

**FILE** (E2)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# 2-Way Memo (2630020)

Subject: USAID/Cairo - Regular Project Evaluation FY 80-6  
Integrated Social Work Trng. Centers - 0070

**INSTRUCTIONS**

Use routing symbols whenever possible.

**SENDER:**  
Use brief, informal language.  
Conserve space.  
Forward original and one copy.

**RECEIVER:**  
Reply below the message, keep one copy, return one copy.

To : Mr. Gerry Miller  
 Agency for International Development  
 NE/TECH, Room 4709  
 Washington, D.C. 20523

DATE OF MESSAGE	Routing Symbol
7/30/80	
SIGNATURE OF ORIGINATOR	
<i>[Handwritten Signature]</i>	
TITLE OF ORIGINATOR	
USAID Program Evaluation Officer	

**FOLD** INITIAL MESSAGE

Pursuant to State 018541, 22 January 1980, "Submission and Distribution of Project Evaluation Summary (PES) Reports," Para 3, herewith attached is a copy of the subject regular evaluation for your processing and internal distribution within AID/Washington.

The covering memorandum is considered a part of this evaluation package.

REPLY MESSAGE

*I find the statements made in the PES in keeping with my findings in the implementation analysis of 12/79.*

From

DATE OF REPLY	Routing Symbol
8/7/80	
SIGNATURE OF REPLIER	
<i>[Handwritten Signature: Gerald D. Miller]</i>	
TITLE OF REPLIER	
International Cooperation Specialist	

## memorandum

DATE: July 24, 1980

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: PRG/S: William Steckel, Program Evaluation OfficerSUBJECT: Regular Evaluation FY 80-6, Integrated Social Work Training  
Centers, 263-0020

TO: DIR: D.S. Brown

THRU: DD : O. Cylke

1. The attached regular evaluation for the project's Integrated Social Work Training Centers -0020, is presented to you for approval. The evaluation highlights a number of serious problems that have arisen during project implementation. Their gravity is such that attainment of the original project objective is deemed most improbable. Principal deterrants to the project's successful implementation have been: (a) lack of firm agreement between the Ministry, USAID, and contractor on project objectives and design; failure of the GOE Project Director to secure cooperation of ministerial officials in implementing project activities due to the Project Director not occupying an established line position within the Ministry; and lack of sustained, effective performance by contract personnel.

2. Despite the above implementation difficulties continuation of the project through to its agreed upon original termination date is recommended. Valuable equipment has arrived in country and is being used by the Ministry of Social Affairs. Training of social workers and para-professionals is underway at the two newly functioning training centers. Moreover, criteria for selection and procedures for sending trainees to the United States have recently been agreed upon and such training is expected to commence in the fall.

3. Section IX, Part II of the Evaluation Study, Lessons Learned, contain four points that need to be seriously considered before Mission undertakes new projects. While each point has practical application, all Missions should bear in mind the first observation:

"Projects whose genesis is not a clearly perceived and articulated need but which reflect the desire on the part of the donor to be forthcoming, as in this instance (meeting between Minister of Social Affairs and HEW officials in Washington in 1975), and therefore, are not well designed, can be said to have less chance of success than projects based on mutual



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understanding and well defined objectives, reflecting deep felt needs of the host country."

4. This evaluation as noted within Part II of the text, incorporates and updates the Implementation Analysis of Gerry Miller, AID/W, NE/TECH/SPRD, who visited Egypt and talked to MSA officials, USAID project staff and contract personnel. Miller's findings, substantially in this report, were discussed with the Project Committee. The Project Officer has used the committee's comments and his experience with the project to prepare this evaluation report. This evaluation report has been cleared by the Project Committee.

5. Although this evaluation does reveal some of the difficulties which have adversely affected project implementation, there appears to be little gained by bringing this study before the Mission's Executive Committee. Accordingly, placing the study on the Committee's agenda for consideration is not recommended.

Clearances:

EHS/H: AFitzcharles (draft)

PRG/S: JSBlackton

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**CLASSIFICATION**  
**PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY (PES) - PART I**

Report Symbol U-447


1. PROJECT TITLE  <b>Integrated Social Work Training Centers</b>	2. PROJECT NUMBER <b>263-0020</b>	3. MISSION/AID/W OFFICE <b>USAID/Cairo</b>
	4. EVALUATION NUMBER (Enter the number maintained by the reporting unit e.g., Country or AID/W Administrative Code, Fiscal Year, Serial No. beginning with No. 1 each FY) <b>FY80 - 6</b>	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> REGULAR EVALUATION <input type="checkbox"/> SPECIAL EVALUATION		

5. KEY PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DATES			6. ESTIMATED PROJECT FUNDING		7. PERIOD COVERED BY EVALUATION	
A. First PRO-AG or Equivalent FY <u>77</u>	B. Final Obligation Expected FY <u>79</u>	C. Final Input Delivery FY <u>81</u>	A. Total	\$ <u>8.3 million</u>	From (month/yr.)	<u>December 78</u>
			B. U.S.	\$ <u>4.0 million</u>	To (month/yr.)	<u>July 80</u>
					Date of Evaluation Review	<u>July 80</u>

**8. ACTION DECISIONS APPROVED BY MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE DIRECTOR**

A. List decisions and/or unresolved issues; cite those items needing further study. (NOTE: Mission decisions which anticipate AID/W or regional office action, should specify type of document, e.g., sirgram, SPAR, PIO, which will present detailed request.)	B. NAME OF OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION	C. DATE ACTION TO BE COMPLETED
Project Purpose/Log Frame to be revised.	Fitzcharles	7/31/80

9. INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS TO BE REVISED PER ABOVE DECISIONS			10. ALTERNATIVE DECISIONS ON FUTURE OF PROJECT		
<input type="checkbox"/> Project Paper	<input type="checkbox"/> Implementation Plan e.g., CPI Network	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) <u>Project Purpose</u>	A. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Continue Project Without Change		
<input type="checkbox"/> Financial Plan	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/T	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____	B. <input type="checkbox"/> Change Project Design and/or		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Logical Framework	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/C		<input type="checkbox"/> Change Implementation Plan		
<input type="checkbox"/> Project Agreement	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/P		C. <input type="checkbox"/> Discontinue Project		

11. PROJECT OFFICER AND HOST COUNTRY OR OTHER RANKING PARTICIPANTS AS APPROPRIATE (Names and Titles)		12. Mission Director Approval	
E.P. Petersen, Project Officer Amal Nassar, Program Assistant		Signature: 	
		Typed Name: <b>Donald S. Brown</b>	
		Date: _____	

## PART II

### Project 263-0020

#### I. Summary:

A. This Project Agreement was signed in September 1977. The contractors, University of North Carolina (UNC) for Project Management (3 yrs), and Planning and Human Systems (P&HS) for the Management Information System (MIS) (1 yr), arrived in December 1978. The delay in contractor arrival was caused primarily by contracting problems in AID/Washington. As a result, project implementation began approximately 14 months behind schedule.

B. The Ministry of Social Affairs (MSA) Project Director is a special advisor to the Minister and is not in a line Ministry position. He has not been able, therefore, to assign Ministry staff to work on project activities on a regular basis. In turn, this has meant that the line Ministry staff do not have responsibility for project administration; hence, the project has had no impact or influence on the operations of the Ministry. Consequently one of the project objectives, to help Ministry staff operate social services more effectively, is clearly not being met.

C. The lack of line Ministry officials' involvement in the project may have been responsible in large part for the failure of the P&HS team to obtain data needed for even a rudimentary information system. Officials are reluctant to make data available as there was no clear administrative requirement for them to do so.

D. In addition to the 14 month lag mentioned above, the UNC team got off to a slow start, having to replace the first Chief of Party after 6 months. Consequently, there was a delay in the UNC submission of a work plan and the development of the needs assessment. Also, the MSA was still renovating the training center at Assiut and had just begun equipping the one at Tanta. These factors were major causes of the postponement of training at the two centers by about three additional months. The first training courses at both centers started on January 12, 1980. The classroom portion of 120 days has been completed and on the job training is still underway.

E. MSA's procurement of equipment and supplies has been slow. The basic problem appears to be compliance with AID procurement requirements, i.e., providing the USAID Project Officer with valid receipts for items purchased with monies advanced against approved lists of equipment.

F. The MSA has not provided, as agreed in writing, the three full time teaching faculty at each center because the most highly qualified teaching staff are already full time faculty members or hold government jobs. There is, however, administrative staff assigned and working at both centers. This staff has been assisting in some cases with the teaching load in the training now underway. For the most part lecturers from universities and the MSA are brought in on a class by class basis. Although originally it had been felt by USAID that appointment of full time faculty was absolutely necessary, we do not now believe it would have been feasible, given the Egyptian situation. We believe, therefore, that training itself is probably proceeding as well as could be expected and, in any event, in accord with host country practices and customs.

G. MSA staff training in the USA has not started but the UNC and MSA have finally agreed on criteria and have selected candidates for US training. They are expected to go next year.

## II. Evaluation Methodology

This evaluation incorporates and updates the Implementation Analysis undertaken by Gerry Miller, AID/W, NE/TECH/SPRD, who visited the field and talked with MSA officials, USAID Project staff and contract personnel. Miller's findings were discussed with the project committee and the Project Officer has used the committee's comments and his experience with the project to draft this evaluation. The evaluation draft has been cleared by PRG/S and the Project Committee.

## III. External factors

Although the MSA Project Director, who is Special Advisor to the Ministry of Social Affairs for Rehabilitation and International Activities, is not in a line Ministry position, he was appointed by Ministerial Decree as the Project Director and will continue to act as such for the life of the project. He is Chairman of a MSA Technical Committee which was established by Ministerial Decree to advise on the project. It is unclear just what power or authority he wields, within the MSA although he apparently has the Minister's confidence. His anomalous position caused problems for the UNC contractors when they have attempted to develop the training centers and to design the MIS with line Ministry officials at the central level. The officials have been reluctant to work on the project because it has not been assigned to line departments for its planning and execution. Without MSA full time participation in and execution of the project plans, the technical advisory teams can accomplish little

in the way of project implementation and achieving expected project outputs.

#### IV. Inputs

A. The UNC Chief of Party had to be changed early in the first year. This caused a delay in the contractor's submission of the plan of operation and also slowed the development of the needs assessment. Training did not start until January 12, 1980, representing about three months delay from the original plan (in addition to the 14 months initial delay).

B. Renovations on the two centers were slow; it was anticipated that work would have been completed prior to project start-up, i.e., by early 1978 at the latest. In fact, work at Tanta was completed in the summer of 1978, while Assiut was not completely finished until late 1979. MSA was authorized to begin procurement of equipment and supplies for both centers and a cash advance given to the MSA Project Director for that purpose in summer of 1978 after USAID had been informed that the major renovation work was finished. There then ensued a year during which very little was procured and, more important, it became evident that neither the MSA Project Director nor his Accountant had any conception of what was required under AID regulations with respect to accountability, although the requirements were explained to them many times. Essentially adequate accounting of expenditures was received for the first advance. Subsequently, the MSA Project Director was given another advance and procurement of equipment is proceeding. (It should be noted that a USAID audit was requested by the USAID Project Manager of MSA's utilization of funds and is currently underway).

C. The needs assessment forms have been designed and field tested but so far have been used only to a limited degree in developing the curriculum. It is anticipated that the data will be used as the curriculum is refined.

D. The MSA has not assigned a full time teaching faculty at the two training centers. Lectures are given by visiting professors, the Center Administrative Staff and Senior local workers. This is apparently the best that can be done as the MSA wishes to have senior professors conduct as many classes as possible and these professors are a level too high to be appointed as full time faculty. At the same time the MSA Project Director will not appoint lower level people as "faculty". Since there seems to be no way to get around these cultural and social difficulties, this input should be modified.

E. The MSA was given the criteria developed by the UNC team for selecting candidates for long and short term training in the USA. The Ministry has selected a number of candidates and has given the list to the UNC Chief of Party. Although it was expected that a number of participants would be sent the first year, none have been sent to date because those MSA persons who have been identified for training and who meet the English language requirement are needed to develop the training curricula and participate in the implementation of the initial training program.

## V. Outputs

A. The Planning and Human Systems (P&HS) contract team for the design and testing of a Management Information System (MIS) submitted a simple record data collection system that may be used for case worker client intake at the social unit level. The final report was delivered in May, 1980. It should be noted that the P&HS team experienced great difficulty in attempting to obtain information from the MSA; in attempting to explain (in English) what the objectives of the exercise were; in attempting to have counterpart staff assigned; and, in attempting to overcome cultural obstacles of many kinds. While it is disappointing that they were not able to achieve more, it is understandable and indicates that it was far too ambitious to think of a MIS under prevailing circumstances.

B. UNC annual report, which was due March 15, 1980, is expected in July. It has been delayed due, first, to the absence of the Chief of Party in the U.S. for some time, and, second to the fact that the Assiut portion as first submitted was, in the words of the Chief of Party, "unacceptable" and had to be redone.

C. Management Information System Component: Based on the difficulties inherent in attempting to establish a MIS (briefly described under "Inputs" section), the threshold decision not to proceed with a full MIS was made; the MSA has yet to advise if any part of the improved record keeping forms developed by P&HS can be used to improve data collection.

D. The UNC team completed a 120 day training course for about 30 students at each of the two centers. The curriculum has been approved by the MSA technical committee. The needs assessment forms have been developed and field tested. The initial curriculum was not based on the needs assessment as envisioned in the PP, but it is expected that subsequent course curricula will incorporate data from it.

E. There were problems in staffing of the training centers in the beginning for the MSA. An administrative staff was assigned but not a teaching faculty. The plan is to use professors from different universities, administrative staff and senior social workers for lectures at the training centers.

F. The procurement of equipment for the two training centers and model social units has been slow largely because of the accounting problems with the MSA.

#### VI. Purpose

A. Project purpose is to identify and test ways through which social services may be increased in number, coverage and effectiveness without additional financial burdens to Government. To accomplish this purpose, two training centers (one in Upper Egypt and one in Lower Egypt), were to be developed to provide in-service training for social workers; to train para-professionals who work in the individual services, such as vocational teachers and daycare center attendants; and, to train community and voluntary leaders.

B. Inasmuch as the first training cycle has not yet been completed and is only for social workers initially, it is not yet possible to determine the effect in terms of project purpose. Judging by the progress so far, however, there may have to be some modification of the stated purpose.

#### VII. Beneficiaries:

The main beneficiaries of the project will be approximately 120 social workers and 240 community development assistants who in turn will improve public services for the community. A second category of beneficiaries is expected to be approximately 30 MSA employees who will receive training in the US and Egypt, and a third category will be the 200,000 persons served by the model and upgraded social units in Assiut and Gharbiya.

#### VIII. Unplanned Effects:

Not pertinent at this time.

#### IX. Lessons learned:

We believe the following lessons have been learned:

- 1. Projects whose <sup>e. or</sup> genesis ~~is~~ not a clearly perceived and articulated need but which reflect the desire on the part of a donor to be forthcoming, as in this instance (meeting between

Minister of Social Affairs and HEW officials in Washington in 1975) and therefore, are not well designed, can be said to have less chance of success than projects based on mutual understanding and well defined objectives, reflecting deep felt needs of the host country.

2. It is vital that common understandings as to project implementation be reached among host country, USAID and contractors.

3. Language capability is extremely important particularly when dealing with lower level and provincial bureaucrats.

4. It is essential that if funds are to be given directly to host country officials for purchases those officials fully understand AID requirements and procedures.