

PROJECT EVALUATION

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1. PROJECT TITLE Niger Shelter Sector Planning			2. PROJECT NUMBER 683-0224	3. MISSION/AID/W OFFICE USAID/Niger
5. KEY PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DATES			4. EVALUATION NUMBER (Enter the number maintained by the reporting unit e.g., Country or AID/W Administrative Code, Fiscal Year, Serial No. beginning with No. 1 each FY) 683-84-02	
A. First PRO-AG or Equivalent FY 78	B. Final Obligation Expected FY 84	C. Final Input Delivery FY 84	6. ESTIMATED PROJECT FUNDING A. Total \$ 655,000 B. U.S. \$ 655,000	
			7. PERIOD COVERED BY EVALUATION From (month/yr.) 08-80 To (month/yr.) 07-84	
			Date of Evaluation Review July 20, 1984	

REGULAR EVALUATION SPECIAL EVALUATION

8. ACTION DECISIONS APPROVED BY MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE DIRECTOR

A. List decisions and/or unresolved issues; cite those items needing further study. (NOTE: Mission decisions which anticipate AID/W or regional office action should specify type of document, e.g., airgram, SPAR, PIO, which will present detailed request.)	B. NAME OF OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION	C. DATE ACTION TO BE COMPLETED
<p>The evaluation took place in conjunction with a National Housing Conference after the PACD. There are no further issues, decisions or recommendations on which there is a need for further action on the part of USAID/Niger relating to the immediate project.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">000137</p>		

9. INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS TO BE REVISED PER ABOVE DECISIONS			10. ALTERNATIVE DECISIONS ON FUTURE OF PROJECT
<input type="checkbox"/> Project Paper	<input type="checkbox"/> Implementation Plan e.g., CPI Network	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)	A. <input type="checkbox"/> Continue Project Without Change
<input type="checkbox"/> Financial Plan	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/T	_____	B. <input type="checkbox"/> Change Project Design and/or
<input type="checkbox"/> Logical Framework	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/C	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)	<input type="checkbox"/> Change Implementation Plan
<input type="checkbox"/> Project Agreement	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/P	_____	C. <input type="checkbox"/> Discontinue Project

11. PROJECT OFFICER AND HOST COUNTRY OR OTHER RANKING PARTICIPANTS AS APPROPRIATE (Names and Titles)	12. Mission/AID/W Office Director Approval
M. Gould, Project Officer B. Bako, Project Manager A. Kalla, Project Director	Signature <i>Peter Benedict</i>
	Typed Name Peter Benedict
	Date



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NIGER SHELTER PLANNING PROJECT (683-0224) --
FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

Judith A. Hermanson

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PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY PART II (AID FORM 1330-15A)

13. SUMMARY

The Shelter Planning Project (683-0224), initiated in 1978 was completed on April 30, 1984. Although there were delays in the implementation, the Project carried out its Purpose and all outputs were made. The principal accomplishment of the Project is to have assisted in the formulation of a draft National Shelter Policy that has received considerable support and that is now under consideration by the Government of Niger (GON). The Shelter Planning Project was conceived as a beginning, and in that, it was successful; moreover with the modification of the Implementation Plan to include a prototype construction subproject, it exceeded those accomplishments originally envisioned for it. The extent to which this planning Project will contribute to the Sector goal and improve the living environment of the low income population of Niger, however, will depend upon the willingness of the GON to adopt the policies and programs developed and upon its ability to establish an improved institutional framework for the coordination and rationalization of public and private resources in the shelter sector. Thus, the long term effectiveness of the Project cannot be predicted at this point, although current indications are that the GON is serious about proceeding to implementation.

14. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this evaluation is to provide a final assessment of the accomplishments of the Niger Shelter Sector Planning Project (683-0224). The evaluation seeks generally to ascertain the extent to which the original Project purpose was met and whether project outputs were achieved. Within this general context, the specific evaluation objectives are as follows:

A. To determine the impact of the project on the ability of the Service Central d'Habitat to (1) collect data for shelter sector planning, (2) coordinate GON and private sector shelter activities and (3) influence GON housing policy.

B. To determine the effectiveness of the training provided under the project.

C. To assess the prototype housing sub-project with specific reference to its (1) cost effectiveness, (2) degree of success in transferring technology, together with the appropriateness of the technology transferred, (3) impact on the position of the Service Central de l'Habitat as a focal point for shelter matters, and (4) impact on the Service Central de l'Habitat's ability to implement such construction projects directly.

D. To assess the progress made by the GON in developing a national policy and plan for low income housing and the role that the project has played.

The evaluation design was based on both secondary and primary data gathering, including thorough review of all extant Project files, conducted both at the Mission in Niamey and at the RHUDO office in Abidjan; interviews with those associated with the Project, including GON Ministry of Public Works and Urban Development officials, AID Mission and RHUDO personnel, and the long term Resident Advisor to the Project; and, finally, interviews with other GON officials and donor representatives. In addition, the evaluator attended a week long seminar, organized by the GON and funded by AID, which focused on National Shelter Policy, and in which the diverse points of view of the participants, drawn from institutions variously concerned with shelter and from local governments, also provided a data source.

Indicators were developed for each of the evaluation objectives, at the outset of the evaluation and were used to assist in the verification, validation and synthesis of the qualitative data that was gathered.

Although the GON did not provide a counterpart for the evaluation, as AID had requested, all officials were extremely cooperative, and the Chief of the Service Central de l'Habitat served as the major contact and coordination point for the evaluator.

15. EXTERNAL FACTORS

No additional external factors have intervened since the last evaluation, conducted in November 1981.

16. INPUTS

As described in the attached evaluation report and the two preceding Project evaluations, the technical assistance inputs were modified substantially as the Project evolved. Initial difficulties with recruiting two long term advisors, fluent in French, were resolved with a decision to field only one long term advisor and to supplement that advisor with additional short term consultancies. These inputs were essentially met, but were in some cases constrained by an inadequate level of French and a delay in the submission of required reports. After the addition of the prototype housing subproject, following the last evaluation, two additional technical assistance inputs were required and satisfactorily made. Although the short term training inputs were satisfactorily made, the long term training of a Nigerien working in the area of shelter that had been contemplated by the Project Paper did not occur.

Following initial difficulties with the level of inputs from the GON side, as detailed in the first evaluation, GON inputs substantially met the terms of the Project Agreement.

17. OUTPUTS

Project outputs as set forth in the Project Paper have been substantially achieved and in some cases exceeded:

- There is in place a draft national shelter policy suitable for presentation to the full government. Moreover, initial steps toward the formal adoption of the policy have been taken and comprehensive discussions and debate of the issues involved have taken place with affected representatives of various Ministries of the central government, parastatal agencies and private organizations involved in the shelter sector, and representatives of local government.
- Designs of preliminary projects have been made and funding of these projects is being actively sought by the GON. In addition, part of the proposed national shelter policy involves proposed structural changes to facilitate the mobilization of individual savings, to provide greater access to long term credit for low and moderate income persons, and to involve the private sector in the development of housing, with the government assuming the responsibility for infrastructure.
- Nigerian counterparts within the Ministry are carrying on the work begun under this project.

Following the last evaluation, the Project implementation plan was modified and the two additional outputs were also required to be met by project completion. These were:

- Planning and execution of housing research activities using indigenous materials, and
- Completion of plans for a large scale sites and services project.

These additional outputs were also satisfactorily made by the time of Project completion.

18. PURPOSE

The purpose of this project was to establish an institutional framework within which the GON can generate and coordinate low and middle income shelter programs in both rural and urban areas.

The outputs set forth above were assumed to be primary

factors in the successful carrying out of this project purpose. However, since the institutional framework which is provided for under the Project is conceptual by design -- that is, there is no specified link between proposals and their adoption -- the extent to which the GON will be able to implement the shelter policy and programs that it has developed with the assistance of this Project is uncertain. Nonetheless, if adopted and implemented as they stand and if the specified support is forthcoming, the GON will be in a strong position to address the shelter problems of its low and moderate income citizens.

19. GOAL/SUBGOAL

The Project goal is to provide an improved living environment for low-income families. This goal remains valid and the Project will have contributed to its achievement if the National Shelter Policy is adopted and implemented. Short of adoption and implementation of the policy as a whole, if external funding currently sought for some of the project proposals designed under the Shelter Sector Planning project, a limited impact on the living environment of low income families will be achieved.

20. BENEFICIARIES

Since this Project was designed to focus on institutional development, its direct beneficiaries have been primarily those organizations involved in the shelter sector in Niger. However, to the extent that the subproject has demonstrated the viability of the use of indigenous materials and traditional building techniques to produce shelter that is affordable by low and moderate income persons and to the extent that other institutions and individuals seek to replicate this subproject, as is already taking place to a limited extent, this population will be indirect beneficiaries of this Project. Moreover, this population will also indirectly benefit from the Project, if, as seems possible, the National Shelter Policy and its supporting organizational proposals are put in place and shelter programs are implemented.

21. UNPLANNED EFFECTS

No unplanned effects were identified. However, resulting from the research activities, GON officials offered the opinion that significant to them was the finding of an "intermediate" building material -- stabilized banco or laterite -- that could provide an acceptable, lower cost house construction to middle as well as low income persons. If used widely, this material will result in foreign exchange savings.

22. LESSONS LEARNED

In addition to the lessons cited in the previous two Project evaluations, there are two major lessons to be derived from the experience. These are:

● A planning project can be considerably strengthened by the inclusion of a component that allows for some implementation experience. The advantages include the making concrete of some of the abstract ideas being considered. This Project in particular would have benefited considerably if this component had been included from the outset -- that is, had it been an integral part of the Project design. Although it played a constructive part in the success of the Shelter Planning Project, the prototype housing subproject could have been rationalized with various stages of the policy development process and perhaps would have assisted the Project in avoiding some of the delays that occurred. In addition, its inclusion in the overall Project design would have allowed a more orderly planning and implementation process.

● This Project experienced serious delays in implementation throughout its life. The most serious of these, however, were in the initial stages, during which there were failures on the part of both the GON and AID to provide the inputs as noted above. The technical advisor was able to develop a series of documents and to provide a sound basis for what has become the proposed National Housing Policy. However, putting aside the difficulty with the timing of inputs, had the Project been designed in such a way as to have allowed/required discussion of various components of the policy upon their completion; indeed had certain aspects of Project expenditures been tied to these discussions, the National Shelter Policy discussions are likely to have reached an advanced stage much earlier in the process. In addition, had there been a forum for discussion of these documents, the Project itself might not have suffered the credibility problem that it did among some who perceived it, until recently, with the organization of the National Seminar, as a largely "academic" exercise.

23. SPECIAL COMMENTS

Attached to this Project Evaluation Summary Part II are the following:

- "Niger Shelter Planning Project (683-0224) -- Final Evaluation Report" and
- "Information Appendix For Executive Level Personnel"

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT NIGER SHELTER PLANNING PROJECT (683-0224)

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Country Context

Niger, with its population of approximately 5.5 million, is still a predominantly agricultural country and will remain so at least for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, while precise data are scant, Niger is currently experiencing a significant shift in the distribution of its population between rural and urban areas. During the past twenty years, the percentage of the total population comprised of urban dwellers has more than doubled, and approximately 13% of Niger's population can now be classified as urban. (World Bank, 1980). Niger is continuing to urbanize at a relatively rapid rate, with its 6.8% urban growth rate greatly exceeding the 2.8% general population growth rate. (World Bank, 1982) If current trends continue, by the end of the decade approximately 20% of the Nigerien population will be urban (World Bank, 1979).

Rural to urban migration, exacerbated both by the drought of the early 1970's and by the economic prosperity enjoyed during the late 1970's, is a continuing phenomenon and is playing a significant role in Niger's urban growth. The preponderance of the urban population lives in Niamey, which had an estimated population of 400,000 in 1983; this figure is expected almost to double to 780,000 by 1990 and to reach the million mark early in the 1990's. While population projections vary according to the source and assumptions made, Niamey's growth rate (7.7% - 11%) is much higher than that (3.8% - 5.5%) of other urban centers in Niger (World Bank, 1979), and while rural to urban migration is estimated to account for approximately 50% of total urban growth, it is estimated to account for over 70% of that experienced by Niamey. (Ibid.)

A high urban growth rate usually brings with it an increasingly heterogeneous population, a relatively younger population in the urban areas (although in Niger approximately 50% of the total population is under 15 years of age), and a tendency for certain portions of the population (particularly new arrivals) to be "transient" in orientation, maintaining strong economic and social ties to the rural areas. These tendencies have been found to be true for Niger as well (World Bank, 1979), and all of these characteristics have bearing upon the social and economic development of not only the urban area but also of the country as a whole.

Although there have been no recent comprehensive household surveys conducted, monthly median income for the employed population in Niamey was estimated in 1981 at between 35,369 CFA and 47,159 CFA, with the majority of those who fell below the median level being migrants to the city. (Hammam, 1981) If we

assume that income levels have kept pace with the annual inflation rate of 12.2% (World Bank, 1982), then current median household figures would range between CFA 49,957 (US\$116) and CFA 66,609 (US\$155) per month. These figures, however, account only for those employed in the formal economy and do not take into consideration the significant number of urban dwellers in Niamey whose income is generated in the informal economy. Indications are, however, that at least half of those working in the informal economy may have incomes above the median level, and so conform to the same general pattern as salaried workers. (Hammam, 1981)

B. Overview of the Shelter Sector

Shelter has not received priority attention by the GON, with shelter problems falling far below the agricultural, health and educational development priorities of the Government. In fact, shelter was not considered as a discrete sector in the last Development Plan, although an intention to control the growth of Niamey, to establish growth poles in the central and western portions of the country, and to encourage the development of secondary agricultural marketing towns was articulated. (GON, 1982) Moreover, with an estimated deficit of 10,000 houses in Niamey, an urbanizing population, and an awareness of the severe urban problems encountered in other African countries, a draft National Shelter Policy, developed with the assistance of this Project, has been prepared and is presently under consideration by the Government.

A 1982 study carried out under the Project showed that Niamey's estimated 11% annual growth is absorbed primarily through subdivision and the creation of rental units in existing structures, rather than through new extensions. The amount of space traditionally required for households is reduced in the cities. Overall, densities are not exceptionally high; however, there is significant crowding in certain quarters of the city. Finally, the study found that infrastructure in Niamey is quite limited, with only 28% served directly by water, an additional 11% having fairly immediate access to fountains or wells, and the remaining 61% of the population dependent on water sellers. Access to electricity is variable, and, with regard to sanitation, the study showed that the use of pit latrines is almost universal. (Hammam 1981, 1982)

Traditional materials (primarily clay or "banco") form the basis for most of the construction undertaken, although many traditionally constructed communities are in a state of transition with more modern construction materials, such as sheet roofs and cement floors, incorporated into the banco structure. Such modifications, however, dependent upon imported materials, add to the cost of construction and are out of the reach of many.

Major constraints on the shelter sector include the well-defined institutional structure for its supply and insufficient credit mechanisms for shelter (particularly exclusively for the below median income person); a

rather limited vision of the urbanization process, including the allocation of plots of unserviced land and an inappropriate legislative and regulatory structure; an inefficient and complicated land registration procedure; a scarcity of rental housing, and the high cost of imported construction materials.

On the positive side, however, there is a strong tradition of self-help housing (auto-construction) in Niger, and there exist indigenous materials as well as indigenous architectural and construction traditions, all of which lend themselves to adaptation and the promotion of low cost, affordable housing. Although rapidly urbanizing, with a relatively serious net housing deficit in its major city (estimated at 10,000 units), Niger's shelter conditions are still at a manageable stage; moreover, the GOM has some experience with planning for human settlements and in its draft policy recommendations has chosen a course in which, within the social givens, the availability of resources would govern the shelter solutions chosen.

II. PROJECT OVERVIEW

The Niger Shelter Sector Planning Project (683-0224) was authorized on April 5, 1978 in the amount of \$655,000, with a counterpart contribution by the Government of Niger (GON) in the amount of \$72,000. The Project Agreement was executed on September 28, 1978, with the Ministry of Public Works and Urban Development as the implementing agency.

The purpose of the project was to establish an institutional framework within which the GON can generate and coordinate low and middle income shelter programs in both rural and urban areas. To this end, a combination of long term and short term technical assistance interventions were envisioned, with the outputs of the Project being as follows:

- A. A draft National Housing Policy suitable for presentation to the full Government.
- B. Designs of preliminary low and middle income shelter projects completed and funding for these projects being actively sought by the GON.
- C. Nigerien counterparts within the Ministry carrying on the work begun under this Project.

Although it was ultimately to carry out its purpose and to meet the required outputs, the Project suffered delays in implementation throughout its life. It got off to a slow start, with the first long term resident advisor fielded in August 1979 (following a two-month TDY in April-May), almost a year after the signing of the Project Agreement. The task of this advisor at first was principally to assist in the establishment of an Office responsible for matters concerning the shelter sector, to carry out the necessary research in order to complete a Shelter Sector Assessment for Niger, and to begin to draft a National Housing Policy. There was difficulty recruiting the second long term advisor, who was to be a technical advisor to assist with questions of materials, costs, design, building codes, housing stock and the provision of public facilities. Moreover, committed logistical support from the GON, including the assignment of a counterpart, was not forthcoming during this early phase.

Following an initial evaluation, however, the problem areas were highlighted to the GON and the support commitments were met and, as the second evaluation found, at times exceeded. In addition, the important step was taken to create a Service Central de l'Habitat (Central Office for Shelter) under the Direction de l'Urbanisme (Urban Development Division), with the head of the Service Central de l'Habitat, assigned as the counterpart to the

Resident Advisor, replacing the previous counterpart who remained as an employee in the Service. This occurred in 1980.

Also, an agreement between AID and the GON was reached to forego the recruitment of the second long term advisor in favor of expanded short term technical consultancies, in particular, a socio-economic analysis to establish housing patterns, needs and affordability in Niger, a cadastral study to document tenure patterns and practices, and an analysis of the financial institutions and their actual and potential role in the shelter sector. These inputs were beset by difficulties of various sorts, from the disappearance of substantial amounts of data that had been gathered, to inadequate levels of French, to the lack of concrete proposals; nonetheless, they helped to provide an analytic framework for the important baseline work being carried out by the Resident Advisor and his counterpart.

Following a second evaluation conducted in November 1981 and coinciding approximately with the end of the Resident Advisor's tour of duty, several additional steps were taken to move the Project along. These included a decision to carry out an experimental building materials research project, which included the design and construction of prototype houses out of indigenous materials that would be affordable to the median income population of Niamey; to synthesize the various pieces of research that together constituted the Shelter Sector Assessment and, on that basis, elaborate a draft National Shelter Policy; and to design a large scale sites and services project. To this end, additional technical assistance inputs were made.

The technical assistance totaled approximately 15 months of short term technical assistance, which was approximately what the Implementation Plan called for, and 41 months of long and medium term assistance (30 months of Lombardini and 11 months of Moncrief), a shortfall of only seven months. Table II-1 shows the sequence and duration of Project technical assistance inputs.

Responsibility for the Shelter Planning Project was divided between the Mission and AID's Regional Housing and Urban Development Officer (RHUDO), located in Abidjan. The Project was Mission-funded and was assigned a Project Officer within the Mission to provide general oversight. However, shelter was not an area that was accorded high priority by the Mission in general and it relied to a considerable extent upon RHUDO for technical assistance in implementing the Project.


On AID's side, certain of the implementation difficulties and delays may be ascribed both to this lack of priority and to the logistical problems posed for RHUDO by not having a continuing presence in Niger. On the GON's side, particularly during the implementation of the prototype subproject, some of the implementation delays may be ascribed to the inexperience of the Ministry personnel, as well as the fact that its accounting procedures had not been certified as conforming to AID's

standards and so it was unable to handle the financial management of the Project directly.

The original Project completion date was December 31, 1981. It was subsequently extended several times, with a final Project completion on 4/30/84. Although the time originally planned for Project implementation was exceeded, the amount of money expended was not. At the end of the Project, \$587,536 had been expended, \$67,464 less than authorized. The bulk of the expenditures went for long and short term assistance (approximately 80%); with another 14% going to the construction activity of the prototype subproject (exclusive of technical assistance), 5% to participant training (exclusive of the skills training in the subproject which because it cannot be separated out is included in the technical assistance costs), and 1% to research and translation support services.

FIGURE II-1

NIGER SHELTER PLANNING PROJECT INPUTS



- Key:
1. Project Agreement signed
 2. Resident Technical Assistance/Lombardini psc/shelter sector studies and preliminary shelter policy draft
 3. Short Term Technical Assistance/Ramirez, - Louis Berger/ cadastral study
 4. Short Term Technical Assistance/Hammam, NSSL/socio-economic study
 5. Short Term Technical Assistance/Wright, NSSL/financial institution study
 6. Medium Term Technical Assistance/Moncrief, Pragma/architectural and shelter project physical designs
 7. Intermittent Technical Assistance/Jerome, Pragma/shelter study synthesis and final policy draft
 8. Intermittent Technical Assistance/Darai, Norton, Development Workshop/dome and vault construction, and training of masons
 9. Project completed

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III. EVALUATION SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this evaluation is to provide a final assessment of the Shelter Sector Planning Project as a whole and to determine the extent to which the Project purpose was met and the outputs achieved. Thus, it examines all aspects of the Project; however, because the two previous evaluations (1980 and 1981) provide background information on the early phases of the Project, this evaluation does not consider these inputs in any detail, except as they relate to the specific objectives defined below. Nonetheless, since there has been no evaluation of the Project since the Implementation Plan was modified following the last evaluation, somewhat more detailed information on this final phase is included in Chapter IV of this report.

The evaluation addresses itself specifically to meeting the following evaluation objectives:

- A. To determine the impact of the Project on the ability of the Service Central de l'Habitat to (1) collect data for shelter sector planning, (2) coordinate GON and private sector shelter activities, and (3) influence GON housing policy.
- B. To determine the effectiveness of the training provided under the project.
- C. To assess the prototype housing sub-project with specific reference to (1) cost effectiveness, (2) degree of success in transferring technology, together with the appropriateness of the technology transferred, (3) impact on the position of the Service Central d'Habitat as a focal point for shelter matters, and (4) impact on the Service Central d'Habitat's ability to implement such construction projects directly.
- D. To assess the progress made by the GON in developing a national policy and plan for low income housing and the role that the Project has played.

The evaluation design is based on the use of data gathered from primary and secondary sources, with document review and the open-ended interview being the principal data gathering techniques. Indicators were established under each evaluation objective (see Annex) and have been used during the analysis for verifying and validating subjective data collected.

All extant Project files have been reviewed, both at the Mission in Niamey and at the Regional Housing and Urban Development Office (RHUDO) in Abidjan. In addition, GON and AID officials associated with the Project have been interviewed, as well as

representatives of other institutions important to the shelter sector and representatives of other donor organizations. The evaluator also attended a week-long seminar, organized by the Ministry of Public Works and Urban Development and financed by AID, in which the draft National Shelter Policy was considered and diverse points of view on the policy and on Niger's shelter problems were presented. This seminar also served as a valuable data source.

The Mission formally requested that a counterpart be named by the Ministry of Public Works and Urban Development to work with the evaluator. This was not done. Nonetheless, all GON officials were very cooperative, and the Chief of the Service Central de l'Habitat served as the evaluator's major point of contact and coordination within the Ministry.

The balance of this report is organized into three major sections. Section IV, immediately following, provides a descriptive analysis of the Project accomplishments and difficulties since the 1981 evaluation; Section V provides an analysis of the Shelter Planning Project as a whole in terms of the evaluation objectives outlined above; and, finally, Section VI provides an analysis of the extent to which the Project purpose was met, draws some general conclusions about lessons that can be learned, and makes some recommendations with regard to future activities in the Nigerien shelter sector.

IV. PROJECT DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE LAST EVALUATION

A. Activities Undertaken

The last regular evaluation of the Niger Shelter Sector Planning Project was done in November 1981. At that time, a decision was made to make a substantial modification to the initial project design -- that is to undertake "on-the-ground implementation of selected research activities." These research activities were elaborated into a pilot project which had two principal objectives:

- to explore systems of affordable housing construction in Niamey based on the use of local materials;
- to provide implementation experience to the Service Central d'Habitat, which, up to that time, had been primarily concerned with the conduct of studies.

In addition, a decision was made also to prepare a final draft National Shelter Policy document and to prepare designs for large scale low cost, low income housing projects. A discussion of each of these major activities undertaken follows below.

1. Pilot Project

The development of the pilot project took place in two phases with two separate types of technical assistance inputs.

a. Pilot Project Design

In April 1982, approximately five months after the departure of the Resident Advisor, a new technical assistance team from an organization called Pragma was brought in. One member of that team, Larry Moncrief, was an architect and was given the job of conceptualizing the research "exploration" that was to take place and of designing the project. In addition, he assisted with the site selection.

As conceptualized, based at least in part on an experimental effort mounted earlier by an Italian technical assistance mission in the eastern section of Niamey, the pilot project was to be based on the use of local construction materials and was also to employ architecture that did not require the use of wood and so contribute to the GON's lutte contre la desertification by helping to preserve a scarce vegetal resource. Specifically, the project conceived by Pragma had the

following aims:

- to demonstrate the viability of the evolutive approach to low cost, affordable housing;
- to demonstrate the use of indigenous construction materials in low cost, affordable housing;
- to explore traditional architectural forms compatible with the local climate and ecology.

The initial proposal was rejected by RHUDO and the Mission because the costs of construction were too high; moreover, the Service Central d'Habitat wanted to see the experiment evolve slightly differently. However, the Mission, RHUDO and the Ministry liked the basic concept and approach that had been developed.

Pragma's first proposal called for 12 serviced lots, on six of which houses would be built (three different floorplans), all out of baked banco brick with domed roofs. The second proposal, adjusted for costs and Ministry research interests, which included a desire to experiment with the vault technique and with other materials, called for 12 lots with exterior walls constructed, of which 6 lots would have houses serviced with electricity, running water and a sanitary block, distributed as follows: one one-room house of baked banco with a vault; one two-room house of baked banco with a vault and a dome; one three-room house of baked banco with two vaults and a dome; one four-room house of baked banco with two vaults and a dome; one four-room house of semi-dur (stabilized banco) with two vaults and two domes; and one four-room house of pressed bricks with a flat roof.

This proposal was accepted in October 1982, and in his final report, Moncrief noted that the project had evolved from a pilot project that was aimed primarily at demonstrating low cost, affordable housing construction techniques to a building materials research project.

b. Pilot Project Implementation

Pragma's contract ended shortly after the acceptance of the prototype subproject plan. Thus, it became necessary to seek additional technical assistance for the implementation of the prototype subproject. A locally-based group, already working in the use of indigenous materials (Tapis Vert) was approached, but was unable to undertake the work. Subsequently, RHUDO identified the Canadian-based Development Workshop and contracted with that group to provide intermittent technical assistance

.during the implementation phase.

Originally AID envisioned that Development Workshop would assist the Service Central de l'Habitat in managing the construction process, including cost control and bidding procedures (Pragma had prepared a bid package as part of its work), as well as with construction techniques. However, the Ministry of Public Works made the argument to the Mission that it did not want to put the project out for bids because (1) it felt that the experimental nature of the project might prove unfair to the bidders -- that is, there would be no way that they, particularly small contractors, could realistically assess their own likely costs, and (2) it wanted to get the experience and expertise that it felt could come only from managing the construction process itself. Thus, the Development Workshop input was concentrated in the area of construction techniques, specifically, the training of masons to build domes and vaults and was designed to occur at those periods of construction that required these inputs; However, the consultants -- particularly John Norton -- provided a great deal of other assistance as well, in some of the day to day project management activities, during the time that he was present.1/

During the course of the project, a variety of construction materials were experimented with, including various combinations of cement and laterite and cement and clay to provide a "stabilized" material, which would be more durable than the pure banco but less costly than concrete block. Although it was originally envisioned that the construction take place using primarily baked banco brick, the project was unable to develop a satisfactory baked brick, at least partly because the materials that it was using to fire the oven for baking the brick (peanut shells) did not reach the required temperature. Consequently, four of the projected six units were built of compressed stabilized laterite and stabilized banco brick and one primarily of pure banco; the sixth unit, for which there was still a hope that a fired brick could be developed, was not built past the foundations.

RHUDO and the Mission had agreed that the research effort should be documented. However, missing from the proposal and, later, from the implementation, was provision for controlled experimentation to take place or for any systematic plan to document the research carried out or to publicize the effort. Nonetheless, Development Workshop's Norton provides some analysis of the subproject development and activities. As to a plan for

1/For a full and thoughtful discussion of the pilot project implementation, see Norton's "Final Report," November 1983.

publicizing the effort, that, in itself proves not to have been necessary, for the undertaking has generated a great deal of interest.

In addition, a video was made of parts of the construction process and was shown on national television during the week of the Seminar. What has not happened, however, is an educational or popularization effort; perhaps that is more appropriately left to follow the completion of the experiment, but it is important to the demonstration intent of the subproject that that aspect in some way be followed through.

Specifically, the pilot project resulted in the following:

- construction of five units of varying sizes, almost entirely out of indigenous materials, using dome and vault technologies to replace the commonly used wooden cross beams each serviced by a sanitary block, water (individual standpipe), and electricity.
- the testing of several variations of stabilized banco and laterite to determine the relative resistance both to an extended period of exposure to water and to a relatively short, intense exposure.
- the training of supervising technicians, masons and laborers in dome and vault construction techniques.
- the provision of technical assistance and certain types of training to employees of the Service Central de l'Habitat pertaining to the organization and management of a construction project.
- the publicizing of the concept of building with indigenous materials and of preserving the scarce wood resource.

The Development Workshop input took place at three separate times during the life of the pilot project, with each input ranging in duration from approximately 4-6 weeks. Technical assistance ended in October 1983, with the completion of the vault and dome construction. Final construction was completed by the Ministry completed in April 1984.

2. Draft National Shelter Policy

Although the pilot project absorbed most of the time and energy of all those associated with the Shelter Planning Project (Mission, RHUDO, Service Central de l'Habitat, and consultants) during this last phase, an important output of this phase was a draft National Shelter Policy document.

One of the Pragma technicians, Axel Jerome, was charged with the responsibility of elaborating the work completed during Resident Advisor Lombardini's tenure into the final draft policy document, which was envisioned as one of the principal Project outputs in the Project Paper. This task was completed.

During this time, too, studies concerning the socio-economic aspects of shelter in Niger and the financial institutional structure, as related to shelter were completed by consultants Sonia Hammam and Ian Michael Wright, both of the National Savings and Loan League. Hammam's study was an effort to repeat, in an abbreviated manner, the study she had carried out in 1981, but for which much of the raw data was lost in transmission from Niger to Washington, D.C. The 1981 report, which she had completed before this phase, had been based largely on her preliminary analyses and on reconstruction of her field notes. Wright's work, largely a descriptive analysis of the existing financial institutional structure in Niger, provided a useful overview but failed to provide the hoped for concrete proposals for ways to provide access for low income households to long term credit.

Although Jerome was present only intermittently, he was able, with the approval of the Director of Urban Affairs in the Ministry of Public Works and Urban Development to establish a standing committee of various interested Ministries and other affected organizations, which met to discuss the document as it developed. The final document which emerged from this process drew heavily on work previously done by Lombardini, Wright and Hammam; it was completed in December 1982.

3. Plan for Large Scale Low Cost Housing Projects

Pragma's Moncrief was required, in addition to his work on the pilot project, to develop at least one large scale (1,000 units) sites and services project design. He basically fulfilled this requirement, but modified it, with the approval of the Ministry, to meet the requirements of four separate sites, which had been considered and rejected as sites for the Pilot Project, instead of one large site.

B. Implementation Difficulties Encountered

During the final phase of the Shelter Planning Project, as might be expected, certain implementation difficulties occurred. These difficulties stemmed primarily from two separate but related aspects of the project:

- phasing of the technical assistance inputs, and
- management and oversight of the prototype subproject.

Each of these is briefly discussed below.

1. Phasing of Technical Assistance Inputs

Time and momentum was lost as a result of a five-month gap between the departure of Resident Advisor Lombardini and the arrival of the Pragma team. As a result both of this time lag and of the inevitable discontinuity that occurs when new personnel arrive, the prototype subproject, decided upon in principal in November 1981 was not fully conceptualized until almost a year later in October 1982. Then, because Pragma's contract came to an end shortly thereafter and other technical assistance for the construction phase had to be sought, there was another time lag of about four months between pilot project acceptance and the start of the construction. Then, the construction activity itself did not proceed rapidly during the phased inputs of Development Workshop, due, at least partly, to the intermittent inputs planned. 1/

The delays made it impossible to meet the already extended Project completion date. When, having now been started, construction could not be completed as anticipated, the Project completion date was extended twice again, with the final extension date being April 30, 1984. The consequence of these extensions (perhaps, better, the need for the extensions), ironically, was a further interruption of construction activity and so caused more delays. In short, had the dynamics of the situation, in terms of the phasing of the technical assistance, been more fully understood at the outset and a realistic schedule established, not only would some of the delays themselves have been avoided, but the planning and the execution of the prototype subproject might have been improved.

2. Prototype Subproject Management

The management difficulties encountered occurred primarily during the implementation of the prototype subproject, and these derived largely from the fact that the Ministry was inexperienced. In that, some of the difficulties were to be expected. For example, the management inexperience contributed to the construction delays (i.e., faulty scheduling of supplies; labor difficulties) as well as to the higher than estimated per unit cost.

This inexperience was exacerbated by what turned out to be a

RHUDO recommended to the Mission that a medium term (6-8 month) resident technician be brought in to coordinate the subproject. His recommendation was not followed partly because of the inability to recruit an appropriate candidate, partly because the Mission felt it could provide adequate support through its own engineers, and partly because the Ministry wanted to manage the subproject itself.

sometimes difficult relationship with the Mission regarding the payment of the prototype project expenses. Because the Ministry decided to manage the prototype subproject itself instead of contracting the job (i.e., to serve as its own general contractor), that meant that it had to deal with and pay a variety of subcontractors and suppliers, as well as the laborers and masons. However, the Ministry's accounting procedures had not been certified to be in conformance with those procedures required by AID, and so each and every payment had, in reality, to be made directly by the Mission. Moreover, no advances could be made to the prototype subproject, not even in the form of a petty cash fund.

Not only did the lack of flexibility at times obstruct implementation, it also caused bad feelings all around. On the one hand, the Ministry felt that it was not trusted, that, in fact, AID's procedures were unnecessarily cumbersome and that they were causing it not to be able really to manage the subproject effectively. On the other hand, the Mission was not really set up to handle this sort of Project accounting and found the processing requirements burdensome.

In short, this aspect of the project led to some negative attitudes within the subproject (eg., initial delays in paying the laborers because of accounting procedures) as well as to higher costs (eg., having to buy larger quantities of items than was necessary because of the necessity of buying on account). In terms of the Shelter Planning Project as a whole, what should have been only an incidental part has come to assume a disproportionately large size in people's minds and, to some extent, overshadow the accomplishments of the effort.

Of course, this situation would not have occurred if the initial plan to contract the work out had been adhered to. Nonetheless, since the purpose of not contracting out the work was to give the Ministry experience, it would have been far preferable for all concerned if it had been able to handle the financial management directly. Had the Ministry's accounting procedures been certified, at least for this Project -- and there is no evidence to suggest that they could not be, although the time constraints and the amount of money involved might have made it not worthwhile -- much of this difficulty could have been avoided. Moreover, it is possible that through a system of established drawdowns established at the outset (instead of the piecemeal "pay as the vouchers are submitted" approach used), the Ministry might have been encouraged to plan more systematically and to have exercised more rigorous control over the subproject activities.

Another aspect of prototype subproject management that also contributed to time delays and higher costs was a lack of consistently effective site management, tied in part to the

sporadic progress of the Project as a whole and in part to the financial management difficulties just discussed. In addition, the Ministry's lack of experience was also a factor.

C. Achievements During the Final Phase

Despite the difficulties encountered, the final phase of the Shelter Planning Project resulted in the outputs originally planned (see section IV.A above), all of which are discussed in more detail in Chapter V immediately following. In addition, however, certainly the prototype subproject served the function of helping to contextualize the shelter planning process for the Service Central de l'Habitat and to focus attention on the issues of affordable shelter and the use of indigenous materials. That attention may itself have spurred the serious consideration that the Draft Shelter Policy document -- also an output of this final phase -- has received. Moreover, in allowing the Service Central de l'Habitat to acquire some, albeit limited, "hands on" implementation experience, it seems also to have allowed it to carry greater weight in the shelter policy planning process.

V. OVERALL PROJECT EFFECTIVENESS

This section, the heart of this report, examines those issues identified by the Mission and RHUDO as being central to the evaluation. The analysis is organized by the specific objectives outlined in Section II, which are, briefly, to determine the following:

- impact of the Project on the ability of the Service Central de l'Habitat to collect data for shelter sector planning, to coordinate GON and private sector shelter activities, and to influence GON housing policy;
- effectiveness of the training provided;
- impact of the prototype subproject with regard to its cost effectiveness, success of transferring technology and the appropriateness of that technology, changes in the Service Central de l'Habitat's position as a focal point for shelter matters and its ability to implement construction projects;
- progress made by the GON in developing a national policy and plan for low income shelter.


A. Project Impact on Operations of Service Central de l'Habitat

Fundamental to the assessment of the Shelter Planning Project's impact on the operations of the Service Central de l'Habitat is the fact that prior to this project, such an entity did not exist. While there were certainly other contributing factors (such as the return from foreign study of a person qualified to head the operation, M. Bako Boubacar) its coming into existence appears to have been stimulated at least in part by the Shelter Planning Project. Indeed, this office, designated specifically to deal with shelter planning and policy issues, was put in place in 1980, after the Resident Advisor Lombardini had been advising the Ministry of Public Works for approximately one year. The Service Central de l'Habitat was initially staffed by the two counterparts of the Resident Advisor, a secretary and himself. At the present time, it has a staff of eight.

The Service Central de l'Habitat is under the direction of the Division of Urban Development (Urbanisme) -- see organization chart in Figure V-1. It could be argued that this organization does not accord sufficient priority to the shelter sector, that the unit is layered over and so not viewed as important. However, it could also be argued, and perhaps more convincingly, that its placement within the context of urban development makes eminent sense and is testimony to the acceptance by the GON of a broad concept of shelter -- a concept which incorporates not only the physical

FIGURE V-1

Organization Chart -- Service Central de l'Habitat



Source: "Ministère des Travaux Publics et du l'Urbanisme du Niger," No. 1.

structure but also the supporting physical and socio-economic infrastructure and services.

As the situation now exists, the Chief of the Service Central de l'Habitat enjoys ready access to the Director of Urban Development and seems to have no difficulty gaining access to the Minister himself. Indeed, the importance accorded to the shelter sector by the Ministry is indicated in part by the fact that during the recent "National Urban Shelter Seminar," financed by AID as a follow-on to the Shelter Planning Project, the Minister was present not only for the ceremonial portions but for most of the working sessions as well.

1. Impact on Shelter Sector Planning Capacity

The major output of the Shelter Planning Project was to be a draft National Shelter Policy document suitable for presentation to the GON. During the course of the Project -- in December 1982 -- a draft policy document was completed with the aid of Pragma advisor Jerome. This document drew heavily on the previous work done, which included studies carried out by the National Savings and Loan League (Hammam and Wright) and some eight studies, including a preliminary draft "Politique de l'Habitat au Niger" (1981), carried out by Advisor Lombardini and his counterparts, principally M. Bako, Chief of Service Central de l'Habitat.

Thus, the draft National Shelter Policy document that was prepared was based on a substantial amount of research, establishing baseline data, and analysis. In the legacy of the basic research alone, the Service Central de l'Habitat's ability to plan for the shelter sector was substantially enhanced. Beyond the documents prepared, however, two important questions remain to be answered -- that of "ownership" by the Ministry of the documents and that of capacity for future action.

With regard to the question of "ownership" of the documents produced, it can be said that during both Advisor Lombardini's and Jerome's technical assistance efforts were made to work closely with Nigerien government officials. In the case of Lombardini, and so much of the basic research and analytical work, the joint efforts were of significant duration and were focused on the Service Central de l'Habitat. Thus, for example, he and M. Bako traveled throughout Niger together to gather, for the first time, data about shelter conditions. As a result of the collaborative efforts, the Service Central de l'Habitat had a significant stake in the work produced -- for example,

1/ A cadastral study prepared by Louis Berger (Ramirez) earlier in the project, however, was not significantly incorporated. See Appendix for complete list of reports produced under the Project.

these, unlike the National Savings and Loan studies, were all issued as official reports by the Ministry of Public Works and Urban Development rather than simply as "project reports."

With regard to the synthesizing process, carried out by Jerome, preparatory to the draft National Shelter Policy, the efforts were focused on a larger group, with representatives of other divisions in the Ministry of Public Works as well as of other Ministries participating in the process. This type of process was undoubtedly important in order to ensure that all the actors "bought in." However, the collaboration with the Service Central de l'Habitat suffered somewhat as a result, and some bad feelings were created by Jerome's submission of the document he had prepared to M. Bako and his rather precipitate departure immediately thereafter, without discussing the document.1/

The negative impression that this created caused more than an initial lack of a sense of "ownership" on the part of Service Central de l'Habitat and appears to have been the reason for failure to communicate AID on the National Policy after its submission. It was submitted in December 1982 to resurface again in discussions with the Mission about the possibility of a National Seminar only in the spring of 1984, some 18 months later.

However, according to Ministry officials action on the draft policy was taking place following its submission. Only after it was submitted by Jerome did the Chief of the Service Central de l'Habitat have a chance to review it. Following that review and assuring himself that it was indeed based on the work that he and Lombardini had done, M. Bako then, through Ministry channels, transmitted portions of the draft Policy to appropriate other agencies for review and comment. In December 1983, a National Commission on Urban Development was convened, and a synopsis of the draft policy was presented there in anticipation of a later National Shelter Seminar. Thus, in the intervening time, there was activity in the policy area by the Ministry.

Although the Mission made efforts to discuss the intentions of the Ministry with regard to the draft policy, matters

/Note: This observation has been corroborated by a number of sources and a negative impression by the Ministry in this matter is accurate; however, the evaluator was unable to talk directly to Mr. Jerome himself.

were basically stalled as a result of this turn of events. Moreover, since there was no mechanism in the implementation plan for systematic follow-up, since there was no Resident Advisor, and since the implementation of the prototype subproject took center stage, as far as AID knew the draft policy had gone nowhere. In terms of a strict interpretation of the Project Paper, however, it could be said that the output had been realized -- the draft policy was a document "suitable" for presentation to the GON. Although the logframe contains the presentation of the policy for GON review as an indicator, a critical missing component (perhaps partly as a result of the Project delays as well as the phasing of the technical assistance inputs) was that of a mechanism to assure or to facilitate that presentation.

In terms of this Project design, and certainly for any such future policy planning projects elsewhere, linkages should be provided between the preparation of a draft and the subsequent steps necessary in the policy-making process of the country concerned to facilitate government review and adoption. In this case, however, the result -- which could not have been predicted, but is perhaps, in the end, a more desirable one -- is that the Service Central de l'Habitat, the Division of Urban Development, and the Ministry of Public Works and Urban Development have deliberated over a period of time, have made specific policy and program suggestions based on the document (including far-ranging consideration of the implications of each), and have taken steps toward the prerequisite review by the Inter-Ministerial Council prior to formal GON adoption. The documents and agenda prepared for and the organization of the recent National Urban Shelter Seminar provides objective evidence for the finding that the ability to plan for the shelter sector has reached a rather sophisticated level.

The second question that must be considered in trying to gauge whether the Service Central de l'Habitat's ability to plan for the shelter sector has been enhanced by the technical assistance provided by this Project is that of its ability to undertake future actions. Now that it has baseline data, plans for specific shelter projects (see also discussion following), and a thorough understanding of the multidimensional nature of shelter sector planning, will the Service Central de l'Habitat be able to collect the data and to carry out the other tasks necessary to ensuring that such planning remains relevant to the sector? The answer to this question is less clear. It will depend to some extent upon what happens as a result of the Seminar's recommendations that there be an institutional overhaul to allow the coordination of activities in the shelter sector. The Ministry of Public Works had initially proposed what would have in effect been an elevation of the functions of the Service Central de l'Habitat to the status

of an independent Agency.

Action on the Seminar's recommendation may take some time. In the meantime, the Service Central de l'Habitat's staff, although interested and supported by all levels of the Ministry, is small and largely untested; moreover, with regard to the specific question of data collection, there is no one on board who has social science training.

While it might not be necessary to have such a person on staff in order to plan effectively (for example, the conduct of surveys could be undertaken by a representative from the Ministry of Plan, by university students or by the local Institute for Human Science Research (IRSH)). However, it is necessary for both micro and macro level planning (that is, for specific shelter projects as well as national policy) that there be a sound understanding of the socio-economic conditions and the preferences of the beneficiary population. It is unfortunate, useful as the Hammam study was, that no person in the Service Central de l'Habitat appears to have benefited from that effort in terms of its methodology and research design. It is also unfortunate that no appropriate candidate was identified and sent for long term training as had been initially contemplated by the Project.

2. Project Impact on Coordination of GON/Private Shelter Activities

Since the Service Central de l'Habitat has not yet undertaken any shelter projects -- outside of the prototype subproject under this Project -- it is difficult to ascertain precisely in what measure the technical assistance under this Project has strengthened it in this area. However, some indications of an enhanced capacity in this area may be found in the current active seeking of financing for the project designs prepared under this Project. (This was an indicator identified also in the original Project Paper.) The Ministry reports that active negotiations are currently taking place with the Italians (CONSASS), the French (REXCOOP), and the UNDP.

A further test of the Service Central de l'Habitat's ability to implement as well as to coordinate public/private sector activities will be the manner in which it is able to handle the disposition of the five prototype units (currently planned to take place through sale to the Credit du Niger and designated for beneficiaries below the median income) and whether it is able to develop the seven other sites with the proceeds.

Whether or not the Service Central de l'Habitat is successful in these various undertakings, however, its ultimate effectiveness in coordinating public and private activities in the shelter sector is limited by the existing

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institutional structure. Both the Ministry of Public Works and Urban Development and the Service Central de l'Habitat, have clearly recognized these limitations and, in the basic document for the National Seminar on Urban Shelter, put forward a proposal for the creation of an independent agency, to operate under the aegis of the inter-Ministerial Council, which among other responsibilities would administer a National Housing Fund (also proposed to be established) and ensure an equitable distribution of housing financing (through a revitalized Credit du Niger) to the median and lower income populations.

The current limitations on the potential effectiveness of the Service Central de l'Habitat are imposed by conditions in the shelter sector itself. The proposals that have been made, however, to restructure that sector -- regardless of whether they are accepted in total and whether what emerges is the independent agency suggested^{1/} -- that the Ministry of Public Works put forward such a proposal indicates that the Service Central de l'Habitat has been able to make a convincing case for the necessity both of a coordinating role in the shelter sector and of the resources and status necessary to carry it out.

3. Project Impact on Ability to Influence GON Shelter Policy

There can be no doubt that the Shelter Planning Project has greatly strengthened the ability of the Service Central de l'Habitat's ability to influence GON shelter policy. Whether or not the policy as recommended by the National Seminar is finally adopted as it now stands, the fact that the seminar was organized around the basic principles of the draft National Shelter Policy prepared under this Project stands as evidence of this ability. Moreover, the recommendations adopted by the Seminar accept the basic premise on which the draft policy is based -- that is to provide greater access to decent, affordable shelter to all strata of Nigerien society, including those below the median income level.

During the Seminar, over eighty representatives of Government Ministries and parastatal organizations, representatives of local government (each Prefecture and Commune), and representatives of international organizations discussed technical, technological, financial, institutional, infrastructural, servicing,

^{1/}During the course of the work in subcommittees, a conflict on the issue of the organizational form emerged, with representatives of local government wanting a direct role. As a result the recommendation of an independent agency was not made and one to restructure the sector substituted. Thus, a central issue was left unresolved.

titling, rental and tenure issues attendant to the policy proposals. The stated goal of the Seminar was to develop concrete proposals to be incorporated into a policy document that would be submitted to the Inter-Ministerial Council for review prior to adoption as a GON policy by the Head of State (See also discussion of policy formulation in Section D of this Chapter). Although the discussions of the points were lively and diverse, sometimes with conflicting points of view being represented, the fact that the issues were formulated based on the Service Central de l'Habitat's work meant that its influence on the process was considerable.

However, it is fair to ask the further question of how important or meaningful that process really was. The answer to the question is difficult to determine precisely, but that the entire seminar was a serious undertaking was reflected by a number of things, including the following:

- a. the opening and closing of the seminar by the Minister of Public Works and urban Development and his accompaniment by other Ministers, including the Minister of Finance;
- b. the fact that the Minister stayed for most of the working sessions and that he was clearly working behind the scenes throughout the process -- for example, the Director of Urban Development and the Chief of the Service Central de l'Habitat met with him each evening after the seminar session to debrief;
- c. the assignment of the counselor to the Prime Minister and the Prefet-Maire of Niamey as President and Rapporteur, respectively, of the subcommittee charged with producing the final synthesizing document that was to be the recommendation of the Seminar;
- d. the amount of newspaper and television coverage of the Seminar, which included coverage not only while the Seminar was taking place but also in the week preceding, when a national "teledébate" on housing and shelter issues took place between M. Kalla, Director of Urban Development, the immediate supervisor of the Chief of the Service Central de l'Habitat, and a representative of the Credit du Niger (virtually the only source of housing finance). Moreover, this coverage was not simply "public relations," but in its raising of difficult issues suggested that concrete proposals for action would be recommended by the Seminar. It seems unlikely that expectations would have been thus raised had the undertaking not been a serious one;
- e. the inclusion of representatives from all institutions potentially affected by the National Policy

to hear their views and to build consensus; and finally,

f. the issuance of a series of policy proposals, read over National television (see Appendix) at the close of the seminar that do not, for the most part, -- as is sometimes the result of such seminars -- put off the troubling issues for "further study" (the rent issue and the insitutional issue being two important exceptions), and does articulate an actionable program.

B. Effectiveness of Training under the Project

Training of four types took place, with relative degrees of effectiveness, under this Project. A discussion of each follows.

1. Counterpart Training

At the beginning of the Project, there was no counterpart assigned, and so the Resident Advisor had to work alone; thus, no counterpart training per se took place in a strict sense during much of this period. Following that, however, for approximately eighteen months, effective counterpart training, on a one-to-one basis, took place during the first part of the Project.

However, it is useful also to approach the concept of counterpart training somewhat more broadly in a Project such as this one, where institutional and policy change is the goal and so the ambit of concern must reach beyond the preparation (or not) of an individual to perform a specific task. Looked at in this way, it could be said that some degree of "training" took place even in the first year, with the result that the Ministry did establish an office specifically focused on shelter.

The next steps concerned with the elaboration of the Shelter Policy, based on the carrying out of basic research efforts, also required more than a one-to-one counterpart training relationship in order to be effective. The result of this work was that not only the official counterpart but others such as the Director of Urban Development adopted a philosophy of shelter supply and delivery based on the principals of greater access to ownership and the availability of affordable shelter options to very income level, including those below the median. Although there is no objective measure available, it is the observation of former Resident Advisor Lombardini, who returned at the request of his former counterpart M. Bako to participate in this seminar, that the approach to shelter problems in the Ministry had evolved substantially from when he first arrived in Niger in 1979.

2. Short Term Training

During the course of the Project, several representatives of

the Ministry, including the current Minister (then Director of Construction), the Director of Urban Development, and the Chief of Service Central de l'Habitat, and others, attended various conferences and seminars on shelter problems. These conferences, held in Kenya, Senegal, Tunisia, Ivory Coast, Mauritius, and Botswana, undoubtedly contributed to the changed approach of the Ministry by the interchange with other shelter professionals and the perspectives and approaches to shelter that they provided. On this level, while not subject to quantification of any sort, the impact appears to have been positive. At least these short term missions generally created good will, for those participants interviewed, unanimously felt that they had benefited from these conferences.

Moreover, whether or not it grows from this short term training, there appears to be a consciousness on the part of Ministry officials of the shelter problems and policies in other parts of the world -- particularly other parts of Africa -- as was indicated by the showing of several films on a self-help approach to affordable housing in other parts of the world, during the week of the Seminar.

As mentioned above, however, some short term training opportunities were missed. Although Project implementation itself perhaps should not be faulted in this regard -- perhaps more the Project design -- there was no provision made for the representatives of the Ministry and, specifically, Service Central de l'Habitat, to benefit from the processes (methodology, etc.) associated with the short term technical assistance inputs. This deficiency, as noted above, is particularly regrettable in the area of socio-economic survey research. It is also regrettable because, given the inability and then the decision not to recruit the second long term advisor and, subsequently, a replacement for Lombardini, the reduced training impact of the Project could have been at least partially offset in this way.

3. Long Term Training

This area is one in which the Project was deficient. Long term training commitments were made at the outset, and, indeed, a candidate from the Service Central de l'Habitat (M. Tahirou) was identified and, in fact, given English language training over a period of some two years. Finally, because of a question of academic qualification, he was not sent. This situation has, understandably, caused some embarrassment and resentment on the part of Ministry personnel. While it is difficult to sort out just why this situation occurred, it seems that it should have been possible to have known earlier -- perhaps even before M. Tahirou was enrolled in language training -- that university level training was not going to be possible for him. There is a feeling on the Ministry's part, too, that having held the promise out to M. Tahirou that some effort should have

been made to enroll him in another type of training of a more practical nature.

Apparently the Ministry was unable to identify another candidate for long term training. At any rate, this aspect of the Project plan was not realized.

4. Technical and Skills Training

This aspect of the training component under the Shelter Planning Project was not originally envisioned, but it took place in conjunction with the prototype subproject. A specific purpose of this subproject was to train Nigerian masons in the techniques of vault and dome construction, with the hope that, once trained, they would extend the technique and the wood-free architecture in which it is used to the greater population.

As to the first part, that took place: the Technical Advisor, Norton, reports that eight masons and three laborers received training in vault construction and seven masons and two laborers received training in dome construction. (Incidentally, for the laborers, the training represents more than mastery of the technology, for it meant that during the course of the prototype subproject they became adept at masonry work as well.) However, while the evaluator was unable to talk directly with the workers involved, the opinion expressed generally was that they would use the new techniques only in response to a demand that may or may not be present in the future, rather than to try actively to create a market for construction using these techniques.

The training was adequate to acquaint the workers with the basic techniques and to give them practice constructing at least one vault and one dome. Of the two, the dome technique is less demanding and so, given the time and other constraints, the workers became relatively more skilled in this area. In both cases, however, the workers are likely to need some supervision before being fully capable of disseminating the technique. (Norton, 1983) The wooden formwork and the dry brick formwork carried out in connection with the construction of arches, however, was successfully taught. (Ibid.)

Perhaps the most severe deficiency of this effort was the absence of a discrete training period; the workers were quite literally trained while they were also building what were to be demonstration, affordable house. Sometimes the training aims and the demonstration aims were incompatible. Although training was envisioned as one of the purposes of the subproject (see also discussion immediately following), the training itself was severely constrained by the deadlines of the Project (exacerbated by delays in the delivery to the site of necessary materials) and some of the

materials used (ameliorated laterite) not being reusable -- as for example banco would have been -- limited the amount of marginally acceptable work that could be torn down. In short, the training and the other purposes of the subproject would have been better served had they been disengaged from each other -- for example, if there had been a practical stage de formation on the worksite before the actual construction began.

Another aspect of the practical training that took place during the prototype subproject had to do with the gaining of experience by the Ministry of Public Works personnel in managing a construction project. In addition to this on-the-job training, four persons at the supervisory technician level gained experience in supervising vault and dome construction and would, in the opinion of Norton, be able to do so again.

In terms of numbers of people trained, the achievement of the prototype subproject is small; however, despite the defects in training design and the other constraints operating, the level of training achieved seems to be in line with what could be expected given the small size of the prototype subproject itself.

Prototype Subproject Effectiveness

This section examines the effectiveness of the prototype subproject from four points of view. As noted in Chapter IV of this report, the concept of the subproject evolved over a period of time, and, in the end, it seems to have been trying to achieve too many different, sometimes competing, objectives. Another way of saying the same thing is that different people had different agendas and these were inadequately sorted out to begin with. The demonstration of the concept of providing low cost housing, that could be built in increments and be affordable to those below the median income, was intertwined with the demonstration of an architecture that did not use wood, which was itself intertwined with the research component that was concerned with the discovery of an appropriate ameliorated indigenous building material. All of these elements were complicated by the training and experience-gaining purposes of the subproject. When "push came to shove," at the end, the overriding objective became -- and appropriately so, for otherwise none of the purposes would have been served -- to get the units built.

Some of these conceptual problems might have been avoided if there had been greater continuity in the technical assistance and if there had been a recognition that the ambiguities in the project would lead to implementation difficulties. At the least, an attempt to prioritize the aims would have been helpful. All of this might have happened had there been a more realistic assessment of the time involved and an extension of the Project completion date requested that reflect that assessment.

The reason for raising these issues at this point is that with the ambiguity of purposes comes a certain ambiguity also in the terms of the subproject's assessment. Certainly this ambiguity can be seen in some of the critical comments that have been made, with each person focusing on that aspect that most interests him or her and disregarding the other purposes that may also have been served. The lesson here is an old one: it is not possible to be all things to all people and so choices have to be made.

Nonetheless, it is important to stress here, lest it should get lost in the following discussion, even against the backdrop of competing agendas and the other constraints, the prototype subproject was worth doing and has provided some very interesting results.

1. Cost Effectiveness

The issue of cost effectiveness will be examined here from four points of view, actual affordability of the units, potential affordability of the units, possible implications of the technology for foreign exchange savings, and the role that the prototype subproject played in the overall effectiveness of the Shelter Planning Project as a whole.

a. Actual Affordability

If we were to judge the cost effectiveness of this subproject on the cost per unit and to compare that with a realistic financing package (assuming credit to be available) in today's market in Niger, we would find that the units are not affordable by the target population. If we were to judge the cost effectiveness of this subproject on the basis of a comparison between actual costs per unit and those costs projected by RHUDO, we would find that they exceed initial estimates, which were based on making the units affordable to low income target population. In gross terms, 33,666,457 CFA or US\$78,295 (exclusive of technical assistance and Ministry employee salaries) was spent on the construction. Divided by the five units built, that comes to US\$15,659 per unit or, more appropriately, if we look at unit size and allocate general "overhead" expenditures uniformly across the units, we have a price range of from 4,918,457 CFA (US\$11,438) for the one room unit to 7,943,180 CFA (US\$18,472) for the four room units. These costs, unadjusted for inflation, are five to six times those estimated as affordable by Hammam in 1981.1/

Even if we adjust the terms of this analysis and adjust for

/Hammam assumed a shorter term loan (15 years) than is usually assumed. She also assumed a 10% downpayment and a lower interest rate (11.5%) than currently prevails.

inflation -- that is to assume that household incomes have risen at the rate of inflation -- the units are not affordable by the median income person. Moreover, if we discount for certain items because of the experimental nature of the project as RHUDO Engineer Johnson has done (See

Appendix) in his final cost analysis, using terms that might be applicable to a HG loan financed project, we find that the units still fall outside the reach of the target population^{1/}.

Figure V-1 compares the monthly payments required per unit, according to Johnson's figures, and the money potentially available for shelter (calculated at both 25% and 33% of monthly income) by the median income household, with the income figures adjusted for inflation. When calculated according to these assumptions, only the smallest unit is affordable, and it is affordable only when 33% of monthly income is available for shelter.

b. Potential Affordability

However, all of the preceding figures are illustrative of the affordability of these particular units. More important for the analysis of the cost effectiveness of the prototype subproject is the potential affordability of similar units. It seems clear that there are areas in which substantial savings could be realized.

In his memorandum, Johnson generously discounts costs for certain of the expenditures that came about as a result of the experimental nature of the project and of its research objectives. In fact there may be other factors that should be considered as having added to the costs in the subproject; these may include some of those covered under Johnson's rubric, "excess labor charges," but are useful to consider anyway:

- delays in construction attributable to irregular building material delivery
- delays in construction attributable to low worker morale having to do, in part, with the slowness of wage payments

^{1/}Note: These calculations are based on Johnson's and the Mission's figures, but from conversations with the Ministry, their figures are somewhat lower. However, the evaluator did not do an analysis of these. Moreover, the calculations have assumed that the land would be a GON contribution; however, since the land on which the units were built apparently belongs to the Municipality of Niamey, the land costs have yet to be determined.

FIGURE V-2

AFFORDABILITY COMPARISON OF PROTOTYPE UNITS

unit	monthly payment required ^{1/}	median household monthly available for shelter and surplus/deficit against requirement	
		estimated current median ^{2/} CFA 58,283 US\$ 135.54	

estimated amount available for shelter			
		25%	33%
		CFA 14,570 US\$ 33.88	CFA 19,233 US\$ 44.72
1A/1 room	CFA 18,442 US\$ 42.89	- CFA 3,872 - US\$ 9.06	+ CFA 791 + US\$ 1.93
2A/2 rooms	CFA 30,254 US\$ 70.35	- CFA 15,684 - US\$ 36.47	- CFA 11,021 - US\$ 25.63
3A/3 rooms	CFA 42,067 US\$ 97.83	- CFA 27,497 - US\$ 63.94	- CFA 22,834 - US\$ 53.10
5B/4 rooms	CFA 53,879	- CFA 39,309	- CFA 34,646
6C/4 rooms	US\$ 125.30	- US\$ 91.42	- US\$ 80.57

1/ Assumes the HG terms of 13% annual interest rate, loan life of 20 years and 100% cost recovery set forth in Johnson's memorandum included in the Appendix to this Report

2/ This is likely to be a high estimate, for it is based on an adjustment of the 1981 median income estimated by Hammam to reflect Niger's inflation since that time. In all probability, however, individual incomes have not kept pace with inflation.

Source: Calculations based on Johnson (1984), Hammam (1982), and World Bank (1982) data. The Hammam data are derived from a 1982 survey of nine communities in the Niamey area. The survey was biased in favor of lower income areas and verified the findings of a household survey carried out in 1972.

- delays in construction attributable to the slowness of bricklaying for vaults and domes as a result of inexperienced workers (Norton estimates productivity with trained workers could easily be doubled)
- delays in construction attributable to rains
- delays in construction attributable to inexperienced site managers
- delays in construction due to the availability of only one press during most of the construction (supplemental presses that had been procured proved to be of faulty construction)
- smallness of project providing no economies of scale
- accounting procedures making small quantity and discount buying difficult
- material wastage due to training activity.

From this listing, it is apparent that there are numerous areas pertaining to overall project management in which cost savings could be realized in future development of these prototypes.

In addition, there are also areas related to the construction technology itself in which it appears that cost savings could occur. These include:

- use of less cement in the ameliorated substance (the subproject found that as little as 3% worked well for some areas but had used percentages as high as 10%, for the foundations for example)
- re-design of the building to reduce the interior wall thickness and to reflect better the materials used.

Finally, the level of infrastructure and associated costs are both fairly high for this pilot project. Future elaborations of the prototypes could include reductions of several types, such as:

- use of a less expensive sanitary disposal system
- no electrical hook up
- centralized water rather than individual connections.

Moreover, the introduction of self-help (or aided self-help) construction would also considerably lower costs.

Thus, if we consider potential affordability of the units as the basis for assessing subproject cost effectiveness, conclusions are quite different from those we draw if we look

only at actual costs. It appears that the prototypes could be produced and afforded by the median and lower income population if credit mechanisms existed to finance their acquisition.

c. Potential Foreign Exchange Implications

From a national perspective, there is demonstrated in the prototype subproject a potential for lowering the import content of construction (including public building construction -- see discussion in section 2 following) and so for lessening the foreign exchange drain. While we will not be able to formulate any exact ratios, if the subproject has contributed to the acceptance of this concept, if only in a small way, this contribution must also be weighed in the assessment of the subproject's cost effectiveness.

d. Role in the Shelter Planning Project

The final dimension to be considered in the assessment of the subproject's cost effectiveness is that of the relationship of the cost to the role that it has played in the overall Shelter Planning Project. From this point of view, the expenditure of roughly 14% of the Project funds (exclusive of technical assistance) seems to have been highly effective in terms of the returns that it has yielded:

- it has generated great interest in the press, among other donors, within the Ministry of Public Works and Urban Development and others in Government. (President Kountché himself is reported to have visited the site late last year, following a television broadcast in which the project and the concepts behind it were discussed.) Regardless of the particular judgments made about the prototype units themselves, they have proved to be a means of focusing on the use of indigenous materials in construction.
- it has helped to focus attention on the issue of shelter in Niger.
- it is likely (although this cannot be objectively verified) to have served a catalytic role in the recent national policy developments.
- it has created good will for USAID.

Technology Transfer/Appropriateness

The subject of technology transfer in this subproject must be divided into three categories:

- dome and vault technology
- stabilized indigenous materials.

• Incremental building concept and building design

a. Dome and Vault Technology

The technology of dome and vault building is not a new technology but it is not widely known in Niger, even though other groups in Niger have worked in this area -- for example, Projet Tapis Vert, which works in unameliorated banco, largely in rural areas, and the Italian technical assistance which build two demonstration houses in Niamey, using similar technology a few years ago. As mentioned under Section B of this chapter, concerning training, this technology was transferred to a dozen Nigeriens during the course of construction. In this limited way, the technology was successfully transferred.

In any larger sense, however, the success (or perhaps the appropriateness or acceptance) of the technology is yet to be verified. There is some resistance to the dome and vault architectural style (as well as some conflicting professional opinion as to whether or not they should be ventilated), based on aesthetic grounds. With specific reference to the prototype units, the resistance is not too serious (and/or the housing deficit is so great) because there have been 250 individual applications for the five units.

With regard to the further dissemination of the technology, the masons trained in it will in all likelihood await the market demand before going further. Projet Tapis Vert reports that it has had some success with trained masons in the rural areas using the technology outside their project; that has been on a very limited scale, but may nonetheless indicate the appropriateness and the potential acceptance of the technology. Moreover, several people indicated to the evaluator that the technology may be even more appropriate in the rural areas where desertification is an everyday issue, where living conditions are more primitive, and where aspirations might not be as dictated by imported technologies and styles.

One non profit group (Sudan Interior Mission) operating in mid-Niger is interested in the technology to build worker housing for the disabled training program it runs and is interested possibly in disseminating the techniques beyond that to the low income rural dweller. Certainly, too, the Ministry of Public Works and Urban Development is interested in further disseminating the technology and is considering seeking funding for similar demonstration projects in other areas of Niger.

b. Stabilized Indigenous Materials

Another aspect of the technology transfer in this project is the indigenous material itself. Although pressed bricks of stabilized (amelioré) banco or laterite have been used successfully in other, neighboring countries, the experience is relatively new in Niger. The experimental aspect of the subproject, the testing of various percentages of cement and the arriving at a successful minimum percentage (which might have to be adjusted according to the material available in other parts of the country) is regarded by the Ministry of Public Works and Urban Development as very significant.

Moreover, the building with an ameliorated indigenous material has generated a great deal of interest among individuals (with the Ministry receiving many requests, for example, to borrow the presses for the bricks) as well as government agencies (eg., Ministry of Public Health and Ministry of Education for the construction of dispensaries and schools).

Although their interest is for public buildings and although they question the affordability of ameliorated material for use in low income housing, the Association Française des Volontaires de Progrès provides further corroboration of the interest generated by the subproject. Indeed, they regard the aspect of the subproject that has demonstrated the use of an ameliorated indigenous building material as its most important. AFVP has worked in ameliorated banco in other parts of West Africa, but prior to the publicity surrounding this subproject, report that they had found great resistance to its use. Now, they find that the material is considered to be "known in Niger" and that there is interest on the part of local government, for example, where there previously was none.

c. Incremental Building Concept and Building Design

One of the concepts that the subproject was intended to demonstrate was that of an incremental approach to building (évolutif), whereby a family starts with a one-room unit and, over time as resources permit, adds additional rooms. This concept was to be demonstrated by the building of units of different sizes. However, without accompanying educational materials, what appears to the uninformed observer is simply five units of different sizes and configurations. And, indeed, the incremental aspect tends to be obscured by the other experimental aspects.

In addition, a technical -- or at least an affordability -- question was raised by several people as to the viability of the use of stabilized laterite for such an incremental design, since that material cannot be re-used.

Moreover, there is also a question as to how the bonding between the present and additional units would take place given the present design. Others offered the opinion that an incremental approach might be more appropriately applied to infrastructure (eg., water and electricity) rather than to the basic structure -- in other words, let the individual families be responsible for their own connections.

These matters of design were not be foreseen at the outset, given the experimental nature of the subproject -- indeed, from one point of view, to uncover such things was precisely the purpose of the subproject. So, too, perhaps the arriving at a better definition of a balance between cost and design. Certainly a social survey was lacking at the outset (although by some lights that was not the purpose of the subproject); however, some of the defects in design, as to privacy, for example, were the result of attempted economies.


In any future replications, these deficiencies can easily be remedied.

3. Relationship of Service Central de l'Habitat's Position with Regard to Shelter Issues

The prototype subproject has generated a great deal of publicity for the Service Central de l'Habitat and, in that, has assisted the perception that this office plays an important role in the shelter sector. The Service reports increased requests for technical assistance from individuals; moreover, as discussed, earlier, it seems that this subproject had a catalytic role in the recent shelter policy discussions. There has, of course, been criticism of the subproject as being too costly, as not suiting the social mores, etc. -- all of which may have some measure of validity -- but the impression that is conveyed, even when the comment is critical, is that the Service is regarded with some respect simply because it has produced the units. As one representative of the Ministry put it, at least something has been done. The impact of the subproject in this area, then, although it is hard to quantify, appears to have been positive and the Service Central de l'Habitat is considered the focal point within the Ministry for matters relating to shelter.

4. Management/Implementation Experience Gained by Service Central de l'Habitat

One of the specific aims of the subproject was for the Service Central de l'Habitat to gain management and implementation experience. In the opinion of those interviewed who work at the Ministry, the experience has been a very valuable one -- although they tend to attribute perhaps too many of the implementation difficulties to AID accounting procedures. As



described earlier, certainly these complicated the implementation procedure; however, there were steps that could have been taken by the Ministry to have improved the process. As Norton points out in his final report, these include better planning for the ordering of supplies and better follow through to ensure timely delivery of the supplies.

The Chief of the Service Central de l'Habitat told the evaluator that, drawing on the experience of the prototype subproject, the management procedures would be modified in future projects. However, the only real test of the extent to which the Service Central de l'Habitat benefited from the experience is whether their next effort is in fact better managed.

If the judgment of whether the experience was worthwhile rests solely on whether the units produced can be afforded without substantial discounting by the below median income population, the answer is clearly "no." However, since the objectives were themselves ambiguous and since the achievements of the subproject are in fact wider in scope than the production of five units, this assessment is incorrect. At this point, a determination of whether the experience gained by directly managing the construction subproject was worthwhile must rest on the Ministry's own judgment, and this judgment is a positive one.

Project Impact on National Policy

The principal output of the Shelter Planning Project, as mentioned earlier, was to be a draft National Shelter Policy suitable for presentation to the GON. This output was achieved during the last phase of the Project. Growing from this policy document a National Seminar on Urban Shelter in Niger, financed by USAID, was organized by the Ministry of Public Works and Urban Development and was held at the Palais des Congres in Niamey from July 9-July 13, 1984.

Throughout this report, there has been an analysis of the Service Central de l'Habitat's relationship to the process, which inevitably touched on some aspects of the policy itself. This section of the report will focus on the current status of the National Shelter Policy, the outstanding issues that exist, and the place of low income, affordable housing in the policy.

1. Current Status

During the time between the submission of the draft policy document and the national seminar just held, the Ministry has clearly been considering the draft seriously. The documents prepared for the seminar revealed that the issues were being put forward for serious discussion and consensus building prior to the final step in the public policy-making process in Niger, review by the Inter-Ministerial Council and review and approval by the Head of State.

Specifically, the draft policy recommends the following:

- Establishment of a National Housing Fund to be supported by annual contributions by the GON financed by surtaxes imposed on employees, by a portion of the reserves of insurance companies and the National Social Security account, from the mobilization of savings of those interested in long term financing, from a portion of the real estate taxes currently imposed, from external loans, and from other sources
- Creation of an Office of Housing to work under the auspices of the Inter-Ministerial Council to plan affordable housing projects, to undertake the study and construction of shelter projects for the low income, to oversee the Credit du Niger and ensure that it uses the funds from the National Housing Fund judiciously
- Reorganization of the Credit du Niger to make it focus exclusively on real estate (mortgage) loans in the 500,000 - 1,500,000 CFA (US\$ 1,163 - 3,500) range.
- Integration of the SONUCI (previously responsible for government housing construction activity) into the newly established Shelter Agency
- Seek the participation of private sector and parastatal organizations in land subdivision and development
- Revision of the housing subsidy system to provide some interest rate subsidies to the low income
- Facilitation of the formation of housing cooperative for the obtaining of credit
- Adjustment of the prices and sizes of urban lots to reflect both costs and affordability
- Normalization of relations between tenants and landlords
- Conduct of a well-coordinated research effort into the possibilities of the use of indigenous materials and new construction techniques and in so doing to develop a Nigerian construction industry

One of the extremely positive aspects of the policy discussions at the Seminar was an insistence on the concept of self-reliance. Although no doubt the GON will, once a policy is adopted, seek outside financing, the focus of the discussions was on making the maximum use possible of Nigerian resources.

The Seminar participants spent two and a half days in subcommittee meetings to draft recommendations for the policy. The subcommittees were as follows:

- Finance and Institutional Issues
- Technical and Technological Issues
- Tenure Issues
- General Policy and Strategy Issues

At the end of the Seminar, a fifth subcommittee was charged with synthesizing the recommendations of each of the other four and the issues raised during the floor discussion of the subcommittee reports. This "synthesis" was produced as the "Final Communique" of the Seminar and it, along with the other documents of the Seminar, will be transmitted by the Minister of Public Works and Urban Development to the Inter-Ministerial Council.

The recommendations of the Seminar are to do the following:

- Restructure the structures active in the shelter sector and put in place appropriate institutions for the financing and implementation of shelter programs including the development of a National Housing Fund
- Inventory the traditional means of constructing and improving shelter
- Examine and coordinate the laws and regulations governing the areas of urban development and shelter
- Create a commission to study the problems of renters and put in place rent ceilings and define the rights and responsibilities of renters and landlords, including standards of livability
- Develop a program to research, train and popularize new manners of construction, particularly having to do with the use of stabilization of traditional materials
- Introduce and generalize a system of sites and services
- Reduce the housing deficit in Niamey
- Rehabilitate the old quarters of the major cities
- Adopt a tenure and titling policy that will inhibit speculation and will facilitate access to ownership of the greatest number of people

- Improve the technical qualifications of construction workers and contractors and produce a practical guide to the construction of affordable housing
- Create new growth poles to curb migration to the major cities
- Institute a professional code for real estate agents and developers

Thus, a comparison between the original policy document recommendations and the recommendations of the Seminar reveals that, with the exception of the specific structural suggestions -- which the Seminar does not exclude -- the policy was, in substance, accepted. The Seminar's first recommendation contains the first four put forward in the draft National Policy, as well as the sixth and seventh recommendations. The second and fifth recommendations of the seminar correspond to the Policy's tenth; the third and the ninth with Policy's fifth. The other recommendations of the Seminar recommendations themselves range more widely than those made explicit in the policy.

When and whether the policy and recommendations will be acted upon is not certain. However, if the tenor of the Seminar, the press coverage, and the high level attention paid to the work are good indicators, it seems likely that some action will be taken.

2. Outstanding Issues

Despite the very encouraging steps taken with regard to the National Shelter Policy, there are still a number of outstanding issues that will have to be resolved if a policy is to be effectively implemented. These include the following:

- A decision as to the extent of the administering/coordinating role that the central government will play in the shelter sector and as to the type of institution most appropriate to it;
- A decision on the allocations from the various revenue sources specified to go into the Central Housing Fund;
- A decision on rent control;
- A decision on what constitutes "social housing" and a realistic assessment of the extent to which that can be subsidized.

In addition to the concrete proposals made the Seminar discussions and the Final Communique have brought these issues to the level of public discussion, acknowledged their

complexity, and framed them in such a way that policy-makers may act upon them.

3. Program for Low Income, Affordable Housing

It is perhaps too early to expect to see a program for low income affordable housing fully articulated, although as indicated earlier, one of the outputs of this Project has been the design of such projects for which the Service Central de l'Habitat is now seeking funding. However, the policy being put forward embraces the principle of providing greater access to ownership to all income levels. Thus, if the policy is adopted, it is likely that such a program would be forthcoming. As a first step in this process, the Seminar specifically recommends the use of a sites and service concept to meet the needs of the low income population.

VI. PROJECT IMPACT

A. Achievement of Project Purpose

The purpose of the Niger Shelter Planning Project was to establish an institutional framework within which the GON can generate and coordinate low income shelter programs. The major indicators set forth in the Project Paper, by which the achievement of this purpose was to be gauged, are as follows:

- Housing study division within SCUAH researches, plans and presents regularly low income shelter proposals for action under GON Development Plan
- SCUAH coordinates shelter activities within its mandate.

As pointed out in Chapter V of this report, the Ministry of Public Works and Urban Development has reorganized since the inception of this Project, and in that reorganization the Service Central de l'Habitat was created as a focal point for shelter matters, disengaging it from the architectural activities with which it was previously housed. Thus, in these indicators, the Service Central de l'Habitat should be substituted for SCUAH; otherwise, it is fair to say that by these indicators the Project purpose has been met.

Whether this institutional structure is adequate to the task envisioned by the Project Purpose, however, is yet another question. The Ministry of Public Works and Urban Development and others concerned with the supply and delivery of shelter do not believe, given the under development of the shelter sector in Niger, that it does. Thus, as part of the national deliberation on the proposed Shelter Policy, a proposal was put forward that would create an independent agency that would do all the things that the Service Central de l'Habitat now does in terms of planning and coordinating shelter projects, but in addition would also assist in the making available of credit to low and moderate income people.

Specifically, it would oversee the Credit du Niger to ensure that the funds allocated to it from the proposed National Housing Fund are used judiciously and to assist in the creation of mechanisms, such as cooperatives, to allow non-salaried persons to obtain long term loans. Moreover, the thrust of all of the commendations issued by the Seminar (see Chapter V of this report) -- and indeed the basis of the draft National Shelter Policy itself -- is to restructure the existing institutions in order to create an adequate framework for the supply and delivery of shelter to persons at every level in society.

Thus, while the Project Purpose has been fulfilled in the terms that were set for the Project, those terms do not appear to be

the most appropriate measures in terms of the adequacy of the institutional framework. Nonetheless, even while it is limited by the external exigencies of the shelter sector itself, the Service Central de l'Habitat has become the focal point for activities in the shelter sector and is putting forward low income shelter proposals for action.

The major outputs of the Shelter Planning Project were described in the Project Paper as follows:

- a draft national housing policy suitable for presentation to the full government
- the design of preliminary projects which maximize the use of local public and private resources, and which can serve as the first steps of policy implementation
- Nigerian counterparts in the Housing Division trained to carry on the work begun under this project

All of these outputs were met. However, the existence of an institutional framework is a prerequisite to their implementation, and the Project Plan did not call for any linkages between these outputs and that framework, making only the major assumption that the GON would adopt or accept in principle the policy and projects developed.

Even with these qualifications, it can be said that the Project Purpose was met and the outputs achieved. The same cannot be said for the envisioned inputs. Specifically, the long term training of a representative of the Service Central de l'Habitat did not take place and neither did the fielding of a second resident advisor, both of which were originally anticipated in the Project Paper. However, an additional input, in the form of the financing of a prototype construction project using indigenous materials, was made and offset in part the shortfalls in the other two areas.

The GON inputs, originally delayed, during the first year of the Project were satisfactorily made and, in some cases, exceeded.

One of the effects of this Project's success, coupled with the recent widely publicized National Shelter Policy Seminar that the Mission funded, is that AID is now perceived to have a leadership role within the shelter sector.

B. Contribution to Sector Goal

The sector goal to which this Project was expected to contribute is the provision of an improved living environment for low income families. This Project, however, was directed primarily toward institution building and policy change. These were ends in themselves and, as noted above, were not linked to mechanisms for implementation. Thus, if we apply the measures of the degree to which this Project has contributed to this Sector goal set forth

in the Project Paper -- GOM allocation of resources in support of the policy and the implementation of initial project proposals for lower income groups -- there has been no direct impact to date.

However, should the draft National Shelter Policy, which addresses itself to making the ownership of decent housing accessible to all levels of Nigerien society, be adopted, the sectoral restructuring implemented, and programs implemented, a significant improvement in the living environment of low income families is possible. Moreover, short of Policy adoption and implementation, if the Service Central de l'Habitat is successful in finding financing for the low income sites and services projects initially developed under the Shelter Planning Project, an immediate impact will be made on up to 1,000 households.

In terms of the immediate effects of the Project on the sector, the prototype subproject has served to stimulate and focus debate on the use of indigenous materials and self-help construction to meet the shelter needs of the low income population. To the extent that this interest is translated into concrete action by other donors, non-profit groups, and local government -- all of which have expressed interest -- the Planning Project will have had a significant direct effect.

Finally, in terms of the immediate disposition of prototype units, the living environment of five low to moderate income households will be significantly improved, if the plans as they now exist are carried out. Moreover, if the Service Central de l'Habitat is then able to take the money that it receives from the Credit du Niger and develop the other six lots and then subsequently to recycle the money to develop additional lots, the effects, although still on a small scale, will be considerably extended.

C. Lessons Learned

There are a variety of lessons to be derived from the Niger Shelter Sector Planning Project, both as to design and implementation. Many of these have been touched upon on other parts of the text; the purpose of this section is, without too much repetition, to attempt to abstract the major lessons. These are as follows:

1. The Importance of Grounding Planning Projects

The Shelter Planning Project was strengthened by the addition of the prototype construction subproject. Among the contributions that this subproject made to the overall planning effort were:

- the building of the confidence and reputation of the Service Central de l'Habitat as an organization capable of carrying out a project,

- the making concrete of some of the abstract ideas and concepts being dealt with in the planning process,
- the creation of a focus for attention and so of a forum for the discussion of a variety of shelter issues both among professionals and the general public,

However, the Project would have been an even stronger one had the subproject been an integral part of the Project design. If it had been thought through as a part of the overall Project, perhaps it would have been more carefully conceived and its purposes, if not more clearly delineated, at least prioritized so that when tradeoffs had to be made, it would be clear what was being traded off. Perhaps even more importantly, had the subproject been conceived of at the outset, then its implementation could have been tied to the specified outputs of the planning process. That alone might well have speeded up the policy preparation.

In short, the lesson is that a Project that deals with policy reform and processes can be strengthened by the inclusion of a "practical" component that allows certain of the concepts being dealt with to be tested out. That strengthening can be maximized when the "practical" aspect is conceptualized as reinforcing the abstract planning processes.

2. Importance of Continuous Liaison and Discussion

This Project experienced serious delays in implementation, which stemmed from a variety of causes, including the slowness of the initial inputs on both the AID and the UN side and, later, the inability to ensure an orderly and continuous sequence of technical assistance inputs. These delays highlight several things:

- Just because a Project experiences delays does not mean that it will not be successful. It may be that, as in this case, some of the assumptions made were unrealistic and that a longer time frame should have been envisioned for various parts of the Project from the outset. The planning process is an iterative one and when it is linked to policy change, by its nature, will move slowly.
- Nonetheless, at least some of the delays can be attributed to the inability to locate qualified personnel for the Project. Before mounting an effort of this sort, some sort of preliminary identification of likely candidates or sources of candidates should be undertaken.
- Discontinuity in Project inputs will cause delays. Beside the obvious disruption to schedules, they may also cause interpersonal difficulties. In the case of a Project such as this one, where policy change is a major

desired result, the personal rapport and trust developed over time will play a large part in whether or not the proposed plans and policies are accepted. The more varied and the more discontinuous the technical assistance inputs, the greater the risk not only that delays will occur but that they will be caused by interpersonal difficulties or the failure to develop a collegial relationship with host country counterparts and other officials. In the worst circumstance, such difficulties risk undermining the Project as a whole.

• In addition to linkages to implementing mechanisms or structures, it is essential that policy planning projects contain provision for -- requirements for -- substantial professional discussion of the work being done in order to ensure that the officials really acquire ownership of the changes being proposed.

D. Recommendations

At this point in the evaluation it is appropriate to raise the question, "Where do we go from here?" This Shelter Planning Project has succeeded in focusing attention on the shelter sector, has prompted discussion of various approaches to meeting the shelter needs of the low and moderate income Nigerien, and has caused the GON seriously to consider making shelter a national priority. These are significant accomplishments.

In this light, the general recommendation is that the Mission should try to devise some way in which to sustain the gains that have been made. Just how that should be done will depend upon a number of factors, not the least of which is the nature of the GON action on and other indications of support for the National Shelter Policy.

However, before the GON is in a position to implement the National Shelter Policy, should it be adopted, it will have to take a series of actions to restructure the shelter sector as it now exists. Although the Mission's priorities do not include the shelter sector, it could consider following up some of the initiatives that have occurred as a result of this Project to assist the GON in making the transition from idea to reality. Areas in which assistance could take place include those of institutional development, policy reform, human resource development and increasing the participation of the private sector.

Before making any decisions about future actions, however, it is important to see what results from the National Shelter Policy Seminar recommendations. Discussions with GON officials suggest that a relatively timely response is expected, with the Minister of Public Works and Urban Development planning to present the recommendations to the Inter-Ministerial Council within the month.

If the recommendations should be adopted, then the Ministry of Public Works and the others concerned will be authorized to take actions to implement, and it is at this point that assistance will be most useful. However, before proceeding to a listing of various options that the Mission might want to consider in the shelter sector, the two sections immediately following attempt to provide a skeletal framework in which to consider such options, by describing the Service Central de l'Habitat's current plans and, as far as they could be ascertained by the evaluator, the interests of other donor organizations in the shelter sector.

1. Service Central de l'Habitat's Current Plans.

At the present time, the Service Central de l'Habitat is seeking funding from the Italians (CONSASS), the French (Realisation Experimental en Cooperation), and the UNDP for some of the projects originally developed (and in some cases now somewhat modified) under the Shelter Planning Project. These projects are located in Niamey, and, in addition, it is possible that AID might be approached for similar support. (One of the policy recommendations of the Seminar was that sites and services programs be undertaken for the low income.)

In addition, the Service Central de l'Habitat is planning to approach the Mission to get support for what is basically a replication -- although with some important modifications in design and implementation plan -- of the prototype subproject in 12 cities throughout Niger as a way of disseminating the techniques.

Other plans include the disposition of the prototype units and the development of the adjoining lots and the extending of technical assistance, particularly as to the use of stabilized indigenous materials, to other Ministries and to individuals who request it.

2. Other Activities in the Shelter Sector

Although it was beyond the scope of this evaluation to carry out research into what the activities of other donors are likely to be in the shelter sector, it appears from informal discussions, mostly occurring at the National Seminar that the following is an accurate representation of some of their interests:

- the UNDP is primarily interested in indigenous building materials research and has put forward -- at least informally -- a suggestion that a regional building indigenous materials research organization.
- the World Bank is not against working in the shelter sector, has no immediate plans to do so, would consider any concrete proposals that the GON might put forward provided the GON seemed to exhibit genuine support, and would be likely to tend toward institutional (probably

financial) development.

- the CONSASS is seriously considering funding about 100 units/sites and services.
- the REXCOOP is seriously considering funding about 100 units/sites and services.
- the FED is interested primarily in revitalizing the SONICERAM and believes that it could produce stabilized bricks economically.

3. What Types of Assistance Could AID Offer

Since Niger is apparently urbanizing at a rather rapid rate -- a rate that is sufficiently high to bear upon its future development, there are two general areas, related to shelter and urban development, consistent both with GON and Mission priorities, in which interesting shelter-related projects might be developed. These are: (a) secondary cities (and/or the "growth poles" that the GON has talked about encouraging) and policy formulation to optimize the urban/rural relationship.

Assuming that a positive response is made to the policy recommendations of the Seminar and that the GON demonstrates its intention to act, then assistance could be provided to the shelter sector in a variety of ways and at a variety of levels, depending upon Mission objectives. Some possible alternatives are listed below under two objectives:

a. Keep the Channels of Communication Open

Institutional Development

- Respond to requests for short term technical assistance.
- Make a small grant of some cinvaram presses to the Ministry to allow them to mount a small technical assistance effort to disseminate the stabilized laterite technique developed under the prototype subproject.
- Finance the development of a "how to" manual for the production and laying of compressed, stabilized laterite

Human Resource Development

- Finance Ministry personnel participation in international shelter seminars and conferences.

Strengthen the Private Sector

- Provide financing for the production and dissemination of the "Guide Pratique" recommended by the Seminar for

use in the construction of low cost housing.

b. Provide Low Profile Assistance

Institutional Development

- Provide technical assistance to restructure the housing finance mechanisms that will allow the implementation of the National Shelter Policy

Policy Reform

- Provide technical assistance in the development of a land titling and tenure policy.

Human Resource Development

- Finance the long term training in social science of a representative of the Ministry or Service Central de l'Habitat (or the new structure, if created) to work in the area of shelter planning
- Finance the design and implementation of a practical training program to teach masons about the use of stabilized materials and architectural modifications that might be appropriately made

Private Sector Development

- Provide assistance for the formation of credit cooperatives for housing

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

LIST OF MAJOR PROJECT REPORTS

Resident Advisor Marc-Antoine Lombardini:

"Enquete Socio-Economique, Niamey, Fevrier 1980"

"Besoins en Logements au Niger, 1980 -1990"

"Emplois et Revenus au Niger 1980-1990"

"Emplois et Revenus au Niger 1981"

"Les Conditions d'Habitat au Niger, 1981"

"Politique de l'Habitat au Niger, 1981"

"Influence Peri-Urbaine au Niger, 1981"

"Le Secteur de l'Habitat au Niger, Sommaire, 1981"

"Projections Demographiques au Niger, 1981"

National Savings and Loan League, Sonia Hamman:

"Socio-Economic Survey, 1981"

"Socio-Economic Survey, 1982"

Louis Berger, Carlos Ramirez:

"An Analysis of Land Use in Niger, 1980"

National Savings and Loan League, Ian Michael Wright:

"Financial Institutions in Niger, 1982"

Pragma, Larry Moncrief

"Pilot Project Proposal, 1982"

Pragma, Axel Jerome:

"Politique Nationale de l'Habitat, 1982"

Development Workshop, John Norton:

"Final Report of Technical Assistance, 1983"

MEMORANDUM

DATE: July 6, 1984
 FROM: Scott Johnson, Abidjan RHUDO Engineer
 SUBJECT: Niger Shelter Sector Planning Project
 TO: Michael S. Gould, Niger Mission Engineer

The purpose of this memo is to analyze the cost effectiveness of the demonstration prototype housing construction component of subject project. To this effect it must be noted that the experimental nature of the construction techniques and materials used for this component required additional technical assistance for training which was not foreseen in the original Project Technical Proposal and which accounted for some of the construction delays and cost increases and it is therefore not fair to this subproject to compare the original construction schedules with the time frame of the actual construction. An additional element of novelty was that the Direction de la Construction (DC) whom provided on site construction management and control for the Ministry of Public Works and Urbanism (MPWU) was inexperienced and used this demonstration subproject to build up it's institutional capacities which in itself was a success but nevertheless delayed construction even more which in turn increased the overall construction cost. This memo does not attempt to focus on the overall continuity of this particular subproject in the context of the entire project but rather is intended to focus on the real per unit cost of construction as it relates to the current economic situation of the general urban popular of Niamey. A more general assessment of the success of this specific subproject will be addressed in the end of Project Evaluation currently being conducted.

Of a total expenditure of 33,666,457 FCFA the following amounts must be discounted from the per unit costs due to their excessive high cost or the experimental nature of the activity:

1. Expenditure on unit 4A (not completed)	1,191,211
2. Utilities hook up (excessively high)	5,923,024
3. Shed construction	1,725,947
4. Fired brick experimentation	984,518
5. Miscellaneous tools, materials and forms	2,719,173
6. Excess labor charges	<u>4,177,837</u>
Total	<u>16,721,710 FCFA</u>

The resulting balance of apx. 50% of the total or 16,944,747 FCFA will be considered as the real construction cost for the purposes of this memo.

Aslo

There are a total of 5 finished housing units on site varying in size broken down as follows: (all figures in francs CFA);

<u>Unit Number</u>	<u>Unit Size</u>	<u>Infrastructure Cost (septic tank and toilet installation)</u>	<u>Superstructure Cost</u>	<u>Total Cost</u>
1A	1 Room	565,874 FCFA	1,008,241	1,574,115
2A	2 Room	565,874 FCFA	2,016,482	2,582,356
3A	3 Room	565,874 FCFA	3,024,723	3,590,597
5B	4 Room	565,874 FCFA	4,032,964	4,598,838
6C	4 Room	565,874 FCFA	4,032,964	4,598,838

For the purposes of determining the affordability of the units using the estimated costs mentioned above and current Housing Guaranty Program financial conditions the following assumptions can be made:

- A. interest rate 13% annual
- B. life of loan 20 years
- C. 100% cost recovery

Based on these assumptions the following monthly payments would be necessary to service the capital investment that would be required to replicate these demonstration units;

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Monthly Payment</u>
1A	18,442 FCFA
2A	30,254
3A	42,067
5B	53,879
6C	53,879

CONCLUSIONS

1. Therefore it may be stated that to amortise these units it would require household incomes of between 92,000 and 270,00 CFA monthly. The income figures may be compared to those identified in the socio-economic report produced by Sonie Hamman of the National savings and Loan. Jeaque dated April, 1961.
2. Despite the high cost of construction of these 5 demonstration units and the fact that they are clearly not affordable to the lower and middle levels of income earners in Niamey, I believe that drastic reductions in the construction costs can be made through reducing the reliance on imported materials and possibly tightening up the management of the construction site itself.

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Communiqué final

Le premier séminaire national sur l'Habitat urbain au Niger s'est tenu à Niamey du 9 au 13 juillet 1984.

La cérémonie d'ouverture a été présidée par S.E. M. Moumouni Yacouba, ministre des Travaux publics et de l'Urbanisme.

Ont participé aux travaux du séminaire :

— des représentants de départements ministériels,

— des représentants de collectivités territoriales,

— des représentants d'associations socio-professionnelles,

— des représentants d'institutions financières et d'agences immobilières,

— des représentants d'organismes de coopération bilatérale, d'organisations Internationales et d'organisations non gouvernementales.

Après avoir examiné de façon approfondie les problèmes techniques et technologiques, institutionnels et législatifs, financiers et de financement inhérents au secteur de l'habitat,

le séminaire :

1. — Considère que de nombreux obstacles ont entravé le développement du secteur de l'habitat notamment :

— la pression démographique et le développement incontrôlé de certains centres urbains,

— le peu de priorité accordé à l'habitat dans les programmes du développement national,

— la diversité et le manque de coordination des organismes intervenant dans le domaine de l'habitat (ministères des Travaux publics et de l'Urbanisme, ministère des Finances, ministère du Commerce et des Transports, collectivités, etc...),

— le coût très élevé des matériaux de construction,

— l'inadaptation de la politique foncière,

— l'absence d'une réglementation sur les loyers.

2. — Estime toutefois que face à ces contraintes, des atouts existent dont :

— la pratique généralisée de l'autoconstruction,

— l'existence d'une véritable solidarité entre Nigériens,

— la disponibilité des terres et des matériaux locaux de construction.

3. — Propose l'adoption d'une stratégie globale qui viserait les objectifs suivants :

— maîtriser les problèmes d'urbanisme,

— satisfaire la demande soluble en permettant à ceux qui ont un certain revenu d'accéder à un logement,

— mettre à la disposition des familles à faibles revenus des logements à loyer modérés, à la portée de toutes les bourses,

— améliorer les conditions de vie et de l'habitat en milieu urbain,

— améliorer les conditions de vie et de l'habitat en milieu rural.

Pour la réalisation de tels objectifs les dispositions devraient être prises pour se doter des moyens techniques et technologiques, des moyens

humains par la formation et l'association des populations aux prises de décisions, et de moyens institutionnels et législatifs adéquats.

Le séminaire recommande la mise en œuvre des actions et programmes ci-après :

1. — Recenser les structures intervenant dans le domaine de l'habitat et mettre en place des institutions appropriées pour la mise en œuvre de programmes et le financement de l'habitat à des conditions douces notamment la création d'un fonds de développement de l'habitat.

2. — Inventorier les moyens traditionnels de construction et d'amélioration de l'habitat.

3. — Dresser un répertoire des textes régissant le domaine de l'urbanisme et de l'habitat.

4. — Créer une commission chargée d'étudier et de codifier les problèmes de loyers et mettre en place une réglementation du loyer qui en détermine le montant plafonds pour tous les cas d'espèce et fixe les droits et les obligations des locataires et des propriétaires,

ainsi que les règles d'habitabilité.

5. — Développer le programme de recherche, de formation et de vulgarisation des nouveaux procédés de construction, en particulier l'amélioration de matériaux traditionnels.

6. — Introduire et généraliser le système de production de parcelles saines.

7. — Réabsorber l'important déficit en logement à Niamey.

8. — Réhabiliter les quartiers anciens dans les grands centres.

9. — Adopter un régime foncier qui puisse freiner la spéculation et qui facilite l'accès du plus grand nombre à la propriété ; mais qui permet par ailleurs à l'Etat d'assurer une maîtrise des terres.

10. — Améliorer la qualification technique des constructeurs et éditer un guide pratique pour la construction du logement économique.

11. — Créer de nouveaux pôles de croissance pour freiner l'exode vers les grands centres.

12. — Instituer un code sur les professions d'agents et de promoteurs immobiliers.

Le séminaire.

7/3/84

Indicators of Impact
Shelter Planning Project -- 683-0224

What follows below is the list of indicators, arranged according to each of the specified evaluation objectives, that will be used, in conjunction with subjective data gathered during the course of interviews, discussions and document review, to assess Project impact.

A. Evaluate the impact on the Division de l'Habitat to:

1. Collect data for shelter sector planning:

indicators:

- a. studies carried out by consultants
- b. establishment of baseline data
- c. studies carried out by staff
- d. GON personnel role in data collection/planning

2. Coordinate GON/private sector shelter activities

indicators:

- a. UN project plan
- b. sites and services plan
- c. additional 6 site development
- d. other activities planned
- e. organizational proposals identifying problems/ proposing solutions

3. Influence GON housing policy

indicators:

- a. National housing policy document
- b. Televised national housing policy debate
- c. National housing policy seminar
- d. Inclusion of/plans to include shelter in National Development Plan
- e. Inter- and intra-Ministerial discussion
- f. General media discussion

B. Effectiveness of training under the project

indicators

1. Attendance at workshops/seminars
2. Counterpart relationships
3. Short term, medium term and long term U.S./third country shelter training for Ministry officials
4. Construction training for masons and laborers
5. Construction management (ojt) training

C. Evaluate the prototype subproject in terms of:

1. cost effectiveness

indicators:

- a. potential/actual affordability
- b. experimental nature/impact on costs
- c. standards
- d. indigenous materials
- e. cost management issues/impact on costs
- f. training component/impact on costs
- g. potential for replicability

2. success of technology transfer

indicators:

- a. masons trained
- b. interest of other Ministries
- c. interest of other development organizations
- d. plan to develop other 6 sites
- e. plan to proceed with technology elsewhere

3. appropriateness of technology transfer

indicators:

- a. indigenous materials
- b. desertification issue
- c. acceptance/lack of acceptance by population
- d. interest of various parties, including applicants for the property
- e. publicity received
- f. fired v. stabilized bricks
- g. desire for an "intermediate" technology

4. effect on the Division de l'Habitat's position within Ministry

indicators

- a. interest of media
- b. interest of other parts of Ministry -- statements at seminar and published documents, if any
- c. changes in funding allocations/staffing
- d. action on/reaction to organizational proposals in draft National Housing Policy
- e. attendance at/response to seminar

Progress made by GON in developing National policy/plan for low income housing

indicators

1. existence of National Housing Policy document
2. dissemination of National Housing Policy document
3. synthesis and elaboration of housing policy proposals for seminar
4. conclusions of seminar
5. popular press coverage of seminar/housing issues (cf. 1e

Sabel 7/5/84)

6. indications of Ministerial support for National Housing Policy, including budget allocations and provisions for inclusion in National Development Plan

INFORMATION APPENDIX
FOR
EXECUTIVE LEVEL PERSONNEL

INFORMATION APPENDIX FOR EXECUTIVE LEVEL PERSONNEL

1. What constraints does this project attempt to overcome and who does it constrain? Does this project attack labor, policy or other constraints?

The Niger Shelter Planning Project attempts to overcome the constraints of an under-developed shelter sector that impedes access of particularly low and moderate income Nigeriens to adequate shelter. This Project attempts to overcome these constraints by addressing itself primarily to the policy level. However, an important component of the Project is a prototype construction subproject that demonstrates the use of indigenous materials to build housing that, by the use also of vaults and domes, does not rely on wood, and is potentially affordable by the below median income household.

2. What technology does the project promote to relieve these constraints?

The technology that this project promotes is of two types. First, and perhaps most important, it seeks to develop an institutional approach to shelter problems that is based upon improving the living conditions of the poor majority by stimulating activities that will provide decent shelter that they can afford. Such projects are designed maximize the available resources by providing for minimal subsidy and for cost recovery mechanisms. In addition, and indeed to demonstrate some of these concepts, the prototype subproject demonstrates a technology that is appropriate to the implementation of the policy -- that is, the use of improved indigenous construction material -- clay and banco -- in low cost housing construction.

3. What technology does the project attempt to replace?

On the policy level, the technology attempts to replace the use of those, primarily Western derived technologies, requiring a relatively high level of standard, that are too costly to be an effective method of providing adequate shelter to the low income Nigerien. On the technical level, the technology attempts to replace the import-dependent construction methods, particularly those relying heavily on concrete block and the use of the scarce wood resource.

4. Why do the project planners believe that the intended beneficiaries will adopt the proposed technology?

The National Shelter Policy has received substantial government and outside support and is currently undergoing government review, following a National Shelter Seminar. The broad

consensus that has formed and the publicity that it has generated indicate that the GON will adopt the policy. In terms of the technical aspects, the extent to which it will be adopted is unclear; however, the Ministry of Public Works and Urban Development has indicated that it regards the stabilized indigenous material developed during the prototype subproject implementation as very significant. In addition, it has stimulated interest among other donors, government agencies and individuals. Moreover, such technology has been successfully used elsewhere.

5. What characteristics do the intended beneficiaries exhibit that have relevance to their adopting the proposed technology?

At the current time, the cost of housing puts ownership out of the reach of most Nigeriens. In addition, with the growth in the population of Niamey there is increasing pressure on the GON to alleviate the situation. Thus, a policy that facilitates the development of affordable housing and a technology that reduces construction costs will both be attractive to the beneficiaries.

6. What adoption rate has this project or previous projects achieved in transferring the proposed technology? Why have or have not the intended beneficiaries adopted this technology?

Many AID-assisted countries -- notably those that have received HG loans -- have adopted policies similar to that prepared in Niger. As to the technical aspect of the Project, stabilized laterite or banco is fairly commonly used in Upper Volta and Mali, as well as other countries.

7. Will the project set in motion forces that will induce further exploration of the constraints and improvements to the technological package proposed to overcome them?

The draft National Shelter Policy, if adopted, will cause the restructuring of the shelter sector, including the financial and administrative agencies. After this institutional framework is in place, then a series of self-sustaining shelter initiatives will be possible for all levels of Nigerien society. The technological experimentation with stabilized indigenous materials has already created great interest and other groups in Niger have begun experimentation.

8. Do private input suppliers have incentives to examine the constraints addressed by the project and come up with solutions?

When and if the financial and institutional restructuring of the shelter sector takes place, then there will be both mechanisms and incentive for greater involvement by the private sector. Indeed, part of the National Shelter Policy is designed to stimulate the involvement of the private sector. As to the technology itself, the private sector may find a less immediate market for the vault and dome technology; however, there is likely to be a considerable market for stabilized laterite.

9. What delivery system does the project employ to transfer the new technology to intended beneficiaries?

The delivery systems to transfer the technologies on a large scale are not yet in place and were outside the scope of this project.

10. What training techniques does the project use to develop the delivery system?

The project used counterpart, short term and technical and skills training to assist in the development of a delivery system.