25	12	92
	2) herbolarios	18	12	6	33
	B. Place of Consultation	Before RRP	After RRP	Dif.	
1) at barrio/ residence		69%	52%	16%	
2) at poblacion		31%	48%	16%	

"Village people are beginning to increase their efforts to get better health protection. The government has apparently recognized this fact since it has recently moved to increase the number of health facilities and programs within the influence areas of the improved roads. Fourteen new health facilities (rural health units, clinics, etc.) were inaugurated to which 10 government health personnel were assigned.

3. Improved Accessibility to Educational Facilities

Educational services	Before RRP	After RRP	Change	Perc. Change
No. of educational institutions	12	13	1	8
enrollment	3,154	3,455	301	10
drop-out/transferees to outside schools	137	61	- 76	- 55
Avg. no. of household members enrolled	2.2	2.7	0.5	23

"Better roads and cheaper, faster and more reliable transportation enable students to commute, eliminating the expenses of board and lodging."

4. Increases in Recreational Activities

"Since most recreational activities occur away from the barrios, good roads also open up the rural recreational scene." In 1975 the average frequency with which the people was 36 times per year, but towards the end of 1977 (after the six roads had been completed and were being utilized) the frequency jumped to 72 times annually."

5. Increased Accessibility to Publications

"With better roads come more of the printed word on a regular schedule."

Communications Media	Before RRP	After RRP	Percentage Change
No. of publications reaching the area	9	33	267
frequency of availability	45	260	478

Average for all six roads surveyed ==

25/77

6. Improved Availability of Government Services

"Poor government service on the barrio level is often aggravated by the lack of good roads. Government performs at the barrio by visitation from extension workers. Thus, good roads are the sine qua nom in the government's effort to get to the people."

Government Services Availability

A. Farm Management Technicians	Before RRP	After RRP	Percentage Change
1. Number	14	29	107
2. Frequency of service	50	156	212
B. Medical Personnel	Before RRP	After RRP	Percentage Change
1. Number	10	21	110
2. Frequency of service	56	156	179

This is exemplified by the Farm Management Technicians of the Bureau of Agriculture Extension. Their numbers increased from 14 to 29 during the "before and after" analysis while their annual frequency of client contact rose from 50 to 156.

1979 Evaluation: Bicol Secondary and Feeder Roads

August 1979

FORMSHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Philippines	B. Project Title Bicol Secondary Feeder Roads	C. Project Number 492-0281	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>76</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY <u>82</u>
E. Life of Project Funding 1. AID (Loan or Grant) <u>10,000,000 (PES)</u> 2. Other Donor _____ 3. Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director (Acting) Dennis Barrett 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) Ralph Bird 3. Other _____	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) not stated 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not stated		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) not stated 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not stated	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date) 1977 Reevaluation Study of the Bicol River Basin Development Project Secondary and Feeder Roads 1978 Evaluation Summary (see page 9 of report)			

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title 1979 Evaluation Bicol Secondary and Feeder Roads Project	B. Evaluation Date August 1979 (July 23-Aug 16)	C. Type of Evaluation on going project	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation July 1978-July 1979
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire not stated a. travel _____ b. per diem _____ Contract _____ Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____	F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation (SEE attached sheet)		G. Initiated By not stated
H. Evaluation Team Composition (SEE attached sheet)			
1. Direct Hire			
a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise	
2. Contract:			
a. Name of Organization (if any)	b. Contract No.	c. Name(s) of Persons	
		d. Area(s) of Expertise	

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position)

not stated

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____

Typed Name _____

Position _____

Date _____

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F. Purpose: The primary purposes of the evaluation were to document construction progress; assess the potential socio-economic impact of the project roads; review the analysis that led to the upgrading of design standards; assess the effectiveness of the maintenance training program; identify problem areas, and, propose remedial action.

----- H. Evaluation Team: --

"Participating were: members of the Project Management Office (PMO) under the Ministry of Public Highways, engineers of the Bicol River Basin Development Program Office (BRBDPO), the Roads Evaluation Program personnel of the BRBDPO, AID/W/Asia/PD, Civil Engineer, DOT/W Transportation Economist, and concerned USAID technical personnel."

13. SUMMARY

Though somewhat behind schedule and plagued by significant cost overruns, it appears that the project goal and purpose will be achieved. Because of excellent supervision, the construction work is of superior quality. Along with the increases in cost, benefits also increased and preliminary traffic count on those roads near completion indicate that they will be economically feasible. The final contract will be finished in 1981. In total, the project is now 11% behind schedule, not including the initial one year delay discussed in the 1978 evaluation report. Barring surprises, no further delays are anticipated. As discussed below, the estimated total construction cost of the project as it will be completed in 1981 is more than triple the \$11,945 million estimated in the Project Paper. Local employment impact of the project has been disappointing, and is estimated at only 20% of the level projected in the PP. The construction contracts did not give emphasis to the employment of labor intensive methods for cost, timing, operating and management reasons.

Though a GOP Road Maintenance Training Program administered by Roy Jorgensen Associates, Inc. has been very successful, considerably more effort will be required to change current unsatisfactory maintenance attitudes and practices. The Bicol Roads Evaluation Project (BREP) set up to monitor and evaluate project impact is hampered in the execution of their vitally important role by lack of technical experience.

Review of the decision to upgrade road design standards from Double Bituminous Surface Treatment (DEST) to Portland Cement Concrete (PCC) reveals that the upgrading was not fully justified on technical or economic grounds.

14. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The evaluation was conducted in the Bicol Region from July 23 to August 16, 1979. The primary purpose of the evaluation was to document construction progress, assess the potential socio-economic impact of the project roads, review the analysis that led to the upgrading of design standards assess the effectiveness of the maintenance training program, identify problem areas, and propose remedial action. Participating were: members of the Project Management Office (PMO) under the Ministry of Public Highways, engineers of the Bicol River Basin Development Program Office (BRBDPO), the Roads Evaluation Program personnel of the BRBDPO, AID/W/ASIA/PD Civil Engineer, DOT/W Transportation Economist, and concerned USAID technical personnel. Visits were made to all 22 road contracts under construction. A representative of each contractor was interviewed. Accompanying the team on these interviews were one or two personnel from the A&E consultant firm responsible for the quality control on each particular contract. Traffic counts were taken on two of the almost completed roads and a survey was made of the project impact on local unemployment in construction activities.

Ministry?

17. EXTERNAL FACTORS

a. Upgrading of Design Standards

A review of the analysis performed by the A&E in justifying the change in design standards revealed that upgrading to Portland Cement Concrete (PCC) or Asphalt Concrete (AC) pavement could not be justified on economic or technical grounds. Given the relatively low traffic levels of less than 600 vehicles per day projected for the opening year, the Double Bituminous Surface Treatment (DBST) pavement for the project roads has a higher Net Present Value (NPV) of benefits over costs than the PCC and AC, unless a total absence of future maintenance is assumed. It is estimated that the additional construction cost due to upgrading exceeds ₱47 million (\$6.3 million) and that the upgrading had only a minor effect on benefits. This will be the subject of further GOP analysis.

b. Administrative Delays

The most important factor in the substantial delays in starting the actual construction work was the Presidential Decree specifying that all contracts in the Philippines exceeding a value of ₱2 million must be approved by a Presidential Review Committee. According to data collected by the evaluation team, the time consuming review in Manila caused an average delay of 5.3 months between the date of contract award to the notice to proceed, with a minimum of 2 months and a maximum of 10 months. The second most important delay was caused by the bid processing in the PMO. It took an average of 3.5 months between the time a contractor's bid was received and the time of contract award, with a minimum of 1 month and a maximum of 10 months.

As a consequence of these administrative delays, a minimum of almost 6 months of valuable dry-weather months per contract was lost. Actual losses are higher due to the unpredictable nature of the delays (the notice to proceed could arrive anywhere between 2 to 10 months after contract award), and contractors often were not ready to immediately commence work after receiving the notice to proceed due to other commitments. It is estimated that the total cost of delays amount to ₱24 million (\$3.2 million), or approximately ₱4 million (\$533,000) per dry month lost.

c. Shortages of Fuel and Cement

Though numerous contractors claimed shortages of fuel and cement as an important reason for slippage, the evaluation team believes the slippage caused by these shortages was minor, especially when compared with the administrative delays discussed above.

d. Weather

The weather conditions during the evaluation period were normal and did not cause any significant cost overruns or slippage.

16. INPUTS

a. Costs

Efforts are being made to keep construction below \$40 million, but the total construction cost of the project as it will be completed in 1981 is estimated at more than triple the \$12 million estimated in the Project Paper. Primary reasons for this large cost overrun were the underestimation of construction costs in the Project Paper, the higher than anticipated rate of inflation, and the upgrading of the road and pavement design standards by the Philippine Government. The average cost of the Double Bituminous Surface Treatment road, including the cost of the additional earthwork required to raise it to a sufficient height above the waterline, is now ₱636,650 (\$84,887) per km. The Asphalt Concrete road costs ₱912,741 (\$121,599) per km. and the Portland Cement road costs ₱1,249,256 (\$166,567) per km. In total, the upgrading of the pavements over the DBST type has imposed an additional cost of approximately ₱47.25 million (\$6.3 million) for the GOP.

b. Maintenance

Assuring adequate maintenance of the project roads will be a most difficult goal to achieve. In general, none of the existing roads in the project area show signs of preventive maintenance and very little of periodic maintenance. Current attitudes and practices are to rehabilitate road sections only after they have deteriorated to an almost impassable condition. The causes of this poor maintenance performance are complex and interrelated and are more fully discussed in the body of the main report. Though the Road Maintenance Training Program administered by Roy Jorgensen Associates, Inc. has been very successful in training 91 persons, or 25% more personnel than initially projected, considerably more effort will be required to change current maintenance attitudes and practices. The program is scheduled to terminate in December of this year, and it is recommended to extend the program for at least another year in order to provide continuity and increase the probability of field implementation of the training program.

17. FINDINGS ABOUT PROJECT OUTPUT

a. Schedule

The project is almost two years behind the original project paper schedule, but we do not foresee any further delays for the majority of the 25 contracts. One of the contracts will be completed this calendar year (the important San Isidro-Libmanan-Cabusao sub-project). Another 17 are now estimated for completion in 1980, and the balance will be finished in 1981. The primary reasons for the initial delay of almost one year (GOP fiscal year changeover, insufficient initial budgetary allocations, and lack of adequate staff levels for effective project management) have been discussed in the 1978 evaluation report. The additional year's slippage in schedule is mainly due to delays in staffing by the A&E supervising contractors and the slow pace of

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processing and approving the contractors bid documents (an average of 9 months delay mostly in Manila). A minor part of the slippage can be attributed to fuel and cement shortages. In total, the project is now 11% behind schedule measured from the time of the first contract notice to proceed. This does not include the initial year delay discussed in the 1978 evaluation report.

b. Employment

The project impact on local employment is less than originally estimated. Due to the capital intensive approach taken by the contractors, the local employment is estimated at only about 20% of the 9000 manyears estimated in the Project Paper.

18. EVALUATION FINDINGS ABOUT THE PROJECT GOAL

The project goal is to "Bring about a self-sustaining rise in income levels of the rural poor in the Bicol River Basin and increase their perceived quality of life."

Since the project is not yet complete, insufficient information exists to fully assess project impact on the project goal. Additionally, the role of the project roads in increasing income levels is closely linked with the realization of complementary agricultural and rural industry growth in the project area. This will take time. However, preliminary traffic counts on two of the roads indicate that, though the roads are not yet completed, they are already used by substantial amounts of traffic and provide promise that the project goal will be achieved.

The current efforts by the BRBDPO to monitor achievement of the project goal and purpose are not sufficient. Unless corrected, this may impede the final evaluation after completion of the project. In addition, the office is not informed in a timely manner of lack of progress and problem areas. The Bicol Roads Evaluation Project (BREP) has been established to monitor and evaluate the implementation phase of road construction and the effectiveness with which maintenance capability is being upgraded. It is also to document socio-economic benefits accruing in the project influence areas. However, though a considerable amount of work has been accomplished and the unit is staffed by hardworking, dedicated, and well educated personnel, they are hampered in the execution of their vitally important role by lack of technical experience. Technical consultancy is recommended (Filipino-U.S.).

19. FINDINGS ABOUT PROJECT BENEFICIARIES

Though the project is still far from complete, there are indications that the rural poor in the zones of influence of the roads will receive significant benefits from the project. In the small barrio of Baliwag Viejo at the end of the partly completed and already useable Pili-Matacroc secondary road, the 3-hour walk (no road connection existed before) has been reduced to a 15-minute tricycle or jeepney ride at a cost of ₱1.50 per passenger. A very substantial traffic of about

50 tricycles and 50 jeepneys per day has been generated on this road. Transport costs for shipping a sack of rice to the market place have dropped from ₱3 per sack (by animal and boat) to ₱1.50 per sack by vehicle. Also, on the almost completed San Isidro-Libmanan secondary road, the generated traffic in jeepneys and mini-buses has exceeded the original estimates and suggests a substantial increase in mobility of the low income category of the population. Confirmation of these favorable trends will, however, have to wait for completion of the post-project Panel and Traffic Surveys.

20. LESSONS LEARNED

- a. As stated in the narrative of the report, the original one year project implementation slippage was due in part to the GOP change in fiscal year, shortage of funds, and other budgeting problems during 1976. If USAID had provided for progress payments to the GOP to cover the cost of funding A&E contracts, a minimum of 6-8 months may have been saved in the preparation of final designs. Thus, the entire bidding process would have been advanced, construction started, etc.
- b. If the GOP bid evaluation procedures are to remain as presently administered, a 6-8 months processing time has to be built into future construction implementation schedules.
- c. The project highlights the importance of determining design standards based on both economic and technical considerations and the need for including a broad spectrum of alternatives in the evaluation.
- d. Assuring adequate maintenance of the road system is a most difficult goal to achieve. Maintenance training is an effective means of correcting poor maintenance performance, but the effort must be sustained over a substantial time period to change maintenance attitudes and practices.

21. UNPLANNED EFFECTS

None.

22. SPECIAL COMMENTS OR REMARKS

Supporting analysis and documentation is provided in the 51-page report of the evaluation team entitled "1979 Evaluation, Bicol Secondary and Feeder Roads Project" dated August 1979.

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Transfer of Technology

and

Management Skills

February 1, 1980

FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Thailand	B. Project Title Transfer of technology and management skills	C. Project Number 93-0274	D. Active Life of Project 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>76</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY <u>81</u>
Life of Project Funding 1. AID (Loan or Grant) <u>1,500,000</u> Other Donor _____ Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ <u>4,000,000</u>		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director <u>Donald Cohen</u> 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) 3. Other	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) <u>(not stated)</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.)		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) <u>DTEC</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.)	

I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date)

January, 1977 (First TTMS evaluation)
 April, 1978 (Second TTMS evaluation)

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title (See attached sheet)	B. Evaluation Date February 1, 1980	C. Type of Evaluation special	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation May 1978-January 1980
F. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire <u>(not stated)</u> - travel _____ - per diem _____ 2. Contract _____ 3. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____		G. Initiated By (not stated)	

H. Evaluation Team Composition

1. Direct Hire
- | | | |
|------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| a. Name | b. Present Position | c. Area of Expertise |
| Vivikka Molldrem | USAID | |
| Michael Sullivan | USAID | |
2. Contract:
- | | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|
| a. Name of Organization (if any) | b. Contract No. |
| DTEC | |
3. c. Name(s) of Persons
- | | |
|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| Pitchet Soontornpipit | d. Area(s) of Expertise |
| Kriengkrai Issara-yangyun | |

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position)

(not stated)

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____

Typed Name _____

Position _____

Date _____

A. Evaluation Title: Third Evaluation-- Transfer of Technology and Management Skills Project

F. Purpose. This evaluation concentrates first on the project's progress in implementing training and advisory activities and the likelihood of achieving targeted outputs; and second, on the project's impact in meeting the project purpose of "improved RIG capabilities in development policy and problem analysis, program planning and evaluation" as measured by the four end-of-project status conditions:

1. Analysis performed in priority areas
2. Better defined, more specific plans of action.
3. Accelerated implementation of projects
4. Greater number of, and improved evaluation of, projects and programs.

TTMS THIRD EVALUATION

February 1, 1980

I. Introduction

This evaluation will concentrate, first, on the project's progress in implementing training and advisory activities and the likelihood of achieving targeted outputs; and second, on the project's impact in meeting the project purpose of "improved RTG capabilities in development policy and problem analysis, program planning and evaluation" as measured by the four end-of-project status conditions:

1. Analysis performed in priority areas.
2. Better defined, more specific plans of action.
3. Accelerated implementation of projects.
4. Greater number of, and improved evaluation of, projects and programs.

To assess progress in achieving outputs, we will review the history of the project as described in the previous two project evaluations. We will then look at overall progress since the last evaluation and estimated future activities during the final year and a half of project life. Advisory services, participant training and overall project administration will be examined separately.

To assess project impact, as measured by the above four indicators, we will look at (1) the effectiveness of advisory services, (2) the effectiveness of participant training, and (3) the extent to which the experience of project administration itself has improved DTEC's performance in the four EOPS indicators. Effectiveness of advisory services and participant training will be assessed from a sample set of interviews with counterparts, supervisors, advisors and participants.

The final section offers recommendations for the remainder of TTMS project life and for the proposed follow-on project, Emerging Problems of Development

II. Project History to April, 1978

The TTMS project was designed to give the RTG wide scope in determining specific advisory and training activities under the following major priority problem areas:

- (a) Coordination and organization of the planning and budgetary process
- (b) Improved terms of internal and external trade for agricultural commodities
- (c) Alleviation of rural under/unemployment
- (d) Expansion of rural social services, especially health and education
- (e) Reduction in population growth rate
- (f) Establishment of policies and practices to conserve Thailand's land resources
- (g) Reduction of urban/rural and regional income disparities.

DTEC, as the implementing agency, is given responsibility for selection of activities, identification of competent advisors or training institutions, and contract negotiations. NESDB, Bureau of Budget, Civil Service Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, and the related technical agencies participate in sub-committees for selection of specific activities. USAID's role is to approve specific activities once selected and to aid in identifying consultants and training institutions when asked, but DTEC has tried several methods to do the latter on its own. This represents a major shift in administrative responsibility from USAID (both local and Washington) to DTEC.

The first TTMS evaluation was carried out in January, 1977. Up to that time project implementation had been extremely slow. Through September of 1976 less than US\$100,000 of project funds had been expended, none of it on advisory services. The evaluators noted that DTEC had opted not to publicize TTMS to Ministries because it felt that it could not accurately rate priorities of requests until the Fourth Five Year Plan was issued. At that time the national development priorities would be clearly defined, giving DTEC a better basis for selection of activities. Of the training approved by that time, the evaluation found that a third was in areas not considered to be high priority. Activities appeared to be selected on an "ad hoc" basis. The evaluators concluded that the problems were due to lack of procedures for informing Ministries of TTMS and its uses, and lack of clear guidelines for selecting the most appropriate among a range of proposals and for expediting recruitment and contracting. Recommendations were made to develop these procedures

Much growth had occurred in project implementation by the second evaluation in April 1978. Most of the training funds had been programmed. The approved training and advisory activities fell within FFYP priorities. The DTEC Training Section was judged to have done an excellent job in carrying out work previously handled by USAID, instituting direct working relationships with several countries in the region for training programs. Long delays were being encountered in implementation of advisory services, however, of which only 43 p.m. had been programmed. The evaluators found that the recommendations of the first evaluation had been taken or were no longer relevant. The evaluators recommended that:

- (a) DTEC should be given greater flexibility in allocation of funds among appropriation categories and between advisors and training.
- (b) Efforts should be made to discourage instances of repetitive training.
- (c) Continued efforts should be made to improve consultant recruitment procedures and allocation of training.
- (d) Consideration should be given to dollar-funded local currency expenditures for in-country training by Thai institutions.
- (e) Logical framework and CPI network chart should be revised.

III. Project implementation since April, 1978

A. Status of 1978 Evaluation Recommendations

The status of recommendations from the 1978 evaluation is as follows

- (a) There have been adequate funds in all categories thus far to carry out project activities. Some long-term training funds will be reprogrammed for short-term training activities, since it is now too late to schedule any more long-term training under the project.
- (b) DTEC continues to carefully weed out nominees for training slots who have already had overseas

training experience or are scheduled for other overseas training.

- (c) Project efforts to improve consultant recruitment and allocation of training are described in the sections below.
- (d) USAID and DTEC have recently agreed to allow dollar funding of in-country training and advisory services, and a project amendment to this effect is in preparation.
- (e) The logical framework and CPI network chart have been revised as recommended.

B. Project Status Indicators

Tables I and II of the appendix summarize annual obligations, expenditures and pipeline under TTMS. Tables III and IV summarize project funds and person months programmed for training and advisory services under each funding category. The Tables indicate a slow but steady annual increase in expenditures over project life. Only \$1.5 million of the total \$4.0 million obligated have been expended through FY 79, after over four years of implementation. Expenditures do not give the full picture, however, since both advisory services and long-term training require a significant commitment of funds but involve a rather long disbursement period. Committed funds total \$890,000 for advisory services and \$1,250,000 for training as of December 31, 1979. In addition, approximately \$400,000 are programmed for advisors now under recruitment and \$44,000 for training requests in process. Thus about \$1.4 million or 32% of project funds remain unprogrammed with 21 months remaining of project life. In terms of project outputs achieved, 306 p.m. of advisory services and 1,522 p.m. of training are completed, out of a targeted 400 p.m. and 2,000 p.m. respectively.

C. Planned Activities for FY 81

Because of the long lead time required to organize training programs and recruit consultants, it is necessary to begin programming FY 81 activities immediately. DTEC has begun to give some thought to FY 81 programming. Potential activities include the following: (Asterisks indicate that the project amendment mentioned earlier to allow for local cost funding will be required).

BANGLADESH:
A PROFILE OF THE COUNTRYSIDE

F. TOMASSON JANNUZI

&

JAMES T. PEACH

April, 1979

FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Bangladesh	B. Project Title not applicable	C. Project Number not applicable	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>not applicable</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY _____
E. Life of Project Funding 1. AID: (Loan or Grant) <u>not applicable</u> Other Donor _____ Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director _____ 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) <u>not applicable</u> 3. Other _____	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) <u>not applicable</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) <u>not applicable</u>		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) <u>not applicable</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) <u>not applicable</u>	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date)			

"Report on the Hierarchy of Interests in Land in Bangladesh", 1977, F.T. Januzzi, James T. Peach, and G. Rabbani

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title <u>Bangladesh:</u> <u>A Profile of the</u> <u>Countryside</u>	B. Evaluation Date April 1979	C. Type of Evaluation Special Study	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation <u>not applicable</u>
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire <u>not stated</u> a. travel _____ per diem _____ Contract _____ 3. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation (SEE attached sheet)	G. Initiated By <u>not stated</u>

H. Evaluation Team Composition

1. Direct Hire

a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise
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2. Contract:

a. Name of Organization (if any)	b. Contract No.
----------------------------------	-----------------

, c. Name(s) of Persons

	d. Area(s) of Expertise
--	-------------------------

F. Tomasson Januzzi and James T. Peach, members of the Center for Asian Studies and the Department of Economics, the University of Texas at Austin

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position)

not stated

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____

Typed Name _____

Position _____

Date _____

F. Purpose: The special study describes the landlord-dominated agrarian structure of Bangladesh and its constraining role in development planning. "Our data make evident the need for rural development programs that are based on the fact that the majority of people in rural Bangladesh cannot use high yielding varieties of seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and modern irrigation facilities. They cannot use these inputs because the majority do not have land."

Chapter V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The following propositions summarize the principal findings of our field research in Bangladesh during the last several years, from 1975 through 1978. The propositions not only incorporate insights from that research, but also those that come from related study and observation in other regions of South Asia.

Notwithstanding major political and economic events of the 20th century, including the partitioning of the subcontinent in 1947, the enactment in the 1950's of agrarian reform legislation, and the establishment of Bangladesh as a new state in 1971, the agrarian structure of Bangladesh is rooted in antiquity and retains many features that characterized the political economy of the region in the 18th and 19th centuries. This agrarian structure, and the institutions that comprise it, constitutes the major impediment to the implementation of a range of rural development programs that would promote economic growth within an environment of social justice.

The agrarian structure of Bangladesh is defined by a complex set of arrangements governing the relationship of people to the land. These arrangements, supported both by custom and by law, have not been altered in any substantial manner by means of the application of state policy in the period from 1948 through 1978. This means that landlordism, a commonly disparaged element in the old zamindari system of undivided

East India, persists in 1979 in rural Bangladesh. The landlords of the present differ little from those of the past in their relations with those who are below them in the agrarian hierarchy. While their rights and prerogatives have been somewhat diminished over time, landlords continue to determine the nature of rural Bangladesh's political economy. Their control of land determines the local structure of power. Their control of land determines who will benefit from rural development programs and who will not; and their control of land is the critical variable in determining what is produced, by whom, and for whose benefit. As long as this system of relationships persists, the prospects for economic progress are dim.

While landlords are a persistent feature of rural life in Bangladesh, they are seldom alluded to in print. This fosters the impression that landlords disappeared when traditional zamindars ceased in the 1950's being revenue farmers for the state.¹ The illusion that landlordism is a diminished phenomenon gains credence also by the use of the term *malik* to refer generally to owners of land who have a permanent occupancy right to the land in their possession. While the term *malik* may not be used consciously to obscure reality, the term is not useful in describing the precise nature of a landowner's relationship either to his land or to the people who till it. *Maliks* may be large

¹As noted in Chapter I, the zamindars had been empowered by the state to act as the state's intermediaries in the collection of land revenue. The East Pakistan State Acquisition and Tenancy Act of 1950 put an end to the era during which zamindars served as the state's intermediaries in revenue collection.

landholders or small. They may be absentee landlords who sublet their land to others. They may be resident landholders who till the land using the services of landless agricultural laborers. As emphasized earlier, they may be classified even as owner cultivators or as small farmers. But, their most common characteristic as a group is that they are divorced from direct agricultural operations, particularly those operations of low status that involve what are perceived of as dirty or menial tasks. As landholders, they also attempt to minimize the assumption of personal risk in connection with agricultural operations. This means in practice that landowners in Bangladesh have traditionally sublet their lands in order to limit their direct responsibility either for providing agricultural inputs or for assuming a share of the costs of such inputs used in cultivation by others of their land. This means in practice that the lessor (sharecropper) has customarily assumed all of the risks and most, if not always all, of the costs of production. No matter how much or how little the sharecropper produces, the maliks are guaranteed at least fifty percent of the product.

Thus, the degree to which ownership of land in Bangladesh is separated from labor and direct investment on the land is only suggested by the data from our field surveys. The data, nonetheless, do not contradict the thesis that landowners in Bangladesh, whether classified as landlords, maliks, owner cultivators, small farmers or bona fide cultivators, are more representative of a traditional system of agriculture

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than a modern one. They address the economic problem in terms of tradition and command. Because they occupy the apex of the agrarian hierarchy of interests, they are in a position to dictate what is produced, by whom, and how the product will be distributed. Characteristically, such landowners are less concerned with agricultural innovation and the productivity of their lands than in holding on to their traditional rights and prerogatives.

Landowners are loathe to admit publicly, in interviews conducted by representatives of the state, the extent to which they sublet lands and delegate responsibility for agricultural operations to others. Though the data from our field research do not disclose landowners' reasons for not reporting fully the extent of subletting, it seems evident to us that landowners have an obvious interest in emphasizing to outsiders that they exercise direct control over all agricultural operations on their land. To admit that their lands are actually tilled by others (usually sharecroppers) is to risk either having someone else recorded as the "actual tiller" of the soil, or establishing in the public record that the owner takes no direct interest even in the management of his land. To minimize the factual record of subletting is one means by which a landowner can attempt to maintain an uncontested claim to his land. In interviews then, landowners or maliks commonly prefer to emphasize their nominal roles as owner cultivators, small farmers, or bona fide cultivators, rather than their actual roles.

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As emphasized above, the persistence within the agrarian structure of Bangladesh of landlordism implies the maintenance of the traditional practice of subletting land to tenant cultivators. Yet, the subletting of land is explicitly prohibited by law. Fortunately for those who wish to sublet by another name, the law has been written to include a facilitating loophole. The law makes plain that peasants who cultivate the land of another on the condition that they deliver a share of the produce to the owner are not "tenants". They are sharecroppers (or bargadars). As such, though they may appear to be lessors of land sublet by an owner, they occupy an anomalous place in the agrarian structure. There are no provisions in law that are protective of their interests. They are outside the scope of the law and therefore subject to arbitrary eviction from the lands they till. Thus, a sharecropper who takes in land from a landowner neither has nor can acquire de jure right to that land. By contrast, sharecroppers in undivided Bengal, prior to 1947, had greater scope within the law to acquire a permanent occupancy right to land than do sharecroppers in contemporary Bangladesh.

The data from our field surveys are consistent in indicating that sharecroppers in contemporary Bangladesh customarily have primary responsibility for producing crops on the lands that they have taken in from landowners. As we have earlier emphasized, this means specifically that they must assume the full risks of production; they are responsible for all labor on the land; they cannot in the general case acquire

credit for agricultural investment purposes, except from non-institutional sources at usurious rates of interest. Moreover, sharecroppers take in land for purposes of cultivation under terms and conditions that are generally specified orally, rather than in writing. The terms and conditions governing the sharecropping arrangement are not established in negotiations between equals. The landowner is in a position to dictate terms, and he does so. The sharecropper, because he occupies a lower position in the agrarian hierarchy, has no means of questioning or debating the proffered terms. If he attempts to do so, he risks losing the opportunity to take in the land he seeks to till. Given the density of population in Bangladesh dependent on the land for subsistence, the supply of potential sharecroppers who would be prepared to accept terms considered unfavorable by others is, for all practical purposes, unlimited.

Our research indicates that sharecroppers in Bangladesh can expect to give at least fifty percent of a crop to landowners. But, the terms and conditions governing the division of the produce vary from region to region, and sometimes from village to village and from para (hamlet) to para. Some sharecroppers will provide landowners sixty percent or more of the final product. Others will provide landowners fifty percent or more of the final product plus fifty percent of rice seedlings at a time prior to transplanting operations. Furthermore, the terms are often stiff and specific enough to require sharecroppers to deliver to landowners the rice straw (used as fodder for cattle) following the

harvest. In sum, the terms and conditions that apply to a sharecropper's cultivation of a landowner's land reflect the relative power positions of the sharecropper and the landlord. In Bangladesh in 1979, this means that the terms and conditions that apply to sharecropping as an institution reflect exclusively the interests of landowners.

The data from our field surveys also indicate that the number of landless households in rural Bangladesh is large and growing. In 1979, more than fifty percent of all rural households in Bangladesh are functionally landless. And, while the data do not establish the number of such households that derive income primarily from agriculture, it can be assumed (given the overwhelmingly agrarian nature of the Bangladesh economy as a whole) that the vast majority of landless rural households derive the largest percentage of their income from agriculture.

As mentioned earlier, state policies have not altered the agrarian structure of Bangladesh. Indeed, state policies in the region have seldom been predicated on the notion that the transformation of the agrarian structure would be instrumental in providing new incentives to people whose status in the agrarian hierarchy places limitations on their participation in programs of rural economic development. By showing the relative proportions of owner households, owner-cum-tenant households, pure tenant households, and landless households, our data make evident the need for rural development programs that are based on the fact that the majority of people in rural Bangladesh cannot use high yielding varieties of seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and modern

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irrigation facilities. They cannot use these inputs because the majority do not have land. And, many who have land are no more able to use modern technology than was the sharecropper in the South of the United States in the 1930's able to apply (on his own volition) the advice of a county extension agent to revive his soil by rotating crops. In Bangladesh, in 1979, as in the American South in the 1930's, backwardness in the agrarian sector is a derivative of an agrarian structure that severely limits the options of the majority of people who actually till the land.

We have stated that the agrarian structure of Bangladesh is an obstacle to economic progress, and that change in the agrarian structure is essential to rural economic development, as we have earlier defined it. We have also stated that those who would change the agrarian structure by means of agrarian reform can derive the long-term political benefits that are the logical derivatives of such a reform.

We have recorded the failure of earlier legislative attempts to transform Bangladesh's agrarian structure, but we have also noted that changes in the agrarian structure are inevitable and have already resulted in part from:

- (1) the continuing rapid growth of population dependent on the land for subsistence;
- (2) the subinfeudation of existing landholdings as families grow and change in composition; and

- (3) other phenomena (including, for example, indebtedness and loss of land following crop failure) that can cause landholders to sell or otherwise give up lands they have customarily tilled.

These unplanned changes in the agrarian structure are important because they are associated directly over time with people's perception of their rights, prerogatives and obligations within that structure. These unplanned changes are part of an historical process -- a process that portends radical transformation of the agrarian sector.

**A PROJECT TO HELP PRACTITIONERS
HELP THE RURAL POOR
Case Study No. 9**

WORKING WITH TRIBAL PEOPLE: THE INSTITUTES AT KOSBAD HILL, INDIA

**S. H. Deshpande
Vasant Deshpande
Sharad Kulkarni**

**International Council for Educational Development
P.O. Box 217 Essex, Connecticut 06426 USA**

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FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country India	B. Project Title not applicable	C. Project Number not applicable	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY _____ not applicable 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY _____
E. Life of Project Funding 1. AID: (Loan or Grant) not applicable Other Donor _____ Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director not applicable 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) 3. Other	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) not applicable 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not applicable		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) not applicable 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not applicable	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date) not applicable			

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title Working With Tribal People: The Institutes at Kosbad Hill, India	B. Evaluation Date 1979	C. Type of Evaluation Special study	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation 1949-present for Agricultural Institute; 1957-present for GBSK Institute
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire not stated travel _____ per diem _____ 2. Contract _____ 3. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____	F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation (SEE attached sheet)		G. Initiated By not stated

H. Evaluation Team Composition

1. Direct Hire

a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise
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2. Contract:

a. Name of Organization (if any)	b. Contract No.
----------------------------------	-----------------

International Council for Educational Development

c. Name(s) of Persons	d. Area(s) of Expertise
Dr. S. H. Deshpande, Professor of Agricultural Economics, University of Bombay.	
Dr. Vasant Deshpande, Director of Nehru Institute of Social Studies at Pune	
Sharad Kulkarni, Director of the Centre for Tribal Conscientization at Pune	

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position)
Anutai Wagh, Jayant Patil, Avinash Chaudhary, Appa Koske, M.S. Gupte, A.H. Sankhe, Dr. N.V. Modak and Appa Amrite (of AI and GRSK)

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____

Typed Name _____

Position _____

Date _____

F. Purpose: This is a "Project to Help Practitioners Help the Rural Poor, Case Study No. 9", and, seeks to "unearth significant operational lessons-- both positive and negative--from the experience of selected innovative rural programs that may have value for policymakers, planners, and program operators in all developing countries and external assistance programs." This is an evaluation of those activities of the two Kosbad institutes that deal with the relatively small tribal population in their immediate vicinity--not an evaluation of the institutes' total activities. The two institutes are the AI and GBSK.

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ICED COMMENTARY*

This is the ninth in a series of case studies under ICED's cooperative international project aimed at helping practitioners to help the rural poor. The practical purposes of these case studies is to unearth significant operational lessons--both positive and negative--from the experiences of selected innovative rural programs that may have value for policymakers, planners, and program operators in all developing countries and external assistance agencies .

This particular report from the State of Maharashtra in India tells the story of two large and highly respected voluntary organizations--the Agricultural Institute (AI) and the Gram Bal Shiksha Kendra (GBSK)--whose roots go back to the Independence Movement and its humanistic Gandhian principles. These organizations, along with their wider-ranging activities, have been working devotedly for more than 20 years to help their Warli tribal neighbors around Kosbad Hill to extricate themselves from their age-old bondage of exploitation, cultural isolation and dehumanizing poverty. The case study focuses on this particular aspect of their overall programs.

It would be difficult to find anywhere a rural poverty situation more severe or more resistant to change than that of the Warli tribals in the Kosbad area. But it would also be difficult to find in the real world any organizations better suited by commitment and competence to tackle such a hard case. Consequently, anyone concerned with improving the lot of the rural poor in India or any other developing country will find this a highly instructive--if somewhat disquieting--story.

The story is told by three knowledgeable Indian social scientists--an agricultural economist, a sociologist, and a student of Indian tribal life. Their research plan was shaped in cooperation with ICED's own Indian staff member, Pratima Kale, a broad-gauged educational sociologist well acquainted with voluntary organizations in India, during an initial joint visit to Kosbad. Subsequently, the authors made further visits to observe various programs in action, to survey and assess the impact of these activities, and to conduct extensive interviews with the leaders, staff members and students of the two institutes and a sample of Warli farmers and other local people. As social scientists, the authors kept in check their strong sympathy and

*Prepared by Philip H. Coombs, director of ICED's international project of which this case study is a part.

respect for the leadership, aims and achievements of these institutes, and their deep compassion for the Warli tribal people themselves, and produced a highly objective and critically analytical report. Others may disagree with some of their interpretations and conclusions, but few would deny that they have given us a very substantial and stimulating account.

THE RESULTS

It should be evident even from the above very abbreviated sketch of their activities that the two Kosbad Institutes have made a diversified and persistent effort, extending over 20 to 30 years, to uplift their Warli neighbors. The question the case study investigators sought to answer was: What have been the practical results? What discernible impact have all these efforts had on the agricultural practices and productivity of the Warlis; on their traditional beliefs, attitudes and behavior; on the development and upward mobility of their children; on their community cohesion, cooperation and

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participation; and on the general quality of their family life?

The short answer--which is elaborated and documented in the report--is that there have been significant results, including a number of outstanding individual "success cases"; yet, taken overall, the impact must be judged as disappointingly low, at least in terms of earlier expectations and what one might reasonably have anticipated.

The GBSK's educational work with young children and mothers has clearly yielded some good results. The strong earlier resistance of mothers to permitting their children to attend the creches, bai-wadis and elementary schools has melted away. Many mothers today are not only willing but anxious to send their children to school, and the children arrive much cleaner than they used to. The attitude toward education has discernibly changed. And some of the children--though still only a small minority--have climbed further up the education ladder. A number of the teen-agers interviewed, particularly the girls, reflected a new freedom from some of the confining and stultifying traditional beliefs and attitudes of their tribal culture, and a critical view of some of the less constructive behavior of their parents, such as excessive drinking.

Despite these encouraging advances, however, the overall progress has been limited and there is still a long way to go. The old cultural barriers and constraints are still strong; even the educated Warlis still display a lack of self-confidence and a tendency to withdraw. Although GBSK has "reached the poor" and gained their acceptance, it has apparently had little success as yet (though not for lack of trying) in stimulating active community participation and direct involvement in the operation of its activities. It seems particularly significant that although a number of tribals are employed by GBSK as farm workers and office peons, none has ever applied for a position as office clerk and only one among nine elementary teachers is an Adivasi.

Changes on the agricultural front are, of course, more tangible, visible and measurable than with education. The case study investigators conducted a revealing survey of 45 farms run by the only Adivasi farmers actively using any of the 100 individual dug wells referred to earlier. Since they are undoubtedly "above average" farmers in the area, any agricultural revolution that may have occurred would undoubtedly be apparent in their fields. But there has not as yet been any real agricultural revolution. Nor could the case study investigators find much evidence that the innovations under the "Better Living Program" had taken hold. There have been, however, some significant breakthroughs in terms of crop diversification through the adoption by these selected Warli farmers of non-traditional crops--especially various fruits and vegetables that improved their cash incomes.

The investigators concluded, however, that the Agricultural Institute's three-cycle year-round agricultural scheme had not succeeded. For the first (rainy season) cycle most of the 45 farmers, though they had adopted the recommended high yielding rice varieties

on a limited scale, were still devoting more than two-thirds of their paddy acreage to the old low yielding local varieties (which yield less than half as much). The wheat that AI had enthusiastically promoted for the next cycle was even less popular, though as indicated above, fruits and vegetables were proving more popular. The adaptation of new types of livestock and sideline activities such as bee-keeping, on the other hand, appeared to have made little headway.

EXPLANATIONS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

If significant lessons for the future are to be drawn from this rich and lengthy experience, it is necessary to try to understand the causes of both the successes and the failures. This, of course, is the hardest part of such a case study because various causal factors are often so intertwined that it is difficult to sort them out and weigh their relative importance. In the end it becomes a matter of judgment, and frequently there is wide scope for differences of interpretation and opinion.

Thus, for example, the farmers and the AI experts had conflicting explanations for the relatively low impact of the agricultural development program. The farmers explained it largely in terms of adverse technical and economic factors, such as inadequate water supply, the low-moisture retention of their light soils, and the prohibitive cost of the heavy fertilizer applications required for HYVs. The AI experts on the other hand minimized these technical-economic explanations and tended to attribute the low impact primarily to the irrational fears and other idiosyncracies of the Warlis. They dismissed as groundless, for example, the farmers' assertion that "the rains wash away the fertilizer"; they pointed out that AI had always been ready to provide credit for the purchase of fertilizer, that the farmers did not always fully utilize their available water supply, and that AI's theoretical cost calculations demonstrated clearly that the farmers could greatly enhance their income if they adopted AI's recommended innovations. The Warlis, it was said, are good workers but poor farmers; they prefer to work on a large plantation for immediate cash wages rather than cultivate their own small farm more intensively and ultimately realize a larger income.

It is impossible to judge from a distance, of course, where the real truth lies in this particular debate, but it is perhaps worth noting that ICED has encountered quite similar debates between non-tribal small farmers and agricultural experts in numerous other areas, suggesting that it may not be simply cultural idiosyncracies that so often cause the small farmer to reject new agricultural technologies advocated by the experts. Frequently the farmer turns out to have his own rational reasons for treating innovations with extreme caution, usually having to do with his meager resource base, his imperative family consumption needs, the unpredictability of the weather and market prices, and his very limited capacity to take risks. It also involves his weighing of available alternatives--such as spending more hours working his own land in hopes of getting a possibly larger but postponed income, as against working more hours on somebody else's larger farm or taking some other available employment for

immediate though meager cash wages. Seen in this light, the small farmer often more closely approaches "the rational economic man" than some of the technical experts who advise him. Their cardinal goal, after all, is increased yield per acre; his is survival.

This is not to suggest that the inherited cultural traits of the Warlis (described in Chapter 1) were not also an important explanatory factor in the relatively low impact of AI's development program. What seems clear from the evidence is that a wide social distance and communication gap still persists between the Warlis and the mainly middle class educated people who seek to help them. Such a gap is, of course, found in poor villages all over the world, but in the case of the Warlis it is exceptionally wide because of their long and continuing (partly self-imposed) cultural isolation. The key problem--to which the Kosbad institutes (and many others) have evidently not yet found a satisfactory solution--is how to close this gap. For until it is closed, or at least substantially narrowed, all sorts of development interventions from the outside are likely to have a low impact, and all the talk about "community participation" is likely to have a hollow ring.

In view of the importance of these frequently neglected social and cultural obstacles to rural development, the authors make a fundamental point when they suggest that, to be effective, technical agricultural research should be accompanied by appropriate social science research. Or to put it differently, he who would help the poor must first know them, and understand how life looks from their vantage point. One must also respect their judgment, for the very fact that they have survived this long under seemingly impossible circumstances suggests that they are not entirely without wisdom and rationality, even though they may be illiterate and some of their beliefs, fears, and practices may be baseless and counterproductive in the light of scientific knowledge.

With respect to the evident lack of "community participation" by the Warlis in the activities of the two institutes, and their seeming indifference toward advancing themselves, the authors note that the approach of the institutes has been strongly paternalistic and that this may have discouraged a sense of self-reliance. They question, however, as other observers have before them, whether a more community-oriented, self-help approach would have been feasible in the circumstances. Perhaps people must be helped out of the worst depths of poverty in paternalistic fashion before they are ready to become their own change agents.

But here the authors encounter something of a chicken-and-egg dilemma. On the one hand they conclude that education is the only real means of altering the traditional beliefs and attitudes of the Warlis and making them self-reliant. Yet on the other hand their findings suggest that the long and extensive educational efforts of both institutes, although helpful in other respects, do not seem as yet to have made any sizeable dent in this respect. Their answer to this seeming dilemma is that the institutes should give much greater emphasis to the consciousness-raising kind of education that will make

the learners--particularly the younger ones--more aware of their socioeconomic and political environment, of the basic causes of their exploitation and poverty, of the strengths and weaknesses of their own inherited culture and traditions, and of their own capacity and innate human power to change this environment and their position in it. In advocating more "consciousness-raising" education, however, they caution against a purely agitational approach that can be counter-productive, "to the extent that it makes the clientele believe that all their ills flow from sources outside themselves." They also recognize that the necessary educational approach is at best a long slow process with no quick and dramatic pay-offs.

The authors do not take the position, however, that a purely educational approach will suffice. On the contrary, they conclude that the program objectives of the Kosbad institutes have been too limited in terms of the basic needs, interests and potential motivations of the Warlis, and that even within these objectives the various activities have been too fragmented. They observe, for example, that while each of the innovative devices for improving family living could be justified in its own right, these devices were of only marginal importance to meeting the basic family needs of the Warlis. They suggest instead that AI's agricultural recommendations might have greater acceptance and success accompanied by a primary health care program attuned to the critical health needs and problems of the area. One might also surmise that the Warli mothers would respond with some enthusiasm to well conceived activities designed to reduce their physical burdens, to help them earn some crucially needed cash, and to elevate their status and self-respect.

To ask such a broader and more integrated approach of these two institutes, of course, may be to ask the impossible, for it would confront them with a difficult choice between continuing to concentrate on what they are so unusually well qualified to do, or taking on additional new functions (such as health care, non-farm occupational training, and family planning), which would probably force them to concentrate their attention and limited resources on serving a more limited audience and geographic area. The point is nevertheless an important one for other rural programs, especially newer ones still in the planning or early development stage, or for older ones that may be able to form close partnerships with other organizations capable of rendering complementary family improvement services in the same area.

FOUR BASIC CONCLUSIONS

Viewed in a broad international perspective, the experiences of the Kosbad institutes over more than 20 years reinforce the following important conclusions of wide applicability that have also emerged from other case studies in this series.

First, even the best conceived technical solutions to poverty problems can be thwarted by deep-seated social and cultural factors and by human communication barriers unless effective ways can be

found to overcome these obstacles. In other words, in order for beneficial material changes to occur, the perceptions, attitudes and outlook of the people themselves must change. Thus, the diagnosis of rural poverty situations and the successful planning and implementation of corrective measures calls not only for technical expertise in such fields as agriculture, irrigation, health and education but also for the insights of such social scientists as cultural anthropologists, rural sociologists and social psychologists. Thus far, comparatively little use has been made of such social science expertise in attacking the problems of rural poverty.

Second, although rural poverty situations differ considerably from one to another, they almost invariably require a multi-pronged approach addressed to a combination of the basic needs of the individuals, families and communities concerned. A single-sector approach--as for example in agriculture--is likely to be far less effective by itself than as if accompanied by parallel efforts directed at such needs as health, nutrition, maternal and child care, family planning, and off-farm employment. And for each of these efforts to succeed, it must include appropriate educational (i.e., *learning*) components, closely integrated with all other components--which is to say that education should be seen not as a separate "sector" unto itself but as an essential nutrient and lubricant of *all* development activities.

Third, achieving sizeable improvement in rural poverty situations requires fundamental social, economic, cultural and political changes in the local environment. This is a considerably more complex, difficult and time-consuming process than is often assumed, particularly by external assistance agencies that place their faith in neatly packaged, narrowly-focussed three to five years "projects." There is urgent need to find more effective alternatives to this conventional "project approach" in the whole area of rural development.

Finally, voluntary organizations, because of their unique flexibility and capacity to innovate and test out fresh approaches, and because of their potential for attracting able and dedicated leadership and staff who can get close to the rural people and articulate their needs and interests, can be a crucially important supplement to larger scale governmental efforts. But to perform this role most effectively they must (1) have a broad development orientation; (2) be permitted to retain a substantial degree of independent control over their own programs; and (3) receive sufficient *general* and *continuing* financial support from both domestic and international sources--not simply short term "project support" restricted to some limited purpose of special interest to the donor.

SOME GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

This final chapter contains several conclusions and lessons derived from our study of the two institutes at Kosbad that we believe have relevance and possible value for other organizations similarly striving to improve the status of the rural poor elsewhere in India and throughout the developing world.

On the economic and technological plane the fundamental problem of the Adivasis is similar to that of small farmers all over the underdeveloped world. They have too small a resource base, and with existing technology their chances of survival are meager. Given this reality, the question that needs to be seriously considered is whether the main thrust of a poverty removal strategy should be toward helping the small man *on the farm or outside it*; and if outside, what real choices are open. We generally agree with the diagnosis of the problem offered by V. M. Dandekar and N. Rath in their book, *Poverty in India*, and with their conclusion that wage employment under government guarantee is the key to the solution. However, modifications will be needed to suit local conditions, and perhaps part-time *agricultural* employment (for example, in orchards under private or public management), rather than relying exclusively on construction works as suggested by Dandekar and Rath, may find an important place in poverty-removal programs in areas such as Kosbad.

If one accepts this view, then it follows that there must be a fundamental reorientation in the conventional thinking, approaches and attitudes of both government and voluntary agencies working in rural areas. The voluntary agencies will have to do three things: first, understand better the problems of their immediate clientele in a larger national perspective; second, press for adoption of viable national and state level policies in order that their own efforts may become more meaningful; and third, change and broaden their objectives and methods of work to suit the requirements of newer but eventually more promising tasks.

Much of the frustration from which voluntary development agencies suffer is attributable to lack of a congenial and feasible development framework. The sphere of voluntary agencies is bound to be small, and they can never be the principal instrument of social and economic change in modern societies; but they can play a special

and very crucial complementary role to government, provided there is an appropriate national policy and strategy framework within which to operate. The situation today in India is of a kind in which such a dynamic national strategy does not exist, and voluntary agencies, therefore, with all their dedication and idealism, seem to achieve relatively little. One important task of voluntary rural agencies, therefore, lies *outside* rural areas, and this consists of generating pressures for adoption of viable state-level and national policies for development.

Given their geographically and otherwise isolated spheres of action, separate voluntary agencies can achieve very little by way of generating political or intellectual pressures of the kind required. What is needed is a forum of such agencies. In Maharashtra such a forum exists called *Gramayan* (of which all three authors of the present study are founder-members and members of the executive), which since 1973 has been trying to perform a variety of functions to the extent that its meager financial and manpower resources permit. What *Gramayan* does is to hold meetings of representatives of agencies for discussions of mutual problems, and of governmental policies affecting the poor and Adivasis; to involve city people (*i. e.*, experts, students and others) in rural development problems and activities; to publish literature useful for workers; and to take up projects on its own. Ways and means must be found to set up organizations like *Gramayan* and make them more effective.

As indicated earlier, "smallness" is one aspect of the Adivasis' total problem; the other is his "Adivasi-ness." In practice this means that even an economically viable technology may not be accepted because of social and cultural obstacles. This applies to other poverty groups as well. Economists have to be wary about theories that assume that economic rationality is a universal characteristic of mankind irrespective of the stage of culture to which men belong. Although our data confirm the importance of the economic factor, they also underscore the crucial importance of cultural and social factors. In dealing with Adivasis (and other backward communities) the latter factors assume supreme importance, and thus an understanding of them becomes an important prerequisite of effective developmental effort.

The problems of the rural poor are magnified in the Warlis. In sharp contrast to poorer people from the entire coastal areas who migrate in hordes to Bombay, the Warlis have not been attracted to urban employment. Even in their own areas they resist change, no matter how grinding their poverty. Sociological research has not yet found the key to unlock the secret of the Warli's compelling attachment to his traditional values and his self-imposed estrangement. But in a continuing, often frustrating, search and research, it must be remembered that great strengths inhere in those who would hold fast to their birthrights and not alienate their traditions.

It would seem that many social workers, including those working in the Kosbad area, tend to believe that, once "exploitation" is removed, the way is clear; and so they direct their energies primarily

Some General Conclusions

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to agitational programs. There is no denying that exploitation has long existed and has often been a root cause in the creation and perpetuation of poverty. But purely agitational work can be counter-productive, to the extent that it makes the clientele believe that all their ills flow from sources outside themselves. It would seem that the lesson to be derived here is that constructive activity, even constructive criticism of the poor themselves (which may not make one very popular), is a *sine qua non* of success.

Of course the ultimate answer lies somewhere in continued education--education in its broadest sense as an induced learning activity. It must be made available to all ages, even though the adult generation under study may well be a lost cause. If it is sufficiently appreciated that the basic problem of underdevelopment is a *human* problem (that is, a problem of personality formation), it almost goes without saying that the process must begin and be emphasized with young children and youth--at the most impressionistic stage of life.

Education in new values and attitudes, however, must not result in taking away a person's identity and alienating him from his culture. To strike the right balance between tradition and modernity is always a difficult matter; yet the realization that a balance has to be struck, that every individual's culture must be respected, that his racial pride must not be hurt, will prove a salutary factor in all educational and development efforts.

UNU-
Philippines

Women

Research Report

ON THE ROAD TO DEVELOPMENT

Impact of Infrastructure on the Changing Economic
Lives of Women in Southeast Mindanao

by

Beverly H. Hackenberg

Davao Research and Planning Foundation, Inc.

Davao City

November, 1978

A Project Sponsored by the U. S. Agency

for International Development

Manila, Philippines

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FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Philippines	B. Project Title not applicable	C. Project Number not applicable	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY not applicable 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY _____
E. Life of Project Funding 1. AID. (Loan or Grant) not applicable Other Donor _____ Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director _____ 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) not applicable 3. Other _____	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) not applicable 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not applicable		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) not applicable 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not applicable	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date) not applicable			

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title "On the Road to Development"	B. Evaluation Date November 1978	C. Type of Evaluation special study	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation 1978
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire not applicable Travel _____ per diem _____ Contract _____ 3. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation (SEE attached sheet)	G. Initiated By Philippines
H. Evaluation Team Composition			
1. Direct Hire			
a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise	
2. Contractor			
a. Name of Organization (if any)		b. Contract No.	
Davao Research and Planning Foundation, Inc.			
c. Name(s) of Persons		d. Area(s) of Expertise	
Beverly H. Hackenberg			

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position)

not applicable

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____

Typed Name _____

Position _____

Date _____

▣ Purpose: Develop and test a methodology to assess impact of improved infrastructure (rural electricity, feeder roads, irrigation and vocational training) on inful economic activity of 1,000 rural women in 2 provinces ("Experimental"= target of accelerated development program; "Control"= not) of Southeast Mindanao (Region IX). Also, measure increased women's access to socio-economic services because of the development project.

ABSTRACT

Title: ON THE ROAD TO DEVELOPMENT
Impact of Infrastructure on Economic Behavior of Women in Region XI, Southeast Mindanao

Author: Beverly Heckart Hackenberg
Davao Research and Planning Foundation, Inc.
Davao City, Philippines

Date: November 20, 1978

A USAID-sponsored inquiry was conducted into the impact of improved infrastructure on gainful employment of women in two provinces of Region XI, Southeast Mindanao. In the experimental province, Davao del Norte, which has benefited from an accelerated development program, 449 households were interviewed. In the control province, Davao del Sur, where public investment has been lower, 443 household interviews were obtained.

Prospective impact variables included roads, irrigation, rural electrification and vocational training. Women's work was measured through the participation continuum, a concept developed for this study which reports all income-producing activities in which women are engaged. Previous studies have reported only work which falls within the scope of conventional occupational titles.

Study sites consisted of nine barangays, 5 in Davao del Norte and 4 in Davao del Sur, within which 25% household samples were drawn. In each province sample barangays were selected along a gradient representing both (1) distance from the provincial capital and (2) distance from the national highway. In this way, the influence of both urbanization and primary transportation routes was controlled.

Data collected in the study documented the following variables affecting the outcome:

- a) amount and date of infrastructure development in each study site;
- b) utilization of items of barangay infrastructure by each household;
- c) household socioeconomic interview, including education, occupation and income data for each household member;
- d) economic participation continuum data for each female 15 years of age and above;
- e) perceived barriers to more effective participation in the economy by women respondents.

To analyze the data, a framework for making comparisons was constructed along three dimensions: (1) the women in the sample, (2) their types of economic activity, and (3) the study sites within which they pursue them. The women in the sample were divided into two groups: spouses and female household heads (Tables 2-3) representing older persons, and their daughters and other women in the household (Table 4), a decidedly younger generation.

Their types of work were classified into three groups (Table 10): traditional (related to subsistence agriculture); bazaar (native commercial activities); and modern (requiring improved infrastructure). Finally, the study sites within each province were divided into three levels of development reflecting public investment in infrastructure (Table 1), as follows:

	Experimental Area DAVAO DEL NORTE		Control Area* DAVAO DEL SUR	
<u>Level</u>	<u>Study Site</u>	<u>Infrastructure Components</u>	<u>Study Site</u>	<u>Infrastructure Components</u>
HIGH	Compostela Nabunturan	All weather and feeder roads; NIA irrigation; fully electrified; vocational schools.	Magsaysay	All weather and partial feeder roads; cooperative irrigation; partial electrification; vocational.
MEDIUM	Mawab New Corella	All weather and partial feeder roads; partial electrification; recent vocational school.	San Isidro	Feeder road only; NIA irrigation.
LOW	Cuambogan	No development.	Santa Cruz	No development.

* The 9th study site, Digos Muslim Village, was included in the Davao del Sur sample for ethnic representation; it does not fit the 3-level development classification.

The three development levels are more useful for intraprovince rather than interprovince comparisons since there is no actual analog for the high level sites (Compostela, Nabunturan) in the control area. The highest development in Davao del Sur, represented by Magsaysay, is comparable to the medium level (Mawab and New Corella) in the experimental area.

Within this comparative framework, the major findings of the study, keyed to the appropriate appendix tables, are reviewed below:

1. The primary differences between the experimental and control areas are to be found in the infrastructure contrasts, rather than in the abilities and characteristics of the women themselves.

Among spouses and female household heads (Tables 2-3), seven characteristics were compared, and two showed differences worth commenting upon. Mean years of education are slightly higher in the north and infant mortality (ages 0-4) is definitely higher in the south. But both are better predicted by level of development within each province. There is no evidence from this study that education can operate apart from infrastructure projects to improve income. It will be shown, rather, that infrastructure advantages have substantial impact on earnings in the absence of educational superiority.

2. Women's economic activity was much higher than expected in all study sites, proving the superiority of the instrument developed for measuring participation. However, infrastructure improvement was unrelated to the level of economic participation disclosed.

In the 1970 census of Region XI, Southeast Mindanao, only 25-35% of women ages 15-64 were reported to be participating in the labor force by age group. In the present study, 72% of all women 15 years of age and older, excluding students, were found to be producing income. Differences between experimental and control areas, and development levels within them, are not impressive (Table 5). The participation continuum is a more effective instrument for capturing women's economic contributions than conventional census concepts.

3. The impact of infrastructure improvement is disclosed by measures of household utilization, household income level, and women's earnings as a contribution to household income.

Infrastructure improvements available to individual households may best be measured by interprovincial differences in vehicle ownership and uses of electricity (Table 7). Almost 1/8 of the households in the north operate vehicles, compared with 1/50 in the south; 1/3 of the households in the north are served by electricity, compared with 1/10 in the south; 1/8 of the households in the north disclose a commercial use for electricity by women, compared with 1/25 in the south.

There are corresponding differences in household income and working women's earnings (Tables 8-9) disclosed below:

Development Level	Experimental Area D.VAC DEL NORTE		Control Area DAVAC DEL SUR	
	Household Income	Women's Income	Household Income	Women's Income
High	₱1,496.56	₱ 646.58	₱ 660.35	₱ 111.88
Medium	757.46	281.94	319.23	49.34
Low	500.16	109.02	236.28	59.21
All Sites	966.77	381.20	466.43	79.92

The mean income comparisons set forth above reveal substantial interprovincial differences in the predicted direction for both household and women's income. Also, when household and women's earnings are compared within each province, substantial gains appear with each increment of investment in infrastructure.

4. Modern sector employment for women is generated by infrastructure improvement with expected higher income, but women's earnings from traditional commerce are also raised substantially by infrastructure investment.

Jobs held by women were classified into traditional, bazaar and modern sector occupations (Tables 10, 11). The proportion of modern sector employment in the north (20.8% of jobs) was higher than in the south (4.0% of jobs). The experimental area also displayed more than twice the proportion of jobs in native commerce, and less than half the proportion of traditional farm work found in the control area. Women's incomes by job classification were also compared with the following results:

Class	Experimental Area DAVAO DEL NORTE		Control Area DAVAO DEL SUR	
	Women by Job Class	Women's Income	Women by Job Class	Women's Income
Traditional	41.4%	P 70.31	79.9%	P 58.66
Bazaar	36.8	287.60	16.1	117.25
Modern	20.8	602.33	4.0	305.82

This comparison confirms that infrastructure improvements have the dual effect of (1) raising the proportion of employment in the modern sector, and (2) improving the income levels derived from traditional commerce in the bazaar market. No significant income improvements appear to have reached the lowest occupational level (traditional farm work) even in the experimental area. Mean income differences by job class may be further subdivided within each province by level of infrastructure (high, medium or low) with predicted results (see text, p. 23).

5. Both education and employment data pertaining to younger women and school children imply that the next generation will derive greater benefits from infrastructure improvements.

Young women in the sample households (Table 4) show higher means of education in the north, higher proportions of employment, and lower numbers of persons both out of school and unemployed, as disclosed by the following figures:

A fitting conclusion to this study is provided by the evidence (Table 16) that it is the interaction between working women and superior infrastructure which is responsible for the income gains discovered in the experimental study sites, and not just the presence of working wives alone.

	Experimental Area DAVAC DEL NORTE	Control Area DAVAC DEL SUR
	<u>Mean Income</u>	<u>Mean Income</u>
Households with Working Wives	P 834.65	P 458.21
Households without Working Wives	548.87	452.92

The working wives of the southern region have no discernible impact on household income, probably because of their heavy concentration in low-paying traditional occupations. In the north, where commercial and modern sector employment is available to women, they succeed in contributing to a 66% improvement in household earnings. It should be concluded that the Filipina is an economically active member of the labor force at all times and in all places. Where her income contribution is less significant, it is because her participation is less effective. The "effectiveness dimension" in turn reflects the level of infrastructure improvement.

	Experimental Area DAVAO DEL NORTE	Control Area D.VAO DEL SUR
	<u>Women 15 and over, not Spouses or HH Heads</u>	<u>Women 15 and over, not Spouses or HH Heads</u>
Employed	36.9	22.2
In School	37.8	45.1
% Out of School not Employed	25.3	32.7
Education (Mean Yrs. Completed)	8.56	7.66
	<u>Mothers' and Daughters' Education</u>	
Mothers (Mean Yrs. Completed)	6.65	4.97
Daughters (Mean Yrs. Completed)	8.52	6.68

The comparison of the education of mothers with daughters (Table 14) discloses that the mean years of education for daughters (6.68) in the south is the same as that for mothers (6.65) in the north! The daughters in the experimental area, however, have a 2-year advantage over their peers in the control study sites. Among proportions of young persons (ages 10-24) attending school (Table 13) neither sex differences nor north-south distinctions can be discerned.

However, the data on grade retardation (Table 15) confirms that among students of high school age (15-19), the proportion who have failed to make normal academic progress is greater in the south (44.4%) than in the north (33.9%). The indicated conclusion is that younger persons are getting a better start toward upward social mobility in the developed portion of the study area. This, in turn, may be attributed to infrastructure improvements.

6. Women in the developed area do not appear to have been deterred from work by the presence of young children in the household. On the contrary, their economic contributions are responsible for the income advantage enjoyed by Davao del Norte.

In refuting the notion that women's economic participation is relegated to a later stage of their life cycle, it can be observed (Table 16) that (1) the median age of working wives is not significantly higher than that of all married women residing in the same study sites; and (2) the proportion of working wives with young children (ages 0-9) at home is no greater than that found among wives who are not employed.

THE PACIFIC ISLANDS: AN ASSESSMENT

By

Dr. Felix Moos

March 1979

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FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Pacific Isles	B. Project Title (SEE attached sheet)	C. Project Number not applicable	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>not applicable</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY _____
E. Life of Project Funding (SEE attached sheet) 1. AID. (Loan or Grant) _____ Other Donor _____ Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director _____ 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) <u>not applicable</u> 3. Other _____	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) <u>not applicable</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) <u>not applicable</u>		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) <u>not applicable</u> 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) <u>not applicable</u>	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date) <p style="text-align: center;">not applicable</p>			

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title The Pacific Islands: An Assessment	B. Evaluation Date March 1979	C. Type of Evaluation special study	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation 1977-January 1979
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire <u>not stated</u> travel _____ per diem _____ contract _____ 3. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____	F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation (SEE attached sheet)		G. Initiated By not applicable

H. Evaluation Team Composition

1. Direct Hire
- | a. Name | b. Present Position | c. Area of Expertise |
|---------|---------------------|----------------------|
| | | |
2. Contract:
- | a. Name of Organization (if any) | b. Contract No. |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|
| | |
3. Name(s) of Persons
- | c. Name(s) of Persons | d. Area(s) of Expertise |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| | |

Dr. Felix Moos, University of Kansas, Department of Anthropology, under the aegis of the Intergovernmental Personnel Act.

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position)

not stated

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____

Typed Name _____

Position _____

Date _____

4-1

B. AID has provided more than \$2.8 million in grants to private and regional institutions working in the South Pacific from 1977 to date (January 1979)*

Purpose: Analyze problems in Oceania development and dynamics of change, especially in those Pacific Islands where AID supports projects. It considers the impact of U.S. assistance in the Pacific and develops recommendations concerning AID's future (and continuing) development assistance in the area.

Foundation for the Peoples of the South Pacific:		
Papua New Guinea		\$ 548,240
Tonga		350,000
Western Samoa		350,000
Summer Institute of Linguistics		
Papua New Guinea		568,000
US/YMCA		
Fiji		33,184
Other grants to date:		
University of the South Pacific-Satellite Communications project		475,000
South Pacific Commission-Skip Jack Tuna Survey		300,000
University of Hawaii--Survey of Facilities at Alafua College of Agriculture		47,000
Cornell University Seismic Networks Project, Fiji		100,000
Accelerated Impact Program:		
Tonga, Solomon Islands, Western Samoa, Fiji, Tuvalu		100,000
	TOTAL	2,871,424

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VI. IMPACT OF U.S. ASSISTANCE IN THE PACIFIC

Economic development is the current primary issue in Pacific island affairs. As of yet, island-life styles and work ethos, are however, not well integrated with economic aspirations or growth. Thus, a primary impact of U.S. funding may well result in a heightened expectation that American money and "American know-how" will bring a "better life" to all islanders. There are of course, a number of pitfalls in developmental assistance to Pacific islands. One among them is, that while economic development plans may be very impressive in theory and magnitude, they may prove, for the most part, unrealizable in practice, particularly in the very small island states of the Pacific. Moreover, in the past these plans have too often been thought out in a kind of vacuum without any real consideration of the actual needs and wants of the general populace in a given society or the unique cultural tradition of a particular island society. As stated earlier in this report, "development" in the Pacific may be perforce a moot issue if the population problem is not given immediate and serious attention. By virtue of extremely high population growths among Pacific islanders, any improvements which may, in fact be generated by well-intentioned funding, may be negated faster than "progress" can be achieved, by a rapidly growing population. Lack of a strong commitment to population control may seriously hinder the effectiveness of any U.S. project-funding. Although U.S. funding does currently have a BHN bias, funds for "development" in terms of improved technologies, tools, and capital structures are

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easier to justify and allocate than funds which would help to bring about some basic changes in attitudes, such as work ethics. This may be an important point in terms of the impact of U.S. assistance in the Pacific. Technology may be perceived as changing in a geometric progression that is, technology "grows" at a rate of 2...4...16...32..., whereas values, and work ethics among them "grow" at the much slower arithmetic progression of 1...2...3...4.... This means in a practical sense that it is far easier to introduce technology into the islands of the Pacific than it is to introduce values that would support, and maintain, this technology. In short, one impact that American funding in the Pacific might well have, is the introduction of ever more sophisticated technologies without a sufficient concomitant commitment to the introduction with technology, of values that could sustain this new or improved technology. That is why at this moment the channeling of American A.I.D. funds through Private Voluntary Organizations like the Foundation for the Peoples of the South Pacific, the YMCA, the American Organization for Rehabilitation Through Training, the International Human Assistance Program, and the Summer Institute for Linguistics, may well be the most efficient way to aid in the economic development, with emphasis on "Basic Human Needs." This is the case, because these organizations have a stated -- and through experience proved - commitment to development through relatively small-scale, and applicably value-weighted projects.

The greatest impact of USAID funded projects in the Pacific ideally should be in terms of upgrading some of the most rudimentary prerequisites of survival in the islands: food in terms of improved diets, greater productivity in small-scale agriculture, aquaculture, and fishing, clothing, shelter, adequate health care, transportation, and a chance for increasing numbers of Pacific islanders to find some

If economic development is the current primary issue in the Pacific island affairs, than "appropriate technology" is primary in Pacific islands project development. One impact of USAID funding should rest on the fact that all funding is approved in terms of adherence to an overall philosophical basis for "Pacific development." It should not be, that a philosophical basis for funding must be invented after funds have already been expended. Projects should be developed in concert with a "philosophy" and not a philosophy invented to justify funding after the fact.

For the moment at least, the effect of relatively insignificant USAID funding in the Pacific: \$1.5 million in 1978, \$2.5 million in 1979, \$3.5 million in 1980, \$4.5 million in 1981 and \$5.0 million in 1982, presents us with a challenge, yet promises to hold possible false perceptions of Pacific islanders for greater riches for everyone from the United States at a minimum.

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The overall impact of USAID funds in the Pacific should in the long run be measured in terms of how much more self-reliant and self-sufficient have Pacific Islands become because the United States has supported appropriate technology, and appropriate agricultural, and appropriate _____ fishing, and appropriate training/education schemes. How much, it should be asked ultimately in terms of BHN, have Pacific island-life styles changed because of USAID support? If these questions can, in future years be answered in the affirmative, then the impact of USAID funding will have been positive and effective.

**Evaluatory Report on Mission
to**

Sri Lankan Settlement Projects

Thayer Scudder

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Sri Lanka	B. Project Title Accelerated Mahaweli Development Project	C. Project Number not applicable	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY <u>not applicable</u> 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY _____
Life of Project Funding not applicable 1. AID: (Loan or Grant) _____ 2. Other Donor _____ at Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials not applicable 1. Mission Director _____ 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) _____ 3. Other _____	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) not applicable 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not applicable		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) not applicable 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not applicable	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date) not applicable			

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title <u>Evaluatory Report on Mission to Sri Lankan Settlement Projects: A Discussion of Some Basic</u>	B. Evaluation Date May 1979	C. Type of Evaluation special study	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation Never stated
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire not stated a. travel _____ per diem _____ contract _____ other _____ TOTAL \$ _____	F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation (SEE attached sheet)		G. Initiated By not stated

H. Evaluation Team Composition

1. Direct Hire

a. Name	b. Present Position	c. Area of Expertise
---------	---------------------	----------------------

2. Contract: a. Name of Organization (if any) b. Contract No.

c. Name(s) of Persons d. Area(s) of Expertise
 Thayer Scudder, Professor of Anthropology, California Institute of Technology;
 "Twenty years experience with river basin development and population redistribution
 in other tropical countries, with special emphasis on Africa and the Middle East."

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position) Nafida Abeywickrema, Sec. Ministry of Lands and Land Development; T. Sivagnanam, Sec., Ministry of Mahaweli Development; and, Jeff Evans, John R. Eriksson, M.J. Perera, and Kapila Wimalad-

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____
 Typed Name _____
 Position _____
 Date _____

Evaluatory Report on Mission to Sri Lankan Settlement Projects:
A Discussion of Some Basic Issues

page two

Purpose: Discuss briefly a number of issues (integrated rural and urban zone development, water, management, environmental deterioration, etc.) pertaining to the Accelerated Mahaweli Development Program which came up during author's 1/25-2/8/79 mission to Sri Lanka "During which he spent half his time visiting resettlement project sites."

Evaluatory Report on Mission to Sri Lankan Settlement
Projects
Hayer Scudder

I. INTRODUCTION

Although no recommendations are included in this report, it is intentionally provocative in hopes of stimulating discussion. Its purpose is to discuss briefly a number of issues pertaining to the Accelerated Mahaweli Development Project which came up during my January 25 through February 8, 1979 mission to Sri Lanka. During this mission, approximately half of my time was spent visiting a number of settlements, including some in System H, Minneriya, Gal Oya, and Uda Walawe. I am especially grateful to Jeff Evans, John R. Eriksson, M. J. Perera, and Kapila Wimaladharma who took time to accompany me into the field and share with me their knowledge and insights. I am also grateful to Nanda Abeywickrema (Secretary, Ministry of Lands and Land Development) and T. Sivagnanam (Secretary, Ministry of Mahaweli Development) for their support of my mission, and for the opportunity to meet and discuss settlement issues with a large number of Sri Lankan officials, academics and research personnel, and settlers themselves.

It is important to emphasize at the beginning that I am not an expert on settlement projects in Sri Lanka. The expertise that I brought with me pertains to over twenty years experience with river basin development and population redistribution in other tropical countries, with special emphasis on Africa and the Middle East.

Throughout the world, settlement schemes have to come to grips with certain basic issues if they are to become productive and if they are to evolve into the type of community in which settlers and the children of settlers wish to live. During my visit to Sri Lanka my main approach was to attempt to assess the significance of these issues in the context of the Accelerated Mahaweli Development Project. The purpose of this report is to introduce a number of these issues and to briefly discuss some of them. Since my return to the United States I have read more deeply in the literature on settlement in Sri Lanka. Principal source materials are mentioned in the bibliography.

At the end of my visit I made no recommendations, my brief familiarity with Sri Lankan conditions and my broad survey of the settlement situation in different areas making specific recommendations inappropriate. I did, however, suggest in a February 8 memo that a high-level Sri Lankan workshop on Mahaweli development policy in relationship to a small number of carefully selected settlement issues be held in the future, possibly followed by other workshops dealing with other issues. Contrary to the situation in many countries, there is a wealth of experience among Sri Lankan officials, scholars, and retired civil servants relevant to river basin development and, more specifically, to settlement projects. Sri Lankans, for example, have written at least 8 Ph.D. theses on settlement policy and on specific settlements while at least two other Sri Lankans are currently involved in dissertation work. The knowledge of these people is a tremendous resource. While some expatriate assistance might be useful in preparing position papers for the suggested workshop, I continue to believe that

-1/6/1

participation should be restricted to Sri Lankans, with the total number attending the workshop not to exceed approximately twenty people.

II. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

The discussion in this report has been influenced by two basic assumptions resulting from my own research on new lands settlement projects. The first assumption is that settlement projects are dynamic entities which must pass through at least four major phases if they are to survive as viable communities. The second assumption is that even spontaneous migration from a home village to a new settlement area involves stress which has major implications for settler behavior and community formation. These assumptions are outlined below. If they are as valid as I believe them to be, they have important implications for the design and implementation of policies for expediting the settlement of relatively unoccupied areas and for optimizing the advantages of this settlement for both the nation and the settlement area.

A. NEW LANDS SETTLEMENT AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS

Government sponsored settlements throughout the world tend to be viewed as production schemes, often specializing in the cultivation of a single major crop. Where irrigation is involved, the responsible agency is usually the Ministry of Irrigation or an agency, like the Mahaweli Development Board, which comes out of, and draws its senior personnel from, the Ministry (or Department) of Irrigation. While this

STRATEGY AND GUIDELINES FOR
IMPROVEMENTS IN SANITATION AND WATER SUPPLY
IN SELECTED AREAS OF THAILAND

A Report Prepared By:
CHARLES PINEO, BSCE
RIFAT BAROKAS, PH.D.
MAX BATAVIA, BSCE, MSSE, P.E.

During The Period:
NOVEMBER 2, 1979 - JANUARY 2, 1980

Under The Auspices Of This:
AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION

Supported By The:
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
OFFICE OF POPULATION, AID/DSPEC-C-0053

AUTHORIZATION:
Ltr. POP/FPSD: 10/22/79
Assgn. No. 583-001

FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country Thailand	B. Project Title USAID had been active in rural water supply projects from 1960-1971 (but no longer)	C. Project Number not stated	D. Active Life of Project: not stated 1. Project Agreement Signed FY _____ 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY _____
Life of Project Funding 1. AID. (Loan or Grant) _____ 2. Other Donor _____ (SEE Attached sheet) Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director Donald Cohen 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) B. Odell, Program Officer 3. Other _____	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) not stated 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not stated		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) Ministry of Public Health 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) not stated	

I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date)

"Water For What": The Potable Water Project in Rural Thailand, Expost Impact evaluation, 10/29-12/4/79, Daniel Dworkin AID/W/PPC and Barbara Pillsbury AID/W/Asia Bureau

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title Strategy and Guidelines For Improvements in Sanitation and Water Supply in Selected Areas in Thailand	B. Evaluation Date 11/2/79- 1/2/80	C. Type of Evaluation special study	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation not stated
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire not stated a. travel _____ per diem _____ contract _____ 3. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____	F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation (SEE attached sheet)		G. Initiated By not stated

H. Evaluation Team Composition

1. Direct Hire
- | a. Name | b. Present Position | c. Area of Expertise |
|--------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Max Batavia, | BSCHE, MSSE, | P.E. |
2. Contract:
- | a. Name of Organization (if any) | b. Contract No. |
|------------------------------------|-----------------|
| American Public Health Association | |
- | c. Name(s) of Persons | d. Area(s) of Expertise |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| Charles Pineo, BSCE | |
| Rifat Barokas, Ph.D. | |

I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position)

H. Merrill, HPN; V. Scott, HPN
Mr. Sala, Sanitation Division of the Ministry of Public Health

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____
Typed Name _____
Position _____
Date _____

6/80

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F. Purpose: The team limited its review of existing conditions to water supply and sanitation in the poorer villages with a population of less than 1,000. The report also includes an assessment of social and economic development and identification of targets for future projects that can be considered for USAID intervention.

Life of Project Funding: UNICEF \$1,050,000
RTG \$1,950,000 (See also page 38 of report)

II. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings

The following is a brief summary of the APHA team's findings on rural water supply and sanitation in Thailand. (See also Chapter III and tables accompanying Chapter IV.)

A. Strengths

Many factors in Thailand make favorable a rural water supply and sanitation program for villages with populations of less than 1,000. These include:

- The existence of the Rural Water Supply Division (RWSD) and the Sanitation Division of the Ministry of Public Health, (SD/MPH), organizations with many years of successful field experience. These divisions have an organizational structure reaching to smaller villages in the country; both require the community's participation in the projects they assist and each has staff trained in motivation and health education.
- The success of past and present AID-assisted programs that involve staff of the various divisions of the MPH.
- An ongoing Primary Health Care Program (carried out through MPH with AID assistance) which is training village health workers and communicators to work in their home villages. This program lacks the strong emphasis on environmental sanitation that a parallel rural water supply and sanitation program would provide.
- The existence of targets, established by Thailand to respond to emphasis on the 1980s as the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Decade. Desire for a coordinated rural water supply and sanitation program is strong.
- The pressing need and desire of the people in the smaller villages for improved water supply and excreta disposal facilities, food handling, solid waste disposal and other elements of environmental sanitation. Basically clean, the villagers welcome an appropriate means to help maintain cleanliness.

B. Constraints

The constraints encountered are listed below in random order. They are lack of:

- Trained personnel for environmental sanitation activities;
- Transportation for personnel;

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- Training focused on environmental sanitation;
- Continuing supervision at all levels;
- Adequate maintenance for even the simplest hand pump;
- A coordinated plan and program for rural water supply and sanitation activities;
- A data base to plan a coordinated program;
- Understanding of the personal preferences of rural people for drinking water sources; and,
- Sufficient funds to reach the ideal goals that are set.

C. Targets of Opportunity

The strengths and constraints listed above indicate a number of targets of opportunity that AID should help the RTG address. These are:

- Improving the water supply and excreta disposal facilities, as well as other environmental sanitation conditions, including food handling in the poorer, more remote villages with population of less than 1,000 that are not being reached by regular RTG programs and that are not included in other donors' proposed programs.
- Strengthening RWS and SD/MPH, an organization that has long been successful in this field and which has contributed substantially to improved rural water supply and sanitation.
- Extending the scope of the ongoing Primary Health Care Program by supplementing it with a program to improve environmental sanitation.
- Helping the RTG meet its rural water supply and sanitation goals for the 1980s.
- Furthering the objectives listed in the U.S. Congressional mandate for rural poor.
- Stimulating the in-country manufacture of hand pumps, household water treatment units, plastic pipe well screens and other equipment needed in quantity for water supply and sanitation purposes.
- Developing competency-based training programs for operation, maintenance, management personnel and others involved in a rural water supply and sanitation program.

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D. Recommended Strategy

The various strategies suggested throughout this report are summarized below.

1. Develop a rural water supply and sanitation program to supplement the ongoing USAID/T-supported Primary Health Care Program. Implement the RWSS Program in the same 20 provinces included in the PHC program, beginning in six provinces and then expanding to seven more, before finally including all 20 provinces. Phase the RWSS Program over three successive three-year periods, and follow up with a one-year evaluation and analysis of physical and social results. Closely coordinate the RWSS and PHC programs and ensure cooperation efforts.
2. Build on the proven capability of the MPH and USAID/T to develop and carry out cooperative public health programs. Develop with the MPH a rural water supply and sanitation project that can be implemented through the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation divisions.
3. Strengthen the RWSS divisions by helping them strengthen their sanitarian corps. Help develop the supervisory staff needed to efficiently use the sanitarians. Provide transportation facilities so that sanitarians and supervisors can fulfill their responsibilities.
4. Provide training for newly-appointed sanitarians and refresher training for present sanitarian staff, as well as village health workers and communicators, that emphasizes environmental sanitation, health education, and community development and participation.
5. Help Rural Water Supply Division staff to facilitate completion of the piped water supply portion of the proposed program by providing necessary supervisory personnel and transportation equipment. Specific training should include not only staff, but also other personnel, including those needed at the village level, to successfully implement the program. Emphasis will be on full community participation before, during and after construction, and throughout the operation and maintenance phases.
6. Help reestablish the RWSS division's former maintenance responsibility and increase the staff needed to provide backup maintenance for the water supply systems it installs, including piped systems and those with hand pumps. This will require setting up provincial maintenance brigades outfitted with the equipment needed to inspect at least once every two

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months the system for which each is responsible and to respond to emergency requests from village committees. These brigades should be charged with providing backup maintenance support for the systems and equipment installed by the Sanitation Division. This will take advantage of bi-monthly visits and avoid duplication of services.

7. Provide training for two professionals from the RWSS divisions, one each in the respective technical programs, and one each in management, supervision, organization and logistics.
8. Make available several options for both water supply and excret: disposal interventions to ensure that the villagers' desires, needs, and capabilities to participate in the programs are considered.

For estimating purposes, the project universe provides for an average of 100 villages in each of the 20 provinces, each with an average size of 100 households of six members each. Hence, the program will benefit 1.2 million people.

The water supply options are:

<u>Villages</u>	<u>Number of Villages</u>		
	<u>Alternate 1</u>	<u>Alternate 2</u>	<u>Alternate 3</u>
With Piped Water Supply Systems	1,200	1,400	1,400
With House Connections	600	700	1,000
With Public Hydrants	600	700	400
With Cisterns, Convertible to Piped Systems	800	600	600
10 cm. Water Cisterns for 2 Families	240	180	180
5 cm. Water Cisterns for 1 Family	560	420	420

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The options for excretion disposal are:

Complete Coverage for 2,000 Villages	Number Privies		
	Alternate 1	Alternate 2	Alternate 3
Total Privies	200,000	200,000	200,000
Water-seal Privies	200,000	100,000	170,000
Pit Privies, Convertible to Water-seal Privies	0	100,000	32,000

Support the options with necessary equipment, supplies and materials.

9. Assist in a detailed study of water supply and sanitation in the 20 provinces participating in the PHC program, using as a pilot project the study of the first six provinces to be included in the RWSS program.
10. Provide four expatriates to help develop and implement the program. The expatriates should have several years' experience in developing countries on assignments similar to those of this project.
11. Arrange for the assignment of 20 Peace Corps Volunteers to help implement the program at provincial district and local levels.

INCENTIVES, FERTILITY BEHAVIOR, AND
INTEGRATED COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

By

Henry P. David

FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A Country (see attached)	B Project Title not applicable	C Project Number not applicable	D. Active Life of Project 1. Project Agreement Signed FY _____ 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY _____
E Life of Project Funding 1. AID (Loan or Grant) _____ her Donor _____ 2. Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director _____ 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) _____ 3. Other _____ not applicable	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) _____ 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) _____		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) _____ 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) _____	

I Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date)

not stated

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title <u>Incentives, Fertility Behavior, and Integrated Community Development</u>	B. Evaluation Date 1980	C. Type of Evaluation special	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation not applicable
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire _____ a. travel _____ b. per diem _____ 2. Contract _____ 3. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation (see attached sheet)	G. Initiated By PPC/PDPR/HR

H. Evaluation Team Composition

1. Direct Hire

a. Name

b. Present Position

c. Area of Expertise

2. Contract

a. Name of Organization (if any)

b. Contract No.

AID/OTR-147-79-90

c. Name(s) of Persons

d. Area(s) of Expertise

Henry P. David, Director of the Transnational Family Research Institute and Associate Clinical Professor, Department of Psychiatry, Univ. of Maryland Medical School, Baltimore

I Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position)

Ann Van Dusen, PPC/PDPR/HR

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____

Typed Name _____

Position _____

Date _____

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A. Country: The Regional Overview features country capsules summarizing experience reported from Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan. The integrated community approach pioneered in Thailand is described in a separate section .

F. Purpose: In order to investigate ways in which fertility can be reduced by influencing the demand for small families, one of the objectives of this overview summarizes what is presently known about the effects of incentives and disincentives, including cost/benefits, ethical consideration, and integration with community development policies.

INCENTIVES, FERTILITY BEHAVIOR, AND
INTEGRATED COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT:

AN OVERVIEW

Henry P. David

Abstract

After outlining selected psychosocial and economic determinants of fertility behavior and discussing their relationship to quality-of-life considerations, relevant aspects of population policy are noted. The next section offers a conceptualization and definition of types of incentives and disincentives, plus a discussion of integrated community approaches to fertility reduction with an orientation to enhancing community development. Legal and ethical constraints are presented in terms of legislative changes, perceived constraints on freedom, and coercion and human rights. The Regional Overview ✓ features country capsules summarizing experience reported from Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan. The integrated community approach pioneered in Thailand is described in a separate section. Research findings are surveyed with particular attention given to sociocultural and methodological concerns as these relate to suggested cooperative pilot and policy research. A summary of major findings plus more than 180 references conclude the overview.

Preface

One of the conclusions of the 1974 World Population Conference was that a policy advocating fertility reduction cannot be isolated from other social and economic development policies concerned with family and individual well-being (U.N., 1974). The multifaceted nature of these interactions is being gradually understood as clearer linkages are emerging between fertility behavior and economic, social, cultural, and political determinants and consequences of national policies. Social scientists have become increasingly involved in studies of the modifiability of fertility choice behavior, motivation for fertility reduction, and willingness to limit family size for societal well-being. One of the objectives of this overview is to summarize what is presently known about the effects of incentives and disincentives, including costs/benefits, ethical consideration and integration with community development policies.

The general approach of this paper encompasses a consideration of psychosocial and psychoeconomic determinants of fertility behavior. Not enough is known as yet about what influences which couples to limit family size under selected environmental conditions. Findings accumulating from well-defined field studies are, however, providing suggestions for ethically acceptable initiatives, rooted in local traditions with a humanistic approach designed to improve the quality-of-life of participating villagers. This is an encouraging evolution when it is considered that most organized family planning programs in the developing world are less than 20 years old, that millions of couples still lack access to modern contraceptive methods, and that the right to choose legal pregnancy termination remains a topic of considerable controversy (David, 1980).

After this preface, there will be a section reviewing relevant aspects of fertility behavior, quality-of-life, and population policy, followed by a discussion of diverse incentives, disincentives, and integrated community approaches. After consideration of legal and ethical constraints, the regional overview presents information from nine Asian countries, plus more extensive observations on the Thai experience with community-based programs. Research findings are surveyed and suggestions offered regarding needed future research to answer specific questions. A summary of major findings and a listing of more than 130 references conclude the overview.

Ascertaining the state-of-the-art on the complex topics discussed in this paper is rendered more difficult than usual by the controversy that has long swirled around the concept of incentives. Although diverse sources were consulted and intensive literature searches conducted, no claim is made for completeness, systematic coverage of all relevant aspects, or total objectivity. Many of the research findings presented are "soft" in the sense that they have not been cross-validated or replicated in other settings. The writer's personal experience in transnational research on fertility behavior will be apparent in the comments and conclusions. In an effort to balance and/or emphasize certain views, liberal use has been made of selected quotations at the beginning and/or end of each section.

Prepared with the support of the Agency for International Development, this overview is based entirely on materials available to the Transnational Family Research Institute. I am pleased to acknowledge the considerable support provided by Hirofumi Ando, Chai Bin Park, and Paul E. Mason through the facilities of the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, Helen Kolbe and Phyllis Piotrow, Population Information Program, Johns Hopkins University; Bruce Knarr, Librarian of the Population Reference Bureau; and Laura Olson, Chief, Clearinghouse and Information Section, Population Division, U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. Much valued consultation was graciously given by James T. Fawcett, East-West Population Institute, Honolulu; Cynthia Green, Population Crisis Committee, Washington; and S. B. Seward, Social Science Division, International Development and Research Centre, Ottawa. Special thanks are expressed to Jonathan V. David who spent several weeks in the field with the Community Based Family Planning Service Program in Thailand and to the senior CBEPS staff who took time during their travel to the United States to visit Bethesda and answer our many questions. The Population Council kindly made available the galley proofs of the monograph on the Singapore experience by Peter S. J. Chen and James T. Fawcett.

It has been said that "the road to political inaction is paved with unused research reports" (Henry, 1976). Discussions at international meetings and regional seminars confirm that serious problems exist in bringing already available and cogent social science research findings to bear in a continuous and systematic way on the refining of priorities and implementation of policies, whether the area be population policy or unintended adolescent premarital pregnancy. While researchers shrug their shoulders about

the "underutilization" of their findings, policy makers and government planners complain that social science research is rarely relevant to immediate policy issues, timely, or couched in an "employable" format.

The effectiveness of dissemination methods and the barriers to the use of policy-relevant information by decision-makers have been well reviewed (e.g., Caplan, 1975; Batscha, 1976). There is clear need for fostering dialogue between policy makers and social science researchers. Involving those close to decision-making in the process of establishing research priorities and the early phases of research planning is likely to enhance better perception of realities and eventual utilization of service oriented recommendations.

It is with the hope of advancing the transnational and interdisciplinary understanding of population policies involving incentives and disincentives in stimulating voluntary fertility reduction, fostering "bottom-up" community development, and enhancing the quality-of-life of acceptors, especially in the villages of developing countries, that this overview is presented.

H.P.D.

January 1980

flows of assistance to villages and in terms of stimulating motivation, including peer pressures, for lowering birthrates" (National Security Council, 1978).

Summary of Major Findings

Background Factors

- The complexity of fertility behavior requires that both psychosocial and economic determinants of fertility be considered in any microeconomic approach to the value of children and policy initiatives to stimulate fertility reduction through using incentives, disincentives, or integrated community programs.
- An incentive is defined as a tangible or intangible reward to an individual, couple, or other target group designed to induce specified fertility-reducing behavior. A disincentive is defined as a tangible or intangible negative sanction incurred by an individual, couple, or other target group as a consequence of exceeding specified fertility behavior.
- Incentives may be paid to recruiters, acceptors, and/or providers of services. They may be small one-time cash payments or larger amounts paid at a later date, dependent on acceptance of specified conditions.
- Disincentive programs should be differentiated from politically organized pressures and coercion which restrict voluntary choice behavior.
- Integrated community programs relate fertility reduction to community development, are sensitive to local needs, and involve the community in voluntary decision-making.
- "The 'universal human right' of every couple to choose the timing and number of children they will have, is a noble sentiment, but there is not a country in the world where it is not subject to highly effective societal and cultural constraints."

see table for
conclusion

The use of incentives, disincentives, and peer pressure is not incompatible with human rights principles as long as there is a community consensus and implementation does not result in discrimination on grounds of income, race, sex, language, property, or religion.

- Most incentive programs have been reported from Asia, particularly from Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Thailand.

Problems Encountered

- Policy decisions on the size of incentive payments, to whom they should be paid, when, how, and in what form appear to have been made largely on the basis of conjecture and intuition, seldom as the result of field experience.
- Despite the millions of dollars spent on incentives, virtually no control studies have been reported. Little knowledge exists on whether incentives will lower the birthrate or how large they would have to be to do so. There is a wide gap between the number of schemes proposed and the few that have been implemented with a research component.
- There is disagreement on whether incentives influence persons to want fewer children or prod them into accepting family planning (notably sterilization) before they would otherwise do so. It has also not been possible to establish the extent to which incentives cloud the judgment of recruiters and service providers, or the informed consent of acceptors.
- Acceptance of nonpermanent methods, prompted mainly by a desire for a small, one-time financial reward, tends to elicit low continuation rates. Delayed incentives or no-birth bonus schemes are of too recent origin to permit longer-term evaluation of their effects on fertility or costs.

- The same variables which lead to compliance with an incentive/disincentive program may also be highly correlated with economic success, independent of any incentive. Ultimately, the validity of the assumption that incentive programs are administratively and politically feasible, economically workable, and in keeping with individual and societal norms can only be assessed by the fertility behavior of the community and society affected.

Successful Elements

- Delayed incentives and no-birth bonus schemes are providing encouraging initial results but longer-term studies are needed to assess effects on fertility and cost effectiveness.
- Disincentives reinforce the public perception of small family norms and encourage rational decision-making by emphasizing cost-benefit factors without, however, preventing couples from having additional children if they wish to pay the costs entailed.
- Disincentives are more readily accepted in societies where all methods of fertility regulation are easily available, where a strong and stable government has a well-established consensual relationship with its citizens, and when care is taken to avoid undue hardships for children born in disregard of official policy.
- Integrated community programs are positively perceived when fertility reduction schemes are oriented to community development, involving local autonomy and appropriate technology to enhance quality-of-life.
- The nongovernmental community-based family planning service program pioneered in Thailand demonstrates the feasibility of utilizing imaginative marketing, traditional folk humor, and innovative leadership tied to economic development goals. The more cohesive the community, the greater the probability of recognizing the need for integrating fertility reduction with socio-economic development for the common benefit.

Suggested Recommendations

- Review and reconsider the present ban on the use of U.S. Government funds for incentives for fertility reduction, particularly for integrated community development schemes known to enjoy the voluntary support of the local population and less subject to possible abuse. More than half the world's population resides in the rural villages of the developing countries of Asia. Their needs should be understood within the context of their own perceptions of fertility behavior, integrated community development, and an enhanced quality-of-life.
- Organize a small working party to identify and reach consensus on psychosocial and economic determinants of fertility behavior in seemingly successful incentive programs that are integrated with community development, supported by the villagers concerned, and focused on fertility reduction and an improved quality-of-life. Another purpose should be to develop guidelines for reporting such programs in a transnationally useful manner and making suggestions regarding priorities related to program delivery, the utility of appropriate technology schemes for fertility reduction, and service oriented research.
- Convene an interdisciplinary regional seminar of informed policy makers, service administrators, and researchers, able to report and discuss programs identified as successful by knowledgeable persons in the field. Project reports presented should follow guidelines suggested by the working party. The objective would be to develop a methodology for cooperative, interdisciplinary, and transnational research, yielding comparable results on program ingredients affecting psychosocial and economic determinants of fertility behavior, voluntary local acceptance, and the utility of appropriate technology schemes in assessments of cost effectiveness.

- Fund cooperative studies of about 13 to 24 months' duration, yielding cross-culturally comparable information that will permit making implementable recommendations to policy makers for organizing similar programs in other lands where administrative and political conditions are favorable.
- Provide support for organizing and implementing carefully monitored larger field projects developed in consultation with directors of programs previously identified as successful and with semiannual meetings to review progress, problems, and plans.
- Provide special funds to support and monitor the family planning services organized by the CBFPS program in Thailand for Cambodian and Laotian refugees.
- To be useful, programs using incentive/disincentive schemes or integrated community approaches will have to be formulated in consistent, clearly defined, and well-communicated policies, responsive to local needs and values with dynamic leadership to obtain and nurture continued political and administrative backing. They will have to demonstrate the complementarity of fertility reduction schemes with socioeconomic development, designed humanistically to improve the quality-of-life, especially in the impoverished rural villages of developing countries.

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Assessment of Six-AID Supported Projects

By

Dr. Gerald Hickey
Dr. Robert Flammang

April, 1979

1-63

FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL EVALUATION

I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Country (SEE attached sheet)	B. Project Title (SEE attached sheet)	C. Project Number (SEE attached sheet)	D. Active Life of Project: 1. Project Agreement Signed FY _____ (SEE attached sheet) 2. Approved Project Completion Date (PACD) FY _____ sheet
E. Life of Project Funding 1. AID. (Loan or Grant) (SEE attached sheet) Other Donor _____ Host Country Counterpart Funds _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Responsible Mission Officials 1. Mission Director _____ 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) _____ 3. Other _____ not stated	
G. Project Design 1. In-House (Name, Position) _____ not stated 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) _____ not stated		H. Implementation 1. Host Country Agency(ies) _____ not stated 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) _____ not stated	
I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date) The Rural Poor Majority in the Philippines: Their Present and Future Status as Beneficiaries of AID Programs, 1977, Gerald Hickey and Robert Flammang			

II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA

A. Evaluation Title Assessments of Six-AID Supported Projects	B. Evaluation Date April, 1979	C. Type of Evaluation various, from midterm to expost	D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation (See attached sheet)
E. Evaluation Cost 1. Direct Hire _____ not stated a. travel _____ per diem _____ contract _____ 3. Other _____ TOTAL \$ _____		F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation (SEE attached sheet)	G. Initiated By Washington

H. Evaluation Team Composition

1. Direct Hire a. Name _____ b. Present Position _____ c. Area of Expertise _____	2. Contract: a. Name of Organization (if any) _____ b. Contract No. _____ c. Name(s) of Persons _____ d. Area(s) of Expertise _____	Gerald Hickey, social scientist Robert Flammang, social scientist
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I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country Personnel (Name, Position)

none stated

J. Evaluation Coordinator

Signature _____
Typed Name _____
Position _____
Date _____

4604

A. Country: Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Bangladesh

B. Project Title:

Provincial Water (Philippines) · · Project # AID-DLC/P2020
1974-1979

Loan # 492-U-033, \$15 million to Local Water Utilities Administration,
signed May 23, 1974

Libmanan-Cabusao Integrated Area Development (Philippines)

492-0275

1975-1979

Loan # 492-T-037, \$3.5 million to Government of the Philippines, authorized
June 28, 1975- July 31, 1980, extension January 31, 1981.

Semarang Steam Power Station (Indonesia)

1971-1979

#497-0240

Loan # 497-H-024, \$19.7 million to Government of Indonesia, 1971-October 1979

Educational Finance (Indonesia)

#497-0229

1975-1979

1975 grant funds of \$425,715

Project began May 1975, completion May 1978 (Conflicting information)

Population Planning (Thailand)

#493-0283, grant funds of \$16,607,000 to Royal Thai Government, FY 1976-1981

Small Scale Irrigation (Hand Pumps) (Bangladesh)

#388-0019A, April 1976--anticipated completion 1978, yet March 1979 still in
planning stage.

Loan # 338-T-010, \$14 million to the Government of Bangladesh
1976-1979

Analyzed UNICEF project instead of AID supported project

F. Purpose: In order to assess the socio-economic innovations that the projects were designed to produce: (A) reconstructed historical setting of each project as well as anticipated impact of the project on intended beneficiaries, (B) focused on project implementation (through documents and interviews), (C) for those projects where implementation had not reached the stage where there was a measurable impact, the interviews were geared to assess the anticipated impact of the project.

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METHODOLOGY AND SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENTS

Since all of the six projects selected for this study were intended to produce socioeconomic innovations, assessment necessitated conceptualizing a before-and-after situation in order to measure the effect of project implementation in producing the desired change.

The first step in doing this was to reconstruct the historical setting of each project. Specifically, this involved investigating the problem which prompted the formulation of each project and defining the anticipated impact of the project on the intended beneficiaries. This was done by collecting documentary data (Project Identification Documents, Project Papers, and other records) and also by conducting interviews with those familiar with each project.

The next step was to focus on project implementation and determine (again through documents and interviews) whether it had proceeded to the point where some manifest impact had been produced. Where this was the case, interviews were conducted with intended beneficiaries to obtain their perceptions concerning the positive or negative effects the project has had on them and their surroundings.

For those projects where implementation had not reached the stage where there was a measurable impact, the interviews were geared to assess the anticipated impact of the project.

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Applying this method, the resulting assessments were attained.

1. Project No. 1, Provincial Water in the Philippines - This project was assessed to have produced more positive effects (which are permanent and more likely to increase) than negative effects (which are short-run in nature). Positive effects such as improved water quality, stronger pressure, a more reliable supply, and more accessible sources are contributing to the well-being of the intended beneficiaries. The improved water systems also are contributing to socioeconomic development in the beneficiary communities. Negative effects such as higher water rates are considered temporary.

2. Project No. 2, the Libmanan/Cabugao Integrated Area Development in the Philippines - The overall conclusion is that most of the targeted beneficiaries see the project favorably at this time, although the actual results are still quite mixed. It therefore is too early to judge fairly what the final impact will be. Intermediate beneficiaries (including some unintended beneficiaries) such as laborers working on the project, contractors, and fishermen, are relatively content. Final beneficiaries - the farm households - have, in general, high expectations about the final outcome of the project, although most have experienced only a small amount of benefit to date. Some have experienced serious costs as a result of poor implementation management.

3. Project No. 3 - The Semarang Steam Power Station in Indonesia - Despite the undue delays in getting the first unit of the plant operating in October 1978, there have been some manifestly positive results that give the project a promise of success. The most striking

of these results stem from the fact that implementation of the project thus far vastly reduces the possibility of blackouts which have been plaguing the PLN grid system of Central Java.

This new reliability has attracted a large number of new users, among them various types of commercial and industrial establishments, which previously maintained their own generators (most of them diesel-fueled). There are indications that the new PLN system has stimulated an expansion of some businesses, which contributes to the economic development of Central Java and the creation of more jobs. There also is evidence that the reliability of power has improved the operation of some health facilities (particularly the larger hospitals). Finally, the addition of the Semarang Steam Power Station enables expansion of the rural electrification program in Central Java thereby benefiting villagers and farmers.

Negative reactions centered on the high cost of service connections and conversion to 220 volts, and also the high electricity rates. The lower cost of fuel for the steam plant (.23-.24 liters per watt hour) in comparison with the gas turbine generators (1-4.6 liters per watt hour) should lower overall operating costs, enabling a reduction of these costs.

4. Project No. 4, Educational Finance in Indonesia - Our overall conclusion is that top-level decision-makers in the Ministry of Education and Culture and the people directly involved in carrying out the project are very satisfied with the results to date.



Decision-makers know a great deal more about what the country's educational system is like than do other officials. They are aware of the flow of funds and what must be done to improve the system with the available funds. The people trained by the project-- participants in training courses, those versed in computer skills, in languages, and in research (techniques and analysis), those experienced in field work, and those whose educations have been financed by the project -- all constitute a solid core of expertise which Indonesia badly needs.

5. Project No. 5, Population Planning in Thailand-- This project was adjudged to be successful. Seen in historical perspective, AID's initial support in 1970 had been catalytic in enabling the Royal Thai Government (RTG) and private sector agencies to launch family planning programs either on a regional or national level. Since 1970, AID has been attuned to the needs of the population planning program so that its support has continued to be significant.

The most significant measure of the success of this program is that population growth has been reduced from +3.0 percent in 1970 to 2.1 percent in 1978.

6. Project No. 6, Small-Scale Irrigation (Hand Pumps) in Bangladesh was the only project to which the methodology did not apply because none of the hand pumps in the AID-supported program has been manufactured. In the absence of sufficient implementation, the alternative was to examine the impact of a similar hand-pump project being conducted by UNICEF (as of 1979, some 90,000 hand pumps have been distributed).

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On the basis of this research the proposed hand-pump project supported by AID appears to be promising in terms of the stated goals. On the positive side, use of the pumps will permit a dry-season crop, which will enable many small landowners to retain title to their holdings where under previous conditions their ever-increasing debt would eventually force them to sell their land. The simple technology of the pump renders it easy to use and maintain. The flexibility of the pump permits it to be used for household water as well as for irrigation, and the crop rotation it affords is beneficial to the soil. The command area is relatively small, so there is little waste of water.

There are questions, however, concerning cost effectiveness of the project (increased production means higher costs to the farmer and lower prices locally). Also is there a possibility that large landlords might gain control of the new pumps (as they did with chemical fertilizer in some areas)? Then to us what will be the effect of a vastly increased number of pumps on the water table?

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Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

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TAGS:

SUBJECT: FORMAT FOR ASIA BUREAU SPECIAL EVALUATIONS

1. SUMMARY: DURING 1988 THE ASIA BUREAU WILL BE TAKING STEPS TO MAKE EVALUATION FINDINGS MORE READILY AVAILABLE AND EASILY UTILIZABLE FOR PROGRAM AND PROJECT PLANNING IN BOTH THE MISSIONS AND AID/W. FOR THIS REASON IT IS REQUESTED THAT ALL REPORTS OF SPECIAL EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED FOR THE ASIA BUREAU AND MISSIONS FOLLOW A COMMON FORMAT OUTLINED BELOW. ASIA/DP WILL SUBSEQUENTLY DISSEMINATE EVALUATION SUMMARIES AND FINDINGS AND MAKE COPIES OF THE FULL REPORT AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST. END SUMMARY.

2. BACKGROUND. DURING RECENT YEARS THE NUMBER OF QUOTE SPECIAL UNQUOTE EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED FOR THE ASIA BUREAU AND MISSIONS HAS INCREASED CONSIDERABLY. (BY QUOTE SPECIAL EVALUATIONS UNQUOTE IS MEANT ALL IN-DEPTH, EXTERNAL, IMPACT AND SIMILAR EVALUATIONS NOT CLASSIFIED AS REGULAR OR STANDARD EVALUATIONS.) AT LEAST 20 SUCH EVALUATIONS ARE SCHEDULED FOR 1988 AND APPROXIMATELY 30 WERE CONDUCTED DURING 1978 AND 1979. MOST OF THE 1978-79 EVALUATIONS, HOWEVER, FAILED TO INCLUDE CONCISE SUMMARIES OR STATEMENTS OF FINDINGS. AS A CONSEQUENCE, OBSERVATIONS PRESENTED WITHIN MAY BE IMPORTANT, YET FAIL TO INFLUENCE OR EVEN

COME TO THE ATTENTION OF DECISION-MAKERS ABOVE THE PROJECT MANAGER LEVEL OR OUTSIDE THE MISSION OR OFFICE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EVALUATION. A COMMON FORMAT HAS THEREFORE BEEN DEVELOPED FOR REPORTS OF SPECIAL EVALUATIONS IN ORDER TO PERMIT EFFICIENT DISSEMINATION OF FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED AND TO FACILITATE COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS. AS OF JANUARY 1988, ALL SPECIAL EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED IN ASIA BY AID AND ITS CONTRACTORS WILL BE CAREFULLY REVIEWED

BY ASIA/DP AND THE EVALUATION SUMMARIES AND MAJOR FINDINGS CIRCULATED ON A REGULAR BASIS TO ALL ASIA MISSIONS.

3. FORMAT. FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, ALL MISSIONS AND AID/W OFFICES ARE URGED TO INCLUDE IN THEIR SCOPES OF WORK FOR SPECIAL EVALUATIONS THAT THE EVALUATION REPORTS ARE TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING SECTIONS:

A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. TWO-PAGE SINGLE-SPACED MAXIMUM. THIS WILL BE CIRCULATED INDEPENDENTLY OF THE FULL EVALUATION. THUS IT SHOULD CONTAIN (1) IDENTIFICATION OF PROJECT (S) BY NAME, NUMBER, YEARS, AND COST; (2) PURPOSE OF EVALUATION; (3) IDENTIFICATION OR SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS OR LESSONS LEARNED, AND (4) IDENTIFICATION OR SUMMARY OF MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS.

B. MAJOR FINDINGS. SHORT, SUCCINCT SUMMARY STATEMENTS PRESENTING THE MAJOR CONCLUSIONS AS WELL AS LESSONS LEARNED, INCLUDING THOSE WITH APPLICABILITY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE PROJECT (S). (LENGTH OPTIONAL.)

C. RECOMMENDATIONS. PROJECT AND PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS AND, WHERE POSSIBLE, STATEMENT OF POLICY IMPLICATIONS. (LENGTH AND DETAIL TO BE DETERMINED BY PURPOSE OF INDIVIDUAL EVALUATION.)

ON A REGULAR BASIS, ASIA/DP WILL DISSEMINATE TO THE FIELD THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES, AND WHERE APPROPRIATE MAJOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, OF ALL SPECIAL EVALUATIONS. FOR THIS REASON, THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY SHOULD BE ABLE TO STAND ALONE AS A BRIEF BUT THOROUGH DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT AND A COMPREHENSIVE PRESENTATION OF THE EVALUATION FINDINGS. (IN ADDITION, PPC/E HAS ALSO BEGUN TO DISTRIBUTE TO OTHER REGIONS THE SUMMARIES AND MAJOR FINDINGS OF SPECIAL EVALUATION REPORTS JUDGED TO BE IMPORTANT AND OF HIGH QUALITY.)

PLEASE NOTE THAT THE FORMAT AND CONTENTS OF THE BODY OF THE REPORT ARE STILL TO BE DETERMINED BY THOSE WHO

SCHEDULE AND CONDUCT THE EVALUATION.

4. ASIA/DP WELCOMES COMMENTS ON THIS ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE UTILIZATION OF EVALUATION FINDINGS AS WELL AS MISSION COMMENTS REGARDING OTHER ASPECTS OF EVALUATION. VANCE

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DEVELOPING A SCOPE OF WORK FOR AN EVALUATION

A clearly thought-out and well written scope of work is essential if an evaluation is to be worth (1) the funds expended on it and (2) the investment of AID and host-country personnel time that the execution of a good evaluation typically requires. A good scope of work makes it possible for the evaluation team to concentrate on substantive matters and to produce a report that effectively presents the information most needed by project managers and other decision-makers. On the other hand, a hastily drafted scope, or even one that is vaguely worded or overly general, causes the evaluation team to fritter away precious time on procedural matters and makes it highly likely that the evaluation report will be delayed in submission and that, when submitted, it will fail to present clearly stated and easily utilized conclusions and recommendations. For these and other reasons, project managers are urged to realize that an investment of time early on in producing the best possible scope of work will, in nearly all cases, result in a greater time-and-effort savings later on.

For the majority of evaluations currently referred to in AID as "special" or "in-depth", the following is therefore suggested as a general framework for a scope of work most likely to guide the evaluation team in producing a report useful to both project managers and program decision makers. It is suggested that the first version produced be regarded as only preliminary and that it be circulated within the mission for comment to ascertain that it most effectively presents what the mission needs. Project officers are urged, wherever possible, to involve host-country counterparts in developing the scope so that it also meets their needs and involves them in the evaluation process at the earliest possible point.

Country Name

"TITLE OF PROJECT (OR PROPOSED TITLE OF EVALUATION REPORT)"
Scope of Work for Evaluation

I. The Project.* Specify project title, number, cost, and life-of-project dates. Suggest also state briefly what is generally known as agreed upon regarding the present status of the project (e.g., lauded as successful, delayed in implementation, or having completed all major inputs).

II. Purpose and Timing of the Evaluation. This section should specify the following:

*Modify appropriately if evaluation covers more than one project (i.e., a program) or only selected components of a single project. Note that this outline can easily be used as an easy guide for organizing information needed for scopes of work not only for evaluations but also for other similar investigations such as assessments, studies, technical assistance analyses, and so on.

1. Why is the evaluation being done? (To be stated in terms specific to details of the project and mission future activities rather than a generality such as "Terminal", or "To measure progress in meeting project objectives.")
2. When will it be done and why at this time?
3. Who is to do what with its findings and recommendations?

III. Questions the evaluation team will answer. What are the main questions that managers responsible for the project want answers to? What are secondary questions? This section should state "The report of the evaluation should answer the following major questions" and should then list a relatively small number (no more than 5 to 10 maximum) of major (essential) questions that the persons responsible for the project want answers to. (Note that some of the major questions might be expanded upon by subordinate clarifying questions -- e.g., "What are the circumstances responsible for this and how might they be changed?") The scope might then list "Additional (secondary) questions to be answered." Note that the listing of specific, explicit questions with an indication of priorities, is important for getting a report that tells the intended audience what they need to know. (A scope that merely says "The team shall address the following subjects, -- matters, concerns, or issues --" is far more likely to produce a rambling report that does not pinpoint the aspects of the project most needing attention or does not effectively provide useful new information).

If the scope is to specify individual tasks for each team member, this can also be done here (or in section IV as "responsibilities of individual team members").

For most evaluations it is suggested that the questions posed be based on a recognition of the present status of the project (as supportable by documentation) rather than be stated as if nothing is known about the present status. (E.g., not "Were the original assumptions valid?" but "Why have so few of the intended beneficiaries participated in the project and is it possible to increase their participation? And, if so, how?")

IV. Team composition. This section should specify the following:

1. What composition (i.e., host-country government, host-country contractor, USAID, AID/W, U.S. contractor) is required?

2. What expertise and male/female balance is required?

V. Methodology and Procedures. The scope should provide answers to the following:

1. What should be the duration (and time-phasing) of the evaluation? Specify, related to this: -

- a. Whether one or more team members should be available in advance of rest of team (to do preparatory work such as document or data analysis) or to continue after the rest of the team (e.g., to see report through to early finalization), and

- b. If contractors are expected to work (and to be paid) for six day weeks, and

- c. What should be the appropriate division of time between capital city interviews and document review, field site visits, and analysis and report writing?

2. What general methodology will be used? Note specifically:

--How will change be measured? (What data exists for the team to review to determine actual project impact to date or projected future impact?)

3. What documents (e.g., PP, previous evaluations, other donors' reports, sector analyses) should each team member have reviewed and be familiar with prior to beginning the team investigation? (These to be provided by the mission or AID/W.)

VI. Funding. This should include an estimate of the cost of the evaluation as well as a statement as to how the costs will be met (i.e., project funds, PDS funds, or other source).

VII. Reporting requirements

1. Format of the report

The report will contain the following sections:

--Executive Summary (two pages, single spaced, including statement of purpose of the AID project(s) reviewed and of the evaluation);

--Basic Project Identification Data Facsheet (see attached);

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--Statement of conclusions (short and succinct with topic identified by subhead) and recommendations (corresponding to conclusions and worded, whenever possible, to specify who, or which agency, should take the recommended action);

--Body of report (which includes a description of the country context in which the project was developed and which provides the information on which the conclusions and recommendations were based); and

--Appendices as necessary (including, minimally, the evaluation's scope of work and a description of the methodology used and, possibly, methodological recommendations for future evaluations).

2. Submission of report

The scope should specify both what portion or version of the report (e.g., preliminary draft) will be presented to the mission at completion of the field portion of the evaluation and when the final draft will be submitted for mission review. It should also state that the team leader will be responsible for seeing the report through to timely, professional-level, completion.

3. Debriefing(s). Timing and audience(s) to be specified.

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BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

1. Country:
2. Project Title:
3. Project Number (grant and loan where applicable):
4. Project Dates:
 - a. First Project Agreement:
 - b. Final Obligation:
 - c. Project Activity Completion Date (PACD):
5. Project Funding:
 - a. A.I.D. Bilateral Funding (loan or grant):
 - b. Other Major Donors:
 - c. Host Country Counterpart Funds:

TOTAL \$
6. Mode of Implementation (specify contractual arrangements and numbers):
7. Project Design (A.I.D. and contractor):
8. Responsible Mission Officials:
 - a. Mission Director (s):
 - b. Project Officer(s):
9. Previous Evaluation and Reviews
(include title, type, and date):
10. Cost of Present Evaluation:
 - a. Direct Hire:
 - b. Contract:
 - c. Other:

TOTAL \$

**U.S. ASSISTANCE TO
THE FAMILY PLANNING AND POPULATION PROGRAM
IN BANGLADESH
1972 - 1980**

**Report of a Program Evaluation
Conducted By:**

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October 27 - November 22, 1980

With the Assistance of the American Public Health Association

**U.S. Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C. and Dacca, Bangladesh**

April 1981

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"short form" of the report. Can be detached to stand alone for those who do not have time or need to read the full report

Intended primarily for decision-makers (others) unfamiliar with the project context and country constraints

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*1) can be
3) Circulated independent*

A small number of major conclusions

Additional conclusions related to the major ones but of secondary importance in terms of the importance of the evaluation

Each item here keyed to items in Part II. is the discussion that presents the information and evidence on which the conclusions and recommendations are based.

See cable (State 063232, 3/8/80) which presents guidance and rationale for using this format.

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Problem and Overview. Bangladesh faces a demographic crisis of greater magnitude than nearly any other country today. It is one of the world's poorest yet most populous nations with 90 million people crowded into an area only the size of Wisconsin. Among this largely malnourished and illiterate population, 90 percent is rural, 50 percent of rural dwellers are landless, and landlessness is increasing. Demand for labor has risen by only 1.2 percent per annum in recent years while the population has been growing at 2.8 percent. Under Bangladesh's president Ziaur Rahman, and with the assistance of AID and other foreign donors, commitment to lowering fertility has been strong. Nevertheless, investments have as yet failed to have the desired impact in lowering the growth rate. Despite indications of desire of individual Bangladeshis to limit their family size, the government's family planning program has been relatively ineffective achieving a national rate of prevalence of contraceptive use of less than 13 percent. Yet, unless rapid population growth can be brought under control all other development efforts to benefit Bangladesh's very poor majority will have been in vain.

U.S. Assistance. Since 1972 U.S. population assistance to Bangladesh has totaled some \$48 million in the form of relief and rehabilitation funds, two bilateral projects, and intermediary projects centrally-funded by AID/Washington. The stated purpose of AID's bilateral project of FY 1973-75 was "to help the BDG (Bangladesh government) make available basic contraceptives to as many eligible couples as possible and to institutionalize family planning delivery services on a national basis." Its longer-range goal was expressed as "(1) to slow population growth by reducing fertility rates to replacement level with low birth and death rates in 30 years, or as soon thereafter as possible, and (2) to reduce the annual population growth rate from an estimated 3 percent to 2.8 percent over the (BDG's) five-year plan period ending June 1978." The stated purpose of the bilateral project of FY 1976-80 has been "to develop a functioning national institutional structure providing family planning services and population/family planning information and education on a continuing basis to the people of Bangladesh." This project had a less specific goal, namely, "to reduce the rate of natural population growth as a critical factor in social and economic development."

Purpose of the Present Evaluation. Despite several internal evaluations and evaluative studies focused on specific components of the program, no comprehensive, external evaluation had been undertaken as of 1980 when plans were being made for three additional years of AID support at a cost of about \$65 million. This evaluation was therefore scheduled with the following purposes: (1) to assess AID's performance to date in helping to reduce fertility in Bangladesh, (2) to make recommendations for improved effectiveness in proposed new family planning and population activities in Bangladesh, and (3) to make recommendations for improved effectiveness of AID family planning assistance elsewhere. The evaluation was timed so that its findings and recommendations would be available prior to the review and finalization of USAID/Dacca's new project paper.

AID Accomplishments. AID has been the principal donor of contraceptive supplies and of family planning training for Bangladeshis, which began under the first bilateral project and without which the BDG would not have been able to begin nationwide delivery of family planning services. At the same time, through its centrally-funded intermediary organizations, AID succeeded in launching an experimental community-based distribution project, research on the effectiveness of various contraceptives under Bangladeshi conditions, and a commercial contraceptive sales network that has made pills and condoms readily available throughout the country. Under the second project, AID has continued to be the major provider of contraceptive supplies while providing for the nationwide introduction of voluntary sterilization services and the launching of additional private-sector community-based distribution projects. Also during this time, USAID/Dacca initiated an operations research program and an innovative project to give Bangladesh's family planning field supervisors practical training in Indonesia.

Effectiveness. AID has been an effective supporter of the Bangladesh program even while it has been only partially successful in meeting its stated project objectives. A "national institutional structure providing family planning services and population/family planning information and education on a continuing basis" has been established, but it has yet to begin to function effectively. Fieldworkers are not well trained nor highly motivated. Organizational issues stemming from the latest attempt to integrate the family planning and health systems will have to be resolved and fieldworker training and supervision vastly improved before either AID's project goals or those of the BDG will be met. Numerous private voluntary organizations, several supported by AID, have proven much more effective although among smaller target populations. AID is praised by Bangladeshis and other donors for USAID/Dacca's competent and cooperative population officers, provision of contraceptives, medical kits, and participant training opportunities, and the ability to rapidly make available high-quality short-term consultants. USAID/Dacca and AID/Washington's Office of Population have played crucial complementary roles in providing this support. AID is faulted for providing only the Norinyl brand of oral contraceptives and for impeding Bangladesh's attempts to meet the active demand for menstrual regulation services which often serve as a means of introducing more effective contraception.

Major Recommendations for Immediate Consideration

1. The USAID/Dacca plan to revise its portfolio to give population planning first priority should be vigorously supported by AID/Washington.
2. In order to effectively implement the greatly expanded measures proposed for its new project, organizational and staffing changes should be made within USAID/Dacca. Ideally, an Office of Population Planning should be established headed by an assistant mission director. Alternatively, the present Population, Health, and Women's Division should become a Population Division and undertake only activities that directly support the mission priority on reducing population growth.
3. Conditions precedent or covenants for the project agreement for the proposed new project should include specification of minimal criteria for the BDG sterilization surveillance agreement. Additional conditions or covenants are also suggested.

BASIC PROGRAM IDENTIFICATION DATA

1. **Country:** Bangladesh
2. **Bilateral project titles:** "Bangladesh Population/Family Planning"
3. **Bilateral project numbers:** 388-11-580-0001 and 388-0001
4. **Program implementation:**
 - a. First project agreement: FY 73
 - b. Final obligation: Ongoing
 - c. Final input delivery: Ongoing
5. **U.S. contributions to program funding:**
 - a. A.I.D. bilateral funding: \$40.9 million (grants, FY 73-80)
 - b. Other funding: \$8 million (approximate)
(Relief and Rehabilitation funds plus AID/Washington centrally-funded intermediary organizations)
6. **Mode of implementation:**
 - a. Project Agreements between USAID/Dacca and Bangladesh Ministry of Health and Population Control;
 - b. Centrally-funded agreements between AID/Washington (Office of Population) and selected population intermediaries; and
 - c. Agreement between USAID/Dacca and Population Services International
7. **Responsible mission officials:**
 - a. Mission directors: Anthony Schwarzwalder 1972-74, Joseph Toner 1974-79, and Frank Kimball 1979-present;
 - b. Responsible project officers: Michael Jordan 1972-77, Dallas Voran 1973-77, Charles Gurney 1977-present, and John Dumm 1977-present.
8. **Previous evaluations and reviews:**
 - a. Project Appraisal Report (PAR), June 27, 1975;
 - b. Project Appraisal Report (PAR), February 18, 1977;
 - c. "First Annual Joint BDG-USG Population/Family Planning Program Review, 17-18 February, 1977;" and
 - d. Project Evaluation Summary covering period 2/77 to 2/78.
9. **Host country exchange rates:**
 - a. Name of currency: Taka
 - b. Exchange rate at time of project: 15 taka = U.S. \$1.

Part II

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The major findings and conclusions of the present evaluation are summarized here, each followed immediately, where appropriate, by one or more recommendations that derive from the respective conclusion or "finding." In Part V below, sections with corresponding headings present details upon which these findings and conclusions are based.*

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Impact of the Bangladesh Program.* Ultimately, a successful population program is one that produces a demographic impact (actual reduction in the population growth rate) leading thereafter to a socioeconomic impact (a better standard of living for the majority of the population) and a viable, self-sustaining economy. In Bangladesh, the population and family planning program has not yet begun to have this ultimate demographic impact. Prevalence of contraceptive use has increased, however, from approximately 8.3 percent of married couples of reproductive age in 1975-76 to about 12.66 percent by mid-1979, and there has been a slight decrease in the crude birth rate making for an estimated 2.4 million births averted during 1976-1980. Evidence suggests that the population and family planning program is one of the leading causes of this decline. Prevalence levels above 30 percent have been achieved by intensive community-based distribution projects, which demonstrates that much more can be accomplished with the right mix of inputs--supervision, training, community participation, and commodity support.

2. Political Commitment of the Bangladesh Government. The commitment of the government of Bangladesh to a policy of energetic fertility control is strong and unequivocal at the pinnacle of government with President Ziaur Rahman forthrightly taking the lead in setting the tone for policy and exhorting the bureaucracy and citizenry to reduce fertility. This commitment is

*Throughout this report "program," when used without further specification, means the total effort in Bangladesh to reduce fertility through both governmental and non-governmental promotion of family planning as well as "beyond family planning" developmental activities such as female income-generating projects or integrated rural development schemes. Where reference is to the government (i.e., national) program per se, this will be made explicit.

also pervasive within the Planning Commission where the need for unambiguous "population control" and ambitious targets to reduce fertility form a central part of the 1980-85 Five-Year Plan. Nevertheless, the well-articulated policy of the President has yet to be effectively acted on by the various parts of the bureaucracy charged with implementation.

Recommendation: USAID, the Embassy, and AID/Washington should continue to provide reinforcing support for senior policymakers in the Office of the President, the Planning Commission, and the Ministry of Health and Population Control in their efforts to maintain a strong fertility control policy and should strive to develop means to reward this commitment and especially its translation into action. In particular, USAID should indicate that it is prepared to offer technical assistance to the BDG in conceptualizing and implementing innovative measures in "beyond family planning."

3. Effectiveness of the BDG Program. The government program is still of limited effectiveness in promoting and delivering family planning services. In large part this is due to the general handicaps under which any national BDG program suffers: the grappling for a "right" path in the highly politicized environment of this nation only eight years old, over-centralized and administratively weak bureaucracies, the lack of a "serve-the-people" orientation among government workers, a weak physical infrastructure, traditional political patronage relationships, and a widespread fatalism among the peasantry expressed as the "will of Allah." In addition, the program has suffered from disruptions and staff disgruntlement through repeated reorganization. First it was a "vertical" program, then integrated with health, then "disintegrated," and now again reorganizing to become "integrated" once more. Despite this, it seems generally regarded as one of the most effective of all of the government's programs. A functioning national infrastructure providing family planning services and family planning information is now in place. What remains is to energize it.

4. Effectiveness of AID Support. While AID has not fully succeeded in meeting all the ambitious goals and purposes stated in its project papers, it has been effective in its provision of support. AID was the first donor to have a staff person working full-time on Bangladesh population problems (1972), to develop a major project in support of the national program (1973), and to supply contraceptives on a large scale (1973). AID is praised for having had competent Dacca-based population officers able to work effectively with both the Bangladeshis and other donor representatives. AID/Washington's Office of Population has also played an important role through its intermediaries and its reliable provision of contraceptives and medical supply kits as well as high-quality short-term

technical advisors. AID support to the BOG program will not succeed in producing a demographic impact, however, until the program's service delivery elements become more effective or unless AID is able to channel resources in ways least likely to be thwarted by the lethargy and bottlenecks of the government program.

5. AID Funded Intermediary and Private Organizations. Achievements in the private sector by AID-funded U.S. intermediary and private organizations have been impressive and of a scale probably unmatched in any other AID-assisted country. The presence and roles of the intermediaries are well-accepted by the government and the people they serve. Their enhancement of community participation is exemplary; their service, standard-setting, training, and ability to undertake innovative activities constitute an essential mix of actions highly complementary to government programs. Both USAID/Dacca and AID/Washington's Office of Population deserve high marks for their skillful and facilitative management of this important cluster of resources.

Recommendations: AID should continue to fund and guide private-sector organizations into areas that bolster the government program or where high prevalence rates (e.g. 25-40 percent) are likely to be achieved. All AID-funded organizations with community-based distribution programs should be required to adopt the "prevalence programming" tool (see below and also Appendix F) as a measure of performance and goal setting. Assuming it proves workable, this experience should demonstrate applicability of prevalence programming to the government program and hasten its wider adoption.

USAID and AID/Washington should again explore with the Syntex Corporation the development of special packaging for both the "Maya" and low-dose "Ovacon" oral contraceptives supplied by AID through the Social Marketing Project.

6. USAID-Proposed Project for FY 81-83. The evaluation team endorses the new Project Paper and its assistance strategy for the period, FY 1981-83. Successful implementation, however, will require greater commitment and effort by both USAID/Dacca and AID/W than comparable projects in more rapidly modernizing countries (e.g., Thailand and the Philippines).

Recommendations: The following concerns should be specifically addressed in the subsequent project agreement, either as covenants or as formal understandings within implementation letters:

a. Minimal criteria for surveillance of voluntary sterilization activities including service standards and provisions to assure compliance;

b. Completion of an emergency contraceptive resupply action before the next monsoon;

c. That those NGOs/PVOs funded by USAID which service discrete geographic areas be required to implement the prevalence programming tool.

It is further suggested that USAID continue to tranche population funds on at least a year-by-year basis and do so specifically contingent upon successful implementation of the sterilization portion of the agreement; the mission should also consider tranching funds according to a more frequent (e.g., semi-annual) review schedule. As stated elsewhere, if the project is to be implemented with maximal effectiveness, it is essential that the population staff be expanded with the recruitment of a public health physician being first priority. Finally, AID/Washington should be prepared to support creative re-programming, by USAID/Dacca, of project funds to meet program needs and targets of opportunity that are not manifest at this time but that arise during the next three years.

OTHER CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7. Population Growth and Fertility Reduction Goals. Virtually all development goals adopted by the BDG under President Zia are intentionally set perhaps unrealistically high, the belief being that this is necessary to energize people to bring about the progress that is realistically achievable. Thus, the government's ambitious population growth reduction goals, desirable as they may be, are almost certain to be unachievable. However, in part because they are perceived to be unrealistic, service delivery staff tend to ignore them. Already field staff do not appear to take very seriously targets that have been assigned them. To the extent that actual economic planning and investment decisions are based on these unrealistic assumptions and projections of population change, serious misallocations of resources could result and the entire development planning mechanism could be distorted, proven faulty and, over time, lose credibility.

Recommendation: USAID, in consort with other principal donors (especially the World Bank and the UNFPA) should consider once again engaging in a dialogue with the BDG at appropriate senior levels of the Planning Commission, the Ministry of Health and Population Control, and the Office of the President to urge an overhaul and revision of growth rate goals, targets for program achievement, and future population size projections.

8. Target-Setting and Program Performance Management. Much confusion exists among field personnel about how to distinguish

between "cumulative new acceptors" and "current users" (or prevalence). This contributes to a major shortcoming of the national program namely that inadequate attention is given to increasing the numbers of actual contraceptive users. Too often the recruitment of new acceptors assumes nearly exclusive priority while followup actions are neglected. Related to this is the serious and almost universal underestimation at all field levels of current population size and the present number of eligible couples. Typically, program managers are relying for both on 1974 census figures, which understate both population size and the number of eligible couples by approximately 21 percent.

Recommendations:

- a. National goals for reduced growth rates (at all organizational levels) need to be translated into goals for increasing the prevalence of contraceptive use. USAID/Dacca should consistently seek means to have this come about.
- b. Management and field staff at all levels need to be trained to use prevalence as a measure of program performance. USAID could initiate this at once, for example, by including instruction about prevalence concepts into the Indonesian training program for Bangladesh field supervisors. (The Western Consortium group contracted by UNFPA for fieldworker training could also be a primary technical assistance and field training resource for this action.)
- c. Estimates of population size and eligible couples must be updated from 1974 figures so that all levels of the service delivery systems are equipped with current target numbers. (The suggestion that this revision be delayed until the 1981 census results are available should be rejected because these results will not be in hand until at least 1982 by which time the currently used data will be eight years out of date.) Eligible couple registers should also be updated in tandem with this exercise, but only after field staff have been given new eligible couple estimates and trained in prevalence programming. The preparation of new estimates of population size and estimates of eligible couples could be quickly accomplished with electronic hand or desk calculators at the central level and distributed to the field.

9. Logistics. Commodity management continues to receive inadequate government attention at all levels. The position of Deputy Director for procurement in the Ministry of Health and Population Control has been vacant for more than 12 months and experienced central staff are lacking. Supplies at district and thana (sub-district) levels are typically less than recommended -- often less than one month's supply -- and funds

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frequently are unavailable for moving stocks from district warehouses to thana storerooms. Meanwhile, the three central warehouses periodically are filled beyond capacity seriously constraining commodity movement operations.

Recommendation: An emergency resupply action needs to be carried out nationwide during the next three months (before the six-month monsoon season begins), as was agreed to by the Secretary for Population Control and Family Planning in November, 1980. This should bring district and thana supply levels up to standard (3 months supply at each). At the same time, supply management forms should again be distributed, field supervisors ("TFPOs") and store-keepers again instructed in how to maintain adequate stock levels, and "first in, first out" procedures reinforced. The warehouse situation also immediately requires remedy. The Chittagong warehouse is now so full that withdrawal of older stocks is impossible. If one third or so of the present stock can be moved out during the next two or three months, then additional warehouse space would not be required. The warehouse staff should also be quickly brought to full strength.

10. Inadequacy of Training and Supervision

a. Paramedics. "Family welfare visitors" (FWVs)--clinic-based female MCH paramedics--are the major clinical support personnel in the sterilization program and are also responsible for IUD insertion. (There are now 1,500 FWVs who have completed an 18-month course following matriculation, the equivalent of 10th grade.) While they have considerable factual knowledge, they receive so little hands-on clinical experience during their training that many are unable to do the tasks specified in their job descriptions.

Recommendation: USAID should monitor the planned FWV re-training for its prompt initiation, practical control, clinical experience under supervision, and certification of actual skills--as distinct from knowledge--at conclusion; at a minimum this necessitates that USAID devote special attention to the support and monitoring of training that is envisaged as part of the CARE component of its proposed new project. So that more extensive actual clinical experience can be inserted into FWV training, it is suggested that their training include internships in both ob-gyn and pediatric wards of busy hospitals.

b. Fieldworkers. Fieldworkers ("FWAs," "FPAs," and "FWWs"), now over some 30,000 in number, represent a major failure in the delivery system thus far. Their training has not been sufficiently practical and their supervision is too half-hearted to render them a motivated effective corps of promoters of family planning and distributors of pills and condoms.

Recommendation: Given that these fieldworkers have a direct responsibility for what happens to the U.S.-supplied contraceptives, USAID should seek a more active role in encouraging and supporting fieldworker retraining and upgrading for practical skills. AID/Washington should strongly support USAID/Dacca attempts to render both their training and supervision more efficient.

c. Participant Training. Many Bangladeshis in key population posts have had U.S.-based participant training. However, numerous problems related to this training have led to the USAID-BDG phase-out agreement. In its place the BDG and USAID/Dacca have initiated an innovative program to give practical training in Indonesia to Bangladeshi family planning field supervisors. It appears, however, that many of these supervisors do not apply lessons learned once they have returned to Bangladesh.

Recommendation: USAID/Dacca should proceed with the proposed evaluation of the effectiveness of this training and with the "fast-funding" grant procedure also proposed whereby funds would be made available quickly and with a minimum of red-tape, to support promising projects proposed by the field supervisors -- as is done in Indonesia. AID/Washington should support this as a major opportunity to make the field elements of the program more effective (thereby also keeping attention on methods other than sterilization). USAID/Dacca should also consider sponsoring the systematic evaluation of its entire participant training effort.

11. Contraceptive Method Mix. Since July, 1977, pill distribution has remained unchanged while condom distribution has increased 30 percent. Emko (foam) use is small and static. Use of injectibles is small and scattered but expanding. Female sterilization, by those ready to terminate childbearing, is accelerating significantly. IUDs, long unpopular because of the unsatisfactory follow-up of the Lippes Loop, are gaining popularity since introduction of the Copper-T. In all this, however, there is little emphasis on child spacing.

Recommendation: USAID should constantly reiterate the need to motivate younger couples to contracept for spacing. Operations research should be directed at the provision of services to the large 20-to-29 age group.

12. An Oral Contraceptive Choice. Norinyl 1+50, provided by AID is the most widely distributed and used oral contraceptive in Bangladesh. However, there is universal discussion of vague symptoms, real or perceived, that cause a high discontinuation rate soon after acceptance. High continuation rates have been achieved in private sector projects that use active, informed field motivators and supply a small number of maternal and

child health services along with family planning. Nevertheless there is a need for an alternative oral contraceptive that will have the same wide range of distribution as Norinyl 1+50.

Recommendations: AID/Washington should initiate a discussion of an alternate to Norinyl 1+50. Acceptance rates for various formulations of oral contraceptives are available from numerous countries. There are fewer, vague, general complaints about oral contraceptives with estrogen doses below 50 micrograms, although breakthrough bleeding and amenorrhea remain problems. At the same time, USAID/Dacca should take concrete steps to see that the planned retraining of all fieldworkers prepares them to motivate more effectively for family planning and especially to know how to deal with side-effects issues.

13. Sterilization. Sterilization is culturally acceptable to Bangladeshis with an increasing preference being shown for female sterilization. Deaths which have occurred have been thoroughly investigated. With regard to procedures currently employed, surgical skills are acceptable; the areas requiring immediate improvement are the anesthetic regimen, aseptic technique, preoperative screening, and postoperative surveillance. While no surgical procedure is without risk, in Bangladesh today the risks a woman regularly incurs through childbirth and abortion are much greater than the relative risks of sterilization.

Recommendation: USAID and other donors should assist the BDG to improve the quality of sterilization services. Priorities recommended, in order of importance are:

- a. Insuring a better anesthetic regimen for female sterilization (to include preoperative sedation-analgesia program, local anesthetic field block technique, and patient monitoring);
- b. Aseptic technique improvement, especially instrument preparation and handling;
- c. More careful preoperative screening to rule out high risk clients; and
- d. Better immediate postoperative surveillance of women recovering from tubectomies.

To the extent that AID becomes more actively involved in the sterilization program, the following should be considered:

a. Preoperative Evaluation (Screening). A sampling of the physical examination charts, an on-site survey of examinations being performed, and a random check of actual weights and blood

pressure measurements were conducted during the evaluation. Omissions and inaccuracies of significant importance to the quality of preoperative screening were identified. The potential impact in an expanded program is an increase in morbidity and mortality of clients volunteering for sterilization.

Recommendations: USAID should encourage the BDG to take measures to ensure that paramedics ("FWVs") responsible for preoperative evaluation are retrained to improve their clinical skills. History-taking, weighing, taking of vital signs, and physical examination skills should be reviewed. FWVs should pass a standardized practical test of these skills for accuracy, completeness, and timeliness before returning to the field.

b. Laboratory Evaluation. A sampling of laboratory examination reports, an on-site survey of laboratory work being conducted, and a random check of hemoglobin measurements were conducted. Again omissions and inaccuracies were identified that could contribute to increased morbidity and mortality.

Recommendation: USAID should encourage the BDG to ensure that personnel responsible for laboratory work pass a practical examination to verify their ability to perform the tests within a standard of error acceptable for the procedure.- In addition an on-site survey of laboratory tools and supplies should be conducted and periodically re-checked.

c. Aseptic Technique. Aseptic technique is a chain of steps no stronger than its weakest link. A sampling of busy sterilization units at work revealed breaks in technique during preparation and delivery of instruments and linen packs to the operating theater.

Recommendation: USAID should encourage the BDG to ensure the regular on-site observation of persons responsible for maintenance and handling of instruments, gloves, and linen packs. Their precise management of sterile and nonsterile but clean materials, boiling of instruments, and autoclaving of packs should be monitored from beginning to end. A recurrent review of the number and condition of sterilization units should ensure that there are enough instruments to permit time for cleaning and sterilization before the demand for re-use.

d. Number of Clients. At several busy sterilization centers, the patient load exceeds the capacity of the physical facilities and operators to provide quality care.

Recommendation: USAID should seek means to ensure that the BDG attempts to enforce its limitation of 12 procedures

to be performed by one operator per day. The BDG should also be encouraged to provide better pre- and postoperative areas and sleeping accommodations.

e. Supervision of Sterilization Units

Recommendation: If AID is to give increased support to sterilization, the surveillance component specified as a condition precedent in the new project paper must be carefully worked out and implemented. USAID should request the BDG representatives to clarify the chain of command extending from the district level to the site of operations. Specific responsibilities should be clearly stated. Where positions or responsibility are unoccupied, a time schedule for appointment should be agreed upon and an alternative supervisor named. On-site observations by members of the chain of command should be regularly scheduled. A plan should also be made for unannounced periodic third-party surveys. Survey teams should be made up of Bangladeshi professionals who would have the power to correct as well as observe procedures. An expatriate advisor should be an ex-officio member of the team.

A schedule of rewards for meeting goals and technical proficiency could be announced to recognize units and individuals who perform exceptionally well. Consideration should also be given to announcing a schedule of censures so that personnel can be encouraged to improve below average performance of duties.

f. Tubectomy vs. Vasectomy. Over the last four years the number of tubectomies has increased by a factor of three while the number of vasectomies has decreased by a factor of four. (In 1977, 66,000 vasectomies were performed while in the first six months of 1980 only 8,400 were done.)

Recommendation: USAID should request the BDG to initiate intensive client motivation and physician training activities to reactivate male sterilization as a viable program method. Attention should be directed to methods of communication which will reach and be understood by illiterate, rural men.

14. USAID/Dacca Population Staffing .

a. U.S. Staff. The mission has not been adequately staffed to simultaneously and fully meet the objectives of the present bilateral project while at the same time coordinating, in the most effective manner possible, the numerous centrally-funded project activities that have been important elements in establishing contraceptive availability and acceptance in Bangladesh. The mission's Division of Population, Health, and Women has

four U.S. direct-hire officers but only two work full-time on population. The present staffing pattern is even more inadequate for the task of getting the maximum impact from the increased number and greater programmatic as well as medical complexity of the activities proposed for FY 81-83 funding. This is especially serious given the centrality of sterilization in the proposed new project and the fact that USAID/Dacca's stated program strategy has recognized the need to place first priority on population.

Recommendations: The USAID/Dacca plan to revise its assistance portfolio to give population planning first priority should be endorsed and vigorously supported by AID/Washington. To effectively implement the expanded scope of family planning service delivery and "beyond family planning" measures outlined for the extremely complex new project, organizational and staffing changes should be made within USAID/Dacca. For greatest likelihood of effectiveness, it is specifically recommended that an Office of Population Planning be established headed by an Assistant Mission Director. Additional key staff would include 1) a deputy and senior population officer for service delivery, 2) a public health physician responsible for support to maternal child health and voluntary sterilization services, 3) a population advisor responsible for integrating population concerns into agricultural extension, education, women's programs, and rural development, and 4) an assistant population advisor to work with private sector grantees. Recognizing that USAID/Dacca's senior full-time population officer is scheduled to rotate soon to another post, it is essential that AID/Washington actively seek a high-quality replacement. Recognizing also that AID now has difficulty finding, in-house, population officers qualified and willing to take responsibility overseas for managing assistance to population programs, it is strongly urged that AID/Washington develop a plan for again building up its personnel strength, and thus competence, in population planning and program implementation.

b. Bangladeshi Staff. USAID/Dacca is serving as a talent identification and training ground for young Bangladeshi professionals who are subsequently hired away at much higher salaries by foreign firms, other foreign donors, and even by AID-funded intermediaries. Two valuable foreign-service-national (FSN) population officers have already been lost in this way and there is nothing to suggest that the most recently-recruited Bangladeshi professionals will not be similarly hired away.

Recommendation: Washington should recognize the false economy of a FSN salary scale set so far below that of competing organizations that USAID/Dacca cannot retain many of the talented people it recruits and should seek

to bring about a more realistic recalculation of the FSN salary schedule. To remedy this, the next local salary survey in Dacca should also include the plethora of U.N. agencies which have been excluded from the Department of State-sponsored survey even though, in Bangladesh, they--the U.N. agencies--are major employers of scarce technical and professional talent exceeding by far employment levels of the U.S. government.

15. Beyond Family Planning. Bangladesh's demographic crisis is already of such great proportions that efforts to strengthen family planning service delivery should simultaneously be accompanied by a range of small-to-large scale "beyond family planning" initiatives, which USAID/Dacca is now contemplating. Receptivity exists at government levels and many small-scale government and private sector projects are already experimenting with alternative approaches to achieving fertility reduction.

Recommendation: AID/Washington should give full, active support to USAID/Dacca's expressed plan to develop a FY 83 portfolio in which the majority of new project activity is designed in such a way as to contribute to fertility reduction. USAID/Dacca should continue to proceed swiftly with this "portfolio reorientation" via both its operations research mechanism and by enlisting appropriate outside technical expertise.

16. Donor Coordination. Effective cooperation has evolved during the past three years among AID, the World Bank, and UNFPA (the three major donors supporting the Bangladesh program). This has been due in large part to the personal efforts, qualifications, and high professional competence of the three donors' Dacca-based population advisors. The three advisors now routinely share information, work together to avoid duplication, and, when appropriate, adopt common positions on program issues requiring government attention. At six-month intervals, a larger assembly of donors is convened at a "Local Consultative Group Meeting" and periodically less formal meetings take place among UNFPA, Bank, and AID headquarters' staffs in the United States. From the field perspective, problems in this area have arisen due to the large number of Bank missions and with IDCA's directive to USAID/Dacca to monitor Bank proposals (the so-called "early warning system").

Recommendations: The focal point for donor coordination should remain in Dacca where donor representatives have more current knowledge of program issues than their respective headquarters' staffs. Headquarters representatives should take specific steps to minimize the flow of separate and special evaluation and appraisal missions which consume an inordinately large part of senior Ministry of Health and Population Control staff time. Specifically, if concerns

over the future course of the voluntary sterilization program merit further special attention by donors, combined donor missions should be considered as more appropriate than several separate ones. Also, if "beyond family planning" strategies are to be explored, combined donor representation could be desirable. Previous combined missions in Egypt, Sri Lanka, and Thailand are useful precedents to consider.