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**An Evaluation of  
A General  
Support Grant  
to Africare**

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## INTRODUCTION, SUMMARY FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This document presents the results of an evaluation of a general support grant financed by the U.S. Agency for International Development to Africare. The grant (No. AID/afr-0443-G-SS-2057-00) became effective July 1, 1982, and ended March 31, 1985. Its purpose was "to provide continued support to selected Grantee activities which aid in the process of long-term development and emergency relief throughout the rural areas of Africa."

The grant was the fourth -- and intended to be the final -- in a series of general support grants provided to Africare by AID. This evaluation assesses the cumulative effects of all four grants as well as the specific outcomes of the fourth grant.

The evaluation was carried out by a three-person team from Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI): Craig Olson, David Barker, and Benjamin Stauss. Dr. Olson led the team and was responsible for the assessment of Africare's technical assistance and field operations. Dr. Barker was responsible for the assessment of Africare's headquarters and financial management. Mr. Stauss helped review the financial management findings.

The evaluation took place entirely in Washington, D.C., and focused mainly on Africare's program and financial management capabilities. Some information about Africare's field operations was obtained by reading field reports and through cable inquiries to AID missions. The complete terms of reference for the evaluation are provided in Annex A.

Data gathering and the preparation of a draft report took place between March 1 and March 26, 1985. The draft was submitted to AID on April 2, 1985. A review of the draft, involving AID, Africare, and DAI, took place on April 8, 1985. This final report was prepared taking into consideration the comments made during the review.

## SUMMARY FINDINGS

The overall finding of this evaluation is that the investment that AID has made in the institutional development of Africare through 12 years of general support grants has been very successful. Since Africare received its first institutional support grants from the Lilly Endowment and AID in late 1973 and 1974, the organization has evolved from a financially tenuous, quasi-relief agency into a competent and financially sound professional development agency. This achievement is all the more remarkable considering the increasingly difficult working conditions prevailing in Africa and the particular constituency that Africare has chosen to address.

Africare is not without problems, many of which are highlighted in this evaluation. But, overall, AID should consider its investment in Africare to be an institutional development success. The findings of this evaluation are summarized below.

1. Africare is a well-managed organization. Institutional values and objectives are clearly articulated, line and staff responsibilities are well understood, and the morale among personnel is high despite relatively low salaries and benefits. Institutionally, Africare now operates at or near full capacity. Any significant increase in activity will require additional staff.

2. The four general support grants that Africare has received from AID since 1974 have been successful in enabling Africare to develop its management and technical capabilities. The last of the four grants, 1982-1985, has been instrumental in enabling Africare to expand its base of private funding, improve its financial management, and expand its field operations.

3. Private fund raising has been very successful over the life of the grant. Financial contributions from private sources were more than seven times higher in fiscal year (FY) 1984 than in FY 1979. When in-kind donations are counted, private contributions were nearly nine times higher in FY 1984 than they were in FY 1979. The single biggest source of these increases is the Combined Federal Campaign. In the last one to two years, contributions from foundations, corporations, and black organizations have also increased considerably.

4. Africare is significantly less dependent on AID than it was in the 1970s. In 1979 private funding represented only about 8 percent of Africare's revenue and support; in 1984, it represented more than 30 percent. Thus, Africare now satisfies the privateness requirements of the Foreign Assistance Act.

5. Despite this relative decrease in dependence, an organization that receives nearly 70 percent of its funding from one organization cannot be said to be financially independent of that organization. However, these dependency percentages -- that is, the extent to which Africare satisfies the privateness criteria of the Foreign Assistance Act -- depend at least as much on AID as on Africare. The total financial commitments of the 111 projects for which Africare obtained funding during the period of the fourth general support grant were about \$20 million. Only 14 of the 111 projects were financed by AID, but the value of AID financing was nearly \$13 million. Thus, the addition or subtraction of just one or two AID-financed projects would greatly affect Africare's dependency percentages.

6. The balance between relatively large AID-financed projects and relatively small privately financed projects affects Africare in other ways as well. Technically, Africare enjoys a comparative advantage over other development organizations in developing and implementing the smaller projects, because the need and demand for this type of project are not met well else-

where. The smaller projects are also more attractive to private donors. Yet in some cases, Africare does not recover as much overhead from these projects as it does from the AID-financed projects despite the fact that the smaller projects are, on a dollar-for-dollar basis, probably more expensive to develop and administer than are the AID-financed projects.

7. Africare's overhead-to-direct-cost ratio has not changed significantly over the life of the grant, at least through FY 1984. Whether the decrease in AID core support that occurred with the end of the general support grant will lead to an increase in overhead costs depends on the extent to which the current trend of increased private support continues and on how much of the private support is unrestricted. The option of cutting staff should not be considered if it can be avoided, since Africare already operates with the minimum number of staff members required to manage its programs effectively.

8. Africare has greatly expanded its program and project activity. Over the life of the grant, Africare designed 128 projects, covering 17 African countries. All but 14 of these projects were for private financing.

9. Program management and project monitoring at Africare are carried out in an orderly and generally effective manner. Country representatives, who have the primary responsibility for project monitoring, are inconsistent in fulfilling their reporting responsibilities. However, the extensive field experience of Africare's Washington-based staff -- several have themselves been country representatives -- makes them sympathetic to the difficulties and pressures of field operations and has contributed to generally good relations between the field and the home office.

10. The quality of Africare's proposals is generally good. However, significant numbers of projects are incomplete or weak both in their treatment of project management and implementation responsibilities and in their concern for the sustainability of project benefits, particularly with respect to the ownership and the recurrent cost implications of project interventions and the capabilities of local institutions.

11. Most AID missions have positive impressions of the effectiveness of Africare field programs. AID missions are particularly impressed with the good working relationships Africare field staff maintain with host country government officials and the performance of Africare-recruited technical assistance. Some missions found that Africare's project design capabilities needed improvement.

12. The most successful of the new field programs that Africare launched over the life of the general support grant is the Village Development Program (VDP). To date, nine VDPs have been launched in four countries and funding has been received from three donors for VDPs that have not yet been designed or initiated. Africare has also continued its training activities, mostly through workshops or informal, on-the-job relationships.

13. The other field programs that Africare was to initiate through the general support grant -- the posting of field technicians, the joint venture, and the senior planners program -- have been less successful. Only one of the two field technicians who were to be recruited and posted in Africa was in fact assigned, and when this technician's two-year tour was completed, his position was discontinued. The joint venture that was to be initiated has not been launched despite some preliminary investigation of joint venture possibilities. No individuals have been specifically recruited and placed to serve as full-time senior planners in African government ministries, although two Africare

country representatives have served in these positions on a part-time basis and some sectoral planning assistance has taken place in connection with project preparation activities.

14. Timeliness in reporting remains a problem at Africare, particularly regarding financial and performance reports to AID. With the recent computerization of the Office of Finance and Administration, Africare has made some progress in improving the timeliness of reporting, but still is chronically behind in monthly and year-end financial reporting as well as in providing progress reports on AID grants.

15. Africare has made much progress in computerization. Financial management is almost completely computerized in the home office, although important limitations still exist in software design and system implementation. Plans have also been made to computerize the Office of Domestic Affairs, program management, and the Development Resources Center (DRC).

16. The DRC serves the Africare staff and the general public as an information resource on African development. It serves also as Africare's organizational mechanism for outreach activities. The center expanded its acquisitions as well as its overall use during the period of the general support grant.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

##### To AID and to Congress

1. AID and other donors should consider Africare capable of managing a large portfolio of rural development projects. Donors should judge Africare proposals on their technical merits but need be less concerned with Africare's program and project management capacities.

2. AID/Washington and AID missions should be aware of the effects of their decisions to fund the Africare projects on Africare's U.S. government dependency ratio. In the light of AID's ability to affect adversely this ratio by funding just one or two additional projects, Congress may wish to modify its privateness legislation by distinguishing between the source of funding for projects and that for basic administrative infrastructure.

#### To AID and Africare

1. Africare and AID should be aware of the tradeoffs involved in Africare's implementation of large AID-funded versus small private donor-funded projects. Africare's comparative advantage lies in the smaller projects, and it is also these projects that stimulate direct involvement of Americans with African development, which is one principal objective of Africare. However, the larger projects generate more overhead revenue and, because of economies of scale, are probably less costly to administer. Africare should strive to achieve a mixture of large and small projects that takes these tradeoffs into consideration while maintaining its efforts to get private donors to pay their fair share of indirect costs.

2. For each AID grant, Africare and AID should agree on reasonable and realistic progress reporting requirements. AID should consider linking disbursements of grant funds to timely receipt of progress reports.

#### To Africare

1. In the design of its projects, Africare should be more explicit about project implementation responsibilities and should give more attention to sustainability issues, including recurrent cost implications, ownership, and local institutional capacities. In this regard, Africare should be aware that its policy of

always making government a partner in its projects tends to increase the dependency of villagers on the state, thus partially vitiating Africare's guiding principle of self-help.

2. Africare lacks technical expertise in the fields needed to broker joint ventures. The idea that Africare would promote a joint venture between an African and a U.S. firm was not sound and should not now be pursued.

3. Africare's planning expertise lies more at the project than at the sectoral or macroeconomic level. Accordingly, Africare should limit its senior planning assistance to discrete sectoral activities that complement ongoing Africare field programs.

4. Africare should move with dispatch toward completing the computerization of its home office, particularly in the functional areas of fund raising, program management, and community response.

5. Africare should consider separating administration from finance by creating either a separate office of administration, reporting directly to the executive director, or an administrative unit under the director of finance and administration.

## CHAPTER ONE

AID AND AFRICARE:  
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRIVATE SUPPORT

## THE ORIGINS AND PURPOSES OF AFRICARE

Africare was formed in 1971 as a private nonprofit organization whose principal objective was to improve the quality of life in rural Africa. The immediate impetus for the creation of Africare was the need to mobilize resources quickly and efficiently to combat the effects of the Sahelian drought of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Experience with the drought in these years led the founders of Africare to orient its activities toward working almost exclusively in sectors that would help alleviate suffering from subsequent droughts: small farmer agriculture, water resources, health services, and reforestation. The early drought experience also led Africare to continue to work in drought relief. Although Africare is now primarily a development rather than a relief organization, it continues to respond to requests for relief assistance, as it is now doing in Ethiopia.

The founders of Africare were Africans and black Americans. The original chairman of the Board of Directors was Hamani Diori, who at the time was the president of Niger. Another founding member was Oumarou Youssoufou, who at the time was the first secretary of the Niger embassy in the United States. On the American side, the founding team consisted of William Kirker, C. Payne Lucas, and Joseph Kennedy. Mr. Youssoufou, Mr. Kirker, and Dr. Kennedy still serve on the Africare Board of Directors, Mr. Youssoufou as vice chairman and Dr. Kennedy as secretary. Mr. Lucas and Dr. Kennedy together constitute the full-time top management of Africare; Mr. Lucas is the executive director and Dr. Kennedy the director of international development. The current honorary chairman of the Board of Directors is another African president, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia.

The backgrounds of Africare's founders, most of whom remain active in the organization, led to the formulation of two other objectives or guiding principles of the organization. The first was that Africare activities would be cooperative endeavors; if most of the financing would be provided through Africare, most of the management and implementation would be carried out by Africans. In practice, this principle has meant that intended beneficiaries are heavily involved in planning and implementing Africare projects and that African government officials usually manage the projects.

The second objective was that Africare would seek to increase the awareness and involvement of black Americans in the problems of African development. This principle has meant in practice that black Americans, individually and through black organizations, serve as the principal private constituency of Africare. Black Americans are heavily represented on the Board of Directors and have become increasingly important financial contributors.

#### INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

From 1971 to 1973, Africare subsisted almost entirely on private donations. For the most part, it simply channeled private donations for relief to the governments of the drought-stricken countries of the Sahel or worked with governments to establish small projects, such as well construction, that would respond to immediate problems resulting from the drought.

During these early years, Africare operated with virtually no professional staff beyond the founders and little financial basis for growth and development. The transition from a financially tenuous, quasi-relief agency to a financially sound, professional development organization may be dated from late 1973

and early 1974, when Africare received the first two in a series of large institutional support grants from two donors: the Lilly Endowment and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

During the mid-1970s, Africare's most important donor was the Lilly Endowment. Lilly's first grant to Africare came in late 1973 in the form of a \$250,000 donation to establish water resource programs in Chad, Mali, and Niger. In 1974 Lilly added another \$270,000 for institutional support and project development, and in 1975 contributed \$1.7 million toward the financing of the Tara integrated rural development project in Niger.

AID's first grant to Africare was a development program grant for \$558,000 in 1974. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, AID had replaced Lilly as Africare's largest donor. Over the 12-year period from 1974 to 1985, AID provided four general support grants to Africare amounting to more than \$3.5 million:

1974-1977	\$ 558,000
1978	252,000
1979-1982	1,731,000
1982-1985	1,032,000
	<hr/>
Total	\$3,573,000

It is primarily this core support from the Lilly Endowment and AID that has enabled Africare to develop the sound management, administration, and professional capacities it now has. In recent years, AID core support has also enabled Africare to increase dramatically its base of private donations.

It is appropriate at this point to cite a passage from AID's policy paper on institutional development (March 1983):

Institutional development takes time -- time to build capacity, time to develop effective working relationships with local populations, time to adapt a priori models of institutional development to on-the-ground circumstances. Thus, A.I.D. must be in a position to make longer term commitments to institutions (both public and private), and must be prepared to support a wide range of institutional development requirements.

One lesson that can be learned from AID's experience with core support to Africare is that the development of Africare's institutional capacities did indeed take time -- 12 years to date. This period should not be seen as overly long in the context of the very difficult tasks of international development.

The development of Africare from 1974 through 1985 can be partially traced by referring to two evaluations that were conducted during the period: one in 1978, the other in 1980. The 1978 evaluation, commissioned by AID to assess the impact of the first two grants, found that Africare was a well-organized private and voluntary organization (PVO) with capable management and staff dedicated to the purposes of the organization. The evaluation found that Africare was contributing significantly to African development and that it had used funds provided under the AID grants for the purposes specified in the grants. The evaluation determined, however, that Africare was not yet able to continue its operations solely on the basis of private support. The grants, according to the evaluation, had had

no discernible effect in improving Africare's ability to raise private funds or to operate without AID . . . . The fundamental problem of Africare as an organization remains as it has been from the beginning -- the lack of a broad and substantial base of private support and the lack of sufficient unrestricted funds to be able to mount a large-scale appeal for funds. [1]

The first recommendation was that Africare should make a major effort to obtain substantial nongovernmental support in the form of both unrestricted and program funds.

By 1980 this situation had not significantly improved. In an assessment of Africare's management, the AID auditor general found that Africare still received more than 90 percent of its revenues from AID:

Africare's ability to raise private funds to support its general operations has not been successful. Since 1975, the net unrestricted revenues from private sources averaged \$83,000 annually. The net amount raised in 1979 was only \$50,000. Africare has also had little recent success in raising private funds for project financing. Since 1976 Africare received over 90 percent (\$12.3 million) of its project financing from AID grants. As of April 1980, Africare had only 7 projects (\$324,000) designed and ready for private financing.

The AID auditors concluded: "Africare needs to broaden its private funding base in order to remain independent of AID and qualify for matching grants." The evaluation recommended that "the Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa, develop a specific plan of action and take steps to phase out general support for Africare." [2]

In response to this recommendation, Africare submitted a cost-sharing proposal for general support that became the basis of the current grant. The proposal was drawn up to address the private financing problem. The purpose of the grant was

to provide operating funds to Africare to help strengthen its institutional capacity and administrative capability in ways which will enhance its ability to attract private donations and supporting contributions in future years. The grant will help support Africare's technical assistance group, Development Resources Center and headquarters management.

The proposal further stated: "The programs to be undertaken should ensure that at the end of the grant period a majority of Africare's core support comes from non-general support grant

sources." To help ensure this result, the grant partially financed positions on the Washington staff that would devote significant time to constituency development and fund raising.

In approving the grant request, the AID Project Committee found that Africare satisfied the general eligibility criteria contained in the administrator's guidelines for matching grants, dated April 1979. Regarding the 1980 AID audit recommendation to phase out AID general support for Africare, the Project Committee determined: "Recognition of the proposed 1982-85 grant as AID's final contribution to Africare's general support would complete this action."

The overall finding of this evaluation is that the 1982-1985 AID general support grant to Africare has been successful in achieving its objectives. As will be documented in Chapters Two and Four, the grant has enabled Africare to strengthen further its management and administration and to broaden and increase significantly its base of private support. As will be shown in Chapter Three, the grant has also enabled Africare to strengthen its field programs and to prepare a much larger number of projects for private funding. Thanks largely to AID core support, Africare today constitutes a valuable institutional resource for the development community.

Africare still receives significant funding from AID in the form of operational program grants (OPGs) for field projects. AID OPGs tend to be significantly larger than privately funded projects. Thus, even though the number of Africare's privately funded projects far exceeds the number of AID-financed projects, the latter still constitutes the majority of field operation funding. Because on a dollar-for-dollar basis the AID OPGs are probably less costly to administer, they also can be seen as financially more attractive. These caveats notwithstanding,

Africare has raised sufficient funds to match the AID funding for the general support grant and has dramatically increased its base of private funding.

#### PRIVATE SUPPORT

The issue of private support to AID-assisted PVOs continues to engender a great deal of debate within and without the agency and was the subject of recent legislation. Section 123 (g) of the Foreign Assistance Act states:

After December 31, 1984, funds made available to carry out Section 103(a), 104(b), 105, 106, 121 or 491 of this Act may not be made available for programs of any U.S. private and voluntary organization which does not obtain at least 20% of its annual financial support for its international activities from sources other than the U.S. government, except that this restriction does not apply with respect to programs which, as of that date, are receiving financial support from the Agency primarily responsible for administering this part.

This 20-percent test had been in effect for less than three months at the time this evaluation was conducted. However, the Continuing Resolution for AID's FY 85 appropriations (P.L. 98-473) contains the Lewis Amendment, which states:

None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available in this Act for development assistance may be made available after January 1, 1986, to any U.S. Private and Voluntary Organization, except cooperative development organizations, which obtains less than 25% of its total annual funding for international activities from sources other than the U.S. government, notwithstanding Section 123(g) of the Foreign Assistance Act.

Aside from the minimum levels of privateness expressed in the 20-percent test of Section 123(g) and the 25-percent test of the Lewis Amendment, a significant difference between them is the inclusion of in-kind contributions and volunteer services. Under the Lewis Amendment, the formula would be modified to include all in-kind contributions (including P.L. 480 commodities) and donated services.

As Chapter Two will show, Africare does satisfy the criteria both of section 123 (g) and of the Lewis Amendment. However, concerning the broader question of whether Africare can or should get along without AID support, the answer is more difficult. When all AID funding, including OPGs, is counted, Africare still receives nearly 70 percent of its financing from AID. Because of the size of AID grants relative to private grants, the ratio of AID to private financing at any one time depends as much on AID as on Africare. If AID were to discontinue financing for one or two of its large OPGs to Africare, the ratio of private to AID financing would significantly increase. Conversely, if one or two additional OPGs are obtained by Africare, the ratio might significantly decrease. In this sense, AID has as much power as Africare to determine whether Africare meets the privateness criteria. Yet it would hardly make sense for AID, after a successful investment of about \$3.5 million over 12 years in the institutional development of Africare, to decrease its financing of Africare projects solely to meet the privateness criteria.

One step that might be taken to help resolve this dilemma would be to change the privateness legislation to distinguish between funding destined for projects and funding allocated to home office support. According to a recent study prepared for AID, the intent of the privateness rule is to ensure that "no PVO should be so dependent on a single source of financial support that loss of those funds will necessitate a dismantling of the basic administrative infrastructure."<sup>[3]</sup> With the phasing out of the general support grant, Africare no longer receives core support from AID. Africare's basic administrative infrastructure, which is the home office plus field representation, is now financed mostly from private sources. Field representatives and the development staff in the home office are partially financed by charging their time directly to projects, but most home office staff, as well as general and administrative costs, are financed from private unrestricted funds and indirect cost recovery income

from AID and private projects. As will be shown in Chapter Three, most of Africare's project income, in contrast, continues to come from AID. However, the intent of the privateness legislation may be interpreted to mean that whether field projects are funded by the U.S. government or by private donors should not necessarily be important as long as the basic administrative infrastructure is funded mostly through private channels.

Beyond policy considerations, the decentralized nature of AID management makes the privateness rule difficult to administer. At present, there is no one office in AID that monitors the entirety of Africare's activities. The Regional Affairs Office of the Africa Bureau (AFR/RA) managed the general support grant, but OPGs are managed from individual missions. No one office has the information necessary to determine whether the approval of any particular grant would move Africare past the 75 percent or 80 percent U.S. government dependency ratio.

The 1980 AID audit of Africare, having found that AID monitoring of Africare activities was "fragmented and lacked cohesion," recommended that oversight of Africare activities be centralized within the Bureau for Africa. Nominally, this was accomplished by naming the AFR/RA as the responsible oversight unit. However, because AFR/RA does not exercise management responsibility for OPGs and because three different individuals within AFR/RA were responsible at different times for monitoring the general support grant, this office has not been able to exercise its oversight responsibility effectively.

Now that the general support grant has ended, there is no longer a Washington-based Africa Bureau unit that has management or oversight responsibility for any Africare activity. However, Africare is about to sign a new grant agreement for small-scale agribusiness development to be managed by the Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation of the Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance (FVA/PVC). It might, therefore, be possible to make another attempt to centralize oversight responsibility

for all Africare activities in FVA. Realistically, however, given that Africare's OPGs are all with the Africa Bureau, it will probably prove even more difficult for FVA to exercise oversight responsibility than it was for AFR/RA.

#### NOTES

1. General Research Corporation, "Evaluation of AID Development Program and Support Grants to Africare," August 1978, p. 3.
2. AID Audit Report Number 81-6, "An Assessment of Africare's Activities," October 14, 1980.
3. Study (author unnamed) attached to a "Dear Colleague" letter from Thomas A. McKay, director, Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation, Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance, AID, March 5, 1985.

## CHAPTER TWO

AFRICARE'S HOME OFFICE: MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES  
AND FINANCIAL HEALTH

## MANAGEMENT ROLES

The organizational structure and management roles of Africare have evolved from its mission and goals, which are clearly and consistently articulated by the Board of Directors and senior management. Because the mission and approach of Africare have changed little over the last decade, they have been strongly internalized by the program management and administrative staff at the home office. Africare's senior managers have been associated with the organization from its inception, and at least two of the senior program managers have been with Africare for 10 years or more.

A clear mission and long service from top management have resulted in a management environment that is well defined in the Africare Organization and Goals Manual. This manual contains four sections and three appendixes:

Section I	Organizational Structure
II	The Programming Process
III	The Reporting Process
IV	Evaluation and Assessment
Appendix One	Selected Job Descriptions
Two	Recruiting Procedures, Headquarters Communications Flow, and the Internal Audit Process
Three	AID Project Proposal Formats


The manual is bound in loose-leaf notebook format, and the two copies inspected by the evaluation team had been updated at least once. The manual is in many respects modeled on the AID handbooks. It reflects a great deal of thought and effort over several years.

The Africare organization chart, shown in Figure 1, was prepared during this evaluation to reflect organizational changes that had taken place during the previous few months. At present, Africare is organized into three major functional units: International Development, Finance and Administration, and Domestic Affairs. The development team, under the director of international development, is divided according to geographic and linguistic regional program areas of Francophone and West Africa and East and Southern Africa. The Office of Domestic Affairs was created in mid-1984 to centralize the closely related functions of constituency development, communications and planning, and development education. The Development Resource Center (DRC) is under the direction of the International Development Office but also serves a number of community outreach and public education functions.

Africare currently has a staff of 57, of whom 24 (42 percent) are assigned to the home office. The field staff, numbering 33, is divided geographically and linguistically between West and Francophone Africa (7 countries with 27 staff members) and East and Southern Africa (9 countries with 6 staff members). Program management in each of the two regions is managed by a regional development officer who supervises a regional operations officer. In comparison with 1980, the field staff in 1985 has increased by 38 percent and the home office staff has declined slightly. The 1980 AID audit report showed that there were 21 field staff and 25 home office staff in that year.

FIGURE 1

AFRICARE ORGANIZATION CHART  
April 1985



Every member of the home office staff who was interviewed by the evaluators had a written job description, and key job descriptions are compiled in the Organization and Goals Manual. In some cases, job descriptions are written to agree with the interests and ideas of the incumbent. All staff members clearly know what is formally expected of them; this does not mean, however, that roles and responsibilities are narrowly defined. Typical staff comments on their work were: "You always end up being a jack of all trades," and "Everyone helps in everything here."

Staff members demonstrate a high level of commitment and dedication to development in Africa. Several expressed personal satisfaction as well. Typical comments were:

There is a sense of family here, and satisfaction. C. Payne gives you the opportunity to do things like writing or computers.

It is a very stimulating place to work. One's best is brought out. There is a unique combination of integrity, freedom, and responsibility. People seem to be alive, concerned, and working.

I like the job very much. It is diversified, broad in scope, not routine. I've done everything in 10 years.

Financial compensation and benefits remain a problem at Africare. Salaries, including those of top management, are generally lower than Africare professional staff could command in private consulting firms or with the U.S. government, although the salaries may be competitive with those of other PVOs. Africare does not yet have a retirement plan for its employees. Most employees feel, however, that the nonfinancial rewards -- particularly their feelings of commitment and achievement -- at least partially compensate for below-market salaries.

Interns and volunteers provide essential supplements to the work of the regular staff. Interns are a part of the DRC program and are supervised by the resource associate, who manages the DRC. The general support grant funded 14 interns, all of whom were enrolled in colleges or universities. Ten of the 14 interns were students in the Washington, D.C., area. Some interns receive course credit, but most undertake the internship to get practical experience in international development. Each intern is assigned to work directly with a program manager after completing an interview with the director of international development.

Africare's organizational structure is appropriate to its dual mission and appears to be an organic development from the functions and responsibilities of the executive director, the director of international development, and other senior staff members. The current staffing pattern is adequate only because most staff members will work long hours and undertake a wide range of tasks. The evaluators' impression is that the staff is stretched to the limit of its output capability and technical skills, and that even a modest increase in the program will require additional staff members with specialized skills.

Several new staff positions are under development. Perhaps the highest priority should be to divide the duties of the current director of finance and administration and to establish subsidiary posts for one or both of these areas of responsibility. Africare is considering hiring one or more new specialists in computerized accounting systems. Also under consideration is the hiring of one or two program monitors, under the supervision of the regional operations officers.

#### DEVELOPMENT RESOURCES CENTER

The DRC serves several functionally related purposes. Physically, the DRC occupies a moderate-sized interior office that serves as a library. The DRC is also the organizational

mechanism for outreach activities for public education on development in Africa and for support of local Africare chapters and institutional constituents. For analytic purposes, it is convenient to differentiate between the staff support and public education functions of the DRC; the latter are discussed in Chapter Four.

Initially oriented to support Africare's development team, the library has evolved to serve broader research and public education purposes. Africare has experienced a growing demand from the public for information, especially since December 1984, when the Ethiopian drought began to receive mass media coverage. Documents can be checked out under three-day interlibrary loan. The library subscribes to many periodicals on development as well as on subjects such as computers, business administration, and foundations for the staff's general use. Staff members submit requests for documents that the director of international development reviews to see if they fit in the collection. Members of the Board of Directors are occasionally asked to provide newsletters. The library also contains a large file of clippings on African development and Africare.

The acquisitions lists during the period of the general support grant show that approximately 450 books and documents were added to the library. Virtually all relate directly to African development. Africare appears to have one of the major information resources in this field.

When renovation of Africare House -- the new headquarters and community center -- is completed in 1986, the DRC will have greatly expanded space available to it, which may eliminate its current physical constraints for the foreseeable future.

## PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

Relationship between Country Representatives and the Home Office

Africare's field program takes many forms. Fundamentally, the number and technical specializations of field staff depend on the wishes of the national government. Africare has projects under way in 16 countries and has a field office in 11 countries. In addition, a new project has started in Malawi that will require field staff. Africare projects in Gambia and Sierra Leone are managed by local Ministry of Health personnel who have been trained by Africare. Projects in Mozambique and Nigeria are managed directly from the home office. Three of the 11 countries with Africare staff -- Ethiopia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe -- have only a country representative. At the other extreme, Niger has the largest number of staff in one country, nine.

Given the practical difficulties of communication between headquarters and the field offices, the field staff has considerable autonomy. Most communication is by letter, which takes an average of about two weeks each way. Telex and telephone are also used for urgent communication. Country representatives have primary responsibility for designing projects and monitoring implementation of all projects in their country. They report to the regional development officer, who is also the primary channel of communication from headquarters to the field. Correspondence and cables are logged by country and reference number. Some, probably most, commodity procurement is done from the home office.

To some extent, tensions between the field and the home office are inherent. Yet one of Africare's strengths is that the senior managers and almost all the current program managers have had extensive field experience, some as Africare country representatives. This experience makes them more sympathetic to field problems. In general, communications between the field and the

home office are action oriented. The quality varies with the country representative. Country representatives are supposed to prepare monthly and quarterly reports on each project, using a one- to two-page format that Africare prepared. But not all representatives regularly follow this procedure.

### Project Monitoring

The country representative has the principal responsibility for project monitoring. If representatives are new, Africare/Washington provides backstopping and feedback on expenditure monitoring. The dialogue varies according to the nature of the project. Africare/Washington does not receive reports on smaller projects every quarter but encourages country representatives to report at least semiannually. Some monitoring is also performed by development team field visits.

The home office conducts evaluations. However, evaluations are systematically done only on the larger and more complex multiyear projects where obtaining an intermediate look at implementation, objectives, and needs is necessary.

## FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

### Program Growth

Africare's program has grown dramatically during the past six years and, in a shorter time frame, during the period of the current general support grant. In 1981 Africare's end of the fiscal year was moved from April 30 to June 30, thus introducing slight distortions in the short-term program picture. The simplest and clearest picture of recent program changes comes in comparisons over the five-year period between FY 1979 and FY 1984. This period includes the first 24 of the 33 months of the general support grant. Table 1 shows Africare's public support and revenue for FY 1979 to 1984.

TABLE 1

AFRICARE: STATEMENT OF PUBLIC SUPPORT AND  
REVENUE FOR FISCAL YEARS 1979 TO 1984

(All Figures in U.S. Dollars)

	FY'84: July 1, 1983 to June 30, 1984 =====	FY'83: July 1, '82 To June 30, '83 =====	For 14 months Ended June 30, 1982 =====	For 2 Months Ended June 30, 1981 =====	For Year Ended April 30, 1981 =====	For Year Ended April 30, 1980 =====	For the Year Ended April 30, 1979 =====	TOTALS =====
PULIC SUPPORT AND REVENUE								
I. PUBLIC SUPPORT:								
a) Foundation Grants	474,459	321,623	210,714	25,000	267,293	209,556	139,620	1,648,265
b) Contributions	755,222	741,198	610,651	88,551	183,329	212,994	130,321	2,722,266
c) Other Grants	149,083	391,475	-256,845	0	803,522	0	0	1,087,235
d) Special Events (Net of related expenses)	16,448	6,293	11,733	3,576	16,230	1,879	9,337	65,496
e) United States Government Contracts and Grants	5,046,851	3,773,594	2,543,027	645,243	4,179,891	3,071,232	4,169,430	24,249,268
f) Foreign Govt. Contributions	209,862	87,810	0	0	430,670	604,005	0	1,332,347
g) Combined Federal Campaign (net of related expenses)	397,743	446,869	362,010	0	0	0	0	1,206,622
h) Donated furniture & equipment	283,956	76,423	96,392	1,920	96,549	158,527	7,800	721,567
i) Donated Services & Materials	253,356	130,216		18,193	32,934	50,931	1,111	486,741
Total Public Support	8,386,980	5,975,501	3,577,682	782,483	6,010,418	4,309,124	4,477,619	33,519,807
II. REVENUE:								
a) Membership Dues	23,764	21,688	39,017	5,202	28,037	11,076	7,080	135,864
b) Interest Income	34,082	36,914	89,316	13,652	54,045	27,846	23,333	279,188
c) Loss on disposal of assets	0	0	-12,285	0	-6,992	-1,779	-910	-21,966
d) Other	0	0	3,210	0	217	1,213	2,820	7,460
e) Gain on foreign exchange	0	0	0	0	0	8,219	5,649	13,868
Total Revenue	57,846	58,602	119,258	18,854	75,307	46,575	37,972	414,414
III. TOTAL PUBLIC SUPPORT & REVENUE	8,444,826	6,034,103	3,696,940	801,337	6,085,725	4,355,699	4,515,591	33,934,221

Source: Africare

A simple measure of the extent of program growth is the average level of non-U.S. government support and revenue for the first two years (FY 1979 and FY 1980) and the last two years (FY 1983 and FY 1984). The growth amounts to approximately 63 percent.

Over the five-year period, AID grants and contracts totaled \$24,249,268, or 72 percent of total public support and revenue, \$33,934,221. This average disguises substantial annual variations in the AID share. In 1979, the first year, AID contracts and grants amounted to 92 percent of total public support and revenue. Since 1980, however, AID's share has been approximately 70 percent; in 1984 it was 69 percent.

In FY 1979, non-U.S. government support in the form of foundation grants and contributions amounted to approximately \$270,000. Over the next five years, this figure grew to approximately \$1,230,000, an increase of more than 450 percent. Contributions from the Combined Federal Campaign began during FY 1982 and have subsequently fluctuated between approximately \$362,000 and \$446,000. The importance of the Combined Federal Campaign to Africare is indicated by the fact that this source of support alone has averaged about 13 percent of the total non-U.S. government support since FY 1979.

The evidence reviewed by the evaluation team suggests that Africare has the intent and capacity to increase its non-U.S. government sources of funding. The specific constituency-building and fund-raising approach of Africare is described in Chapter Four. Africare has greatly expanded and diversified its funding sources and has established long-term institutional relationships that will very probably result in substantial annual increases in absolute funding levels.

Overhead Costs

Africare's accounting system provides for a two-level distribution base to compute indirect cost rates. Its accounting plan groups direct costs into seven major categories: personnel, travel and allowances, training, other direct, supplies, equipment, and construction. The first four categories tend to have a more immediate and predictable impact on the level of Africare general and administrative expenses. Africare's response to this organizational reality is a two-level indirect cost reimbursement structure that weights Level I costs (personnel, travel and allowances, training, and other direct) more heavily than Level II costs (supplies, equipment and construction) to arrive at an indirect cost billing rate. The intent of this procedure is to derive a valid weighted average overhead rate that will result in an equitable allocation of indirect costs to individual projects.

As reported to the Defense Contract Audit Agency on July 20, 1983, Africare's effective indirect cost rates for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1982 were:

Level I: 25.8 percent

Level II: 12.9 percent

These rates were calculated on the basis of:

Total out-of-pocket administrative expenses:	\$816,704.00
Less unallowable costs:	21,805.00
	<hr/>
Allowable indirect cost pool:	\$794,899.00

As reported to the Defense Contract Audit Agency on January 17, 1984, Africare's effective indirect cost rates for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1983 were slightly but not significantly higher:

Level I: 27.03 percent

Level II: 13.51 percent

These rates were calculated on the basis of:

Total management and general expenses:	\$888,076.00
Less unallowable costs:	40,302.00
	<hr/>
Allowable indirect cost pool:	\$847,774.00

Africare's proposal for actual overhead rates for FY 1984 has not yet been prepared. The evaluators were also unable to make an independent judgment about what the rates might be in 1985. However, discussions with Africare management indicate that these rates will not vary significantly from those of FY 1982 and FY 1983.

In the case of Africare, however, analysis of trends in the ratios between indirect and direct costs is complicated by two factors. First, Africare has recovered indirect costs under provisional rates established for 1983 and 1984; the last negotiated rates were fixed in 1982. Second, actual recovery of indirect costs cannot occur until expenditures are made. Implementation of several AID grant projects has been delayed, the most important of which is in Rwanda; these delays have had a negative impact on absolute levels of indirect cost recovery.

In common with all PVOs, Africare finds strong donor resistance to paying full indirect cost rates. Most private donors are charged a flat rate of 24 percent. Some donors, such as the Christian Children's Fund, the Presiding Bishops' Fund, and the United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR), refuse to pay this much. UMCOR, for example, pays only a 10-percent indirect cost rate. The difference between the overall indirect cost rate negotiated with the U.S. government and the rate that private

donors will pay is made up from unrestricted funds. This is consistent with the U.S. government requirement that it not pay more than its fair share of indirect costs. Africare would like to change the two-tiered rate to a flat rate because the two-tiered rate causes too much confusion.

Obtaining funds to provide for general and administrative costs that cannot be directly allocated to specific programs is probably the major fund-raising challenge facing Africare now and for the foreseeable future. Africare has chosen to report contributions from the Combined Federal Campaign as unrestricted, but in fact it programs these funds as though they were restricted for use in village development projects. This is a conservative policy that will serve well in the long run to maintain Africare's credibility and integrity in the Combined Federal Campaign, but it greatly reduces the funds available to meet unrecovered indirect costs.

#### Funding Match, Funding Schedule, and Expenditures

Matching funds utilized by Africare for the general support grant are shown in Table 2. This table covers FY 1983 and FY 1984, July 1, 1982 to June 30, 1984, the first 24 months of the 33-month grant. This was the most recent information available at the time of the evaluation. Table 2 shows that Africare met \$916,402 of its total obligation of \$918,427 by the end of its second year of the three-year grant. Thus, even though data are not available for the final year, Africare should easily achieve its matching targets with respect to the general support grant. Africare's reports also show that it has been conscientious in identifying appropriate matching funds.

Africare's budget and expenditures against the general support grant, through December 31, 1984, are shown in Table 3. This information covers 10 of the 11 quarterly periods for which

TABLE 2

AFRICARE GENERAL SUPPORT GRANT: MATCHING FUND EXPENDITURES --  
FISCAL YEARS 1983 AND 1984

PROJECT NAME	SALARIES	FRINGES & RECRUITING	TRAVEL AND RELOCATION	EQUIPMENT	SUPPLIES	CONSTRUCTI	TRAINING	OTHER DIREC	INDIRECT COST		S TOTAL	TOTAL PROJ. YTD
									LEVEL 1	LEVEL 2		
ESSAY CONTEST	0.00	0.00	3,489.44	0.00	4,230.02	0.00	-23.40	3,513.42	1,697.30	515.71	2,213.01	13,422.49
PSA's (IN FUND)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.20	8,243.00	900.15	0.00	900.15	9,150.95
NEWSLETTER	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	4,602.22	0.00	0.00	1,918.22	411.46	501.00	912.46	7,512.90
EXP:SERVICE TO CHAPTERS	100.00	0.00	198.00	0.00	813.95	0.00	0.00	4.69	71.88	94.75	166.43	1,203.07
VDP:MAHONGA/ZINSUINCHOR	800.19	149.69	0.00	0.00	1,129.56	0.00	0.00	0.00	256.45	159.27	415.72	2,495.16
VDP:MAHONGA VILLAGE(SEN)	23.51	0.00	0.00	356.53	2,329.15	0.00	0.00	0.00	8.63	304.01	311.44	3,020.63
EXP:BRUS CORPS:SIERPA L	15,165.72	1,627.93	18,693.69	0.00	1,347.06	18.27	0.00	0.00	7,612.03	146.09	7,758.12	44,610.79
PFB:SUDAN COOP.(FVT)	12,449.79	6,615.01	9,296.31	65.00	47.04	0.00	1,019.69	717.36	6,456.06	14.14	6,470.20	36,680.40
EXP:VDP: LAVALANANJA	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
VDP: MUGUPANENO	0.00	0.00	0.00	3,375.60	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
EXP:UMCOR:ZIMB.PEP.SUP.	12,820.50	2,846.55	15,089.14	3,867.00	21.74	0.00	0.00	0.00	4,703.64	415.40	5,119.04	40,094.20
EXP:UMCOR:ZIMB.PEP.SUP.	0.00	0.00	232.56	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	330.23	0.00	0.00	330.23	40,424.43
EXP:JOURNALIST MISSION	0.00	0.00	6,431.97	0.00	2.40	0.00	716.94	0.00	214.39	0.00	214.39	1,213.89
HOST GOVT. SPACE/FURNITUR	0.00	0.00	8,000.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1,379.66	.26	1,379.92	7,814.29
EXP:AFR.MATCH GEN. TECH.	3,79,293.61	66,506.38	34,865.27	220.80	120.00	0.00	0.00	20,000.00	6,006.00	0.00	6,006.00	34,006.00
EXP:AFR.MATCH/VDP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1,000.00	22,619.05	126,271.70	40.37	126,312.07	630,937.18
EXP:AFR.MATCH:JT.VEN.DE	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
EXP:AFR.MATCH:SR.PLANNE	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
EXP:AFR.MATCH.REG.CTR.P	7,806.55	56.09	4.00	45.00	457.40	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
EXP:AFR.MATCH.COMM.RESP	30,412.90	3,848.20	4,479.64	30.00	16,006.31	0.00	312.10	22.86	2,233.72	53.76	2,287.48	10,991.48
EXP:AFR.MATCH.DIPL.SEN.	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	350.00	1,418.83	9,812.18	2,273.74	12,005.92	69,431.80
TOTALS	458,872.77	81,649.85	100,830.02	7,959.93	31,506.85	18.27	3,375.13	58,787.66	168,041.05	4,680.19	172,921.54	916,402.02

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Source: Africare

TABLE 3

AFRICARE GENERAL SUPPORT GRANT:  
BUDGET AND EXPENDITURES THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1984

	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Travel and Allowances</u>	<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Supplies</u>	<u>Training</u>	<u>Construc- tion</u>	<u>Other Direct</u>	<u>Indirect</u>	<u>Total</u>	
<u>Budget</u>	510,501.00	171,076.00	16,000.00	9,000.00	121,108.00	0.00	15,000.00	189,315.00	1,032,000.00	
<u>Expenditures</u>										
From	To									
07/01/82	09/30/82	69,024.16	22,776.76	0.00	544.30	3,062.04	0.00	64.40	20,420.16	115,891.82
10/01/82	12/31/82	73,860.32	41,980.93	17,648.38	250.52	1,852.50	0.00	15,064.50	30,391.82	181,048.97
01/01/83	03/31/83	60,935.22	25,579.70	902.00	246.81	1,892.28	0.00	65.88	19,100.40	108,722.29
04/01/83	06/30/83	45,298.87	7,803.64	37.50	41.06	769.91	65.88	(42.38)	11,562.01	65,536.49
FY83 Total		249,118.57	98,141.03	18,587.88	1,082.69	7,576.73	65.88	15,152.40	81,474.39	471,199.57
07/01/83	09/30/83	31,605.23	15,867.87	150.00	42.47	471.18	0.00	35.85	10,312.33	58,484.93
10/01/83	12/31/83	33,745.89	1,841.17	0.00	0.00	1,104.85	0.00	48.00	7,880.91	44,620.82
01/01/84	03/31/84	25,796.76	1,623.38	0.00	203.12	1,253.72	0.00	0.00	6,172.29	35,049.27
04/01/84	06/30/84	24,777.64	2,498.58	0.00	1,421.50	1,218.05	0.00	375.00	29,101.48	59,392.25
FY84 Total		115,925.52	21,831.00	150.00	1,667.09	4,047.80	0.00	458.85	53,467.01	197,547.27
07/01/84	09/30/84	21,930.28	4,429.90	0.00	1,818.06	988.71	0.00	375.00	7,387.28	36,929.23
10/01/84	12/31/84	147,823.85	14,086.14	31.69	(1,410.86)	(110.98)	140.00	3,840.87	41,584.29	205,985.00
FY85 6 Mos.		169,754.13	18,516.04	31.69	407.20	877.73	140.00	4,215.87	48,971.57	242,914.23
Total Expenditures		534,798.22	116,657.07	18,769.57	3,156.98	12,502.26	205.88	19,827.12	183,912.97	911,661.07
Expenditures/Budget		1.05	0.68	1.17	0.35	0.10	ERR	1.32	0.97	0.88

Source: Africare, Form 269 submissions

the grant was awarded, and it represents the most current information available at the time of the evaluation. It should be noted that line items such as for personnel, travel, and allowances are not a formal part of the Grant Agreement but were developed by Africare for purposes of financial management. Overall, 88 percent of the budget was expended by December 31, 1984. The largest line item overrun, amounting to approximately \$24,000, or 5 percent, is for personnel. Relative to the budget, the most important expenditure shortfall is for training, for which only 10 percent of Africare's budget has been spent. On the whole, the pattern of expenditures indicates sound financial management.

In its proposal for the general support grant, dated August 15, 1981, Africare proposed a declining AID allocation amounting to two-thirds in the first year, one-half in the second year, and one-third in the third year of the grant. The Grant Agreement does not specify any allocation structure or disbursement schedule, and, in practice, Africare has not implemented its original allocation proposal. Matching funds were used disproportionately during the first two years, as shown in Table 3, leaving a substantial balance of the AID portion of the grant at the end of the second year. This balance was partially rectified by a very large billing for personnel during the 10th quarterly period.

#### Financial Reporting to Donors

The primary financial report of Africare is presented in the Annual Report, the most recent of which covers 1983. Of the approximately 10,000 copies printed, about one-half were mailed to important recent donors. The 1983 Annual Report contains:

- Combined Balance Sheets for June 30, 1982, and June 30, 1983;
- Combined Statement of Support, Revenue, and Expenses and Changes in Fund Balances for the Year Ended June 30, 1983;

- Combined Statement of Functional Expenses for the Year Ended June 30, 1983;
- Notes to the Combined Financial Statements; and
- Auditors' Opinion.

The evaluators performed no independent assessment of the timeliness of financial reporting to donors. However, Africare's external auditor, Deloitte Haskins & Sells, reported on this subject in its management letters for FY 1983 (dated November 22, 1983) and FY 1984 (dated November 14, 1984). The auditor stated: "The compilation of year end financial statements is not timely. Statutory and third party reporting is invariably late."

Year-end financial statements are delayed for two primary reasons. First, the field offices and the subgrantees are slow in reporting to the Washington office; second, the Washington office is unable to process the information sent to it on a timely basis. The field office and subgrantee reports are delayed by the time required to complete the records in the field, the delays in receiving bank statements, and the slow mail system in Africa. The Washington office is unable to process the information on a timely basis because of insufficient personnel with the knowledge necessary to perform proper accounting adjustments and process the foreign reports.

The auditor recommended that more of the accounting work be performed at the headquarters in Washington and suggested that field offices mail their cash receipts and disbursement vouchers and the supporting documentation to the Washington office on a semimonthly rather than a monthly basis.

Africare appears to have moved determinedly to speed up record keeping. Obviously, any organization must accommodate itself to the slow mail in Africa, but problems in the Washington office seemed to the evaluators to be less critical than they

were during FY 1983. Many record-keeping problems could be traced to the initial computer program and to the extensive training and familiarization necessary to enable the accounting staff to use the computer effectively. The Foreign Currency program has reduced processing time in Washington, and the field staff are said to be diligent in submitting biweekly financial reports.

#### Reporting to Private Donors

Apart from the need to keep timely records for financial management purposes, private donors require Africare to provide a range of different financial reports. Most OPGs and cooperative agreements from AID missions require quarterly reports. These are sent directly from the country representative to the AID missions, and a copy is sent to the home office. Some donors require only semiannual reports, and others require only a final report. Africare tries to use photographs as much as possible in its reports, particularly with private donors who usually have little familiarity with conditions in Africa.

The frequency and detail of reports to private donors depend to some extent on the length of time they have supported Africare projects. Some members of the development team noted that corporate foundations scrutinized performance during the first few years of their support but, once convinced that Africare was spending funds effectively, reduced the reporting requirements to a minimum.

#### Reporting to the U.S. Government (AID)

The Grant Agreement for the general support grant requires Africare to submit quarterly financial status reports (Form 269) no later than 30 days following the end of the quarter and reports of federal cash transactions within 15 working days following the end of the quarter. The evaluators reviewed the submission of the financial status reports. Table 4 summarizes the performance of report submission.

TABLE 4  
TIMELINESS OF REPORTS TO AID

Report Period		Date Submitted to AID
07/01/82	09/30/82	04/13/83
10/01/82	12/31/82	05/06/83
01/01/83	03/31/83	07/11/83
04/01/83	06/30/83	10/04/83
07/01/83	09/30/83	02/07/84
10/01/83	12/31/83	02/09/84
01/01/84	03/31/84	06/05/84
04/01/84	06/30/84	08/02/84
07/01/84	09/30/84	12/12/84
10/01/84	12/31/84	02/20/85

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Source: Africare Form 269 submissions

Although Africare has not formally complied with the 30-day timeliness requirement for any of its reports, its performance improved throughout the period of the general support grant. The first three reports were submitted several months after the report was due, but the three most recent reports were submitted on a much more timely basis.

The Grant Agreement also requires submission of a quarterly performance report within 30 days of the close of each quarter, comparing actual accomplishments with goals, discussing why goals were not met, and providing other pertinent information. However, during the period of the grant, Africare submitted just three performance reports:

<u>Report Period</u>	<u>Date of Submission</u>
July 1982-June 30, 1983	July 1983
July 1, 1983-September 30, 1983	October 1983
October 1, 1983-March 31, 1984	April 1984

Clearly this record of quarterly report submission is not in compliance with the requirement of the Grant Agreement.

The three program performance reports submitted during the grant period consist primarily of narrative summaries of inputs and activities. A reader can scarcely fail to be impressed by the amount of staff travel recorded or the number of small grants awarded to Africare. However, the reports so lack in critical analysis that it is almost impossible for a reader to draw any conclusions about the achievement of planned outputs or the purpose of the grant. The reports do not contain a systematic comparison of accomplishments with goals, or any summations of progress.

These observations do not imply that the progress reports should be considered formally deficient from the standpoint of their contents. The evaluators received no indication from AID personnel that the reports were inadequate or failed to comply with minimum acceptable standards. Given the nature of the general support grant, it would have been difficult and very time consuming for Africare to evaluate its progress on a quarterly basis. Africare evidently missed several opportunities to undertake a rigorous self-assessment of the results of the general support grant, as implied by the progress reporting requirements of the Grant Agreement, but the reporting requirement itself seems to have been unnecessarily sweeping. In retrospect, it might have been preferable for AID and Africare to identify a few key objectively verifiable indicators of outputs and purpose and to base reporting requirements on these.

#### Computerization

Africare's financial management is almost completely computerized in the home office, and one microcomputer has been installed at a field office in Rwanda. Africare could not manage its finances without its current, adequate system and, appropriately, Africare's first, and still primary, application for computers is accounting. Approximately 75 percent of the computer time is for finance and accounting. The remainder is for word processing. Staff members see important opportunities for improving productivity through computerizing additional management information. Space and financial constraints to expanding the system will be alleviated after the move to Africare House in 1986 and a successful capital fund drive.

The Africare computer system consists of one HP 250/50 small business microcomputer with four personal work stations and one IBM PC that is used both as a stand-alone computer and as a terminal for the HP 250/50. System and user memory is adequate for current finance and accounting requirements. Work stations

are clustered in the area occupied by Administration and Finance. Applications software include General Ledger, Accounts Payable, Payroll Management, Plan/250, Accounts Receivable/Donor, Lotus 1,2,3, Symphony, and Word Processing. Of particular importance is the Foreign Currency program that Africare developed for batch entry of vouchers prepared in the field.

Although the current computer system represents a significant improvement in accounting capability during the life of the general support grant, there remain several important limitations as a result of software design and possibly also of system implementation. Timely report generation is severely limited because financial data cannot be entered for one fiscal year until the previous fiscal year is completely closed. Applications software is not fully integrated. For instance, Payroll is not automatically posted to the General Ledger. Consequently, the system cannot yet generate all of the reports that may be needed in a format that minimizes extraneous information. The pace of system implementation may have been suboptimal during 1983 and 1984, because the former director of finance and administration took personal responsibility for software development and few other staff members understood the system well. The current director of finance and administration appears to have a good grasp of the system, but her numerous duties preclude concentration on software development.

Staff members generally view computers positively and are quick to identify potential productivity increases through an expanded computer system. Although by no means exhaustive, the following three examples typify potential applications:

- The Office of Domestic Affairs maintains a mailing list of 26,000 names, under contract with an outside computer firm. The office would like to bring its list in-house to improve communication with contributors.

- The development team is still in the paper and typewriter era. But it has decided to computerize program information, has developed a job description for one person in each of the two regions to handle computerized program monitoring, and is investigating the best software to do this.
- The DRC is behind in cataloguing the library because staff, intern, and volunteer time is needed for more urgent tasks. The resource associate believes that a computer would speed up and simplify cataloguing.

## CHAPTER THREE

AFRICARE IN AFRICA:  
PROJECT DEVELOPMENT AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

One principal objective of the general support grant was to permit Africare to maintain, expand, and improve its project development and technical assistance activities. To this end, the grant supported program management and technical staff both in Washington and in Africa.

## AFRICARE'S APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT

In compliance with a requirement of its first general support grant (1974-1977), Africare prepared what was to become a general model for its rural development projects. In keeping with the participatory emphasis of its development activities, Africare developed its model through a series of meetings and workshops with Africans. A 1978 evaluation concluded that the "model/strategy" resulting from this exercise was

essentially a statement of philosophy and methodology rather than the fully articulated model that was contemplated in the Development Program Prop. Nonetheless, it has served the basic purpose of providing a point of departure for the conduct of workshops and joint planning in the design of integrated rural development projects.[1]

This conclusion of the 1978 evaluation remains valid today. Since then, there has been no further attempt to formalize a general model, but the fundamentals of the philosophy or approach that were developed in the mid-1970s are still operative within the organization. As articulated in interviews, as found in Africare documents, and as interpreted by the evaluation team, three elements are basic to this approach:

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- Africare projects should aim directly at increasing income or quality of life in rural areas. Thus, Africare projects should take place almost exclusively in rural areas and should directly benefit rural people. This element of the approach results in a focus on four sectors that are of particular concern to rural Africans: agriculture (including livestock), water systems, health, and reforestation. It also means that Africare projects tend to focus on activities that produce tangible and immediately usable results (crops, wells, health clinics, and tree nurseries) rather than projects with less tangible benefits or less immediate results (formal education, research, and planning.)
- Africare projects should be designed and implemented with the participation of Africans. This element of the approach incorporates an emphasis on self-help. It also requires working with existing rural institutions or sometimes creating new ones.
- Africare projects should increase contact and collaboration between rural people (and their institutions) and support systems, meaning mainly the government. An important Africare principle is that government structures should not be bypassed, that the government should become a participant in virtually all Africare projects.

The evaluation team was struck by the extent to which these principles had been internalized by Africare staff and to which they were pursued systematically in the field. Although these principles are not written down in any one place in the form presented above, they were mentioned repeatedly by Africare staff in interviews and conversations. As will be discussed below, they are reflected also in the selection and design of Africare projects.

#### PROJECT DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

The scope of work for this evaluation required the evaluators to assess the "effectiveness of technical assistance" that Africare provided under the grant. One element of this section of the scope of work was to assess Africare's effectiveness in the "design and implementation of new Africare field activities." Because the scope of work did not provide for visits to project

sites in Africa, the assessment was to be carried out primarily by examining a "representative sample of project proposals" and by querying AID missions about their impressions of Africare's effectiveness.

### Project Proposals

In terms of sheer numbers, the amount of project preparation work undertaken by Africare is impressive. During the course of the grant, Africare's field representatives and home office staff designed and approved 128 projects. A larger number of projects were actually designed, but about 10 percent of these were not approved internally by Africare.[2] Of the 128 projects that Africare approved, 111 have been funded (see Table 5). The remaining 17 have not yet been funded (see Table 6).[3] The funded projects cover a total of 17 African countries: 59 are in Anglophone countries, 46 in Francophone countries, four in Lusophone countries, and two Africa-wide projects. The total value of external financing for the 111 projects is \$19,752,948.

Most of the projects -- 68 -- were in one of the four rural development sectors that Africare has singled out as priority sectors. As shown in Table 4, of these 68, 31 are in agriculture, 18 in water, 13 in health, and 6 in reforestation. Another important, albeit episodic, area of Africare project activity is emergency relief. During the life of the grant, Africare obtained funding for 19 relief projects; most of these are relatively recent since they are aimed at helping famine victims in Ethiopia.

The private sector funded the vast majority of the 111 projects -- 94 (85 percent). The U.S. government financed 14 projects exclusively. The private sector and the U.S. government jointly funded three projects. (This breakdown refers only to external financing. In most Africare projects, there is also a significant contribution from the beneficiary community and/or

TABLE 5

AFRICARE PROJECTS DEVELOPED AND FUNDED DURING THE PERIOD  
OF THE GENERAL SUPPORT GRANT --  
JULY 1982 THROUGH MARCH 1985

<u>Country/Region</u>	<u>Agriculture</u>	<u>Water</u>	<u>Health</u>	<u>Reforestation</u>	<u>Emergency</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Total Projects</u>	<u>Total (\$)</u>
Africa-wide			2				2	\$ 379,292
Burkina Faso	3	2		2		1	8	86,131
C.A.R.	1						1	535,710
Chad	1	1	1		1	4	8	3,788,930
Ethiopia					16		16	1,401,504
Malawi						1	1	1,475,000
Mali	1	6				2	9	624,030
Mauritania	1						1	1,130
Mozambique	2				1	1	4	376,826
Niger	4		2		1	1	8	2,070,785
Nigeria			1				1	334,613
Rwanda						2	2	4,410,420
Senegal	5	3	2	1			9	99,147
Sierra Leone							2	353,586
Somalia	4	1	1	3		3	12	1,048,761
Sudan						1	1	73,228
Zambia	7	4	4			3	18	2,248,504
Zimbabwe	2	1				5	8	445,351
Totals	31	18	13	6	19	24	111	\$19,752,948

Source: Africare

TABLE 6

AFRICARE PROJECTS DEVELOPED DURING  
THE PERIOD OF THE GENERAL SUPPORT GRANT --  
JULY 1982 THROUGH MARCH 1985 -- BUT NOT YET FUNDED

<u>Country</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Somalia	1	\$1,200,000
Nigeria	2	1,522,000
Ethiopia	1	700,000
Gambia	1	228,000
Zambia	2	100,000
Zimbabwe	2	51,332
Chad	4	34,364
Mali	3	10,008
Senegal	2	7,257
Total	17	\$3,852,961

Source: Africare

the host country government.) In dollar terms, however, the U.S. government-financed projects assume a much greater importance. Of the \$19.8 million representing total funding for the 111 projects, \$12.6 million (64 percent) has been provided by the U.S. government.

### Project Size

One striking feature of Africare's project portfolio is that, in budget terms, most projects are very small. Of all projects funded or under implementation during the life of the general support grant, 28 percent had budgets of less than \$10,000 and 63 percent had budgets of less than \$50,000. On the other end of the scale, a handful of projects, representing about 9 percent of the total portfolio, had budgets of more than \$500,000; this group included four projects with budgets of more than \$2 million. The small projects are all privately funded, whereas the large projects are mostly funded by the U.S. government.

The coexistence of very small and very large projects within Africare's portfolio raises the issue of the relative effectiveness of Africare in managing and implementing small versus large projects. It also raises the issue of what limits, if any, AID should place on the size of the projects that a PVO such as Africare implements.

The 1980 AID audit of Africare found that Africare's AID-funded projects were "too large and complex" and that implementation problems stemmed, among other things, from "the inability of Africare and local government officials to manage and implement projects efficiently" and "the lack of clearly defined roles for Africare, local government and village member participants." This finding resulted in a recommendation that AID "should

develop more specific criteria regarding the size, scope and complexity of Operational Program Grants awarded to Africare and other PVOs."

Among the personnel interviewed in AID's Africa Bureau and FVA/PVC, no one knew of the existence of any criteria of this kind. If these criteria have been drawn up, it would appear that they are not being used.

Having not visited Africare projects in Africa during this evaluation, the evaluation team is not in a position to render a judgment about the relative effectiveness of Africare's management of large and small projects. However, Africare has a comparative advantage in the management of the small projects because the demand for these projects is not met well elsewhere. The small projects are also more attractive to private donors and are, therefore, more appropriate for stimulating involvement of Americans in African development, which is one principal institutional objective of Africare.

Africare, however, probably needs a certain number of large projects in its portfolio for financial reasons. The relatively small number of large projects make up the majority of the value of Africare's project portfolio. Moreover, Africare does not recover as much overhead from some of the small projects as it does from the large projects. In addition, because of economies of scale, the larger projects are probably less expensive, on a dollar-for-dollar basis, to develop and administer than are the smaller projects.

#### Project Proposal Quality

The evaluation team read and assessed 31 of the 111 project proposals funded during the life of the grant. These 31 proposals were in general representative of the total number.

Nine were U.S.-government funded, two were funded by Canada, and 20 were privately financed. Sixteen were proposals for activities in Anglophone countries and 15 for activities in Francophone countries. Some of the projects proposed activities in more than one sector or focused on activities that were only indirectly related to one of Africare's four priority sectors. For this reason, it is difficult to break down the sampled projects by sector. However, at least eight were predominantly agricultural projects, five predominantly water, six health, and two reforestation.

The quality of the proposals was assessed principally using Africare's own standards as implied in the approach outlined in the preceding section. Additional criteria against which quality was assessed were those mentioned in the scope of work, including "clarity of objectives, methodologies, project management arrangements, financial plans, and budget presentations."

Against these criteria, the quality of Africare's proposals is very good in many areas, uneven in others. Virtually all of the proposals have been influenced by the spirit of Africare's approach, but some have fallen short in specific design elements that should logically follow from the approach. Most of the proposals are strong in their statement of objectives and methodologies as well as in their financial plans and budget presentations, but many are weak in project management arrangements and in their concern for sustainability.

#### Project Rationale and Objectives

Most of the proposals contain strong analyses of the need for the project, clear statements of purpose that are linked to the needs assessment, and good descriptions of project activities. The purpose statements are almost all linked to the Africare goals of increasing rural incomes and quality of life, and the proposed activities are usually aimed at short-term, tangible outputs that would help accomplish these objectives. The Tiougou

Dispensary project in Burkina Faso, for example, proposed to assist the people of five villages in the construction of a dispensary in the central village of Tiougou. The rationale for the project was that the nearest health facility serving this population was 13 kilometers away. Another example is the Boboye Women's Vegetable Production Project in Niger, which proposed to assist a women's agricultural cooperative to increase vegetable production. The rationale for the project was that an increase in vegetable production would augment the income of the women and improve the nutrition of those who purchased and consumed the vegetables.

Africare proposals are also typically strong in their identification of intended beneficiaries. The Tiougou project noted that the proposed dispensary would serve five villages with a combined population of 4,000. The Boboye project identified as direct beneficiaries the 300 women farmers in the agricultural cooperative and as indirect beneficiaries their families and the members of the surrounding community.

#### Budgets and Financial Plans

All the proposals contain complete project budgets and financial plans. The budgets of small privately financed projects typically contain three elements:

- Program and project management costs, which pay for the time of Africare field personnel (such as the country representative and administrative assistants) and the program manager in Washington;
- Direct costs of the proposed activity (including materials, equipment, travel and transportation, and labor); and
- Indirect costs (overhead), which are expressed as a percentage of the subtotal of the preceding costs.

AID-financed project budgets are usually more elaborate and follow the AID rather than the Africare format.

Not all budgets use the same indirect cost rate. As reported in Chapter Two, Africare's AID-financed projects use a two-tiered indirect cost rate that, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1983, was 27.03 percent (for personnel, travel and allowance, training, and other direct costs) and 13.51 percent (for supplies, equipment, and construction). Many privately financed projects, however, use a single rate and require the donor to pay a much smaller percentage of indirect costs, as low as a flat 10 percent in the case of UMCOR. The apparent reason for this differential in budgeted overhead rates is that many private donors are simply unwilling to pay a higher rate. The difference between the actual overhead costs of a project and what is recovered from a donor is made up from unrestricted funds.

Most of the budgets also included some attempt to quantify and present the cash and in-kind contributions of the host country government and the beneficiary community. Often these contributions were substantial, reflecting the emphasis that Africare places on self-help.

#### Project Management Arrangements

With respect to project management and implementation arrangements, the proposals were less uniform. Many proposals contained clear descriptions of these arrangements, but several lacked them. Sometimes a single proposal would mention a bewildering number of government and private agencies (occasionally identified only by their acronyms) that would somehow be involved in the project, but would be vague about each organization's responsibility. As a result, it was frequently difficult to know who would be responsible for which activity at what time.

One example is the Reducing Post-Harvest Losses Project in the Central African Republic. This is a \$4 million project, financed mostly by AID, that was designed by VITA and Africare. In the implementation, Africare is a subcontractor to VITA. The project is to be administered by a tripartite commission composed of AID and the Peace Corps, VITA and Africare, and the government's High Commission for Plan and Economic and Financial Cooperation. The implementing agencies are to be SOCADA and ACADOP, identified only by these acronyms with little explanation of what either agency does in general or what either would do in the project. In addition, the following organizations are to be associated with the project: The Food and Feed Grain Institute at Kansas State University, the Denver Wildlife Research Center, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Post-Harvest Institute for Perishables at the University of Idaho, the Tropical Development and Research Institute in London, the Non-Formal Education Information Center at Michigan State University, the Farming Systems Support Project at the University of Florida, and the Peace Corps. The proposal document gives little information about the specific project activities of each organization.

Another example is the San Fisheries Pipeline in Mali. This project, financed by UMCOR, proposes to provide piping from the Bani River to ensure a permanent supply of water for local fish farmers so that they would not be dependent on the local rice irrigation scheme for their pumped water. The proposal is unclear on a number of implementation issues. Is only piping to be provided and not a pump? If so, who provides and pays for the pump? In any case, who owns and operates the pump? The proposal is also unclear about how the fish farmer beneficiaries will participate in the project. In addition, although the piping scheme would theoretically resolve the problem of a steady, year-round supply of water, two other constraints to farmer adoption of fish farming were mentioned but not addressed in the project: the relative novelty of aquaculture in Mali, and the farmers' fear that the fish would eat their rice grain.

A third example of this phenomenon is the Tanda Women's Poultry Project in Niger. This project, financed by the Global Ministries of the United Methodist Church, proposes to organize women into cooperatives to be trained in animal health and poultry production. The activities to be undertaken in the project are described in the passive voice. At one point in the proposal, the reader learns that implementation will be carried out by the Ministry of Rural Development and the Niger Cooperatives Authority, but there is no active voice link between these agencies and the activities of the project.

Almost all the proposals that the evaluation team examined for projects in Somalia had similar problems. The proposal for the AID-funded Jalalaqsi Reforestation Project does not say who will be responsible for the nurseries, for the construction activities, or for the training component. The proposal for the Geed Ashir Village Water System Project does not say who is responsible for the construction of the water storage tank, the installation of the gravity-fed spigot distribution system, or the operation and maintenance of either. The proposal for the Tools and Seeds Chest Project does not indicate who will procure the tools and seeds.

This problem of clarification of implementation responsibilities did not arise in all the proposals. Indeed, many were clear on this matter, including the Chipata District Well Construction Project in Zambia, the Indigenous Private Enterprise Project in Malawi, and the Goundam Dispensaries Project in Mali. But the lack of clarity concerning implementation responsibilities arose with sufficient frequency that the evaluation team recommends that Africare take measures to improve its proposals in this regard. Even if, as is frequently the case, "everyone knows" who will be doing what to whom and when, writing it down to have a record of the proposed division of responsibilities is a good policy.

### Sustainability

Given Africare's expressed concern for self-help and participation, it was somewhat surprising to find that the proposals examined contained little analysis of or provision for the sustainability of project benefits. This problem manifested itself in several ways.

#### Recurrent Costs

Few of the project proposals contained an analysis of the recurrent cost implications of proposed interventions. The Goundam Dispensaries Project in Mali, for example, mentioned that the two villages in which the dispensaries were to be built had health facilities in the past, but that they had fallen apart. This fact should constitute a red flag. Why had they fallen apart? Who was responsible for maintaining them, for staffing them, for providing them with supplies? And who will be responsible for these functions once the two new dispensaries are built? The proposal is simply silent on this matter.

The Lake Bangweulu Self-Help Boat-Building Project proposes to assist a boat-building cooperative to build plank boats that will help members fish more deeply in Lake Bangweulu than they currently can with their dugout canoes. However, the proposal contains no analysis of the demand for the boats, of a break-even selling price, or of the cash-flow needs of the cooperative.

#### Ownership

Another manifestation of the problem of sustainability concerns the notion of ownership, which is closely related to the previously discussed problem of responsibility. Who owns the wells that Africare helps construct? Who owns the dispensaries and the reforestation nurseries and the irrigation equipment?

An Africare well rehabilitation project in Chad proposes to deepen and repair four wells that have fallen into disrepair. Who owns, that is, who is responsible for, these wells? Is it a family, a complex of families, the village, or the government? Who failed to take responsibility for maintenance of the wells last time, and who will be responsible for them this time? Or will an external donor have to repair them once again in three or five years?

Reports from the Gouraye Irrigated Agriculture Project in Mauritania indicate that one principal implementation problem has been the maintenance and repair of pumps. Who owns these pumps -- the government irrigation agency that provides technical assistance to farmers or the farmers' cooperative that benefits from their existence?

This issue of ownership frequently falls between the cracks in project analyses. It is often ignored or brushed aside with vague references to the village, as in "the village will be responsible for. . ." or to the often exaggerated collective nature of African society. Yet the issue of ownership is critical to chances of sustainability, for it is a first step in affixing responsibility for the continuation of project benefits.

Frequently, of course, the owner of the dispensaries and the reforestation nurseries and the like is the state. When the state owns or controls the infrastructure or the services on which villagers rely, they come to depend on it for the provision of those services. This dependency relationship -- for everything from health and education to credit and agricultural inputs -- should, in principle, be something that Africare, with its expressed interest in self-help, tries to sever. Yet many of the projects appear to perpetuate it as they create additional services -- dispensaries and reforestation nurseries -- that can be controlled only by the state. Indeed, the Africare principle

of never bypassing the government, of making government a partner in virtually all its projects, tends to perpetuate and increase the dependency of villagers on government.

### Institutional Capacities

Finally, the relative lack of attention to project sustainability is manifested in relatively weak, sometimes non-existent, analyses of or attention to the capabilities of local institutions. Most Africare projects aim at providing immediate, tangible benefits. Very few, in contrast, provide the less tangible, but equally important, investment that is frequently necessary to ensure that the particular set of activities that is launched will be sustained through an institutional home.

Africare projects are frequently implemented through government agencies. Yet none of the projects examined contained an appreciation of the abilities of the government agency to carry out and sustain project activities. Many implementation problems of the Gouraye Irrigated Agriculture Project in Mauritania have apparently stemmed from management and technical deficiencies within the implementing agency, SONADER, but the project proposal contained no analysis at all of SONADER's capabilities. The Binga District Fishing Project in Zimbabwe proposed to work through the Binga District Council to establish a cooperative village development scheme, featuring the administration of a revolving fund. But the proposal contained no analysis of the District Council's capabilities to foster cooperative development or administer a revolving fund.

To the extent that Africare, consonant with its emphasis on self-help, should attempt, as suggested above, to increase community responsibility for the implementation and sustainability of projects, it is even more important that attention be given to the capabilities of non-governmental local institutions and to ways in which Africare can help strengthen them. Yet this concern is also lacking in many projects.

Many Africare projects propose, for example, to work through cooperative societies. In at least one project, Tara II in Niger, Africare demonstrated a good understanding of cooperative principles (the Rochdale approach). In most other cooperative projects, however, the proposals offer little or no analysis of the potentials or constraints of cooperative development regarding the particular activity proposed and the particular socioeconomic setting. The Binga District Fishing Project in Zimbabwe, for example, proposes to organize cooperatives that will circumvent the middleman in marketing fish. Yet the proposal makes no mention of what efficiencies the cooperative would hope to offer that would be greater than those of the middleman, no mention of any history of collective activity on the part of local fishermen, and no identification of what cultural or organizational constraints might have to be overcome to promote cooperative activities. Similar observations are valid concerning the proposed cooperative endeavors of the Gouraye Irrigated Agriculture Project in Mali, and the Boboye Village Vegetables Project and the Tanda Women's Poultry Project in Niger.

Beyond formal organizational arrangements such as cooperatives, many Africare proposals give insufficient attention to the identification and strengthening of formal or informal community institutions. Given Africare's process of working directly with villages to identify and plan village improvement projects, it is possible that a great deal of attention has, in fact, been given to the local institutional dimension. But if this is the case, it infrequently shows up on paper. The Illela Nutrition Project in Niger proposes to establish a nutrition recuperation center for malnourished children and to train village women in more nutritious child-feeding. Technical assistance and training will be provided by the chief of the health service for the subdistrict of Illela, but there is no mention of what community structure will be involved in operating the

recuperation center. The Community Development Center Wells Project in the village of Segou in Mali, financed by the Presbyterian Hunger Committee, proposes to build nine wide-diameter wells for the community. The local implementing institutions are identified as the Community Development Center (CDC) in Segou and the Development Committee in the nearby town of Dioro. But both the CDC and the Development Committee are government-created and controlled institutions that are unlikely to serve as organizations either that can inspire community participation or that can subsequently assume responsibility for maintaining the wells.

#### AID MISSION IMPRESSIONS OF AFRICARE

The scope of work did not provide for the evaluation team to make site visits to Africare projects in Africa. Instead, to obtain impressions of the effectiveness of Africare's field operations, AID/Washington was to send cables to selected AID missions. Accordingly, on March 12, 1985, AID/Washington cabled six AID missions -- Bamako, Ouagadougou, Niamey, Kigali, Ndjamena, and Lusaka -- and the Refugee Office of the American embassy in Mogadishu with the following questions:

- How well-designed are Africare's projects?
- How soundly have Africare's projects been implemented?
- Has Africare engaged in any training of host country counterpart officials? If so, has the training been effective?
- How effective are Africare's field office staff members in managing field programs and carrying out other functions?
- What is the reputation of Africare in the eyes of the host country government? How well does the Africare staff maintain relations with the government?

In general, the responses were positive in Africare's behalf.

The responses to the first question concerning project design were mixed. Most missions gave Africare high marks, but some observed that Africare staff lacked a thorough understanding of AID project design requirements or did not have sufficient field staff to design complex AID projects.

The responses to the second question were generally positive. Some missions complimented Africare on its ability to recruit competent technical assistance in a timely manner, whereas others noted that this was a problem. Some procurement problems were also noted. In general, the missions were complimentary about the adaptability of Africare and its ability to operate effectively in difficult and often changing environments.

The responses to the third question were less specific, indicating a lack of detailed knowledge on the part of most AID missions concerning the counterpart relationships and the training activities carried out by Africare personnel.

The responses to the fourth question were mostly concerned with the relations between the Africare field office and AID, particularly with how well Africare provided AID with information. For the most part, the missions were satisfied with their relationship with Africare, generally giving it high marks for cooperativeness and responsiveness. Ironically, the Niger mission offered that the number of individuals in Africare's field office, which, at nine, is the largest of all Africare's field offices, may not be sufficient to manage its portfolio in Niger.

The responses to the last question were favorable across the board. The uniformly positive responses to this question provide evidence that one great strength of Africare lies in its ability to foster and maintain good relations with host country governments. The complete text of the responses received are provided in Annex B.

## NEW FIELD PROGRAMS

The grant provided that Africare would expand its development team by posting two technicians in Africa. It provided that the team would "train host country officials through ongoing 'counterpart' relationships and through periodic 'development workshops'." It also provided that the expanded team would undertake three new initiatives: a village development program, a joint venture, and a senior planners program.

Field Technicians

The grant provided that Africare would assign two technicians to field locations most closely coinciding with development priorities in East and Southern Africa and Francophone West Africa. The two technicians were to be a forestry specialist and a bio-medical technician.[4] Neither Africare's proposal nor the Grant Agreement provides details on how long these technicians were to be assigned to the field or what their terms of reference were to be.

As it turned out, only one technician was recruited and posted to the field, a biomedical technician who was assigned to the Francophone West Africa region and who lived in Dakar, Senegal, from October 1982 to August 1984. This technician served both the health and agriculture sectors in four countries: Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal. In the health sector, he helped install medical equipment in rural health clinics in Senegal and trained Senegalese and Gambian counterparts to use and maintain this equipment. In the agriculture sector, he worked mainly on the repair and maintenance of irrigation pumps in Mauritania and Mali.

The proposed forestry specialist was never recruited or assigned. The explanation offered was simply that, given the technical coverage already provided by field offices in several Sahelian countries, posting such a technician was not deemed an appropriate use of grant funds.

### The Village Development Program

The Village Development Program (VDP) is similar to the mainstream of Africare programs in that it consists of discrete projects aimed at improving the standard of living in African villages. It differs from other Africare programs, however, in its focus, emphasis, and fund-raising strategy. Specifically, each VDP:

- Limits its target group to a single village;
- Seeks to enter into a long-term assistance relationship with each target village; and
- Seeks to establish a long-term commitment on the part of a donor to a particular village.

The specific projects that have been undertaken under the VDP differ little from other Africare village-based projects, although they are more modest in cost. The VDP projects tend to emphasize visible and swiftly achievable outputs such as clinics and wells and place great emphasis on the participation of the villagers in the planning and implementation of the project. In theory, planning begins with a needs assessment conducted jointly by village authorities and the Africare country representative. The result of this assessment is the identification of a single priority project that can be undertaken in Year One, with an implied commitment on the part of Africare to undertake other activities identified in the needs assessment in subsequent years. This implied obligation on the part of Africare is subject to successful completion of the Year One project and, of course, success in locating a U.S. funding source. In addition, a base-line study is supposed to be carried out in each village. The information obtained in this study would enable future evaluators to measure changes in the village over time.

VDP activities are financed either from Africare's general funds or, preferably, from a single donor. Participating donors are assigned a village. In return for multiyear funding commitments to the village, donors are encouraged to communicate directly with village leaders, even to visit the village itself. In this manner, donors are able to follow closely the progress that is made in the villages with the use of their money. In some cases, Africare makes commitments to villages and prefinances projects from its general funds, but then refinances the project once support from a specific donor is obtained. In other cases, support from a donor is obtained before specific projects are designed or even before specific villages are identified, but once a VDP is designed, the match is made.

To date, nine VDPs have been launched in four countries financed by general funds (see Table 7). All these projects are small, visible, construction or equipment provision projects: construction of health clinics, schools, schoolteachers' houses, and wells, and provision of equipment for irrigation schemes. In addition, one project has an institution-building component as it seeks to establish a pharmacy cooperative. The projects are all very low cost, ranging from \$3,500 to \$7,500 in Africare financing; all include substantial labor and material contributions from the villagers.

In addition to these nine projects, funding has been received from three donors for projects that have not yet been designed or initiated. The largest commitment -- \$57,000 -- has been received from the International Foundation for the funding of six women's projects in Gambia. Two other donors -- The National Federation of Teachers and Citibank -- have specified the countries but not the type of project in which they wish their funds to be used. The Citibank contribution is in the local Zambian currency, kwacha (K).

TABLE 7

VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DEVELOPED AND FUNDED UNDER THE GENERAL SUPPORT GRANT --  
JULY 1982 THROUGH MARCH 1985

Name of Village	Country	Donor	Field Cost	Other Direct	Indirect	Total	Activity	Year
Kayalamanja	Zambia	General Funds	\$4,900	-0-	\$1,176	\$6,076	Construction of a health clinic	1
Domboshawa	Zimbabwe	General funds	\$5,915	\$325	\$1,498	\$7,738	Construction of an irrigation system for vegetable production	1
Mugurameno	Zambia	General funds	\$4,500	-0-	\$1,080	\$5,580	Construction of school teachers houses	2
Undesignated	Zambia	Citibank	K7,250 [a]	-0-	K1,750	K9,000		0
Six Rural Women's Project	Gambia	International Foundation	\$30,000	\$16,019	\$11,044	\$57,063	To support projects that conserve women's time and labor and establish food storage facilities	1
Mandeh Kunda	Gambia	General funds	\$5,770	\$303	\$1,458	\$7,531	Well construction	1
Midekhine	Chad	General funds	\$2,822	-0-	\$678	\$3,500	Provision of an irrigation pump, tools, and seeds	1
Danouna	Chad	General funds	\$2,822	-0-	\$678	\$3,500	Provision of an irrigation pump, tools, and seeds	1
Abougouaye	Chad	General funds	\$4,530	\$450	\$1,195	\$6,175	Construction of a school and a clinic, and establishment of a pharmacy cooperative	1
Boutal-Fil	Chad	General funds	\$1,610	-0-	\$386	\$1,996	Construction of a school	1
N'Djamena Fara	Chad	General funds	\$4,530	\$450	\$1,105	\$6,175	Construction of a primary school and a clinic	1
Undesignated	Somalia	National Federation of Teachers	\$4,032	-0-	\$968	\$5,000		0

a K = kwacha

Source: Africare

Total VDP commitments to date are approximately \$110,000, plus K9000. These commitments are now being or will soon be used to fund 17 VDPs.

None of the project documents specified output levels that the VDP program was to attain by the end of the grant. It is the judgment of the evaluators, however, that the number of projects launched to date and the volume of funding that has been obtained clearly demonstrate the viability of the program.

Contrary to original intentions, none of the projects developed to date has been preceded by a formal needs assessment or base-line study. The analysis contained in individual project proposals indicate that needs assessments do occur informally in collaboration with villagers and local authorities, but no separate documents exist that constitute plans for long-term Africare involvement in villages. According to Africare staff in Washington, field representatives are reluctant to take the time to carry out formal needs assessments or base-line surveys on the grounds that VDP projects are too small to justify this effort. Acknowledging the validity of this argument, Africare staff in Washington see the VDP program as still maturing conceptually.

Regarding project quality, the evaluators reviewed two of the currently funded projects. Both were for villages in Chad: Abougouaye and Njamena Fara. Each project was to establish a school and a clinic in its village because neither village had access to a school or a clinic. In addition, the Njamena Fara project was to establish a cooperative that would purchase pharmaceutical supplies for the clinic.

Both of these projects were well prepared in terms of the assessment of need, the statement of purpose, and the project description. Responsibilities for accomplishing project activities were easily identifiable with the villagers themselves

responsible for most of the actual construction. The government of Chad had promised to provide a teacher for each school and a nurse or pharmacist for each clinic.

As with the non-VDP projects, the weaknesses in the design of these two projects were in their lack of attention to recurrent cost implications and local institutional capacity. The Abougouaye project did not specify how supplies for the clinic would be obtained. The Njamena Fara project specified that supplies would be purchased through a cooperative but did not specify who would organize the cooperative, how it would function, whether there was a cooperative tradition in the village, and who would keep the books. Possibly these questions were answered satisfactorily in the village surveys that preceded the design of these projects but were simply not mentioned in the project papers. If not, the history of failure in many rural development projects teaches that it should not be assumed that these organizational, implementation, and sustainability issues will be resolved by themselves.

#### Training of Host Country Officials

The Grant Agreement provided that Africare, through its development team, would "train host country officials" through ongoing "counterpart" relationships and through periodic "Development Workshops."

As indicated by the cable responses from the AID missions and by the methods Africare used to design and implement projects, one key feature of Africare's project work in Africa is strong and continuing interaction with Africans. Africare projects are planned and implemented with maximum participation of host country government officials and with the intended beneficiaries. In the course of this interaction, a great deal of informal training and skills transfer occurs naturally. The

impact of informal, on-the-job training of this nature is always difficult to measure, but it is arguably even more beneficial than formal training.

During the course of the grant, Africare has also continued to carry out workshops for project planning and to work with counterparts in more formal relationships. In Somalia, for example, Melvin Foote, former Africare country representative, organized a project planning workshop for government officials and others. In Zambia, agricultural engineer Harold Schmucker, succeeded in 1984 by Thomas Moller, served as the counterpart to a senior Zambian agricultural extension supervisor in managing the Chama rice extension program. Also in Zambia, the Africare country representative worked closely with a senior government health official in managing an Africare-supported environmental sanitation program. This officer is now applying the program development, administrative, budgeting, and management skills that he acquired through this counterpart relationship as a field officer on the staff of Africare/Zambia.

### Joint Venture

The grant provided that Africare would "bring to fruition an initial cooperative venture involving Africare, a U.S. corporation, and a host country economic unit." The Africare proposal implied that the project would be in the agriculture sector because its social objectives would be to "reduce the participating countries' food import requirements" and possibly also to "generate foreign exchange." A pro forma budget accompanying the project proposal, showing a total investment of approximately \$250,000 for the joint venture, implied that the joint venture would involve medium-sized firms on both sides of the Atlantic. None of the general support grant documents specified the country in which the joint venture would be launched or the mechanisms that would be used to bring it about.

To date, no such venture has been launched. Moreover, Africare does not now appear to consider this activity to be of high priority.

Some attempt was made during the grant period to take the first steps toward launching a joint venture. In 1982 a consultant was retained to determine the potential for joint ventures in Gambia, Mauritania, and Senegal. Twenty-one projects were identified in these three countries, but only six were in the agriculture sector. None of the projects was analyzed in depth by the consultant nor by Africare staff subsequently. Apparently little, if any, follow-up has occurred to this initial consultancy.

Another initiative regarding the joint venture was taken in the context of the preparation of Africare's proposal to AID/Malawi for an Indigenous Private Enterprise Project. One objective of this project is to establish links between U.S. corporations and the Malawian business sector. The original proposal called for the establishment of a full-fledged joint venture as an output of the project, but this provision did not appear in the final Grant Agreement.

In the opinion of the evaluation team, it should not be surprising that Africare has had difficulty in following through on its joint venture idea. The establishment of joint ventures between medium-sized U.S. and African firms has been difficult for all who have attempted it. Moreover, Africare has no particular expertise in this field.

The attempt to broker joint ventures between medium-sized African and American firms requires specialized skills and knowledge. (Large firms generally do not need an intermediary.) It requires a specialized understanding of product and credit markets, of debt and equity financing, and of the legal requirements for incorporation in African countries. It entails

a great deal of screening of prospective partners on both continents to ensure honesty and business compatibility. It generally requires carrying out a detailed feasibility study that will pass muster with sources of financing. Above all, it entails coming up with a good idea that promises a very high rate of return for the U.S. partner. The high rate of return (50 percent or more annually on equity) is generally required to compensate for the high risk that U.S. investors see as prevailing on the African continent.

These difficulties are such that the Joint Agricultural Consultative Corporation -- a U.S. government-sponsored organization that was established in 1982 for the purpose of brokering joint ventures, mainly in agriculture, between the U.S. and developing countries -- has succeeded to date in establishing only three fully operational joint ventures in Africa, despite full-time professional attention to this activity.

In the opinion of the evaluation team, Africare lacks the professional expertise and overall resources to give adequate attention to this very difficult undertaking. As this evaluation points out, Africare does a very good job at its mainstream endeavors. It should stick to what it does well and leave the business of international joint ventures to others.

#### Senior Planners Program

The Grant Agreement stated that Africare would provide "senior planners on two-year assignments to strengthen critical ministries such as Planning, Agriculture or Rural Development." Once again, none of the project documents provided details concerning how many planners would be placed or in what countries.

To date, Africare has made no assignments that fit the formula as specified above; that is, no individuals have so far been specifically recruited and placed to serve as full-time

senior planners in African government ministries. Several assignments and requests, however, could reasonably be interpreted as fulfilling the spirit of the requirement.

From January 1983 until her death in September 1983, Ida Chambliss served in a joint capacity as Africare's country representative and as an adviser to the Ministry of Community Development and Women's Affairs in Zimbabwe. Ms. Chambliss's offices were in the ministry itself. Her replacement, Lucille Thomas, still maintains her offices within the ministry, although she does not spend as much time working directly with ministry staff. Ms. Chambliss's position was paid for by a grant from UMCOR.

Africare has also received requests from the Ministry of Rural Development in Burundi and the Women's Bureau of the Office of the Presidency in Gambia for senior planning assistance. To date, however, Africare has been unable to secure funding for these positions.

In a more short-term capacity, Africare provided 12 person-months of expertise to the Ministry of Health in Gambia in planning for an improved system to manage and distribute pharmaceuticals. In Sierra Leone, Africare provided five person-months of expertise for the same purposes and has laid plans for the provision of another nine person-months. Short-term expertise is also being provided in Nigeria in designing a nutrition-oral rehydration therapy project.

The primary obstacle that Africare has had to overcome in the provision of ministry-level planning assistance is a lack of funding. It would appear that Africare's donors prefer to provide funding for project-level activities that produce tangible, visible results (wells and clinics) over ministry-level planning activities whose results are more paper oriented.

Given the difficulties encountered in carrying out this component of the grant, Africare may wish to re-examine the wisdom of diverting its energies from project-level activities to macro- or sectoral-level planning activities. There is a great deal of difference between project planning -- an undertaking in which Africare has much experience and that it performs very well -- and ministry-level planning -- an undertaking in which Africare and its staff have considerably less experience. It might occasionally make sense to provide sectoral planning services in connection with a large, ongoing Africare program -- for example, the strengthening of health clinics in 11 states in Nigeria. But the evaluation team does not believe that ministry-level planning is an activity in which Africare has a comparative advantage over organizations -- the World Bank and the United Nations, for example -- that traditionally provide this type of technical assistance. The evaluation team does not believe that this activity is one that Africare should seek systematically to pursue.

#### NOTES

- 1 General Research Corporation, "Evaluation of AID Development Program and Support Grants to Africare," August 1978, p. 2.
- 2 Africare records do not permit an exact tally of approved versus rejected projects, only a tally of approved projects.
- 3 Africare records do not permit a tally of how many Africare-approved projects never receive funding.
- 4 Curiously, the "Action Memorandum for the Assistant Administrator for Africa" requesting authorization of this grant states on page 2 that "three technicians will be assigned to field locations: a food production specialist in the East/Southern Africa region and a civil engineer and rural health specialist in the Francophone West Africa region." Yet the budget accompanying the Action Memorandum provides for only a forestry specialist and a biomedical technician.

## CHAPTER FOUR

AFRICARE IN THE UNITED STATES:  
BUILDING A BLACK CONSTITUENCY FOR DEVELOPMENT

## THE CONSTITUENCY

As a predominantly black organization attempting to develop a constituency primarily among black Americans, Africare faces a difficult challenge. Africare staff remarked to the evaluation team that blacks have traditionally contributed little to PVOs and that blacks themselves tend to stigmatize black organizations, believing that they cannot handle large amounts of money.

Africare has a strong record in implementing projects in Africa and has avoided any semblance of scandal. Even so, it has taken Africare more than a decade to build credibility in its fund raising. Constituents with a long-term commitment to development have not come quickly or easily. In the mid-1970s, Africare seemed to be doing well in increasing its levels of support from non-U.S. government sources, but this support declined dramatically at the end of the decade of the 1970s and the early 1980s.

Africare used the fourth general support grant to position itself to take full advantage of the outpouring of concern and contributions for the drought and famine in Ethiopia and neighboring countries. Every member of the home office staff who was interviewed by the evaluators expressed a sense of wonder at the rapidity with which institutional support increased during the four months prior to the evaluation. It seems unlikely that Africare would have been perceived as an important recipient of private donations were it not for Africare's continued efforts to build strong ties to the black community.

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## OUTREACH

Outreach activities include exposing black American groups to African diplomats and government officials, providing 20 local Africare chapters with technical assistance and audio-visual materials, and sponsoring an essay contest. Outreach audiences and methods are effectively integrated with implementing development and relief projects in Africa and creating a diverse permanent constituency.

Outreach activities are primarily undertaken by the executive director and by the director of international development. These activities include speaking engagements, media interviews and programs, news articles by and about Africare, and a variety of special programs. The emphasis in all outreach activities is to educate the public about conditions in Africa and about African economic and social development. Public education is also the full-time responsibility of one Washington-based staff member, who is funded under a matching grant from the Ford Foundation. As may be expected, there is a fine line between the public education and constituency-building and fund-raising objectives of Africare. The information presented to the evaluators suggested strongly that public education is the highest priority, and that constituency building is seen as deriving naturally from this effort.

Seminar Series for African Diplomats

Several African diplomats have used the DRC. Africare has also called on African diplomats to sponsor receptions in connection with the essay contest and the Minorities in Development Workshop. Ambassadors are also taken on speaking trips to places such as Kansas City and take part in panel discussions.

### Community Response Project

Africare receives numerous requests each year from public schools, national voluntary organizations, and professional associations for presentations or for literature pertaining to African problems and development opportunities. Africare also publishes "Special Reports," which provides analytic coverage of development-related events, and prepares periodic issues papers on the food, water, health, and reforestation sectors.

Among Africare's most innovative community response projects is an essay contest in the Washington, D.C., public schools that was started by the Washington chapter of Africare. The contest involves writing a 1,500-word essay on "The U.S. and Africa: Linkages in an Interdependent World." The same theme is repeated every year. The first prize is an all expenses paid trip to Africa. The second through fourth prizes are cash awards of \$500 to \$125. The winner of the best essay in each school is awarded an African artifact. The DRC associate coordinates the contest.

The DRC associate also runs the Minorities in Development Workshop.

### Audio-visual Library

The DRC library houses a large slide collection. The slides are filed in plastic sheets in large loose-leaf albums, and they all appear to be clearly labeled.

The first slide show, on the subject of water development in Africa, was made before the current general support grant began. This show was subsequently made into a videotape, and 20 copies of this videotape are now out on loan to the Africare chapters. More recently, Africare has made a slide show on Ethiopia that is in great demand.

## FUND RAISING

Africare bases its fund raising on institutional relationships with the U.S. government, foreign governments, industry, foundations, churches, secular voluntary associations, and the Combined Federal Campaign. These sources provide U.S. dollar grants, foreign currency grants, and contributions in kind. Secondary fund-raising bases are individual contributors and members.

The U.S. government, through AID, is the largest single funding source. The governments of the countries in which Africare works provide office space and some housing. Foreign governments have also been important donors, particularly for Africare House. Over the period of the general support grant, Africare has dramatically expanded its relations with corporations, foundations, churches, and voluntary associations. Contributions from the Combined Federal Campaign, foreseen in Africare's proposal for the general support grant, began to flow during the period of the grant.

Contributions come from individuals or individual churches. Most contributions are \$10 or \$25, but some are as high as \$100. Any contribution over \$50 or \$100 is followed up with one of five letters generated by the computer. Individual letters are written for large institutions.

Africare's fund-raising strategy is to appeal for help with specific projects and to package similar projects to the extent possible. The smallest projects, such as a well in a village in Burkina Faso, cost a minimum of approximately \$4,000. In its VDP, Africare attempts to have a church congregation, sorority, or similar group adopt a village and commit to funding a succession of small projects over a period of several years. Small projects are bundled into larger packages.

Africare's revenue from non-government (U.S. and foreign) sources increased significantly during the first half of FY 1985 in comparison with the first half of FY 1984, as shown in Table 8. Grants from corporations increased by 226 percent, while grants from church groups increased by more than 150 percent. The decline in U.S. government grants of more than \$1 million between 1983 and 1984 would have been less significant if implementation of a project in Rwanda had not been delayed.

TABLE 8

## AFRICARE: COMBINED STATEMENT OF PUBLIC SUPPORT AND REVENUE

July 1-Dec. 31, 1984      July 1-Dec.31, 1983

	July 1-Dec. 31, 1984	July 1-Dec.31, 1983
U.S. govt. grants	\$3,151,899	\$4,299,183
Foreign govt. grants	200,712	140,994
Foundations	394,406	415,700
Multilateral orgs.	0	105,231
Corporations	375,928	166,250
Churches	129,309	85,017
Membership orgs.	17,234	1,155
Federated fund raising	204,478	98,766
Individuals	164,722	281,630
Total	<u>\$4,696,296</u>	<u>\$5,661,886</u>

Regarding forward financial planning, Africare had a five-year plan, which is almost at the end. Africare knows it needs to make the 20-percent rule, and has taken that into consideration.

Africare has a mailing list of 26,000 that ranges from individuals to organizations of 100,000 members. Recent contributors number 5,000. The maintenance of the mailing list is contracted out, but Africare hopes to bring it in-house in the next two months.

Each year Africare attempts to produce two newsletters, which are sent to all 26,000 persons on the mailing list. Africare did not do a spring 1984 issue because of work on Africare House. The most recent newsletter was in fall 1984, and the previous one was in fall 1983.

What has changed the most in fund raising for Africare in the past five years is that donations from corporations and foundations have increased tremendously. Foundations traditionally fund such activities as student exchanges and cross-cultural conferences, but have shied away from financing development. Africare has always been popular at the grassroots, among individuals. Recently Africare established a relationship with The Links, the black Junior League.

#### OUTLOOK

Africare has growing name recognition, especially in the black community, and corporate donors appear impressed with what Africare has accomplished. Perhaps because of Africare's work on the Ethiopian drought, a particularly large response in the last two months has occurred.

Africare appears to have gained permanent new supporters among black American institutions. For example, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) organized formal support to Africa through Africare, and NAACP's magazine, The Crisis, published a long article on Africare. The Progressive National Baptist Convention has also endorsed Africare, and there have been articles on Africare in Ebony and Jet.

Regarding staffing, the grant contribution to the home office staff has now ended. To compensate for this loss, Africare is attempting to charge staff time directly to projects, a more difficult task with small than large projects. Africare also uses many interns and volunteers, and it does not plan to

cut staff. Past experience suggests that the organization could freeze salaries, curtail benefits, or cut back on travel to reduce costs. Ultimately, Africare hopes to compensate by continuing to receive contributions from churches and other sources of unrestricted funds. To the extent that cost cutting and increases in unrestricted funds are not sufficient, staff will be paid from indirect costs, which could mean an increase in overhead rates.

During the period of this final general support grant, Africare launched a successful effort to purchase its own building, which it has named Africare House. The building, a former D.C. public school, will cost approximately \$1.3 million to purchase and renovate for office use. The funds were successfully raised during the grant period, and Africare expects to move to its new quarters during 1986. Africare House will provide 8,700 square feet of office space, nearly double its current rented space. Operation and maintenance costs can be controlled more tightly than rental costs, and Africare's plant fund drive has attracted new contributors that are expected to retain a long-term commitment to funding field programs. The success of Africare in establishing its own headquarters is perhaps the most striking evidence of its maturity and the substantial positive return that AID may calculate from its 12-year investment in Africare's institutional development.

STATEMENT OF WORK

I. Introduction

In July 1982, the Office of Regional Affairs/Africa Bureau (AFR/RA) awarded Africare a general support grant totalling \$1,032,000, for a two-and-a-half year period ending Mar. 31, 1985. The purpose of the grant was to "provide support for Africare's continued work in development and emergency relief in Africa." In effect, the grant continued core funding to Africare, covering in particular salary and travel costs of Washington-based technical staff.

A key AID concern was that by the end of the grant Africare was to have achieved a substantial measure of financial independence from AID. Africare had received earlier core support grants from AID, dating back to 1974 and totalling some \$2.5 million. AID's intent was that this current project be the last core support grant, in view of Africare's excellent progress--during the two years preceding the grant--in attracting contributions from private sources on a continuing basis. To further encourage Africare's fundraising efforts, AID awarded the current grant on a cost-sharing basis, with Africare pledging to provide \$918,417 over the life of the grant. Total Africare and AID contributions were to be allocated according to the following formula: year 1 -- 2/3 AID, 1/3 Africare; year 2 -- 50 percent AID, 50 percent Africare; year 3 -- 1/3 AID, 2/3 Africare.

AID and Africare have agreed that because the grant agreement document is so vaguely worded, the scope of work for this mid-term evaluation will derive not only from the grant agreement but also from Africare's original proposal and from mutually agreed-to objectives flowing from recent discussions between AID and Africare.

The majority of grant funds were to have supported salary and travel costs of Washington-based Africare staff (the Technical Assistance Group--TAG) carrying out design and tracking of projects overseas. While it is outside the scope of this evaluation to assess impact and effectiveness of all Africare field activities, the evaluation will try to measure general progress in program design and monitoring capabilities of the TAG. Additional areas to be examined include Africare's Development Resources Center; improvements in headquarters' management capacity; and Africare's progress in reducing its financial dependence on AID.

Since neither Africare's original proposal nor the grant agreement contain measurable output objectives or benchmark data, Africare, AID, and the evaluators will have to probe for some definition of these before the evaluation begins.

AFR/RA will supervise execution of the evaluation, assisted by FVA/PVC as needed. No field travel is planned, although funds are reserved in the budget, should AID decide that site visits are necessary. Selected AID missions will be canvassed by cable for their views on Africare's performance of project design and negotiation tasks, during the life of the grant.

AFR/RA will contract with two evaluation specialists under an IQC work order, per section III below. Evaluators will interview Africare and AID/W staff, as well as other Washington-based individuals who are knowledgeable about Africare's activities in the field. Documents to be reviewed include Africare project proposals and other activity data; Africare financial and administrative records; and AID evaluation and audit reports.

## II. Scope of Work

The evaluation team will assess Africare's progress over the course of the grant in the following areas:

### A. Effectiveness of Technical Assistance

1. Field-based T.A. Africare was to have placed two technicians in the field, one each in East and West Africa (provision IIA of the grant agreement, attachment 2). The evaluation team will examine Africare's record in timely recruitment and placing of qualified individuals and their performance in the field.

2. Design and implementation of new Africare field activities. The evaluators will:

-- Determine how many project proposals were prepared by the TAG over the course of this grant, and how many were approved for funding (by AID and other donors). These should include extensions/expansions of existing projects.

-- Examine a representative sample of project proposals for quality of preparation. Assess clarity of objectives, methodologies, project management arrangements, financial plans, budget presentations, etc.

-- Review responses of selected AID missions to cables requesting information on Africare's performance of project design and negotiation tasks in the field. Missions also will be asked to comment on effectiveness of Africare country representatives in managing field programs.

-- Interview AID and Africare staff, as well as other Washington-based individuals, for general information on Africare's track record in project preparation and implementation.

3. Design and start-up of Village Development Program (VDP) projects. Based on goals laid out in provisions II(A)(1)a, b, and c of the grant agreement, the evaluators will assess Africare's progress in launching VDP projects over the course of the grant. Africare and AID should determine ahead of time a reasonable target figure for new VDP projects. Issues to be examined include: Has Africare been able to attract private funds for VDP projects (per page 5 of its original proposal)? If not, why not? Did country representatives carry out needs assessments and collect baseline data for new VDP enterprises?

4. Training of host country officials. Provision IIA, paragraph 1 of the grant agreement states that the TAG "will also train host country officials through ongoing 'counterpart' relationships and through periodic 'development workshops.'" The evaluators will determine the extent to which such training was carried out.

5. Joint venture. In its original proposal (pages 6-7), Africare pledged to initiate a cooperative venture with a U.S. corporation and a host country economic unit. Design and start-up of the joint venture were to come to fruition by the end of the grant. The evaluation team will determine whether the joint venture was successfully launched, and if not, why not. Aspects to be examined include Africare's success in identifying a suitable project; the host country contribution and Africare's private match; and training of host country nationals.

6. Senior planners program. Under the grant, Africare was to "provide senior planners for two-year assignments to strengthen critical ministries such as Plan, Agriculture, or Rural Development." The grant was to finance identification by the TAG of appropriate host government ministries and costs of recruiting and placing individuals as planners in these ministries. Salary costs were to be raised privately by Africare. The evaluators will assess to what extent Africare successfully identified ministries and placed senior expatriate

planners in them. To what extent was lack of private funds to cover salary costs of planners a constraint? In countries where the Africare country representative also served as a senior ministry planner, did this dual role have any negative effect on the amount and quality of work devoted to ministry-related tasks?

#### B. Development Resources Center

The evaluation team will visit Africare's Development Resources Center and assess improvements in the Center's information materials and its other activities over the life of the grant. Per the grant agreement document, the team will examine: published materials; the audiovisual library; development internships; the seminar series for African diplomats; and the Community Response Project.

Assessment of the Development Resource Center's progress will be a secondary focus for the evaluation team, and should not take up more than half a day's time.

#### C. Headquarters Management Capability

A subpurpose of the grant was improvement in Africare's home office management capabilities. The evaluators will attempt to gauge progress in this area by examining:

-- management roles. Are there clear lines of authority within the organization? Do staff have clear understanding of their job responsibilities and how these fit within overall organizational goals?

-- computerization of financial reporting, personnel, and project monitoring functions. Has this been accomplished?

-- project monitoring. Is it done regularly? Are results used constructively to modify implementation of projects?

-- financial reporting to outside donors. Is it done in a timely way? Is reporting accurate and easily understandable?

-- overhead costs. Did the overhead-to-direct-cost-ratio remain favorable during the life of the grant?

-- relationship between country representatives and home office. Are lines of communication effective? Are field representatives receiving adequate backstopping from headquarters?

#### D. Private Fundraising

The evaluation team will pay particular attention to Africare's progress in reducing dependence on AID support, during the course of the grant. It will examine the following:

-- Did Africare achieve its matching targets, with respect to this grant? Did it follow the funding schedule presented in its original proposal? Was private money raised actually spent on grant-related activities?

-- Did the level of program activities increase over the course of the grant? If not, why not?

-- What is the outlook regarding Africare's ability to maintain and increase its non-USG sources of funding?

-- What are implications for staffing, following termination of grant funding?

ANNEX B

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES FROM AID MISSIONS REGARDING  
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AFRICARE PROGRAMS

QUESTIONS

On March 12, 1985, AID/W cabled six AID Missions -- Bamako, Ouagadougou, Niamey, Kigali, Ndjamena, and Lusaka -- and the Refugee Office of the American Embassy in Mogadishu with the following questions:

1. How well designed have you found Africare's projects?
2. How soundly have Africare's projects been implemented?
3. Has Africare engaged in any training of host country counterpart officials? If so, has the training been effective?
4. How effective have you found Africare's field office staff in managing field programs and carrying out other functions?
5. What is the reputation of Africare in the eyes of the host country government? How well does the Africare staff maintain relations with the government?

RESPONSES

The complete text of the responses are provided on the following pages.

R 161249Z MAR 85  
FM AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3737

UNCLAS OUAGADOUGOU 01594

AIDAC

E.O. 12356: N/A  
SUBJECT: AFRICARE EVALUATION

REF: STATE 72029

1. AS PER REFTEL PARA 2, QUESTION 1, AFRICARE IS IN THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTING THE SEGUENEGA INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT (SIRD) PROJECT AND WILL IN THE NEAR FUTURE BEGIN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SOUTHWEST REGIONAL REFORESTATION PROJECT IN BURKINA FASO. IN BOTH INSTANCES AFRICARE HAD THE PRIMARY DESIGN RESPONSIBILITY. AS REGARDS THE SIRD PROJECT, THIS PROJECT WAS DESIGNED IN THE MID-1970S AT A TIME WHEN THE USAID MISSION IN BURKINA WAS ESTABLISHING ITS PROGRAM. THE SIRD PROJECT IS COMPLEX AS IT HAS 3 PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS WITH APPROXIMATELY 10 SUB-ACTIVITIES. IT IS BEING IMPLEMENTED IN COLLABORATION WITH 3 BURKINIAN MINISTRIES. THE PROJECT HAD A RATHER DIFFICULT START-UP PERIOD AND IMPLEMENTATION WAS SLOW DURING ITS EARLY YEARS. THE REASON FOR THE SLOW START-UP WAS NOT NECESSARILY DUE TO POOR DESIGN, BUT RATHER TO OVERLY OPTIMISTIC ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING THE COLLABORATING BURKINIAN INSTITUTIONS' CAPACITIES FOR THE ADMINISTRATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VARIOUS PROJECT ACTIVITIES. SINCE THE MID-1970S, THE INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT APPROACH TO PROJECT DESIGN HAS ALSO FALLEN FROM GRACE IN USAID DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES IN BURKINA. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION HAS, HOWEVER, BEEN EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE OVER THE LAST FOUR YEARS. THE SIRD PROJECT HAS RECEIVED 2 POSITIVE EVALUATIONS, AND A PHASE II DESIGN EFFORT IS BEING DISCUSSED. THUS, USAID/BURKINA IS OF THE OPINION THAT AFRICARE'S DESIGN OF THE SIRD PROJECT WAS SOUND IN THAT ACTIVITIES AS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED HAVE ACHIEVED THEIR OUTPUT GOALS.

AS REGARDS THE SOUTHWEST REGIONAL REFORESTATION PROJECT, AFRICARE ORIGINALLY PRESENTED THIS PROJECT FOR APPROVAL IN 1983. USAID/BURKINA WAS SATISFIED IT MET ALL THE NECESSARY CRITERIA FOR APPROVAL, BUT THE AID/W TECHNICAL OFFICES RAISED QUESTIONS WHICH DELAYED ITS APPROVAL UNTIL MID-1985. THERE IS A DEGREE OF DISAGREEMENT AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE PROJECT'S DESIGN WAS SUBSTANTIALLY ALTERED DUE TO THE AID/W TECHNICAL OBJECTIONS. FOR THE MOST PART THE PROJECT'S SUBSTANCE REMAINS THE SAME WITH ONLY ITS PRESENTATION BEING MODIFIED. THUS, USAID/BURKINA IS, LIKEWISE, OF THE OPINION THAT THIS DESIGN EFFORT WAS ALSO ADEQUATELY DEVELOPED AND PRESENTED TO THE MISSION AND REPRESENTS A VIABLE DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY.

2. AS PER REFTEL PARA 2, QUESTION 2, THE SIRD PROJECT HAS BEEN VERY SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENTED OVER THE LAST FOUR YEARS. AS EXPRESSED IN PARA 1 ABOVE, THE EARLY YEARS OF THE PROJECT WERE CHARACTERIZED BY SOME BASIC ORGANIZATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS WHICH, HOWEVER, DID NOT PREVENT THE PROJECT FROM BEING EXTREMELY VIABLE. USAID/BURKINA

IS VERY SATISFIED WITH AFRICARE'S IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE OF THE SIRD PROJECT.

3. AFRICARE IN IMPLEMENTING THE SIRD PROJECT HAS FOCUSED ITS TRAINING EFFORTS ON LOW-TO-MEDIUM LEVEL BURKINIAN PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE PROJECT. CATEGORIES OF TRAINING INCLUDE MECHANICS, WELL DRILLING TEAMS, EXTENSION AGENTS, PARA-HEALTH AGENTS, LITERACY TRAINING TEACHERS, AND MID-LEVEL REGIONAL ADMINISTRATORS. THE FOCUS OF THIS TRAINING HAS PAID OFF AS LITTLE COULD HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY THE SIRD PROJECT WITHOUT THESE CADRES OF GRASS-ROOTS TECHNICIANS. TO THIS END, AFRICARE'S TRAINING EFFORTS UNDER SIRD HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE GIVE THE FOCUS OF THE PROJECT ACTIVITIES.

4. AS PER REFTEL PARA 2 QUESTION 4, USAID/BURKINA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH AFRICARE IS A GRANT RELATIONSHIP IN ALL ITS ACTIVITIES, I.E. SIRD SOUTHWEST REGIONAL REFORESTATION, AND SOME SMALL OUTREACH GRANTS. GIVEN THE GRANT RELATIONSHIP, USAID/BURKINA'S MONITORING AND OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITIES ARE LESS THAN WHAT IS REQUIRED BY BILATERAL PROJECTS. TO DATE, USAID/BURKINA HAS BEEN EXTREMELY SATISFIED WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF THE AFRICARE COUNTRY AND FIELD STAFF AT BOTH THE PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND TECHNICAL LEVELS. THIS IS EVIDENCE BY THE FAVORABLE EVALUATIONS OF THE SIRD PROJECT.

5. AS PER REFTEL PARA 2 QUESTION 5, AFRICARE HAS A VERY SOLID REPUTATION WITH THE BURKINIAN GOVERNMENT. THIS IS ESSENTIALLY THE RESULT OF AFRICARE'S IMPLEMENTATION

PERFORMANCE OF THE SIRD PROJECT. THE SEGUENEGA REGIONAL BORDERS THE SAHEL AGROECOLOGICAL ZONE IN NORTHERN BURKINA. THE AGRICULTURAL AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTAL CONSTRAINTS ARE NUMEROUS. AFRICARE'S PERSISTENT EFFORTS IN ALLEVIATING THESE CONSTRAINTS AND PROVIDING ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES IN A LESS FAVORABLE AREA OF BURKINA HAVE BEEN MUCH APPRECIATED BY THE BURKINIAN GOVERNMENT. USAID/BURKINA IS OF THE OPINION THAT AFRICARE-BURKINIAN GOVERNMENT RELATIONS ARE GOOD AS EVIDENCED BY THE SUCCESSFUL PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE SIRD PROJECT. NEHER

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P 151551Z MAR 85  
FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8548

UNCLAS LUSAKA 01270

AIDAC

FOR AFR/RA

E. O. 12355: N/A  
SUBJECT: AFRICARE EVALUATION (698-0443)

REFERENCE: STATE 072091

FOLLOWING RESPONSES ARE KEYED TO PARA 2, REFTEL. AID/  
ZAMBIA IS CURRENTLY FINANCING TWO AFRICARE PROJECTS, I. E.  
CHAMA AREA DEVELOPMENT (611-0204) AND WESTERN PROVINCE  
SMALL FARMER PRODUCTION (611-0205).

1) IN BOTH PROJECTS, AID/ZAMBIA REVIEWED INITIAL  
SUBMISSIONS AND PARTICIPATED IN THE APPROVAL PROCESSES.  
EACH SUBMISSION DEMONSTRATED A SOUND KNOWLEDGE OF PROJECT  
DESIGN AND OF AID PROCEDURES - RESULTING IN TWO WELL  
DESIGNED ACTIVITIES. THE PROOF OF WHICH HAS BEEN THE  
EASE OF IMPLEMENTATION AND PROGRESS TOWARDS ATTAINMENT  
OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES.

2) SEE 1) ABOVE.

3) AFRICARE HAS PROVIDED TRAINING UNDER BOTH ACTIVITIES  
(IN-COUNTRY, THIRD COUNTRY WORKSHOPS AND AT IAPCS). IN  
ONE CASE THE TRAINING RESULTED IN IMPROVED LAND  
PREPARATION AND PLANTING METHODOLOGIES AND IN PART, CLOSER  
COLLABORATION AND COOPERATION WITHIN FARMER GROUPS. IN  
THE OTHER CASE, THE TRAINING HAS BEEN TOO RECENT TO  
EVALUATE, HOWEVER WE HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT IT  
WILL NOT BE AS EFFECTIVE.

4) THE LOCAL AFRICARE OFFICE CONSISTS OF ONE U.S.  
REPRESENTATIVE, ONE ZAMBIAN PROJECT OFFICER (NOT YET ON  
BOARD) AND ONE ZAMBIAN SECRETARY. BESIDES THE TWO  
PROJECTS MENTIONED ABOVE, THE AFRICARE ZAMBIA PORTFOLIO  
INCLUDES REFUGEE SETTLEMENT, CATTLE DIPPING, HEALTH CARE,  
PORTABLE WATER SUPPLY, FOOD PRODUCTION SCHEMES, ETC. IN  
VARIOUS AREAS OF THE COUNTRY AND WITH VARIOUS MINISTRIES,  
DEPARTMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL  
AND LOCAL NGOS. THE REPRESENTATIVE HAS CARRIED OUT THESE  
ACTIVITIES AND FUNCTIONS WITH A MINIMUM OF AID ASSISTANCE  
WHILE AT THE SAME TIME KEEPING AID INFORMED OF PROGRESS  
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR PROGRAM. WE GIVE HIGH MARKS  
TO AFRICARE IN THIS REGARD.

5) THE GRZ GIVES VISIBLE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT TO THIS PVO AS  
EVIDENCED BY MEDIA COVERAGE, ACCESS TO MINISTERIAL AND  
OTHER RANKING GOVERNMENT AND PARTY OFFICIALS AND RESPONSE  
TO AFRICARE INITIATIVES. THE PRESIDENT OF ZAMBIA IS  
THE HONORARY CO-CHAIRMAN OF AFRICARE. HILL

UNCLASSIFIED

P 140631Z MAR 85  
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8527

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 1464

AIDAC

STATE PAGES TO AF/C, AF/EPS AND EB

E.O. 12356: N/A  
TAGS: EAID, CD  
SUBJ: AFRICARE EVALUATION

REF: STATE 873444

1. AFRICARE HAS BEEN INVOLVED WITH FOUR USG-FUNDED ACTIVITIES IN CHAD SINCE THE AID PROGRAM RECOMMENCED 30 MONTHS AGO:

- ABECHE RURAL DEVELOPMENT 690-0502.4A	DOLS 3,000,000
- VEGETABLE PRODUCTION, 677-0041.6	380,000
- HEAVY EQUIPMENT REPAIR, 673-0041.3	160,000
- AMBASSADOR'S DISASTER RELIEF FUND	25,000

2. FOLLOWING RESPONSES ARE KEYED TO QUESTIONS POSED REFTEL PARA 2.

(1) THE ABECHE PROJECT WAS VERY WELL DESIGNED. SOME LINE ITEMS MAY HAVE BEEN OVERBUDGETED BECAUSE OF COST UNPREDICTABILITIES OF A PROJECT SITE 400 MILES FROM THE CAPITAL. THE DESIGN OF THE VEGETABLE GARDEN ACTIVITY DID NOT INCLUDE ADEQUATE TECHNICAL INPUTS. THE DESIGN OF THE HEAVY EQUIPMENT PROJECT WAS SATISFACTORY.

(2) THE ABECHE PROJECT HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED VERY SOUNDLY. LONG LINES OF COMMUNICATION, THE MEDICAL EVACUATION OF THE PRIMARY TECHNICAL ADVISOR AND AN UNSETTLED LOCAL POLITICAL HIERARCHY HAVE ALL CALLED FOR FLEXIBILITY AND IMAGINATION TO KEEP THE PROJECT FULLY OPERATIONAL; AFRICARE HAS DONE AN EXCELLENT JOB. LIKEWISE THE DESIGN DEFECT IN THE VEGETABLE PROJECT HAS BEEN RECTIFIED BASED ON AN INTERNAL EVALUATION. WE HAVE NO CRITICISM OF AFRICARE'S ABILITY TO SOUNDLY IMPLEMENT PROJECT.

(3) TRAINING PROVIDED HAS BEEN ON-THE-JOB AND HAS BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL, I.E., PEOPLE LEARNING TO PLANT GARDENS AND SHOP REPAIRMEN WORKING ALONGSIDE AN AMERICAN COUNTERPART. WHILE THIS IS NOT EXACTLY "TRAINING HOST COUNTRY COUNTERPART OFFICIALS", IT WAS THE TYPE TRAINING CALLED FOR IN PROJECT DESIGN.

(4) EXCELLENT FIELD OFFICE STAFF HAVE PROVEN TO BE THOROUGH, COOPERATIVE AND FLEXIBLE, AND HAVE READILY RESPONDED TO MISSION SUGGESTIONS AND REQUESTS.

(5) AGAIN EXCELLENT. AFRICARE HAS RECEIVED EXTENSIVE COVERAGE BY THE LOCAL NEWS MEDIA, AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNTRY RECOGNIZED THEIR EFFORTS IN RESETTLING DISPLACED PERSONS.

3. AS A FINAL UNSOLICITED COMMENT, USAID/CHAD IS COMPLETELY SATISFIED WITH AFRICARE'S PERFORMANCE IN FIELD AND IN TERMS OF SUPPORT FROM HEADQUARTERS. THEY HAVE SUCCESSFULLY MOUNTED A SUBSTANTIVE PROGRAM IN ONE OF THE MORE DIFFICULT COUNTRIES TO WORK. AS A CLEAR INDICATION OF OUR OPINION, WE SOUGHT OUT AFRICARE TO MANAGE A NEW PROJECT JUST GETTING UNDERWAY, ORT, AND WE ARE ENCOURAGING ADDITIONAL AFRICARE RURAL DEVELOPMENT/RESETTLEMENT PROJECTS IN THE SAHELIAN ZONE.

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F 210921Z MAR 85  
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9750

UNCLAS BAMAKO 1780

AIOAC

TO: AFR/RA

E.O. 12356: N/A  
SUBJ: AFRICARE EVALUATION (698-0443)

1. THE FOLLOWING ARE MISSION RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS IN REFTEL.  
RESPONSE NUMBERS CORRESPOND TO QUESTION NUMBERS IN REFTEL.

2. AFRICARE MALI HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF  
TWO USAID PROJECTS:

(A) SAN FISHERIES, AN OPERATIONAL PROGRAM GRANT (OPG) IN SAN,  
5TH REGION.

(B) ACTIVITES PAYSANNES: 683-0934, A COOPERATIVE GRANT AGREE-  
MENT IN THE 6TH REGION OF MALI.

(1) DESIGN:

(A) AFRICARE DESIGNED SAN FISHERIES. LATER IMPLEMENTATION PRO-  
BLEMS PARTIALLY DUE TO THAT DESIGN.

(B) AFRICARE TOOK OVER ON-GOING ACTIVITY PAYSANNES AND HAS NOT  
REDESIGNED.

(2) IMPLEMENTATION:

(A) SAN FISHERIES WAS COMPLETED IN MARCH 1983. EVALUATION  
DOCUMENTS REGARDING AFRICARE'S PAST INVOLVEMENT ARE AVAILABLE  
IN AFRICARE WASHINGTON. SOME REPORTED IMPLEMENTATION BOTTLENECKS  
WERE DUE TO LACK OF COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION DIFFICULTIES  
BETWEEN AFRICARE REPS IN MALI AND HOST GOVERNMENT STAFF INVOLVED  
IN PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION. IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS DUE TO  
FAULTY ASSUMPTIONS IN AFRICARE'S DESIGN.

(B) AFRICARE TOOK OVER ACTIVITES PAYSANNES IN JULY 1984. A  
MIDTERM EVALUATION OF THE PROJECT WAS PERFORMED IN MARCH 1985.  
NO MAJOR IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS WERE REPORTED. THE GENERAL  
FEELING WAS THAT THE PROJECT HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENTED  
SO FAR

(3) TRAINING: HOST COUNTRY COUNTERPART OFFICIALS WERE NOT  
TRAINED IN FIRST PHASE OF ACTIVITES PAYSANNES. HOWEVER, AFRICARE  
IS PREPARING TO CREATE AND COLLABORATE WITH VILLAGE ASSOCIA-  
TIONS. SELECTED MEMBERS OF THESE ASSOCIATIONS WILL BE TRAINED  
IN FUNCTIONAL LITERACY, CREDIT MANAGEMENT, PUMP MAINTENANCE,  
IRRIGATION TECHNIQUES, ETC.

(4) EFFECTIVENESS OF AFRICARE'S FIELD OFFICE STAFF IN MANAGING  
PROGRAMS WAS ADEQUATE IN ACTIVITES PAYSANNES. BESIDES THEIR  
ROUTINE FIELD PROGRAM, THEY HAD SUCCESSFULLY PERFORMED MARKE-  
TING ACTIVITIES OF WHEAT AND SPICE SUPPLIES PROVIDED BY FARMERS  
AS CREDIT REIMBURSEMENT.

(5) REPUTATION IN THE EYES OF THE HOST COUNTRY GOVERNMENT:  
AFRICARE HAS GOOD REPUTATION IN THE EYES OF THE GRM. AFRICARE  
IN MALI IS INVOLVED IN IMPLEMENTING LOCALLY IMPORTANT SMALL  
SCALE PROJECTS SUCH AS VILLAGE WELLS, DISPENSARIES, MATERNI-  
TIES, VILLAGE REFORESTATION, ETC. BY SO DOING THEY HAVE FRE-  
QUENT AND BENEFICIAL CONTACTS WHICH RESULT IN FRIENDLINESS AND  
INCREASINGLY GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH OFFICIALS OF THEIR PROJECT  
AREAS.

RYAN

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R 181235Z MAR 85  
FM AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2930

UNCLAS MOGADISHU 02923

FOR AFR/RA

E.O. 12356: N/A  
TAGS:  
SUBJ: AFRICARE EVALUATION (698-0443)

REF: STATE 072355

1. BACKGROUND: THE US MISSION PROVIDES FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE JALALAQSI REFORESTATION SUB-PROJECT, IMPLEMENTED BY AFRICARE, JKGR THE CDA/FORESTRY PROJECT (649-0122). THROUGH A TRIPARTITE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT BETWEEN USAID, THE NATIONAL RANGE AGENCY (NRA) AND AFRICARE, THE JALALAQSI REFORESTATION SUB-PROJECT RECEIVES DOLLARS 678,000 FROM USAID, DOLS 160,000 FROM THE GSDR, AND DOLS 139,000 IN OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS. AFRICARE CONTRIBUTES DOLS 91,000 IN FINANCIAL AND IN-KIND ASSISTANCE TO THE SUB-PROJECT. THE SUB-PROJECT, WHICH BEGAN IN APRIL, 1983, HAS A TWO-YEAR LIFE, ALTHOUGH AFRICARE HAS REQUESTED A 14 MONTH EXTENSION FOR THE LIFE OF THE SUB-PROJECT.

- THE GOAL OF THE JALALAQSI REFORESTATION SUB-PROJECT IS TO COUNTERACT THE ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION CAUSED BY THE RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES AND THE INCREASED DEMAND FOR FUELWOOD AND OTHER WOOD PRODUCTS IN THE JALALAQSI AREA. JALALAQSI DISTRICT, LOCATED 166 KILOMETERS NORTH OF MOGADISHU, HAS 4 REFUGEE CAMPS CONTAINING SOME 85,000 REFUGEES AT OFFICIAL POPULATION FIGURES. SPECIFICALLY, OVER A TWO-YEAR PERIOD, THE SUB-PROJECT INTENDS TO:

- ESTABLISH 44 HA. OF FUELWOOD PLANTATIONS;
- STABILIZE 160 HA. OF SAND DUNES;
- IMPROVE AND/OR ESTABLISH 6 SEEDLING NURSERIES WITH A COMBINED ANNUAL OUTPUT OF 125,000 SEEDLINGS;
- TRAIN NATIONAL RANGE AGENCY (NRA) PERSONNEL IN NURSERY AND PLANTATION MANAGEMENT; AND
- MOBILIZE INDIGENOUS SOMALIS AND REFUGEES IN SEEDLING PRODUCTION AND AMENITY PLANTING.

- AFRICARE HAS AN AMENDMENT TO THE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT PENDING WITH THE MISSION. THIS AMENDMENT, WHICH HAS BEEN APPROVED IN PRINCIPLE, WILL EXTEND THE LIFE OF THE SUB-PROJECT BY 14 MONTHS AND PROVIDE AN ADDITIONAL DOLS 128,000 FROM USAID AND 6,326,000 SOMALI SHILLINGS FROM THE GSDR.

- AFRICARE HAS ALSO RECEIVED MISSION FUNDING TO CONDUCT A SOCIO-ECONOMIC STUDY OF REFUGEE SETTLEMENT OPTIONS IN THE JALALAQSI AREA. THIS SHORT-TERM RESEARCH WAS FUNDED FOR DOLS 40,000 THROUGH THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL STUDIES COMPONENT OF THE REFUGEE SELF-RELIANCE PROJECT (649-0123). FIELD WORK WAS COMPLETED IN FEBRUARY 1985 AND THE MISSION HAS NOT YET RECEIVED

A COPY OF THE CONSULTANT'S FINDINGS.

- ADDITIONALLY, IN MID-1983 AFRICARE SUBMITTED A PROPOSAL FOR THE JALALAQSI AGRICULTURE SUB-PROJECT TO BE FUNDED UNDER THE REFUGEE SELF-RELIANCE PROJECT. UNDER THE SUB-PROJECT, REFUGEES WOULD BE SETTLED ON A 1,000 HA. IRRIGATED FARMING SITE NEAR THE JALALAQSI CAMPS. THE PROPOSAL WAS PLAGUED WITH TECHNICAL PROBLEMS AND DID NOT RECEIVE MISSION APPROVAL. ALTHOUGH AFRICARE AGREED TO SCALE-DOWN THE SUB-PROJECT, AS YET, THEY HAVE NOT RESUBMITTED THE PROPOSAL.

- AFRICARE HAS HAD OTHER, PRIVATELY-ASSISTED PROJECTS IN SOMALIA. IN 1981-82, AFRICARE MANAGED AND MAINTAINED WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS IN 14 REFUGEE CAMPS IN TWO REGIONS OF SOMALIA AND PROVIDED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE GSDR REFUGEE WATER SUPPLY DIVISION UNDER UNHCR-FUNDING. UNTIL MID-1984, AFRICARE ALSO SECURED AN EXPATRIATE SANITATION ADVISOR TO THE REFUGEE HEALTH UNIT. IN SMALLER, NON-REFUGEE PROJECTS, AFRICARE HAS PROVIDED FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR SAND DUNE STABILIZATION EFFORTS IN BRAVA AND ADELA COMMUNITIES.

2. THE MISSION CAN FURNISH GENERAL COMMENTS IN RESPONSE TO THE QUESTIONS POSED IN REFTEL. HOWEVER, NO FORMAL EVALUATION FINDINGS OF THE JALALAQSI FORESTRY SUB-PROJECT OR OTHER AFRICARE ACTIVITIES IN SOMALIA ARE AVAILABLE. CURRENTLY, THE MISSION IS ESTABLISHING TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR AN OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE CDA FORESTRY PROJECT. UNDER THIS EVALUATION, TO BEGIN THE

END OF MARCH 1985, ALL SUB-PROJECT ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING AFRICARE'S, WILL BE REVIEWED.

- RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONS POSED IN REFTEL WERE BASED ON COMMENTS PROVIDED BY THE USAID CDA/FORESTRY PROJECT MANAGER, THE ADVISOR TO THE NRA, AND OTHER RELATED MISSION PERSONNEL.

(1) AS WITH MOST OF THE SUB-PROJECTS UNDER CDA/FORESTRY, THE JALALAQSI REFORESTATION SUB-PROJECT MAY HAVE BEEN TOO AMBITIOUS IN ITS TARGETED OBJECTIVES. IN EVALUATING AFRICARE'S ORIGINAL PROPOSAL, THE MISSION'S SUB-PROJECT REVIEW COMMITTEE NOTED THAT THE PROPOSAL WAS WEAK IN SEVERAL TECHNICAL ASPECTS. THE PROPOSED EXTENSION WILL ALLOW AFRICARE TO ACHIEVE OR EXCEED MOST OF ITS TARGETED OBJECTIVES. NEVERTHELESS, THE EXTENSION MADE NO EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN OR REVISE THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REQUIRED UNDER THE ORIGINAL AGREEMENT. ACCORDING TO THE ADVISOR TO THE NRA, THE SUB-PROJECT DESIGN ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED THE NEEDS AND ABILITIES OF THE NRA.

(2) IMPLEMENTATION OF AFRICARE'S SUB-PROJECT HAS BEEN VERY GOOD. HOWEVER, DELAYS IN HIRING STAFF AND PROCUREMENT OF NECESSARY EQUIPMENT RESULTED IN THE LOSS OF ONE GROWING SEASON. THE STRENGTHS OF THIS SUB PROJECT LIE IN THE AREAS OF COMMUNITY EXTENSION WORK AND AMENITY PLANTING AND THE SUPPORT AND TRAINING PROVIDED TO THE NRA. THESE PORTIONS OF THE PROGRAM HAVE A STRONG POTENTIAL FOR SUSTAINABILITY IN THE FUTURE. THE PRIMARY WEAKNESSES ARE THOSE WHICH WERE NOTED IN THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL - THAT IS, AFRICARE'S ABILITY TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR ESTABLISHING WOODELOTS AND SAND DUNE STABILIZATION.

(3) MUCH OF THE TRAINING AFRICARE HAS PROVIDED TO

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PAGE 02 OF 02 MUGADI

NATIONAL STAFF HAS BEEN OF THE INFORMAL NATURE AND THUS IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS. TRAINING IS PROVIDED THROUGH ON-THE-JOB ASSISTANCE AND SITE VISITS TO OTHER FORESTRY PROJECTS. THE NATIONAL STAFF ASSUMES MOST OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SUB-PROJECT WITH ONE EXPATRIATE ACTING PRIMARILY IN AN ADVISORY ROLE. THE STAFF COULD BENEFIT FROM SHORT-TERM, FORMAL TRAINING ESPECIALLY IN AREAS OF FINANCIAL PLANNING AND REPORTING AND OTHER OPERATIONAL AREAS.

-  
- (4) AFRICARE'S FIELD OFFICE HAS STRONGLY ENCOURAGED LOCAL MANAGEMENT OF THE JALALAUSSI REFORESTATION SUB-PROJECT. THE MAJOR PROBLEMS WHICH THE FIELD STAFF FACED HAVE BEEN THE TIMELY PROCUREMENT OF MATERIALS AND RESOLVING LOGISTICAL CONSTRAINTS TO THE SUB-PROJECT. HOWEVER, THESE PROBLEMS ARE NOT UNIQUE TO THE AFRICARE PROGRAM.

- (5) THE NRA, AS THE COUNTERPART GOVERNMENT AGENCY, VIEWS THE JALALAUSSI REFORESTATION SUB-PROJECT AS ONE OF THE BEST IN TERMS OF ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES AND TRAINING STAFF. IN THIS SUB-PROJECT, AS IN AFRICARE'S OTHER, PRIVATELY-FUNDED PROJECTS, ONE OF THE AGENCY'S MAJOR STRENGTHS HAS BEEN IN THEIR ABILITY TO RECRUIT QUALIFIED STAFF WITH GOOD CROSS-CULTURAL SKILLS. THIS ABILITY HAS HELPED AFRICARE TO MAINTAIN A GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GDDR AT THE NATIONAL AS WELL AS LOCAL LEVEL.  
BRIDGES

P 201507Z MAR 85  
FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9826

UNCLAS NIAMEY 01895

AIDAC

E. O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: AFRICARE EVALUATION (698-0443)

REF: STATE 072090

1. FOLLOWING IS USAID RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS POSED IN  
PARA 2 OF REFTEL:

- A. DESIGN OF AFRICARE PROJECTS: LOW CAPACITY.  
AFRICARE DOES NOT HAVE STAFF EXPERIENCED WITH USAID  
DESIGN REQUIREMENTS. CONSEQUENTLY, AFRICARE-DESIGNED  
PROJECTS TYPICALLY REQUIRE SEVERAL REVIEWS AND  
RE-DRAFTS. MISSION HAS, HOWEVER, FOUND AFRICARE STAFF  
VERY COOPERATIVE IN MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE  
DESIGN PROCESS.

- B. SOUNDNESS OF IMPLEMENTATION: FAIRLY GOOD AS  
LONG AS PROJECT ACTIVITIES NOT OVERLY COMPLEX. AFRICAREPD  
HAS HAD PROBLEMS FIELDING AND MAINTAINING COMPETENT  
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AT THE PROJECT LEVEL.

- C. TRAINING OF HOST COUNTRY COUNTERPARTS: TRAINING  
APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN VERY EFFECTIVE IN CASES WHERE  
COUNTERPARTS HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED BY GON. AFRICARE  
TYPICALLY DEVELOPS CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH  
LOCAL STAFF AND PROVIDES EXCELLENT IN-COUNTRY TRAINING.  
MISSION HAS NO EXPERIENCE WITH AFRICARE'S MANAGEMENT OF  
U. S. OR THIRD COUNTRY TRAINING.

- D. FIELD OFFICE MANAGEMENT: MORE ATTENTION TO  
DETAIL COULD BE MADE, PARTICULARLY IN KEEPING USAID  
INFORMED OF AFRICARE ACTIVITIES ON A REGULAR BASIS AS  
OPPOSED TO WAITING UNTIL PROBLEMS ARISE. AFRICARE HAS  
BEEN VERY RESPONSIVE, HOWEVER, TO USAID REQUESTS FOR  
REPORTS AND INFORMATION ON PROJECT PROGRESS. STAFF IS  
PERHAPS A BIT SMALL TO EFFECTIVELY MANAGE SIZE OF  
PRESENT PORTFOLIO IN NIGER.

- E. EVALUATION IN EYES OF HOST GOVERNMENT: REGARD  
APPEARS TO BE EXCELLENT AS EVIDENCED, FOR EXAMPLE, BY  
ATTENDANCE OF HIGH LEVEL PUBLIC OFFICIALS AT AFRICARE  
FUNCTIONS. WE WORRY, HOWEVER, THAT HIGH OPINION OF  
AFRICARE TENDS TO LESSEN REQUIREMENT FOR ATTENTION TO  
IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS ON THE GROUND.  
CASEY

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OWN CATTLE. FOR EXAMPLE, 15 PCT OF THE REFUGEES IN FACT OWN 50 PCT OF THE CATTLE.

--- B) THE DESIGN DID NOT PAY SUFFICIENT ATTENTION TO THE ROLE/RESPONSIBILITIES OF WOMEN WITH RESPECT TO PROJECT ACTIVITIES. SINCE THE HERDERS WERE MEN THE PROJECT WAS DESIGNED TO BENEFIT THEM. NEVERTHELESS MANY OF THE PROJECT ACTIVITIES WILL INVOLVE WOMEN AND INCREASE THEIR WORKLOAD. THIS SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE FULLY ADDRESSED IN THE DESIGN.

O 200942Z MAR 85  
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0314

UNCLAS KIGALI 01198

AIDAC

E.O. 12356: N/A  
SUBJECT: AFRICARE EVALUATION (698-0443)

REF: STATE 072088

1. OAR/RWANDA PROVIDES THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS IN RESPONSE TO REFTL, PARA 2; WITH RESPECT TO AID GRANT NUMBER AID/AFR-0422-G-SS-3071-00.

-- BACKGROUND: THE PROJECT WAS ORIGINALLY INTENDED TO BENEFIT REFUGEES FROM BURUNDI WHO ARE RELATIVELY WELL ESTABLISHED AND ACCEPTED IN RWANDA. AT THE TIME OF THE DESIGN TEAM'S VISIT A LARGE GROUP OF REFUGEES CROSSED THE BORDER FROM UGANDA. THEIR NEEDS WERE CLEARLY GREATER THAN THE BURUNDIAN REFUGEES AND THEREFORE A DECISION WAS MADE TO SHIFT THE ACTIVITY TO ONE OF ASSISTING THE UGANDAN REFUGEES. THUS THE DESIGN WAS UNDERTAKEN IN AN ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UGANDAN REFUGEES WERE NOT CLEARLY KNOWN AND GOR POLICIES TOWARD THEM HAD NOT BEEN DECIDED. THE GOR ENCOURAGED THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROJECT BUT SUBSEQUENTLY TOOK A NUMBER OF ACTIONS WHICH HAVE MADE NEGOTIATION OF THE FINAL AGREEMENT AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION MORE DIFFICULT. BASICALLY THE GOR IS RELUCTANT TO TAKE ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD IMPLY THE REFUGEES HAVE A RIGHT TO PERMANENT STATUS. IN THIS ENVIRONMENT IT WAS INEVITABLE THAT ERRORS OR FALSE ASSUMPTIONS WOULD BE MADE. PROBLEMS RESULTED FROM THE SITUATION AS DESCRIBED ABOVE AND THE NECESSITY TO DESIGN AND APPROVE THE PROJECT IN ORDER TO OBLIGATE FY 83 FUNDS. THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN LIGHT OF THESE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

A) HOW WELL DESIGNED HAVE YOU FOUND AFRICARE'S PROJECTS.

THE ORIGINAL DESIGN TEAM WAS SMALL AND PER PARA 1 ABOVE OPERATING IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING ENVIRONMENT. BECAUSE OF THESE LIMITATIONS IT FAILED TO ADDRESS SOME TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE PROJECT AND MADE SOME UNWARRANTED ASSUMPTIONS. NEVERTHELESS WE BELIEVE THE BASIC DESIGN OF THE PROJECT IS SOUND. FURTHER THERE WAS BUILT INTO THE DESIGN CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY THAT ALLOWS THE PROJECT TO ADJUST TO CHANGING CONDITIONS. AFRICARE HAS SHOWN A WILLINGNESS TO USE THIS FLEXIBILITY AND IS NOW REDESIGNING CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE PROJECT TO MEET CURRENT CONDITIONS.

THE MAIN ERRORS MADE IN THE DESIGN PROCESS WERE THE FOLLOWING:

--- A) IT WAS ASSUMED THAT BECAUSE THE REFUGEES WERE FROM AN ETHNIC GROUP OF HERDERS THAT THE MAJORITY OF REFUGEES OWNED CATTLE. THEREFORE THE DESIGN INCLUDED VETERINARY ACTIVITIES AND CONSTRUCTION OF VET FACILITIES. WHAT AFRICARE FIELD STAFF FOUND AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF THE REFUGEES IS THAT ONLY A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION

B) HOW SOUNDLY HAVE AFRICARE'S PROJECTS BEEN IMPLEMENTED?

OUR OVERALL VIEW IS THAT THE AFRICARE FIELD TEAM IS DOING AN EFFECTIVE JOB UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES. WE HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED WITH THE LOCAL AFRICARE STAFF'S POLITICAL ACUMEN, FLEXIBILITY IN ADJUSTING TO CHANGING CONDITIONS, AND PLANNING SKILLS. FURTHER THEY HAVE DEMONSTRATED A WILLINGNESS TO SQUARELY FACE ISSUES AND CONSEQUENCES. FOR EXAMPLE, AFRICARE CHANGED ITS IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE IN RESPONSE TO CHANGES IN PROJECT CONDITIONS. IT IS NOW MEETING THE TARGETS IN THE REVISED SCHEDULE. THUS WHILE IT IS TOO EARLY TO MAKE A DEFINITIVE JUDGEMENT ON AFRICARE'S ULTIMATE EFFECTIVENESS IN IMPLEMENTING A VERY DIFFICULT PROJECT WE ARE CONFIDENT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH BOTH ENTHUSIASM AND PROFESSIONALISM.

C) HAS AFRICARE ENGAGED IN ANY TRAINING OF HOST COUNTRY COUNTERPART OFFICIALS? IF SO, HAS THE TRAINING BEEN EFFECTIVE?

NO COUNTERPART TRAINING HAS OFFICIALLY BEGUN. THE GOR COUNTERPART FOR THE AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES HAS JUST BEEN FORMALLY ASSIGNED. HOWEVER, AFRICARE HAS BEEN INFORMALLY WORKING WITH HIM AND THE RELATIONS ARE CORDIAL. IN ADDITION, THEY HAVE SHARED DISCUSSIONS REGARDING THE SUITABILITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE AGRICULTURAL STAFF ASSIGNED TO THE PROJECT AND HAVE AGREED ON A FORMAL EVALUATION SYSTEM OF JOB PERFORMANCE. THESE ARE GOOD INDICATIONS OF THE WORKING RELATIONS WHICH MAY BE EXPECTED AND THE CLIMATE WHICH EXISTS FOR MUTUAL EXCHANGE OF IDEAS AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION.

D) HOW EFFECTIVE HAVE YOU FOUND AFRICARE'S FIELD OFFICE STAFF IN MANAGING FIELD PROGRAMS AND CARRYING OUT OTHER FUNCTIONS?

SEE BI ABOVE.

E) WHAT IS THE REPUTATION OF AFRICARE IN THE EYES OF THE HOST COUNTRY? HOW WELL DOES THE AFRICARE STAFF MAINTAIN RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT.

ALL INDICATIONS ARE THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN AFRICARE AND THE GOR, BOTH IN KIGALI AND AT THE PROJECT SITE, ARE EXCELLENT. WE FULLY ANTICIPATE THAT THIS WILL CONTINUE.

2. OAR OFFERS THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:

A) OVERALL AFRICARE HEADQUARTER RESPONSES TO FIELD OFFICE ARE SLOW.

B) AFRICARE/RWANDA COUNTRY DIRECTOR DECISION MAKING AUTHORITY IS LIMITED. GUIDANCE FROM HEADQUARTERS TO THE FIELD FREQUENTLY CONCENTRATES ON DETAILS, WHILE POLICY INQUIRIES REMAIN UNANSWERED FOR LONG PERIODS OF TIME.

C) WE ARE NOT SURE IF AFRICARE HEADQUARTERS IS FULLY AWARE OF AID PROCEDURES, E.G., WITH RESPECT TO PROCUREMENT.

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D: NEITHER OAS/R NOR AFRICARE/RWANDA KNOW WHAT HAS BEEN SPENT TO DATE FOR COSTS INCURRED IN THE U.S. PRIOR TO THE TEAM'S ARRIVAL IN RWANDA. THEREFORE FIELD STAFF DOES NOT KNOW THE TOTAL OF REMAINING FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION. BLANK

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