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SUMMARY REPORT ON AID ASSISTANCE
TO DEVELOP LIVESTOCK IN THE
SAHEL

Audit Report
No. 7-625-86-3

October 17, 1985

memorandum

October 17, 1985

DATE:

REPLY TO
ATTN OF:John P. Competello 
Regional Inspector General for Audit/West Africa

SUBJECT: Summary Report on AID Assistance to Develop Livestock in the Sahel--Audit Report No. 7-625-86-3 dated October 17, 1985

TO: Mr. Mark Edelman
Assistant Administrator, Africa Bureau

This report presents a summary of the results of audit of four AID-assisted livestock projects in the Sahel. The audit was made to identify causes of common problems found in individual projects and to recommend improvements.

The report concludes that design and implementation problems limited the benefits of AID assistance. Design problems were largely due to faulty assumptions based on an earlier Sahel development strategy. These included inadequate consideration of the impact of drought in these countries, and insufficient market analysis for increases in livestock production. Also, Missions did not take action to correct implementation problems and projects continued, making little or no progress. In general, Missions had not systematically reevaluated project assumptions, measured progress against objectives nor evaluated project results.

Recommendations were made to you in a draft of this report to improve project design by incorporating drought and market analysis into Sahel development strategy, and improve project implementation through increased Mission awareness of the common problems reported.

We find your comments and actions taken on the recommendations fully responsive, and consider them closed upon issuance of this report. Particular notice was made of your intent to simplify project design and increase the number of management indicators. Future audits will consider how this strategy is implemented.

Again, I very much appreciate your interest and support for our reviews.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

During 1984-1985, the Office of the Regional Inspector General for Audit/West Africa reported on four livestock projects in Mali, Niger, and Senegal which accounted for about \$48 million of the \$67 million obligated by AID as of March 1985 for livestock projects in the Sahel. The reports disclosed limited project results primarily due to faulty design and implementation problems, and included recommendations to the Missions responsible for monitoring the projects. Corrective action has been taken or is in progress on these recommendations.

This summary report addresses the causes of these problems and how (1) AID strategic planning in the Sahel could be improved to foster better project design, and (2) project implementation could be strengthened.

The Sahel is characterized by low and variable rainfall and recurrent droughts lasting from one to several years. In 1973, a drought devastated livestock production. Up to 50 percent of the herds perished with some herders losing everything. Coupled with losses in crop production, famine resulted. The international community spent about \$1 billion in emergency aid for food and rehabilitation. Realizing such costs inevitably would recur unless Sahelian countries were better prepared, the donor countries developed a long term strategy to provide sustained resources to the Sahel. In line with this and with its own strategy, AID initiated projects to intervene in the livestock subsector.

The review of AID assistance showed that livestock projects were poorly designed, largely because the early Sahel development strategy, on which they were modeled, included several unsound assumptions. As a result project assumptions were also flawed, making it impractical, if not impossible, for these projects to succeed.

In revising its strategy in 1984, AID made good use of the lessons learned on previous projects. However, the reviews showed development strategy and subsequent project design could have been improved by better recognizing (1) the impact of drought on development projects, and (2) the capability of Sahelian markets to absorb increases in livestock production. The audits found the lack of adequate drought planning was a significant factor impeding the Niger and Senegal livestock projects during 1983 and 1984 when drought again struck the Sahel. Also, the lack of capability of markets to absorb increases in production greatly undermined the effectiveness of the Mali and Senegal projects.

Project implementation was hampered because the Missions did not systematically reevaluate project assumptions and revise objectives and implementation plans. Since some assumptions were based on invalid strategic planning, their reevaluation as the projects continued was crucial if the projects were to have a chance to succeed.

Implementation problems were compounded because the Missions did not measure progress against project objectives and failed to evaluate results and take timely corrective action. As a result, projects were continued notwithstanding little progress.

This report includes recommendations that the Assistant Administrator, Africa Bureau (1) require the design of livestock projects to include the impact analysis of drought and marketing capability, and (2) reemphasize the need for Missions to periodically reevaluate project design assumptions, measure project results, and amend project objectives and implementation plans.

The Africa Bureau agreed with the findings and recognized that the problems reported by this audit will not be overcome in the short term and will require continuous attention. On August 5 1985, the Assistant Administrator of the Bureau instructed AID/AFR principal officers to adopt the report recommendations for livestock as well as agricultural and other Bureau projects. The recommendations are considered closed upon issuance of this report.

Office of the Inspector General

SUMMARY REPORT ON AID ASSISTANCE
TO DEVELOP LIVESTOCK IN THE SAHEL

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SUMMARY REPORT ON AID ASSISTANCE
TO DEVELOP LIVESTOCK IN THE SAHEL

PART I - INTRODUCTION

A. Background

The Sahel is a semi-arid zone of about two million square miles which includes eight of the world's poorest countries: Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, the Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal. The region is characterized by low and variable rainfall and droughts lasting from one to several years.

A drought in the early 1970's devastated livestock production--the second most important agricultural economic activity in the Sahel. Up to 50 percent of the cattle perished. Some herders lost everything. Coupled with the drought's impact on crop production, famine resulted. To alleviate suffering, the international community spent an estimated \$1 billion in emergency aid for food and rehabilitation.

Realizing such costs inevitably would recur unless the Sahelian countries were better prepared, donor countries developed a comprehensive strategy to provide sustained resources to the long-term development of the Sahel. Part of this strategy centered on the development of the livestock industry.

AID began assisting livestock in the Sahel in 1973 and as of March 1985 had obligated about \$67 million for livestock projects. AID relied on host country governments to implement the projects through their institutions. AID overseas Missions monitored the projects to ensure they were implemented effectively, and that the funds were spent in accordance with AID regulations.

In 1980, AID formalized the Sahel-wide strategy which had guided project designers since 1974. To provide future guidance for AID-assisted projects, AID revised this strategy in April 1984.

In 1984 the Sahel was in the midst of a worsening drought which started in 1982 and had reached proportions of the drought of the 1970's. Cattle losses were significant. Again the Sahel appealed for help and donors responded, including the United States.

B. Audit Objectives and Scope

During 1984-1985, the Office of the Inspector General for Audit/West Africa reported on four livestock projects in Mali, Niger and Senegal (see Exhibits I and II). They were:

- the Senegal Range and Livestock Project (Bakel)
- the SODESP Livestock Development Project (SODESP)
- the Mali Livestock Sector II Project (Mali)
- the Niger Integrated Livestock Production Project (Niger)

These projects accounted for about \$48 million of the \$67 million obligated by AID for livestock projects in the Sahel at March 31, 1985.

The reports disclosed limited results largely due to faulty design and implementation problems and included recommendations to the Missions responsible for monitoring the projects. Corrective actions are in process on these recommendations. This summary report addresses the causes of these problems and how:

- AID strategic planning in the Sahel could be improved to foster better project design; and,
- project implementation could be improved.

Audit scope was limited to reviewing the three audit reports covering the four projects and analyzing support documentation. The auditors reviewed files pertinent to the AID Sahel development strategy from 1974 to 1985 and interviewed AID officials.

The review was made in accordance with generally accepted U.S. government audit standards for program results audits.

SUMMARY REPORT ON AID ASSISTANCE TO
DEVELOP LIVESTOCK IN THE SAHEL

PART II - RESULTS OF AUDIT

A. Findings and Recommendations

1. Improved Sahel Livestock Strategy Can Lead to Better Project Design

Livestock projects were poorly designed, largely because the early Sahel development strategy, on which they were modeled, included several unsound assumptions. As a result, project assumptions were flawed making it impractical, if not impossible, for these projects to succeed.

AID revised its development strategy in 1984 making good use of the lessons learned on previous projects. However, project design and development strategy could be improved by better recognizing (1) the impact of drought on development projects and (2) the capability of Sahelian markets to absorb increases in livestock production.

Recommendation No. 1

We recommend the Assistant Administrator, Africa Bureau require (a) the design of livestock projects include the impact analysis of drought and marketing capability, and (b) these factors be incorporated in the current Sahel Country Development Strategy Statement.

Discussion

Several design assumptions crucial to the success of the four livestock projects reviewed were invalid. Guided largely by the early Sahel development strategy, project designers assumed (1) livestock population in the project zone could be controlled to balance with available forage and water, (2) no drought would occur during the life of the project, and (3) livestock production increases could be marketed.

Overall guidance for project design originated from the Sahel Development Strategy formalized in 1980. Livestock strategy emphasized rebuilding the herds destroyed by drought through increased livestock production, water development, range management, health programs, large feedlot operations and marketing systems.

The strategy assumed (1) seasonal migration of herds and herders could be reduced by developing adequate forage and water resources in the project zone, (2) cattle ranges could be

controlled, (3) feedlot operations could be effective, (4) herd management could be more efficient, and (5) the private sector could be more effective in marketing cattle. Although overall Sahel strategy recognized the potential for prolonged drought there was no provision to deal with it in the livestock subsector. The strategy also provided for the modernization of marketing, but did not adequately consider the capability of the market to absorb increased production.

Experience soon proved interventions based on some of these assumptions were not successful. A 1980 Inspector General audit report^{1/} noted that large feedlot operations or attempts to control livestock in ranch type operations were neither economical nor effective.

The more recent reviews of four livestock projects disclosed (1) cattle ranges and seasonal migration could not be controlled, (2) without drought contingency planning project benefits were soon lost, and (3) increases in livestock production could not be fully marketed.

Assuming Livestock Could Be Controlled

The Bakel and SODESP projects in Senegal proposed to sustain livestock growth and concurrently protect natural resources in the project zone. This was only feasible under the assumption made by project designers that the number of livestock in the project zone could be controlled to balance with available forage and water.

The audits found this assumption faulty because the range control component of the project could not be successfully implemented. For example, in Senegal the project zones were public domain accessible to sedentary and transient herders. In 1983, the Government of Senegal estimated over 150,000 cattle from Mauritania passed through northern Senegal, in part through the SODESP project zone. The Bakel project contemplated changing the legal status of the project area to set aside the land, but provided no means of enforcement.

If AID is to undertake projects which include control of livestock population, it must find means to protect the zone from outside migration. Without better protection as experienced in Senegal, such interventions will fail.

Assuming No Drought

The 1983 and 1984 droughts devastated the livestock projects in Niger and Senegal. Livestock losses were considerable and

^{1/} Audit report No. 80-67, dated June 6, 1980, "Problems in Implementing AID's Livestock Sector Project Activities in Mali"

project activities were severely disrupted. The limited increases in livestock population achieved by the projects were wiped out and the herders' well-being jeopardized. Had a drought contingency plan^{1/} been included in the planning process, these disruptions might have been less. Conditions found at three projects reviewed illustrate.

In the Bakel area the livestock needed water, but forage was available. In the SODESP area there was no forage, but deep wells provided water. During 1984, lack of forage or water created an exodus of project cattle south to areas already short of forage because of competing cattle from other areas of Senegal and from Mauritania. Donors undertook an emergency program to bring food to the cattle, and USAID/Senegal shifted about \$1.1 million of SODESP project funds to meet the crisis.

The situation was somewhat similar for the Niger Integrated Livestock Project. Here the designers recognized the potential for drought and included a project component to develop a long term drought strategy. However, they assumed no drought would occur during the 5-year life of the project. Considering the project was designed in 1983, a severe drought year, the "no drought" assumption was a serious design flaw. The country, including the project zone, experienced large herd movement, shortage of grain, forced sales and loss of livestock. The impact in 1984 was even more severe than 1983 as Niger experienced its second year of drought.

Since the project had no drought contingency plan, project activities were suspended in September 1984. By then much of the livestock population had left the project zone. But project resources, including a large technical assistance work force, were still on site. Mission officials did not know how to respond effectively to the herders' critical needs, but began to shift some of the project activities to cope with the drought.

If AID is to promote the growth of livestock in the Sahel, it cannot increase the size and quality of the herds only to lose them to drought. Some losses will undoubtedly occur, but advance planning should serve to lessen the effect of drought and to provide a coherent post-drought program. None of the projects reviewed adequately considered this question.

^{1/} Drought contingency planning can involve food supply monitoring mechanisms, early warning systems, infrastructures and policies which encourage early destocking, cereal security stocks, and prior agreements with neighboring countries to facilitate forced migration.

Assuming Increases in Production Could Be Marketed

Audits of livestock projects in Mali and Senegal disclosed the traditional market could not absorb the increases in production generated by these projects.

In Mali, the market could not absorb project production of farm-fattened cattle. The market was saturated at about 2,500 cattle annually against objectives of 4,000 to 6,000 necessary to make the project cost effective and replicable. In May 1984, 20 to 50 percent of the livestock could not be sold in two areas visited by the audit team. Sales difficulties had been encountered for several years. Limitations in local and export markets for the type of cattle produced through the project were not adequately considered in the design of the project.

For the Bakel project in Senegal, production could not be marketed because the project zone was isolated from large cities and the herders were reluctant to sell livestock. According to the Government of Senegal Project Director, annual project sales were about 4 percent of the herds. Project objectives were set at 14 percent.

The Bakel project design marketing assumption overlooked the fact herders in the area traditionally sold cattle for subsistence, not for commercial purposes. Livestock was a source of personal wealth and savings to the herders. Because very little livestock was marketed in the area, increases in livestock population, the basic objective of the project, further taxed forage and water resources in the project zone.

AID projects designed to increase livestock must include an analysis of the marketing potential. Demand for livestock is predicted to increase in the Sahel because of rising population. However, this does not mean that within a project zone, traditional marketing mechanisms, or consumer demand, can absorb this increase. Project design must recognize these factors and their impact on project objectives.

Improved Sahel Development Strategy

In revising the Sahel Country Development Strategy Statement, AID duly considered the lessons learned on previous livestock projects. Assumptions proven invalid were discarded and interventions were limited to those believed to be beneficial.

AID concluded that many interventions such as firebreaks, ranches, range control and most supplemental feeding were uneconomical, even when production was increased. AID also

concluded that traditional herd/range management^{1/} and marketing systems were efficient and seasonal migration provided for natural and best use of range resources. This latter concept was incorporated in the Niger livestock project which recognized the need for herders to search for the best pasture in the face of highly variable rainfall.

The new strategy still emphasized livestock production, but limited interventions to water development, animal health, and production research. We believe the current Sahel Country Development Strategy Statement made good use of the lessons learned on previous AID livestock projects. It limited projects to those considered more feasible and should facilitate project design. However, the audit disclosed Sahel development strategy and project design could be further improved if drought contingency planning and marketing analysis were incorporated in the planning process.

Management Comments

The Africa Bureau agreed that drought impact and market capability analyses must be included in livestock as well as other agricultural projects in the Sahel. (See Appendix I for detailed management comments.)

The Bureau pointed out the draft report's frequent references to the absence of a drought contingency plan overstate and obscure the fact that the entire Sahel Development program is, ipso facto, a long range drought contingency plan on a regional basis. However, the Bureau agreed that the Sahel program had been more optimistic about the course of nature in the Sahel than was indicated by the meteorological data. The Bureau observed it was now apparent that the climatological trend in much of the Sahel was increasingly for drought years to be the norm and years of ample rainfall to be the exception.

The Bureau's reply was communicated to all Sahelian missions. The Bureau indicated its reply would serve to clarify the Sahel Country Development Strategy Statement approved June 11, 1984. These actions were reemphasized by the Assistant Administrator in an August 5, 1985 cable addressed to AID/AFR principal officers.

^{1/} By traditional herd management system we mean (1) maximizing animal production when the nutrients available from the rangeland are high, and (2) minimizing mortality during dry periods by seasonal migration to more fertile pastures.

Office of Inspector General Comments

We concur with the Bureau's action on the recommendation and consider it closed upon issuance of this report.

We agree that the Sahel Development Program is a long range drought contingency plan. As noted in the report, the overall Sahel strategy recognized the potential for drought. However, this was not translated into specific guidance for the livestock subsector including how planners were to consider prolonged droughts in project design. The clarification provided by the Bureau in its reply to the report draft should better assure that drought contingency planning and marketing capability analyses become an integral part of the project planning, implementation, evaluation, and redesign process.

2. Design Assumptions Must be Systematically Reevaluated

Project implementation was ineffective primarily because the Missions did not systematically reevaluate project assumptions, and revise objectives and implementation plans. Since many of these assumptions were based on invalid strategic planning, their reevaluation during project implementation was crucial if the projects were to have a chance to succeed. This problem contributed to the projects' limited results.

Recommendation No. 2

We recommend the Assistant Administrator, Africa Bureau reemphasize to Missions in the Sahel the need to reevaluate project design assumptions periodically and amend objectives and implementation plans.

Discussion

Assumptions are used to help determine the feasibility of project objectives. If invalid, most often the objectives will be unrealistic and project implementation decisions and accomplishments jeopardized. Because assumptions can be erroneous during design, or as social, economic and administrative environments change, the AID Handbook suggests they be reevaluated if necessary and the project redesigned. Once there is project experience, or when conditions change, periodic and systematic reviews of project assumptions are needed to help mission management identify program implementation problems.

Audits of livestock projects showed that although significant changes in the environment had occurred, Missions did not systematically reevaluate project design assumptions. Some of the questions which should have been considered were:

- was it still reasonable to assume normal climatic conditions would prevail?
- was livestock marketed at the predicted rate?
- was project livestock overloading the range?
- was the project controlling the range?
- was the project achieving expected production increases?

Early in the implementation of the projects, enough information was available to the Missions to demonstrate assumptions were invalid, and that the projects could not possibly succeed without significant redesign.

The Missions reviewed the projects bi-annually, but project reviews concentrated primarily on evaluating the adequacy of project inputs. Project results received little or no emphasis. In those cases where pertinent information was provided to mission management, it often was disregarded or misinterpreted. Project assumptions were not challenged, and ineffective project activities continued. These selected examples illustrate.

SODESP and Bakel Projects

The SODESP project design in 1978 assumed no drought would occur during the project's life. This assumption was not reassessed upon the occurrence of the 1983-84 drought. During a visit to the SODESP project zone in early 1984 herders were found to have migrated south due to a lack of forage for their livestock. Yet the project was fully staffed. Project personnel were still enrolling herders in the SODESP program, but now had to seek them outside the project zone. Since the project zone was designed to provide feeding, enrolling herders without forage was a poor use of project resources. As drought conditions worsened, project personnel began taking part in an emergency food program for livestock which had migrated toward southern Senegal.

The Bakel project design assumed increases in livestock could be marketed. An AID 1980 mid-project evaluation questioned the lack of marketing potential of the region. The project continued essentially as planned and by 1984 there was still no strong marketing program for the project. In our opinion a reassessment of the marketing assumption would have shown that a marketing program was not likely to be effective because of the isolation of the project zone from large commercial markets, and the traditional reluctance of herders to sell cattle.

Niger Livestock Project

The Niger project design assumed no drought would occur during the project life. This assumption was not valid even when project activities began in 1983. By September 1984, after two years of drought, most of the livestock had left the project zone, yet project activities continued. In September the Mission began to reassess the project to deal with the drought and to terminate ineffective project activities. An earlier reevaluation of the "no drought" assumption may have resulted in a more orderly and effective transition of planned project activities to an emergency posture in 1984.

Mali Livestock Project

Project designers recognized potential marketing problems but assumed the problems would be resolved as herd size increased and health improved. Through its project monitoring system, the Mission found the farmers could not sell all of their production. The Mission concluded this was because the farmers could not reach outside markets. Attempts to create new markets were unsuccessful.

A reevaluation of the assumption that marketing problems could be resolved should have uncovered limited local and export sales markets. Looking for markets in Mali outside the project zone was not viable. It negated the longer term objectives of the project to demonstrate the project could be supportive within the project zone and replicated throughout Mali. In fact, by seeking such markets, the project essentially would compete against those very farmers it ultimately sought to benefit.

We believe design assumptions define the environment within which a project can effectively operate. If their validity is not periodically reevaluated, project activities can become totally disassociated from what is realistically achievable.

Management Comments

The Africa Bureau agreed with the issues discussed in the report draft, and reemphasized to the Missions the need to continually reevaluate project assumptions and amend objectives and implementation plans. The Bureau expanded this guidance to cover all projects and suggested this process could be greatly facilitated by the semi-annual project implementation report currently used by the Missions.

Office of Inspector General Comments

We concur with the Africa Bureau's action, and consider this recommendation closed upon issuance of this report.

3. Project Results Must Be Measured

Missions did not effectively measure results against project objectives. Such a system was needed to evaluate progress and take timely corrective action. Because an effective system was lacking, projects were continued notwithstanding little or no progress.

Recommendation No. 3

We recommend the Assistant Administrator, Africa Bureau, reemphasize to Missions in the Sahel, the requirement to establish effective systems to measure project results.

Discussion

Because of uncertainties inherent in development programs it is necessary to continuously measure project results. AID Handbook 3 establishes the need for measurable project objectives and for monitoring performance against these objectives. Without this, AID and project management cannot effectively determine if the project is having an impact or reassess the validity of project assumptions and objectives. Also, opportunities to improve project effectiveness cannot be identified.

The projects audited did not have adequate systems to measure project results, even though information to establish such systems was generally available. For example, project papers quantified objectives to be attained, and data to periodically look at performance were available from field and other activity reports. Better measurement systems would have alerted the Missions that the projects were achieving marginal results and corrective actions were necessary.

In Senegal, the audit disclosed Bakel and SOBESP project objectives were quantified in the project paper and data on results could have been obtained by analyzing AID and host government project files. These results were not organized and presented in such a way that mission management could gauge progress in production, mortality, birth rate, and sales objectives. By comparing the objectives established in SODESP project papers with project performance data, the audit found the project was far from meeting project objectives. In some cases, partly because of drought, indicators were lower than when the project began. These results should have demanded decisions about the usefulness of the project. However, mission management had not focused on this issue.

In Niger, the Mission recognized the need for a measurement system and devoted \$5 million to a phase I effort partly to compile base line data against which phase II could measure

results. Although contemplated in the phase II project paper, a measurement system was not implemented. As the 1983 and 1984 drought worsened, there was no data showing progress against project objectives. Had such data been available it would have highlighted the impact of the drought on the target population. When the Mission decided to deal with the drought in September 1984, insufficient information was available about the condition of the target population to select a course of action.

Without a good system to measure results, Missions cannot take timely action to ensure effective project activities.

Management Comments

The Africa Bureau recognized the need to focus attention on the measurement of project results and reemphasized this concern to the Missions. The Bureau noted its continuing efforts to develop more accurate and reliable verifiable project results indicators. It suggested the key was in maintaining simplicity of project design and indicated this objective was being encouraged by AID management and host country leaders. The Bureau observed many AID projects have been designed with too many components, variables, assumptions and too few key management indicators. The Bureau suggested the resolution of this issue could not be accomplished by any single action but required continuous agency-wide attention.

Office of Inspector General Comments

We concur with the Bureau's action and support the Bureau's effort to develop more accurate and reliable verifiable project results indicators. Simplicity in project design should also facilitate the development of such indicators. We will continue to include these aspects in future audits and report on conditions found. The recommendation is closed upon issuance of this report.

B. Compliance and Internal Control

Compliance

Overall, the three audit reports showed an adequate level of compliance with AID standards and the Project Agreements. Audit tests made during our reviews reflected a consistently satisfactory level of compliance. Other than conditions cited in the reports, nothing came to our attention which would indicate untested items were not in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

Internal Control

Internal controls were found to be weak and not operating in a satisfactory manner. The two major instances of internal control weaknesses were the absence of a system to reevaluate project design assumptions and to measure project results. Minor instances dealing with controls over advances and use of project assets were brought to management's attention in the audit reports and corrective action was initiated.

SUMMARY REPORT ON AID ASSISTANCE
TO DEVELOP LIVESTOCK IN THE SAHEL.

Part III - EXHIBITS AND APPENDICES

Description of Projects Reviewed

The Senegal Range and Livestock Development Project in Bakel, Eastern Senegal, was established in 1975 to manage a grazing reserve of 110,000 hectares, increase cattle from 11,200 to 16,000, develop year-round water resources, and provide veterinary care. Amendments increased the range to 220,000 hectares and cattle to 25,000. The project was completed in January 31, 1985 and about \$5 million had been obligated.

By December 1983, most of the funds had been spent to develop at most 110,000 hectares of range, instead of the 220,000 for which the project was ultimately justified. Cattle population increased by less than a thousand instead of several thousands, and other production factors had not increased appreciably. In March 1984, year-round water resources had not been developed and herders were short of water. Range deterioration had not been checked. The veterinary health program, however, had shown positive results.

The SODESP Livestock Development Project in Northern Senegal was established in 1978 to provide livestock production by financing production and commercialization activities. About 6,250 cattle and 4,950 sheep and goats were to be sold. The project was also to develop a system for water and range management, forestry, improve the quality of life of the herders' families and create a data base for research and monitoring. The project was completed June 30, 1984 and about \$7 million had been obligated.

By 1984 most of the project funds were spent on livestock production, essentially supplemental feeding and marketing. SODESP had sold 263 cattle. Qualitative factors such as weight and birth rates had declined. Other aspects of the project i.e., range management, improvement of the quality of life of the herders, and research and monitoring, were either not implemented or reduced to a point where their contribution to the project was minimal.

Mali Livestock Sector II, was established in 1982 to promote animal health, provide a cattle feeding program during the dry season, conduct forage production research and improve the participating country's managerial capabilities. As of September 30, 1984, \$15.7 million of the \$17.5 million granted had been obligated and about \$3.2 million had been spent.

Since this was a fairly new project, we limited our audit to the most active components-- the management development assistance team, and cattle feeding and related research. We found the Mission, through the team, had resolved many of the

problems noted in past evaluations and audit of livestock. We found that cattle feeding and related research could not be successful because sales levels could not be reached due to limited local and export markets.

The Niger Integrated Livestock Production Project, was established in 1983 to improve the economic well-being of indigent herders in the project zone by increasing livestock productivity and expanding the herders' health care. As of August 31, 1984, AID had obligated \$10.0 million of the \$17.5 million planned and spent \$1 million.

USAID and the Government of Niger did not resolve their differences over the project's objectives. They signed the grant agreement to avoid losing funds at the end of the fiscal year; but they could not agree on whom the project would help and how, and the level of technical assistance. Without objectives to measure the project's progress and lacking essential support and commitment by both parties, the project proceeded on an ad-hoc basis.

In August 1984, the project came to a standstill when the current drought caused an exodus of herders and livestock from the zone. Neither the host government nor the Mission had a drought plan or sufficient information on the plight of the project herds to decide on a course of action to prevent further cattle losses and to effectively respond to the herders' needs.

EXHIBIT 11

Reports Issued by the Inspector General
on Livestock Projects in the Sahel

Audit Report 7-685-84-4 dated July 20, 1984 - "Better Internal Controls Could Have Improved AID Management of the Livestock Program in Senegal"

Audit Report 7-683-85-4 dated February 28, 1985 - "Need to Redesign the Niger Integrated Livestock Production Project"

Audit Report 7-688-85-5 dated March 27, 1985 - "Progress and Problems in Managing the Mali Livestock Sector II Project"

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 PP PUTADS
 IT RUFFC #9124/21 2171357
 ZNR UUUUU 7ZH
 P 051356Z AUG 85

LOC: 292 395
 05 AUG 85 1406
 CR: 23522
 CRG: AID
 DIST: RIG

FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO PUTADS/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 2855
 INFO RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 3256
 RUFFOC/AMEMBASSY OUACADUGUCU PRIORITY 4134
 PUTABO/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0525
 RUFFPR/AMEMBASSY PRAIAPRI PRIORITY 2665
 RUFFJL/AMEMBASSY BANJUL PRIORITY 5436
 PUTANL/AMEMBASSY NOUACOTT PRIORITY 3449
 PUTAND/AMEMBASSY NIJAMENA 0169
 BT
 UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 239124

AIDAC DAKAR FOR RIG/A AND USAID, ALGERIA FOR REDSO/WCA

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: RIG/A/WA DRAFT AUDIT REPORT ON SAHEL LIVESTOCK
 PROJECTS

REFS: AUDIT REPORT 7-626-85-XXY

1. FOR RIG/A/WA FROM AFR BUREAU.

2. AFRICA BUREAU HAS THOROUGHLY VETTED SUBJECT DRAFT
 AUDIT REPORT. WE HAVE FOUND THE REPORT TO BE GENERALLY
 ACCURATE AND HELPFUL, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE A FEW POINTS
 WHICH, WE BELIEVE, SHOULD BE CLARIFIED.

3. THE THREE RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED FOR AID/W REVIEW
 AND COMMENT IN THE DRAFT REPORT WERE:

RECOMMENDATION NO. 1: THAT THE ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
 AFRICA BUREAU REQUIRE THAT (A) THE DESIGN OF LIVESTOCK
 PROJECTS INCLUDE THE IMPACT ANALYSIS OF INPUT AND
 MARKETING CAPABILITY, AND (B) THESE FACTORS BE
 INCORPORATED IN THE CURRENT SAHEL COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT
 STRATEGY STATEMENT.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 2: THAT THE ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
 AFRICA BUREAU REEMPHASIZE TO MISSIONS IN THE SAHEL THE
 NEED TO REEVALUATE PROJECT DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS
 PERIODICALLY AND AMEND OBJECTIVES AND IMPLEMENTATION
 PLANS.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 3: THAT THE ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
 AFRICA BUREAU, REEMPHASIZE TO MISSIONS IN THE SAHEL THE
 REQUIREMENT TO ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE SYSTEMS TO MEASURE
 PROJECT RESULTS.

4. FOLLOWING ARE SYNTHESIZED COMMENTS/RESPONSES OFFERED
 BY AFR BUREAU OFFICES/MISSIONS TO ABOVE RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. REGARDING RECOMMENDATION NO. 1, WE AGREE NOT ONLY THAT DROUGHT IMPACT ANALYSES AND MARKETING CAPABILITY MUST BE INCLUDED IN LIVESTOCK PROJECTS BUT THAT THESE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN ALL REPEAT ALL AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PROJECTS IN SAHEL. THE AA/AFR IS BY SEPTEL TO ALL AFRICA MISSIONS ISSUING A REMINDER TO GIVE SPECIAL CONSIDERATION TO DROUGHT IMPACT ANALYSIS IN PROJECT DESIGN. SEPTEL WILL, IN FACT, CONSTITUTE A CLARIFICATION OF THE SAHEL COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY STATEMENT APPROVED ON JUNE 11, 1984, AND, WE BELIEVE, DIRECTLY ADDRESS THE AUDIT CONCERNS OF RECOMMENDATION NO. 1. IN THE AUDIT REPORT DISCUSSION SECTION RELEVANT TO RECOMMENDATION NO. 1, THERE WERE FREQUENT REFERENCES TO THE ABSENCE OF A QUOTE DROUGHT CONTINGENCY PLAN UNQUOTE, A REFERENCE WHICH EMERGED PRIMARILY FROM THE SEPARATE AUDIT REPORT DONE ON THE NIGER INTEGRATED LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION PROJECT AND TO WHICH THE NIGER MISSION IS RESPONDING SEPARATELY. HOWEVER, WE FEEL THAT TO SUGGEST NO DROUGHT EMERGENCY PLAN WAS ESTABLISHED IS AN OVESTATEMENT AND OBSCURES THE FACT THAT THE ENTIRE SAHEL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IS, IPSO FACTO, A LONG RANGE CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR THE DROUGHT ON A REGIONAL BASIS. MOREOVER, BASED ON LESSONS LEARNED AND HINDSIGHT, WE ARE INCLINED TO AGREE WITH THE AUDITORS THAT THE SAHEL PROGRAM -- BOTH THE FIELD ELEMENTS AND IN WASHINGTON -- HAVE TENDED TO BE MORE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE COURSE OF NATURE IN THE SAHEL THAN IS PRESENTLY INDICATED BY EXISTING METEOROLOGICAL DATA. IT IS NOW APPARENT THAT THE CLIMATOLOGICAL TREND IN MUCH OF THE SAHEL IS INCREASINGLY FOR DROUGHT YEARS TO BE THE NORM AND YEARS OF AMPLE RAINFALL TO SUPPORT DRYLAND/RAINFEED AGRICULTURE TO BECOME THE EXCEPTION. THIS POINT HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE BOTH WITH AID OFFICIALS IN THE FIELD AND IN WASHINGTON AND WITH HOST COUNTRY AGRICULTURAL PLANNERS AND WILL BE REFLECTED IN THE AA/AFR'S SEPTEL TO THE FIELD WHICH WILL BE ISSUED TO FOLLOW THIS CABLE.

B. REGARDING RECOMMENDATION NO. 2, THE SEPTEL FROM AA/AFR WILL ALSO EMPHASIZE TO FIELD MISSIONS THE NEED TO CONTINUALLY REEVALUATE PROJECT DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS AND MEET PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND IMPLEMENTATION PLANS. ADDITIONALLY, THIS SAME GUIDANCE IS BEING GIVEN FOR THE DESIGN OF ALL REPEAT ALL AFR BUREAU PROJECTS. IT IS A CONTINUING PROCESS WHICH IS FACILITATED TO A GREAT DEGREE BY THE SEMI-ANNUAL PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION REPORT (PIR) EXERCISE WHICH IS BEING UTILIZED BY THIS BUREAU.

C. WITH RESPECT TO RECOMMENDATION NO. 3, THE AA/AFR RECOGNIZES THAT THERE IS A CONTINUING NEED TO FOCUS

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ATTENTION ON THE MEASUREMENT OF PROJECT RESULTS AND WILL, THE ABOVEMENTIONED SEPTEL, EXPRESS THAT CONCERN AS WELL AS THE IMPORTANCE OF MISSIONS PENDING PROJECT COMPLETION REPORTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH GUIDANCE SET FORTH IN HANICOM 2. HOWEVER, THE AFRICA BUREAU HAS ALSO BEEN CONCERNED FOR SOME TIME ABOUT THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE GAPS EXISTING BETWEEN THE INPUT REVIEW (AS REFLECTED IN THE TID PROCESS) AND MACRO-LEVEL IMPACT ASSESSMENT. THE QUEST WITHIN AID TO FIND AND ACCURATELY DESCRIBE COUTH OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS UNQUOTE IS IN ITS SECOND DECADE AND AID PROJECT DESIGNERS, IMPLEMENTERS AND EVALUATORS ARE STILL STRUGGLING TO REFINE THIS PROCESS. THE ANSWER THAT SEEMS TO BE INCREASINGLY APPARENT IS THAT THE KEY TO ESTABLISHING RELIABLE MEASUREMENT INDICATORS IS IN MAINTAINING UTMOST SIMPLICITY OF PROJECT DESIGN AND IN KEEPING MISSION PROJECT PORTFOLIOS TIGHT SO AS TO MINIMIZE THE NUMBER OF UNITS OF MANAGEMENT AND THE CONSEQUENT WORK LOAD ON MISSION PROJECT MANAGERS AND EVALUATORS. THE OBJECTIVE OF KEEPING PROJECTS AS SIMPLE AS POSSIBLE IS BEING ENCOURAGED NOT ONLY BY AID MANAGEMENT BUT BY HOST COUNTRY LEADERS THEMSELVES. MANY OF OUR PROJECTS HAVE BEEN DESIGNED WITH TOO MANY COMPONENTS, TOO MANY VARIABLES, TOO MANY ASSUMPTIONS AND TOO FEW KEY MEASUREMENT INDICATORS. THE RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE CANNOT BE ACCOMPLISHED BY ANY SINGLE ACTION OR SERIES OF ACTIONS ON THE PART OF AA/AFR, BUT REQUIRES CONTINUOUS AGENCY-WIDE ATTENTION. HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY -- BOTH THE BILATERAL AND THE MULTILATERAL DONORS -- REGARD A.I.D. AS ONE OF THE FOREMOST REPOSITORIES OF EXPERTISE IN THE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE IMPROVED DESIGN/EVALUATION INDICATORS.

5. THE BROADER QUESTION OF WHETHER A.I.D. SHOULD REMAIN INVOLVED IN LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES, ESPECIALLY IN THE SAHEL, UNDER THE EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES OF UNCERTAINTY, IS BEING ADDRESSED ON A CONTINUING BASIS. AN IN-PROGRESS EVALUATION OF THE NIGER INTEGRATED LIVESTOCK PROJECT (ONE OF THE FOUR PROJECTS INCLUDED IN THE SUBJECT AUDIT) WILL BEGIN IN SEPTEMBER. THE FINDINGS OF THIS EVALUATION WILL SOON THEREAFTER BE INCORPORATED INTO THE NIGER CPSS AND SUBSEQUENTLY, AS APPROPRIATE, INTO THE SAHEL REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY STATEMENT.

6. WHILE WE FULLY RECOGNIZE THAT THE AUDIT-DISCLOSURE PROBLEMS WILL REQUIRE CONTINUING ATTENTION AND WILL NOT BE ENTIRELY OVERCOME IN THE SHORT TERM, BASED UPON THE ISSUANCE OF AA/AFR'S SEPTEL REFERRED TO ABOVE AND UPON THIS MESSAGE, WE REQUEST THAT THE THREE RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE SUBJECT DRAFT AUDIT BE CONSIDERED BY RIG/A FOR CLOSURE UPON ISSUANCE OF THE FINAL REPORT. SHELITE FT

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TO USAID MISSIONS IN AFRICA PRIORITY
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 239125

LOC: 297 412
05 AUG 85 1411
CN: 23504
CHRG: AID
DIST: AID

AIDAC DAKAR FOR USAID AND RIG/A, ALGERIA FOR REDSO/USA,

F.C. 12350: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: RIG/A/AA DRAFT AUDIT REPORT ON SAHEL LIVESTOCK
PROJECTS

REFS: STAT239124 NOTAL

NAIROBI FOR USAID, REDSO/ESA AND RIG/A

1. FROM AA/AFR EDELMAN FOR AID AFR PRINCIPAL OFFICERS.

2. THE REGIONAL INSPECTOR GENERAL WEST AFRICA OFFICE
RECENTLY SUBMITTED FOR AFR/W COMMENT A DRAFT AUDIT
SUMMARY REPORT ON A.I.D. ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOP LIVESTOCK
IN THE SAHEL WHICH CONTAINED THREE RECOMMENDATIONS.
WHILE THE REPORT IS ACTUALLY A SYNTHESIS OF EARLIER AUDIT
REPORTS DONE IN THREE SAHELIAN COUNTRIES ON FOUR
LIVESTOCK PROJECTS, I BELIEVE THE REMEDIAL ACTIONS
CONTINGENT UPON THESE RECOMMENDATIONS SHOULD BE APPLIED
TO ALL AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES (PERHAPS EVEN
MANY PROJECTS IN NON-AGRICULTURAL SECTORS) IN THE SAHEL
AND ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA WHERE THE SAME KIND OF PROJECT
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION SHORTCOMINGS EXIST.

3. THE RECOMMENDATIONS WERE:

RECOMMENDATION NO. 1: THAT THE ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
AFRICA BUREAU REQUIRE THAT (1) THE DESIGN OF LIVESTOCK
PROJECTS INCLUDE THE IMPACT ANALYSIS OF DROUGHT AND
MARKETING CAPABILITY, AND (2) THESE FACTORS BE
INCORPORATED IN THE CURRENT SAHEL COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT
STRATEGY STATEMENT.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 2: THAT THE ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
AFRICA BUREAU EMPHASIZE TO MISSIONS IN THE SAHEL THE
NEED TO REEVALUATE PROJECT DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS
PERIODICALLY AND AMEND OBJECTIVES AND IMPLEMENTATION
PLANS ALL ON A TIMELY BASIS.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 3: THAT THE ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
AFRICA BUREAU, EMPHASIZE TO MISSIONS IN THE SAHEL THE
REQUIREMENT TO ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE SYSTEMS TO MEASURE
PROJECT RESULTS.

4. SINCE THE INCREASED INTENSITY OF THE SAHEL PROJET LAST YEAR, SEVERAL CASES HAVE COME TO MY ATTENTION IN WHICH THE BASIC ASSUMPTIONS ON WHICH PROJECT DESIGNS RESTED DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY CONSIDER THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A WORSENING OF THE DROUGHT. THEREFORE, AS RECOMMENDED BY RIG/A/WA, I MUST ONCE AGAIN REMIND OUR FIELD MISSIONS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF EXAMINING THEIR PORTFOLIOS CRITICALLY AND FREQUENTLY TO ASSURE THAT BASIC PROJECT ASSUMPTIONS WERE/ARE VALID AND THAT CONDITIONS WHICH WERE ANTICIPATED OR TARGETED HAVE ACTUALLY MATERIALIZED.

5. AS TO INCLUDING DROUGHT AND MARKETING IMPACT ANALYSES IN THE DESIGN PROCESS, WE SHOULD NOT HAVE TO REMIND OURSELVES OF THIS IMPERATIVE SINCE THE RAISON D'ETRE FOR A SAHEL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, BOTH AS A SEPARATE LINE ITEM IN THE FAA AND AS AN IDENTIFIED AND SEPARATE GEOGRAPHIC ENTITY, IS THE THREAT OF CONTINUED OR REPETITIVE DROUGHT IN THE SAHEL.

6. LET ME EMPHASIZE ONCE AGAIN THAT THE CONCERNS RAISED BY THE AUDITORS IN THE SUBJECT DRAFT REPORT SHOULD NOT BE CONFINED TO YOUR MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT SOLELY OF LIVESTOCK PROJECTS. THEY SHOULD BE PART AND PARCEL OF YOUR MISSIONS' PROJECT DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, EVALUATION AND REDESIGN PROCESS FOR ALL TYPES OF PROJECTS.

7. FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL ADDRESSEES, SOME OF WHICH DID NOT RECEIVE THE REFTEL, WE REPEAT BELOW ONE PARAGRAPH OF REFTEL DESCRIBING AFRICA BUREAU RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATION NO. 3:

QUOTE. WITH RESPECT TO RECOMMENDATION NO. 3, THE AA/AFR RECOGNIZES THAT THERE IS A CONTINUING NEED TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON THE MEASUREMENT OF PROJECT RESULTS AND WILL, IN AFOREMENTIONED SEPTEL, EXPRESS THAT CONCEPT AS WELL AS THE IMPORTANCE OF MISSIONS PREPARING PROJECT COMPLETION REPORTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH GUIDANCE SET FORTH IN HANDBOOK 3. HOWEVER, THE AFRICA BUREAU HAS ALSO BEEN CONCERNED FOR SOME TIME ABOUT THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE GAP EXISTING BETWEEN THE INPUTS REVIEW (AS REFLECTED IN THE PIR PROCESS) AND MACRO-LEVEL IMPACT ASSESSMENT. THE QUEST WITHIN AID TO FIND AND ACCURATELY DESCRIBE QUOTE OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS UNQUOTE IS IN ITS SECOND DECADE AND ALL PROJECT DESIGNERS, IMPLEMENTERS AND EVALUATORS ARE STILL STRUGGLING TO REFINE THIS PROCESS. THE ANSWER THAT SEEMS TO BE INCREASINGLY APPARENT IS THAT THE KEY TO ESTABLISHING RELIABLE MEASUREMENT INDICATORS IS IN MAINTAINING UTMOST SIMPLICITY OF PROJECT DESIGN AND

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IN KEEPING MISSION PROJECT PORTFOLIOS THIN SO AS TO
MINIMIZE THE NUMBER OF UNITS OF MANAGEMENT AND THE
CONSEQUENT WORK LOAD ON MISSION PROJECT MANAGERS AND
EVALUATORS. THE OBJECTIVE OF KEEPING PROJECTS AS SIMPLE
AS POSSIBLE IS BEING ENCOURAGED NOT ONLY BY AID
MANAGEMENT PUT BY HOST COUNTRY LEADERS THEMSELVES. MANY
OF OUR PROJECTS HAVE BEEN DESIGNED WITH TOO MANY
COMPONENTS, TOO MANY VARIABLES, TOO MANY ASSUMPTIONS AND
TOO FEW KEY MEASUREMENT INDICATORS. THE RESOLUTION OF
THIS ISSUE CANNOT BE ACCOMPLISHED BY ANY SINGLE ACTION OR
SERIES OF ACTIONS ON THE PART OF AA/AFR, BUT REQUIRES
CONTINUOUS AGENCY-WIDE ATTENTION. HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE
NOTED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY --
BOTH THE BILATERAL AND THE MULTILATERAL DONORS -- REGARD
A.I.D. AS ONE OF THE FOREMOST REPOSITORIES OF EXPERTISE
IN THE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE IMPROVED DESIGN/EVALUATION
INDICATORS. END QUOTE.

8. THE TEXT OF AFRICA BUREAU'S RESPONSE TO RIG/A/WA
(REFTEL) HAS BEEN REPEATED TO ALL SAEEL MISSIONS. SHULTZ
BT

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APPENDIX II

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