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AN EVALUATION OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND PLANNING PROJECTS IN AFRICA, ASIA, AND THE NEAR EAST

AGRICULTURAL POLICY ANALYSIS PROJECT

Volume I: Draft Interim Report

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

Over the past 20 years, the Agency for International Development (AID) has funded a broad range of agricultural policy and planning projects worldwide. AID has supported many types of activities, including development of agricultural sector data bases, creation of planning units within government, training of host country staff in policy analysis, and implementation of policy and programmatic changes.

The objective of this study is to evaluate AID-sponsored agricultural policy and planning projects in Africa, Asia, and the Near East since 1970. The evaluation examines the impacts and relative success of the projects and compares results both within and across the three regions. Findings are also compared with the findings that emerged from the earlier Abt Associates evaluation of agricultural planning activities in Latin America and the Caribbean. The intent of the study is to glean information from past projects that will help in the design of better agricultural policy and planning projects in the future and will pinpoint problems in ongoing projects that need to be addressed.

This report is an interim report in the overall evaluation. It is based primarily on a review of AID documentation, particularly project papers and evaluations of individual projects. The interim report is designed to pull together the findings and conclusions of AID's own evaluations of individual projects. Since the evaluations in question tend to focus on design, management, and implementation, not on long-term impact, this interim report is heavily weighted towards the former set of issues.

In the next phase of this evaluation, the emphasis will shift. As described in Chapter 6, phase II will consist of a series of country site visits to examine the long-term impacts of AID planning and policy projects, particularly the social and economic effects of policy and program changes made as a consequence of AID-sponsored projects. Phase II will also examine the broader role of AID in policy reform. Thus, Phases I and II together should provide many useful insights about the design, management and implementation of projects as well as the long-term impacts of AID support to agricultural policy analysis and reform.

Evaluation Design

Although AID has conducted numerous evaluations of individual projects, relatively little attention has been paid to assessing the overall impact of agricultural policy and planning assistance. One exception is a recent study that analyzes the impact of agricultural sector planning activities in Latin America and the Caribbean.[1] The methodology and general framework of the Latin American and Caribbean study is followed here, but this study concentrates on three other regions, Africa, Asia, and the Near East.

The study identifies five different kinds of impacts that agricultural policy analysis and planning activities can have. The five kinds of impacts are capacity-building impacts (that is, impacts on the capacity of institutions to conduct policy analysis and planning, and to provide input to policymaking effectively), interinstitutional impacts (that is, impacts of policy analysis and planning institutions on other public or private sector institutions), decisionmaker impacts (that is, impacts on the awareness of or demand by decisionmakers for policy analysis and planning), policy and program impacts (that is, impacts on policy and program decisions), and social and economic impacts (that is, social and economic changes resulting from policy and program changes). In this evaluation, the usefulness of agricultural policy analysis and planning activities is assessed according to the impacts that have resulted from them.

In addition to examining impacts, we also consider the operational success of projects. Operational success deals with how well projects were implemented and whether they met their objectives. This is a distinctly different but complementary issue to the examination of project impacts.

A Description of AID-Supported Agricultural Policy Analysis and Planning Projects in Africa, Asia, and the Near East

The intent of this study is to review the experience of all AID funded agricultural policy analysis and planning projects in Africa, Asia, and the Near East since 1970. There are approximately 90 such projects. As of this writing, documentation is available to us on only 66 of the projects. Thus,

[1] Abt Associates Inc., Evaluation of Agricultural Sector Planning Activities In Latin America and the Caribbean, June 1982.

this interim report considers this subset of the total set of projects. For the final report, we shall collect documentation on as many of the remaining projects as possible.

The 66 projects represent assistance to 31 countries in Africa, Asia and the Near East. More than half of the projects (38) are in eighteen African countries; about one-third (20) are in nine Asian countries; and five are in four Near Eastern countries. Three projects are regional in scope, all in Africa.

The total dollar value of the projects is $1.083 billion. Of this amount, $363.2 million was allocated to African projects, $612.6 million to Asian projects, $67.9 million to Near Eastern projects, and $39.4 million to regional projects. AID's support came to $491.8 million, 45.4 percent of total project investment. Host countries contributed $289.2 million (26.7 percent) and other donors contributed $302 million (27.9 percent).

Not all project funds were earmarked for policy analysis and planning activities. In some instances, policy analysis and planning activities represented only a small part of the project, though in a majority of cases most or all of the project dollars were devoted to policy and planning. The amount of funds targeted to agricultural sector policy and planning came to $371 million. As compared to its contrbution to total project funding, AID provided a majority of policy analysis and planning funds ($228 million).

The distribution of AID policy analysis and planning support among regions differs from the distribution of projects. Near Eastern countries, with only 7.6 percent of the projects, received 23.1 percent of AID support. This greater than average contribution came at the relative expense of Africa and, to a lesser extent, of Asia. African countries with 60.7 percent of the projects, received 48.8 percent of AID policy analysis and planning funds. Asian countries with 26.2 percent of the projects, received 21.4 percent of AID support.

Project Goals and Purposes

It is useful to review the goals and purposes in the logical frameworks of policy and planning projects. Project goals tend to be general and call for overall improvement in agricultural sector performance and improvement in the life of rural people. Goals are highly consistent across projects.

Project purposes are more concrete and define the substance of projects in more detail. Analysis of project purposes reveals several generalizations applicable to the entire set of policy analysis and planning projects. In the first place, most projects have capacity building as an objective. Second, most projects include training of host country personnel as a major purpose. Third, few projects are designed specifically to analyze and bring about changes in defined areas of agricultural policy. Policy analysis and policy reforms are rarely identified as key project purposes. This is a most important finding.

Impacts of AID-Sponsored Policy Analysis and Planning Projects

Although a total of 66 projects are included in Phase I of our study, only 39 of the projects have been evaluated by AID. Since our impact analysis is based on information from AID evaluations, it is this number of projects that form the basis for the findings that follow.

AID-sponsored agricultural policy analysis and planning projects have had a substantial impact on the capacity of host country governments to engage in policy analysis and planning. In fact, capacity-building impacts are, by far, the most prevalent. Fully 36 of the 39 projects have had capacity-building impacts as reflected in the qualifications of planning staff and in the quality of analyses and data bases produced by policy analysis and planning offices. The presence of capacity impacts does not tend to vary by region. Given the purposes of most projects, it is not surprising that their major impact has been capacity building.

Interinstitutional impacts are observed in just under one half of the projects reviewed (19 of 39 projects). These impacts have resulted from improved coordination between agricultural policy analysts and planners and their counterparts in other public sector agencies or private sector organizations. The major type of interinstitutional impact has been the establishment of an interagency board or commission, which by its nature improves institutional coordination. Interinstitutional impacts are more frequent in Asian projects than in African or Near Eastern projects.

Decisionmaker impacts are observed in 15 of the 39 projects (38 percent). Decisionmaker impacts have been quite varied, but the most prevalent has been increased demand for information and analysis by decisionmakers. The other relatively common impact has been the development of

greater understanding by decisionmakers of the agricultural sector and its relationships with other sectors of the economy. Asian projects have been more successful than African and Near Eastern projects in bringing about decisionmaker impacts.

Policy and program impacts are observed in 11 of the 39 projects (28 percent). Such impacts result when AID-sponsored projects contribute to actual changes in policies or programs. Some examples include changes in commodity pricing policies, credit policies, marketing policies, legislation on land redistribution, commodity distribution policies, and investment policies. In Indonesia, for instance, a flexible fertilizer pricing system and an expanded rice storage program were established, while in Kenya revisions were made in marketing policies as a consequence of an AID project. The regional distribution of policy and program impacts follows the same pattern as in the cases of interinstitutional and decisionmaker impacts. In Asia, policy and program impacts are observed in 42 percent of the projects in question. In Africa and the Near East, the corresponding percentages are 22 and zero.

The final kind of impact is socioeconomic impact. Socioeconomic impacts flow from policy and program impacts. If a project has brought about changes in policies or programs, then it is important to assess what effect the changes have had on agricultural sector performance. This is very difficult to determine from the evaluations we have reviewed, given their focus on short-term design and management issues. It is interesting to note, however, that socioeconomic impacts are identified in roughly half of the projects that have had policy and program impacts. This is an area that will be examined in greater detail in Phase II of the evaluation.

The major conclusion of the impact analysis is that agricultural policy analysis and planning projects have had substantially greater impact on improving the capacity of host country governments to plan and conduct policy analysis than they have had on bringing about policy reforms or programmatic changes. In a narrow sense, the projects were successful in achieving their purposes, which dealt primarily with capacity building and training. Policy reform and programmatic change were not major purposes of the projects in question. The projects did have some impact on increasing the awareness of decisionmakers about the importance of analysis, but this kind of impact was considerably less frequent than capacity-building and interinstitutional impacts.

Another major conclusion has to do with regional differences in impacts. Projects in Asia have had substantially more policy/program and decisionmaker impacts than African and Near Eastern projects. The reason that the Near Eastern projects have had such little impact is quite straightforward. There are only three Near Eastern projects in our sample, and projects in question focus on data gathering and analysis. They were not designed to result in decisionmaker or policy impacts. The relatively low level of policy impacts in Africa as compared with Asia has three major explanations.

- Asian countries have placed greater emphasis on agriculture than African countries and have tended to provide more support to AID-sponsored projects.
- AID-sponsored projects in Africa have been more involved in basic institution building, and less involved in actual policy analysis and implementation issues than projects in Asia.
- The logistics of carrying out projects have been more difficult in Africa than in Asia.

These three reasons appear to account for most of the differences in performance between African and Asian projects.

Operational Success of Projects

In addition to analyzing the impacts of projects, this study also examines the operational success of projects. This is a measure of how smoothly projects have run and whether they have met their objectives. Given the many components of a typical agricultural policy analysis and planning project, it is difficult to rate each project by its balance of success and failures. Nevertheless, it is instructive to provide an overall rating of projects. The distribution of projects falling into categories ranging from poor to excellent operational success is shown below:

- poor -- 8 percent of the projects
- marginal -- 20 percent of the projects
- adequate -- 38 percent of the projects
- good -- 26 percent of the projects
- excellent -- 8 percent of the projects

The ratings of operational success form a roughly normal distribution with the largest percentage of projects falling in the adequate or average category. The implication of this rating scheme is that most projects have been implemented adequately or better, but that there is considerable room for improvement among the 28 percent of the projects rated poor or marginal and among the additional 38 percent rated adequate.

The regional distribution of operational success shows that Asian projects have tended to fare the best. Of the 12 Asian projects evaluated, seven were rated as excellent or good, only one was marginal, and none were poor. Of the 24 African projects evaluated, none were rated as excellent, five were rated as good, six were rated as marginal, and three were rated as poor. Thus, 58 percent of the Asian projects were excellent or good, but only 21 percent of the African projects were rated as good (none were excellent). Moreover, only eight percent of the Asian projects were rated as marginal, while 38 percent of the African projects were rated as marginal or poor. Of the three Near Eastern projects, one was rated as good, one was rated as adequate, and one was rated as marginal.

Factors Affecting Project Success

The study has attempted to identify the key factors that contribute to generation of impacts and successful implementation of projects. The most prevalent reason for positive performance among the projects examined appears to be the qualifications of project staff and the level of expatriate advisor interaction with host country personnel. A well qualified expatriate team working closely with host country staff can provide valuable technical and managerial input into the policy and planning process, provide on-the-job training, serve as role models for host country counterparts, and establish long-term relationships between host country personnel and expatriate institutions.

Host country demand for a project has also been a factor leading to project success. Demand can come from governmental units and key decision-makers within them, but it can also come from the private sector.

Project flexibility is another factor that has contributed to success. There have been a number of relatively open-ended projects that have been designed to address key problems as they arise. Such projects have been more successful than other projects in addressing urgent issues.

Other reasons for project success include: forceful leadership and a desire for progress; involvement of analysts with farmers and other private sector groups; a stable political environment; and staffing host country agencies with expatriate personnel while staff are trained in the United States or elsewhere.

Constraints to Project Success

There are many factors that can impede policy analysis and planning projects from achieving their objectives and resulting in identifiable impacts. Interestingly, despite the different sizes, emphases, and locations of the projects reviewed, the same constraints are mentioned repeatedly. These are described below:

- Lack of host country support and staff is the most frequently cited constraint. In nearly half of the projects, assumptions were made that host countries would supply support in the form of money, access to policymakers, and staff, but some or all of these commitments were not forthcoming as planned.

- Lack of a clear implementation plan and work assignments is a deterent noted in many evaluations. Project papers frequently failed to include detailed implementation plans. This often caused delays and confusion in project implementation.

- Project staff were obliged to spend too much time "firefighting." Firefighting is not bad in and of itself in that it reflects demand for information and analysis, but it was also a constraint in that it impeded progress on other fronts.

- Over-ambitious project designs and lack of specificity were also major constraints. Designs tended to be too global and were often impractical.

These are the major constraints cited in the evaluations. Other important constraints that are noted less frequently include: start-up delays; unavailable or inadequate data; poor project monitoring; and poor project management.

Recommendations for Design and Implementation of Future Projects

The principal finding of the recent Latin American and Caribbbean study is that lack of demand for planning is more than just one of a set of problems to be addressed; rather, it is the central constraint to effective agricultural sector planning. This became a central hypothesis to test in

this study, and our findings indicate that lack of demand is indeed a problem to successful agricultural planning and policy analysis. It his not, however, the whole story.

The set of projects under review here have not, as a rule, had policy or program change as stated objectives. Consequently, it should not come as a surprise that the projects in question have had relatively little impact on policies and programs. They have, however, definitely contributed to the building of host country capacity for policy analysis and planning. Unfortunately, it is not at all clear that the creation of such capacity translates itself into constructive policy and program changes. This may be true in the long run, but experience indicates that the translation is far from automatic in the short run.

If AID is to have its support contribute more directly to policy reform and programmatic change, it appears that its approach to and design of policy analysis and planning projects needs to be modified. First, there needs to be more diagnosis of what the major problems of the agricultural sector are and what policies constrain sector development. The diagnosis needs to be done prior to or as part of project design so that projects can be more specific about policy issues to be addressed.

Second, policy issues must be gone through in detail with key host country decisionmakers. Fruitful areas to study should be agreed upon jointly. This is part of the demand baseline strategy suggested in the Latin American and Caribbean study. Greater up-front interaction will help cement host country commitment, which was a source of difficulty in the policy analysis and planning projects reviewed.

Third, the role of policy analysis must be viewed explicitly as one of contributing to policy deliberations and policy change. While the focus on development of host country capacity should by no means be abandoned, it must be tied into specific policy issues of concern.

The overall approach to policy analysis and planning projects should, therefore, be weighted toward: 1) diagnosis of policy problems prior to project implementation; 2) increased interaction with key decisionmakers; and 3) viewing policy analysis explicitly as leading to policy<u>making</u>. Other

recommendations for the design and implementation of policy analysis and planning are:

- Projects design must be realistic and uncomplicated. More importantly, it should clearly define outputs to be produced.

- A clear and detailed implementation plan is necessary, either as part of project design or as a document to be produced immediately thereafter. Such a plan should be updated periodically. It should detail how the project will be implemented and it should specify what organizational responsibilities will be.

- Capacity building and training are objectives whose scope and time are commonly underestimated. Many evaluations point out that capacitybuilding is long-term in nature and may take more than five years. The implication is that AID must be cognizant of such a time horizon in the design and implementation of policy analysis and planning projects.

- Interinstitutional communciations are essential. Project design must not assume that policy analysis is an isolated exercise that can take place in an institutional vacuum.

- A Hention must be paid to project management and monitoring procedures. The chief issues here are financial accountability and assessing progress toward outputs, purpose, and goal acheivement.

- It is necessary to free up technical personnel from administrative demands on their time. In the case of expatraite advisors, it is generally unrealistic to expect a Chief of Party both to exert technical leadership and to serve as project manager without a capable on-site administrative assistant.

Other important recommendations for the design and implementation of policy and planning projects are included in Chapter 5.

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1.0 INTRODUCTION: AN EVALUATION OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND PLANNING PROJECTS

Over the past twenty years, the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) has funded a broad range of agricultural policy and planning projects in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Near East. AID has supported many different types of activities, including building of agricultural sector data bases, creating planning units within government, training of host country staff in policy analysis and planning, analysis of specific price and input policies, and implementation of policy and programmatic changes.

Although AID has conducted numerous evaluations of individual projects, there has been less work in assessing the overall impact of agricultural policy and planning assistance. Nevertheless, a major attempt was made several years ago to analyze the impact of AID-sponsored agricultural sector planning activities in Latin America and the Caribbean region.[1] This study builds upon the methodology and design of the Latin American and Caribbean study but focuses instead on three other regions: Africa, Asia, and the Near East.

The objective of this study is to evaluate AID-sponsored agricultural policy and planning projects in Africa, Asia, and the Near East that have taken place since 1970. The evaluation examines the relative success and impact of these projects and compares the results both within and across the three regions. The intent of the study is to glean information from these projects to help in designing better agricultural policy and planning projects in the future and in pinpointing problems in ongoing projects that need to be addressed.

This evaluation is one component of the Agricultural Policy Analysis Project (APAP) funded by the Office of Agriculture of the Bureau for Science and Technology of AID. APAP is a five-year project designed to improve the quality and usefulness of agricultural policy analysis conducted in and supported by AID Missions throughout the world. APAP has a number of different components. The components include: technical assistance in the design,

[1] Abt Associates Inc., Evaluation of Agricultural Sector Planning Activities in Latin America and the Caribbean. June, 1982.

implementation, and evaluation of policy analysis projects; technical assistance in conducting policy analysis; the development of guidelines for host country policy analysts and AID Mission staff to carry out effective agricultural policy analysis; and the provision of workshops to sharpen skills in policy analysis. The evaluation is intended to provide helpful information for all other components of the APAP, but it has particular relevance for the guidelines. In order for guidelines to be useful, they must be rooted in lessons learned from the past, and this evaluation is a vehicle to synthesize lessons across a broad range of projects. The evaluation will be updated throughout the course of the APAP in order to reflect lessons learned through other components of the project, particularly technical assistance activities.

1.1 Rationale for AID's Involvement in Agricultural Policy and Planning

AID has long been involved in providing general development assistance as well as agricultural policy and planning assistance in developing countries. The reasons that AID provides general development assistance are quite clear. In the first place, there is tremendous need for assistance in impoverished regions of the world. A second reason is somewhat less altruistic. Development assistance is provided because the U.S. wants to improve ties with countries that are important current or potential trading partners.

The reasons that AID provides assistance in the agricultural sector are also clear. Throughout the developing world, development of the agricultural sector is commonly viewed as a key ingredient to the improvement of the economy as a whole. In most developing countries, the agricultural sector employs a substantial percentage of the working population and accounts for a significant share of Gross Domestic Product. Although other sectors naturally play important development roles, agriculture is key to meeting the basic needs of a country's population and, in addition, is typically the source of livelihood for one of a country's most disadvantaged groups, small farmers. As a rule, therefore, support of agricultural sector development is consistent with the principal objectives of U.S. development policy, namely, "the promotion of conditions enabling developing countries to achieve self-sustaining growth with equitable distribution of benefits."[1]

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[1]U.S. Congress, "Public Law 95-424: International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978," Section 102 (b), Washington, 1978.

AID's 1978 agricultural development policy paper outlines a strategy for assistance to agriculture in the developing world. The strategy has two emphases:

- To increase countries' capacity to expand and distribute food supplies to alleviate hunger and malnutrition; and
- To increase participation of poor people in the process and benefits of development.[1]

This joint focus on production and equity has been operationalized by the Agency in five major functional areas:

- Asset distribution and access;
- Planning and policy analysis;
- Development and diffusion of new technology;
- Rural infrastructure; and
- Marketing and storage, input supply, rural industry, and credit.[2]

The relative importance of these five functional areas has varied considerably over time. During recent years, however, the growth in support of agricultural policy and planning has been substantial. This has stemmed from an increasing recognition that without proper policies to encourage agricultural development, other assistance will likely have little impact. Secondly, in relation to the magnitude of development problems in these regions, the level of assistance that AID can provide is small. Priority must therefore be given to assisting countries in the development of approaches that are sound, realistic, and implementable by the countries themselves.

1.2 Agricultural Policy and Planning Projects: A Definition

This evaluation examines a number of agricultural policy and planning projects that have been sponsored by AID since 1970. It is useful to provide some background on what these projects are intended to do, how they fit into a

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[1] Agency for International Development, "Agricultural Development Policy Paper," 1978, p. 1.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

host country's agricultural policy and planning environment, and what they can reasonably be expected to accomplish.

The origin and character of AID-supported agricultural policy and planning projects vary considerably. Country officials may have identified a need for assistance and requested help, or an AID Mission may have taken the initiative itself. The types of activities that AID has funded are diverse and often one project has many different ongoing activities. Examples of these activities are data collection and analysis, model building, training of host country staff, the creation of a new unit in government, analysis of specific policies, design of new programs and policies, and planning of investment decisions. The projects can best be described as a combination of technical assistance and training.

The main interest of such a project is to help a host country plan and manage the agricultural sector more effectively. From AID's perspective,the project typically has a dual goal, to make the agricultural sector more productive and to improve income distribution among participants in the sector.

Although the planning and management of an agricultural sector vary dramatically among countries, there are elements that are common to all. The overall planning and management process is portrayed graphically in Exhibit 1.1. AID-supported policy and planning projects aim at the first four stages of the process, that is, the projects focus on: 1) improving the monitoring of performance; 2) identifying problems with performance; 3) developing a strategy to address problems; 4) identifying alternative policies, programs, and investments to carry out the strategy. The final two stages of the planning and management process--decisions and implementation--are the province of key decisionmakers and managers within the host country. AID-supported agricultural policy and planning projects are designed to furnish decisionmakers with better information about the consequences of different policies and programs as well as to improve host countries' capacity to perform the first four stages in the national planning and management process effectively.

1.3 Criteria to Evaluate AID-Sponsored Projects

This framework suggests criteria to evaluate AID-sponsored agriculture policy and planning projects. A first major criterion is the extent to which the capacity of a host country government has been improved as a result of such a project. A policy and planning unit must have sufficient capacity in

Exhibit 1.1

STAGES OF A NATIONAL MANAGEMENT PROCESS



the size, training and calibre of its staff to identify problems and propose feasible and credible solutions to problems. A major objective of AID-supported projects has been to bolster this capacity.

A second criterion that is closely related to capacity is the degree to which AID-sponsored projects have improved interaction among agencies involved in the national planning process. Since agricultural policies and programs affect and are affected by policies elsewhere in the economy, coordination and sharing of information among concerned parties are essential. Improving interinstitutional relationships is an important part of strengthening host country capacity.

Another criterion for evaluating policy and planning projects is the degree to which decisionmakers have come to appreciate and demand policy analysis and planning. If decisionmakers have no interest in using analysis in making policy decisions, then there is little chance that policy analysis or planning will result in any tangible changes or improve the efficiency and equity of the agricultural sector.

A fourth criterion for rating the performance of projects is the extent to which they have resulted in actual changes in policies or programs. Such changes can be difficult for policy and planning projects to achieve, but come closer to having a direct impact on agricultural sector performance.

A fifth and final criterion is the extent to which changes in policies and programs have translated themselves into social and economic improvements within the agricultural sector. It is often difficult, if not impossible, to attribute such improvements directly to policy analysis and planning. Nevertheless, it is these kinds of impacts that are the ultimate objective of AID-sponsored policy and planning projects.

1.4 The Role of Other International Institutions and AID's Approach to Policy

Although economic policies are extremely important to the agricultural development, they are highly complex and politically sensitive. Many other international institutions try to influence the economic policies of developing countries. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank are particularly instrumental in this regard. The IMF focuses primarily on economic policies as they relate to a nation's balance of payments position. It also has been effective in bringing about desired policy changes by making its assistance--and related donor assistance--conditional upon policy

reform. The IMF's ability to establish "conditionality" is vividly demonstrated by its approach to countries that currently have serious foreign exchange problems--Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, for example.

The World Bank's influence on macroeconomic policies is more indirect, since the Bank is concerned primarily with project lending. But the Bank stresses economic policies in its lending activities (its Structural Adjustment Lending program, for example) and through close cooperation with the IMF.

In addition to the IMF and the World Bank, there are other multilateral and bilateral institutions that have major aid programs and have an influence on the policy front. Thus, AID is typically only one of a series of external actors concerned with economic and agricultural policy. This does not mean that AID has no influence in the policy arena. U.S. bilateral economic assistance is not insignificant by any means, and AID does have the capability to serve as an independent vehicle for dialogue on economic and agricultural policies.

AID's approach to economic and agricultural policy development is to engage in a dialogue with developing countries rather than to prescribe policy change. AID also provides considerable technical assistance and training to better inform decisionmakers of the consequences of various policies and to bolster the capability of host country policy analysts. A major challenge of this evaluation is to review the effectiveness of AID's intervention in the policy arena and to make recommendations for improvement, particularly in the way policy projects are designed and implemented.

1.5 Organization of the Report

The remainder of this report is structured in the following way. The next chapter (2) provides a backdrop for the evaluation. It discusses major development issues in Africa, Asia, and the Near East since 1945, the role of agriculture in the economies of countries in each of the regions, the general policy directions taken in each of the regions, and U.S. involvement in general economic and agricultural policy.

The next chapter (3) provides more detail about the methodology for the evaluation and describes the sample of agricultural policy and planning projects that are evaluated. This is then followed by a description of the impacts and the operational successes of the projects in question. The fifth chapter reviews constraints identified in project implementation and then

provides recommendations for the design and implementation of future projects. This is followed by a description of the challenges faced by AID in agricultural policy analysis projects in each of the regions. The last chapter lays out the directions for the second phase of this evaluation, which will be oriented more to country visits and long-term assessment of AID-sponsored projects.

2.0 A REVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLICY ISSUES IN AFRICA, ASIA, AND THE NEAR-EAST

This chapter provides a backdrop for the comparative evaluation of AID-sponsored agricultural policy and planning projects. The chapter is important because it discusses the very different approaches taken in Africa, Asia, and the Near East to the monumental tasks of nation-building and economic development since 1945. It also discusses the role that agriculture played in the economies of countries in these regions, the varying approaches governments adopted to develop their agricultural sectors, and AID's early intervention in the agricultural policy and planning arena in countries across all three regions. The chapter, thus, sets the stage for the detailed evaluation of AID-sponsored agricultural policy and planning projects in all three regions since 1970, which follows in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.

2.1 GENERAL POLICY OVERVIEW[1]

Agricultural policy and planning pre date independence for many of the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and the Near-East; yet, the postwar emergence from colonialism created a new context for these efforts. Economic development was one of the vital tasks of nation building, and in many countries agriculture was the dominant source of wealth and employment. The agricultural policies and structures that nascent governments inherited from the colonial powers, however, were not oriented to the challenges of national development. Colonial agricultural policies primarily served the import needs of Europe, leaving the majority of rural producers to bear the risks of subsistence farming. Attention and resources focused on export production on large plantations. In contrast, independence created a new political reality in which economic development policies needed to serve a broad range of domestic constituencies. Nationbuilding required governments to incorporate rural producers into a development process in which their interests conflicted with those of urban consumers.

In many ways, the post-colonial experience with agricultural policy was one of coping with independence, of balancing conflicting domestic inter-

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[1]For bibliographic references on the policy overview see Appendix A-1.

ests, and of finding a viable mix of equity and efficiency to promote economic development. Regional approaches to these challenges have varied; the results have been mixed.

2.1.1 Policy Approaches and the Role of Agriculture

As the primary source of wealth and income in most developing economies, agriculture strongly influenced economic development. Whether agriculture drove development or impeded it depended on three broad factors: the agricultural sector's condition at the time of independence; the intellectual understanding of development; and, the choice of development strategy. These factors varied widely across regions.

The condition of agriculture at the time of independence was influenced by both historical and physical factors. Historical factors included the distribution of land ownership, access to credit, and the availability of technical expertise. Differences between regions and subregions were great. East Africa, for instance, inherited a large expatriate export agriculture, based on a plantation system, while West Africa's tradition was peasant agriculture.

Natural endowments further conditioned agricultural policies, as governments sought to increase agricultural production. The availability of fertile land, water supply, and climatic influences both constrained agricultural policy and accounted for great regional variation.

The second element affecting countries' approaches to agriculture was policymakers' intellectual understanding of development. The predominant view in the 1950's and 1960's was that development meant industrialization. Planners considered agriculture, at best, a source of extractable surplus to fuel industrialization. The promise of factory work motivated rapid urbanization, and the consequent pressure to supply cheap food for urban consumers further retarded agricultural development.

By the late 1960's, economic stagnation had crushed hopes for a "take-off into self-sustained growth." The widespread failure of industry-intensive development and the advent of "Green Revolution" technologies forced policy makers and economists to reconsider agriculture's role in economic development. More recent policies reflect this intellectual revolution.

The final element distinguishing countries and regions--choice of development strategy--was a function of environmental conditions and intellec-

tual understanding. Two considerations broadly characterized strategic choices: the degree of reliance on market mechanisms (versus government involvement), and the approach to foreign trade.

No economy was either purely free market or fully planned. Governments chose a mix of these approaches based on their goals and capabilities. One can categorize countries by the extent to which governments intervened directly through marketing boards, fertilizer corporations, or state food stores versus indirect involvement through price policies for agricultural inputs and outputs. Governments in Tanzania, Syria, and India intervened actively in economic decisions, while in Kenya, Morocco, and Thailand, governments relied more on price signals to guide development.

Attitudes toward foreign trade were another basic consideration in development strategy. One school of thought promoted self-sufficiency as a high priority. This inward-looking strategy called for "import-substitution" policies in which countries produced commodities for their own consumption, even where they might more efficiently have produced goods for export and then imported for domestic production. Governments, such as Ghana's, that promoted import substitution believed the cost in inefficiency worth the security of not relying on volatile international markets. This temptation was (and remains) particularly great when food supplies were at stake.

The contrasting approach looked to foreign trade as a stimulus to growth. Export-led strategies, like Taiwan's, exploited their comparative advantage by exporting whatever commodities they produced most efficiently. The goal was to provide for domestic consumption and economic growth by earning the foreign exchange to import. This strategy was commonly associated with a more free market approach to development. One danger in this approach was "Dutch disease," in which the export of a valuable commodity, such as oil or copper, induced stagnation of agriculture. Indonesia and Zaire suffered these effects.

These general themes--the agricultural sector's initial condition, the intellectual understanding of development, and the choice of development strategy--serve as focal points at which to observe the widely varying postwar experiences of Africa, Asia, and the Near East. The experience in each of the regions will now be discussed at greater length.

2.2 AFRICA[1]

The Second World War and its end in 1945 did not represent a major break in the development pattern of Sub-Saharan Africa. Since the fighting in the war was outside of the region, peace did not imply a restoration of normalcy. Instead, it simply allowed the colonial powers to continue the policies of greater economic control that the war had engendered. Independence remained a dream of the future. The continuation of colonization beyond the war years can only have retarded the development process in Africa, postponing the disruptions entailed in independence struggles and slowing the creation of the technical and managerial skills necessary for development.

The problems of African development are most clear in the agricultural sector. Studies of Africa routinely indicate that "Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region of the world where per capita food production declined over the past 20 years." (AID, 1980) The statement is true in comparison with Asia and Latin America, though less so in comparison with the Near East. Faced with the fastest growing population of all the world's areas, the yields for main staple crops have risen slightly, if at all, since the 1960s, and the drought conditions affecting much of the area have only widened this discrepancy. Even under normal conditions yields of major crops were often only one-half those of Latin America or Asia.

Thus, African agriculture may well be the greatest challenge to development in the 1980s and beyond. The role of policy in the sector will assuredly be important, giving added weight to an understanding of the context of policy.

2.2.1 Major Development Issues in Africa

The central issue for Africa at the end of the Second World War was indeed "development"--whether and in what fashion a self-defined and self-directed set of policies could be implemented. In its initial phases this meant that decolonization was the central question, and societies dedicated resources and energies of the societies to resolving it. On the colonialists' side, this implied a greater concern for the situation of the colonies, in an

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[1]For bibliographic references on Africa, see Appendix A-2.

effort to forestall the inevitable. Thus, there were important resource transfers to the colonies, generally dedicated to infrastructure projects. But colonial governments also attempted major development schemes, for example, Kongwa in Tanzanika (Tanzania) and Casamance in Senegal, and showed some interest in organizing rural smallholders.

Perhaps the effort with greatest long-run importance was the reorganization of colonial trade relations to ensure the colonies as export markets, while at the same time providing them an assured market for their primary products with some measure of stable prices. These trade relations, along with some examples of sub-regional common markets and common currencies, survived in some form through the post-colonial period, perhaps the most important current example being the Lome regime between Britain and its former colonies.

The colonies adjusted to these policies, but the key concern was the ending of colonization, and this absorbed the talents and energies of leaders in political and often in military tasks. While the process of gaining independence was necessary and positive, it postponed dealing with underlying fundamental economic questions in the agriculture sector.

In their survey of Sub-Saharan agricultural development, authors C. Eicher and D. Baker suggest four crucial areas in which colonialism was detrimental to agricultural development. By implication, the continuation of colonialism simply extended the negative effects of the colonial policies. First, for the most part, Europeans systematically excluded Africans from participation in colonial development schemes and forced them to adjust their own activities to fit colonial mandates. Colonial policies sought primarily to benefit the home countries. Secondly, colonial governments gave little attention to training Africans. The evidence on the absence of well-trained managerial and scientific personnel is truly appalling. Between 1952 and 1963 there were only four university graduates in agriculture in all of Francophone Africa, and in 1964 there were only three African scientists working in all the experimental stations in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.

Since the dominant concern of the colonial powers was access to primary product exports, a third factor was the concentration of research in this area rather than the production of food crops and the problems of smallholder agriculture. To be sure, there were benefits from the research effort, but its applicability to the crucial national problems of agricultural development

was small. The final problem was the use made of the surplus or the wealth created during the colonial period. Suffice it to say, at least in theory, much better use could have been made of it if the dominant concern had been the internal development of the African colonies, soon to be states.

Once the nation state was established, and there are still a number of areas in Africa where this is not the case, the internal definition of development became the problem. The bitter taste of colonialism ensured that the effort would involve a break with the colonial pattern of production, a greater effort at internal, self-reliant development, and a concern with the process of Africanization.

The intellectual backdrop to the attempt to define development is an important story in its own right. As P.T. Bauer and many others have pointed out, the colonial powers imparted a bias toward government intervention and control of the economy. This grew directly out of the effort to integrate the colonies into the war effort, and momentum in this direction was provided by institutions such as marketing boards and the civil service. Indeed, attempts at planning the economy had gone on for some time. The first ten year economic plan for the Gold Coast (Ghana) was prepared in 1919. Yet, the newly-independent governments questioned colonial institutions, and worked to develop an independent understanding of the development process.

The economic theories of W. Arthur Lewis were particularly influential in this process He knew many of the Pan-African leaders and supported their aspirations for independence, and he wrote a number of tracts on West African development dating from the early 1950s. His basic stance was favorable to the private sector in all areas of the economy. He distrusted the ability of a central government to coordinate the myriad components of a modernizing economy, reserving his confidence for the market.

But there was one supposition that Lewis and state interventionist thinkers held in common: that industrialization was the path to development and modernization, that it could absorb the labor that would be freed from agriculture in the process of development and in doing so would raise the productivity of the entire economy. Lewis's most recent work places the focus of development on raising productivity in "tropical agriculture." One can only wish he had been so insightful 30 years ago!

The emphasis on industry cut across all theoretical approaches to development in Africa and dominated all strategies of development. To be sure

countries differed in their institutional approach. Acharya divides the countries he examined into Statist--Ghana, Sudan, and Tanzania--and market-oriented--Ivory Coast, Kenya, and Malawi. The first group used direct state intervention in the form of state enterprises, marketing boards, and planning, while the second relied upon the effects of a directed price system and of international resources. But both were oriented to the development of the industrial sector, and it is not clear which was most effective in this regard.

If there are any benefits from the turmoil of the 1970s, with its volatility in primary product prices and in world economic growth, with its drought and its famines, the demise of the industrialization strategy is among them. The capital flows that Lewis envisioned, based upon the Puerto Rican experience, did not materialize. Market-led industrialization failed; and, government involvement in the same effort created hot-house industries that withered when any disruption or outside competition arrived.

By the end of the 1970s, the basis for any African economic development was clear, even in those countries with significant mineral wealth such as Zaire. Agriculture must grow and improve and thereby provide the source of increasing income and well-being. That is certainly the challenge of the 1980s, as an examination of the role of agriculture in the countries illustrates.

2.2.2 The Role of Agriculture in Africa

The African countries are quite diverse in their natural resource endowments, the structure of their agricultural sectors, their integration into the international economy, and the resultant role of agriculture. Yet, by comparison with other areas of the world, there are striking differences. First and foremost is the continued importance of the agricultural sector in the share of the labor force. With few exceptions, mainly energy and mineral exports, the share of the agricultural labor force is far higher than the overall average, in many cases over 80%. This is certainly an indicator of the failure of industry to absorb significant segments of the labor force despite Lewis's hopes in this regard. Agriculture's share in total output declined since 1960 as expected, but it continues to remain higher than the averages by national income groups. This does not indicate that there was rapid agricultural growth, however, since, as noted above, on a per capita

basis, the 1970s saw a decline in agricultural output. Rather, the data indicate that agricultural growth was slower than overall GNP growth, which, on average, was slower than growth elsewhere in the world.

The general view is that the agricultural sector is stagnant the economies failing. Given agriculture's importance in the labor force, this has significant implications for overall economic performance.

Some breakdown of countries is necessary to obtain a clearer pattern. One important distinction is between the East African countries that were developed much more along plantation lines and the West African countries that relied more upon a peasant or smallholder agriculture. In the former, the base that had been laid for the European farms provided a source of rapid agricultural growth during the 1950s and into the 1960s. It also generated a broader industrial base and more experience with state intervention. Thus, the agricultural and industrial stagnation of later years grew from the inability to extend the growth process to other sectors and the disruption in the original situation. In West Africa, the problem was the shift in government resources and policies away from viable peasant agriculture toward promotion of industrialization. These resources were soon exhausted, leaving West African economies, too, without fuel for growth. In both cases, agricultural expansion did not continue through the 1970s.

In summary, agriculture in Africa is important and will remain important in all of the regions. But its importance at this point is partly as a constraint to development. In few cases has there been a positive contribution from agriculture, and in many cases it has contributed in a highly negative manner. Truly Africa is the next agricultural frontier.

2.2.3 Policy Directions in Africa

The concern with economic policy and its role in agricultural development is nowhere greater than in Africa. P.T. Bauer and, more recently, Robert Bates have led in developing an extensive literature on the distortions in the sector and on the role of price policy and marketing boards. The key document in the current debate, however, is the "Berg Report," under the auspices of the World Bank, which places the major responsibility for lagging African development on failures of economic policy and suggests that changes in policy would be the major contributor to improved performance. This is reinforced in

the World Bank's 1983 Report, which categorizes policies of four of the nine African countries as "highly distorted."

To be sure, even in the early 1960s, agriculture was not simply ignored. As the FAO study indicated: "under present African conditions, industrial development depends more on rural progress than rural progress depends on the development of industry." (p.32) Nonetheless, it shared the prevailing view, based most clearly on Hollis Chenery's work on the "patterns of development" that the share of agriculture in both output and employment was certain to fall over time. Thus, the FAO report implicitly acccepted the industrial focus of the day.

Over time, this view led to a neglect of research and institution building in the agricultural sector, to a decline in the internal price of agricultural goods compared with world prices (see Ellis on Tanzania for example), and to a generally adverse shift in the internal terms of trade for agriculture. Even in countries such as Malawi, which avoided many of these problems, there was a shift to estate production and control through the marketing board which raised output but discriminated against smallholder agriculture.

The end result is a policy context unsupportive of agricultural development. The USDA study details the resultant situation in the five areas of Africa. The most obvious areas of government involvement are in setting producer prices and establishing a monopoly for crop procurement. There are producer price controls in virtually every country of Africa, though there are many instances in which they are subject to a high degree of evasion. Monopoly in basic food crops is far less common, with Sahelian countries using it more extensively than elsewhere. But add to these interventions the many others used in particular areas: subsidies on inputs, overvalued exchange rates, retail price controls, storage policy, milling organization, and export or import controls. It becomes clear why Lewis saw the challenge to government policy makers as impossible.

It is against the backdrop of this historical involvement and current situation that policy analysis and the development of analytical capabilities is so important in contemporary African agriculture. On the one hand it is important not to substitute a new naivete, that improvements in policy will finally lead to a dynamic African agriculture. This is unrealistic, for many other factors must come into place before improvements can be self-sustaining.

On the other hand, unless there is an improvement in the policy context, the effects of the concomitant policies will be diluted.

2.2.4 AID's Role in Agricultural Policy in Africa

Aside from its historical relationship with Liberia, the U.S. was on the sidelines in Africa until the independence period. Thus, there is a much shorter period of involvement, and a much less clearly defined role than in other regions. Nonetheless, the sheer magnitude of the U.S. economy and its role in the international sphere has naturally increased its importance to Africa; and the increasing importance of Africa in the overall foreign development assistance program has played a similar role.

During the 1950s, the U.S. felt that the problem was simply the transmission of technical knowledge through extension. But by the 1960s, when independence came for many countries, there was a realization that institution building was an important component. Thus, Africa accounted for 28% of all AID-financed institution building projects, and 26% of them were in the agriculture sector. The range of such projects was quite broad, from drylands cropping research in Kenya to agricultural economics in Mauritania and Nigeria, and agricultural planning in Botswana. About one half of the projects were evaluated as having more positive effects than negative, about the average for all AID bureaus.

The major problem that beset these efforts, and indeed that affected much of AID support in Africa, was continuity. As noted earlier, the level of capacity in African countries was far below that in the other regions, and thus any effort at institution building was going to take decades to reach fruition. But internal upheavals such as the Ethiopian revolution, external shocks, and changes in AID goals prohibited such long-term investments and thus limited the number of "successes." An evaluation of agricultural research projects rated only one African project as better than satisfactory, while rating three satisfactory and six less than satisfactory. Such results are not surprising, but they make continuity difficult to maintain.

The decision for donor agencies in the 1970s to move much more toward rural development projects compounded the problems of institution-building. This implied that fewer resources were going into the basic understanding of agricultural systems and to developing broad based capacities for fostering agricultural development. It also meant that the best resources of the

countries were concentrated in particular projects rather than working at a broader level.

While pointing out a number of benefits of this shift in focus, Lele, in a 1979 postcript to her 1975 book, points to three gaps that lessened the success of the investments of the World Bank, and presumably of AID as well. First is the gap between the knowledge, financial, institutional, and physical inputs necessary for African development and the resources that are actually available. Second is the gap between existing knowledge and resources and those that are actually brought to bear in designing and implementing rural development programs. Third is the gap between expectations and acheivements, a cautionary note for whatever strategy may be adopted, including forays in policy analysis. For, in a very real sense, the same problems that existed in the earliest of such projects exist today: scarcity of trained personnel, difficulties in environmental conditions, and instability of policy and of government. One hopes that the earlier experience can at least close one of the gaps noted by Uma Lele, the gap between expectations and achievements.

2.3 ASIA[1]

There are many elements of commonality among the countries of Asia. First and foremost is the historical reality: in virtually all cases, the Second World War was a major turning point. For the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, it represented the removal of the Japanese colonial structure; for the Philippines it meant a much more direct integration into the world as a result of the occupation and liberation; and for most of the other countries it represented the end of colonial domination by European powers. Though the patterns and process might differ from country to country, their course was charted from the starting point of the War.

A second common pattern across most of the countries is a relatively clear division of the postwar experience in agricultural policy into two phases. In the initial phase, the major concern of policy was the structural basis of agriculture: the ownership of land, credit arrangements, access to modern inputs, and the terms on which exchange took place. Some writers have

[1]For bibliographic references on Asia, see Appendix A-3.

described this phase as one of distrust in the rationality of rural producers, with a tendency to mandate "enlightened policy" by the central government and its consequent imposition on rural producers. Certainly there was an element of this, but the more important influence was the perception that the structures of colonialism were unlikely to suit the developmental needs of an independent country. The second phase changed the emphasis from structure to production, from a concern with socioeconomic relations to a preoccupation with production, particularly of food. This was not simply a change from reliance on national planning to reliance on markets, for India among others, never deviated from significant interference in market relations. Rather, it represented a realization that policymakers had to be sensitive to the needs of producers and that social policy should encourage the provision of modern inputs into production.

A final common pattern across Asian countries is the division into an initial period of growth at the extensive margin, followed by one in which the growth in output came at the intensive margin. The best examples were Thailand and the Philippines, both of which saw important population movements into new areas that were less populated and less cultivated in the years after the war. Even in the case of India, from independence to 1964-65, additions to the area under cultivation provided output increases that were generally greater than those due to improved yields. Yet, the following decade saw yield increases contributing twice as much to output as increases in cultivated land, with the only important exception being wheat.

These common patterns provide a basis for examining Asia's development problems and processes and agriculture's role.

2.3.1 Postwar Asian Development Issues

The basic problem in Asia after World War II was political stabilization, and the development of a governmental structure which would have the legitimacy required to make the "nation" a reality. As one observer of Korea noted, "The U.S. Military Government took over the colonial administrative system without modification. Amidst social confusion after liberation from Japanese rule, the U.S. Military Government was obliged to concentrate all its efforts on maintaining social order, and the major emphasis in economic policy, if any, was directed toward reducing the post-war inflationary spiral." (Ban)

In this situation, governments naturally searched for support among important domestic and international sectors. In many cases this gave an important voice to former colonial civil servants, to workers in cash export crops, to urban elites, and to foreign powers. But in some cases, rural producers also had an important influence, e.g., in Taiwan and Malaysia. The pressures that were brought to bear at this point began to play an important role in policy once the basic governmental structure was established and other issues could be dealt with.

The intellectual issues of development were no less important, for development in a post colonial phase had not been an important problem since Latin America's independence from Spain in 1810-1820. The dominant current of thought at the outset of the period grew from Eastern Europe's experience of the 1930s and 1940s, and the problem of development was seen as the problem of industrialization and capital shortage. This linked with the surplus labor models into a coherent view, but one that gave little place to agriculture. It was only in the 1960s with the work of John Mellor and Bruce Johnston that the role of agriculture was appreciated even in the surplus labor model, and it was later in the decade that agriculture established independent importance. The advent of the Green Revolution both reinforced the importance given to agriculture and suggested a series of new issues to consider: rural industry, income distribution, input policy, and so on. A key role in these concerns was the development of a viable policy framework for agriculture. It is this story that is the primary concern of this chapter.

Understanding combined with environmental constraints to generate a strategy of development. Although the outlines varied, for the most part the initial effort consisted of two parts: extraction of the surplus from the rural area (constrained by the potential effect on rural unrest), and capital formation in industry as the main generator of growth and development. The Mahalanobis model for India that included only capital in the production function framework, typified this approach. Another element of the strategy was the foreign exchange constraint. Most countries relied on foreign aid to close the gap in exchange availability and to facilitate desired growth patterns. The rural areas were to be dealt with by structural reforms, if at all.

The fruits of this approach were disappointing--growth rates were higher in general than historical experience, but far below what was desired.

Governments responded with new approaches, redressing the imbalance between agriculture and industry and seeking mechanisms that would develop growth linkages between agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. Governments also increased their efforts to alleviate rural poverty. The possibilities presented by the development of the high yielding varieties and the experience with their dissemination strongly colored these new approaches.

Thus, agriculture, and agricultural policy, claimed a place far different from that occupied at the outset of postwar development. It became a central component of Asian development strategy.

2.3.2 The Role of Agriculture in Asia

The labor force in Asia reflects agriculture's central importance. Only in Korea did the share of the labor force in agriculture fall below 40% (between 1960 and 1980). In Malaysia and the Philippines, the share was 50% or below, but in all the other cases more than one-half of the total labor force was in agriculture, reaching a high of 79% in Afghanistan. It is also clear that this situation has persisted and is likely to continue in most of the countries, for the massive shift out of agriculture that the labor surplus models had suggested generally did not take place, with Korea again the exception. However, even in Korea the shift has been slight, a matter of a few percentage points.

Agriculture's importance in terms of other indicators was less marked. The share in output fell substantially in most cases, though Bangladesh, Burma, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines were exceptions. In most countries, agriculture lost its status as the largest contributor to output, though Bangladesh, Burma and India were exceptions. This was most often the case beause of the very rapid rise in the service sector share. One also sees this pattern in growth rates of agriculture, which have generally been lower than GDP growth rates. At the same time however, the importance of agriculture is clear, for those countries with low agriculture growth generally exhibited low growth in GDP as well, an indication of the importance of the growth linkage between agriculture and the remainder of the economy.

A comparison with countries of comparable income levels indicates that the role of agriculture in Asia was greater, and remains greater than its role in the rest of the world. For almost all indicators, the Asian countries were above the observed averages. The same was the case in the question of the

export share of primary products, which have dropped much less in Asia than in comparable countries elsewhere, and which remain notably high in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.

Underlying these aggregate trends was a rich variety of performance and experience across the countries, across regions within the countries, and across agricultural products. One important pattern was that food production in most countries increased more rapidly than overall agricultural production, with the major exception being Bangladesh. Performance in food production has also exceeded world performance during the 1970s.

Within the food sector, the performance of rice versus other products is an important consideration, given the role of rice in most of the economies and its growth as part of the Green Revolution. In rice production, Bangladesh exhibited the weakest performance, though several countries' output grew less than the world average, including Afghanistan, India, Sri Lanka, Korea, and Malaysia. However, in the countries with wheat production, performance was generally much stronger than the world average, the major exception being Korea. In India, for example, this clearly reflected the Green Revolution experience that saw major increases in both acreage and yield per acre.

The opposite pattern appeared with corn production, where growth was slower in Asia, with the one exception being Thailand. Corn was an important element in the extensive development of agriculture in Thailand as new areas were opened for cultivation. Finally, palm oil increased at a rapid rate in both Malaysia and Indonesia, in the former because of a careful and continuous improvement in the export agriculture and in the latter because of attempts to improve estate sector performance.

2.3.3 Policy Issues and Planning

The initial and overriding policy problem in agriculture was to establish viable rural structures of landholding, credit allocation, and access to modern inputs. Without solutions in this regard, the possibilities of agricultural development were small. The approach varied tremendously from country to country, from Korea's movement to consolidation of holdings and movement away from tenancy relations, to Taiwan's extensive agrarian reform, and Thailand's extension of producing areas through the construction of roads.

The second set of policy problems that generally followed in temporal sequence was how to "modernize" agriculture by making available modern infra-

structure, modern inputs, and the newly developed biological advances in plant stocks. Again, the approach and experience varied substantially across countries, from the wholesale adoption of new varieties and attendant inputs in areas of India to the rather lethargic pace of introduction and adoption in the Philippines and Thailand. But in all cases it became clear that producers would play the central role, and that government and its policies could at best facilitate, and at worst, inhibit the process.

The final set of policy problems arose from the realization that the extensive margin was exhausted and that most increases in production would have to come from increased yields and improved efficiency in utilizing the resources of rural areas. This moved traditional economic policy questions to the forefront, making questions of pricing and of resource allocation of fundamental concern. At the same time, it implied that distributional questions, and the problem of persistent poverty in rural areas would have to be faced directly, that neither the transfer of surplus labor to industry nor the migration of population to new areas was likely to provide a viable solution to these problems. Government policymakers now confronted these issues, as well.

Despite the existence of a general historical pattern in the agricultural development of the region, and although the set of problems faced by agriculture were relatively consistent across countries, there was substantial variation in the policy stance adopted by the different governments.

At the one extreme were India and Pakistan, large countries with large and quite diverse populations. Their stance, especially in India since 1950, was to undertake an extensive attempt at economic planning. They established a central planning organization and a central statistical office, and hired excellent thinkers to conceptualize the Indian economy and the policy that could deal with it. Indian planners were in the forefront of attempts to use formal economic models as planning devices.

In Pakistan, the formal apparatus of planning came into being in 1953, but it was not until about 1957 that there was effective access to the Prime Minister and decisionmakers. The Pakistani models were generally close to the Indian, at least initially, and their development went hand in hand. Also, while early plans had focused mainly on industry by the Third Plan in India (1961-62 to 1965-66), planners had substantially modified their perspective, giving more priority to agriculture.

The problem with these early planning documents was the overambitious formulations that they incorporated. They attempted to deal with the commanding heights of the economy, assuming that the rest would come up the hill at the same pace. But the rest of the economy generally did not follow along, and the commanding heights tended to be rather difficult to dominate.

At the other extremes were Malaysia and Taiwan, in which the process of moving into planning was quite different. There was a much greater awareness of the centrality of the farmer in the entire economy, and thus initial government involvement operated at a micro level with programs to facilitate rural production. Only gradually did they develop a more comprehensive planning capability as it became important to integrate micro activities into a more coherent whole. The initial micro programs were action-oriented, taking as given the need for accountability and careful resource use. They also assumed a tight progress reporting scheme as well as project control. The new aggregative planning approach was an attempt to make sectoral programming more coherent.

Other countries in Asia adopted planning approaches that were between the Indian/Pakistan model and the Malayasia/Taiwan model. There was a strong nationalist bent to most of this planning.

2.3.4 The Impact of the Green Revolution

The Green Revolution of Asia followed from the adoption of High Yielding Varieties (HYV) throughout the region. The consequent increases in yields opened the possibility of dealing with the problem that had been one of the initial concerns in the 1950s--the ability of a country to feed itself.

The problems of the Green Revolution are well-known: an increase in landlessness in some areas; a skewing of income distribution in some areas; an increase in required inputs and in the technical level of cultivation. The political impacts were tremendous, in many cases giving more power to cultivators than formerly imaginable. But the impact of the model was substantial. From this centralist research program, primarily biological in nature, the model of induced development through technical change spread widely. It ignored existing cultivation systems, causing short-run problems and creating perhaps a long-run reaction. Yet, for the most part, agricultural policy from the late 1960s on had a clear supply-side goal: to expand the cultivation of the new varieties and the incentives, inputs, and marketing structures

necessary to support the green revolution.

According to Robert Anderson, this led to an alliance between central planners and rural political brokers. "Development would be achieved through the central administration channeling funds and materials to select projects in rural areas. No longer would bargains need to be struck with traditional local organizations; now political brokers would receive and distribute resources from the center in return for delivering electoral support and keeping the countryside pacified." (p.9) The growing power of the countryside allowed the now more powerful rural producers to collude with the central government, rather than leading to a decentralization of power and decisionmaking. Nonetheless, it certainly changed the problem of the planner.

The overall characteristic of policy formulation for rural development in Asia was its diversity. The countries' various starting points in 1945 foreshadowed this variety, which their subsequent agricultural policies maintained.

Asia attained a higher responsiveness on the part of rural producers than many other areas of the world. In part, that was the result of the greater numbers and power of peasants in these areas; in part, it was the historical context in which independent development commenced. In any case, the degree of policy distortion was not as great in Asia as elsewhere. The growth of knowledge and analysis that the FAO efforts and Asian Development Bank study represented contributed to this, but more fundamentally it reflected the importance of the peasants' and governments' desire not to repeat the Chinese experience.

2.3.5 AID and Policy Development in Asia

U.S. foreign aid institutions played an active and varied role in the policy development process of Asian agriculture. Most often, it paralleled and reacted to the general directions of the countries' policies, but on some occasions it played a dominant and directive role.

It would be difficult to provide a clear classification of the degree of success of U.S. foreign aid. Certainly in some areas, the foreign involvement was clearly detrimental, perhaps the best example being the imposition of a 1.5 million ton rice reparation payment upon Thailand at the end of the Second World War. In other cases, such as the support for the international research centers and for the dissemination of the resultant varieties, there

was a clear success. But in most cases the picture is ambiguous. In a real sense, however, the efforts of AID and of the countries in agricultural policy were so intertwined that an assessment of agricultural performance provides a "fair" assessment of AID and its predecessors' role. And that was generally a successful performance, certainly by Third World standards.

In most cases, AID initially attempted to use the lessons of United States agriculture as a model for structuring the agricultural sector of Asian economies. This was consonant with the attempts underway to provide the structural basis of agricultural development. India was an important and broadly representative forum for donor involvement in agricultural policy. By the early 1950s, the first Joint Indo-American Team recommended the development of agricultural universities, patterned on the land grant colleges of the United States. They were to build the existing research capacity of the country on the base laid by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (founded in 1929). The model of the family farm of the United States also provided a basic level of understanding and support for the structural changes underway in the economies, land reforms, credit reforms, and the initial efforts to build rural infrastructure.

The U.S. was the largest donor to the area in this period, providing over 50 percent of bilateral aid to India up through 1966, and virtually all of bilateral aid to Korea and Taiwan. In the case of India, around 51% of the total aid package was food commodities under PL 480. These resource flows provided the direct foreign exchange or the domestic counterpart funds that were necessary to allow the structural changes in the rural areas and the development of the first governmental entities to provide resources to agriculture. For example, "Public investment and loans in agriculture started in 1949 when the government (of Korea) formulated an economic rehabilitation budget based on counterpart funds generated by U.S. aid delivered by the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA)." (Ban, p.165)

Critics have noted the disincentive effects of the commodity flows. "Large amounts of P.L. 480 commodities--particularly wheat--were sent to Taiwan under the U.S. aid program, and this wheat was used to supply the armed forces with their cereal requirements....It played a vital role during the early post-war years in allowing the government both to maintain an enormous military establishment and to ignore the (post-land reform) rural areas." (Griffin, p.32) New research questions the magnitude of the disincentive

effects. In any case, foreign commodity assistance facilitated the reforms in agriculture and later contributed to better performance.

Bad crop years brought to the fore the concern with increasing production. A Ford Foundation study group and its subsequent report played a key role in India. It stimulated an initial attempt to bring better packages of agricultural practice into use, yet its main effect was to influence the changing policy stance of the government in the mid-1960s. In the Fourth Plan of 1966, the Indian government adopted the Intensive Agricultural Areas Program (IAAP) intended to provide production incentives and high-yielding inputs to farmers in areas where output response was likely to be the greatest. This approach is a good exemplar of the second phase of Asian agricultural development.

The role of U.S foreign assistance in the adoption of the IAAP is a matter open to dispute. Some observers claim that there had been an intellectual conversion among agricultural planners, but the "short tether" policy of Lyndon Johnson was certainly seen as having played a major part. The effect in the short run was to give U.S. support to agricultural growth which has been documented most completely by John Mellor for the Punjab. The effect in the long run was to raise the level of Indian resentment at foreign interference, contributing to the break in assistance after 1971.

While the role of the foreign donors was less dramatic in other Asian countries, the general direction in the area was similar. In the case of Taiwan and of Korea, the scenario was played out through the cessation of food aid and the consequent incentive this provided for agricultural growth. In both cases, the sector responded with increased growth rates. In other countries the change was more directly one of greater encouragement to rural producers through the provision of high-yielding varieties and the concomitant modern imput package.

One tangible activity of AID was the funding of long-term sector analysis projects in several countries, among them Korea, Thailand, Pakistan, and the Philippines. These were expensive projects with an impressive output of knowledge about the agricultural sector. Since there are many similarities among them, a brief examination of the Thailand project gives a flavor for all.

AID initiated Thailand's sector analysis project in 1973 with initial funding for five years. AID then extended funding to the present. The basic

thrust of the project was to build national macroeconomic models, regional models, and sectoral models. A farm survey covering 20,000 farms, carried out prior to the onset of the project, aided the process. In addition, there was a major training component in the project, both in-country and for long term training outside of country. The major indicators of success were the numbers of persons trained and the number of models developed. However, there were also indicators that there was an impact on economic policy. For example, in developing Thailand's Fourth Five-Year Plan, the agricultural sector relied heavily upon the information and models developed by the project. In addition, the members of the sector analysis team participated in many of the important policymaking committees within the Ministry.

Of course the final measure of success will be the incorporation of the entire process within the Ministry, and this will only be seen over time. But from the views presented and the models developed by the project, it seems that there were important contributions to the knowledge of Thai agriculture and to the process of sectoral policy formulation. Of course, the final project evalaution may provide a different perspective, but such information is not available as yet.

It is clear that these projects have the closest resemblance to new emphases of the Agency. Thus, a more detailed evaluation of their performance would certainly be important in the final version of this evaluation, based on written evaluations and more on-site information.

2.4 NEAR EAST[1]

In many ways the key to understanding the Near East is the concept of "wealth," for much of the development of the Near East was conditioned by its existence or total absence. This was in no case more true than in agriculture and its patterns of development. The wealth of oil in many of the countries often engendered a particular version of the "Dutch disease," the tendency of a tradeable sector to stagnate in an economy characterized by another booming tradeable sector, such as oil or natural gas. The most common lagging sector was agriculture.

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[1]For bibliographic references on the Near-East, see Appendix A-4.

The paucity of water throughout the region further constrained agricultural development. In Yemen, the average rainfall is 300 milimeters--in the wetter areas of the country. Any irrigation depends on run off from the highlands, and these waters are so sparse that they rarely would reach the sea, even without takeoff for irrigation. This is a common story. Thus, it is no surprise that agriculture has been anything but the leading sector in the area.

One final reality of the Near East is the central importance of the international sphere. There is probably no area of the world where there is a greater imbalance between the international definitions of the importance of the country and its economy and the valuation that would be given in internal terms. These generally small and thinly populated countries, with their relatively low living standards, are seen to have tremendous wealth because of their oil holdings. Yet the oil wealth is highly unequally distributed. Similarly proximity to Israel, as well as to oil fields, provides the countries with substantial international political importance. The domestic economies exhibit this imbalance. The Dutch disease is one rendition of this effect, but there are others noted below.

2.4.1 Major Development Issues

In political terms, the postwar period was much less a break with the past than in other areas. For example, Turkey had been established as a republic, and Egypt as a monarchy, in the early 1920s; the continued political turbulence in the two countries was simply a continuation of past experience.

Of greater political and economic significance for the region was the division of the political map into competing blocs, and its general alignment with the West during the postwar period. This meant a ready market for the region's oil, which at the same time provided access to the food production of the most developed agriculture in the world. In time it would also provide a context in which large migrations of temporary workers from Turkey to Europe and from Egypt and Yemen to other Near Eastern countries would have a substantial economic importance.

Close ties with the West also incorporated into the region a particular way of thinking about and defining development. Though the population situation of the countries did not accord well with the fashionable "labor surplus" approach, government readily accepted industry and industrialization

as the key indicators of development. The logic of this view of development led to the attempt to substitute domestic production for imports. This process had begun long before in some countries such as Turkey, but the postwar period brought its acceleration. By 1962, Turkey's manufacturing output was 17% of GNP and it included substantial intermediate goods production and some capital goods as well. There were substantial outputs of cement, automobiles, and other heavy and sophisticated products. Egypt, under Nasser, took a similar approach. In both cases, the state sector was the primary focus of activity and resources.

This intellectual orientation naturally led to a relative neglect of agriculture in resource allocation and national priorities. Even in the countries that did not push import substitution to the degree of Turkey and Egypt, agriculture received much less priority.

Another intellectual problem was equally important in the area: the relation of these new developments with the traditions of the region, with Islam and with the Arabian heritage. Some leaders challenged tradition. In the 1920s, Turkish leader Kemal Aturk adopted a modernizing, essentially secular and nationalist approach to society. Thirty years later, Egypt's Gamal Nasser proposed Arab Socialism, an effort to unite the Arabs across arbitrary colonial boundaries and to use the vision and the power of the pan-Arab state to undo colonialism and to bring power and modernization to the Arab countries. In practice, Nasser's theory was reduced to a type of statist nationalism, but his vision provided an understanding of development that was pervasive over the years of the 1960s and into the 1970s.

Even in Turkey and Egypt, and much more so in other countries, there was a continuing reservoir of Islamic and village traditions that was never emptied by the siphon of Arab socialism or secular nationalism. Islamic traditions persisted in Yemen even after the overthrow of the Imam in 1962 with the aid of Nasser, and they obviously continued in Iran throughout the Shah's extensive and expensive efforts at modernization.

Nonetheless, most national strategies grew directly out of the dominant understanding of development: extensive state intervention in all aspects of the economy; dedication of development resources to industry; and initial emphasis on agrarian reform both as a mechanism to increase support of the state and in the populist belief that small scale agriculture could be more productive. To the extent that agriculture played a role, it was usually seen

in the context of large scale irrigation works designed to bring new land into cultivation and to improve the productivity of existing lands.

Subsidiary issues of price policy and exchange rate policy generally were submerged in these larger concerns. This should not be construed as indicating that there were no incentives provided to agriculture. In Egypt, Nasser was careful to maintain a remunerative support price for wheat to encourage its production, and government provided fertilizer at subsidized rates for the same purposes. The point is rather that there generally was no coherence in broad agricultural policies, leading to imbalances in agriculture and between it and other sectors of the economy.

2.4.2 Agriculture's Role in the Near East

The general low historical priority accorded agriculture, combined with the magnitude of available resources, has resulted in a varied pattern of agricultural performance in the area. The low priority for the most part resulted in a lesser role for agriculture than in other regions. But growth rates in given countries during given periods were higher than international averages owing to the financial resources that could be accorded even a lower priority sector. In some cases, agricultural performance was truly impressive. For example, in the case of Egypt, per acre yields for extra-long staple cotton were the highest in the world, yields for sugar cane ranked second, for peanuts third. Only a few advanced countries exceeded Egyptian corn and wheat yields. (Richards, p.255).

In terms of the share of agriculture in output and in the labor force, only Yemen, Iraq, and in some cases Turkey, exceeded the shares for their income groups. In all other cases the shares were lower at the outset of the period as well as in 1981. These results correspond with the general priority accorded agriculture in the countries.

The same pattern existed in the share of agriculture in exports. In 1960, Egypt, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, and Algeria all evidenced agricultural shares higher than international averages. But by 1980, only Yemen and Turkey remained in this situation. These changed standings resulted from the growth of other exports in many countries and from the stagnation of agriculture in others. Import shares were generally higher than the international average in both 1960 and 1980.

Growth rates of agriculture were not as low as the share figures would suggest. Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey and Algeria were all lower than the average in the initial period of the 1960s, but Morocco, Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon were higher. In the 1970s, only Egypt was below the average. The indices for production show some of the contributing factors in this pattern, for example, the impressive growth of wheat output in Yemen, Turkey, and Syria. A central factor in this situation was the role of the government and its ability in many cases to direct large amounts of resources to agriculture. However, in general, the heavy government involvement failed to produce a coherent agricultural policy. Differential performance across crops and the continuing minor role for agriculture reflect this failure.

2.4.3 Policy Directions in the Near East

State domination of agricultural policy in the Near East has a long history. The Bible recounts the story of the Pharaoh who dreamed of seven fat cows being devoured by seven lean cows, the prosperous years to be followed by famine. This called forth an effort to plan the production of food crops and their end use so as to withstand the drought.

More recent attempts were carried out by the British, first in the Sir John Russell report of 1903 and then the report of the Royal Commission on Agriculture of 1928, both of which attempted to develop policies for increasing agricultural production. In the period covered by this survey, the initial years saw many of the countries dealing with previously ignored structural problems.

Most countries institutionalized the planning process in the following decades. By the 1960s, most countries had central planning organizations that were operational and were developing economic policy papers and plan documents. For the most part there was a heavy statist orientation toward planning. This orientation has continued and dominates the approach to policy in most cases in the area.

Contemporary efforts at agricultural policy development began as a component of general planning in the countries involved. For the most part planning took a sectoral stance as its point of departure, and agriculture was generally one of these sectors. But in the early phases the primary concern was with budgetary allocations. This then moved to a concern with development and coordination, often resulting, as in Egypt, in a "file of industrial

projects." Only later did they deal meaningfully with questions of agricultural policy and its relation with the broader concerns of economic development.

One of the first tangible evidences of this development was the CENTO Seminar on Agricultural Planning held in Tehran in 1971, bringing together a series of experts from Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, the U.S. and the U.K. as well as AID mission personnel from the area. The keynote address of A.T. Mosher of the Agricultural Development Council of the U.S. set out clearly the understanding of agriculture and its development that reigned at that time. Mosher's approach, remarkably similar to the Ford Foundation approach in India, essentially called for the development of a modern commercial agriculture. It received verbal support from the participants. However, their countries' concerns were somewhat different, for they had to deal with linking the agricultural sector to the broader planning framework, with carrying out major rural development projects, with the techniques of planning and of data collection, and finally with physical and institutional barriers to agricultural development.

These pressures and a preoccupation with industrialization led planners away from Mosher's description of a dynamic agriculture. Countries with oil reserves such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Libya tended to ignore agriculture, content to rely on food imports. Countries without oil, particularly Egypt, attempted to use the agricultural sector to generate surplus to aid industrialization.

In both cases, the level of success in planning and agricultural policy was not high. This was particularly true in Egypt and Iraq. Planners consistently underestimated the physical constraints to agriculture in the region. In addition, despite the minor emphasis on agriculture, governments proved unable to spend the funds allocated to the sector. Agencies in the region consistently found themselves unable to organize agricultural projects due to shortages of qualified personnel. In a typical year, Iraq was able to spend only half the funds allocated to agriculture.

In the attempts to develop agriculture, a number of common approaches emerged. One focus of government agricultural policy was irrigation. Indeed, in many countries, irrigation was practically the sole focus of agricultural policy. Unfortunately, policy was so poorly implemented that the benefits of irrigation initiatives were few.

Land reform was another common concern of rural development policy in the Near East. Much reform was politically motivated as an effort to establish a political base for the ruling party in the countryside. In most cases redistributed land was government owned. In Iraq, land reform followed the 1958 revolution: 1.5 million hectares were to be distributed, yet by 1963 only 363,000 had been affected. In Egypt, reform began after the 1952 revolution. In Iran, serious land reform began in the early 1960s, and the reform was more extensive than elsewhere. The idea was to increase the number of small farmers and this it clearly did. By 1965, over 57 percent of farms were less than five hectares, whereas in 1952, 35.4 percent had been less than five hectares. Between 1950 and 1970, about 13.6 percent of all arable land was redistributed.

In the case of Iraq, the reform was poorly administered. Land distribution was slow due to a shortage of trained personnel, and, planners gave little thought to how reform would affect rural institutions. Formerly, large landowners had taken care of input supply and investment in the land. Both were adversely affected by reforms with consequent disruptions. In Iran, a few years after beginning reform, policymakers decided that small farming was inefficient and took steps to promote large holdings, including the encouragement of foreign ownership of irrigated land.

Egypt's approach to agriculture was particularly noteworthy. The basic thrust of Egyptian policy was found in other countries, and many governments followed at least parts of Egyptian policy. Egypt introduced a number of distortions in agriculture in order to extract a surplus to aid industrialization and the urban areas. An important aspect of Egyptian policy was to provide farmers key inputs at subsidized prices, while controlling the output prices they received. Government marketing agencies then sold the product at higher prices and used the surplus to fund industrialization or urban area projects. Control over cotton production was complete in Egypt, and the government reaps substantial benefits from cotton exports. One should note that the net effect of the input subsidies and forced deliveries was to reduce farm incomes. This is similar to what has been happening in Africa. The policy of overtaxing agriculture contributed to the sector's stagnation by reducing the incentive to produce. Neglect of rural incomes was widespread in the Near East, as planners failed to realize that farmers responded to economic incentives.

Another unfortunate aspect of this bias against the rural sector was that it spurred migration to urban areas. This created a further problem of a shortage of manpower in the rural sector, further lowering agricultural output, and consequently leading to crowded conditions in urban areas. As the number of poor urban dwellers rose, there was increased pressure to keep food prices low and agricultural production incentives low. Egypt's agricultural sector is still languishing, for the country spends $8 million a day on food imports. Nor will Egypt's policy facilitate growth, for the agricultural surplus never finds its way to industry, but instead is used for consumption purposes. Other countries, of course, have made some or all of Egypt's mistakes.

In the last few years agriculture has received more attention from planners in the Near East. Many nations are embarking on attempts to achieve food independence. One finds this new stress among many of the oil producers such as Saudi Arabia and Libya. Uncertainty about shipping in the Persian Gulf, the United States grain embargo of 1980, and the experience with costly food imports in the 1970s have given many nations in the Near East the incentive to grow more of the food they eat. Saudi Arabia has embarked on an ambitious plan to expand its agricultural production by offering generous incentives to producers, and by stressing capital intensive production. Libya has embarked on a $7 billion plan to irrigate 180,000 hectares, twice what is now irrigated, and envisions using 2000 kilometers of pipeline to carry 4 million cubic feet of water.

2.4.4 The Role of AID

Two factors have determined the role of AID and other foreign donors in the Near-East: the political situation of the region and the internal definition of the agricultural problem. This results in an overall survey in a varied pattern that does not offer the clarity of some of the other regions.

Throughout much of the postwar period, there was a substantial AID involvement in irrigation, reflecting the general orientation of agricultural policy. The Aswan Damn was to be financed by the United States and other Western donors until political and economic factors intervened. AID also supported land reform in many of the countries.

Attempts were made to cooperate with multinational agricultural initiatives. One of the major initiatives was to encourage the introduction of the miracle wheat varieties, especially in Turkey and in Egypt. In the former,

there was rather good success in many areas, with up to one half of the crop using the new varieties. In Egypt, the effect was quite different, for the first crop planted was destroyed by the 1974 drought, and consequently, farmers distrusted the new varieties.

During the 1970s, there was a number of policy analysis initiatives in the region. AID maintained relations in Turkey in the policy analysis area, despite the difficult political situation. In Jordan, a linear programming model of the Jordan Valley was prepared. There was activity in Tunisia and ever increasing activity in Egypt. An Agricultural Sector Assessment was carried out in Yemen in 1982 that provided excellent background information on the sector and made a number of policy suggestions, most of them having to do with upgrading the capacity of those involved in the sector.

There are two experiences that could stand as exemplars of AID's role, and of the problems and possibilities that it holds. The first is Syria. A major multi-volume study, an Agricultural Sector Assessment carried out in 1979 and was to play a role in the 1981-85 Plan. In terms of its proposals for agricultural economic analysis, a mini-USDA was the model, with a vast array of data resources and analytical capacities envisioned in an attempt to rationalize and upgrade Syrian agriculture. Activity was envisioned from the farm level through the "optimum production marketing system." The assessment was never published and it is unlikely that its proposals were taken very seriously. In part, it was certainly caught in the middle of political differences with Syria, but in another sense it indicates how unlikely it is that the entire history of agricultural policy, which has been sketched earlier, will be altered on the basis of an externally funded review. Future work must be more sensitive to this reality.

The other example is Egypt. There can be little doubt about the severity of distortion in the Egyptian agricultural sector, where it has become remunerative to feed chickens on bread. AID is in a position to press for changes, and has been doing so. Egyptian policy has changed, though slowly and grudgingly, and without notable effect on output. It would be interesting, and probably important, to draw the parallels between Egypt today and India in the middle 1960s. In both cases, agriculture was not performing well, and, in both cases, there were specific policy changes that AID was pressing for, with major resources backing up the pressure. India changed its policy, though the role of United States pressure was unclear. What became

clear later, with the break in relations, was the degree of resentment that had been developed and the degree to which this complicated later relations in all areas, including India's relations with the Soviet Union. As policy initiatives continue in Egypt, the Indian case may offer parallels and lessons to examine.

3.0 METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATING AID-SUPPORTED AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND PLANNING PROJECTS AND A DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS FUNDED SINCE 1970

This evaluation examines agricultural policy and planning projects that AID has supported in Africa, Asia, and the Near East since 1970. The evaluation focuses on the impacts these projects have had and their success in meeting stated objectives. In this chapter, the methodology and analysis plan for the evaluation is presented, together with a description of the AID-supported agricultural policy and planning projects in the three regions.

3.1 Evaluation Design and Methodology

This study builds upon the methodology and design developed by Abt Associates in its study of agricultural sector planning activities in Latin America and the Caribbean.[1] The evaluation design is summative in that it pulls together information from many evaluations of individual projects. It has both an impact component and a process component: the impact component examines the types of impacts that are reasonable to expect from agricultural policy and planning projects, while the process component is concerned with how well projects are carried out.

3.1.1 Impact Analysis

AID has provided over $225 million of assistance for agricultural policy and planning projects in Africa, Asia, and the Near East since 1970. These funds have been spent in more than 60 individual projects. The major questions of this evaluation are: what have been the impacts of these projects and many millions of dollars? Have they resulted in improved agricultural policies and improved planning and management systems in developing countries?

In order to answer these questions, it is first necessary to define what impacts are reasonable to expect of AID-sponsored agricultural policy and planning projects, and then to determine if the projects under study have had such impacts.

One of the major objectives of AID-sponsored agricultural policy and planning projects has been to improve the capability of agricultural policy

[1] Abt Associates, Inc., Evaluation of Agricultural Sector Planning Activities in Latin America and the Caribbean, June, 1982.

and planning units within developing countries. Given the role that these units are intended to play within government, there are three relevant criteria--or types of impacts--that need to be assessed in evaluating whether AID-sponsored projects have succeeded in building up the capability of policy analysis and planning units. These three impact areas are:

- Capacity-Building Impacts: This criterion examines the extent to which AID-sponsored projects have improved the capability of host country staff to engage in effective policy analysis and planning. Improvements can be manifested by better trained staff, compilation of better data, better physical facilities for planning and policy analysis, organizational improvement to give policy analysis a more central role, improved quality of analysis, and so forth.

- Interinstitutional Impacts: A second criterion is the degree to which AID-sponsored projects have facilitated improved coordination and interaction between agricultural policy and planning units and other key actors in the national planning and management process. Agricultural policy analysis and planning is not an isolated exercise. Agricultural policy analysts are expected to interact with other public sector institutions and with institutions outside the public sector, in both an active and reactive capacity. To the extent that linkages are formed with other public and private institutions and that impacts of agricultural policies on other sectors are considered, policy analysts may be judged as doing their job effectively.

- Decisionmaker Impacts: A third criterion to consider in evaluating agricultural policy and planning projects is the degree to which decisionmakers rely on policy analysis for developing policies and programs, or for understanding policy and program issues. Policy analysis can be said to achieve a major portion of its objective if decisionmakers consider agriculture policy and program issues in light of policy analyses, and if they demand specific studies of policy analysis staff. In other words, decisionmakers must see the value of policy analysis in their deliberations. If this is the case, then an administration's awareness and use of policy analysis may ultimately contribute to more effective agricultural policies and programs.

A second major objective of AID-sponsored policy and planning projects is to generate improved policies and programs in host countries. This suggests a fourth criterion to be considered in the evaluation of the effectiveness of agricultural policy and planning projects:

- Policy and Program Impacts: If AID-sponsored projects have resulted in changes in policies or programs, then they can be said

to have had an influence in a more ultimate sense. Such impacts are particularly important because they can result in direct improvements in efficiency and equity in the agricultural sector.

It is a major accomplishment if an AID-sponsored project results in policy and program changes within a developing country. But the most important question still needs to be addressed. Did changes in policies and programs bring about improvements in the country's agricultural sector, as measured by increases in production, increases in incomes, more equitable distribution of income, etc? Such improvements can be called the social and economic impacts of projects. They are extremely difficult to measure empirically, and are often assessed only anecdotally. Nevertheless, they are of central importance and suggest a fifth criterion for evaluating policy and planning projects.

- Social and Economic Impacts: If an AID-sponsored project changes policies and programs, then it is necessary to measure the social and economic impacts of these changes. Social and economic impacts consist of changes in output of certain commodities, changes in farm income, changes in production by suppliers of farm inputs or by purchasers of farm outputs, etc.

These five criteria are the basis for the impact analysis of this evaluation. For each agricultural policy and planning project funded by AID, an examination is made of which of the five impacts--capacity-building, inter-institutional, decisionmaker, policy and program, and social and economic--it has had.

3.1.2 Process Analysis - Operational Success

A second perspective on agricultural policy and planning projects may be had by examining the operational success of projects. This perspective focuses on how well a project was actually implemented and whether it met its stated objectives. This is a distinctly different but complementary perspective to focus on project impacts. The impact analysis concentrates on the ultimate objectives of projects, while the process analysis examines how well inputs (personnel, data, equipment, etc.) were provided and managed, whether intended outputs (studys, surveys, plans, etc.) and how smoothly projects were carried out.

These two components, the impact analysis and the process analysis, form the basis for the evaluation of agricultural policy and planning projects

in Africa, Asia, and the Near East since 1970. The next section describes how the study design has been implemented.

3.2 Study Implementation

3.2.1 Project Identification

The first step in this study was the identification of AID-supported policy analysis and planning projects in Africa, Asia, and the Near East since 1970. In order to identify all such projects and other related projects with major policy or planning components (for example, fertilizer and credit projects) conducted during this period, several different sources were queried. One source was AID's Development Information Unit (DIU) listing of all agricultural policy analysis and planning projects. The DIU computer files contain projects world-wide and provide good abstracts of the various reports associated with each project. DIU files are not complete, however, so additional time was spent talking with country experts in AID's Africa, Asia, and Near East Bureaus to identify additional projects.

3.2.2 Project Documentation

This report is the result of the first phase of the evaluation. It is based solely on review of project documentation, especially project papers and interim and final evaluations. As was the case in the Latin American and Caribbean study referenced above, these documents provide a rich source of data, information, and insight regarding the impacts of projects. The information contained in the documentation is limited, however, and will need to be amplified and updated through visits to individual countries anticipated to take place during the second phase of the evaluation.

For each project, information from the review of project documentation is summarized and codified in three sets of forms: "Project Summaries," "Activity Descriptions," and "Evaluation Summaries." The forms summarize key information about the objectives, impacts, constraints, and lessons learned in projects and allow for useful comparisons across projects. The forms are, in fact, the data base for the analysis. A short description of what is contained in each of the forms is as follows:

- A Project Summary includes the title, number, country, date, and level of funding of a project. It also identifies the institutions involved and presents the logical framework for the project.

- An Activity Description consists of a one-page summary of the content of the project. It is a short description of the activities planned under the project as well as a listing of the policy areas addressed by the project.

- An Evaluation Summary capsulizes the conclusions of evaluations of an agricultural policy and planning project. Each summary contains information on achievement of goals, project impacts, constraints to achieving objectives, and lessons learned and recommendations.

The project summary and activity description forms were completed for each of the projects in the data base of the study. For each project with one or more evaluations, an evaluation summary form was also completed. The full set of forms is presented in Appendix B.

3.3 A Descriptive Overview of AID-Supported Agricultural Policy and Planning Projects

Sixty-six different AID-funded projects with agricultural policy and planning activities were identified and found to have documentation available. Although there are some, particularly quite recent, projects for which useful documentation is not available, the 66 projects presented in Exhibit 3.1 are a reasonably comprehensive list of agricultural policy and planning projects supported by AID in Africa, Asia and the Near East since 1970.[1] As reflected in the exhibit, project summaries were prepared for 64 of the 66 projects, and activity descriptions were prepared for all 66 projects. Evaluations were available for 39 of the projects, and so evaluation summaries were completed in these cases. The total set of 66 projects represents a broad diversity of agricultural policy and planning activities, both geographically and substantively. Although documentation is not currently available for all AID-funded agricultural policy and planning projects, the resultant sample is sufficiently representative in our judgment to support meaningful inferences about the effectiveness of AID-support of agricultural policy analysis and planning.

The 66 projects represent assistance to 31 countries in Africa, Asia and the Near East. The countries with the most projects (though not necessarily the most dollars of funding assistance) are Niger (with five), Kenya,

[1]As additional documentation becomes available, the set of projects will be expanded.

Exhibit 3.1

SELECTED AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND PLANNING PROJECTS

roject	Project Summary	Activity Description	Evaluation Summary
FRICA			
Botswana			
. Agricultural Planning (633-0067)	X	X	X
Cameroon			
. Agricultural Management and Planning (631-0008)	X	X	X
Ethiopia			
. Agricultural Advisory Se ces (663-0111)	X	X	X
. Agricultural Sector Planning (663-0172)	X	X	X
. Drought Recovery and Rehabilitation (663-0187)	X	X	X
Gambia			
. Mixed Farming and Resource Management (635-0203)	X	X	X
Ghana			
. National Agricultural Planning (641-0048)	X	X	X
. District Planning and Rural Development (641-0073)	X	X	X
Kenya			
. Agricultural Planning (615-0133)	X	X	X
). Rural Planning (615-0162)	X	X	X
1. Rural Planning II (615-0189)	X	X	
2. Arid and Semi-Arid Land Development (615-0172)	X	X	X
Lesotho			
3. Agricultural Sector Analysis (632-0064)	X	X	X
4. Agricultural Planning (632-0218)	X	X	
Liberia			
5. Agricultural Program Development (669-0123)	X	X	X
6. Agricultural Cooperative Development (669-0127)	X	X	X
7. Agricultural Sector Analysis and Planning (669-0137)	X	X	X
8. YMCA Agricultural Training and Development (669-0141)	X	X	
Mali			
9. Livestock Sector I (668-0203)	X	X	X
Mauritania			
). Renewable Resources Management (682-0205)	X	X	X
1. Rural Assessment an Manpower Survey (682-0211)	X	X	X
Niger			
2. Evaluation Assistance to Ministry of Planning (683-0229)	X	X	

	Project Summary	Activity Description	Evaluation Summary
23. Forestry and Land Use Planning (683-0230)	X	X	
24. Integrated Livestock Production (683-0242)	X	X	
25. Agricultural Production Support (683-0234)	X	X	
26. Cereals Research (683-0225)	X	X	
Rwanda			
27. Agricultural Survey and Analysis (696-0115)	X	X	
Senegal			
28. Casamance Regional Development (685-0205)	X	X	X
29. Agricultural Research and Planning (685-0223)	X	X	
Sudan			
30. Agricultural Planning and Statistics (650-0047)	X	X	
31. Rural Development Planning (650-0012)	X	X	
32. Southern Region Agricultural Development I (650-0046)	X	X	
Tanzania			
33. Livestock Marketing and Development (621-0122)	X	X	X
Upper Volta			
34. Grain Marketing Development (686-0243)	X	X	
35. Eastern Region Food Production(686-0244)	X	X	
Zaire			
36. Agricultural Economic Development (660-0050)	X	X	X
37. Agricultural Sector Studies (660-0070)	X	X	X
Zambia			
38. Agricultural Training, Planning, and Institutional Development (611-0075)	X	X	X
ASIA			
Bangladesh			
39. Agricultural Sector Assessment		X	
40. Rural Finance Experimental Project (388-0025)	X	X	X
Indonesia			
41. Assistance to Agricultural Planning (497-0189)	X	X	X
42. Agricultural Development Planning and Administration (497-0625)	X	X	
Korea			
43. Rural Policy Plan and Development (489-0594)	X	X	X
Laos			
44. Agricultural Development -- Administration and Planning (439-0065)	X	X	X

	Project Summary	Activity Description	Evaluation Summary
Nepal			
45. Strengthening Institutional Capacity (367-0144)	X	X	
46. Administration and Management (367-0101)	X	X	
47. Resource Conservation and Utilization (367-0132)	X	X	X
Pakistan			
48. Agricultural Research (391-0296)	X	X	X
49. Agricultural Inputs (391-0419)	X	X	X
Philippines			
50. Small Farmers Income and Production (492-0259)	X	X	
51. Integrated Agricultural Production and Marketing (492-0302)	X	X	X
52. Agricultural Research (492-0280)	X	X	X
53. Agricultural Research II (492-0286)	X	X	X
Sri Lanka			
54. Agricultural Sector Assessment		X	
55. Development Services and Training (383-0044)	X	X	X
Thailand			
56. Agricultural Planning (493-0317)	X	X	
57. Rural Off-Farm Employment Assessment (493-0306)	X	X	
58. Agricultural Sector Analysis (493-1084)	X	X	X
NEAR EAST			
Egypt			
59. Agricultural Development System (263-0041)	X	X	X
60. Data Collection and Analysis (263-0142)	X	X	
Jordan			
61. Agricultural Economics and Planning (278-0137)	X	X	
Tunisia			
62. Agricultural Economic Research and Planning (664-0237)	X	X	X
Yemen			
63. Agricultural Development Support (279-0052)	X	X	X
AFRICAN REGIONAL PROJECT			
64. Gambia River Basin Development (625-0012)	X	X	
65. Niger River Development Planning (625-0915)	X	X	
66. Entente Food Production (626-0203)	X	X	X

Liberia and the Phillippines (with four projects each). Overall, more than half of the projects (38) are in eighteen African countries, about one third (20) in nine Asian nations, and five in four Near Eastern nations. In addition, three projects are regional in scope, involving two or many countries; the three regional projects are all in Africa.

In total, the dollar value of the projects is $1.083 billion, as reflected in Exhibit 3.2. Of this amount, $363.2 million corresponds to African projects, $612.6 million to Asian projects, $67.9 million to Near Eastern projects, and $39.4 million to regional projects. Overall, AID's support comes to $491.8 million, 45.4 percent of the total. Of this amount, $343.1 million (69.8 percent) is in the form of grant funding and $148.7 million (30.2 percent) is in the form of loan funding. Host countries contributed $289.2 million (26.7 percent of the total), and $302 million, (27.9 percent) came from other donors.

Not all project funds were devoted to policy and planning activities. In some projects, policy and planning activities represent only a small part of project funding, though in a majority of cases most or all project monies are devoted to policy and planning. Exhibit 3.3 parallels Exhibit 3.2 but is confined to funds estimated to be in support of agricultural policy and planning. As shown in Exhibit 3.3, $371 million (34.3 percent of total project dollars) were targeted to agricultural policy and planning.[1] In contrast to the cost of total project funding, AID provided a majority of the funds (61.5 percent) intended for policy and planning purposes.

Regionally, the distribution of funding in support of policy and planning is dissimilar to the distribution of projects. This is true both for total funding and for funding provided by AID. Near Eastern countries, with only 7.6 percent of the projects, received 18.3 percent of 23.1 percent of AID funding for policy and planning purposes. Relatively large policy and planning of activities in the Near East are counterbalanced by relatively small activities in Africa--and to a lesser extent in Asia. African nations, with 60.7 percent of the projects, received 43.3 percent of total policy and

[1] A majority of the $712.1 million total project dollars that did not go to policy and planning fell under a single very large agricultural input project in Pakistan.

Exhibit 3.2

TOTAL FUNDING OF PROJECTS WITH AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND PLANNING ACTIVITIES

Region	Number of Projects*	Funding in $000s				
		AID GRANT	AID LOAN	HOST COUNTRY	OTHER	TOTAL
Africa	37	$203,394.4	$23,900	$93,045	$42,838.4	$363,177.8
African Regional	3	21,924	10,000	484	6,990	39,398
Asia	16	64,940.2	114,822	184,252.2	248,598.8	612,613.2
Near East	5	52,837	0	11,429	3,606	67,872
Total	61*	$343,095.6	$148,722	$289,210.2	$302,033.2	$1,083,061

* Funding information is available for only 61 of the 66 projects.

Exhibit 3.3

FUNDING OF AGRICULTURAL
POLICY AND PLANNING ACTIVITIES

Region	Number of Projects*	Funding in $000s				
		AID GRANT	AID LOAN	HOST COUNTRY	OTHER	TOTAL
Africa	37	$104,638.9	$5,400	$41,106.2	$9,682.3	$160,827.4
African Regional	3	16,554	0	387	5,592.2	22,533.2
Asia	16	32,850	16,000	65,189	5,684	119,723
Near East	5	52,837	0	11,429	3,606	67,872
Total	61*	$206,879.9	$21,400	$118,111.2	$24,564.5	$370,955.6

*Funding information is available for only 61 of the 66 projects.

planning funds and 48.8 percent of AID funds targeted to policy and planning activities. Although 26.2 percent of the projects were in Asia, only 21.4 percent of AID policy and planning funds were allocated to these projects. Asian countries benefited from more than their expected share of total policy and planning funds, principally because they contributed so much to the projects in question. Asian countries provided $65.5 million, over half of the total funds destined for AID-supported policy and planning activities in the region. The countries with the highest amount of AID policy and planning support are Yemen ($32.9 million), Niger ($22.6 million), the Phillipines ($20.4 million) and Senegal ($17.7 million).

The numbers in Exhibits 3.2 and 3.3 are influenced significantly by a very few large projects. Whereas the mean policy and planning project/component is slightly more than $6 million, the median is only $4,060,000. The median AID support for such activities is $2,276,000, over half of the total. As illustrated in Exhibits 3.4 and 3.5 the distribution of total support for agricultural policy and planning activities is roughly bimodal, whereas AID support is concentrated in contributions amounting to less than $2,000,000.

Helpful to an assessment of AID-supported agricultural policy and planning projects is an awareness of basic economic indicators for the countries in which projects have been supported. Exhibit 3.6 presents indicators of population, GNP, and agricultural activity. These indicators may be used to group countries according to similar characteristics for purposes of descriptive analysis. This is done in Exhibit 3.7. The Exhibit presents the distributions of countries falling in different categories and lays out information on agricultural policy and planning projects by categories. Distributions among categories reflect a number of differences among regions taken as a whole. For example, in comparison to the 18 African countries, the nine Asian countries tend to have greater populations and to have been more successful in food production in the 1970s. With exceptions, they have somewhat higher annual GNPs per capita, marginally lower population growth, and somewhat lower proportions of their labor forces in agriculture. The last three patterns, however, are not as clear cut as the first two, and there are no differences between African and Asian countries in the preparation of agriculture in GDP. The four Near Eastern countries tend to have higher population growth rates and lower proportions both of agriculture and agricultural contribution to GDP and of their labor forces in agriculture.

Exhibit 3.4

DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL FUNDING OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND PLANNING ACTIVITIES

Project Funding	Africa	African Regional	Asia	Near East	Total
>$6 million	11	2	5	3	21
$4-6 million	7	0	3	0	10
$2-4 million	5	0	3	1	9
<$2 million	14	1	5	1	21
Total	37	3	16	5	61

Exhibit 3.5

DISTRIBUTION OF AID FUNDING OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND PLANNING ACTIVITIES

AID Funding	Africa	African Regional	Asia	Near East	Total
>$4 million	8	1	5	3	17
$2-4 million	12	0	5	1	18
<$2 million	17	2	6	1	26
Total	37	3	16	5	61

Exhibit 3.6

BASIC ECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR COUNTRIES UNDER STUDY

Country	Population (mid 1980) (in millions)[1]	Average Annual Growth of Population (percent) (1970-80)[1]	GNP Per Capita (Dollars (1980)[1]	Agriculture as % of GDP (1980)[1]	Average Annual Growth Rate of Agriculture (Percent) (1970-80)[1]	Average Index of Food Production Per Capita (1969-71 = 100)[3]	Percentage of Labor Force in Agriculture (1980)[1]
AFRICA							
Botswana	0.8	2.6[2]	910	28[2]	0	89	0
Cameroon	8.4	2.2	670	32	3.8	109	83
Ethiopia	31.1	2.0	140	51	0.7	83	80
Gambia	0.6	2.8[2]	250	0	0	71	78[2]
Ghana	11.7	.0	420	66	-1.2	82	53
Kenya	15.9	3.4	420	34	5.4	86	78
Lesotho	1.3	2.3	420	31	2.9	91	87
Liberia	1.9	3.4	530	36	4.7	98	70
Mali	7.0	2.4	190	42	4.4	88	73
Mauritania	1.5	2.5	440	26	-1.1	76	85
Niger	5.3	2.8	330	33	-3.7	93	91
Rwanda	5.2	3.4	200	48	-	106	91
Senegal	5.7	2.8	450	29	3.7	89	76
Sudan	18.7	3.0	410	38	2.6	102	72
Tanzania	18.7	3.4	280	54	4.9	92	83
Upper Volta	6.1	1.8	210	40	1.2	95	82
Zaire	28.3	2.7	220	32	1.2	88	75
Zambia	5.8	3.1	560	15	1.8	95	67
ASIA							
Bangladesh	88.5	2.6	130	54	2.2	94	74
Indonesia	146.6	2.3	430	26	3.8	110	58
Korea, R.O.	38.2	1.7	1520	16	3.2	130	34
Laos	3.4	1.8	-	-	-	100	75
Nepal	14.6	2.5	140	57	0.5	88	93
Pakistan	82.2	3.1	300	31	2.3	101	57
Philippines	49.0	2.7	690	23	4.9	114	46
Sri Lanka	14.7	1.6	270	28	2.8	121	54
Thailand	47.0	2.5	670	25	4.7	128	76
NEAR EAST							
Egypt	39.8	2.1	580	23	2.7	93	50
Jordan	3.2	3.4	1420	8	-	89	20
Tunisia	6.4	2.1	1310	17	4.9	120	34
Yemen, A.R.	7.0	2.9	430	29	3.7	94	75

[1]Source: IBRD, World Development Report, 1982

[2]Obtained from a compilation of U.S. Department of State Reports

[3]Source: IBRD, World Development Report, 1982. The index of food production per capita shows the average annual quantity of food produced per capita in 1978-80 in relation to that in 1969-71.

Exhibit 3.7

AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND PLANNING ACTIVITIES BY COUNTRY INDICATORS

Indicators	# Countries			# Projects	# Projects with Funding Data	Funding (in $000s)				Total
	Africa	Asia	Near East			AID Grant	AID Loan	Host Country	Other	
Population 1980										
Less than 5 million	5	1	1	12	12	28,268	-	6,029.9	377.3	34,675.2
5-20 million	11	2	2	30	28	130,545.9	5,400	39,588.3	11,553.2	187,087.4
over 20 million	2	6	1	21	19	48,166	16,000	72,843	12,684	149,693
Annual Population Growth 1970-80										
< 2%	1	3	0	6	4	9,474.2	-	2,164.8	-	11,639
2-3%	10	5	3	38	37	150,653.5	20,350	99,337.1	10,345.1	280,585.9
> 3%	7	1	1	19	18	30,298.2	1,150	16,572.3	8,677.2	56,697.5
Annual GNP Per Capita, 1980										
< $410	9	4	0	28	26	70,549.2	1,150	27,007	9,442	108,148
$410-910	9	3	2	31	30	113,663.7	20,350	90,019.2	9,580.3	233,513.2
≥ $1,300	0	1	2	3	2	3,937	-	780	-	4,717
no data	0	1	0	1	1	2,276	-	268	-	2,544
Agriculture/GDP, 1980										
< 20%	1	1	2	4	3	8,722	-	2,231	-	10,953
20-40%	10	5	2	44	41	150,481.7	21,400	106,571.9	14,900.3	293,353.9
> 40%	6	2	0	13	13	25,608.2	-	8,281.3	4,122	38,011.5
no data	1	1	0	2	2	5,614	-	990	-	6,604
Index of Food Production Per Capita, 1980 (1969-71 = 100)										
< 90	9	1	1	21	20	60,021	-	18,213.3	7,367	85,601.3
90-99	6	1	2	21	20	89,967.9	4,750	26,494.9	4,085.3	125,298.1
≥ 100	3	7	1	21	19	40,437	16,650	73,366	7,570	138,023
Labor Force in Agriculture, 1980										
< 50%	0	2	2	7	6	9,398	15,000	57,669	-	82,067
50-75%	6	5	2	25	22	88,985	1,650	26,931.1	9,038.2	126,604.3
> 75%	11	2	0	30	30	88,543.7	4,750	33,474.1	9,984.1	136,751.1
No Data	1	0	0	1	1	3,500	-	-	-	3,500
TOTAL	18	9	4	63[1]	59					

Overall, AID-supported policy and planning projects tend to focus on countries with high population growth rates, low annual per capita GNP, and high proportions of their labor forces in agriculture. The same focus is evident for total and AID policy and planning funding. This suggests that AID is targeting its resources toward countries with the greatest needs for agricultural assistance.

Another fruitful way to describe the 66 agricultural policy and planning projects under study is by their emphasis. From the complexities of differences among individual projects, a number of general emphases emerge. These emphases are presented in Exhibit 3.8. Analysis of emphases reveals several generalizations applicable to the entire set of policy and planning projects. First, all projects stress capacity-building or institution-building associated with agricultural policy making, planning or closely related functions. Almost invariably, long-term and/or short-term technical assistance was to be provided toward this end by outside advisors. Second, almost every project includes training of host country personnel as one of its inputs. More often than not, training was to be provided in the United States, though some projects relied more heavily on third-country training, formal in-country training, or on-the-job training. Third, almost none of the projects were intended to have a direct impact on policies. Rather, projects typically purported to improve the capabilities of host governments to make better or informed policy decisions by improving management or planning capacity, its capability to collect accurate and useful information, to process it, to use it in analysis or to produce policy-relevant studies.

These three generalizations best describe the 66 projects as a whole. In addition, most projects have one or more emphases that can be characterized more specifically. First, a majority of projects (42 of 66) were geared to produce analytical or statistical outputs. Projects with analytical/statistical objectives are particularly frequent in Asia and the Near East, and notably less frequent in Africa. Analytical/statistical projects are also relatively more frequent in countries with larger populations, lower population growth rates, higher GNPs per capita, higher food production performance, and lower proportions of their labor forces in agriculture. A second major focus has to do with data. Almost 40 percent of the projects (25 of 66) included data collection or survey components, and 15 percent (10 of 66) proposed to improve data processing or data systems. Survey projects

Exhibit 3.8

POLICY AND PLANNING ACTIVITIES*

OBJECTIVES	Africa (38)	African Regional (3)	Asia (20)	Near East (5)	Total (66)
Institution Building/ Capacity Building	38	3	20	5	66
Training of Host Country Personnel	36	3	17	5	61
Analytical and Statistical Studies and Reports	18	3	16	5	42
Data Gathering	17	1	6	1	25
Data Processing and Data Systems Development	4	0	5	1	10
Management Systems and Procedures	15	2	8	1	27

*Note that objectives are often overlapping and complementary and are not mutually exclusive.

appear frequently in Africa; while data systems projects are strongly represented in Asia. Together, these projects can best be described as data-intensive projects. A third apparent focus among the entire set of projects occuring in projects that were designed to improve management systems and procedures, including budgeting and personnel. About 40 percent (27 projects) of the projects included a focus on management. There is no significant pattern, by regions or economic indicators, of projects with management emphases.

Finally, projects can be described usefully in terms of the relative amounts of resources devoted to policy and planning (see Exhibit 3.9). In some projects (10 of 66 or 15.2 percent), policy and planning made up only a very small part of much larger agricultural or livestock development projects. In a majority of projects (40 or 60.6 percent), the entire project was devoted to achieving agricultural policy and planning objectives. The remainder (15 or 22.7 percent) devoted a substantial portion of project resources (20 percent or more) to policy and planning. Interestingly, projects in African countries were much more likely to be devoting only a small part of their total resources to policy and planning than projects in the other two regions. Projects in Asian countries were much more likely to be focusing entirely on policy and planning, and the five projects in the Near East were geared completely toward policy and planning objectives. Interestingly, projects in countries with low annual GNPs per capita and higher proportions of their GDPs deriving from agriculture were relatively unlikely to be targeted entirely on agricultural policy and planning objectives.

This chapter has described the methodology, analysis plan, and projects that are covered in this evaluation. The next two chapters contain the results of the first phase of the evaluation and recommendations, pending completion of the evaluation's percent phase, for the design of agricultural policy and planning projects in the future.

Exhibit 3.9

AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND PLANNING COMPONENTS
IN RELATION TO TOTAL PROJECT FUNDING

Policy and Planning Component	Africa	African Regional	Asia	Near East	Total
Small Part of Much Larger Project	8	1	1	0	10
Substantial Part (≥20%)	10	1	4	0	15
Totally Devoted to Policy and Planning	19	1	15	5	40
Insufficient Information	1	0	0	0	1
Total	38	3	20	5	66

4.0 IMPACTS AND OPERATIONAL SUCCESS OF AID-SPONSORED AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND PLANNING PROJECTS

This chapter examines the achievements of AID-sponsored agricultural policy and planning projects. Achievements can be measured by the types of impacts projects have had and their operational success. These are distinct dimensions of achievement. Impacts refer to what ultimately resulted from a project, while, operational success focuses on how well it was carried out.

The first part of this chapter examines the impacts of projects on the planning processes and agricultural sector performance of countries concerned. The second part of this chapter deals with the operational success of projects, or how well projects were actually implemented and whether they met their stated objectives. Finally, the chapter touches upon the constraints that served to impede projects from resulting in identifiable impacts achieving their objectives.

Chapter 3 presented a brief description of 66 AID-sponsored agricultural policy and planning projects in Africa, Asia, and the Near East. Of the 66 projects, there are 39 for which one or more evaluations are available. Thus, 39 projects in Africa, Asia, and the Near East are included in the analysis that follows of impacts, operational success, and constraints. Unfortunately, final evaluations are available for only eight of this subset of 39 projects. This is unfortunate because final evaluations tend to focus more on the final outcomes and longer-term impacts of projects, while interim or special evaluations concentrate on operational difficulties and steps needed to get projects "back on track."[1]

The 39 projects are shown in Exhibit 4.1; the exhibit also shows the types of evaluations that are available for each project. There are a total of 24 projects in Africa, 12 projects in Asia, and three projects in the Near East. Final evaluations are available for six projects in Africa, two projects in Asia, and no projects in the Near East. In what follows, an examination is made of project impacts, operational success, and constraints.

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[1]Attempts were made to obtain more final evaluations. Relevant AID Missions were sent letters requesting final evaluations on projects that had terminated. Although a wide response was recieved from Missions, little additional documentation was obtained because, in most cases, final evaluations have not yet been performed.

Exhibit 4.1

TYPES OF EVALUATIONS AVAILABLE ON
AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND PLANNING PROJECTS

PROJECTS BY REGION AND COUNTRY	TYPE OF EVALUATION		
	Regular	Special	Final
AFRICA			
Botswana, Agricultural Planning	x		
Cameroon, Agricultural Management and Planning	x		
Ethiopia, Agricultural Sector Planning	x		
Ethiopia, Agricutural Advisory Services	x	x	
Ethiopia, Drought Recovery and Rehabilitation	x	x	
Gambia, Mixed Farming and Resource Management		x	
Ghana, National Agricultural Planning	x		
Ghana, District Planning and Rural Development, Phase I			x
Kenya, Agricultural Planning	x		
Kenya, Rural Planning		x	x
Kenya, Arid and Semi-Arid Land Development		x	
Lesotho, Lesotho Agricultural Sector Analysis	x	x	
Liberia, Agricultural Program Development	x	x	x

PROJECTS BY REGION AND COUNTRY	TYPE OF EVALUATION		
	Regular	Special	Final
Liberia, Agricultural Sector Analysis and Planning	x		
Liberia, Agricultural Cooperative Development	x	x	
Mali, Livestock Sector II		x	
Mauritania, Renewable Resources Management Project		x	
Mauritania, Rural Assessment and Manpower Survey Project			x
Senegal, Casamance Regional Development		x	
Tanzania, Livestock Marketing and Development	x	x	x
Zaire, Agricultural Economic Development		x	x
Zaire, Agricultural Sector Studies	x		
Zambia, Agricultural Training Planning, and Institutional Development		x	
AFRICAN REGIONAL			
Entente Nations, Entente Food Production	x	x	
ASIA			
Bangladesh, Rural Finance Experimental Program			x
Indonesia, Assistance to Agriculture	x		

PROJECTS BY REGION AND COUNTRY	TYPE OF EVALUATION		
	Regular	Special	Final
Korea, Rural Policy Planning and Development	x		
Laos, Agricultural Development Administration and Planning	x		
Nepal, Resource Conservation and Planning		x	
Pakistan, Agricultural Research	x		
Pakistan, Agricultural Inputs		x	
Philippines, Integrated Agricultural Production and Marketing	x		x
Philippines, Agriculture Research Loan	x	x	
Philippines, Agricultural Research II	x	x	
Sri Lanka, Development Services and Training		x	
Thailand, Agricultural Sector Analysis	x		x
NEAR EAST			
Egypt, Agricultural Development System	x		
Tunisia, Agricultural Economic Research and Planning	x	x	
Yemen, Title XII Agricultural Development Support, Core Subproject		x	

4.1 Project Impacts

The projects under examination produced a variety of impacts on the capacity of the countries to engage in agricultural planning, on development of interinstitutional linkages, in generalzation of decisionmaker demand for information and analysis, on policies and programs, and the agricultural sector performance. It should be kept in mind, however, that the projects under study were not necessarily designed in conformance with the categorization of impacts used in this evaluation. Moreover, the authors of project evaluations need not have looked specifically for the type of impacts of interest here. Therefore, there is room for reasonable differences of opinion as to whether particular kinds of impacts in fact occurred. On the other hand, the big picture is unlikely to be affected by such differences in interpretation, and it is this picture that is presented here.

4.1.1 Capacity-Building Impacts

Capacity-building impacts are by far the most prevalent. The, projects exmained usually contributed to an improvement in host countries ability to carry out some aspects of agricultural planning and policymaking. Slightly over 90 percent of the projects reviewed exhibited some form of capacity-building impacts.

Improvements in the qualifications of planning personnel lead the list of capacity-building impacts. Fifty-nine percent of the projects resulted in training of planners, economists, and other technical personnel, and ten percent of the projects led to hiring of personnel with better qualifications. Type of training varies greatly from project to project, since training needs are quite different from case to case. Training was both short-term and long-term, with the latter leading to a Masters degree or Ph.D. It occured in host countries, in the United States, and in third countries. Training included attendance at conferences and, in some cases, consisted of on-the-job learning from project advisors. Moreover, the type of personnel trained (economists, statisticians, planners, etc.) varied according to the objectives of projects.

A significant problem with training involved retention in government service of individuals in whom an educational investment had been made. A number of instances, individuals left the agencies that sponsored their education, often for better paying jobs outside government service. Thus, the

impact of training on the ability of the public sector to engage in agricultural planning can become muted by turnover of personnel whose options for jobs are increased by virtue of training.

A second major type of capacity-building impact has to do with the "presence" of an agricultural planning unit. Presence refers to staff experience, staff size, facility size, the institutional base of the planning unit, and establishment or reorganization of the unit.

The prevalance of different types of impacts on the presence of planning units can be seen in the following statistics:

- 28% of the projects resulted in increased staff experience or staff size;
- 21% of the projects resulted in the establishment of a planning unit or reorganization of the unit;
- 8% of the projects resulted in a strengthened institutional base for the planning unit; and
- 8% of the projects resulted in new or larger facilities for the planning unit;

Examples of increased presence are:

- a larger planning staff in Lesotho;
- creation of a planning bureau in Liberia;
- undertaking of larger projects by the planning staff in the Philippines;
- upgrading of the organizational status of the Division of Agricultural Economics in Thailand;
- establishment of a socioeconomic planning unit in the Gambia; and
- construction of a research center in Pakistan.

A third type of capacity-building impact is improved policy analysis. Thirteen percent of the projects resulted in improved research and analysis, and 26 percent resulted in the establishment or improvement of data bases. In addition, 15 percent of the projects were cited specifically as resulting in the preparation of studies, although one can assume that studies are included in many other types of impacts.

In sum, AID-sponsored agricultural policy and planning projects had a significant impact on the capacity of host country governments to engage in policy analysis and planning. Exhibit 4.2 shows the listing of impacts by region and country. Fully 36 of the 39 projects had capacity-building impacts. The impacts typically concerned the qualifications of planning staff, the creation or improvement of planning units within government, and the quality of analyses and data bases produced by planning units.

The presence of capacity-building impacts does not tend to vary by region (see in Exhibit 4.3). In Africa, 87 percent of the projects had some form of capacity-building impacts, while in Asia and the Near East, 100 percent of the projects had such impacts. Although Asia and the Near East evidence more impacts than Africa, AID-sponsored planning and policy projects have had consistent capacity-building impacts throughout the world.

4.1.2 Interinstitutional Impacts

Interinstitutional impacts were observed in just under one half of the projects reviewed. Interinstitutional impacts have to do with linkages among agricultural planning units and other agencies and nongovernmental organizations such as banks and farmer cooperatives. Several types of interinstitutional impacts were relatively common. First was the establishment of an interagency board or commission, which by its very nature improves linkages. Thirteen percent of the 39 projects established such a board. For example, in Kenya (Agricultural Planning), coordinating committees were established among agencies, and in Indonesia (Assistance to Agriculture) an interdepartmental fertilizer management board was established.

Improved communication with other offices was observed in 15 percent of the projects. Moreover, 13 percent of the projects resulted in cooperation with other organizations. As an example, in Tunisia (Agricultural Economic Research and Planning), the first effective collaboration between the Ministry of Plan and the Agricultural Development Department of the Ministry of Agriculture is cited to have resulted from contract staff initiative.

Agricultural research was also linked to other research agencies. This impact was identified in eight percent of the projects. In Thailand (Agricultural Sector Analysis), for instance, the interaction of project personnel with other agricultural economists has enhanced the agricultural

Exhibit 4.2

SUMMARY OF PROJECT IMPACTS AND OPERATIONAL SUCCESS

PROJECTS BY REGION AND COUNTRY	TYPES OF IMPACTS AND OPERATIONAL SUCCESS					
	Capacity-Building	Inter-institutional	Decision Maker	Policy/Program	Socio-economic	Operational Success
AFRICA						
Botswana, Agricultural Planning	x					adequate
Cameroon, Agricultural Management & Planning	x					marginal
Ethicpia, Agricultural Sector Planning	x	x				adequate
Ethiopia, Agricultural Advisory Services	x	x	x	x		good
Ethiopia, Drought Recovery and Rehabilitation	x	x				adequate
Gambia, Mixed Farming and Resource Management	x	x	x			good
Ghana, National Agricultural Planning	x		x	x		marginal
Ghana, District Planning and Rural Development, Phase I	x					marginal
Kenya, Agricultural Planning	x	x	x	x		adequate
Kenya, Rural Planning	x	x	x	x		adequate
Kenya, Arid and Semi-arid Land Development						poor
Lesotho, Lesotho Agricultural Sector Analysis	x					adequate
Liberia, Agricultural Program Development	x	x				adequate

	Capacity-Building	Inter-institutional	Decision Maker	Policy/Program	Socio-economic	Operational Success
Liberia, Agricultural Sector Analysis & Planning	x		x	x		marginal
Liberia, Agricultural Cooperative Development	x					good
Mali, Livestock Sector II						poor
Mauritania, Renewable Resources Management Project	x					adequate
Mauritania, Rural Assessment and Manpower Survey Project	x	x	x			marginal
Senegal, Casamance Regional Development	x					poor
Tanzania, Livestock Marketing and Development	x					marginal
Zaire, Agricultural Economic Development	x		x			adequate
Zaire, Agricultural Sector Studies	x	x				good
Zambia, Agricultural Training Planning, and Institutional Development		(too early to tell)				good
AFRICAN REGIONAL						
Entente Nations, Entente Food Production	x	x	x	x		adequate
ASIA						
Bangladesh, Rural Finance Experimental Program	x	x	x	x	x	excellent
Indonesia, Assistance to Agriculture	x	x	x	x	x	good

	Capacity-Building	Inter-institutional	Decision Maker	Policy/Program	Socio-economic	Operational Success
Korea, Rural Policy Planning and Development	x	x	x	x	x	excellent
Laos, Agricultural Development Administration and Planning	x	x				adequate
Nepal, Resource Conservation and Utilization Project	x					marginal
Pakistan, Agricultural Research	x					adequate
Pakistan, Agricultural Inputs	x					good
Philippines, Integrated Agricultural Production and Marketing	x		x			adequate
Philippines, Agriculture Research Loan	x	x	x			adequate
Philippines, Agricultural Research II	x	x			x	good
Sri Lanka, Development Services and Training	x			x		good
Thailand, Agricultural Sector Analysis	x	x	x	x	x	excellent
NEAR EAST						
Egypt, Agricultural Development System	x	x				marginal
Tunisia, Agricultural Economic Research and Planning	x	x				adequate
Yemen, Title XII Agricultural Development Support, Core Subproject	x					good

Exhibit 4.3

DISTRIBUTION OF PROJECT IMPACTS BY REGION

IMPACTS	REGION									
	Africa		African Regional		Asia		Near East		Total	
	Number n=23	Percent	Number n=1	Percent	Number n=12	Percent	Number n=3	Percent	Number n=39	Percent
Policy-Program	5	22%	1	100%	5	42%	0	0%	11	28%
Decisionmaker	8	35%	1	100%	6	50%	0	0%	15	38%
Interinstitutional	9	39%	1	100%	7	58%	2	66%	19	49%
Capacity-Building	20	87%	1	100%	12%	100%	3	100%	36	92%

economics profession in the nation, and the project research has been disseminated to research institutes, government offices, and universities.

Finally, in eight percent of the projects, planning units provided assistance to other agencies. In Ethiopia (Agricultural Sector Planning), for example, planning assistance was provided to the Ministry of Land Reform and Administration.

The regional distribution of interinstitutional impacts is quite pronounced (see Exhibit 4.3). In Africa, 9 of the 23 projects had interinstitutional impacts (39 percent) in contrast to 7 of 12 projects in Asia (58 percent) and 2 of 3 projects in the Near East (66 percent). The only regional project (Entente Nations, Food Production) also had an interinstitutional impact. Thus, Asia and the Near East both have considerably higher percentages of interinstitutitional impacts than Africa, even though the Near East percentage should be treated with caution because of the small number of projects in the region. Interinstitutional impacts in Africa are clustered in projects in Ethiopia and Kenya. Aside from projects in these countries, relatively few interinstitutional impacts are observed in Africa as a whole. In contrast, projects in Asia and the Near East appear to have been relatively successful in breaking down barriers among various units of government and between units of government and the private sector. The higher level of development and the importance placed on agriculture in Asia presumably have much to do with this finding.

4.1.3 Decisionmaker Impacts

Approximately 38 percent of the projects under examination have had tangible effects on decisionmakers. The impacts have been quite varied, but the most prevalent has been increased demand for information by decisionmakers. For example, in Mauritania (Rural Assessment and Manpower Survey Program), data collection has been recognized by decisionmakers as useful and has been introduced into the planning process. In Kenya, a greater cognizance of the need for more careful review of institutional factors affecting the development of agricultural subsectors evolved as a result of the Agricultural Planning Project. One of the most successful projects, the Agricultural Sector Analysis Project in Thailand, stimulated demand by decisionmakers for information developed through an economic model of the agricultural sector.

The other relatively common impact is the development of greater understanding by decisionmakers of the agricultural sector and its relationship to the rest of the economy. In Kenya (Agricultural Planning), the government gained a greater understanding of relationships among prices in different sectors of the economy. In the Philippines (Integrated Agricultural Production and Marketing), there was increased appreciation by decisionmakers for timely and accurate economic information, and a greater understanding of linkages between agricultural production and marketing.

Regionally, a relatively similar pattern emerges for decisionmakers as for interinstitutional impacts. In Asia, 50 percent of the projects examined had some effect on key decisionmakers. The corresponding percentage is 35 percent in Africa. In the Near East, there were no decisionmaker impacts. It is somewhat difficult to interpret the Near East finding because the sample of projects there is so small, but one reason for the lack of such impacts maybe that the project in question tended to focus on the collection and analysis of agricultural statistics and were not directly concerned with key policy issues. In Asia, on the other hand, half of these projects observed resulted in some change in attitude on the part of decisionmakers' toward policy analysis. African projects were less successful in this respect than Asian projects, but more than one third of the projects in Africa did have some impact on desisionmakers.

4.1.4 Policy and Program Impacts

Policy and program impacts result when AID-sponsored agricultural policy and planning projects are responsible for concrete changes in policies or the creation or redirection of programs. Policy and program impacts are more important than the three types of impacts discussed above in that they come closer to bringing about improvements in agricultural sector performances.

Policy and program impacts were observed in 28 percent of the projects under examination. Examples include impacts on commodity pricing policies, credit policies, marketing policies, legislation or proclamations on land redistribution, commodity distribution policies, and investment policies.

Specific examples of policy and program impacts are:

- In Ghana (National Agricultural Planning), funds were made available for fertilizer and seed programs.

- In Kenya (Agricultural Planning), revisions were made in marketing policies to benefit the entire economy.

- In Kenya (Rural Planning), the project staff helped prepare the 1979-83 Development Plan, focusing on small farmer assistance programs.

- In Liberia (Agricultural Sector Analysis and Planning), the project team prepared recommendations on policy and organizational structure for the Ministry of Agriculture, many of which were implemented.

- In Indonesia (Assistance to Agriculture), a flexible fertilizer pricing system and an expanded rice storage program were established.

- In Thailand (Agricultural Sector Analysis), analyses of development policy alternatives were used in formulating the Fourth Five Year Plan.

- In Ethiopia, the project helped to improve the marketing system for grain and meat. This resulted in the development of international markets for Ethiopian-produced meat.

- In Korea (Rural Policy Planning and Development), income, price, and investment policy and growth targets were developed.

Thus, AID-sponsored agricultural policy and planning projects resulted in tangible changes in policies and programs. These are major impacts, and it is important to stress that they occured in 28 percent of the cases under study.

The regional distribution of policy and program impacts follows the pattern of other impacts (see Exhibit 4.3). A much higher percentage of projects in Asia (42 percent) achieved policy and program impacts than in Africa (22 percent) or the Near East (0 percent). The one regional project -- Entente Nations Food Production -- also had an impact on pricing policies in a number of countries. The relatively low level of impact in Africa as compared to Asia can again be attributed to a number of themes that have emerged throughout this report:

- Asian countries placed greater emphasis on agriculture than African countries and tended to provide more support to AID-sponsored projects.

- AID-sponsored projects in Africa were more involved in basic institution building, and less involved in actual policy analysis and implementation than in Asian countries.

- The logistics of carrying out projects were more straightforward in Asia than in Africa.

The three projects in the Near East, on the other hand, had very limited objectives and it is probably unrealistic to expect them to have had major impacts on policies on programs.

While 28 percent of the projects did have policy and program impacts, the converse of this finding must not be ignored. Over 70 percent of the 39 AID-sponsored policy and planning projects resulted in no changes in policy or programs, at least as reported in the written record. Many projects encountered technical and institutional problems, which are discussed at length below, and these problem certainly impeded progress. But another significant factor that contributed to lack of impact was original project design. Projects were simply not designed to examine specific policies and, in fact, policy or program change was not a stated objective in many instances. The project designs tended to be global and lacked specificity. This often led to descriptive reports rather than to focused policy papers assessing specific alternatives on major issues. It is somewhat ironic that in several of the projects that had policy and program impacts, there was nothing in the corresponding project papers or work plans that was designed to bring about such impacts. In one instance, in fact, it was only when a coup thrust project staff into positions of responsibility that they were able to contribute to major policy decisions.

4.1.5 Socioeconomic Impacts

A number of AID-supported projects resulted in changes in policies and programs within host countries. It is, therefore, important to ask if changes in policies and programs resulted in improvements in agricultural sector performance. This is a very difficult question to answer from the evaluations reviewed. Many evaluations focus on short-term issues and fail to examine socioeconomic impacts on agriculture, its suppliers, or sectors purchasing agricultural output. Even when evaluations do focus on socio-economic impacts, it is very difficult to attribute the impacts to planning or policy

projects. Socioeconomic impacts often take many years to develop and frequently occur after final evaluations of projects have taken place.

Even with all of these caveats, it is interesting to note that socioeconomic impacts were in fact identified in roughly half of the projects that had policy and program impacts. In these cases, evaluations report that the policy and program changes led to such outcomes as improvements in farm production, increased farm income, lower food costs, and expanded production of agricultural inputs such as fertilizer. In Thailand, the Agricultural Sector Analysis Project is reported to have resulted in investment in irrigation and extension activities and in improved marketing of products, which in turn are said to have improved agricultural income and income distribution throughout the country. As a second example, in Korea (Rural Policy Planning and Development), the development of income, price, and investment policies is claimed to have led to increased farm output, increased farm household incomes, and relatively lower food costs to urban consumers. There also appears to have been some linkage between expansion of fertilizer production capacity and the establishment of a flexible fertilizer pricing system in Indonesia (Assistance to Agriculture).

The projects that had socioeconomic impacts are listed in Exhibit 4.2. Analysis of socioeconomic impacts is an area to be expanded upon in the second phase of this study as part of country visits. It will then be possible to follow up on projects and examine their long-term impacts in greater detail.

4.2 Operational Success of Projects

The previous section examined the types of impacts that AID-sponsored agricultural policy and planning projects have had. This section takes a slightly different slant for assessing the relative success or failure of projects. It examines how well projects have "worked" and whether they accomplished what they set out to accomplish. This pragmatic approach to project success examines process and implementation issues; the impact section, on the other hand, dealt more with objectives more ultimate.

4.2.1 Overall Operational Success

The first question addressed is how smoothly projects ran and whether they accomplished the objectives specified in their respective project papers. It is difficult to rate each project's successes and failures because there are typically several objectives of a project, and some have been

achieved more completely than others. Despite the somewhat subjective nature of such a rating for projects, it is nonetheless instructive to present an overview of the degree of success of each project. In order to do this, a five-point scale was used and applied independently by three analysts to confirm its validity. The independent ratings along the five-point scale were highly consistent, varying at most by one point on each project. This one-point variation is acceptable, given the qualitative nature of the rating and differences of interpretation concerning the relative balance between success and failures. In most cases, the three analysts agreed on the ratings.

The rating scale is as follows:

Poor performance: Few if any objectives were achieved, most activities result in little or no success.

Marginal performance: A few objectives were achieved, but most activities fail to achieve their objectives.

Adequate performance: The project exhibits both successes and failures; this modal rating reflects the situation when some things go wrong but enough things go right to bring about some positive change in policy analysis and planning.

Good performance: Most objectives are achieved, but a few failures are identified.

Excellent or outstanding performance: Project objectives are achieved or exceeded, and there are no failures of any consequence.

The ratings of each of the 39 projects under study is included in Exhibit 4.2. The distribution of ratings is as follows:

- Poor - 3 projects (8%)
- Marginal - 8 projects (21%)
- Adequate - 14 projects (38%)
- Good - 10 projects (26%)
- Excellent or outstanding - 4 projects (8%)[1]

[1]The percentages do not add to 100 percent because of rounding error.

Twenty-nine percent of the projects were dominated by failures, and 34 percent achieved most or all of their goals. A plurality of projects (38%) experienced both significant successes and failures (adequate performance).

The regional distribution of overall project success shows that Asian projects tended to fare the best. Out of the 12 Asian projects evaluated, seven were rated good or excellent, only one was marginal, and none were poor. Out of the 24 African projects evaluated, five were rated good, none were rated as excellent, six were rated marginal, and three were rated as poor. Thus, 58 percent of the Asian projects were good or excellent, but only 21 percent of the African projects were rated good (none were excellent). Moreover, only eight percent of the Asian projects were rated marginal, while 38 percent of the African projects were rated as marginal or poor. There were only three Near Eastern projects--one was rated marginal, one was rated adequate, and one was rated good.

4.2.2 Factors Affecting Project Success

What factors enhance a project's chances for successful achievement of its objectives? It was not always possible to identify the reasons for success from the evaluation documents, but the documents frequently provide some discussion of factors affecting project success.

The most prevalent factor leading to success is project advisors or administrators who worked collaboratively with the host country and provided consistently good and useful advice. This occurred in at least nine projects.

A qualified project team working closely with host country personnel can provide reliable technical and managerial input into the planning process, serve as role models for host country staff and thereby provide on-the-job training, establish long term relationships between the host country personnel and U.S. universities, enable host country personnel to conduct policy analyses after the project has ended, and set up good administrative routines.

Host country demand for a project was also mentioned as a factor leading to project success. This demand may be manifested in the form of staff support or budgetary support. Demand may come from governmental units, but it can also come from farmers who desire the project's output (such as cooperatives in the case of Liberia, Agricultural Cooperative Development).

Two projects were "catch-all" projects, which provided flexibility to address problems quickly through an existing mechanism rather than having to

prepare a new project proposal. This enabled countries to deal with some issues as the opportunities arose: examples are Indonesia (Assistance to Agriculture) and Sri Lanka (Development Services and Training).

Other reasons for project success cited less frequently include:

- Forceful leadership and a desire for progress;
- Responsiveness of the agricultural planning unit to requests for policy analysis;
- Training through in-country theses or other studies by graduate students;
- Involvement of researchers with farmers and farm problems;
- A stable political environment;
- Staffing line agencies with expatriate personnel so that the host country staff can be trained in the U.S. or elsewhere.

It should be noted that, in general, the project evaluations contained very little information about factors which led to project success. This is an area in which AID could improve its evaluation process. There is a great deal of information, on the other hand, on factors which constrain project success, as discussed below.

4.2.3 Factors Constraining Project Success

There are many factors that can impede policy and planning projects from achieving their objectives and resulting in identifiable impacts. Interestingly, despite the different sizes (i.e., dollar amounts), foci (i.e., analytical, data gathering, management development), and location (i.e., Africa, Asia, Near East) of the projects reviewed, the same constraints were repeatedly mentioned. The reasons for the commonality of the problems faced by projects are probably threefold. First, the documents reviewing project progress focused on administrative, management, and institutional problems and constraints rather than on technical problems. Second, technical constraints, when mentioned, were often unique to the project reviewed, and not generalizable for an analysis that attempts to shed light on what to avoid in other activities and what steps might be taken to design and implement better policy and planning projects in the future. Third, and finally, despite the subjective foci of the progress reports, the repeated mention of the same institutional, management, and administrative constraints points to the continuing

need to consider the importance of problems that impede the whole or entire implementation of the projects, not just parts thereof.

Exhibit 4.4, on the following page, presents a list of the most common constraints noted in the project progress reports and evaluations by region, followed by Exhibit 4.5 which simply lists a number of other generalizable constraints which were cited less often.

The constraint that was cited most frequently by far (in 16 of the 39 evaluations) was lack of host country support and staff. In other words, in fully 41 percent of the evaluated activities, assumptions were made that the host country would supply support in the form of money, access to policy makers, or commitment to the project; or that they would provide counterpart staffing; some or all of which were not forthcoming as planned. Lack of host country support, a singular problem in half of the 16 cases, was mentioned more frequently in Africa than in other regions. This, in part, is to be expected since many of the African governments were either relatively more financially or politically unstable and were more frequently recipients of assistance without requesting it. For example, in an evaluation of the Mali Livestock Sector Redesign Project, reviewers found that the government of Mali lacked the financial resources to absorb the costs of the activities, and they did not evidence a management or administrative capability to support the host-country contracting mode that was being used.

Constraints concerning lack of host country staff were singled out in 12 of the 16 cases. While proportionately more of a problem in Africa, this constraint was faced in all of the regions. Most often, this problem consisted of lack of available and adequately trained counterpart staff. An example is the lack of sufficiently trained Ethiopian manpower in data processing, administration, and management, and in agricultural and analytical specialties for the Dought Recovery and Rehabilitation Project. Also, staffing constraints were faced when frequent counterpart agency reorganizations lead to turnover of leadership as well as staff -- as was the case on the Agricultural Sector Analysis and Planning Project in Liberia where repeated turnover of ministers (five in five years) frustrated project progress. Other contributors to high staff turnover included low or disparite salaries for agency staff making it too easy for trained staff to be recruited by the private sector or higher paying government agencies, underutilization of trained staff's skills (sometimes due to lack of adequate demand for skills

Exhibit 4.4

DISTRIBUTION OF CONSTRAINTS BY REGION

Constraints	Africa *		Asia		Near East		Total	
	Number (24)	Percent	Number (12)	Percent	Number (3)	Percent	Number (39)	Percent
1. Lack of host country support and/or staff	12	50.0%	3	25.0%	1	33.3%	16	41.0%
2. Unclear implementation plan or work assignment	6	25.0%	2	16.7%	0	0 %	8	20.5%
3. Start-up delays caused by difficulties in getting or keeping TA staff	6	25.0%	0	0 %	2	66.7%	8	20.5%
4. Inadequate space/facilities	5	20.8%	0	0 %	0	0 %	5	12.8%
5. Overly ambitious project design	5	20.8%	1	8.3%	0	0 %	6	15.3%
6. High host country staff turnover	6	25.0%	1	8.3%	0	0 %	7	17.9%
7. Low or disparate salaries	5	20.8%	1	8.3%	0	0 %	6	15.3%
8. Lack of available or adequate data	5	20.8%	0	0 %	1	33.3%	6	15.3%
9. Commodity procurement problems	4	16.6%	2	16.7%	0	0 %	6	15.3%
10. Problems in Interagency cooperation/coordination	4	16.6%	1	8.3%	1	33.3%	6	15.3%
11. Poor project monitoring procedures	3	12.5%	1	8.3%	2	66.7%	6	15.3%
12. Poor project accounting/auditing procedures	4	16.6%	1	8.3%	0	0 %	5	12.8%
13. Poor project management	4	16.6%	0	0 %	0	0 %	4	10.3%
14. Start-up delays due to time ironing out contractual arrangements	0	0 %	2	16.7%	2	66.7%	4	10.3%
15. Staff (TA or host country) time spent firefighting	4	16.6%	0	0 %	1	33.3%	5	12.8%
16. Government or government policies not supportive of project assumptions	3	12.5%	1	8.3%	0	0 %	4	10.3%

* The African projects include one regional project.

Exhibit 4.5

OTHER CONSTRAINTS

CONSTRAINT	NUMBER OF TIMES CITED n=39
1. No one institution in charge	2
2. Research not on target: too academic, late, or not interdisciplinary	3
3. Lack of interest by leadership in project work	2
4. Lack of secretarial services	2
5. Underfunding	3
6. Insufficient Technical Assistance	2
7. Counterpart agency reorganized during project period	3
8. Change in government leadership	2
9. Commodity costs affected by inflation in prices	3
10. Attempted or actual coup disrupted project	2

and sometimes due to mismanagement), poor opportunities for promotion, and/or poor working conditions.

Unclear implementation plan and/or work assignments was a deterrant noted in eight (20.5 percent) of the project evaluations. Represented higher proportionately in Africa (in 25 percent of the evaluations), reviewers often concluded that project papers must include a detailed implementation plan including a delineation of the roles and responsibilities of counterpart as well as advisory staff; or that such a plan should be thought out and documented prior to actual project implementation. A resulting constraint (noted in five cases) was the fact that staff (either advisory and/or host country) were forced to spend too much time firefighting and not enough time on implementing the intended project. While such firefighting is not bad in and of itself for it reflects a healthy demand for expert assistance, it was also found to be a constraint because it was not an intended activity of the project and actually served to impede progress and reflect a poorly planned implementation design.

Two other common constraints revealed questions about the adequacy of the project design and project assumptions. First, six evaluated projects (five of which were in Africa) noted that, in retrospect, the project design was overly ambitious. Criticisms included questionable socioeconomic assumptions, generally unclear designs, not well though out designs, and over-ambitious logical frameworks. Gambia's Mixed Farming Resources Management Project, for example, was found to have six different logical frameworks, which, in sum, were neither realistic nor integrated. Since so many problems were experienced with host country support, one might also question the reality of assumptions in project papers concerning the ability of the host country to deliver such support.

Equally as important, though not as frequently noted, four projects found that current government policies were not supportive of guiding project assumptions, and that without either a definitive statement of policy or change in government focus, project objectives could not be met. In other words, although the projects were designed to provide a stimulus for policy change, the stimulus itself was actually impeded by the lack of the very policy being sought to change. For instance, in Ghana, a project was implemented to develop a greater planning and rural development capacity at the district level. The project met only marginal success because district

councils had little authority to allocate resources or implement their own programs. Thus, while the project set out to show how a decentralized government could work to help itself, the objectives could never be achieved without the passage and effective implementation of a national decentralization act. Other uphill battles were forged by projects designed to conduct long-term policy analyses for governments with a short-term policy horizons or by advisors sent to conduct agricultural sector analysis (macro level) for agencies with a project (micro level) focus.

Startup delays caused by AID difficulties in getting or keeping technical advisors was a problem in eight (20.5 percent) of the evaluated projects, and again was experienced by fully 25 percent (6) of the evaluated African projects. The reasons for this were diffuse or not always clear, but the result was always the same--delay in implementation with less likelihood of project impacts. In Ghana, for example, the Mission experienced difficulties obtaining a suitably qualified long-term technician to complement project requirements. Two contractors left early due to family and personal complications. Short-term U.S. consultants were never brought on board due to time delays and lack of identified needs. Also in Kenya, recruitment and arrival of scientists did not occur until after all other donor scientists had arrived. It was necessary for these scientists to work together, and the frictions were accentuated by their lack of understanding of local cultural conditions and ministry procedures.

Another constraint affecting turnover in technical advisors and related to lack of host country support was inadequate space, housing, or facilities, experienced solely in African projects (5), and most often in projects requiring the outstationing of staff in rural areas. In Mauritania's Renewable Resources Management Project, lack of water and other infrastructure at two of the pilot intervention centers caused the loss of one full year of work. On Tanzania's Livestock Marketing and Development Project, advisors were provided with inadequate housing as well as office space.

Lack of sufficient coordination or communication appeared as a constraint in six projects. Most coordination problems were interagency or across relevant ministries within the host country. This is especially relevant to the conduct of agricultural sector analysis, as it is with any policy analysis, which is interdisciplinary in approach and requires policy input from different agencies. Interestingly, lack of coordination between the AID

Mission and the host country and/or the technical advisors on the terms and extent of the project was proported as a problem in four projected evaluations as well.

Finally, other constraints that were cited at least four times included commodity procurement problems (take for instance, a Mali project in which a $50,000 mobile home could not be transported to the project because of poor road conditions, or 19 of the 51 AID-financed vehicles could not be used because of inadequate maintenance; or a Liberian project in which goods cleared slowly from the port, orders were late, goods were purchased with no local servicing available, and vehicles were misused by the host government); lack of available or adequate data; poor project monitoring; poor project accounting/auditing; poor project management; and startup delays due to time involved in ironing out contractual arrangements between AID and the host country, or more often, between AID and technical contractors.

5.0 LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY AND PLANNING PROJECTS

This chapter covers recommendations for the design and implementation of agricultural policy and planning projects in the future. The evaluations reviewed have generated a long list of lessons and recommendations. As one would expect, many of these recommendations address the issues raised as constraints and barriers to accomplishment of project objectives. While a number of these recommendations are project or situation-specific, others have been repeated many times over and are generalizable to future agricultural policy and planning projects (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2). It is these generalizable recommendations that are focused on here. The recommendations are divided into three categories: technical, institutional, and other.

This chapter also contains an outline of future agricultural policy directions in Africa, Asia, and the Near-East. These grow out of review of past agricultural policies in Chapter 2 as well as review of AID-sponsored projects in Chapters 3 and 4.

5.1 TECHNICAL LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A number of the most repeated lessons learned concern the adequacy of the overall assumptions and design of agricultural institution building, training, and policy analysis projects in developing countries. As detailed under constraints in Chapter 4, some projects designed to provide an impetus to policy change have concluded that in the chicken and egg situation, policy direction needs to be articulated prior to the accomplishment of project goals. While policy articulation can result from AID support, this recommendation grew from projects that did not have the support of the host government as evidenced by commitment, and indeed seemed to be attempting to achieve objectives that were against the very grain of host country operations (e.g., decentralization in a centralized system; sectoral analysis in a project oriented institution). Thus, a more promising and generalizeable recommendation is the precondition for future projects that senior host country management and policy makers need to endorse the project up front in order for there to be any policy or program impacts. Articulated well in the evaluation of a Tanzanian project frustrated by the lack of policy definition, reviewers noted that, "If there is to be any noteable and lasting impacts, the host country needs to buy in fully to the policy objectives, to be prepared to

Exhibit 5.1

FREQUENTLY CITED LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND PLANNING PROJECTS

Lessons Learned/Recommendations	Africa Number (N=24)	Africa Percent	Asia Number (N=12)	Asia Percent	Near East Number (N=3)	Near East Percent	Total Number (N=39)	Total Percent
Technical:								
1. Relevant national policy needs to be articulated (before project objectives can be met).	5	20.8%	0	0 %	0	0 %	5	12.8%
2. A clear and detailed implementation plan should be developed.	4	16.7%	0	0 %	2	66.7%	7	17.9%
3. Increase time period of project.	4	16.7%	2	16.6%	1	33.3%	7	17.9%
4. Plan project concepts and outputs clearly (and reasonably) so that they lead to outputs; update as needed.	4	16.7%	0	0 %	1	33.3%	5	12.8%
5. Increase attention to data gathering activities.	3	12.5%	0	0 %	1	33.3%	4	10.3%
6. Develop in-country data processing capabilities.	4	16.7%	0	0 %	0	0 %	4	10.3%
7. Have participant trainees conduct a thesis in-country.	3	12.5%	0	0 %	1	33.3%	4	10.3%
8. Do not make project goals overambitious: designs should be realistic and not overly complicated.	2	8.3%	0	0 %	1	33.3%	3	7.7%
9. To avoid delays, identify participant trainees before project start-up or very early in the project.	1	4.2%	1	8.3%	1	33.3%	3	7.7%
Institutional:								
1. Improve host country interagency and interdisciplinary communication and cooperation.	3	12.5%	5	41.7%	1	33.3%	8	20.5%
2. Increase pay scale/salaries for returning trainees.	3	12.5%	3	25.0%	0	0 %	6	15.4%
3. Increase communication among AID (or donors), the advisors, and the host country government.	6	25 %	1	8.3 %	2	66.7%	8	20.5%
4. USAID must make sure that host country commitments are realized or more realistically planned.	7	29.2%	1	8.3%	0	0 %	6	15.4%
5. Returning trainees should be placed or commited to work in the unit they came from.	6	25 %	1	8.3%	0	0 %	6	15.4%
6. Senior host country management and policy makers need to endorse the project upfront (and therefore be more likely to be accessible to project personnel).	3	12.5%	2	16.6%	1	33.3%	6	15.4%
7. Adequately trained professionals are needed as counterparts to technical advisors. If necessary, project designs need to overcompensate with additional training.	4	16.7%	1	8.3%	1	33.3%	6	15.4%
8. An organization structure needs to be specified for project or relevant agency.	3	12.5%	0	0 %	1	33.3%	4	10.3%
9. Increase training for host country staff.	2	8.3%	0	0 %	1	33.3%	3	7.7%
10. Assure adequate and forceful management and leadership of counterpart institution and staff.	2	8.3%	0	0 %	2	66.7%	4	10.3%
11. Offices of advisors and counterparts should not be separated but should be arranged to foster collegial relationships.	1	4.2%	1	8.3%	1	33.3%	3	7.7%
Other:								
1. Assure adequate financial management controls and auditing (by project and AID).	4	16.7%	2	16.6%	2	66.7%	8	20.5%
2. Assure adequate project monitoring and reporting.	3	12.5%	2	16.6%	1	33.3%	6	15.4%
3. Arrange for adequate housing/facilities for project staff.	1	4.2%	2	16.6%	0	0 %	3	7.7%
4. Free technical leaders from administrative demands on their time.	2	8.3%	0	0 %	1	33.3%	3	7.7%

Exhibit 5.2

OTHER LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

	LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS	NUMBER OF TIMES CITED
	Technical:	
1	When there are serious political or adminstrative changes on the host government, the mission and host country should review the project goals and objectives for continued relevance and government commitment.	2
2.	The agricultural sector analysis approach is is successful.	2
3.	Papers (policy and research) must be prepared on a continual basis. Often a series of 6-7 papers will cause change where one report cannot.	1
4.	Progress toward achievement of policy must be reviewed annually at the policy-makers' level.	1
5.	Key terms, e.g., agricultural sector analysis, should be defined as precisely as possible.	1
6.	Planning cannot be too theoretical if it is to have an affect on national direction. A sectoral rather than project focus is recommended. Also, greater attention needs to be paid to policy papers rather than background research papers.	2
7.	Credit considerations must be given attention in the project planning phase. Credit programs must be long term so as not to curtail technical progress.	2
8.	Large scale economic models take a long time to set up and sophisticated staff to operate. These requirements may not be met in some developing countries.	1
9.	Projects should be developed to be self-sustaining after the formal project period ends.	2
10.	A "catch-all" project can be useful because it can be used to fill in the gaps between other projects.	1
	Institutional:	
1.	Rural population involvement can only be achieved if activities produce tangible results with immediate evidence of benefits. Social benefits are not enough, rather evidence is needed of increased profits and demonstrated effectiveness of outcomes.	2
2.	Authority over money is the key to effective decentralization.	2
3.	USAID should not provide purchasing support. This should be done by the contractor.	2
4.	Projects should not aim themselves at specifically created institutional entities that cannot survive or outlive the project period.	1
5.	A larger stipend is needed to attract participants for out-of-country training.	2
6.	Public recognition of high quality work is needed.	2
7.	Full acceptance by host country officials could be maintained if they recommend their own projects.	1
	Other:	
1.	Missions should not hesitate to terminate bad projects.	2
2.	The complexities of AID contract and procurement regulations require 1-2 years of learning time by the host country.	2

contribute substantially to project operations, and be committed to taking over and continuing operations after the project is over."[1]

A number of other recommendations also reflected a focus on the project premises and design: Project goals must not be made overambitious. Rather, designs should be realistic, not over complicated, and more important, concepts should lead to outputs that are clearly defined. "While developing assistance strategies which, on paper, integrate many diverse projects in a country, or many different subprojects within an overall project, is laudable, it often leads to serious problems when one considers impacts. Projects whose effectiveness is partly or largely dependent upon the accomplishments of other projects are vulnerable to limited or nonexistent impacts, often simply because the other projects do not produce their expected outputs. If inputs are important to projects, then all the preconditions for impact must be identified and addressed, particularly for projects aiming to change or implement systems or policy."[2] Furthermore, as host country government personnel and institutional leaders change, project goals and outputs should be reviewed by USAID with the new leaders of the country or ministry for continuing relevance of the project to the new government.

A related recommendation repeatedly noted by project reviewers is the necessity for the development of a clear and detailed implementation plan, either as part of the project proposal or as a document immediately following the project proposal. Such a plan should be updated periodically. It should detail how the project will be implemented and it should specify what the organizational structure for the project will be (also an institutional recommendation). Specifically, the roles of advisors and counterparts need to be elaborated so that expectations will be mutual rather than at surprising odds.

A final recommendation made regarding project design was that capacity building and training is an objective whose scope and time is commonly underestimated. Many evaluations point out that capacity-building activities are long-term in nature and may take longer than five years before an active

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[1]USAID, Final Evaluation Report, Livestock Marketing and Development Project (621-0122), Tanzania, September 1982.

[2]Ibid.

professional, self-sufficient agricultural sector planning unit has been established within the host country. The implication is that AID should be cognizant of such a time horizon in the planning and programming of its technical assistance projects.

Other technical recommendations addressed data and training issues. Specifically, increased attention to data gathering and analysis was called for in a review of all types of projects. Quality of data is as much of a problem as quantity. Particular lessons included that data gathering should be reasonable, not voluminous, that as much attention needs to be paid to data analysis as data gathering, and that survey implementation takes adequate leadership and management. Similarly, an increasing need to develop data processing capabilities including hardware, software, and backstopping was recommended.

A majority of the projects reviewed included a training component. A particular recommendation in African countries was the need to have training praticipants who are sent to study abroad, conduct an in-country thesis. An in-country thesis serves a number of objectives. First, it makes the activity more relevant to the work the student will do in the future. Second, it may provide useful research for the country; and third, it increases the likeliness that the student will return to the host country upon graduation.

5.2 INSTITUTIONAL LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In this subsection, we examine lessons and recommendations of an institutional nature. In this discussion, we shall be concerned with such questions as how to set up agricultural sector planning organizationally and administratively, how to integrate planning within a government's overall management system, and how to promote effectiveness over the long term. It is important to preface this discussion with the caveat that no one of these questions can be answered definitively and once and for all. Institutional arrangements always need to be tailored to specific situations -- a country's governmental structure, its politics, its level of development, the technical capability of its public sector, etc. Nevertheless, the lessons and recommendations found in the evaluations provide important insights that can help guide the design of agricultural sector policy and planning activities in the future.

An overriding concern of the policy and planning projects, especially in Africa, was the realization (or lack thereof) of host country commitment. One evidence of commitment, the endorsement by host country leadership, was addressed above. Other conditions of commitment are the appropriation of staff and/or resources promised by the host country as a condition of project funding by USAID. Time and again, projects found such commitments not forthcoming, and without them, it was impossible to implement the project, much less achieve objectives. Recommendations were often made that in the future, USAID must monitor the host government's commitments. Effort must be made to realistically plan the commitments, and consideration must be given to terminating projects in which commitments are not forthcoming.

Communication issues were of equal concern to the projects in influencing their ability to achieve objectives. The improvement of host country interagency cooperation was especially relevant to agricultural sector analyses and projects with an interdisciplinary focus. "The research and analysis process should be shifted from individuals to working groups. Unless [the host] government endorses the priority to do interdisciplinary and intersectoral work under a common policy framework with common objectives, research will continue to go on in an isolated fashion."[1] Projects found such improvements or linkages need to be deliberately planned. A Senegalese project recommended that all heads of relevant implementing committees should coordinate by working on a research committee. Similarly, a project in the Phillipines recommended that interinstitutional linkages must be based on the mutual advantages of cooperation that could be obtained from regular planning sessions.

Communication among AID, counterpart ministries, and technical advisors was also an area recommended for major improvement and attention in future project planning and implementation. Such communication is essential for a mutual understanding and agreement on project objectives and approach, for updates and modifications to the project, for the monitoring of host country commitments, for the discussion of problems and continued project relevance, and for the presentation of findings. In order to keep the com-

[1]RAMS Assessment Team, Final Report for USAID, Rural Assessment and Manpower Survey Project (682-0211), Mauritania, 1979.

munication network open between responsible agencies and solve problems before they become stumbling blocks, formal meetings are recommended at project startup and at six month intervals thereafter.

Host country personnel issues plagued many capacity building and training projects that were not able to access adequately trained counterpart professionals. If necessary project designs must overcompensate for this problem by providing additional training over that which was planned. Many training projects noted that more on-the-job training (OJT) was called for.

Recruitment and retention of trained staff was a problem when participants were trained abroad. Projects like Cameroon's Agriculture Planning Project and Ethiopia's Agricultural Advisory Services recommended that safeguards should be incorporated into the training program to ensure effective utilization and participant return. Success is more likely to be achieved when trainees return to work in the institution for which they are being trained. One major deterrant to experienced staff retention is the uneven or low pay scale faced by returning trainees. "The salary scales in the Civil Service must be adjusted upward or all the training provided by USAID is for naught, because trainees cannot accept positions in the government. They cannot afford to live on the wages."[1]

A final institutional lesson noted repeatedly as important for project success was that forceful and quality management of the counterpart ministry or relevant division is a significant development factor. Staff need to be utilized appropriately, and appropriate work needs to be produced that will generate demand for future services.

5.3 OTHER LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Most of the lessons learned and recommendations made in the evaluations are either technical or institutional, but there are a few lessons and recommendations that do not fit easily under either of these categories. The overwhelming majority of these suggestions point to the need for improvement in project management and monitoring. First, a procedure for adequate financial monitoring and auditing, both by project management and by USAID, is

[1]USAID, Mid-term Evaluation of Project 070, Agricultural Sector Studies, Zaire, February 1982.

recommended. The chief issue here is accountability of the host government in the expenditure of USAID grant funds. A Nepalese project points specifically to the need for procedures for monitoring employee attendence, reimbursements, and inventory control. A Kenyan project simply recommends that USAID must continually monitor use of funds as well as the achievement of expected inputs.

Another type of improved monitoring procedure needed is the monitoring and reporting of project progress toward output, purpose, and goal achievement. Periodic reporting to USAID by project management should be required for all activities. Both quantitative and qualitative data should be reported.

A final management recommendation was the need to free up technical leaders from administrative demands on their time. This problem arose when the chief of party was expected to be both project manager and technical guru simultaneously. Because of the problems in commodity procurement in accessing secretarial services, etc., such managers often spend too much time on administrative issues to the detriment of the technical objectives. In such cases, employment of an on-site administrative assistant is recommended.

5.4 MAJOR AGRICULTURAL POLICY CHALLENGES OF THE 1980s IN AFRICA, ASIA, AND THE NEAR EAST

The previous sections in this chapter provided detailed recommendations for AID-sponsored agricultural policy and planning projects in the future. This section shifts gears and examines general policy directions for each of the three regions in our study.

5.4.1 Africa

The challenge of the 1980s for Africa has many of the same elements as the challenge of the 1960s: to increase production and productivity in the economy, especially in the rural economy that provides the livelihood for such a high proportion of the African population. Yet, the challenge is greater now in that the situation is more difficult after stagnation in output and increases in population have lowered per capita food production. The countries have moved from a high degree of self-sufficiency to even greater reliance upon the international market to supplement their own production, and this at a time when terms of trade have not favored Africa.

Many of the issues remain the same: They are the old issues of inadequacy of the policy and strategic framework, government priorities to bring about rural development objectives, trained national manpower, and financial and institutional constraints. However the context has changed, the challenge increased.

In some areas the context is more favorable. There are more Africans who have the training and knowledge necessary to make a positive contribution to confronting agricultural problems; decolonization is now a reality and the continuing struggles around it are becoming fewer. There even appears to be some calming of the continuing problem of relations with the Republic of South Africa.

Institutional development has been tried, sometimes with success, but with lessons that can be learned. There has been some success with new technological packages such as with maize in Kenya.

There is also a realization that agricultural development will be smallholder development and will have at least five elements: diminution of policy bias against agriculture; dealing with the problems of intensive agricultural growth; limits on the tractorization of agriculture; reliance upon animal power and new implements; and a reduction of the transport and marketing margins between the peasant and the point of final sale. Of course the specifics will vary from country to country, and different elements will play roles of varying importance across countries.

But the development of smallholder agriculture will have to take place against a backdrop of a much greater degree of consistency in agricultural direction, summarized by Eicher and Baker as structural reforms, training of African scientists, the strengthening of faculties of agriculture and national agricultural extension and research systems, and improving policy analysis and the administration and execution of development programs and projects.

5.4.2 Asia

The challenges in Asia are quite different from those elsewhere, just as Asian performance differs. Policy reform appears largely unnecessary, for the experience of the mid-1960s corrected the major distortions that were growing and provided the supply-oriented basis for the developments of the 1970s. The widespread adoption of high yielding varieties catalyzed this evolution.

Even in India, the most highly planned and most interventionist of the states, measures of price distortions in the basic foodgrains showed that since the mid-1960s there was not a major disincentive to production and little tendency to discriminate between wheat and rice. Thus, while policy analysis can contribute to effective policy development, it does not appear to have to wage battle against rigid and distorted policy structures. There can still be important contributions to efficiency and resource allocation, but these may be less important than in other areas.

There appear to be three areas of policy concern in Asia. The first is the persistence of poverty in rural areas, and the inability to reduce it significantly. This, of course, is not a new concern, but it is a continuing challenge to development and remains a source of potential instability.

The second area has to do with research and development and the adoption of new biological innovations when they come on line. One effect of the green revolution was to highlight the relevant issues, and one hopes that policy analysis can deal more actively with the issues involved in this new agricultural revolution.

Finally, the growth of an interdependent world is a continuing challenge to policy-makers. The rapid fluctuations in prices and availability of agricultural products during the 1970's had ramifications throughout the world and caused numerous problems for agricultural policy. In addition, many countries have come to rely more heavily on exports for an impulse to the domestic economy, and agricultural exports have been part of this concern. At the same time, the balance of payments pressures faced by the Third World add a new dimension to the need to import agricultural products.

In many ways the major challenge to the policy analyst may be the relation of domestic agriculture to the international economy. This is an important and continuing challenge that requires analysis of the international economy as well as analysis of the effect of "other" domestic policies, such as exchange rate policy, tariff policy, and domestic monetary and fiscal policy. This is indeed a fruitful area for further work.

5.4.3 Near East

There have been large amounts of resources dedicated to agriculture in the Near East, simply because of the large amounts of resources available to the area. And yet, for the most part they have not had a significantly posi-

tive impact on agricultural output. Thus, in a real sense the challenge is to bring home the benefits of these existing resources by incorporating them into a more integrated and rational agricultural system.

In another sense the challenge is the same that it has always been, the challenge of wealth and of poverty. The tremendous wealth of oil in many of the countries is likely to continue to have a detrimental effect on agriculture, one that will be countered only by a growing awareness of the political importance of the rural sectors. The continuing poverty in terms of water and of arable land and productive technologies will continue to be a constraint, one chat will challenge agricultural policy in the Near East well into the future.

6.0 PHASE II WORK PLAN

6.1 PURPOSE OF PHASE II

This evaluation is designed to take place in two phases. Phase I involves the identification, collection, review and analysis of documentation on agricultural policy and planning projects in Africa, Asia, and the Near-East that have been conducted since 1980. This phase has been completed and the analysis is the primary subject of this report volume.

Phase II of the comparative evaluation involves visiting a number of project sites to collect additional information on the impact and process of selected projects. By making these visits we hope to strengthen and expand on the knowledge gained in Phase I. While the document review process was informative, it was subject to two circumstantial weaknesses. First, the project evaluation summaries focused primarily on process--or how well the projects were carried out--and were often never designed to address impact issues, or to examine the projects in their macroeconomic environment. Second, few final evaluations were available to us on recently completed projects, and when they were available, they, too, could only reflect the benefits of recent hindsight, and could not assess the staying power of identified project impacts. Thus, the site visits are intended to fill in the gaps left by the document review. Specifically, the objectives of the site visits are:

- to broaden the perspective on planning activities and policy making gained from the Phase I document review;
- to gain additional insights on the overall institutional framework in which agricultural sector planning and policy making takes place;
- to verify findings from the document review;
- to further assess project impacts that were:
  a) not measurable as part of final evaluation(s),
  b) never assessed as part of final evaluation(s),
- to gain information on projects of interest that weren't yet finally evaluated;
- to assess the <u>cumulative</u> effects of multiple AID projects in a country;
- to gather information on lessons and constraints that <u>cut across</u> projects in a particular setting/country;

- to futher compare and contrast the experiences within and across regions;

- to gain firsthand information for input to other tasks on the Agricultural Policy Analysis Project, particularly the writing of the Agricultural Officers' Guidelines;

- to give AID a better idea of what needs to be considered in future project evaluation and documentation; and

- to assess ways to most effectively present and disseminate information so that the findings of the evaluation are applied by agricultural development officers (ADO) in the future.

6.2 Project Site Selection

The process of selecting project sites to visit in Phase II is entirely purposive. The intent of the visits are to learn from the past and for the future. The purposive selection, made from the universe of projects reviewed in Phase I, is based on the following criteria.

1) The sample must minimally be representative of the number of AID projects in each region.

2) The sample should consider only projects that have ended during 1980 or beyond. This is done to maximize the chances that government personnel who will know about the project will be available; to gain recent information that will have the most applicability for the near future and to fill in the information gaps on projects which have not yet been finally evaluated.

3) The sample should include projects which have primarily focused on agricultural policy and/or planning in order to maximize our data collection visits and learn from such efforts.

4) The sample should include projects which appear to have the potential for positive impacts, i.e. projects which we can learn something from. The reason for this is that the literature so often focused on problems and constraints. Thus, we feel we have a good understanding of pitfalls to project implementation but could afford to gain a better understanding of what strategies work well and why. Projects that were assessed "adequate" or better by impact reviewers (see Exhibit 4.2 in Chapter 4) are preferred. Projects rated "marginal" are considered only if other appropriate projects are not available.

Exhibit 6.1

COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL EVALUATION OF
AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND PLANNING PROJECTS

Country/Project(s)	Assumed Project Duration	Final Evaluation Available	If Not, Date Of Last Available Evaluation	Impact Reviewers Assessment	Notes
AFRICA					
1. Kenya					
*Rural Planning I	1976-80	yes	-	adequate	sufficient number of projects to examine cumulative impacts
Rural Planning II	1980-85	no	none	no documents to assess	ongoing, a continuation of Rural Planning I
2. Lesotho					
Lesotho Agriculture Sector Analysis	1976-80	no	1980	adequate	continuation of previous project
3. Liberia					
*Agriculture Program Development	1972-80	yes	-	adequate	sufficient number of projects to examine cumulative impacts, and a variety of projects
Agricultural Sector Analysis & Planning	1977-81	no	1981	marginal	
Agricultural Cooperative Development	1977-82	no	1980	good	
4. Zaire					
*Agricultural Economic Development	1977-83	yes	-	adequate	can examine cumulative effects
*Agricultural Sector Studies	1981-84	no	1982	good	
5. Zambia					
Agricultural Training, Planning, and Institutional Development	1980-82	no	1983	good	
6. Entente Nations					
Entente Food Production	1976-84	no	1983	adequate	only choice for a regional project
ASIA					
1. Indonesia					
*Assistance to Agriculture	1968-81	no	1980	good	
Agricultural Development, Planning & Administration	1977-84	no	none	no documents to assess	
2. Pakistan					
Agricultural Research	1973-82	no	1982	adequate	
3. Sri Lanka					
Development Service & Training	1978-82	no	1981	good	
Agricultural Sector Assessment	(1979)	(Since no reviews are available on activities such as agricultural sector assessments, this activity can also be assessed during the site visit.)			
NEAR-EAST					
1. Egypt					
*Agricultural Development System	1977-82	no	1981	marginal	only recently ended Near-East project
Data Collection & Analysis	1980-85	no	none	-	project underway

*Primary project(s) of focus on country visits with more than one project.

EXHIBIT 6.2

OVERLAP OF COMPARATIVE EVALUATION AND [1] TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE [2] (TA) SITES ON THE AGRICULTURAL POLICY ANALYSIS PROJECT (ADAP)

Comparative Evaluation Site	# Projects	Same As TA Site	Nearest TA Site
AFRICA			
1. Kenya	2	no	Zaire
2. Lesotho	1	yes	-
3. Liberia	2-3	yes	-
4. Zaire	2	yes	-
5. Zambia	1	no	Zaire
6. Entente Nations/Ivory Coast	1	no	Senegal
ASIA			
1. Indonesia	2	no	none
2. Pakistan	1	yes	-
3. Sri Lanka	2	yes	-
NEAR-EAST			
1. Egypt	2	no	none

[1] ADAP Task 6

[2] ADAP Tasks 1, 5, and 8

5) To the extent possible, the sample can "piggyback" on site visits made by staff on the technical assistance tasks[1] of the Agricultural Policy Analysis Project. This strategy has the advantage of cost efficiency, and it guarantees us that we will visit sites with Missions that have both an interest in learning more through their own experiences and a willingness to cooperate with our efforts.

6) Finally, the sample should consider a mixture of sites with one and more relevant projects. That way, individual projects can be examined in some sites, while in other sites, the cumulative effects of projects can be examined.

Based on all the above criteria, 6 sites in Africa, including 1 regional project, 3 sites in Asia, and 1 site in the Near-East are recommended. Most sample projects have already ended (since 1980), or, in some cases, are ending now. Exhibits 6.1 and 6.2 on the following pages present and describe the recommended sample project sites.

6.3 Data Collection

6.3.1 Data Collection Guides

As in Phase I, the Phase II data collection will focus on both the process and impacts of the projects. However, unlike Phase I, Phase II data collection, because it will be conducted on site, can better focus on the role of the project within the macrolevel/national agricultural planning and policy making process, and can tailor questions of interest on or across projects.

The framework for data collection has four guiding components.

1) Exhibit 6.3 on the following page provides a convenient scheme for understanding the agricultural sector planning process in the context of a national management system. (For a more complete discussion of this process, see Abt Associates Inc., Evaluation of Agricultural Sector Planning Activities in Latin America and the Carribean prepared for USAID, June 1982, Chapter 3.0.) This scheme will guide the development of questions on the role and effectiveness of the AID project in the national planning and decision making process.

[1] ADAP Tasks 1, 5, and 8.

2) Project Summaries, included in Volume II of this report, were designed to present the project's logical framework. This simple form will be used to develop questions on the differences between planned and actual purposes, objectives, inputs, and outputs.

3) The Evaluation Summary forms, as also presented in Volume II, provides a listing of most relevant questions on project impacts and process. Following this form, interviewers will focus on a projects' success in meeting goals, policy/program impacts, decision maker impacts, interinstitutional impacts, capacity building impacts, socioeconomic impacts, constraints, enhancements, lessons learned, and recommendations.

4) Finally, based on available project documentation, questions of interest will be tailored for each site, country, region, and project visited.

6.3.2 Respondents

A list of appropriate respondents or officials to be interviewed will be developed through a review of project documentation and discussions with Mission personnel. It is hoped that Mission personnel will assist in setting up interviews, or at least in notifying all appropriate officials of the purpose and circumstances of our visit. Similarly, we hope that AID/Washington will "open the door" of the Missions by following up on a letter sent to them last year, and asking for their cooperation on this task. While it is impossible to identify the particular interviewees for each selected project site here, the following list provides a representative group of respondents:

- Agricultural Development Officers and other staff in AID Missions,
- Host country government participants,
- Trainees,
- Key officials in the Ministry of Agriculture,
- Key officials in related ministries,
- Private sector representatives knowledgeable about, or related to, the project, and
- Contractor's advisory staff.

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6.4 Staffing

As a means of conserving APAP resources while assuring quality of project, site visits will generally be made by a team composed of a senior and junior policy analyst. To the extent possible, as reflected in Exhibit 6.2, this work will be conducted by the same team who will be providing technical assistance in either the same or neighboring nation. The purposes of this team's visit, and therefore the length of their visit, will be expanded to cost effectively accomodate complimentary objectives. In other cases, a team will be fielded for the purpose of collecting information for this task alone.

Senior personnel will have overall responsibility for the conduct of the analysis and assurance of quality, while junior personnel will assist in documentation, making arrangements and analysis of assigned topics. Use of a junior person who has experience in the area will conserve the time of a more experienced and expensive senior analyst while still assuring quality of the final product.

6.5 Schedule of Field Work

In-country field work will range from 4 to 10 days per site depending on the number and complexity of projects under examination. The site visits will be conducted during the fall and winter of 1984-85. The specific schedule will be interdependent on the schedule of technical assistance activities. Following each site visit, a detailed site visit report will be written, documenting the trip and analyzing the project or projects studied.

6.6 Documentation Review

In addition to conducting project assessments on site, Phase I work will continue. Abt Associates Staff will continue the process of identifying, collecting and analyzing documentation on relevant Agricultural Policy and Planning projects in Africa, Asia and the Near-East. Findings of Chapters 1-5 of this report volume will be updated.

6.7 FINAL REPORT

The final report will combine the information from both phases of this study. It will build upon the material in the interim report but will also emphasize work from Phase II, which should have more information on long-term impacts by project.

APPENDIX A

Bibliographies for Chapter 2.0

A-1 General Policy Overview
A-2 Africa
A-3 Asia
A-4 Near East

Appendix A-1
General Policy Overview - Bibliography

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AN EVALUATION OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND PLANNING PROJECTS IN AFRICA, ASIA, AND THE NEAR EAST

AGRICULTURAL POLICY ANALYSIS PROJECT

Volume II: Appendix B - Project Summaries, Activity Descriptions, and Evaluation Summaries

October 15, 1984

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APPENDIX B

PROJECT SUMMARIES, ACTIVITY DESCRIPTIONS AND EVALUATION SUMMARIES

B-1 AFRICA

B-2 ASIA

B-3 NEAR-EAST

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Explanatory Note:

These background materials are prepared for each of the projects in the evaluation of agricultural policy and planning projects in Africa, Asia, and the Near East since 1970. The Project Summaries and Activity Descriptions were prepared from project papers primarily, and the Evaluation Summaries were prepared from AID evaluations.

This is a partial listing of AID projects with agricultural policy and planning components undertaken in these three regions since 1970. There were approximately 30 additional projects which we identified but were unable to obtain documentation on.

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B-1 AFRICA

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Botswana

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Planning (633-0067) 1977

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$4,786,000	$3,500,000
Grant	4,7886,000	3,500,000
Loan	0	0
Country	0	0
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Ministry of Agriculture, Planning and Statistics Unit

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

U.S. Department of Agriculture

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To improve the welfare of Botswana's small scale farmers and herders by increasing their incomes and food consumption levels.

PURPOSES: To develop a localized Government of Botswana economic and analytical capacity to rationally plan and program responses to the issues of rural sector development.

OUTPUTS: 1. To increase the immediate capacity of the Government of Botswana to plan and evaluate projects and assess and modify rural development strategies.
2. To increase the number of middle and upper level Botswana with relevant skills in rural development, research, analysis, planning, implementation and evaluation.

INPUTS: USAID: Technical assistance personnel; commodities and project support; participant training; construction of offices and homes

Government of Botswana: Personnel; commodities and project support; and construction of offices and houses

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Botswana

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Planning (633-0067) 1977

DESCRIPTION:

Technical advisory assistance, participant training and the construction of offices was provided to the Government of Botswana in order to improve the Ministry of Agriculture's (MOA) rural development planning capabilities.

A combination of practical in-country training and advanced overseas coursework were designed to upgrade personnel within the MOA Planning and Statistics Unit (PSU) and other Government of Botswana personnel who work in coordination with agricultural planning. U.S. experts assisted with in-country training and occupied professional positions in PSU while counterparts were being trained. 16-20 candidates were trained in economics and related rural development fields in U.S. universities.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Upgrading the incomes of small farmers and herders
- Shortage of arable land
- Land conservation issues
- Water shortages

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Botswana

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Planning (633-0067) 1977

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: USAID, Project Evaluation Summaries, 1979 and 1980

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular ___x___ Special _____ Final _____

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

About halfway into the project, there appeared to be good movement towards meeting the goals and purposes of the project. The evaluation team felt that it would be difficult to assess if there were actually an improvement in the welfare of Botwana's small-scale farmers and herders that could be attributed to the project. This improvement could only be achieved indirectly and over the long term.

There had been good progress in achieving the objective of institution-building and developing a trained, localized planning and analysis capability within the Ministry. The training of Botswanans in U.S. universities was proceeding well and the quality of the data collection and analysis undertaken within the Division of Planning and Statistics (Ministry of Agriculture) was vastly improved. The one major drawback was that little long range economic analysis of the agriculture sector had taken place. The evaluation team strongly recommended an agricultural sector assessment to form the basis of policy development in subsequent years. The rest of the project was proceeding so well, however, that the evaluation team concluded it should become the model for technical assistance and training projects conducted elsewhere.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

None identified

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

None identified

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

None identified

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- The training of 16-20 Botswana in U.S. universities proceeded extremely well. Trainees were expected to return to take positions within the Division of Planning and Statistics in the MOA.

- The data collection and publication of agricultural statistics and farm management areas improved enormously. The DPS was playing a more important role in project review within the Ministry of Agriculture. Little economic analysis, however, was taking place.

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

None identified

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None identified

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None identified

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

- There were internal disruptions in the Division of Planning and Statistics due to staff shortages and lack of clear assignments for the staff. There were also concerns that the presence of technical assistance staff from the U.S. might hinder the job mobility of Botswanan staff.

- There wasn't enough interaction between the district-level planners and the members of the Division of Planning and Statistics (DPS) so the DPS data and analyses weren't used to the extent possible.

- There was so much time spent by staff "fighting fires" on projects that there was little time for long-range economic analysis.

- There was not sufficient coordination and interaction between the DPS staff and the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) on project approval criteria.

ENHANCEMENTS:

- The evaluation team stressed that the project should serve as a model for future AID projects involving technical assistance and training components. The placement of expatriate staff in line positions allows local staff the requisite time for training, and the phased localization plan ensures adequate continuity. They felt this was an excellent strategy to fill human capital needs in developing countries.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

- Sufficient time and manpower needs to be set aside for long range economic analysis on policy issues or else staff will be consumed in fighting fires on "project issues."

- An agricultural sector assessment was recommended as a way to structure the long range analytical work.

Institutional

- The model of staffing the line agency with expatriate personnel so that the host country staff can be trained in the U.S., and then have the trainees return for on-the-job training is a highly successful way to upgrade the agency's human capital. The approach was recommended for other parts of the Ministry of Agriculture.

- The lack of a rationally articulated national policy can severely compromise national development programs in all sectors of the economy. Such a policy would also help them to more successfully deal with other donors.

Other:

None identified

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: United Republic of Cameroon

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Management and Planning (631-0008) 1979

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$7,550,000	$7,550,000
Grant	3,250,000	3,250,000
Loan	0	0
Country	2,000,000	2,000,000
Other (Other Donors)	2,300,000	2,300,000

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Planning and Statistics Unit within the Ministry of Agriculture

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

United States Department of Agriculture

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To execute rural development projects which benefit the majority of rural people.

PURPOSES: To institutionalize a fully functioning planning and statistical unit within the Ministry of Agriculture's Directorate of Studies and Projects.

OUTPUTS: 1. Agriculture statistics handbook produced. 2. Improved annual crop production/acreage estimates. 3. Marketing/price statistics. 4. Subsector analyses and studies. 5. Documentation center/reproduction facilities. 6. In-country training programs. 7. Cadre of trained enumerators. 8. Returned participants: production economist/farm manager; rural sociologist; agricultural economist/planner; agricultural statistician; survey design statistician; agronomist; and marketing specialist.

INPUTS: USAID ($3.3 million): agricultural economic sector planner: 60 months; survey statistician: 60 months; planning/marketing design-data: 60 months; processing statistician: 36 months; consultants: statistics: 5 months; information system: 2 months, sub-sector studies: 10 months, mid-project evaluation: 2 months; ongoing evaluation: 6 months.

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ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: United Republic of Cameroon

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Management and Planning (631-0008) 1979

DESCRIPTION:

A grant was provided to the Government of Cameroon to institutionalize a fully functioning planning and statistics unit within the Ministry of Agriculture. Project components included training, reference material productions, and subsector study preparation.

In-country training programs were established in the following disciplines: enumerator training, planning principles, data processing concepts and utilization, project management, and statistical concepts. Courses were offered within the country in these areas. On-the-job training was also provided by advisors to subordinates and staff. Additional training was sponsored at U.S. or third country institutions for advanced degrees in agricultural economics, statistics, rural sociology, and agronomy.

An agricultural statistics handbook was to be prepared. The handbook is a compendium of crop production, yield, price, and other time series data, of rainfall and temperature data, and of government organization and development projects in the rural sector. The handbook will serve as a reference document for researchers and planners. An agricultural statistical yearbook was also to be compiled containing crop yield, acreage, production, and marketing/price data. This document was to provide basic statistics needed for sectoral and crop specific analyses and forecasting. In addition, a reference/documentation/information office and reproduction facility was to be established.

Numerous subsector studies were to be generated in preparation for the complete sector analysis. These studies were to be developed jointly by project technicians and their counterparts, and would provide for useful on-the-job training.

By the end of the project the directorate was to consist of a trained and functioning cadre of planners capable of producing on a regular basis; an agricultural sector analysis, policy papers, project monitoring functions, feasibility studies, and an annual report.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- An overall analysis of the agricultural sector.
- Productivity of small farm agriculture through investments in rural roads and road maintenance.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: United Republic of Cameroon

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Management and Planning (631-0008) 1979

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: USAID, Project Evaluation Summary, May 1982

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular ___x___ Special _____ Final _____

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

At this mid-point evaluation the project had mixed results in meeting its goals and purposes. The goal was to execute rural development projects which benefit a majority of rural people. These projects were to be designed once a strong planning unit and process was in place. There had been numerous problems in helping to establish the planning unit so consequently there was little movement towards designing rural development projects.

The difficulties in institutionalizing a fully functioning planning and statistical unit within the Ministry of Agriculture were many. There were long delays in getting the technical assistance advisors to the country. The country wasn't able to contribute sufficient staff time for training or economic analysis. There had been little communication between USAID and the Minister of Agriculture about the project before start up so there was confusion about who should do what. Finally, the project paper had been very general so it provided little direction. Thus, overall the project has had little success to date in achieving either project goals or purposes.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

None identified

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

None identified

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

None identified

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- Long-term training in the U.S. had been provided to 3 participants (they were having trouble identifying another 5, however).
- Contributions had been made to several host country plans, including the National Agriculture Plan, and the National Food Plan.

- Progress had been made on improving the agricultural census and the statistical service.

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

None identified

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None identified

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None identified

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

- Lack of host country support and staff. They were too busy involved in project monitoring and design to contribute time to implementation.
- Lack of a clear design and implementation plan within the project paper.
- Lack of communication between USAID technicians and ministry officials about how to carry out the project.
- Inability to identify technical assistance personnel. Great delays in getting them on site.
- Inadequate space.
- Lack of specificity as to what type of economic analyses to perform.

ENHANCEMENTS:

None identified

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

- Project designers should make more of an attempt to conceptualize the activities that lead to outputs, and should always include an implementation plan, though these activities will no doubt be modified as the project proceeds.

Institutional

- Initial meetings must be held between USAID, the counterpart Ministries and the technicians in order to discuss the direction of the project; these meetings must take place at six month

intervals in order to keep the communication network open between responsible agencies and solve the problems before they become stumbling blocks.

- USAID must take a hard stand to see that commitments by host country staff are met.

- Technical assistance personnel should be identified before project start-up with guarantees as to date of arrival.

- Identify, to the extent possible, host country personnel for training prior to project start-up.

- The project plan should take a more formal approach to coordinating their activities. Regular meetings need to be held.

- It is recommended that returned long-term trainees be placed within the unit from which they came to assure that new skills are utilized to further the project.

Other:

None identified

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Ethiopa

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Advisory Services (663-0111) 1964

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$4,218,000	$4,218,000
Grant	2,774,000	2,774,000
Loan	0	0
Country	1,269,000	1,269,000
Other (Other Donors)	175,000	175,000

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Land Reform

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

USAID technical advisors

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: Expand commercial-scale farming to increase export earnings, to increase production to meet growing urban demand and to diversify agricultural production; increase peasant agricultural output and earnings and thereby improve the quality of rural life.

PURPOSES: Develop a planning and programming department within the Ministry of Agriculture which will identify, plan and evaluate agricultural programs.

OUTPUTS: USAID participants trained and employed by the MOA and Ministry of Land Reform. Planning and evaluation of agricultural programs underway. Comprehensive agricultural projects developed. Feasibility studies underway and/or planned. Market structure analysis being conducted. Relevant land reform legislation planned.

INPUTS: USAID, USDA personnel, participant training, commodities, other costs, PASA personnel, contractor personnel. IEG: personnel, commodities, local costs, participant training.

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ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Ethiopia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Advisory Services (663-0111) 1964

DESCRIPTION:

The main purposes of this project are to improve the overall policy, planning, administration, and development of all phases of agriculture and agricultural industry in Ethiopia.

The functions and responsibilities of this project are concerned with: (1) Agricultural development policy of the Ministry of Agriculture and of other ministries and agencies dealing with agricultural development; (2) Building the Ministry of Agriculture's planning capabilities to cope with development problems; (3) Establishing a viable Agricultural Economics and Statistics Department within the Ministry of Agriculture; (4) Assisting the Ministry in overcoming administrative deficiencies which tend to make the Ministry inefficient in its operation; (5) Establishing a marketing system for the efficient marketing of all agricultural products; (6) Collaborating in selecting and processing participants to help build professional agriculture competence and capabilities; (7) Integrating and coordinating USAID agriculture programs with other donors; and (8) Advising and guiding the Ministry of Agriculture to implement specific new projects.

The project was planned originally to operate through 1976. The budget, however, was incrementally obligated. As a result, during the regular refunding periods, the project experienced some changes in scope as well as duration. Specifically, in 1970, the project was revised to absorb residual elements of earlier subjects. The residual elements were the training program for Ministry of Agriculture spray pilots and the continuation of the participant training program in agriculture extension. In addition, project staff were increased and it was thought the project end date should be eliminated, since the mission believed the project should continue indefinitely.

However, in 1971, it was decided that the project would be phased out during FY 1972 and FY 1973, and relevant project staff would be transferred to a new replacement project on Agricultural Planning (see 663-0172), which would focus specifically on the Planning and Programming Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture, and on provincial agricultural planning.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- This is an institutional capacity-building project whose ultimate aim is to increase agricultural production through improved policies, planning and research.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Ethiopia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Advisory Services (663-0111) 1965

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: USAID/Ethiopia, Audit Report, June, 1969. USAID/Ethiopia, Project Appraisal Reports, December, 1969, April, 1972, and September, 1973.

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular ___x___ Special ___x___ Final _____

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

The primary purpose of this project was to improve the planning capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture of the Government of Ethiopia. Since its inception, the project has moved progressively to achieve this goal. Early project activities focused on training Ethiopian staff abroad, and on doing planning studies and providing guidance through technical specialists, but institutionalization of that process was slow due to Ethiopian budget and staff constraints. By 1969-70, a Planning and Programming Department was established. By 1973, the Department served as a focal point for the Ministry, planning and evaluating projects for all technical divisions, coordinating the agricultural sector budget, and collecting and analyzing statistical data. The training of Ethiopian staff was highly successful: 100% of participants returned to positions for which they were trained. Also, the project conducted grain marketing studies, and commodity index time series were implemented in all areas of the country.

Finally, there were a number of subsidiary activities (added to the project in 1971) which were not entirely central to the achievement of the project purpose. These included continued assistance to the MOA Aerial Spray Unit (Pilot/Plant Protector Advisor), assistance to the Ministry of Land Reform and Administration (consultant and participant training), and to the MOA Motor Pool. A relevant result of these activities, however, was the embryonic development of a planning unit within the Ministry of Land Reform and Administration by 1983.

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*This project was originally planned to operate from 1965 through 1976. In 1973, this project was phased out and replaced with the Agricultural Sector Planning Project, No. 663-0172. See the evaluation summary of 663-0172 for related findings of the follow-on project.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

- Helped to develop the country's five year plan and prepared the Plan of Operation for the Ministry of Agriculture.

- A steady improvement in the marketing structure and systems for the Ethiopian grain and meat industries have been registered since the U.S. assistance began. International markets have been identified and developed.

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

- The project established Planning and Programming Department was relied on by the Ministry of Agriculture to provide data, and input and sometimes guidance to the development of agricultural projects, programs, budgets and policies.

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

- The Ministry of Land Reform and Administration developed an embryonic planning unit.

- Staffing and assistance to the Ethiopian Grain Corp.

- Staffing and assistance to the Livestock and Meat Board

- Project staff served on a high level Task Force on Land Use and Resettlement Policy

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- Design, establishment, building and training of staff in the Planning and Programming Department, including a Statistical Division of the Ministry of Agriculture

- Training, return, and employment of 67 Ethiopians

- Conduct of numerous studies and evaluations

- Completion of a survey of the Agro-Industry sector

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

<u>The Agricultural Sector</u>

None noted

<u>The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs</u>

None noted

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None noted

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

- Early difficulty in getting capable in-country technicians to staff planning unit
- Budgetary restrictions of the host country

ENHANCEMENTS:

- The project was well managed.
- The project was given support by the Government of Ethiopia.
- During this project period, the political environment in Ethiopia was relatively stable, this made it easier for individuals being trained abroad to return home.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

None noted

Institutional

- Success is more likely to be achieved when trainees return to work in the institution for which they are trained.
- Host country support is an essential contributor to success.

Other:

None noted

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Ethiopia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Sector Planning (663-0172) 1973

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$477,000	$477,000
Grant	477,000	477,000
Loan	0	0
Country	0	0
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Land Reform and Administration

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

USAID technical consultants, training institutions

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: Assist the government of Ethiopia in planning, implementation, evaluation of rural and agricultural development programs and projects during Fourth Five-Year Plan (FFYP) period.

PURPOSES: Assist those central ministries and agencies engaged in planning Ethiopia's agricultural and integrated rural development effort for FFYP, with particular reference to programming management and evaluation, as well as manpower development.

OUTPUTS: Water/land conservation and development programs expanded. Grain marketing policies developed and major project prepared. Marketing, farm management research programs continued. Two regional development projects with sound marketing components prepared. Pulses production program finalized. Agricultural sector component of FFYP expanded. Ministry of Agriculture evaluation system installed. Land reform, administrative components of FFYP prepared. System for budget procedures improved. Third FYP agricultural sector reviewed.

INPUTS: Technical consultants, participant training.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Ethiopia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Sector Planning (663-0172) 1973

DESCRIPTION:

This project represents a sequel to the Agricultural Advisory Services Project (663-0111) operated from 1964-1973. The various expert consultants who were employed by the earlier project were absorbed to conduct the activities of the Agricultural Sector Planning Project, representing a continuation of their project planning and design efforts in the Ministry of Agriculture. Specifically, the staff were retained to advise the Government of Ethiopia on marketing, training of staff for the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), conducting financial analyses and organizing teams for project identification, preparing and installing an evaluation system and a budget procedure system, providing technical advice on project development, developing strategies for the Fourth Five Year Plan (FFYP), developing enforcement capabilities, and providing assistance in the areas of land reform and livestock planning. In addition, the Agricultural Sector Planning Project includes a training component, as did its predecessor, to provide training abroad to Ethiopians in agricultural planning.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Integrated rural development policy guidelines
- Improved and expanded water and land conservation and development policies
- Grain marketing policies with regard to institutions and programs developed for implementation during the FFYP period
- Land reform policies

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Ethiopia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Sector Planning (663-11-190-172) 1974

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR:

U.S. AID, Project Appraisal Reports, November, 1974 and Janaury, 1977

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular ___x___ Special _____ Final _____

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

The project goals originally specified that planning and programmatic assistance be provided to Ethiopian agencies involved in agricultural and rural development during the Fourth Five Year Planning (FFYP) period. Early progress of the project was satisfactory with work continuing as under the predecessor Agricultural Advisory Services project. Project consultants for the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) formulated a number of projects including a small grain structure analysis and storage project provided input to the FFYP, and to drought relief proposals, streamlined budget systems, completed a number of surveys and assisted the Ministry of Land Reform and Administration conduct their planning. Training also continued.

Early project progress, however, was halted, and in fact reversed, sometime after 1974 when new leadership emerged in Ethiopia, redirecting the government policies as well as personnel. Comprehensive project development of an agricultural planning capability was postponed, later cancelled, and was succeeded by extensions of support designed to complete that which had begun (i.e. participant training). Despite the fact that broad planning support was precluded by events outside project control, the project did support some short term and academic participants and short term consultancy services in support of the Ministry of Land Reform and Administration.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

None noted

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

- Early in the project, planning assistance was provided to the Ministry of Land Reform and Administration

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- Early in the project, the budgetary procedures of the MOA were streamlined and standardized.

- As of 1977, ten M.S. degree programs and three short-term training programs were initiated. At the time of the evaluation, none of the three M.S. candidates who completed training had returned to Ethiopia. The three short term participants were employed in the Ministry of Agriculture and Settlement (formerly the Ministry of Agriculture)

- Early project activities resulted in completion of two crop surveys, a survey of grain storage and marketing, and a survey of agricultural credit needs of small farmers in Ethiopia.

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

None

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

1. The emergence of a new government directed with a different political philosophy and the complete transformation/reorganization of the social and administrative structure in the rural sector through the implementation of land reform proved destabilizing to Ministry programs.

2. There was rapid turnover of relevant government ministers and department heads during the government transition period.

3. Strong support for planning and program development was lacking.

4. The disparity in government salary levels further undermined the organizational viability of PPD.

5. Participants trained in the U.S. were reluctant to return to the uncertain political environment in Ethiopia.

ENHANCEMENTS:

None

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

1. Salary levels should be studied to determine their potential effect on staff retention

2. Safeguards should be incorporated in participant training programs to ensure effective utilization and participant return

Institutional

1. The institutional viability of planning agencies involved should be studied, along with their relationship to the central planning commission. The host government should be effectively committed and prepared to provide the support necessary for achievement of project purposes.

Other:

1. Thorough project design and a complete and up-to-date logical framework is necessary for effective project evaluation.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: The Gambia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Mixed Farming and Resources Management Project (635-0203) 1979-1983 plus possible 2nd phase

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$7,298,000	$4,060,000
Grant	6,000,000	3,338,000
Loan	0	0
Country	1,298,000	722,000
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (MANR)

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

Consortium for International Development

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To increase the economic well being of the rural people of the Gambia

PURPOSES:

- o Foster intensification and integration of crop and livestock enterprises within existing Gambian farming systems
- o Increase net rural family income

OUTPUTS: a) Detailed large-scale land classification maps for each of the Gambia's five administrative divisions; b) a trained cadre (8-10) of Gambian resource planning technicians capable of using and interpreting aerial photographs; c) physical development of grazing areas; d) baseline inventory of existing plant communities; e) year long forage and natural resources planning capability; f) improved technology and productivity for forage and maize production, with 4-5 officers and 5-6 assistants trained in forage production and management; g) improved efficiency in farm production with 300 members of 30 local Livestock Owners' Associations (LOA) and 30 district extension agents trained; h) baseline, in-depth and market surveys, with three MS-level persons trained and 25 field enumerators trained; i) trained Gambian teams and BS-level Ministry officials; 20 trained Gambian laborers and machine workers; 50 Gambian officials trained in workshops

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INPUTS:

- 18 person-years of technical assistance from five long-term specialists (later increased to 25 person years of 6 specialists)
- U.S. contractual assistance for aerial photography, photo interpretation
- GOTG staff time and support resources

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: The Gambia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Mixed Farming and Resource Management Project (635-0203) 1979-83

DESCRIPTION:

The first phase of a long-term program envisioned for The Gambia, the project consists of six components: 1) land resource and use evaluation, classification and cartography; 2) grazing areas development and management; 3) improved crop and forage production and management; 4) improved rural technology; 5) strengthening ministry planning and evaluation capacity; 6) agricultural skills training and communications. A wide variety of activities was planned in each component. To carry out activities, a technical asssitance team was planned of four specialists (range ecology, forage agronomy, agricultural economics, rural sociology) for four years each and a fifth for two years (maize agronomist). This long-term TA of 18 person years was expanded to 25, increasing to five years the time of the first four operational specialists, to three years the time of the fifth, and adding a sixth (agricultural economist researcher) for two years.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Improving agricultural planning and data surveying capabilities in GOTG as support for developing land use policy
- Improving grazing land management
- Improving technology and productivity of farm production, particularly with regard to forage and maize production
- Agricultural diversification

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: The Gambia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Mixed Farming and Resources Management Project (635-0203) 1979-1983

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: USAID, Early Mid-Term Evaluation, April 1983

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular _____ Special ___x___ Final _____

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

Field implementation began in spring, 1981, rather than the original plan of FY80, after a technical assistance contract with AID was signed in February, 1981. The broad and multi-faceted project scope narrowed appropriately to focus on three major thrusts: 1) improving maize, forage and range management through research, trials and demonstrations with selected farmers and Livestock Owner's Association (LOAs); 2) a broader push to increase maize production and its commercialization; and 3) testing of the production packages developed for maize, forage and range management in integrated village settings. These main thrusts have proceeded well. Maize productivity among participating farmers has increased to 2.5 tons/hectare from a national average of 1.6. 18 LOAs have been very receptive to assistance in range management and feeding. The range inventory is proceeding. Selection and training of Gambian counterparts, demonstrators and enumerators has been successful and reflects the high degree of cooperation and interest found in Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (MANR). The socioeconomic data base is being developed, surveys occurring and a Socio-Economic Research Unit (SEU) has been established in MANR. Introduction of farm carts proved impractical. Aerial photographs and land use maps were delayed but are being produced and will be useful in range management and planning, but their use in developing a national natural resources policy and plan is more than can be done under this project. Moreover, since MANR has been reorganized into two Ministries and the current Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) has no jurisdiction over the natural resources, there is no central unit responsible for overall land use and natural resources planning. The project, overall, has been quite successful in meeting goals (or in showing progress toward meeting goals) in maize, forage and range ecology areas, in establishing an SEU, and in training. Recommendations were that it should be continued along the lines it has evolved toward, with its actual goals streamlined to be consistent with its actual focus, eliminating specific or allusive reference to national natural resources policy and planning or to effects on the entire agricultural sector.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

None identified

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

- Maize productivity increased among participating farmers to 2.5 tons per hectare (from a national average of 1.6). This was of great interest to decision makers and may point to some policy and program changes in the future to promote increased production of maize.

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

- Local LOA's have been convinced to cooperate with AID initiatives to improve forage and range management

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- Socio-Economic Unit established in MANR
- Gambian personnel trained or being trained
- Aerial photographs and land use maps being produced which will have great use in agricultural and natural resources management and planning
- National farming/livestock survey was conducted

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

<u>The Agricultural Sector</u>

Not identified

<u>The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs</u>

Not identified

<u>The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs</u>

Not identified

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

- No implementation plan in project paper and six different logical frameworks which, in sum, were overly ambitious and not integrated
- Attempted coup in July-August, 1981, disrupted project
- Underfunded in relation to its broad objectives. Project originally to be $9M, but was cut to $6M with no changes of objectives or activities
- COP overly burdened by minor administrative duties
- Insufficient short-term and very specific TA in development and analysis of survey instruments

- GOTG has delivered on its in-kind contributions, but has been unable to contribute necessary operating funds

- Split of MANR into two units, with MOA no longer responsible for natural resources

ENHANCEMENTS:

- Excellent AID-host government technical and administrative cooperation and appropriate Title XII institutional involvement (CID) in TA, training and technology transfer

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

- Need to focus project on achieving its maize, forage and range production/management objectives and integrate the six logical frameworks into a consolidated basic thrust, as is illustrated and recommended in this evaluation

- More attention to analysis and survey interpretation

- Develop micro-computer data processing capabilities for in-country processing and analysis of survey data

- Need to have more training of GOTG staff in how to use the maps and economic data collected

- Project implementation has been hampered by the weakness of the Project Paper. Its project description goes from the general to the specific without defining a guiding integrating concept, and the components themselves are unwieldy and over-ambitious.

Institutional

- Relieve GOTG of obligation to cover operating expenses for which they have no budgeted funds

- Improve financial management of project to reduce administrative and certification burdens without losing accountability and separation of funds

- Need to provide assistance to GOTG in developing a pointed, comprehensive policy and mechanism for the management of national natural resources. Without this, most individual efforts are doomed to failure.

- The chief of party has been too burdened with administrative details. Needs to be freed up to supervise technical work.

Other:

- The project is underfunded and too short. Increase funding from $6M to the initially contemplated $9M and extend it for two additional years under a refocused and reasonable set of goals and objectives

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Ghana

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: National Agricultural Planning (641-0048), 1969 (FY 1970)

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	Not Available	Not Available
Grant		
Loan		
Country		
Other (Other Donors)		

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), Development Coordination Unit (DCU)

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

OPEX personnel recruited by the Near East Foundation, U.S. training institutions

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To assist the Government of Ghana to upgrade the quality of agriculture sector planning, project appraisal, and performance evaluation of the MOA, by developing and operating the DCU.

PURPOSES:

1. To improve the Ministry's capacity for staff level analysis of policy problems;
2. To develop and institutionalize rigorous planning, programming and budgeting of Ministry activities; and
3. To improve the implementation and evaluation of Ministry programs and projects.

OUTPUTS: 1) DCU permanently established in the MOA; 2) DCU operating at full strength; 3) Budgets prepared by DCU; 4) Projects prepared by Economics and Marketing Division; 5) Refinement of the review and evaluation process being performed by the DCU.

INPUTS: 1) two OPEX specialists in agro-administration and agro-economics; 2) training of 5 of the participants in the U.S.

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ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Ghana

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: National Agricultural Planning (641-0048) 1970

DESCRIPTION:

In 1964, the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) established a Development Coordination Unit (DCU) to prepare agricultural development plans and coordinate technical activities of the service organizations of the MOA. The lack of staff, however, essentially rendered the DCU ineffective. This project, by providing technical staff, was directed at institutionalizing the planning, programming and budgeting functions in the MOA. The project provided two experts in agro-administration and agricultural economics for a period of four years starting in 1969. Some DCU staff were also to be trained as participants in the U.S.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

None noted

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Ghana

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: National Agricultural Planning (641-0048) 1970

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: USAID, Project Appraisal Reports, April, 1972 and November, 1974.

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular ___x___ Special _____ Final _____

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

The purpose of this project was to institutionalize the Development Coordination Unit (DCU), later renamed the Planning Division, within the Ministry of Agriculture, and to provide agricultural program planning assistance. By the end of 1974, a Planning Division was established but not functioning at its potential or with a clearly defined role. The division did not grow as expected, has experienced high turnover, and even lost returning participant trainees. More optimistically, proposals developed for a National Fertilizer Program and Seed Components have been accepted and expanded by the Government of Chana.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

o MOA funds were made available for fertilizer and seed programs.

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

The government of Ghana accepted proposals under the project for a National Fertilizer and Seed Program.

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

None noted

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

o A Planning Division was established

o Nine staff received MSC training

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

None noted

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None noted

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None noted

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

1. The project experienced early delays in recruiting personnel and organization of backstopping support.

2. The DCU staff were relatively young and inexperienced and there were problems with Civil Service regulations regarding permanency of appointments to the Unit.

3. Optimum performance of project staff was inhibited by a seeming lack of demand for planning support on the part of MOA leadership.

4. Many returning trainees did not remain with the DCU due to poor service conditions and low morale brought about in large part by inadequate leadership and the ambiguous role of the unit in the MOA.

5. Training of counterparts was minimal due to high turnover of staff.

ENHANCEMENTS:

1. High quality staff

2. The DCU, despite limited numbers of staff, did a superior job of selecting and releasing participants for training.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

None noted

Institutional

1. OPEX technicians should perhaps not be used in situations where institution building is one of the primary goals. Because of the nature of the relationships and strictures created by chains of command their leverage is often weak in situations where the availability of outside backstopping support and an unimpaired line of communications to the top is required to assure project directions are maintained and jointly supported.

2. The crucial factor determining success is the will and desire of the host government applied to achievement of project goals. It is vital that the senior management of an institution to be assisted should understand and endorse the funcion to be introduced by the technical assistance advisor and firmly desire

to have them built into or strengthened within the organization. Such a commitment will provide maximum assurance of provision of counterparts and sustained impetus for the local staff to develop and assume steadily increasing responsibility.

3. The Planning Division could have the capability of developing and implementing policies and programs, but it must be properly utilized and directed.

4. Significant political and administrative changes in a host government organization call for a serious project review between the Mission and the organization to clarify whether unity of understanding and a similar level of perception still exists on the project's purpose and the means of its implementation.

Other:

None noted

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Ghana

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: District Planning and Rural Development (641-0073) FY 1977

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$724,000	$144,800
Grant	500,000	100,000
Loan	0	0
Country	224,000	44,800
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Atebubu District Council

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

USAID technical consultants

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To improve the economic and social well-being of rural Ghanians in a way that becomes self-sustaining.

PURPOSES: To develop the capacities of the Atebubu District Council and its supporting system of local, regional, and national institutions to effectively involve the district's population in the planning, management, implementation and evaluation of an integrated rural development program directed towards achieving the district's growth, employment and equity objectives.

OUTPUTS: Pre-Implementation Phase: 1) Methods for identifying the potentials for and the critical obstacles to district development change evolved. 2) Method for improving the planning capabilities of a District Council and its supporting institutions identified. 3) Methods for creating local self-help capabilities in the development of economic and eventual social infrastructure identified. 4) A low-cost easily managed information system that allows District Council and other decision makers to monitor, evaluate and correct the individual and combined effects of the various development activities established. 5) An integrated system approach for increasing the production and incomes of small farmers within the district worked out. 6) Identification of income-generating activities that increase rural employment opportunities. 7) Approaches to non-formal education and local organizational development to support agricultural production and alternative income-generating activities as well as infrastructure development identified.

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Implementation Phase: 1) Approaches/measures for developing capacity instituted. 2) Management information system operational. 3) Agricultural production increasing techniques/inputs introduced. 4) Appropriate income-generating activity introduced. 5) Economic and social infrastructure development. 6) Non-formal education and local organizational development.

INPUTS: USAID:

1. Technical services: development planning advisor, short-term consultants, project proposal preparation
2. Commodities and vehicles
3. Research support from Ghanian institutions for special studies and surveys
4. Support money for technical consultants (including housing)
5. Experimental projects
6. Coordination with the USAID Managed Inputs and Delivery of Agricultural Services Program for Small Farmer Development (MIDAS)

Government of Ghana:

1. Local resources
2. Budget

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Ghana

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: District Planning and Rural Development (641-0073) FY 1977

DESCRIPTION:

This grant was provided to help the Government of Ghana to develop the capacities of the Atebubu District Council and its supporting institutions to effectively involve the district's population in the planning, management, implementation, and evaluation of an integrated rural development program. By using the process approach to project development, it was expected that project activities would evolve out of the local decision making process, and though experimental trial activities. The Government of Ghana had been expected to decentralize its decision making with the district councils and village development committees responsible for identifying and carrying out self-help activities within the district's development plan. Since this decentralization strategy was new and untested, this project was funded in a pre-implementation phase only. A larger implementation phase was expected to follow later.

The pre-implementation phase was to identify, develop, and test the effectiveness and replicability of: 1) methods for identifying the potentials for and the critical obstacles to district developmental change; 2) methods for improving the planning and management capabilities of the district council and its supporting institutions; 3) an integrated system for increasing the production and incomes of small farmers within the district; 4) alternative income-generating activities that increase rural employment opportunities; 5) methods for creating local self-help capabilities in the development of non-formal education and local organizational development which will support development; and 7) a low-cost, easily managed information system that will allow the district council to monitor the various development activities.

The project was expected to operate from 1977 to 1980. The end date, however, was later revised to 1982.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

None identified

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Ghana

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: District Planning and Rural Development, Phase I (641-0073) FY 1977

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: USAID/Ghana, Project Completion Report, October, 1982.

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular _____ Special _____ Final ___x___

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

The project was only marginally successful in achieving its purpose. The project did not succeed in organizing and motivating the Atebubu District Council to coordinate with other local, regional and national institutions to implement an integrated rural development strategy or a 5-year development plan for the district. This is because throughout the life of the project, the role and authority of the Atebubu District Council remained unclear. District governments of Ghana have little authority to allocate resources or implement self-initiated programs. This constraint was to have been eliminated with the passage of a decentralized Local Government Act which was never occurred. The project was able to conduct a survey of local needs and constraints and to design and implement eight subactivities (six of which were completed) to test the local population's ability to carry out rural development projects. The project was not extended to the implementation phase.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

None noted

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

None noted

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

None noted

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- Completed project activities included:
- A socio-economic study which surveyed the needs and constraints of the District population

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

None noted

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None noted

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None noted

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

1. The Mission experienced difficulties obtaining a suitably qualified long term technician to complete project requirements and high contract turnover. Short-term U.S. consultants were never brought on-board due to time delays and lack of identified needs.

2. The project could not be achieved without passage of a national decentralization act.

ENHANCEMENTS:

None noted

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

- Activities which did not produce tangible and immediate evidence of benefits for the rural population did not gain the needed involvement, support and sustained enthusiasm to assure completion. In projects, such as a community health center, where only social benefits accrue to the population, the motivation has to be provided by an individual or organization outside the community. Without this assistance, it was unlikely that the facility would have been completed.

Institutional

- The passage and effective implementation of a national decentralization act is needed to fully achieve the overall project purpose.

- Without the authority to collect revenues, allocate resources, and make decisions on behalf of the local population, district governments are ineffective as coordinators of various governmental services within the district and are unable to

implement community development projects. Even with such authority, there must exist good working relationships between the district governments and the local population.

- In the early stages of the implementation of the sub-activities, the Mission recognized the need to assume a more active role than was originally planned. This was due to the fact that the organization dealt with in the sub-activities was inexperienced and not well organized for project implementation. Major problems which they faced in dealing with USAID as a donor agency were a lack of understanding of procurement regulations and documentation of financial transactions and activities, and completing project activities within a specified time. Thus, USAID had to undertake much of the routine procurement and almost all of the construction responsibility. Rather than try to bypass the existing system and implement projects differently than designed, USAID/Ghana recommends that Missions should not hesitate to terminate projects that are performing inadequately.

Other:

- The Mission was concerned with the high cost of inputs required for project implementation, such as basic building supplies. On the one hand, Mission policy throughout this project was to encourage local participation in procuring necessary and available materials. On the other hand, because of the shortage of materials available locally and because of severe inflation, USAID had to obtain most of the materials from other sources.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Kenya

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Planning (615-0133) FY 1965*

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$1,644,000	$1,644,000
Grant	521,000	521,000
Loan	0	0
Country	123,000	123,000
Other (Other Donors)	1,000,000(est.)	1,000,000(est.)

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Ministry of Agriculture

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

Agricultural planning experts provided by USAID and other donors; U.S. Census Bureau training

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: Increase production of Kenyan agricultural sector, enabling farmers to participate in the cash economy of the country where their capital generated by increased production will assist in overall development.

PURPOSES: Assist Ministry of Agriculture in establishing country-wide policies that will most economically and effectively develop Kenyan agricultural and range resources.

OUTPUTS: Planning unit established within the Ministry of Agriculture, Kenyan personnel trained in agricultural economics and planning as replacements for AID technical advisors, policy reports prepared in policy planning, agricultural development projects implemented.

INPUTS: USAID: 2 technical experts, training of one participant in the U.S. Bureau of the Census' course on agricultural statistics. Kenya: financial and logistical support.

related findings of the follow-on project.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Kenya

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Planning (615-0133) FY 1965

DESCRIPTION:

The general approach of this project is for USAID to provide two technical experts in agricultural planning to the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA). These experts were to collaborate with the experts provided by other donors and endeavor to establish a Planning Unit as a functional organization in the Ministry, and undertake to plan an agricultural program for Kenya, subject to the direction of the Minister. Specifically, the project was targeted to: a) provide assistance to the MOA in the development and institutionalization of a planning unit; b) assist in the formulation and evaluation of agricultural development projects; c) advise the MOA on policy issues associated with the negotiations in international trade in farm products; d) assist in the evaluation of ongoing projects; e) assist in the preparation of policy reports on the economic growth of the agricultural and related industries for Government of Kenya officials; f) to train 3 Kenyans in agricultural eocnomics and planning to replace technical advisors; and g) to train one Kenyan from the Ministry of Finance at the U.S. Bureau of Census in agricultural statistics.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- international trade of farm products
- growth of agricultural and related industries

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Kenya

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Planning (615-0133) FY 1965

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: USAID, Project Appraisal Reports, February, 1969, and October, 1972

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular ___x___ Special _____ Final _____

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

The purposes of this project was to develop and institutionalize a planning unit in Kenya's Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), to provide policy and planning expertise, and to train Kenyan personnel. In 1969, the MOA reorganized and decentralized the planning function, spreading out planning responsibilities within various divisions in the Ministry. Despite the reorganization, project advisors were quite productive and successful in influencing policy, especially pricing policies, in producing a development plan, in conducting analysis and writing reports, and in training personnel. By 1972, a planning unit had apparently been established and institutionalized, and the production of policy and planning papers continued.

This project was subsumed under the National Range and Ranch Development Project in July, 1972.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

- Understanding by the Government of Kenya of the need for realistic price relationships between producer prices, the prices of purchased inputs and for the sale of agricultural products in relation to world prices; and the announcement of a new policy to bring producer prices in line with world prices through a series of phased steps.

- Marketing revisions based on benefits to the whole economy instead of a protected few.

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

- As a result of the project, a gradual evolvement of greater cognizance of the need for more careful review of all factors (especially institutional factors) affecting the development of agricultural subsectors. This awareness provided a favorable environment for the work of the Planning Division.

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

- Major economic research for policy and action determination came to be handled almost exclusively by interinstitutional working parties. Coordinating committees between agencies have been established in most project areas.

- The action of the project team caused a closer working relationship between personnel in Economic Planning, Agriculture, Cooperatives, and Land Settlement. This resulted in data available to demonstrate to Ministry leadership the relationship between internal prices and world markets.

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- The project proceeded on target in meeting planned objectives for preparing policy and planning papers, filling positions in the Planning Division with Africans, developing background donor organization contributions, and papers for organizing working parties and committees.

- More Kenyans were trained (in country and out-of-the-country) for key roles in the planning process.

- Project efforts resulted in the hiring of an international management team to support a study of producer prices.

- Situation papers resulted in a survey of research facilities and actions.

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

<u>The Agricultural Sector</u>

None noted

<u>The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs</u>

None noted

<u>The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs</u>

None noted

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

1. The direction and organization of the personnel in the division was weak.
2. There was a lack of economic data available in readily useable form.
3. Secretarial services was inadequate.

4. U.S. input was slow. Recruitment and arrival of scientists did not occur until after all other donor scientists had arrived. Problems immediately arose from environmental factors as borne upon the scientists with different backgrounds from different countries. It was necessary for these scientists to work together and the frictions were accentuated by their lack of understanding of local cultural conditions, and ministry procedures.

5. Government operations do not encourage inter-ministerial cooperation, resulting in procedural delays.

ENHANCEMENTS:

1. Excellent counterpart staff.

2. Working relationships between USAID and other donors' personnel have been quite good.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

- A definite organization structure needs to be arranged for project staff so that the role and responsibilities of the scientists is clear and acccepted by all parties, rather than having staff act on an adhoc basis.

- Papers must be prepared on a continual basis. Often a series of 6-7 papers will result in changes where a first report alone cannot.

Institutional

- Due to the reorganization of the MOA, additional technical advisors should be considered.

Other:

None noted

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Kenya

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Rural Planning (615-0162) FY 1976

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$5,882,000	$5,882,000
Grant	2,648,000	2,648,000
Loan	0	0
Country	939,000	939,000
Other (Other Donors)	2,295,000	2,295,000

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and Ministry of Finance and Planning (MOFP)

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

USAID technical advisors (through the Harvard Institute for International Development) and short-term consultants, academic institutions

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To enhance the absorptive capacity for development activities in rural areas, particularly agricultural programs directed toward the rural poor, and to ensure opportunities for full participation of rural people in planning these activities.

PURPOSES: To develop within the Ministry of Agriculture an improved institutional capability for agricultural policy and strategy formulation, project preparation and implementation monitoring. To develop within the Ministry of Finance and Planning (MOFP) an improved institutional capability to plan and implement a system of decentralized, particularly rural planning, supportive of the Ministry of Agriculture's (MOA) planning and implementation efforts.

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OUTPUTS:

(1) A reorganized MOA Development Planning Division more than 50% staffed with trained Kenyan officials.

(2) A new Management Systems Evaluation Unit attached to the Office of the Permanent Secretary, MOA, 50% staffed with Kenyan officials.

(3) A new Planning and Management Committee within the MOA.

(4) Reorganization of the Inter-Ministerial Estimates Working Group for Agriculture.

(5) Establishment of the "Project Committee" concept within the MOA whereby officers of the planning, technical and financial divisions jointly participate in project design and evaluation.

(6) Preparation of detailed guidelines for developing projects at the district level.

(7) Development of project inventory matrix identifying both central and local development activities by District.

(8) Development of recommendations by MOFP Rural Planning Unit for expanding local participation in planning/implementation.

(9) Preparation of a rural planning section of a 1979/80-83/84 Development Plan.

(10) Development and installation of a system to ensure central planners have access to and consider local inputs into planning efforts.

INPUTS:

AID:

(1) Technical advisory services to the MOA and MOFP

(2) Short-term consultant services to the MOA and MOFP

(3) Long-term, short-term training, and overseas training for Kenyan personnel

(4) Commodities in support of advisors

GOK:

(1) Counterparts for all TA advisors

(2) Office space, equipment, secretarial, clerical and transport support

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Kenya

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Rural Planning (615-0162) FY 1976

DESCRIPTION:

Through the provision of technical assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and the Ministry of Finance and Planning (MOFP), later renamed the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development (MEPD), this project attempted to improve the institutional capacity of these ministries to plan and manage rural development (particularly agricultural) programs and projects and at the same time ensure local-level participation in these processes by strengthening the Government of Kenya's evolving decentralization efforts. The project funded, jointly with contributions from five other donors, a contract with the Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID) to provide technical assistance and training over a period of four and one-half years to upgrade planning and management skills in the MOA. In addition, AID funded, on a bilateral basis, a four-year program of technical assistance and training in the Rural Planning Unit of the MOFP to improve and accelerate the Government's ongoing efforts to decentralize planning and attain greater local-level participation in the process. By working with these two ministries, AID hoped to forge better linkages between the center and the field so that planning and implementation activities carried out in each place could be better coordinated and harmonized.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Focus on planning and program development

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Kenya

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Rural Planning (615-0162) FY 1976

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: Saywell, John T., The Rural Planning Project, Rural Planning Section, Ministry of Economic Planning and Community Affairs, A Mid-Term Evaluation, 1979, USAID, Project Evaluation Summary, May, 1982, and USAID/Nairobi, Kenya Rural Planning II Project, Project Paper, 615-0189, August, 1980.

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular _____ Special ___x___ Final ___x___

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

The purpose of this project was to strengthen the planning, coordinating and supervisory capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development (MEPD) (previously called the Ministry of Finance and Planning), and to assist the MEPD to gain local-level input into the evolving decentralized decision-making process. A mid-term evaluation found that despite major efforts by the various parties involved progress toward achieving these purposes was not being made, with the exception of training Kenyan personnel. Delays were experienced in getting the Government of Kenya to assign trained counterparts, to establish a Management Systems Evaluation Unit, to coordinate with other donors, and to submit timely reimbursement claims. Also, while recommendations were made by advisors for improving organization, decentralized planning, and implementation of the Rural Development Funds Program, most recommendations were not implemented. Access to policy makers had also been difficult, and identification and evaluations of district projects had not yet begun. Contributions, however, had been made to the Fourth National Plan.

Many of the mid-term problems were overcome by the final evaluation. Progress was made toward goal and purpose achievement, although the time allowed for the project was felt to be inadequate. Project staff helped prepare the 1979-83 Kenyan Development Plan, leading to a number of small farmer assistance programs. In addition, the project trained staff contributed to food policy. The MEPD advisors prepared standardized systems for infrastructure inventories, information flow, project identification and anlaysis. Most district plans (40) were completed, though they ranged considerably in quality. More impacts are described below.

After project completion, assistance to the MOA was continued with other donor funding. Assistance to the MEPD was continued under USAID Project #615-0189, Rural Planning II.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

- Project staff helped prepare the 1979-83 Kenya Development Plan which focused attention on small farmer assistance programs. Examples of specific development were the Machakos Integrated Development Program, AID's Arid and Semi-Arid Lands Project, and the completion of nearly all 40 District Development Plans.

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

The Kenyan government specifically focused its Development Plan on small farmer assistance programs.

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

- Nearly all 40 District Development Plans were completed, although many were not completed in time to be used in formulating the National Plan.

- Divisional and locational development committees now play an active role in local planning.

- As a result of training undertaken for and by this project, the Kenya Institute of Administration has increasingly added material relevant to district planning to its standard course for administrative staff.

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- A comprehensive staff training program was undertaken. Both in-country and overseas training was provided.

- Within the MEPD, advisors prepared standardized systems for inventories, information flow and project identification and analysis.

- Two reorganizations in the MOA resulted in functioning sections dealing with Strategy Planning Commodity Analysis, Policy Planning, Project Preparation, and a Management Systems Evaluation Unit.

- The District Development Officer (DDO) is now an institutionalized function associated with planning and project monitoring at the district level.

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

<u>The Agricultural Sector</u>

None noted

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None noted

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None noted

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

Mid-term constraints:

- There are historical, structural, attitudinal, and manpower factors that have impeded the Government of Kenya in implementing a rural development policy that has strong inputs from planning at the district level in the short-term and is largely determined by participatory decentralized planning in the long-term.

- Changes in the organization for planning have been recommended. While the thrusts of the recommendations have been accepted in principle, they have not been, and are not likely to be implemented due to shortages in staff.

- A system for decentralized planning was designed that may not have been realistic considering constraints. Too much data was requested in relation to staff capacity at the district level with the know-how to gather data or to write a plan. District planning was not perceived as a high priority, and Kenyan participation was low with too much reliance on advisors.

- Furthermore, time constraints on the advisors, inadequate staffing and counterparting by the Government, the centralized structure of the Government, and the newness (lack of experience) of the District Development Committees have hampered the decentralization process.

- It was difficult to get trained counterparts.

- Advisors time was often diverted to short term operational needs.

- Advisors were unable to reach policy level Kenyan officers.

Final constraints:

- The private sector continues to hire staff to better paying jobs.

ENHANCEMENTS:

- Perhaps as a result of increasing government concern with performance in the agricultural sector, advisors (over the life of the project) were finally able to reach policy makers.

- During the project, the MEPD was given major design and coordinating responsibilities for AID's Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) Development Program. This opportunity gave the MEPD authority and control over resources for a broad range of planning in the ASAL districts, which in turn, increased the legitimacy and political weight of district level planning in these areas.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

- Although progress was made toward goal achievement, the time originally allowed for the project was too short.

Institutional

- To improve decentralized planning:

  1) redesign the financial information and budget flows to provide (only) necessary data at the district level;

  2) provide sufficient socio-economic information on a district base to permit an accurate assessment of needs and against which results can be measured;

  3) increase discretion over resource allocation decision at the district level, and real impact on sectoral programs through the District Development Committee (DDC); and

  4) increase staffing in the Rural Planning Section (RPS) and the districts.

- In order for long-term rural development planning progress to be made, there must be a clear and well understood commitment to the policy and the means to implement it at the Cabinet level. Progress and findings should be reviewed annually at a meeting of Permanent Secretaries.

- The RPS should be upgraded, reorganized, and provided with adequate cadre of trained staff. Professional development opportunities and training should be provided.

- District plans should be analyzed for input to the national plan.

- A management plan, laying out priorities and schedules and reorganizing inputs should be developed by the Senior Advisor and Government to control planning through December 31, 1980.

- Expand the role of the DDCs gradually to increase their responsibilities for all development activities in the District.

- Authority over money is the key to decentralization. Under this project not enough effort was placed on determining the set of conditions that would need to be met to convince the central authorities that substantial funds could be allocated and used effectively at district level. This is the focus of the follow-on project (Rural Planning II, 615-0189).

- Similarly, sectoral planning groups, established to draft various sections of the National Plan, were only sporadically successful. Reliance on this institution is likely to be productive only if the groups have some very concrete tasks to perform and very specific resources under their control.

- Counterparts for advisors continued to be a problem, mostly at MOA. Project designs need to overcompensate with additional training, etc.

- There is a strong advantage to donors when they have close contacts with high level advisors such as provided in this project. While the advisors must respond primarily to the interests and perceptions of their Kenyan employers (as it should have been) they could improve the flow of information and ideas with the many contacts developed between donors and government.

Final recommendations:

- In the case of the MEPD District Planning activity the attempt to prepare 40 plans simultaneously was unfortunate. There was not the data base, the capability of District staff was limited and some central ministries were not cooperative. The rigidities of existing systems were probably underestimated. However, progress has been made and a process begun. Data disaggregation and a slow buildup of District Level responsibility for activities are an important first step.

- There was no clear division between the advisor role and the operational line ministry positions. The advisors spent considerable time in line capacities particularly in planning and implementation of the integrated district level projects. This has the positive effect of increasing the advisors' knowledge of actual processes but does reduce time available for other tasks.

<u>Other</u>:

None noted

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Kenya

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Rural Planning Project II (615-0189) FY 1980

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$5,600,000	$5,600,000
Grant	3,575,000	3,575,000
Loan	0	0
Country	2,025,000	2,025,000
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Ministry of Economic Planning and Development (MEPD)

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

USAID technical advisors, University of Nairobi, Kenya Institute of Administration, other training institutions

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: Establish a planning system in which district planning constitutes an integral part of the national planning process.

PURPOSES: Develop, within the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, and at the district level, an improved capability to involve rural people in planning and implementing rural development activities in their district.

OUTPUTS: 1. District plans modified/updated/implemented. 2. District level plan monitoring procedures designed/implemented. 3. Small project identification/evaluation system designed, strategies formulated for the 1984-88 planning period. 5. System established to automatically provide districts with disaggregated expenditures and information for high rural impact ministries/programs. 6. Current fiscal procedures and decisionmaking process mapped, implementation of a strategy initiated for selected fiscal devolution to districts in one or more high rural impact ministries. 7. District Planning Officer cadre launched, skills of the Regional Planning Division and district staffs upgraded.

INPUTS: 1. Long-term U.S. advisory service to the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development. 2. Short-term U.S. consultant services. 3. Planning assistance to districts. 4. Training: A. Long-term, overseas; B. Long-term, in-country; C. Short-term, in-country. 5. Evaluation consultant services. 6. Administrative support services.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Kenya

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Rural Planning Project II (615-0189) FY 1980

DESCRIPTION:

This project is being conducted to assist the Government of Kenya (GOK) to improve the capability of the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development (MEPD) to involve rural Kenyans in planning and implementing development activities in their districts. MEPD will implement the project with long-term consultant assistance.

The project consists of three components. First, 40 district plans developed under AID's Rural Planning I project (615-0162) will be implemented, as follows: costs will be updated to reflect recent GOK budget revisions, and these changes will be transmitted to district officers; procedures to clarify district-level responsibilities for plan implementation will be developed; criteria will be devised to help district officers identify and evaluate small projects so as to recognize gaps between district needs and funding; and strategies will be designed for the 1984-88 period.

Training will be provided to GOK and non-governmental district planners. Short-term "learning-by-doing" training workshops and seminars will be taught by experienced Kenyans and expatriate tutors; and rural planning extension officers will carry out field work with district development and planning officers. Master's degree training will be offered abroad to 12 rural planning division officers and selected district officers. Also, eight Kenyans will receive a B. Phil. degree and four will receive a Masters degree at the University of Nairobi. A total of 160 Kenyans will attend 3-month classes at the Kenyan Institute of Administration, and 900 will attend 3-day seminars offered by the Rural Service Coordinating and Training Unit.

Rural development decision-making will be decentralized. Existing budgetary process and supporting fiscal information of GOK ministries with high rural impact will be mapped, and the financial information flow for programs of these ministries will be expanded to permit input from the districts. Increased financial information will be conveyed to the districts on a regular basis. Finally, appropriate ministry programs (including, where possible, GOK accounting, auditing and such procedures) will be transferred to the district level.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Capacity building

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Kenya

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) Development (615-0172) 1979

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$18,654,000	$1,864,500
Grant	13,000,000	1,300,000
Loan	0	0
Country	5,645,000	564,500
Other (Other Donors)		

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

1. Ministry of Economic Planning and Community Affairs (MEPCA)
2. Ministry of Agriculture (MOA)

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

USAID advisors

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: Improve the quality of life of rural poor people living in Kenya's arid and semi-arid lands, especially the Kitui District, through soil and water conservation activities, appropriate farm technology and decentralized planning.

PURPOSES: 1. Establish a basis for launching an accelerated national development program in arid and semi-arid lands through: a) enhanced administrative, planning, and technical competence, and b) testing and proBing an array of activities in soil and water conservation and tillage methods. 2. Preserve and improve the agricultural production base in the pilot area in Kitui district.

OUTPUTS: 1. National annual planning documents containing general ASAL development plan. 2. National annual planning documents containing agricultural development plans for ASAL. 3. District annual development planning documents for Kitui district. 4. Planning officers trained in improved techniques of planning. 5. Improved data base for ASAL development planning. 6. Feasibility studies completed. 7. Soil conservation technicians each with 6 months of intensive training. 8. Conservation officers with advanced training abroad. 9. Improved farming system. 10. Farmers trained to use the improved farming systems. 11. Improved soil moisture conditions. 12. Enhanced usable water supplies. 13. Reduction in the rate of loss of soil.

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INPUTS: Technical advisory services to the MOA and MEPCA in the central government and to district organization in Kitui district. Short-term consultant services to MOA and MEPCA. Long-term training for personnel in MOA and MEPCA. Counterparts for all technical advisors. Office space and equipment. Technical advisory services to the ASAL branch, MOA. Technical advisory services to the Survey of Kenya. Short-term consultants services to the Survey of Kenya and ASAL branch. Feasibility studies. Landsat imagery. Aerial photographs. Commodities in support of ASAL branch.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Kenya

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) Development (615-0172) 1979

DESCRIPTION:

This five year grant was provided to the government of Kenya to establish a basis for launching an accelerated national development program in arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL). Problems were to be addressed at both the national level, primarily through ASAL planning and data collection, and the district level, primarily through soil and water conservation activities in a pilot area in Kitui district.

The planning component was to consist of technical assistance from 3 ASAL planning advisors. Two advisors were to provide ASAL planning assistance at the national level, and the third advisor was to work at the district level, specifically focusing on planning for Kitui district.

In the data collection component, 3 different methodologies were to be employed to provide basic data needed for effective planning in ASAL. These included: pre-investment resource inventories, aerial photography, remote sensing imagery, and other mapping aids; and feasibility and project design studies.

In the soil and water conservation component, soil and water conservation techniques were to be tested in a pilot area of The Kitui district. A 350-acre soil and water conservation demonstration farm and training program was to be established at the Better Living Institute in Kitui. Sixty soil and water conservation technicians were to be trained at the Institute each year, and training was to be provided abroad in modern conservation techniques for selected officers. Also, farmers were to be oriented to improved conservation measures. In addition, moisture conserving tillage implements were to be designed and tested, and conservation oriented afforestation activities will be supported.

The project was projected to directly benefit an estimated 21,000 farm families in Kitui district, 170 certificate level graduates through training in soil and water conservation methods, and approximately 40 government of Kenya personnel through training received outside Kenya.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Land use and development

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Kenya

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Arid and Semi-Arid Land (ASAL) Development (615-0172) 1979

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: USAID, Regional Inspector General for Audit/ Nairobi, Memorandum Audit Report on Review of Host Country Contributions Associated with Louis Berger International, Inc. Host Country Contract in Kenya, March 11, 1983.

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular _____ Special ___x___ Final _____

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

This report evaluates the host country contract with Louis Berger International, Inc. (LBII) to implement the arid and semi-arid lands development project in Kenya. The report focuses on contracting procedures during the first year of project activity (8/81-10/82) without addressing project progress in meeting goals and purposes. However, since most of the problems noted below concern late start-up, it is fair to assume that at the early time of this evaluation in the project's life, no substantive progress was being made toward goal and purpose achievement.

The GOK has been unable to provide the financial and resources initially planned. As a result, AID has paid costs that have been paid by the GOK, and LBII technicians have not been able to work effectively. The GOK has not provided the funds for 30.3% of project costs or for stipulated facilities, equipment, and services as planned. USAID/Kenya intervention has not resulted in more rapid flow of GOK funds.

Offices and housing for LBII personnel were not provided by GOK, causing LBII to use AID funds to construct or rent facilities and to pay commuting costs; the lack of facilities in turn lowered team morale. The GOK also has not made available and maintained vehicles and tractors purchased by AID, resulting in the use of project funds to rent vehicles and purchase gasoline.

Furthermore, the GOK did not provide laborers to maintain maize and bean fields or a draftsman. GOK counterparts for the soil and water conservation component spent only 5% of their time on the project. Training in soil/water conservation, targeted for 55 technicians, was cancelled after completion of the first course for 20 participants as the GOK would not assure hiring of course graduates.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

None noted

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

None noted

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

None noted

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

None noted

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

None noted

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None noted

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None noted

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

1. The GOK was not able to provide planned facilities, personnel or resources in support of contractor staff.

2. The project was designed during a reasonably good economic period in Kenya, when money was committed based on expected availability. When the project actually started, the GOK was experiencing serious "cash flow" problems.

ENHANCEMENTS:

None noted

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

1. The lack of local housing adversely affected implementation because of time lost commuting between Nairobi and Kitui, and low team morale and because office facilities were not available as expected.

2. Procedures whould be developed to ensure that project vehicles are available to the project, rather than being directed to other uses.

Institutional

1. USAID/Kenya was unable to solve the procedural and financial problems resulting from the GOK financial crisis. The problem was exacerbated by lack of clarity regarding GOK contractor support responsibilities.

Other:

o None noted

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Lesotho

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Lesotho Agricultural Sector Analysis (632-0064) 1976

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$1,768,200	$1,768,200
Grant	1,181,500	1,181,500
Loan	0	0
Country	271,600	271,600
Other (Other Donors)	315,100	315,100

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Planning unit of the Government of Lesotho

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

Colorado State University

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To increase the capacity of the Government of Lesotho to rationally plan and respond to the major agricultural development issues of the country.

PURPOSES: The project has two purposes. The first purpose is to develop the capacity of the Government of Lesotho (GOL) to implement, update, and utilize sector analysis as a planning tool in evaluating alternative development strategies for economic and social development in the agricultural sector. The second purpose is the establishment of a long-term institutional relationship between a U.S. university department and its personnel and Lesotho's Ministry of Agriculture, Cooperatives and Marketing (MOA) and the Central Planning and Development Office (CPDO) in the Ministry of Finance (MOF).

OUTPUTS:

- Preparation of an Agricultural Sector Review (ASR) by university personnel and GOL personnel
- Preparation of an Agricultural Sector Assessment
- General agricultural and rural sector analysis
- Training for Lesotho personnel in sector analysis
- Institutionalization and integration of data collection, data analysis and policy evaluation for the agricultural sector

- o Agricultural development planning library in Lesotho

INPUTS:

- o 15 person-years of U.S. technicians in Lesotho
- o 15 person-years of Lesotho technicians
- o 36-54 person-months of participant training in the U.S.
- o 1,000 books for the library

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Lesotho

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Lesotho Agricultural Sector Analysis (632-0064) 1976

DESCRIPTION:

In the mid-1970's the government of Lesotho lacked adequate capacity to address the major agricultural problems which the country faced, such as severe erosion and lack of fertilizer use. This project was designed to bolster the government's capacity to deal with these problems by training personnel in agricultural economics, by providing long term advisors to work in the areas of policy analysis and implementation along with the government of Lesotho staff, and by building up a reference library in the country. The goal was to position the government to deal effectively with the major problems faced in the agricultural sector.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Severe on-farm erosion
- Lack of fertilizer
- The structure of farming does not promote land conservation and efficient crop production.
- The government finds it difficult to translate awareness of problems into concrete and feasible strategies.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Lesotho

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Lesotho Agricultural Sector Analysis (632-0064) 1976

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: USAID, Project Evaluation Summary/ June, 1978
USAID Special Evaluation/February, 1980

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular ___x___ Special ___x___ Final _____

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

The project had varied success in meeting its goals. The most successful component was training in which Lesotho personnel were trained in agricultural economics at Colorado State University (CSU), and many of the trainees returned to take positions in the Lesotho government. It appeared that a good long-term relationship between CSU and Lesotho had been formed through this training component.

The building of capacity within the government of Lesotho had mixed results. The planning unit within the government had definitely expanded with capable new staff and had been reorganized to function more effectively. Unfortunately, the staff within the government of Lesotho had not worked jointly with the project team from CSU on policy analysis. This meant that the extensive research and analysis done as part of the project was done solely by CSU and did not result in increased government capacity. Also, the research and policy analysis that was conducted was felt to be too academic and not appropriate for policy change within the government.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

None identified

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

None identified

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

None identified

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- During the period from 1976 to 1979, the Ministry of Agriculture planning unit was upgraded to a division and its professional staff increased from three to ten persons. The average level of training of the staff was increased and several persons trained at CSU took higher level jobs in the government.

- Considerable progress had been made toward the institutionalization of agricultural planning in Lesotho, and this project had played an important role in this.

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

None identified

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None identified

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None identified

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

- Lack of time and commitment by host country staff to work on the project
- Little work on research projects which addressed actual program and policy concerns. Reports were too academic.
- Lack of time by GOL staff made it difficult to provide in-country training. It was felt that the costs of this in-country training exceeded benefits.
- Some of the policy and research papers were prepared too late for use in decisions within the country.

ENHANCEMENTS:

- The training component was highly successful which led to a long-term relationship between CSU and Lesotho.
- The project staff was also dedicated and produced a number of excellent reports which also helped to correct the relationship with the country.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

- During project design, more attention should be given to establishing a realistic plan for counterpart personnel. The plan was too optimistic which caused problems with project implementation.
- Key terms should be defined as precisely as possible. For example, the term "sector analysis" is still subject to a wide range of interpretations more than three years into the project. If the project designers are unable to precisely define a key term, project managers and implementors should strive for a more precise definition as the project unfolds.

Institutional

- Once agreement between the country and AID has been reached, it is essential that the host government commit the agreed upon numbers of personnel unless unusual circumstances develop.
- USAID personnel should be alert to potential differences regarding project implementation between the host government agency and the contractor. The probability of success can be greatly enhanced if USAID takes the initiative to negotiate differences and, if necessary, modify the contract agreement. If modification is necessary, it is important that these changes be well documented so that misunderstandings can be minimized.

- If a project has a substantial training component, it is important to reach agreement with the host government on the assignment of students upon completion of their training. It would seem realistic that a specific period of service related to project activities should be a condition of scholarship acceptance. The period of service could be tied to the length of training involved.

Other:

- Students selected for advanced training in certain fields should be given special tutoring if required. This project provided special intensive assistance in mathematics to Lesotho students who were scheduled for graduate training in economics. This proved to be critical for their success at CSU and other U.S. universities.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Lesotho

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Planning (632-0218) 1980

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$7,352,200	$7,352,200
Grant	6,200,000	6,200,000
Loan	0	0
Country	1,152,000	1,152,000
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Ministry of Agriculture, Planning Department

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

USAID technical advisors, U.S. Universities

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To continue toward the attainment of a prosperous, agriculturally-led economy in Lesotho.

PURPOSES: To institutionalize an effective planning system in the Ministry of Agriculture.

OUTPUTS:
(1) Approved and functioning agricultural planning organization
(2) Personnel recruitment program
(3) Trained personnel in all key posts
(4) Approved and functioning operational system and procedures

INPUTS:
Long-term technical assistance: 4 persons for 5 years each
Short-term technical assistance: 30 person months
Participant training: 120 person years
Other: office and housing construction, vehicles, equipment, professional materials

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Lesotho

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Planning (632-0218) 1980

DESCRIPTION:

The goal of this eight year Agricultural Planning Project, started in 1980, was to contribute toward the attainment of a prosperous agriculturally-led economy in Lesotho through improved planning. The purpose of the project was to institutionalize a planning system in the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) with the capability to develop effective agricultural policies and plans. This was to be accomplished through detailed policy analysis and effective program and project formulation and evaluation. The purpose was to be accomplished when long-range planning systematically incorporates identified policies and priorities of the MOA. Achievement of the project purpose should result in a more efficient and effective utilization of scarce resources. As discussed in the 1982 Country Development Strategy Statement (CDSS), Lesotho must not only rely on, but also develop, its agricultural system as the cornerstone of economic development if the country is to attain increased economic and social viability.

The overall thrust of the project was to enable the Planning Division to become a complete, effective, qualified, and respected control center for agricultural sector planning efforts. To accomplish this objective, the Division would require better trained and more experienced personnel, incentives to attract and retain qualified people, an appropriate organization, well-defined and accepted operational systems and procedures, and effective working relationships with other government units, parastatals, and other donor agencies who have a role to play in the nation's agricultural planning process.

Thus, the project strategies involved providing technical experts to carry out operational responsibilities within the MOA, and on training counterparts and other personnel to assume greater responsibilities.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- capacity building for increased agricultural policy analysis

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Liberia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Program Development (669-0123) 1972

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$28,171,000	$1,836,000
Grant	2,588,000	1,836,000
Loan	0	0
Country	25,583,000	0
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Ministry of Agriculture (MOA)

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

USAID, technical consultants, training institutions, Peoples Republic of China, Peace Corps, UNDP, IBRD, CARE

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: Develop and implement policies and programs to enable farmers to modernize production technology to increase income flows, and participate more fully in economic and social outputs of Liberia.

PURPOSES: Provide technical expertise and related training and commodities to help MOA plan and monitor its development activities for the traditional sector. Specifically, this project will assist in MOA's planning/management unit, marketing division, and establishment of the soils division.

OUTPUTS: Planning; functional capability; analysis of agricultural sector; agricultural development plan; supporting programs and projects; data collection/tabulation of grading and fair trade standards; system of minimum buying; local rice mills, soils technology; publications; specific site information; recommendations for application of fertilizers and other physical inputs.

INPUTS: US: technicians, participants, commodities, other costs
Liberia: MOA budget, staff
Training institutions: training
IBRD and Peace Corps: technical services
UNDP: technical services, participants, commodities
Peoples Republic of China: commodities

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Liberia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Program Development (669-0123) 1972

DESCRIPTION:

The purpose of this project is to provide technical expertise and related training to enhance the capability of the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) to plan and monitor its development program. Specifically, this project was designed to: 1) assist the MOA planning and management unit to improve its capability for sector analysis, development planning, and evaluation projects; 2) assist the MOA marketing division to develop a capability for improving the marketing system and thereby provide production incentives to traditional farmers; and 3) assist in the establishment of a MOA soils division to provide information on land capabilities for planning purposes and for use of individual farmers. As the project progressed, the end date was revised from FY 1976 to FY 1979.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Overall short-term and long-term agricultural development, specifically development aimed at stimulating food production.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Liberia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Program Development (669-0123) 1972

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: USAID Project Appraisal Reports: May, 1974 and June, 1975; Robert R. Nathan Associates Inc., Liberia's Agricultural Program Development Project: Evaluation and Recommended Evolution, December, 1976; and USAID/Liberia, Impact Study of the Agricultural Program Development Project, December 1980.

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular ___x___ Special ___x___ Final ___x___

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

The purpose of this project was to provide technical expertise and support to the Ministry of Agriculture especially in planning and analysis, marketing, and soils information. Under the auspices of this project, the Planning Division grew from 4 to 47 staff, the budget increased eightfold and 32 Liberian staff were trained. Likewise, a statistics section with a growing budget was firmly established. Interim assessments showed that the project experienced delays in training, due to lack of qualified candidates, and that the soils component was progressing particularly slowly.

The project, however, also showed sufficient interim outcomes to be extended two years to compensate for delays. These early outcomes included a new pricing system (designed by project staff) tied to the FOB export value of the commodities, for coffee, cocoa and palm kernels. Other accomplishments included project evaluations, economic appraisals, completion of a first national rice survey in Liberia, preparation of proposals, publication of a statistical handbook, and proposals for the four-year national development plan.

Despite these encouraging interim indicators, later evaluations found that, except for training which resulted in the single positive project impact, the project capabilities were not institutionalized and the project had no impacts. Specifically, while a total of 32 MOA personnel were trained, almost all the trainees subsequently left the MOA due to underutilization of their skills. A competent statistical bureau was created within MOA, but its contributions have been ignored by the Minister. The soils technicians at the central agricultural experimental station were ordered to do studies of individual farms rather than conduct a nationwide soil survey. The marketing component was a failure due to the incompetency of the staff assigned, while the technology transfer function never developed at all.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

None identified

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

None identified

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

- Most of the 32 project trained professionals occupy middle and top level positions in government and public corporations, although not necessarily at the MOA.

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- The project enabled the MOA's Statistical Division to become established and operational, and for the Planning Bureau to be created.

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

None identified

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None identified

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None identified

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

1. Commodity procurement was an ongoing problem. Goods were cleared slowly and delayed in delivery from the port, orders were placed late, materials, such as calculators, were purchased with no local servicing available, project vehicles were misused, and GOL contributions to a trust fund for vehicles maintenance were slow.

2. There were continuing indigenous personnel shortages, especially in staffing the soils division, as local college graduates were usually unavailable for hire.

3. Even though the project attempted to address problems in the MOA, the political and organizational climate were unfavorable and unsupportive. Attempts to reorganize were not successful. Also, midway in the project, political emphasis changed from a sectoral to a project planning approach.

4. The effectiveness two agricultural economists (advisors) assigned to the project was reduced by their being spread across too many activities.

5. Appropriate technology was not available for adaptation to Liberia, nor did the technology transfer function receive adequate financial support.

ENHANCEMENTS:

1. The superior qualifications of the USDA PASA (technical advisors) team and positive relations with the host country personnel helped early progress.

2. The Government of Liberia provided growing budgetary support to MOA units.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

1. Consideration should be given to relevant third country training.

2. The project design, though well conceived, overestimated Liberian resources (mostly funds and qualified personnel), thus overloading the outputs and cutting the project's time frame too short. Critical project positions remained vacant for too long. Demands on available technical consultants were so considerable, that their effectiveness was diluted.

3. The project did not develop the technology transfer function, partially because no technology adapted specifically for Liberian situations were available, and partially due to lack of financial resources.

Institutional

1. Because of its project focus, MOA ended up with eleven satellite bodies, each with its own management, administrative and logistical structures, representing a significant duplication of resources.

2. The Planning Division was assigned responsibiliites that were too broad, considering early training limitations, which placed sharp limits on its capability and performance in developing individual projects.

3. A planning unit was established, but was influenced by outside events to switch from a sectoral to a project planning approach. The planning unit was too theoretical to have much effect on the direction of national planning. Because each project was implemented by a semi-autonomous agency and was planned without regard to sector needs, the project failure rate was very high. This approach was basically opposed to the coordinated effort which was necessary if food production on subsistence farms was to increase. The MOA was unable to take research and extension actions felt to be encessary due to policy directions.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Liberia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Cooperative Development (669-0127) 1977-82

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$2,062,000	$350,000
Grant	1,400,000	350,000
Loan	0	0
Country	494,800	0
Other (Other Donors)	167,200	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Cooperative Marketing Division (CMD) of the Liberian Ministry of Agriculture (MOA)
LCUNA (Liberian Credit Union National Association)

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

ACDI (Agricultural Cooperative Development International)

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: Increasing agricultural productivity and economic benefits for rural households engaged in small-scale agricultural production

PURPOSES: To foster development of an effectively structured and functioning agricultural cooperative system in Liberia, a) by installing adequate MOA services to currently operational cooperatives of small farmers; b) by concurrently analyzing issues basic to expansion and evolution of the cooperative system; c) by using the conclusions in planning for the project's second phase.

OUTPUTS: 1. Establish uniform accounting system. 2. Develop coop "extension tools". 3. Job description development of coops and MOA coop division, train coop staff, small farmers. 6. Produce and marketing standards established. 7. Establish a coop visitation program. 9. Establish coop capital expenditures and financial management advisory service. 10. Improve Liberian Credit Union National Association capacity to serve small farmers and coops. 11. Analyze issues re: farmer participation in expanded coop system.

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INPUTS: 1. Technical assistance (senior coop advisor, financial management specialist, coop training specialist, short-term consultants) $904; 2. participant training (2 academic, non-academic, in-country) $157; 3. commodities and equipment, $170. Total USAID funding: $1400. British ODM/Plunkett Foundation: 1. participant training, $61.2; 2. Plunkett coop course, $10. Peace Corps: 4 volunteer, $96. GOL, 1. MOA/coop and marketing division budget support, $487.3; 2. LIPA - management training, $7.5.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Liberia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Cooperatives Development (669-0127) 1977-82

DESCRIPTION:

Agricultural Cooperatives are relatively new in Liberia (1970) and are judged to be very weak. Yet, they are identified as the cost effective vehicle through which small farmers can profitably market crops and be advised on modern agricultural techniques. This project aims to install a more effective and efficient agricultural cooperative system by providing training to upgrade staff of MOA's cooperative marketing division and through OJT of government and cooperative employees, improving managerial skills, and responsiveness to members needs and institutionalizing accounting and auditing systems, a cooperative education system, marketing and management systems at the national and primary society levels. The project also endeavors to improve the capacity of the credit union movement to serve small farmers through assistance to LCUNA (Liberian Credit Union National Association). ACDI (Agricultural Coopertive Development International) is providing a senior cooperative advisor (team leader) to serve as advisor to the director of Cooperative Marketing Division (CMD), an accounting/records specialist to develop standardized records keeping and accounting systems for the cooperatives, and a cooperative training specialist to plan and coordinate training for MOA staff, boards of directors, cooperative employees and members. Short-term consultants will be provided and four Peace Corps Volunteers will be assigned to work for CMD.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Develop and strengthen capacity of agricultural cooperative system
- Improve capacity of credit union system to serve small farmer

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Liberia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Cooperative Development (669-0127) 1977-82

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR:

Project Evaluation Summary, June 1979
Project Evaluation Sumary, August 1980
Special Evaluation Report, June 1980

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular ___x___ Special ___x___ Final _____

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

There have been a number of process achievements which indicate positive movement toward project goals, including a) 2 week seminar for auditors at Cooperative Marketing Division (CMD); b) development of records keeping books and forms for cooperatives; c) development of visual aids for training cooperative personnel, Board of Directors and members; d) 3-week training course for field staff; e) conducting annual audits of most active cooperatives and several spot audits; f) conducting 7 special investigations at cooperatives with theft problems; g) TA provided to new cooperatives and to the new Liberian Federation of Cooperatives; h) reviewed and recommended revisions to existing cooperative act; i) revisions begun of standard by-laws of cooperatives; j) developing, on conjunction with MOA, a plan for an autonomous agency to replace present CMD; k) completed study of farmer understanding and attitudes at two cooperatives.

Overall, the cooperative system shows signs of improvement. More credit needs have been met, records keeping has improved (but is still weak) and there are improvements in holding annual board meetings and in assembling and handling produce. Also, farmers want and accept cooperatives.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

None yet, but on the horizon is the possibility of a new Agricultural Cooperative Act and the creation of an autonomous cooperative agency.

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

None noted

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

None noted

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

CMD and cooperative field and local staff are becoming better trained in bookkeeping procedures, management procedures, etc.

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

None noted

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None noted

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None noted

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

- Inadequate accountability of loan funds by cooperative management
- Cooperatives are and continue to be too dominated by sub-agents who do not operate cooperatives for the members' benefit
- Money continues to "disappear" from coffers of some cooperatives

ENHANCEMENTS:

Farmers want cooperatives and benefit from them (though they could benefit much more). One can't attribute this to the project, but, since 1976 the number of viable cooperatives has increased from 18 to 26. The volume of goods sold through cooperatives (vs. private agents) has risen from 52% to 71% and the amount of sales has increased from $2.9M to $9.7M.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

- GOL should enact a revised cooperative act
- GOL should create an autonomous cooperative agency to replace CMD
- Staff training should be intensified
- Consider establishing a section in the cooperative agency to provide TA to cooperatives in their formative stages, replacing the adhoc services now provided by the financial advisor
- Intensify financial management training and controls

- Continue support for credit union development

- Create an agricultural apex organization to represent cooperative concerns over produce prices and credit to the ACDC (Agricultural Cooperative Development Corporation) and the LPMC (Liberian Produce Marketing Corporation)

- Continue to stress and strengthen audit functions and controls

Institutional

None noted

Other:

None noted

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Liberia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Sector Analysis and Planning Project (669-0137) 1977-1981

LEVEL OF FUNDING	**ENTIRE PROJECT**	**PLANNING COMPONENTS**
Total	$1,888,000	$1,888,000
Grant	1,376,000	1,376,000
Loan	0	0
Country	478,000	478,000
Other (Other Donors)	34,000	34,000

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Ministry of Agriculture (MOA)

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

U.S. Department of Agriculture

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS:

- Increase agricultural productivity and economic benefits for rural households engaged in small scale agricultural production
- Formulate multi-year agricultural development policies and strategies to broaden socioeconomic program options for employment of physical, human, and domestic and foreign financial resources

PURPOSES:

- Facilitate and encourage an orientation toward a sectoral system framework in the preparation, appraisal, and implementation of development policies and projects
- Establish an improved procedure and factual base for continuing examination of sectoral problems through disciplined inquiry leading to more relevant and effective development programs and policies
- Use the preparation of a comprehensive sector analysis as an on-the-job training exercise which, with associated supporting resources, will consolidate and enhance the Ministry of Agriculture's Planning Division's capability for economic planning

OUTPUTS:

- A broad sector analysis including an intensive treatment of the subsector of rural households engaged in small-scale agricultural product

- On-the-job training for personnel of the Planning Division of the Ministry of Agriculture in broad sector analysis, including intensified training in micro-economic analysis and in the collection and utilization of field survey data

- Consolidated capability for producing crop statistics and for preparing and appraising development projects

- Augmented staff of the Planning Division of the Ministry of Agriculture having M.S. level training

INPUTS:

- From USAID: technical assistance (senior survey statistical advisor, farm management advisor, senior agricultural economic advisor, short term consultant); training (U.S. academic and nonacademic, third country); commodities (vehicles, office equipment)

- From Liberia: staff support, budget support

- From Peace Corps: volunteers to the MOA Planning Division in logistics, data processing, and farm management/micro-economic analysis

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Liberia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Sector Analysis and Planning Project (669-0137) 1977-81

DESCRIPTION:

- Production of a broad comprehensive agricultural sector analysis by the Ministry of Agriculture
- On-the-job training for the personnel of the Planning Division of the Ministry of Agriculture in broad sector analysis, including intensified training in micro-economic analysis
- On-the-job training in the production of crop statistics and in the collection and utilization of field survey data
- On-the-job training in preparation and appraisal of development projects
- Training for six participants in U.S. for Masters Degrees
- Practical training for six participants in U.S.
- In-country seminar presentations on project evaluation
- Special consultant studies and reports concerning forestry, land tenure, etc.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Rural manpower availability by region
- Participation in alternative forms of production under alternative institutional arrangements
- Range of crops that could be produced
- Liberian comparative advantage in various agricultural activities

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Liberia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Sector Analysis and Planning Project (669-0137) 1977-1981

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: Internal Evaluation of the Liberian Agricultural Sector Analysis and Planning Project, 1980

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular ___x___ Special _____ Final _____

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

- Self-sustaining staff capabilities in data collection and analysis have not been created and it is unlikely that they will be created by the end of the project.
- The comprehensive Agricultural Sector Analysis Report was behind schedule in 1980.
- The project team assisted the Ministry of Agriculture prepare its budget, reorganize its structure, appraise development proposals, and set policy after the coup d'etat. These activities were not part of the original project goals but the coup necessitated a change in direction.
- Delays in recruitment of U.S. advisors delayed progress on the project .
- Reports on soils, livestock, forestry, rice, land tenure, statistics, the socio-economic setting of subsistence agriculture, and project evaluation were completed by 1980.
- Participants for training were limited to staff of the MOA Planning Division and their quantitative background was inadequate for the proposed statistical training. Persons selected for training have been identified but training costs have been higher than expected.
- Progress on specific work tasks as of 1980 was as follows: Review of Institutional Framework - completed; Review of Development Projects - completed; Farm and Household Profiles - little progress; Socio-economic Appraisal - completed; Labor and Management Survey - no work; Soil Resources - responsibility transferred elsewhere; Demand Estimates - behind schedule.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

The project team prepared policy and organizational structure documents for the Ministry of Agriculture, many of which were

implemented, and advised the Ministry on development proposals. These impacts were not intended but the coup d'etat led to a role of increased importance for the team.

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

The new Ministry of Agriculture (after the coup) relied on the project team to provide policy analysis, organizational assistance, and appraisal of development proposals.

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

None intended

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

Somewhat limited impacts were observed in 1980 because the trained staff were unlikely to stay in the Ministry of Agriculture. Statistical capabilities were quite limited, although some progress had been made.

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

None noted

The Agricultural Sector

None noted

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None noted

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None noted

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

- Turnover of Minister of Agriculture (5 in 5 years) frustrated project
- Ministerial reorganization impacted progress
- Lack of agricultural statistician from U.S. hampered progress on project
- Other U.S. advisors arrived in Liberia one year late
- Low salaries and limited job opportunities may cause trained MOA staff to leave government positions. Thus it is difficult to maintain a capable staff
- Inflation forced up the costs of vehicles and equipment

- A coup d'etat resulted in a different mission for the advisory team than that planned in the project year. Instead of assisting analysts, the team prepared much of the analysis themselves and worked on different topics than those outlined in the project paper.

ENHANCEMENTS:

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

- In-country training is more appropriate to this project than overseas training for Masters Degrees.

Institutional

- Offices of consultants/advisors and Liberian analysts should be arranged to foster collegial relationships rather than separate, isolated actions, especially since the project is to promote long term Liberian capabilities.

Other:

None noted

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Liberia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: YMCA Agricultural Training and Development (669-0141) 1977

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$105,700	$90,700
Grant	57,200	57,200
Loan	0	0
Country	18,300	3,300
Other (YMCA)	30,200	30,200

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

YMCA

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

USAID

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To improve the productivity, income and quality of life for the rural poor in the villages in the project area.

PURPOSES: To provide a valid program design for assisting the villagers to identify their priority developmental needs and to plan and implement self-help activities to provide solutions.

OUTPUTS: Data collected and analyzed;
Elements of implementation phase program identified and quantified;
Access road built; land cleared for demonstration farm;
Soil analyzed (GOL);
Some village groups formed for development planning and action.

INPUTS: Survey planned
Survey staff provided
Survey staff outfitted with supplies, equipment, office, etc.
Survey conducted
GOL road equipment and labor (access road and land clearing)
GOL advice and assistance in data analysis

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Liberia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: YMCA Agricultural Training and Development (669-0141) 1977

DESCRIPTION:

The primary purpose of this survey was to collect information to help villagers in the project area (in and adjacent to the YMCA property in Habahn Chiefdom), to identify their development needs, and to plan and implement self-help activities to resolve their problems. The survey was meant to be a pre-condition and first phase of a process leading to a larger project to improve the income and productivity of local villagers.

The survey was to be conducted by selected villagers in the project area who were chosen on the basis of literacy and leadership potential. It was hoped that these selected surveyors would become village developers' assistants during the subsequent phase.

The YMCA was to direct and supervise the survey, and coordinate the analysis of the data, calling on the University of Liberia, the interested GOL government services and Ministries, and specialized consultants to assist in the analysis. The YMCA was to design and plan the larger project on the basis of the results of the survey, calling on these government services and consultants for necessary assistance or advice.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- rural development at the village level

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Mali

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Livestock Sector I (688-0203) 1975-82

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$13,422,000	$268,000
Grant	13,000,000	268,000
Loan	0	0
Country	422,000	0
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

OMBEVI (Malian Livestock and Meat Board)
ELIBEV (National Agency for Livestock Credit and Commercialization)

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

Chemonics
TAMM involved through other projects, principally in the Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL)

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS:

1. Help reestablish livestock sector, particularly as a food source, and avoid greater losses to herds or damage to pasture land.

2. Improve resource capacity of government personnel and herders and increase communication and exchange of information.

3. Help GOM carry forward its livestock program for Five-Year Plan and provide means by which they may improve their strategy, evaluate ongoing efforts and encourage further external support.

PURPOSES: To make a measurable impact toward restoration and improvement of one of Mali's meat productive sectors, within 3-5 years and of the quality of life of those dependent on the sector for livelihood.

OUTPUTS:

1. Extensive livestock operation in Dilly based on voluntary herder cooperation

2. GOM organized, with capacity developed, for all aspects of tse-tse fly eradication, land use planning and improvements

3. Alternative means to vaporize tse-tse fly zones fostered

4. Training and communications capability created to assure continued upgrading and recycling of GOM personnel and sensitization and improvement of communications with herder groups

INPUTS: TA (five full-time people); extensive short term consultants; commodities and contraction for Sahel grazing activity, training facilities at Sotaba and Dilly, research facilities for CVL and new land test activities; financial support for research and studies and funds for unanticipated needs and for testing new opportunities (including marketing).

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Mali

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Livestock Sector I (688-0203) 1975-82

DESCRIPTION:

A five-year program, initially financed for three years, which includes: 1) Sahel Grazing Activity ($2,791,000), selective interventions in the Dilly area of the western Sahelian zone and programs to incrase communications with livestock owners and to obtain their cooperation in phased modification of rangeland use; 2) Training and Communication, in-country training to assure well trained government personnel are available for livestock sector activities. Also sensitize herder groups and train leaders as a means to facilitate execution of the Sahel grazing activity ($1,542,000); 3) New Lands Activity, open new lands to cattle production and through tse-tse fly eradication and land use management. Phase I ($1,424,000) develops Malian capacity in tse-tse fly survey and eradication and aids completion of initial ecological and land use planning studies. Phase II ($3,500,000) provides commercial and technical assistance in tse-tse fly eradication and land development of a test site in the higher rainfall zone; 4) Complementary Activities, includes modest additional assistance to Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL) (tse-tse fly research) ($89,000), strenthening capacity in economics and sociology of the Malian Office of Meat and Cattle ($300,000) support for annual feeding, nutrition, selection of local stock research for Sahelian production ($500,000), improvements in collection and dissemination of market information and investigation of alternative marketing channels between Sahelian livestock producers and the modern sector ($50,000), and participant support in language training, follow-on studies, design and evaluation work ($408,000).

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

1. Reestablish productive livestock sector

2. In-country trained capacity to respond to increased demands for land use planning, tse-tse fly eradication, and livestock sector improvements

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Mali

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Livestock Sector I (688-0203) 1975-82

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: Mali Livestock Sector Redesign, 1980

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular _____ Special ___x___ Final _____

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

The 1980 audit report, the latest available evaluation of livestock sector projects (including Mali II -- the project here under scrutiny) concludes that AID-financed livestock activities have had little measurable success in developing the sector. No significant results have been derived from the Sahel grazing activity. The Sahel test area is 150,000 hectares, which a 1978 evaluation found much too large, recommending 4,000 hectares. This recommendation was not adopted and the only signficant accomplishment of the grazing activity has been the construction of about 500 km of livestock fencing. Evaluators feel that, among other things, planning and management of the Sahel activities have been inadequate. The New Lands Activities, designed ultimately to open up 3.5 m hectares of high rainfall but tse-tse fly infested land to grazing is "a year behind schedule because of frequent turnover of contractor personnel." The OMBEVI operated and AID-funded Lanugage Training Center, teaching English, French and Bambaum, has less than 20% (23/120) of its students involved in OMBEVI or other livestock projects. A March, 1979 AID project paper proposed a $46.4 m comprehensive livestock strategy, incorporating and enlarging upon many of the activities of the current four livestock projects in Mali (Mali II is one of them), but was rejected by GOM. A new project paper is now being prepared in collaboration with GOM. As of this evaluation, all four projects are being operated, as an interim measure, through the Mali Livestock II project.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

None noted

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

None noted

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

None noted

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

None noted

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

None noted

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None noted

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None noted

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

- GOM lacks the financial resources to absorb the recurrent costs of activities.
- GOM cannot adequately support the host-country contracting mode that is being used.
- AID and other donors are not coordinating their efforts.
- Accounting procedures are inadequate.
- Commodity procurement and utilization is insufficient (e.g. a $40,000 landing strip is not used, a $50,000 mobile home can't be transported to the project site because of road conditions, 19 of 51 AID-financed vehicles can't be used because of inadequate maintenance, etc.).
- USAID/Mali project management "needs improvement."
- The host government contracting mode creates too much of an employer-employee relationship between contractors and Mali, rather than a contractual relationship.
- Duplicate responsibilities for new lands studies - tse-tse fly control between Mali II project and Tse-Tse Fly/Ivy ponosonaisis analysis project and thus, between Chemonics and TAMN and between OMBEVI and the Central Veterinary Lab.

ENHANCEMENTS:

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

- USAID/Mali, in designing a new Mali Livestock project, should insure that the project is based upon sound assumptions and reconsider whether rolling design methodology should be used without first assuring that there are periodic evaluations
- USAID/Mali should assess and demonstrate potential financial viability of activities in new project
- Assess GOM's capability to utilize host country contracting mode
- Improve coordination of donor assistance in Mali
- Defer Sahel grazing activity until a definitive plan of action is developed
- Consolidate all livestock sector research in the CVL
- Establish Language Training Center as an outside project
- Make financial reports reconcilable with OMBEVI accounting records
- Establish adequate accounting system for ECDEV
- Ensure that financial monitoring responsibilities of the Office of Financial Management and of AID project managers are adequately defined and implemented

Institutional:

None noted

Other:

None noted

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Mauritania

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Renewable Resources Management Project (682-0205), 1978

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$5,466,100	$2,460,000
Grant	4,677,700	2,105,000
Loan	0	0
Country	788,400	355,000
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Directorate for Environmental Protection, Ministry of Rural Development

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

U.S. Contractor to AID

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To promote self-sustained development in the rural sector through the establishment of comprehensive programs to build manpower and resource base needed to withstand adverse climatic and environmental conditions, without disruption of continued development.

PURPOSES: To survey existing renewable resources and implement a series of pilot interventions which, together, will provide sufficient data to develop an integrated program of renewable resource management and conservation in Mauritania.

OUTPUTS:
1. Completed resource survey, inventory, and data base.
2. National plan developed for management and conservation of renewable resources.
3. Personnel trained for Protection of Nature Service.
4. Dune stabilization in pilot areas with experience gained for replication.
5. Pilot facilities established.

INPUTS:
- o AID:
  1. Technical assistance with support.
  2. Resource inventory.
  3. Vehicles and equipment.
  4. Commodities.
  5. Training.
  6. Construction and well drilling.
  7. Other.

- GIRM:
  1. Personnel and labor.
  2. Water.
  3. Land
  4. Commodities.
  5. Training.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY: Mauritania

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Renewable Resources Management Project (682-0205), 1978

DESCRIPTION:

The purpose of this project was to assist the Government of Mauritania in developing a national renewable resources management and conservation plan. The project collected baseline data by carrying out a renewable resources survey, tested the feasibility of discrete renewable resources interventions, and trained Mauritanians in resource management, extension, and interpretation of satellite and aerial imagery. Two contractor teams were to implement the project.

As a prerequisite to developing a national plan, a renewable resources survey, coupled with training for nine LANDSAT photo interpreters, was to be conducted through the interpretation of satellite imagery, aerial photographs, field observations, and pertinent literature. Data was to be collected on geology and mineral resources, hydrology and groundwater resources, forests, rangelands, wildlife and domestic animals, land use patterns, demography, transportation, and climate.

This baseline data was to be used to design and implement pilot dune stabilization, range management, and reforestation/forest management interventions which were to involve local populations and were to provide an experiemental base upon which the socioeconomic feasibility of expanding such activities can be determined. Dune stabilization were to be achieved through selective planting of trees and shrubs to create live fences and windbreaks in the towns of Boutilimit and Mederdra. In each town, nurseries were to be established to test grasses and native and introduced woody plants and to serve as local education centers in horticulture and silviculture. Two pilot vegetation/grazing reserves comprising 20,000 hectares were also to be developed. Wells were to be dug after the reserves had been developed and the local populace sensitized.

Finally, a specialist were to oversee short-term participant training for 40 people in extension methods. U.S. training were to be provided for two people in general resource management. Management training were also to be conducted in Senegal and Morocco for one person each in arid lands and forest resources and for four people in extension and personnel.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- How to promote self-sustained development in the rural sector in face of a deteriorating, renewable natural resource base.

*U.S. obligation started in FY 1965; implementation started in FY 1967.

*Source: Project Paper and AID Development Information System.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Mauritania

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Renewable Resources Management Project (682-0205), 1978

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: USAID/Mauritania, Project Evaluation Summary, 1982.

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular _____ Special ___x___ Final _____

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

Phase I, that of long term training in the U.S. for two Mauritanians, has been underway since 1979. Phase II, resources inventory using satellite and aerial photo imagery was completed in 1981. Results of this phase were expected to be available in 1982. Phase III, the pilot intervention centers Boutilimit, Mederdra and Haddad, have been plagued by numerous logistical and personnel problems. From a technical aspect, the project activities including range management, tree planting and sand dune stabilization had not significantly materialized at the time of the evaluations.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

None identified

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

None identified

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

None identified

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- A data base on renewable resources is being developed and will be processed into a report and accompanying mosaics.
- Two Mauritanian students have been trained in the U.S.

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

None identified

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None identified

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None identified

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

1. Lack of communication between project participants.

2. Lack of water at two of the pilot intervention centers caused the loss of one full year of work. Extension and training activities were unable to begin because of the lack of progress.

3. One center has no infrastructure.

4. The lack of project finalcial incentives for Mauritanian technicians has had a negative impact on project morale.

5. Backlogs in the USAID Project Support Division have caused numerous delays and resulted in increased expenditures.

6. Change in government leadership led to change in obligation.

7. Consultant personnel lost through attrition have not been replaced quickly.

8. Counterpart technicans have not been an integral part of Phase III activities as originally envisioned.

ENHANCEMENTS:

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

1. The contractor should be assigned greater purchasing and support responsibilities for the remainder of the project.

2. Change the following outputs: eliminate the Haddad pilot center; adding a reduced management component to Mederdra and increasing tree production to make up one year's loss of activities; and increase nursery production in Boutilimit.

3. The most effective management tools, communication and a tracking system were the missing elements that led to the delays and problems in the project. Open communication between all participants would have eliminated many of the logistical and personnel problems.

4. The Chief of Party should not be responsible for both technical and administrative leadership. Technical backstop by the contractor should be an integrated element of the project, affording project technicians the ability to discuss and have their work reviewed.

5. Greater attention must be devoted to mobilizing necessary host country government inputs (money, staff, commodities, training) to the project.

6. Technically, the activities of the project addressing sand dune stabilization and range management should be reconsidered and readjusted with more realistic goals in mind. Reforestation should be the focal point.

Institutional

None noted

Other:

None noted

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Mauritania

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Rural Assessment and Manpower Study (682-0211), 1979

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$5,600,000	$5,600,000
Grant	5,600,000	5,600,000
Loan	0	0
Country	0	0
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Ministry of Economy and Finance
Ministry of Rural Development

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

Checci, Inc., Louis Berger Associates, and Action Projects International

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: Long term economic growth with emphasis on the rural sector.

PURPOSES:
- o Information for decision-making and choosing among alternative development strategies;
- o Establish systematic data analysis and project planning for development planning in Mauritania

OUTPUTS:
- o Survey and data base
- o Project identification
- o Development strategy

INPUTS:
- o Team of long-term and short-term employers
- o Survey and computer tabulations
- o Office space, vehicles, household furniture and report reproduction center.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Mauritania

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Rural Assessment and Manpower Survey (682-0211), 1979

DESCRIPTION:

The project was designed to: a) establish a base of needed empirical information in the form of 15 baseline studies and statistical compendium; b) to analyze the data in order to determine realistic development options; c) to develop plans for specific actions and project interventions in the form of 19 option papers; and to collaborate with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania (GIRM) in incorporating project determinations into the country's upcoming Fourth Development Plan.

The project team consisted of a group of long and short-term technical advisors from a consortium of three consulting firms in the U.S.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Plight of the population in the rural areas.
- Overall development plan for the country
- Institution-building of government

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Mauritania

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Rural Assessment and Manpower Survey Project (682-0211), 1979

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: RAMS Assessment Team, Final Report for U.S. AID, 1981

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular _____ Special _____ Final ___x___

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

This project has had little success in meeting its stated goals. The project was disrupted by numerous technical, organizational and start-up difficulties. These problems were significant and long-lasting. The RAMS project was addressed to improving the data collection, analysis and planning capability of the Mauritanian Government, but unfortunately did not significantly improve this capability and funding was ended in mid-stream. The project did, however, produce some results, including 13 aggregate baseline studies and 5 microeconomic studies. A survey was also completed but its data were considered unreliable by the project evaluations.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

- The survey has been recognized by the GIRM as a useful tool and has been introduced into the planning process.

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

- The GIRM has established a committee system.

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- RAMS has helped GIRM to initiate the preliminary steps in the formulation of the Fourth Economic Development Plan (1981-85). Meetings have been held to aid in establishing national development indicators for the period ending in the year 2000.

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

None Noted

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None noted

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None noted

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

1. The RAMS project paper was unrealistic and overambitious in light of its short time frame and the logistical difficulties in conducting research in Mauritanian conditions.

2. Project staffing was inadequate, particularly in regard to a senior planner and a survey research expert.

3. Early contractor performance was poor in regard to financial management, recruitment and assignment of personnel, and the design and conduct of research.

4. Because of the failure to integrate and coordinate the component studies adequately at the outset of the project or to properly design the surveys, there were serious problems in analyzing the results for policy and planning purposes.

5. Phase I reports were behind schedule and Phase II output requirements were unrealistic in light of available time and staff.

6. Little attention had been given to institutionalizing the RAMS data collection and analysis process in the Mauritanian Government.

7. No interdisciplinary approach was envisioned in the project design. Specialists had been reluctant to alter their own methods and ideas to accommodate other fields. Also, no plan was developed on how the specialized baseline studies would be used to derive Phase II policy options.

8. While surveys collected data not previously collected, there were significant problems. In their haste to organize the surveys, specialists did not acquire a basic understanding of the Mauritanian context. This resulted in delays because consultants overrelied on survey data. Also, some important questions arose which were not earlier anticipated. Finally, numerous questions were not properly couched to adjust to the local cultural context and an acceptance of the difficulty in obtaining certain information from direct questioning and the evolution of alternative data collection strategies were not fully confronted.

ENHANCEMENTS:

None noted

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

- Greater attention should be paid to policy papers and inputs to the Fourth Five Year Plan, rather than background research papers.

- The number of research papers planned should be reduced a great deal to make them more detailed and thorough.

- The research and analysis process should be shifted from individuals to working groups. Unless management endorses the priority to do interdisciplinary, intersectoral work under a common policy framework with common objectives, RAMS staff from different units are likely to continue work in an isolated fashion. Long-term experts should constitute the core of most working groups for the purpose of clarifying policy issues and incorporating findings from other experts.

Institutional

- The GIRM should assure that long-term trainees be given a role and job within government upon completion of training.

- Better contact should be established between project staff and host country government staff.

Other:

None noted

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Niger

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Niger Integrated Livestock Production Project (683-0242) 1983-1988

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$19,284,000	$990,330
Grant	17,500,000	875,000
Loan	0	0
Country	1,784,000	115,330
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Ministry of Rural Development
Ministry of Plan
Ministry of National Education
Ministry of Health

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

Tufts University, North Carolina A&T University, New Mexico State University

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: Increased food production, higher incomes for herders, and a greater contribution of the pastoral sector to the national economy.

PURPOSES: To increase livestock productivity in Niger's pastoral zone by establishing institutional and policy framework with an appropriate set of private sector incentives.

OUTPUTS: 1. Herder Organization and Development: development of well managed, localized voluntary groups of herders organized into associations, pastoral communities and pastoral centers capable of representing herder interest and of undertaking productivity-increasing activities.
2. Animal Production and Health: identification of economically feasible and socially acceptable means of increasing productivity of livestock systems in the zone and the development of an animal production and health impact delivery system.
3. Natural Resources Management: establishment of a program for the listing, evaluation and extension of improved range management techniques which do not upset the delicate balance between animals, people, and resources through the network of Pastoral Centers to the herders and herder associations.
4. Marketing Research: establishment of an effective system of collection, evaluation, analysis, and timely reporting of

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livestock marketing information that would enable the government and the private sector in Nigeria to make informed decisions and coherent policy.

5. Human Resources Development: expanded primary health care and functional literacy programs impacting upon a mobile herder population.

6. Project Management: establishment of a project management component that will assure continuous monitoring and supervision of activities, assessment of impact on herders and their livestock, and evaluation of the project's results.

INPUTS: Technical assistance (long and short-term)
Training
Vehicles, micro computers, laboratory equipment, scientific equipment, camping equipment, office equipment
Credit fund, vehicle operations funding, animals, vaccination funds, satellite imagery, aerial surveys, communications and utilities
Veterinarian posts, water point development

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Niger

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Niger Integrated Livestock Production Project (683-0242) 1983-88

DESCRIPTION:

1. Herder Organization Development: assist associations to organize; monitor management of associations; provide credit; assist in training the associations' human and animal health auxiliaries; recommend techniques to improve livestock productivity.

2. Animal Production and Health: establish low-cost veterinary care system, including voluntary veterinary auxiliaries attached to each herder association trained to treat some conditions; introduce new technology through field research, field trials, partial implementation with evaluation, full implementation, and monitoring.

3. Natural Resource Management: inventory dry season watering practices; prepare water point maps; improve wells; inventory biomass and water conditions to provide information on forage and water.

4. Marketing Research: improve the capacity of the Nigerian government to collect, process, and analyze livestock and cereals marketing data; monitor food security by zone; analyze the economics of livestock markets.

5. Human Resource Development: expand the system of primary health care available in the pastoral zone; construct two dispensaries; train health care personnel; develop an early warning system for emergency health problems; train teachers to teach literacy to herders; develop teaching materials for literacy training; evaluate literacy training efforts.

6. Project Management: develop a management information system; prepare annual management plan; prepare regular monitoring and evaluation reports; hold in-country conferences.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Initiative for increasing agricultural production: policy is that private initiative should be encouraged through incentives

- Resource utilization: policy is that livestock programs should be managed within the context of habitat utilization and resource constraints such as water and biomass availability

- Health care: policy is that reduced incidence of disease and injury should be promoted to ensure sufficient availability of labor for herding population

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Niger

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Niger Agricultural Production Support Project (683-0234) 1982-1986

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$25,249,300	$9,822,500
Grant	19,900,000	7,761,000
Loan	0	0
Country	5,349,300	2,061,500
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Ministry of Rural Development
Institut National de Recherche Agronomique du Niger (INRAN)
Union Nigerienne de Credit et de Cooperation

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

Purdue University

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To assist Niger in achieving self-sufficiency in food production and improve rural standards of living.

PURPOSES: To expand and strengthen Niger's national level institutions providing support services, including cooperative development, agricultural inputs, supply seed multiplication, and extension services necesary to achieve sustainable increases in agricultural production.

OUTPUTS:
- o Creation of a National Center for Cooperative Training
- o Establishment of a more effective seed multiplication and distribution program
- o Establishment of an Extension Support Center
- o Institionalized coordination of extension and research activities
- o Expansion and increased effectiveness of logistical system for procuring and distributing agricultural inputs

INPUTS:
- o Personnel, both long-term and short-term
- o Construction
- o Commodities
- o Training

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ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Niger

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Niger Agricultural Production Support Project (683-0234) 1982-1986

DESCRIPTION:

- Creation of the National Center for Cooperative Training (NCCT): construction of classroom building with a library and study hall, dormitory, cafeteria, staff housing; training of field agents and cooperative officials, support for functional literacy training. (Training concentrates on cooperative organization, arithmetic, bookkeeping, agriculture, literacy training.)

- Design and Pre-implementation of Input Supply: analysis of input productivity, profitability, demand and supply for each agro-ecological zone; assessment of strengths, weaknesses, constraints, and potential in public and private sector resources and management capacity. (These are first year activities only; subsequent years' activities not yet approved.)

- Extension Support Center: construction of a documentation center, programming and evaluation of in-service training programs for extension personnel; development and evaluation of extension methodologies; integration of research and extension activities.

- National Seed Multiplication Program: establishment of a national seed office to carry out the policies of the National Seed Council; improvement of organization of seed multiplication centers; establishment of linkages with INRAN, extension programs and farmers.

- Program Coordination and Management: provision of support for engineering services, management of project and of Niger Cereals Research projects.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Reform of agricultural input supply system

- Increased capacity for training, through the National Center for Cooperative Training

- Institution-building: strengthening linkages between extension and research, clarifying division of effort among Seed Multiplication Centers, improving service delivery systems; establishing good working relationships between the Extension Support Center and regional productivity projects

- Increased capacity for research

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Niger

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Evaluation Assistance Project (683-0229), FY 1981

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$2,539,000	$ 2,539,000
Grant	2,000,000	2,000,000
Loan	0	0
Country	539,000	539,000
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Ministry of Plan, Bureau of Evaluation

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

USAID technical advisors, Peace Corps

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the Republic of Niger's development program management and administration.

PURPOSES: To establish a functioning program evaluation unit in the Ministry of Plan and effective linkages and information exchanges with the technical ministries.

OUTPUTS:
1. A trained, experienced pool of evaluation technicians and trainers in the Ministry of Plan.
2. A system (protocol) whereby the trained Nigerian staff of the evaluation Bureau in the Ministry of Plan will have access to the reports on project evaluations conducted by the technical ministries.
3. A capability to conduct major program evaluations or sector assessment.
4. A capability to conduct major program evaluations or sector assessments at the regional level (department).
5. A data bank and document archives on program and project evaluation.
6. An evaluation training component in National School of Administration.

INPUTS:
1. Long-term technical assistance.
2. Short-term technical assistance.
3. Commodities, maintenance, fuel, long-term training in the United States.
4. Long- and short-term training in third countries.
5. Country seminars, workshops, and in-service training courses.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Niger

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Evaluation Assistance Project (683-0229) FY 1981

DESCRIPTION:

The purpose of this project is to improve the Government of Niger's (GON's) development programs by establishing within the Ministry of Plan (MOP) a capability to evaluate these programs and develop effective information linkages between technical ministries. An Evaluation Bureau (EB) will be created within the MOP to implement the project.

A U.S. team, with expected help from the Peace Corps, will be providing initial training to staff members of the National School of Administration (ENA) in four areas: (1) basic skills (evaluation methodology, research design, field methods, data anlysis, systems design, management concepts, evaluation as a management tool); (2) practical training in evaluating a current evaluation program; (3) data gathering and cataloguing in preparation for the documentation center to be established within the EB; and (4) training of trainers to allow the EB to assist other evaluators within the MOP and GON technical ministries.

Other training is to include long-term, third-country training for one archivist and one or two other positions, and short-term training sessions, seminars, and workshops for EB staff in connection with practical assignments and evaluation of on-the-job performance. Finally, one ENA and two MOP staff members will be recieving Masters in Public Administration (MPA), with a specialization in program evaluation, in the United States. Course work will be emphasizing development administration, research design, and data analysis, and will be including a three-month internship working in the EB; interns will be spending four to six weeks of this time receiving orientation and further training and participating in project activities. The ENA trainee will eventually design and teach courses on evaluation in ENA's regular training programs. Training efforts will be supplemented by short courses conducted by the World Bank Economic Development Institute.

To provide a basis for information exchanges between the MOP and the technical ministries, a documentation center and data bank will be established within the EB. Mini-computers will be provided to catalogue studies and evaluations.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Institutional capacity building

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Niger

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Forestry and Land-Use Planning Project (683-0230) FY 1980

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$5,302,000	$1,855,700
Grant	3,839,000	1,343,000
Loan	0	0
Country	1,232,000	512,700
Other (Other Donors)	131,000	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Ministry of Rural Development (MRD)

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

USAID, Peace Corps

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To arrest and reverse the existing trends in deterioration of Niger's soil and vegetative resources.

PURPOSES: To establish a planning and managerial capability within Niger's forestry service; produce a long-term perspective plan for the rehabiiitation and protection of Niger's soil and vegetative resources; and increase the awareness of Niger's rural population and government service personnel on the need for resource conservation actions.

OUTPUTS: 1. Technical planning unit. 2. Natural resource inventory: A. field surveys, B. aerial photography, C. satellite imagery, D. maps made, E. documentation. 3. Model Sites: A. production, B. conservation, C. forest management. 4. Human resource development: A. forestry service, B. other GON services and agencies, C. general public.

INPUTS: 1. Personnel: A. Government of Niger, B. AID, C. Peace Corps. 2. Training: A. academic, B. in-country/extension. 3. Commodities. 4. Construction. 5. Land. 6. Other.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Niger

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Forestry and Land-Use Planning Project (688-0230) FY 1980

DESCRIPTION:

Under this four-year grant, technical assistance, participant training and commodities were to be provided to the Government of Niger (GON) to strengthen its resource management and planning capacity. The project was to consist of four major components: (1) a technical planning unit; (2) a natural resource inventory and data base; (3) model sites; and (4) human resource development.

Within the Water and Forest Service (EFS) of the Ministry of Rural Development (MRD), a technical planning unit (BTF) was to be established whose principal task will be to prepare a 20 year plan for the rehabilitation and conservation of Niger's soils, waters, natural vegetation and wildlife. This agency was to be staffed by 7 Nigerian forest technicians and one USAID land resource technician supported by short-term personnel as required.

Sixteen model sites were to be established to serve as data-producing units, in-service training facilities, and input sources from the public on experiments and activities. Model site activities were to include firewood and forage production, nursery and fire management, windbreaks, contouring, watershed development, and terracing.

A national resource inventory were to be produced from satellite imagery, aerial photography, and field observations to access to location, nature, and quality of resources.

EFS staff capability were to be developed through on-the-job training and academic programs, either in or out of Niger as appropriate. MRD and other GON personnel were to become familiar with the project through seminars and visits to model sites. Campaigns directed to the public to increase awareness of the project's efforts are to be accomplished through mass media. The Peace Corps was to provide two resource management volunteers to work full time with the BTF staff.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

A comprehensive plan for long-range land use.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Niger

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Cereals Research Project (683-0225) 1982-1992

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$13,373,000	$13,373,000
Grant	10,600,000	10,600,000
Loan	0	0
Country	2,773,000	2,773,000
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Institut National de Recherces Agronomiques du Niger (INRAN)

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

Purdue University, Alabama A&M University

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To assist Niger in achieving self-sufficiency in food production and to improve rural standards of living.

PURPOSES: To develop the capacity of L'Institut National de Recerches Agronomiques du Niger to undertake cereals research programs whose results can be disseminated to farmers via the extension and cooperative system.

OUTPUTS: 1. Growth and development of INRAN's capacity to administer and manage its research program, its resources and its linkages to other institutions.
2. Growth and development of INRAN's ability to support its researchers' efforts through support functions.
3. Growth and development of specific research activities oriented around a comprehensive, integrated, and systematic approach to research.

INPUTS: 1) Long term U.S. staff providing technical and institution building assistance; 2) research associates providing research efforts in Niger in U.S.; 3) short term U.S. staff providing technical and institution building assistance; 4) long term academic training for INRAN staff; 5) short supplies and library material; 7) operational funds for conduct of applied research; 8) remodeling and expansion of Kolo research station; 9) vehicles; 10) contracts for research services of CRSP programs or other international organizations (CRSP = Collaborative Research Support Programs).

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Niger

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Cereals Research Project (683-0225) 1982-92

DESCRIPTION:

This project is intended to:

a) Increase policy and planning of INRAN, including capacity to administer and manage research programs, to set priorities for research programs, and to manage research stations.

b) Strengthen interinstitutional linkages between INRAN and extension programs and non-Nigerian research institutions.

c) Provide suport to researchers (through INRAN) by expanding library facilities, analytical capabilities and by training research personnel.

Specific activities planned are:

a) Research on cereal crop improvement

b) Farmer surveys and on-farm testing of applicability of technological improvements

c) Farm management research

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Varying agricultural policy and plans to suit different ecological zones of Niger and to suite areas of different farming practices.
- Developing interinstitutional linkages on research and extension.
- Increasing capacity of INRAN to introduce new technology, to carry out research, to improve rural welfare, and to better set research priorities.
- Addressing the socio-cultural and economic needs of small farmers.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Rwanda

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Survey and Analysis (696-0115) FY 1981

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$4,691,000	$4,691,000
Grant	3,706,000	3,706,000
Loan	0	0
Country	985,000	985,000
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MINAGRI) with liaison with the Ministry of Planning

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

USAID technical advisors

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To incrase Rwanda's per capita food production and farmer income by better use of its limited resources.

PURPOSES: To improve the Government of Rwanda's (GOR) performance and strengthen its capacity for data collection, processing, analysis, planning and management in the agricultural sector.

OUTPUTS:

1. New and functioning statistics and analysis unit in the MINAGRI
2. Trained survey and analysis staff
3. Specifically designed computer programs and data collection procedures
4. Pre-testing of data collection procedures and pilot survey
5. National agricultural survey
6. Statistical, methodological and analytical documents

INPUTS:

AID

1. Long-term and short-term technical assistance
2. Training (long-term and in-service)
3. Commodities: vehicles, motorcycles, survey equipment, computer hardware, household furniture, office furniture and equipment
4. Office construction
5. Local operating costs

GOR

1. Staff
2. Land

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Rwanda

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Survey and Analysis (696-0115) FY 1981

DESCRIPTION:

The purpose of this project was to strengthen the capability and performance of the Government of Rwanda (GOR) in data collection, processing, analysis, planning and management in the agricultural sector. Anticipated results included increased availability and reliability of information needed to manage the agricultural sector; and improved capability for data collection, processing and analysis in the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MINAGRI).

The principal vehicle for achieving these results was to be a national agricultural survey. The project was also to establish a functioning Agricultural Statistics and Analysis Unit (ASAU) in the MINAGRI which would be staffed and provided with the necessary computer hardware to carry on future survey and analysis work after the completion of the project.

Project activities were designed to produce a number of outputs, largely in the areas of institution building, training and analytical and procedural documentation. Specific project outputs included:

1. the establishment of a functioning ASAU in the MINAGRI;
2. the formation of a trained survey and analysis staff in ASAU;
3. specifically designed computer programs and data collection procedures;
4. a pilot survey including pretesting of data collection procedures;
5. a national agricultural survey; and
6. statistical, analytical and methodological documents for future use by the MINAGRI and the Ministry of Planning (MINIPLAN).

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

This was an institutional capacity building project.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Senegal

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Casamance Regional Development (685-0205) FY 1978

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$34,515,000	$14,395,000
Grant	23,710,000	9,958,000
Loan	0	0
Country	10,805,000	4,437,000
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Societe de Mese en Valeur Agricole en Casamance (SOMIVAC)

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

USAID technical advisors

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: Increase agricultural productivity and improve the quality of life of people living in the Lower Casamance

PURPOSES: Develop a capability to undertake national development planning and implement those plans

OUTPUTS: 1) Develop a planning and coordination unit in SOMIVAC. 2) Develop the implementing capability of PIDAC (Projet Integre pour le Developement Agricole de la Casamance) (an implementation unit of SOMIVAC). 3) Strengthen the capability of ISRA (Institute Senegalais pour la Recherche Agricole). 4) Collect adequate data and prepare preliminary plan. 5) Functioning action programs in agriculture and health.

INPUTS:
(1) Technical assistance
(2) Vehicles
(3) Construction facilities
(4) Agricultural credit
(5) Education materials
(6) Health interventions
(7) Village self-help fund
(8) Contracted studies
(9) Government of Senegal staff

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ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Senegal

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Casamance Regional Development (685-0205) FY 1978

DESCRIPTION:

This large scale and long term AID project (extended to end in 1985) addresses the agricultural problems of the Lower Casamance on a global and integrated basis. The project has four primary thrusts: 1) Extending proven agricultural techniques to farmers and developing new techniques for the future; 2) conducting an adult literacy program and a rural health outreach program; 3) operating a rural credit program; and 4) building institutional capacity and conducting studies in preparation for long term development. Because of its policy and planning relevance, this last thrust is described below.

The institution-building component focuses on the Soceite de Mise in Valeur Agricole en Casamance (SOMIVAC), the Government of Senegal's regional agricultural development planning, management, and control agency which is implementing the project as a whole with USAID technical assistance; and on its implementing arm for the Lower Casamance, Project Integre pour le Developpement Agricole de la Casamance (PIDAC). The SOMIVAC direction staff should, at project end, be capable of assuming their planning function, with at least 75% of the staff positions filled by qualified (B.S. level and above) Senegalese capable of appraising consultant-prepared feasibility and design reports and of undertaking limited design on their own. Management training will be provided for the most critical staff. The PIDAC staff will be enlarged and its contacts with the Senegalese Institute for Agricultural Research (ISRA) improved to enable PIDAC to deliver technical information and agricultural inputs to farmers in a timely fashion. PIDAC will have an ongoing, systematic data collection program for micro-level farm management data and will be providing regular retraining for its extension agents.

The studies components will include a planning and a health surveillance study. The former will involve an inventory of the soil, water, and human resource base in Lower Casamance, a land use plan, a master plan for agricultural and transport development, and feasibility studies of six priority projects and completed final design of at least two of these. The health surveillance study will involve an assessment of the health situation in Lower Casamance and of the health effects of planned development activities, recommendations for health interventions, and the design of a health project incorporating these interventions.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Regional agricultural development strategies.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Senegal

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Casamance Regional Development (685-0205) FY 1978

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: Stoner, Benjamin, Carl E. Furguson, et al., Evaluation Report: Casamance Regional Development Project, July, 1981; and Zalla, Tom, USAID/Africa Bureau, Evaluation Report, Lower Casamance Integrated Rural Development Project, October, 1983.

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular _____ Special ___x___ Final _____

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

Implementation of the Casamance Regional Development Project has faced continual delays and obstacles since it began in 1978. Five years after it began, and 2 years from completion of its extended first phase, the project was viewed as having very little impact or success in meeting its goals/purposes to increase agricultural production. Most activities of the project, with the exception of the research program (at ISRA), have achieved disappointing results. The lack of progress has, primarily, been due to administrative and management problems.

Within SOMNIVAC, the Directorate of Studies, Evaluation and Planning (DEP), with technical assistance from AID, has been responsible for initiating, conducting, and coordinating studies, and monitoring and evaluating all rural sector activities in the Casamance. In the absence of experienced managers and senior researchers, it has been unable to fulfill its manifold role adequately, although it has been more successful at some efforts, such as data collection, than at others, such as project development and planning. (The recommendations noted below are largely from the 1983 evaluation. These recommendations either reinforce 1981 findings or reflect an assessment better grounded in experiences.)

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

None noted

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

None noted

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

None noted

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- The number of professional staff at SOMIVAC increased.
- Some Senegalese were provided with training.
- Numerous studies were conducted by SOMIVAC.

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

None noted

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None noted

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None noted

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

1981:

1. The lack of an administrative reorganization which would improve SOMIVAC operations by decentralizing management, reducing operating costs, and improving efficiency was a major problem.

2. The main reason why SOMIVAC was not able to attract needed professional staff was the lack of financial resources. The GOS was not able to supply such resources.

1983:

1. The legal statute under which SOMIVAC operates imposed on projects administrative procedures for ordering inputs and managing personnel that were incompatible with agricultural production and development.

2. GOS counterpart contributions have been irregular. USAID has had to supplement GOS funds over the two previous years (1981-83).

3. Necessary operating inputs and timely material support for important project activities was lacking.

4. Planning was weak; there was a lack of work plans and monitoring systems for improving project performance.

5. There were no incentives for good work or effective sanctions for low productivity and negligence by project employees.

Note: Most of these difficulties had been experienced in a wide range of projects in Senegal, and were not considered project specific.

ENHANCEMENTS:

1. Recent GOS reforms to policy and programs had encouraged decentralization and village level responsibilities that are complementary to the project strategies.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

None noted

Institutional

- The Director General of SOMIVAC needs more administrative and management autonomy.

- PIDAC, SOMIVAC's project implementing arm, should be delegated greater autonomy for program development, financial management, acquisition of inputs and program execution. SOMIVAC headquarters and its technical directorates should limit their responsibilities to planning and approval of work programs, insuring the integrity of supervision and monitoring programs of the projects and conducting large scale technical studies.

- A planning and programming committee should be created within SOMIVAC. This committee would identify promising investments and studies needing to be undertaken and would integrate the work plans and actions of the various directorates of SOMIVAC and the implementing agency, PIDAC.

- A management by objectives system should be instituted to better define the work of employees. A personnel evaluation and bonus system should also be established.

- All project technicians need to be provided with the resources necessary to getting their job done.

- To resolve its own internal management problems, the establishment of a Project Management Committee is recommended.

- In exchange for the necesssary administrative changes, and recognizing the unreliability of GOS counterpart funds, the evaluators recommend AID offer to make a 15-20 year commitment to support the operations of PIDAC.

- USAID should strengthen its own administrative and accounting services so as to insure support for project financial accounting systems and more effective control over project expenditures.

- PIDAC should reconstitute its monitoring unit as a Monitoring and Liaison Unit responsible directly to the Director or PIDAC.

The unit should have responsibility for establishing feedback mechanisms for regularly monitoring the effectiveness of the many activities of the project.

- USAID should recruit a senior expatriate specialist in monitoring and management for the PIDAC Monitoring and Liaison Unit. (Other personnel changes were also suggested.)

- DEEP (SOMIVAC's Division for Studies, Evaluation and Planning) should reduce the data collection activities of its Evaluation Unit and analyze the data already collected.

- All heads of the technical divisions in the implementing agencies should be statutory members of the Research and Development Committee. Working sessions of the Committee should be organized around individual implementing agencies.

Other:

None noted

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Senegal

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Research and Planning (685-0223) 1981-86

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$9,700,000	$9,700,000
Grant	4,950,000	4,950,000
Other AID	4,750,000	4,750,000
Country	0	0
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

ISRA (Institute Senegalais de Recherche Agricoles), particularly the Central Systems Analysis Group (CSAG) and Production Systems Department (PSD)

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

Michigan State University

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To increase the capacity of the GOS to more effectively plan and evaluate agricultural development policies and projects.

PURPOSES:

A. To develop Senegalese agricultural research capacity through in-country, third country and long-term overseas training and through participation in the design and execution of production systems research and macro-economic research programs;

B. To assist in organizing and carrying out production systems research in major ecological zones in order to identify social, economic, technical and institutional constraints on present farming systems and develop improved technical packages which are biologically stable, privately profitable and socially acceptable.

C. To carry out macro-economic research on food, nutrition and agricultural policies in order to provide guidance to policy makers on economic and institutional constraints on agricultural production and marketing with emphasis on the foodgrain subsector and food security.

OUTPUTS:

1) Production systems studies on farm trials of improved technology, and improved technical packages for "recommendation domains" in major ecological areas.

2) Macro-economic studies of the agricultural sector and subsector.

3) Upgraded technical and professional skills for agricultural researchers.

4) Expanded collection of socio-economic documents in ISRA's Documentation and Information Service, including the improvement of the documentation and information service in two research stations.

5) Improved computer capacity for the production system research (PSR) and macro-economic programs.

INPUTS: 1) Technical Assistance

1 Team Leader/Rural Social Scientist, 5 person-years
2 Macro-Economists, 8 person-years
2 Production Systems Economists, 8 person-years
8 Research Associates, 9 person-years
Consultants (30 pm) in econometrics, macro-economics, marketing, farming systems, computer programming, documentation and information services and rural sociology,
1 1/2 person-years of computer program development

2) Training

Long-term academic training in the agricultural and social sciences in the U.S. (approximately 864 person-months at approximately 36 participant months for 24 participants)

Short-term training in the U.S. in-country and in third countries (25 pm)

In-country training

3) Commodities and Operating Support

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Senegal

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Research and Planning (685-0223) 1981-86

DESCRIPTION:

This is the first phase of a long-term (10-15 year) institution building effort with ISRA, contributing to ISRA's decentralized research program by supporting production systems research (PSR) in two locations, strengthening the Central Systems Analysis Group (CSAG) and conducting macro-economic research on the agricultural subsector. AID will provide 21 person-years of long-term assistance (team leader-rural social scientist 5; 2 Macro-economist 8; 2 PSR Economists 8), 9 person-years of research associate assistance, 30 person-months of consultants, and 1 1/2 person years of data processing technical support. It will provide MS level long-term training in agricultural and social sciences in the U.S. to 24 Senegalese (average 30 months each), in-country and third-country short-term training of about 25 person months. This project is part of a much larger $129 million multi donor effort to aid ISRA's decentralization, of which AID is contributing $19.3M, Senegal $42.6M, France $42.1M, World Bank $15M, and other sources $10M. Five major AID projects in agricultural research are consuming an estimated $20M AID funds in 1981-85.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Develop agricultural research capacity in Senegal and support ISRA's decentralized research program

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Sudan

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Planning and Statistics (650-0047) FY 1981

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$8,321,000	$ 8,321,000
Grant	4,900,000	4,900,000
Loan	0	0
Country	3,421,000	3,421,000
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Planning and Agricultural Economics, Administration (PAEA) of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources (MAFNR)

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

USAID technical advisors, academic institution(s)

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To improve the level of living in Sudan's traditional agricultural/livestock sector.

PURPOSES: To improve policy definition and planning for agricultural development in the traditional sector of agriculture. To develop the capability for improved methods of agricultural sector policy analysis. To develop the capability to identify, design, and implement project procedures to carry out agricultural development programs. To develop a reliable and statistically sound system for generating agricultural statistics.

OUTPUTS: 1. Planning and policy analysis with specific training and Sudan experience in economic and policy analysis related to agricultural problems. 2. Sudanese capability to initiate and manage the preparation, evaluation, and implementation of an orderly project development process. 3. Sudanese capability to operate, maintain, update, and expand agricultural statistics in a timely manner.

INPUTS: USAID: 1. Training: A. long-term; B. short-term; C. in-country. 2. Technical assistance: A. long-term; B. short-term.

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ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Sudan

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Planning and Statistics (650-0047) FY 1981

DESCRIPTION:

This four year project was designed to strengthen the capability of the Planning and Agricultural Economics Administration (PAEA) of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources (MAFNR) to improve policy definition, analysis, and planning. The project was to have three facets: 1) to strengthen the capability of the MAFNR to identify, prioritize, and analyze critical problems and policy issues; 2) to support a project formulation and evaluation unit for the orderly and timely accomplishment of development programs through project implementation; and 3) to develop a reliable and statistically sound system to generate timely agricultural statistics.

Emphasis was to be placed on upgrading the skills of the PAEA. A policy assessment calendar identifying decision points and recurring data needs for production and marketing cycles was to be developed to permit timely analysis and decision making. Price supports, which have worsened the trade deficit by increasing wheat imports and decreasing profitable cotton exports, were to be overhauled. The potential of export-promoting price incentives was to be studied. A unit to identify, implement, and evaluate projects was to be structured in MAFNR to improve project development.

Under the project's statistical component, an effective data collection and management system regarding agricultural production, marketing, and resource utilization data was to be developed in PAEA. To this end, a computerized central statistical facility was to edit, store, and manage data to meet present and future needs. Using experience gained in the Remote Sensing for Agriculture Project (931-1224), a pilot project was to be implemented in White Nile Province, where two-thirds of the traditional agricultural population live. Landsat imagery, available photography, maps, and special studies were to be assembled to delineate homogenous farming system zones in the pilot area. This effort was to be extended to enumerate area sample frames for each province.

Four Sudanese were to receive U.S. training at the M.S. level in agricultural policy and planning, economics, and statistics. Two PAEA employees were to receive U.S. training in long-range planning and analysis. Short local courses were to be offered in subjects such as survey design and report writing.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Overall agricultural development policy

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Sudan

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Rural Development Planning (650-0012) 1979-1984

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$6,432,000	$ 6,432,000
Grant	2,000,000	2,000,000
Loan	650,000	650,000
Country	3,782,000	3,782,000
Other (Other Donors)		

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Ministry of National Planning (MNP)
Regional Ministry of Finance, Industry, and Economic Planning (RMFIEP) in Bahr El Ghazal and Lakes Provinces

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

U.S. Universities, University of Khartoum, technical advisors - Development Alternatives, Inc.

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To increase the development impact of provincial projects on the rural poor of Sudan.

PURPOSES: To strengthen the capacity of central, regional, provincial, and local government institutions to plan for provincial development.

OUTPUTS: 1) In-country diploma training for 20 government personnel, 2) training for 8 government officials to earn Master of Science degrees, 3) twelve 2-week workshops on provincial project development problems and solutions, 4) non-formal training courses for Sudanese provincial and regional officers on special development planning topics, 5) evaluation of 42 ongoing development projects, 6) design of about 100 village level development projects and 50 economic development projects.

INPUTS:

Technical advisors, training

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Sudan

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Rural Development Planning (650-0012) 1979-84

DESCRIPTION:

To develop Sudanese planning, administrative, and project appraisal capabilities, U.S. training at the M.S. level will be extended to eight high level Sudanese officials, four from each region. In addition, 1-year diploma training at the University of Khartoum in regional/development planning will be provided to 20 Sudanese officials. Sudanese institutions will be contracted to conduct non-formal training in development planning and administration on topics to be identified early in the project. Other non-formal training will consist of 12 2-week workshops for provincial or regional officers on topics drawn from project planning experiences, e.g., women's participation in rural enterprise. Provincial planners will also receive on-the-job training in such areas as resource surveys, project evaluation, and other areas of applied research.

To bolster Sudanese capabilities regarding project development/evaluation and development information, a list of development and applied research topics for each project province will be drawn up early in the project. The list will focus on provincial economic objectives, (most likely agricultural/rural development) and will be the basis of the provinces' development models. Sudanese institutions will be contracted to evaluate 42 ongoing development projects in the four project provinces and to collect field data to improve those projects. These data also will be used in designing 100 new village development and 50 new economic development projects. A modest amount of research also will be conducted on projects in other provinces and on national and regional policy issues affecting provincial planning.

Four long-term advisors will provide assistance in training, project evaluation, project financing, scheduling consultants, plan development, budgeting, local participation in planning, select candidates for training, and project design. Short-term advisors will assist in training, project evaluation, and development planning.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Improved capacity to perform policy analysis overcoming: a) inadequate training of provincial planning staff, b) functional weaknesses in project development and evaluation processes, c) lack of appropriate and timely planning information.

- Correction of imbalance between large-scale projects <u>versus</u> local development projects.

- Tailoring programs to suit regional differences.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Sudan

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Southern Region Agricultural Development I (650-0046) 1982-86

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$16,280,000	$2,442,000
Grant	10,100,000	1,513,000
Loan	0	0
Country	6,180,000	929,000
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Southern Regional Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (RMANR)

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

Technical advisors

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To increase agricultural production and the incomes of traditional farmers and pastoralists and to promote the participation of private entrepreneurs in agricultural processing and marketing.

PURPOSES: To relieve key policy production, marketing, institutional, and infrastructural constraints to increasing private sector agricultural production, processing, and marketing in the Southern Region of Sudan.

OUTPUTS:

1. Agricultural Marketing: regional marketing and transport study, regional crop marketing study, market information systems, market surveillance system, crop storage, grading, and bulking facilities, feasibility studies for rural enterprises

2. Farming Systems Research: establishment of institutional capability to carry out a farming systems approach to research, including identification of constraints on farm or station research and extension, strengthened RARTC (Regional Agricultural Technical Committee)

3. Budget and Financial Planning: improved budget planning process, comprehensive agricultural development budget, long term program for identifying and resolving capital and recurrent cost issues, cost-benefit analyses of RMANR programs, analysis of fiscal policy and recommendations for reform

4. Manpower Development and Utilization: comprehensive plan for pre- and in-service training of agricultural manpower, recurrent budget support to conduct training programs at YIA and RATC (Yambio Agricultural Training Center and Rumbek Agricultural Training Center), study and report on future role of training facilities at the Yei, Rumbeck, and Yambio, support for programs at YIA and RATC during second and third years of project, practical agricultural work-study program at the University of Jabor, career development for RMANR staff, participant training program, farmer training program at Yambio

5. Area Development: baseline study on income and agricultural production, operating plan for Area Councils, pilot credit programs for rural enterprises; construction of on-farm storage facilities, rehabilitation and improvement of feeder roads, strengthened extension service

INPUTS:

- Technical advisory services, short-term and long-term
- Training in United States, for degrees and for short-term periods
- Construction of buildings, roads, grain storage facilities
- Training in third country, for short term periods
- Commodities
- Credit

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Sudan

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Southern Region Agricultural Development I (650-0046) 1982-86

DESCRIPTION:

- Agricultural Marketing. Incentives are needed to encourage farmers to innovate and produce commodities for market. Incentives include prices, access (road) improvements, and improvements in input delivery system. To establish incentives a regional marketing and transportation study, marketing strategies, marketing information system, a market surveillance system, and farm infrastructure improvements will be carried out or established.

- Farming Systems Research. Information will be gathered to formulate a research strategy, institutional capacity for research will be built up, and appropriate farm technology will be identified. Support will be provided to the Regional Agricultural Technical Committee for coordinating and planning agricultural research in the Southern Region.

- Budget and Financial Planning for the Agricultural Sector. Planning studies will be conducted, including budget development, cost-benefit analyses, and impact assessments of fiscal policies. Training and technical assistance will be provided to increase the planning capacity of RMANR.

- Manpower Development and Utilization. Training will be provided, the future role of the training facilities at Yambio and Rumbek will be analyzed, support for the University of Juba will be provided, a career development program will be prepared, and the farmer training program at Yambio will be strengthened through training and construction of facilities.

- Area Development. A baseline study on income and agricultural production will be carried out, Area Councils will be assisted by technical advisors, technical assistance in credit, lending policies, and loan application review will be provided, 50 experimental grain storage units will be constructed, feeder roads will be rehabilitated or improved, and extension support will be provided through technical advisors and vehicles.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Incentives to encourage the production, processing and marketing of agricultural commodities. Incentives include prices, improved access, and improved input delivery systems

- Adequately trained manpower for agricultural planning

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Tanzania

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Livestock Marketing and Development Project (621-0122) 1973-82

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$26,289,000*	$233,670
Grant	4,400,000	132,000
Loan	18,500,000	0
Country	3,389,000	101,670
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Tanzanian Livestock Development Authority (LIDA)
Tanzanian Livestock Marketing Corporation (TLMC)
Tanzanian Natural Ranching Company (NARCO)

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

Texas A&M University (TAMU)

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To assist the Tanzanian Government to achieve self-sufficiency and an exportable surplus in livestock

PURPOSES: a) To establish an effective and efficient livestock marketing system in Tanzania through the Tanzanian Livestock Marketing Company (TLMC); b) To implement the Range Management and Water Development aspects of the IDA Livestock Development Project, Phase II; c) To improve the financial/accounting/management operation of the Tanzanian Livestock Development Authority (LIDA); d) to provide a comprehensive livestock sector analysis.

OUTPUTS: 1. Livestock Marketing: a) 4 week in-country OJT training for 200 Tanzanians on livestock buyer and Livestock Marketing teams; b) 6 degree-trained in U.S. Tanzanian staff (to market TLMC); 11 top-level and operational level management given 4-8 week observational study tours and training in U.S.; c) 13 trained market management teams; d) trained livestock buyers team; e) national livestock marketing plans, budgets, operating procedures and analyses for TLMC. 2. Range Management and

*IDA Livestock Development Loan doesn't really directly support the project, but is intended to support other related projects in Tanzania, but is

Water Development: a) Two Tanzanian staff degree-trained in U.S.; b) Range Management Plans for each ranch (37) plus holding ground (27) plus for stock routes; c) water development plan for the same. 3. Financial Management Assistance to LIDA: a) 2 Tanzanian staff degree-trained in U.S.; b) financial and management procedures and descriptions for LIDA: c) Financial and management analyses/plans/recommendations for subsidiary company. 4. Livestock Sector Analysis: a) complete study and supplements, as necessary

INPUTS: A. AID: 1. A nine-man contract team (6 in TLMC, 2 in Phase II and 1 in LIDA) (AID - $3,862,000); 2. Participant training ($248,000); 3. Livestock subsector analysis team ($150,000); 4. Commodities and other costs ($140,000). B. PANGON: Personnel, Financial, and Logistical Support ($2,500,000) and Infrastructure Development ($960,000). C. IDA: Livestock Development Loan (really not an intrinsic part of this project) $48,500,000.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Tanzania

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Livestock Marketing and Development (621-0122) 1973-82

DESCRIPTION:

The Livestock Marketing and Development project is to be conducted in relation to the six sub projects of the Livestock Credit (1973) from IDA and generally coordinated with other AID agricultural sector projects in Tanzania (9 projects totalling c. $20M by 1980) and other foreign assistance (c. $475M from 27 countries and other donors in 1980). The project seeks to help the GOT to establish an effective livestock marketing system, provide a livestock sector analysis, implement range management and water development projects of the IDA Livestock Development Project and improve financial/accounting/management operations of the Tanzanian Livestock Development Authority (LIDA). The principal means of achieving this is through providing expert and technical assistance of 9 people, under contract to Texas A&M, principally to TLMC and LIDA (but TLMC, 2 in Phase II unit, 1 at LIDA), by providing degree training in the U.S. to 10 staff members of TLMC and LIDA. The principal component of this project in the policy planning area was the livestock sub-sector analysis, which represented only a small portion of the overall project.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- National livestock marketing system and policy
- Developing and increasing livestock production and offtake as a means for reaching self-sufficiency and exportable surplus vis a vis livestock

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Tanzania

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Livestock Marketing and Development (621-0122) 1973-82

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR:

USAID, Project Appraisal Report, June, 1976
Special Evaluation Report, September, 1979
Audit Report, February 1980, and
Final Evaluation Report, September 1982

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular x **Special** x **Final** x

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

The project started slowly (1974-75), though a 1976 evaluation was positive about progress. The livestock survey was completed and the analysis for the subsector assessment was proceeding. A later evaluation, however, found that progress had slowed and, in fact, the project needed to be redesigned (a process which took 1 1/2 years) in order to accomplish its goals.

By 1980, the subsector assessment component had still not been completed and suffered from the lack of host country support and technical expertise. The survey was completed but the analysis effort appeared to be less successful.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

None identified

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

None identified

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

None identified

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

A limited number of host country government staff were trained and some on-the-job training was conducted for market and pricing teams

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

None identified

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None identified

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None identified

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

- Unclear project goals and design
- Inadequate housing and work facilities for Texas A&M advisors
- Inadequate Tanzanian Government support
- Poor communication between TAMU, AID and LIDA parastatals
- Insufficient number of technically-trained Tanzanians

ENHANCEMENTS:

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

a. The goals, purposes and logical frameworks of projects are usually too global and optimistic to be achieved. Moreover, they often provide insufficient direction to the university or contract teams assisting in the project.

b. If there are to be any notable and lasting impacts, the host country needs to buy in fully to the policy objective, be prepared to contribute substantially to project operations and be committed to taking over and continuing operations after the project is over.

c. Similarly, shortage of appropriately trained host country staff for helping to implement the project and for institutionalizing it after the AID project is over -- is a constraint for this and many other projects. Developing the in-country capacity technical and managerial, is an objective whose scope and time frame is commonly underestimated. Similarly underestimated or underexamined are the incentives or lack thereof for trained staff to work in the types of positions for which they have been trained.

d. While developing assistance strategies which, on paper, integrate many diverse projects in a country, or many different subprojects within an overall project, is laudable, it often leads to serious problems when one considers impacts. Projects whose effectiveness is partly or largely dependent upon the accomplishments of other projects are vulnerable to limited or nonexistent impacts, often simply because the other projects do not produce their expected outputs. If inputs are important to projects, then all the preconditions for impact must be identified and addressed, particularly for projects aiming to change or implement systems or policy.

e. Inadequate support by the institution (university or consortium) providing assistance was a problem in this project and is not infrequently mentioned on other projects. Timely responsiveness to staff needs of the project, staff occasionally considered to be inappropriate or "not the best" and support of staff while in-country seem to be recurring problems. While advantageous institutions from several perspectives, universities have competing agendas and staff development location goals and are sometimes unprepared to satisfy the implicit and explicit expectations of AID and projects in LDCs.

f. Aside from faultily designed projects, the goals, purposes and logical frameworks of projects and this project are usually too global and optimistic to be achieved. Moreover, they often provide insufficient direction to the university or contract teams assisting in the project. The problems most frequently cited is poor communication between some or all actors -- AID/W, the Mission, the contractor, the host country (and institutions within it).

Institutional

None identified

Other:

None identified

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Upper Volta

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Grain Marketing Development (686-0243) FY 1980

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$7,176,000	$942,480
Grant	2,381,000	848,232
Loan	0	0
Country	237,000	104,248
Other (PL 480)	4,558,000	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

National Cereals Office (OFNACER)

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

USAID technical advisors, Kansas State University

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To attain food self-sufficiency in Upper Volta.

PURPOSES: 1. To improve grain marketing conditions, increase cereal production and food security in rural areas. 2. To improve the basis for policy and operational decision-making in food grain marketing.

OUTPUTS:

INPUTS: AID: 1. Technical assistance; 2. Commodities; 3. Training; 4. Other; 5. PL 480: (A) construction, (B) training, (C) rolling fund. Government of Upper Volta (GOUV): 1. land, 2. personnel.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Upper Volta

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Grain Marketing Development (686-0243) FY 1980

DESCRIPTION:

This grant was provided to the government of Upper Volta (GOUV) to increase cereal production in rural areas and upgrade the capability of the GOUV's National Cereals Office (OFNACER) for formulating and implementing food grain marketing policies and programs.

Grant-funded technical advisors were to assist OFNACER personnel with analysis and selection of 30 sites for the construction of grain storage facilities (also to be implemented under the project), with the establishment of a planning unit, and with the execution of an extensive study of Upper Volta's cereal marketing economy. This study was to consist of analyses of the traditional urban and rural grain marketing sector; the modern grain marketing sector; grain market integration over space and time; the role of transportation, storage and handling costs, and risks associated with grain marketing in the modern sector; the volume of grain traded in a cross-section of markets over time; the most unstable marketing areas; cross-border grain movement; and the roles played by women in grain marketing. The grant also funded short-term training for 15 OFNACER employees in grain storage and marketing at Kansas State University.

In addition to the grant, 35,500 metric tons of PL 480 food was to be given to the GOUV which, in turn, was to resell and thereby generate $4.6 million in revenue. These moneys were to be used to finance: (1) the construction of 30 small-scale grain storage facilities of 150-250 metric ton capacity each; (2) the in-country training of 50 locals in warehouse management; (3) the provision of commodities and warehouse equipment; and (4) the establishment of a revolving fund to finance the purchase of local grain and support the creation of a grain buffer stock to relieve food shortages in rural areas.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

Food grain marketing

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Upper Volta

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Eastern Region Food Production (686-0244) FY 1981

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$31,690,000	$2,542,500
Grant	3,000,000	2,250,000
Loan	0	0
Country	390,000	292,500
Other (Other Donors)	28,300,000	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Eastern Region Development Organization (ERDO) and the Ministry of Rural Development (MRD)

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

USAID technical assistance

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To improve food production and the quality of life in the Eastern Region of Upper Volta in the long term.

PURPOSES: To improve the capacity of the Government of Upper Volta to manage rural development in the Eastern Region through higher-level training, monitoring/evaluation, and special studies during 1981-85.

OUTPUTS: 1. Officials of the Eastern Regional Organization for Development and the Ministry of Rural Development trained to manage development, especially financial management, planning, training, and research. 2. Continuous monitoring/evaluation of International Fund for Agricultural Development-led program. 3. Special studies on critical issues in the multi-donor program.

INPUTS: 1. Training funds and technical assistance. 2. Technical assistance for Monitoring and Evaluation Unit. 3. Funds and technical assistance for special studies; USAID contracting for this with responsibility in Ministry of Rural Development.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Upper Volta

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Eastern Region Food Production (686-0244) FY 1981

DESCRIPTION:

This grant has been provided the Government of Upper Volta (GOUV) to develop the capacity of the Eastern Region Development Organization (ERDO and the Ministry of Rural Development (MRD) to manage Eastern Region agricultural development. A follow-on to Project 686-0201, AID's Eastern ORD Rural Development Project, this project is part of a multi-donor program in the Eastern Region led by the International Fund for Agricultural Development and including the Government of France and the U.N. Development Program.

Independent of the EORD, an MRD Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (MEU) will be established at Fada N'Gourma to record multilateral project activities, improve extension services, and assess project impacts on food production. USAID will provide an agronomist to analyze the evolution and testing of farm system packages; a sociologist to collect social statistics and examine problems of program adoption and equity; and an economic geographer to conduct statistical analyses and evaluate environmental impact, infrastructural development, and regional planning.

The MEU and USAID will set priorities for training programs to upgrade the skills of all EORD and selected MRD and MEU personnel. In-service training in the form of five local/expatriate-managed technical seminars will be provided at all levels. Two trainees will receive long-term regional planning training at the Pan African Institute of Development, and four others will receive short-term training at the University of Pittsburgh. Long-term technical training in finance, personnel management, program planning, economic analysis, statistics, and other fields will be provided for seven at U.S. and Francophone West African institutions. Extension agents' skills will be upgraded at the Agricultural Support Center in Diapaga.

Based on MEU output and consultation with GOUV, special studies will be conducted on critical topics such as the project's environmental impact, perfecting farm system packages, and village-level program adoption.

(Note: Although this project was funded in FY 1981, as of March, 1984, the project was still not operating due to lack of trained counterpart inputs.)

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

None (this is applied research and training)

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Zaire

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Economic Development (660-0052) 1977

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$7,358,000	$4,341,000
Grant	3,527,000	2,081,000
Loan	0	0
Country	3,381,000	2,260,000
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Zaire Department of Agriculture, Rural Development and Environment (DADRE), specifically the Service d'Edutes et Planification (SEP), and within SEP, the Division of Agricultural Statistics (DAS) and Division of Agricultural Strategy and Planning (DASP)

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

SECID (especially University of Georgia)

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: Increase the technical and management capacity of the Government of Zaire (GOZ) through the Department of Agriculture (DOA) to develop and implement public sector action strategies in agriculture.

PURPOSES: Develop a statistical reporting service. Develop the capacity to conduct economic analyses, develop the capacity to identify, design and evaluate projects. Develop a comprehensive economic planning framework. Improve overall planning, management and budgeting capacity.

OUTPUTS: Training Zairian staff (55 in total) to take charge of statistical, economic, project and budget analysis. Statistical, planning and budgeting systems in place.

INPUTS: U.S. contribution: senior statistician, 4.5 yr.; systems analyst, 3 yr.; senior economic planner, 5 yr.; planning systems analysis, 3 yr.; agricultural economist, 5 yr.; agricultural projects economist, 4 yr.; senior management/budget systems analyst, 2 yr.; 24 man months of U.S. consultants; training funds for 55 participants; funding for institution coordinating training program; 144 mobylettes; data

processing equipment; 4 vehicles. GOZ: participants' salaries; staff replacements; physical facilities, clerical services; internal travel; local curre

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Zaire

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Economic Development (660-0052) 1977

DESCRIPTION:

Project 660-0052 continued project 660-0050 by providing U.S. degree-level training (through SECID universities) to 55 Zairians in Division of Agricultural Statistics (DAS) and Division of Agricultural Strategy and Planning (DASP) at the M.A. and Ph.D. levels. The intention was for these Zairians to return to provide trained capacity for DAS and DASP. In addition, SECID was to provide long-term and short-term in country assistance in developing agricultural statistical data gathering and analysis capability, a planning framework and capability and a modern management/budgeting system. In addition to the training (U.S.), 24 months of consultants and minor amounts of commodities, AID was to provide 24.5 person years of assistance of statisticians, planners, systems analysts, and agricultural economists.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- To improve host country's capability for policy analysis

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Zaire

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Economic Development (660-0052) 1977

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: USAID, Final Evaluation, 2/23/83
Review of AID Program in Zaire, 11/28/79.

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular _____ **Special** ___x___ **Final** ___x___

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

The accomplishments of this project have been significant according to the final evaluation. The project was supposed to train 55 Division of Agricutural Statistics (DAS) and of Division of Agricultural Strategy and Planning (DASP) personnel in the U.S. to the M.A. and Ph.D. level. All 55 were, in fact, trained. As of February 1983, 11 graduates were working for DAS or DASP; 17 others held government jobs; one was working for an international organization; 14 were still pursuing studies; 7 had not returned to Zaire; and one had failed master's studies. The evaluation expressed concern that more graduates weren't working for DASP or DAS, but the training has gone well overall.

The institutional capacity building component has not fared as well, however. The data management and census work in the Department of Statistics was done poorly and has not produced an accurate data base on the country's agricultural sector. The validity of survey data is not good. The project was also supposed to integrate an overall analytical and planning framework for projects. This was not accomplished but was hoped to be done on subsequent projects. Some good analytical work had been done by Zairians on an agricultural sector analysis, but the work was crippled by lack of an adequate data base. This hinders most of the nation's analytical efforts and is a continuing problem.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

None identified

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

- The Government of Zaire has committed a substantial amount of money to conduct an agricultural census. The Government has also substantially increased the size of its analytical staff because of the project.

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

None identified

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- The Government of Zaire has substantially increased the size and capacity of its policy analysis and planning arms. A number of trained Zairians have returned to take positions in the government.

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

None identified

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None identified

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None identified

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

- Contrary to original plans in the project paper, some SECID organizations (notably University of Florida) have not required in-country (Zaire) theses.

- Turnover in DASP and especially DAS, mainly due to the system of premium payments which provide higher income to other government departments, especially the Commissariat du Plan.

- Inability of DAS, despite large infusions of TA staff assistance and training, to produce any valid qualitative data on the agricultural sector, which along with the turnover problem, has compromised greatly the ability of DASP to produce studies, analyses, evaluations and plans.

ENHANCEMENTS:

None noted

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

1. Do theses in Zaire, require >1 year English language training (several other minor training-related recommendations also made.)

2. To increase retention in the Service, the Mission is urged to match immediately the premium provided to employees of comparable grades in the Ministry of Plan and to support the effort to place the Service on the same pay scale as university researchers. If this were accomplished, the problem of Service personnel sustainability would be reduced.

3. Stress in-country training even further, particularly OJT within the Service.

4. Because of the difficulties of institutionalizing a valid system of data gathering, USAID (Kinshasa) should fund a short TDY to advise on the alternatives available within the U.S. government to remedy this situation. This is expected to require a new project.

5. USAID take the leadership in the systematic gathering of agricultural data in collaboration with the FAO, and the Belgian and other bilateral missions.

6. Any measures short of the systematic gathering of data gradually for all the agricultural regions of the country will result in plans, projects, and sector studies built on an invalid and inadequate data base. This will continue to constrain Zairian agricultural development and result in failure to meet the project goals and purposes of the series of three projects over 12 years. All that will remain is a training effort with results built on the same "expert judgment" as before and quantitative planning and analysis will not be operationalized.

Institutional

None noted

Other:

o Some system of backstopping technical training and maintenance in the use of computer programs. This should include development of experience in using the programs and procedures in the DAS, providing training courses for "programmers" and operations in Zaire in French and being "on call" as required by telex or telephone to answer techical problems and service problems.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Zaire

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Sector Studies (660-0070) 1981-84

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$8,680,000	$ 8,680,000
Grant	3,480,000	3,480,000
Loan	0	0
Country	Not	Not
Other (Other Donors)	Available	Available

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Zaire Department of Agriculture Rural Development and Enviornment (DADRE), particularly the Division of Agricultural Statistics (DAS) with the Service d'Etudes et Planification (SEP) and the Division of Agricultural Strategy and Planning (DASP) in SEP

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

USAID technical advisors

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To strengthen the Department of Agriculture's capability to develop and implement a rational agricultural strategy for Zaire.

PURPOSES: To raise the level of institutional capability of the Department of Agriculture's Bureau of Studies and Division of Statistics to collect and process data, analyze it, to formulate policy and agricultural strategy, to identify and evaluate agricultural prospects.

OUTPUTS: 1. Job description and specific workplans for every employee of the Division of Statistics (DS) and Bureau of Studies (BS). 2. Trained administrators and bookkeepers for the DS and BS. 3. Trained personnel who can use the area sample frame, design field questionnaires, conduct field surveys, and to manage data processing programs. 4. Format established and personnel trained to produce a quarterly agricultural situation report. 5. Established procedures and trained personnel to identify, design, monitor, and evaluate projects. 6. Completion of Masters theses by returned participants. 7. Permanent institutional interaction established between the Ministry of Plan, the Central Committee, and the Department of Agriculture

(DOA) on regional planning and development of agricultural and rural development. 8. Completed studies of major agricultural commodities. 9. Completion of food crop marketing systems studies in Zaire. 10. Issuance of an annual agricultural document highlighting agricultural performance and flagging problem needing attention. 11. Issuance of a policy paper identifying options based on data collected. 12. Production of a 10-year agricultural strategy paper. 13. Agricultural investment program for 1983-85.

INPUTS: 1. Personnel: agricultural analyst and sector planner (chief of party); economic analyst; agricultural marketing economist; statistician/computer programmer; administrative assistant/bookkeeper (local hire); short-term consultants. 2. Training: long-term in the United States; short-term training abroad; short seminars in Zaire. 3. Commodities: vehicles; mini-computer, office equipment; spare parts.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Zaire

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Sector Studies (660-0070) 1981-84

DESCRIPTION:

The project, a follow-on to projects 660-0050 and 660-0052, to upgrade the agricultural sector analysis capability of the Government of Zaire's (GOZ) Department of Agriculture, Rural Development and Environment (DADRE) by providing participant and on-the-job training in key areas to personnel from DADRE's Division of Agricultural Statistics (DAS) and Division of Agricultural Strategy and Planning (DASP).

U.S., Ph.D.-level training will be provided in the statistical measurement of food crop production from intercropping to one DAS staff member and in agricultural marketing, international and commodity markets, or development finance to a BS employee. Further, four DS and four BS staff members will receive U.S. M.S.-level training. A total of 12 Zairians will recieve degree-level training in the U.S. (10 M.A.; 2 Ph.D.) and DS and BS technicians will receive a total of 15 person-months of project, financial, and commodity analysis, forecasting, and statistical methods; included in the above will be the U.S. Department of Agriculture's course on project implementation.

Five resident experts, helped by short-term consultants, will provide on-the-job training to DS and BS personnel. DS and BS staff will be trained to prepare job descriptions and specific workplans for all personnel; use the improved administrative, bookkeeping, and data processing methods; use the area sample frame and design and conduct field surveys; issue a quarterly agricultural sector report that includes production indices and anlayses of marketing conditions and agricultural prospects; design and evaluate agricultural projects; issue an annual agricultural sector report and a policy paper identifying options; and prepare long- and short-term studies of Zairian food crop marketing systems, an investment program in agriculture for 1983-85 and a 10-year agricultural strategy.

Finally, the project will foster interaction between the Ministry of Planning, the Central Committee, and the DOA/RD in regard to regional planning and agricultural development and will help 25 returned participants from prior AID projects complete their masters theses.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Overall agricultural sector analysis and institution building

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Zaire

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Sector Studies (660-0070) 1981-84

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: USAID, Mid-term Evaluation of project 070, Feb. 23, 1982.

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular x **Special** _____ **Final** _____

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

Twelve additional Zairian technicians have been selected for training and "after experiencing initial difficulties in the selection of U.S. contract technicians," the project "is making good progress on its statement midway through its contract period." Many of the lessons learned on earlier projects are being applied on this one, including in-country theses and increased emphasis on in-country studies, strengthened linkages with the Commissariat du Plan's Division of Regional Planning and Development (which "is taking place") and greater institutionalization of annual planning and project identification, design, monitoring and evaluation in DASP.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

None identified

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

None identified

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

- Under project 0070 strengthened linkages with the Commissariat du Plans' Division of Regional Planning and Development is taking place.

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- The project selection process has been improved. The Government of Zaire is now better able to evaluate self-initiated projects as well as projects initiated by donors.

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

None identified

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None identified

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None identified

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

- The number of students returning from training and taking jobs in government was small. Salary levels were so low for government level employees that there was no incentive for them to take the jobs.
- The Department of Statistics with many man-years of technical assistance from many donors has been unable to produce a valid data base on the agricultural sector. This has made it extremely difficult to conduct meaningful policy studies or agricultural sector studies.
- The technical quality of the research reports was uneven.
- Change in personnel has hampered performance.
- Government agency is so short staffed and involved in fire-fighting that it is unrealistic to expect them to work on project activities.

ENHANCEMENTS:

None noted

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

- Large amounts of time and effort have gone into the collection of agricultural data, but a valid census have not been achieved. Without appropriate data, quantitative analysis is impossible.
- A more realistic plan for assembling agricultural data is required.
- Computer problems in terms of both hardware and programmers must be solved before data processing can proceed properly.

Institutional

- The salary scales in civil service work must be adjusted upward or all of the training provided by USAID is for naught because the trainees cannot accept positions in government. They cannot afford to live on the wages.

- Host country contribution of time has not been realized. GOZ staff have not been available to work on the project. More realistic planning of government staff time contribution is needed in project design phase.

Other:

1. In-country training should be increasingly emphasized, but it should directly relate to on-the-job applied areas of instruction. Pragma team members and Division and Bureau heads should be polled at least quarterly to identify specific training needs.

2. Dissertation and thesis work done by students should be undertaken in Zaire to make it more relevant to the issues of importance in Zaire.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Zambia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Training, Planning, and Institutional Development (611-0075) 1980-1982

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$6,236,000	$ 6,236,000
Grant	4,785,000	4,785,000
Loan	0	0
Country	1,451,000	1,451,000
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

National Commission for Development Planning
Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development
University of Zambia
Rural Development Studies Bureau
Central Statistics Office
Ministry of Finance

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

Iowa State University

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS:
1. To increase Zambia's per capita food production
2. To increase the incomes of the small farmers

PURPOSES: To improve the Government of Zambia's performance and strengthen its capacity for analysis, planning, and management in the agriculture sector.

OUTPUTS:
- Collaborative policy studies, research, and analysis
- Trained personnel in key decision making positions; training will include long term post graduate work in the U.S., short term specialized training in a third country and in the U.S. and in-country training for short term courses
- Plans for improving organization and procedures of institutions

INPUTS:
- From the U.S.: technical assistance (advisors, consultants) training (long term, short term, in U.S. and a third country, in-country training, carryover SAAST training requirements), commodities and supplies
- From Zambia: personnel, office space, training facilities, other operating expenses

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Zambia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Training, Planning and Institutional Development (611-0075) 1980-82

DESCRIPTION:

This grant was provided to the Government of Zambia to strengthen its capacity to carry out effectively planned and managed agricultural programs. The principal project components consisted of analyses of critical agricultural problem areas and the development and implementation of training programs to enable GOZ officials to address those constraints.

Analyses were to be carried out by the National Commission for Development Planning and the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development and were to focus on human resource constraints and organizational and policy defects. Possible areas of study included statistical needs and problems; sociocultural characteristics, technologies and costs of traditional farmers (through the interpretation of the 1980 Census and recent agricultural surveys); decentralization and implementation of agricultural programs; agricultural pricing; present and future agricultural resources and the recurrent costs of alternative development programs; costs and benefits of fertilizer distribution; agricultural credit; transportation, storage, and marketing; and the information, analytical, planning, coordination, and decentralization measures necessary for an effective agricutural sector strategy. Thirty-five persons were to receive training in the U.S.; additional candidates were to receive short-term training in Zambia an in third countries. The participants were expected to recieve training in the fields of agricultural and development economics, development administration, monetary and fiscal policy, business administration, and regional analysis and planning. USAID was also to provide two long-term advisors (2 years each), short-term consultants (90 person-months), OPEX personnel (20 person-years), and a limited amount of commodities (vehicles and office equipment). Between 60,000 and 120,000 farmers could ultimately benefit from the training and information generated by this project.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Investment in agriculture
- A more coherent and effective agricultural sector strategy
- Increased availability and utilization of information for managing agriculture
- Improved design and execution of projects for small farmers
- Decentralization of agricultural programs for small farmers
- Agricultural prices

- Fertilizer distribution
- Agricultural credit
- Transportation, storage and marketing of agricultural production of small farmers

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Zambia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Training, Planning, and Institutional Development (611-0075) 1980-82

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: First Phase In-House Evaluation, May 1983

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular _____ **Special** ___x___ **Final** _____

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

- o A one year hiatus in the project due to U.S./Zambian political differences caused a delay in project start-up.
- o By May '83 the following policy analysis studies had been completed: a) agricultural credit scoping document; b) report on the development and strengthening agricultural economics and economics degrees and in-service training programs at the University of Zambia (UNZA); c) policy guidelines for the Zambian Agricultural Development Bank; d) feasibility study for the use of computers in the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development.
- o As of May '83, several other policy analysis studies were underway: a) agricultural inputs-supply, demand, costs, benefits; b) groundnut production and pricing policies; c) computer manpower and software needs; d) regional crop production patterns and prices; 3) adoption of agricultural technology by small farmers; f) small farmer agricultural production
- o The UNZA curriculum for agricultural economics will be put into effect.
- o Projects have been carried out collaboratively with U.S. and Zambian participants rather than unilaterally by U.S. consultants.
- o Analyses of 1980 Census data, of fertilizer distribution costs and benefits, and agricultural credit are underway (as of May '83).

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

(No impacts could be clearly identified as of May '83. It was too early in the course of the project. Capacity building and interinstitutional impacts are expected, though.)

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

None noted

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

None noted

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

None noted

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

None noted

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

None noted

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None noted

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None noted

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

- Political differences between the U.S. and Zambia caused a one-year delay in project start-up.
- Retention of trained personnel is a major problem--their salaries are low, promotion opportunities are limited, and housing is inadequate.

ENHANCEMENTS:

None noted

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

May '83 evaluation is too early to provide sufficient data for lessons learned/recommendations.

Technical

None noted

Institutional

None noted

Other:

None noted

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Entente Nations: Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Dahomey (now Benin), Togo

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Entente Food Production (626-0203) 1976

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$16,680,000	$1,680,000
Grant	6,680,000	1,680,000
Loan	10,000,000	0
Country	NA	NA
Other (Other Donors)	NA	NA

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Mutual Aid and Guaranty Fund of the Council of the Entente (Entente Fund)

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

Technical advisors, research institutes within member nations, educational institutions

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To reverse the trend of declining per capita food production and increasing food imports in the Entente member nations (Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Dahomey, Togo) by achieving higher equilibrium levels of production, marketing and prices for select food crops.

PURPOSES:

1) to increase the level, efficiency and reliability of food production by small farmers over the medium to long term.

2) to promote the national capacity of Entente member states to design and implement rural development projects.

OUTPUTS:

1) Viable small farmer-oriented food production projects

2) Improved access to and follow-up of credit for small farmers

3) Improved government capability to identify, design, implement and evaluate small farmer-oriented rural development projects, including development of research capacity to adapt technology and organization of projects to small farm conditions

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INPUTS:

1. Technical assistance: 2 full-time advisors to EF; consultant assistance in project design and evaluation; farm level trials of proposed minimum packages to test feasibility; and participant training in credit, applied agronomy and extension

2. Financing of subproject activities

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Entente Nations: Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Dahomey (now Benin), Togo

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Entente Food Production (626-0203) 1976

DESCRIPTION:

A primary purpose of this project was to promote self-sufficiency of Entente member nations in select food crops by achieving higher equilibrium levels of production, marketing, and prices. A second purpose of the project was to develop the capability of the member nations to plan programs and to identify, design, implement and evaluate projects aimed at improving the productivity of small farmers in growing food crops. The major output of this component was to be the identification, design, implementation and evaluation of one or more viable, small farmer oriented food production projects in each Entente country. Project foci could include rural development, credit, fertilizer, seed multiplication, dissemination of high-yield varieties, and extension agent training.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- credit
- pricing
- marketing

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Entente Nations: Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Dahomey (now Benin), Togo

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Entente Food Production (626-0203) 1976-1984

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: Auditor General, Review of the Entente Fund's Food Production Project, Report No. 80-31, February, 1980; and USAID, Project Evaluation Summary, January, 1982

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular x **Special** x **Final** _____

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

As part of a sizeable capital assistance project to increase food production in Entente nations, AID provided a technical assistance grant to assist in project management, planning and evaluating subprojects, research, and training. Several policy studies were completed in rural development. An early auditors report found that the project was adversely affected by inadequate planning and management and therefore unlikely to achieve project goals. Improvements were made however, and by 1982, evaluators noted reasonable progress toward goal achievement. Sixteen projects were developed by consultant teams; eight were approved for funding. The design, implementation and evaluation of subprojects were found, for the most part, to have met the requirements of the project paper.

Participating state officials were trained in seminars, meetings and in-country training programs. Degree training plans, however, were not being met. It was felt that planning, implementation and evaluation capabilities of agricultural officers in member states were increased, however, mid-way through the project, it was too early to tell if these increased capabilities would be institutionalized at the regional level.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

- Meetings of ministers of agriculture from member nations led to increased policy discussions. The first meeting, held in 1981, led to an adoption of policy recommendations for rural development in Entente Council countries for 1982-86.

- Some subprojects impacted national policy in member countries. The Upper Volta animal traction subproject impacted credit policy and resulted in a new credit institution.

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

None noted

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

- The Entente Fund initiated cooperation and strengthened its relationships with ministries of agriculture in member countries.

- In 1981, for the first time, a meeting of the five ministers of agriculture was held to discuss agricultural prices, trade and marketing policies.

- Several subprojects strengthened national and local institutions. For example, the Caisse National de Credit Agricole (CNCA) was established as a result of recommendations by the project management team regarding one of the Upper Volta subprojects. In Niger, a new national institution was created to manage the purchase and distribution of veterinary pharmaceuticals.

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- Participants were trained

- The team's strong coordination and cooperation with subproject managers and other officials in member states increased the capabilities of the agricultural officers in member states in design, implementation, and analysis.

- The Entente Fund strengthened its regional role, recognition, and credibility.

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

None noted

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None noted

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None noted

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

Early constraints:

- TA was late to arrive
- Benchline data was not collected
- Financial difficulties of some host governments made them unable to make contributions
- No centralized accounting procedures were established by the Fund
- The Fund did not perform financial audits, as planned

Mid-term constraints:

- The 15 subprojects were not monitored adequately due to inadequate data collection and reporting. Such requirements were not included in the project design
- In some cases, the Entente Fund failed to comply with AID financial and other reporting regulations
- The subproject designs did not give enough thought to support services such as credit
- Sometimes project commodities arrived late in relation to planned start up

ENHANCEMENTS:

The Entente Fund was found to be effective in implementing the project.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

1) Adequate data collection and reporting from subprojects are necessary for adequate monitoring. Such data collection should be included in the project design. The following items are recommended for inclusion in standardized quarterly reports:

   a) estimated expenditures required to complete subprojects and a technical review of how targets are to be attained or adjusted;

   b) narrative reviewing activities planned for next quarter;

   c) data on production and income;

   d) assessment of implementation problems; and

   e) extent of financial self-sufficiency of subprojects.

2) Credit considerations must be given attention in the project planning phase.

3) Project designs should not be overly complicated, and should also consider management and organizational issues.

Institutional

1) More effort is needed to involve the local population in implementation of subprojects.

Other:

1) Disbursement of AID funds through a regional agency is a cost-effective use of AID management and other resources. Regional management of subprojects permits administration economies.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Entente States (Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Benin, Togo)

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Entente Food Production (626-0203) 1976-78

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$25,587,000	$3,117,400
Grant	8,180,000	1,636,000
Loan	10,000,000	0
Country	7,407,000	1,481,400
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Entente Fund
Nigerian Ministry of Rural Development
Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole (Niger)
Nigerian Credit and Cooperative Union
Nigerian National Literacy Service
Upper Volta Ministry of Rural Development
Benin Ministry of Rural Development
Togo Ministry of Rural Development
Compagnie Iviorenne Pour le Development des Textiles (Ivory Coast)

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

Louis Berger Inc.

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To reverse the trend of declining per capita food production and increasing food imports in the Entente member nations by achieving higher equilibrium levels of production, marketing and prices for selected food crops.

PURPOSES:

- To increase the level, efficiency, and reliability of food production by small farmers over the medium to long term
- To promote the national capacity of Entente member states to design and implement rural development projects

OUTPUTS:

- Viable small farmer-oriented food production projects
- Improved access to and follow up of credit for small farmers

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- Improved government capability to identify, design, implement, and evaluate small farmer-oriented rural development projects, including development of research capacity to adapt technology and organization of projects to small farm conditions.

INPUTS:

- Technical assistance grant including two full time advisors to EF (Entente Fund).
- Consultant contracts to assist in evaluation and design of projects
- Farm level trials of proposed minimum packages to test feasibility
- Participant training in the U.S. or Africa in credit, extension, and applied agronomy
- Financing of subproject activities

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Entente States (Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Benin, Togo)

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Entente Food Production (626-0203) 1976-78

DESCRIPTION:

Agricultural Credit: development of a small, carefully administered credit program for small farmers.

Capacity to Promote Rural Development:

- o Agronomic Research -- field trial offices will be provided
- o Ten scholarships to train agronomists in the U.S. or other countries (2 scholarships per country)
- o Assessment of appropriate technology for farmers
- o Sociological Research -- one scholarship per country to train a sociologist or rural development specialist
- o Sociological evaluations and research in rural development problems related to traditional food production

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- o Food production by small farmers
- o Integrated rural development as related to agriculture
- o Bottlenecks in small farmer food production, including credit, fertilizer delivery, availability of farm implements, and seed availability
- o Appropriate technology

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Entente States (Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Benin, Togo)

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Entente Food Production (626-0203) 1976-78

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: USAID, Evaluation of Entente Fund Rural Development Projects: Livestock II and Food Production, December 1981.

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular x **Special** _____ **Final** _____

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

Much of this project has focused on infrastructure and extension type activities. These included irrigation projects, animal traction projects, construction of seed farms, etc. These are not directly related to agriculture planning or policy.

The project did promote a number of planning studies on rural development issues and also brought together the Ministers of Agriculture from the five Entente States. This led to discussions on national policy issues and resulted in the adoption of policy recommendations by certain of the ministers. This should be considered of considerable importance even if many of the individual subprojects had less success.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

- La Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole was established based upon recommendations of the project management team of a subproject (Upper Volta)
- Nigerian agricultural credit was restructured based on a cooperatives subproject

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

- Meeting of Ministers of Agriculture and Rural Development included discussions of national policies and adoption of policy recommendations
- Ministers of Agriculture adopted recommendations on conducting planning studies, studies of production of agricultural inputs, and other studies

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

- Ministers of Agriculture of other nations met for the first time in 1981 to discuss prices, trade, and marketing policies

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- Training of staff in areas of agricultural land titles, agricultural credit, analytical skills, project implementation, project monitoring, and financial management

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

- Improved agricultural productivity due to animal traction (as opposed to hand tillage)

- More cohesive farmer cooperatives (Niger)

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

- Demand for animal traction equipment grew so rapidly that new manufacturing firms were established

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

- Project Management team dwindled to only one person; this was insufficient to monitor all the projects, provide technical assistance, stimulate coordination and develop subprojects

- Poor project design led to expensive subprojects, subprojects whose magnitude was severely underestimated, overly ambitious subprojects, subprojects whose support services were underestimated, or subprojects of excessive complexity

- Procurement problems arose due to insufficient planning -- e.g., poor ordering and processing, customs clearance problems, late arrivals of commodities, etc.

- Inflation

- Fluctuations in currency exchange rates

- Interagency disputes led to project delays

- Lack of integration of rural development institutions impeded project effectiveness in Togo

ENHANCEMENTS:

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

None noted

Institutional

- Access to credit by small farmers allows technological improvements to be adopted that lead to greater productivity
- Credit programs must be long term; otherwise lack of access to credit will curtail technological progress
- Where bovine husbandry is unknown, adoption of animal traction is slow and so policy to promote animal traction is unsuccessful
- Projects should not aim at specially created institutional entities that cannot survive the project

Other:

- Too short a project time horizon may stifle the prospects for a self-sustaining system of credit, production and marketing
- Large, complex projects dependent on U.S. procurement will meet with implementation delays
- Projects should have only one or two objectives with a priority between them.
- Projects should be developed to be self-sustaining after the formal project comes to an end

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Gambia River Basin (the Gambia, Senegal)

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Gambia River Basin Development Project (625-0012) 1981-1986

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$13,394,000	13,394,000
Grant	13,394,000	13,394,000
Loan	0	0
Country	0	0
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Organization pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Gambie (OMVG)
Ministries in the Gambia and Senegal

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

Technical advisors, training institutions

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: The socioeconomic development of the rural population of the Gambia River Basin.

SUBGOAL: To establish an effective coordinating agency for Gambia River Basin Development in conjunction with member states and other donors by December, 1985.

PURPOSES: In conjunction with other donors, to establish an effective planning division within the Organization pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Gambie (OMVG) by December 1985.

OUTPUTS: Studies effectively completed and recommendations accepted by OMVG as valid:

- o Environmental Study (river resources, public health, wildlife, vegetation)
- o Socioeconomic study
- o Aerial photography and mapping

Training

- o Academic and on-the-job (environmentalist, civil engineer, river basin planner, rural sociologist, natural resource economist, statistician, geodetic and cartographic staff)

INPUTS: Training, technical advisors, funding for studies, commodities, funding for evaluations, contingency funding, inflation factor.

U.S. Technical Assistance (long term)

- Environmental
- Civil engineer, basin planner
- Rural sociologist
- Natural resource economist

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Gambia River Basin (the Gambia, Senegal)

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Gambia River Basin Development Project (625-0012) 1981-86

DESCRIPTION:

Technical Assistance: this component of the project is to build institutional capabilities for technical planning. Activities include:

- long term technical assistance in river basin planning (environmental specialist, engineer, rural sociologist, natural resources economist)
- short term technical assistance in cartography and geodetic surveys; OMVG staff will be trained in aerial photographic and mapping techniques
- training of OMVG and host country staff in environmental, social and economic analysis

Aerial Photography and Mapping: 1:10,000 contour maps will be prepared for selected areas and photographs will be prepared. OMVG and Ministry personnel will receive on-the-job training in mapping procedures. Personnel will also be trained in map use.

Environmental and Socio-Economic Studies:

- baseline socio-economic information on agriculture will be collected and can be used in policy making and policy evaluation with respect to agricultural production goals for the year 2000 and other projects
- environmental studies on river resources, public health and wildlife and vegetation will be carried out

Training of OMVG and Host Country Personnel:

- academic training -- four OMVG staff members will study at the Master's level in the U.S. Their theses will be based on basin studies and these individuals will return to permanent work at the OMVG. Academic training for a junior statistician will also occur
- technical training -- two persons will be trained for six months in data processing and four persons will be trained in mapping procedures for one month
- on-the-job training -- from working with technical advisors

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Coordinated river basin planning
- Socio-economic development in the Gambia River Basin through simulation of employment possibilities for rural people, promotion of a more equitable distribution of revenues, and promotion of agricultural and industrial development.
- Grain self-sufficiency
- Forestry development
- Increased meat production
- To establish OMVG as an effective operating agency for the coordination and management of a development planning and project implementation plan

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Sahel (9 countries)*

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Sahel-Regional Activities, Niger River Development Planning

(625-0915) 1977-1984

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$9,324,000	$7,459,200
Grant	1,850,000	1,480,000
Loan	0	0
Country	484,000	387,000
Other (Other Donors)	6,990,000	5,592,200

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

River Niger Commission (later called Niger Basin Authority (NBA)
Hydrological Service Organization of the nine member states

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

USAID, CIDA (Canada), FAC (France), UNDP (United Nations)
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To assist the River Niger Commission design and undertake a coordinated program for the development of the land, water, and human resources of the Niger Basin for the benefit of the basin population.

SUBGOALS:

- o Formulation of an internationally recognized Indicative Basin Plan and Investment Program which will ensure the rational development and utilization of basin resources for the benefit of the resident population
- o Establishment of an institutional structure with sufficient technical and managerial capability to mobilize necessary resources and assist member states in the future implementation of the basin plan and supporting investment program.

included among resources cited in PROP.

*Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger,

PURPOSES:

- To establish the analytical base (Diagnostic Study) and planning framework (Action Program) required for the preparation of the indicative basin plan and investment program

- To commence the process of strengthening the institutional capability of the River Niger Commission to carry out an effective program of planning and development for the Niger River Basin over time

OUTPUTS:

- Diagnostic Study: comprehensive diagnostic study which defines the existing and potential basin resources and the scope and requirements of long term efforts for the preparation of an Indicative Plan (through a five year action program)

- Institutional Development:

  -- established and functioning expatriate advisory staff
  -- expanded indigenous staff assigned and functioning within the Executive Secretariat of the River Niger Commission
  -- improved documentation center operations
  -- academic training for future indigenous staff
  -- increased comprehension of river basin development and coordination requirements by member states of the River Niger Commission

INPUTS:

- Short-term contract personnel and logistics for preparation of diagnostic studies

- Long-term technical assistance

- Long-term participant training

- Short-term training and study tours

- Architectural design service

- Logistical support

- Increased permanent indigenous staff and budgetary support to the River Niger Commission

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Sahel (9 countries)

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Sahel-Regional Activities, Niger River Development Planning (625-0915) 1977-84

DESCRIPTION:

Original Project (Niger Basin Development Planning):

- "Start-up" phase of a long term, multi-donor assistance effort
- Produce information needed to prepare an action program by undertaking a diagnostic study and then delineate the budget for the action phase
- Provide expatriate technical advisory assistance to carry out the action program
- Initiate short and long term academic training for the RNC staff
- Provide technical support
- Prepare Diagnostic Study elements including agriculture survey, topographic and mapping survey, environmental survey, social survey, water resources survey, engineering survey, education and training requirements, legal and institutional survey, and preparation of atlas and report. Data from the Diagnostic Study were to be largely existing -- not newly collected

The result was to be a five year action program.

Due to start-up difficulties, the project was amended. New activities were to be:

- continuation of long term technical assistance, participant training, short term training and study tours, and logistical and budgetary support
- aerial reconnaissance of Niger River
- assembly of existing river data into a data storage and retrieval system
- performance of a geographic study
- determination of future data needs

Further work (not part of this project) will include development of water-sedimentation routing model and navigation studies.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Comprehensive river basin planning

B-2 ASIA

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY: Bangladesh

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Sector Assessment 1983

DESCRIPTION:

The objective of this agricultural assessment was to prescribe long-term USAID program interventions which would be most appropriate in Bangladesh. The assessment recounts the performance of the agricultural sector since independence and the progress of related areas of the economy which are of consequence to overall development. Included are descriptions of the natural and human resource base, the marketing system, the status of women, the public sector, donor programs, and the scientific base in agriculture. Emphasis is given to identifying both the positive factors which can assist sectoral development and the constraints which must be corected. An overall development strategy based on increased agricultural productivity is proposed, along with specific recommendations for USAID programming within each of the elements of the strategy.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- o overall agricultural sector development

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*Source: Wennergren, E. Boyd, Anthoit, Charles H. and Whitaker, Morris D., An Assessment of the Agricultural Sector in Bangladesh, Utah State University, August, 1983.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Bangladesh

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Rural Finance Experimental Project (388-0025) 1977-1982

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$7,440,000	$7,400,000
Grant	7,000,000	7,000,000
Loan	0	0
Country	440,000	440,000
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Bangladesh Bank

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

Technical Consultant and AID Mission

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: Establishment of an effective nationwide institutional rural finance system providing credit and savings facilities to small farmers and other small rural producers.

PURPOSES: Development of one or more replicable model rural finance systems providing credit and savings facilities to small farmers and other small rural producers.

OUTPUTS: Model rural finance systems fully tested and evaluated on a pilot operation basis. They include: 1) encouraging small borrowers to contact credit institutions; 2) extending small farmers agricultural credit through sub-branch banks; 3) allocating credit for area needs; 4) providing small farmer service centers; 5) training lending officials to be credit officers/referral agents; 6) commissioning salaried village loan referral agents; 7) lending to village groups and starting coops. At least 7 models will be in operation.

INPUTS: AID: 1) 243 person months of technical assistance; 2) 1200 work months of training; 3) funds for credit and losses; 4) vehicles. BDG: 1) legislative and policy changes; 2) overhead, including office space, staff and supplies, operation and maintenance of motor vehicles.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Bangladesh

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Rural Finance Experimental Project (388-0025) 1977-82

DESCRIPTION:

Project tests potential rural credit systems with the intention of finding a replicable model for providing reasonable credit in support of rural development and agricultural production. A series of experiments will be undertaken by the Bangladesh Krishi Bank, six commercial banks and a rural cooperative bank testing a variety of possible credit system models. AID will underwrite all risk and financing for each loan extended to a target group borrower (rural resident, over 18, earning less than $200/year, with assets under $333, cultivating ≤2 acres of land). A technical consulting firm, responsible to the Bangladesh Bank will be responsible for technical assistance, evaluation and training (particularly of loan officers). At least seven models are being tested.

Lack of available rural credit has stemmed from the fact that BDB has set maximum rate ceilings (currently 12% on regular agricultural loans and 13% on rural industrial loans) which are too low to support costs of lending and savings rates (7.75% when RFEP began) which are too low to attract savings in a country with high inflation. Consequently, rural credit has not been readily available from banks and much of it has come from high interest money lenders. RFEP tests demand for loans at 12%, 18%,24%, 30% and 36%, ability of banks to attract savings at rates from 11% to 15%, performance of loans granted under RFEP, and institutional reforms aimed at streamlining loan process and reducing its costs to lending institutions.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

Rural credit systems
Rural agricultural development

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Bangladesh

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Rural Finance Experimental Program (RFEP) (388-0025) 1977-82

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR:

Final Report, October 1982

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular _____ Special _____ Final _____

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

Project implementation started in September, 1978 and continued through August 31, 1982. The final evaluation concludes that the project "met its objectives and fulfilled its purpose." Eight lending models, testing 6 key variables were tested at 98 outlets in Bangladesh. Overall, 81595 loans to 43113 separate borrowers had been granted, valued at 134M Taka (U.S. $9.1 M). The final evaluation cites the following results:

RFEP reached the target group (90% of loans were to target group) with resulting production and income increases. It increased rural non-agricultural lending and lending to other non-crop-production agricultural activities. RFEP loans out performed non-RFEP loans with regard to loan recovery and overdue loans. The group lending model had lower productivity than any of the individual models.

Finally, the project had a significant impact on informal credit in project areas, causing money lenders to substantially reduce their rates. Although RFEP demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of financial reform in rural areas, there is no mention of whether (as intended) the project developed a replicable model which, in fact, was going to be replicated in Bangladesh or whether it contributed to the establishment of an effective nationwide institutional finance system. If the new larger project is successful (388-0037), RFEP will clearly have contributed to an economically viable national rural finance system.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

Has been a significant reason behind BDG and AID decision to embark on a much larger ($75M AID: $420M BDG) project (388-0037) (1983-87) to create an economically viable rural financial system which mobilizes savings and provides credit facilities to private farmers and entrepreneurs.

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

Direct impact on decisions to pursue program mentioned above

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

Four banks introduced performance incentives to staff and to borrowers.

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

Streamlining loan application procedures, reducing reporting requirements and removing some collateral requirements expedited loan process and reduced costs without having negative effect on performance of RFEP loans. Banks, through RFEP participation, began to change procedures and develop capacity for a more viable approach to rural financing.

Cooperation of banks and institutions participating in RFEP.

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

None identified

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None identified

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None identified

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

BDG established rate for savings increased from 7.75% to 10% at beginning of RFEP, somewhat blunting potential effects of the savings parts of the experiment.

ENHANCEMENTS:

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

The group lending model is less productive than individual models.

Institutional

Other:

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Indonesia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Assistance to Agriculture (497-0189) 1968-1981

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$2,683,000	$2,683,000
Grant	2,683,000	2,683,000
Loan	0	0
Country	not available	not available
Other (Other Donors)	not available	not available

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Department of Agriculture

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

Auburn University
University of Hawaii
Kansas State University
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: Improved agriculture sector management, increased food production, strengthened agricultural marketing program

PURPOSES:

- Improved capability of the Indonesian Department of Agriculture in utilizing modern agricultural technology in specific agricultural production projects as identified by area surveys and feasibility studies
- Improved purchase, supply, and distribution systems for agricultural inputs; improved farmer credit assistance; improved marketing of agricultural outputs

OUTPUTS:

- Department of Agriculture Personnel trained in techniques of evaluating and analyzing survey data, of conducting feasibility studies, and of preparing implementation plans
- Report on organization, technical focus, and resource needs of the Bureau of Planning in the Department of Agriculture. This report should indicate organizational responsibilities and interrelationships of the Department of Agriculture Planning Bureau, Research and Agricultural Development Agency, Directorates and Regional/Provincial Planning Offices
- Improved input distribution

- Management training course in principles and techniques of modern corporate management, including personnel, administration, financial control, marketing, logistics, and sales

- Marketing testing programs developed for new agricultural inputs and regulatory controls

- Establishment of Indonesian policies and commercial systems for supporting producers' prices and promoting agricultural exports

- Rice marketing system survey

- Restructured purchase and distribution systems for fertilizers, pesticides, grains, and agricultural chemicals

INPUTS:

None indicated

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Indonesia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Assistance to Agriculture (497-0189) 1968-81

DESCRIPTION:

The original project was designed to strengthen the administration, organization, and operation of an existing Indonesian agricultural credit extension program (BIMAS). The purpose of the program was to promote increased food grain production through wide-scale application of fertilizer, high yielding seeds, and other agricultural inputs. In 1975 the project was revised to include agricultural planning to identify agricultural projects which contribute to Indonesia's and AID's program objectives. In 1977 the project was revised again to assist in the development of new agricultural programs and policies and to increase the Department of Agriculture's capability to design and implement new programs and policies. In short, this project is a "fund proejct" to provide a quick response as specific planning issues come up. Among the specific activities were:

- Training of central government agency staffs in sector analysis, program planning, and project implementation
- Increased credit for purchase of production inputs
- Improvements in the distribution of fertilizers and pesticides
- Changes in policies on prices and on markets for rice production
- Training of managerial personnel in marketing
- Soil and plant analyses
- Improvement of farmer education and information services through a demonstration program
- Seed improvement, production and distribution
- Assistance in drying snd storing rice
- Training of extension agents for demonstration - extension program
- Training of technicians in seed processing, drying, storage, rice production, etc.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Fertilizer pricing and distribution
- Rice storage
- Farm production and technology
- Providing information to farmers on new technology

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Indonesia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Assistance to Agriculture (497-0189) 1968-1981

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: Memorandum Audit Report/1980
Project Appraisal Report/1975
Project Appraisal Report/1977
Project Evaluation Summary/1978

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular ___x___ Special _____ Audit ___x___

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

- Since 1975 the project has been a catch-all for Indonesia's Department of Agriculture.
- 1969 to 1975: The project proceeded largely as planned: participants in project overseas training slightly exceeded targets; studies and technical assistance provided by the project led to an expanded rice storage program, flexible pricing system for fertilizer, expanded fertilizer production facilities, and several agricultural research programs; some equipment was delayed.
- September 1975-February 1977: Major targets met on schedule, participant training program was well received and graduates have improved their effectiveness (162 participants) through life of project. Delays were experienced in obtaining vehicles.
- February 1977-February 1978: Participant training remained on schedule with five long-term participants studying in the U.S. Land use planning course for Ministry of Interior highly successful. Rural Dynamic Survey ongoing with project funds. Soils reserach on schedule.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

- Establishment of flexible fertilizer pricing system
- Expanded rice storage program

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

Decisionmakers improved understanding of the importance of a flexible system for fertilizer pricing.

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

- Inter-departmental Fertilizer Management Board established to advise on supply, imports, pricing, and distribution

- Regional meetings of the Department of Agriculture with field personnel contribute to better agricultural planning

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- Trained personnel in various Directorates of the Ministry of Agriculture (156 persons, not all in planning, however)
- Rural Dynamic Survey has generated baseline data for planners and policy makers
- Improved capability for conceptualizing and developing five-year agricultural plans
- Land use planning capabilities were improved through a land use planning course

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

- Enrollment in the credit and extension program rose but later declined
- Farmers received information and demonstrations from extension workers

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

- Expansion of fertilizer production capacity
- Greater production of rice seed (high yield varieties)

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

- Study on rice handling, storage, and marketing was produced

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

ENHANCEMENTS:

TVA provided a consistent pattern of technical and managerial training and sound advisory services. This advanced inter-departmental cooperation and managerial capacity for fertilizer.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

None identified

Institutional

- Projects like this one (Assistance to Agriculture) are useful because of their flexibility and quick response mechanism. That is, the "catch-all" project can be used for assistance to fill in the gaps between other projects.

Other:

- Need for improved fiscal management

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Indonesia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Development, Planning and Administration (497-0265) (1977-84)

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$10,400,000	$10,400,000
Grant	1,300,000	1,300,000
Loan	5,000,000	5,000,000
Country	4,100,000	4,100,000
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

DOA especially its Bureau of Planning (BOP)

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

U.S. University

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: Increase agricultural production, rural income, and employment opportunities.

PURPOSES: Upgrade the planning and programming capabilitiy of the Department of Agriculture.

OUTPUTS: 1. More efficient and effective approach to agricultural planning. 2. Trained personnel. 3. Improved system of data collection. 4. Computer-based information center.

INPUTS: AID: loan of $5.1 Million, grant of $1.3 Million. GOI: $4.1 Million plus personnel.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Indonesia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Development, Planning and Administration (497-0265) 1972-84

DESCRIPTION:

The project provides: a) long and short term academic training, in-country and in the U.S., b) technical assistance to improve DOA capabilities in policy and project planning and implementation, and c) improvements in the data management system by centralizing it in one bureau, constructing a new data information center and equipping it with the necessary data processing equipment. 300 candidates will receive agricultural planning and development OJT in Indonesia; 80 will follow graduate programs, in-country (50) in U.S. (15) or in other countries (5). In addition, 50 upper-level GOI officials will receive training seminars and short courses in the general capabilities of the DOA data processing system. Heavy emphasis in training will be given to reaching down to the provincial level where planning is based on inputs from local and district level agriculturalists. Technical advisory services will be provided by one agricultural sector planning specialist (2-4 1/2 years), a data processing and computer specialist (2 years) and 52 months of short-term consultants. In addition to 6 vehicles, the project's major commodities are data processing equipment, operating system, computers, assemblers, utilities, disk drives, printers, monitors, tape drives, and readers.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Improve agricultural policy and planning capability in DOA/BOP
- Centralize and improve agricultural data processing capability

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Korea

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Rural Policy Planning and Development (489-0594) 1964-74

LEVEL OF FUNDING	**ENTIRE PROJECT**	**PLANNING COMPONENTS**
Total	Not Available	Not Available
Grant		
Loan		
Country		
Other (Other Donors)		

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
Agriculture and Fisheries Development Corporation
Office of Rural Development
National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation
Economic Planning Board
Office of Fisheries

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

Technical advisors

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: More rapid growth in the rural sector through more productive use of agricultural resources

PURPOSES: Improved agricultural planning, programs, and use of resources

OUTPUTS:
- o Agricultural price policy
- o Rural income policy
- o Effective production programs at provincial level
- o Irrigation/land development/fertilizer program
- o Increased grain production
- o Improved research, especially administration and coordination
- o A single functional unit in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry with the technical capability for national planning and policy
- o Enlarged Agricultural Economic Research Institute
- o Trained staff

INPUTS: Not indicated

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Korea

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Rural Policy Planning and Development (489-0594) 1964-74

DESCRIPTION:

- Training of crop breeders to develop new varieties of rice
- Research on double cropping and intercropping
- Establishment of Agricultural Economic Research Institute
- Introduction of new crop varieties
- Demonstration programs on farms
- Coordination of development efforts through committee actions
- Training of research workers in provincial offices
- Training of project managers in feasibility analysis and other methods
- Provision of management and marketing advice
- Training of research and extension staff
- Provision of advisory services to identify key policy issues, problem areas, and development opportunities
- Provision of advisory services to provincial government offices concerned with rural development and agricultural production
- Provision of technical advisory services to the Agriculture and Fisheries Development Corporation
- Provision of technical advice and assistance to the Office of Rural Development and the Seoul National University
- Analysis of demand and supply situation for food and feed grains

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Income on farms
- Farm prices
- Agricultural investment
- Agricultural growth targets
- Food grain self-sufficiency

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Korea

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Rural Policy Planning and Development (489-0594) 1964-74

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: USAID, Project Appraisal Report/Jan, 1971.

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular ___x___ Special _____ Final _____

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

- o Farm output grew by 30% from 1964 to 1971 and farm household income rose 73% from 1964 to 1969. Urban consumers now spend less of their income on food
- o Crop breeders developed new varieties of rice
- o Research on double cropping and intercropping was carried out
- o The Agricultural Economic Research Institute was established
- o New crop varieties were introduced
- o Committees were established to coordinate development efforts
- o Training of research workers, project managers, and research and extension staff took place
- o Management and marketing advice was provided
- o Field programs were executed so well that they could be phased out early
- o Most activities were on schedule in 1970
- o Training in the U.S., the Philippines, Taiwan and Japan in agricultural economics, extension, development policy, research administration, statistics, marketing, and other subjects took place

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

- o Development of income, price, and investment policy, including sector growth targets

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

None noted

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

- o Scattered administrative functions for agricultural statistics, economics, and planning are consolidated into a functional unit in the Ministry of Agricultural and Forestry

- o Recommendations were made to subsidiary farms of a government holding company concerning production and processing of agricultural products or food services and many were accepted by the farmers. Recommendations pertained to marketing and management

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- o Expansion of the Agricultural Economic Research Institute from 2 to 5 divisions

- o Development of multi-year planning, feasibility analysis and food balance anlaysis capabilities

- o Assistance in marketing, financial and management analysis for the government holding corporation supporting agribusiness

- o Increase in the number of university trained staff in governmental and quasi-governmental agricultural institutions

- o Provincial planning coordinators to help prepare overall development plans

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

<u>The Agricultural Sector</u>

- o Increased farm output (30% increase from 1964 to 1971)

- o Increased farm household income (73% increase from 1964 to 1969)

<u>The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs</u>

None noted

<u>The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs</u>

- o Lowered food cost to urban consumers as a percentage of total budget

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

- o Drought in 1967 and 68

ENHANCEMENTS:

- o Forceful leadership at all levels and a desire for progress have promoted economic development

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

None noted

Institutional

- Forceful leadership at all levels is a significant development factor

Other:

None noted

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Laos

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Development--Administration and Planning, Subproject 07 (439-0065) 1967-75

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Obligations through Dec. 31, 1973:		
Total	$2,544,000	$2,544,000
Grant	2,276,000	2,276,000
Loan	0	0
Country	268,000	268,000
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Directorate of Agriculture

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

Technical advisors

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To improve the economy of Laos through self-sufficiency in production of basic foodstuffs, including protein, and diversification of agricultural production.

PURPOSES: To improve management and data analysis capabilities in the Directorate of Agriculture.

OUTPUTS:

- Construction of a building for the Directorate of Agriculture
- Assembly and collection of agriculture data
- Improvement of audio-visual and duplicating facilities
- Establishment of agricultural radio programming facilities
- Conferences on program management and evaluation
- Preparation of periodic reports on agricultural economics
- In-service training

INPUTS:

None indicated

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ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Laos

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Development--Administration and Planning, Subproject 07 (439-0065) 1967-75

DESCRIPTION:

This project is primarily concerned with improving the capacity of the Directorate of Agriculture to assemble, prepare, analyze and evaluate data on the agricultural sector and to plan for the agricultural sector. Specific activities include:

- Training of staff in statistics, mathematics, economics
- Securing economic data to develop marketing zone programs and to diversify agricultural output
- Training of staff in problem solving techniques and program evaluation
- Collection of data pertaining to programs
- Provide equipment for information dissemination such as visual teaching devices, studio recording equipment, fellowships, charts, etc.
- Training of clerical staff in office and administrative procedures
- Capacity building

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Capacity building

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Laos

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Development--Administration and Planning, Subproject 07 (439-0065) 1967-75

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR:

USAID, Project Appraisal Report, 1969 (April);
Audit Report/September,1972
Project Appraisal Report, December 1969
Project Appraisal Report, December 1970

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular ___x___ Special _____ Final _____

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

- o Laotian government did not provide its portion of the funds until 1969 thereby delaying startup
- o Construction of the Administrative Building was started in 1969 and finished in 1970.
- o Clerical training had minimal impact by 1969. Having staff work with AID personnel coupled with limited training was not successful.
- o Planning conferences are held regularly for the accelerated rice production program and the Agriculture Development Organization.
- o Collection of agricultural data, statistical training, informational services work, and program management work started in 1970 and was on schedule in 1970.
- o Program evaluation conferences were held with USAID.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

None identified

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

None identified

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

- o Planning conferences were held regularly for the accelerated rice production program and the Agriculture Development Organization

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- o Technical--audiovisual and duplicating capacity increased, radio programming capacity increased
- o Analytical--only a modest amount of participant training occurred by 1970

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

None indicated

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None indicated

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None indicated

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

- o Staff of Directorate of Agriculture showed little interest in improving their clerical skills; their supervisors also apparently showed little commitment to improving staff clerical skills
- o Ongoing war made agricultural data collection difficult
- o Low number of graduates in Laos made it difficult to find suitable candidates for training

ENHANCEMENTS:

None noted

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

None

Institutional

- o Without institutional commitment to improved staff capabilities, there is likely to be little impact of training programs on the capacity to plan and administer agricultural programs. This problem is exacerbated by low staff morale. "Patient persuasion on the part of all agricultural advisors and training whenever the training is truly desired upon the part of the recipients" are recommended.

Other:

- Subproject recommended for termination before technical capabilities in information dissemination started and before analytical training started. However, subproject was continued.

- In a country with low levels of education, it is difficult to identify individuals for technical training.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Nepal

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: PVO* Co-Financing Subproject C3: Strengthening Institutional Capacity in the Food and Agricultural Sectors (367-0144), 1981

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$1,456,000	$1,456,000
Grant	1,092,000	1,092,000
Loan	0	0
Country	0	0
Other (Other Donors)	364,000	364,000

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Ministry of Agriculture

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

Agricultural Development Council, Inc.

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To improve the performance of the agricultural sector in Nepal.

PURPOSES: To upgrade the social science research, economic analysis and information management capability of Nepal's Ministry of Agriculture.

OUTPUTS: Research reports, trained staff, and data bases.

INPUTS: Private Voluntary Organizations, 25% of costs of subprojects.

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*Private Voluntary Organizations.

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ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Nepal

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: PVO Co-Financing Subproject 03: Strengthening Institutional Capacity in the Food and Agricultural Sector (367-0144), 1981

DESCRIPTION:

Project to support efforts of the Agricultural Development Council, Inc. to upgrade the social science research, economic analysis, and information management capability of Nepal's Ministry of Agriculture (MOA). The project will strengthen planning, research, evaluation, monitoring, and training in select MOA-related institutions, promote more productive use of human and resource endowments, and increase the number of competent rural analysts, administrators, and researchers.

The project supported a number of research efforts in the areas of credit policies and institutional development.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Credit policies
- Institution building

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Nepal

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Administration and Management Program (376-0101) 1972

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$161,000	$161,000
Grant	161,000	161,000
Loan	0	0
Country	0	0
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

The Administration and Management Department (AMD) of HMG

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

American public administration advisor in Nepal

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: Improve the overall effectiveness of administration within HMG to facilitate the achievement of Nepal's development objectives.

PURPOSES: Increase the administration and management (O&M) capability in HMG.

OUTPUTS:

1. Eight staff members trained by organization and management advisor; five staff members given further O&M training in U.S. during FY 73 and 74.

2. Policies devised and system established for deputing analysts to other ministries to perform O&M functions by the end of FY 73.

3. Eight O&M studies undertaken and completed during FY 73; 14 during FY 74.

4. Seventeen seminars dealing with different O&M subjects conducted twice for new staff by the end of FY 74.

INPUTS: USAID: 1. Technicians - 1 Long term O&M advisor (ZMY); 2. Participant Training A. 2 individuals - General O&M - 7 months each - U.S. B. 2 individuals - specialized O&M - 3 months each - U.S. C. 1 individual - specialized O&M - 3 months each - U.S.; HMG: 1. Personnel as specified in proposal A. 7 new posts (approved FY 72) B. 1 new O&M team (undersecretary and 3 section officers) 2. logistical support.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Nepal

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Administration and Management Program (367-0101) 1972

DESCRIPTION:

USAID will provide a long term advisor in public administration to assist the Administration and Management Department (AMD) analysts in research, study design, problem identification, evaluation of alternatives, development of recommendations and implementation. His day to day assistance will be supplemented by conduct of seminars and personnel activities at AMD. In this last area, he will assist and encourage implementation of a Position Classification System and assist the department in functioning as a central personnel agency.

In addition, five local Organization Management staff will be sent to the United States (2 for 7 months; 3 for 3 months) in general management analysis and specialized analytic techniques.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

Capacity building in administration, management and personnel

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Nepal

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Resource Conservation and Utilization Project (RCUP) (367-0132) 1980-85

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$32,558,700	$8,200,000
Grant	27,498,200	5,700,000
Loan	0	0
Country	$5,060,200	$1,500,000
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

HMG/N, Ministry of Forest, Department of Soil and Water Conservation

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

SECID (Southeast Consortium for International Development)
Duke - long term training and identification of needs for short term TA
VPI - establishing new Pokhava campus of IRNR
Western Carolina - short term training

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To improve the standard of living of the rural poor through increased agricultural production, raise the nutritional level of the rural population, and to develop employment opportunities in rural areas.

PURPOSES: To assist the Government of Nepal (HMG/N) in the protection and restoration of the soil, water and plant resource base upon which the rural population is totally dependent. (institutional support)

OUTPUTS:

- o Increase in number of trained persons in natural resources management - 49 trained long-term in U.S. and 63 trained short-term
- o Watershed and forest management programs established, improving 173,991 hectares of watershed
- o Over 12,618 hectares of foder and firewood tree plantation established

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- Increased crop yields by 15%

- Increased livestock production by 10%

INPUTS: AID and HMG/N provide financing to carry out technical services and training. From AID is 408 person months of long-term advisors, 90 person months of short term advisors and financing for long-term training of 49 participants plus 99 person months of short-term training. Home office support, local consultants, equipment and supplies, allowances, are additional AID inputs. 3-6 Peace Corps volunteers, trained by the project, will be assigned to it.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Nepal

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Resource Conservation and Utilization Project (RCUP) (367-0132) 1980-85

DESCRIPTION:

Rapid degradation of Nepal's environment poses a signficant threat and this project is attempting to help HMG/N in protection and restoration of the soil, water and plant resource base upon which the population is dependent. Focusing on two catchment areas (Gorkha and Mustang/Myagdi) this multi-faceted 5 year project (recommended as first stage of larger 15 year project) will engage in a number of strategies of a) institutional development, b) energy alternatives, c) forest management, d) range management, 3) agricultural improvements and f) watershed management. These will be supported by an inventory and monitoring system and a social support system. Much of the assistance and non-personnel inputs are going to activities b-f above. Activity a fits more directly into a policy analysis and planning focus and will be elaborated on here. Institutional development activities, accomplished through training Nepalese in-country and in the U.S. is intended to increase the capacity of the Nepalese to apply technical and administrative skills required to carry out resource conservation management. In the U.S., the project will support 49 long-term Nepalese trainees in degree work at Duke University. In-country training will take place at Tribhuvan University and the Ministry of Forest's Training Wing. Five long-term expatriate teachers plus short-term professionals will be supplied to Tribhuvan by RCUP at 2 campuses (the current facilities at Hetauda and new campus being built by the World Bank at Pokhara). This is intended to support training for 1524 certificate graduates (at least 10% women) and 33 diploma graduates and to make present courses more practically oriented, including a semester of field experience. RCUP will supply 2 expatriate teachers to the Ministry of Forest's Training Wing with the purpose of training trainers (at least 10% women) who will conduct training sessions at the community/panchayat level. RCUP will also support the extension programs providing agriculture and conservation related training at the certificate level for qualified villagers (again, including women), relying initially on the inputs of Peace Corps volunteers and National Development Service (NDS) students.

The other activities are intended to test and implement direct agricultural and conservation improvements in the five activity areas mentioned above. The performance of any improvement, however, will depend upon success in the institutional development activity.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

Natural resource conservation

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Nepal

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Resource Conservation and Utilization Project (RCUP)
(367-0132) 1980-85

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: Audit Report of Inspector General, July, 1983
PD-AAN-163

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular _____ Special ___x___ Final _____

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

The project was inititated in May 1980 and SECID contracted for in February 1981. Eleven Nepalese have received long-term training, but only four are working on RCUP projects. Although the evaluation concludes that "the project is creating positive results toward improving the quality of life of Nepal's rural inhabitants" the project area is too large and investment (particularly construction) too dispersed over many targets. Long term training is occurring but only four of eleven returning graduates are working for RCUP. To date, women are not significantly involved in RCUP. In addition, villagers have not been intimately involved and many are confused. These shortcomings threaten the institution building objective of the project.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

None identified

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

None identified

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

None identified

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

11 Nepalese long-term trained (no mention of short term progress)

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

None identified

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None identified

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None identified

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

- Project area too large for resources available
- Women and other villagers are not becoming adequately involved
- Expatriates insufficiently involved in project management
- Communications problems between SECID and HMG/N
- Reporting deficiencies
- Accountability and inventory control problems

ENHANCEMENTS:

None noted

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

None identified

Institutional

- Director of USAID/NEPAL should initiate evaluate of project impacts, leading toward revisions in project scope (reductions to make interventions and likelihood of impacts more realistic)
- Grant be amended to require periodic reporting
- Director USAID/N should obtain commitment from RCUP officials re: women's participation and employment
- Director USAID/N implement without delay approach to provide meaningful participation by villagers in RCUP and subsequent institutionalization of RCUP
- Expand village extension and outreach program
- Director USAID/N should determine how funding provided to ADB (Agricultural Development Bank) has been utilized

- Reoriented RCUP central staff to provide increased authority for and integration of expatriate staff and improved communication between SECID and HMG/N personnel

- Assure that SECID/Nepal adapts procedures for certifying time and attendance reports and reimbursement by employees for personal use of project assets

- Assure that SECID/Nepal has a complete inventory of commodities on hand and that they have an acceptable inventory control system

- Rehire the seven trained RCUP personnel who now do not work on RCUP

- Require SECID to update the existing construction plan to provide USAID/N with more accurate data for monitoring performance

Other:

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Pakistan

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Research (391-0296) 1973-1982

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT*	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$10,624,800	$7,315,000
Grant	1,500,000	10,500,000
Loan	7,600,000	5,320,000
Country	790,000	945,000
Other (Other Donors)	734,800	

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Agricultural Research Council (ARC)

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

Technical advisors, USDA, U.S. Universities

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: Increased agricultural production and increased incomes for small farmers.

PURPOSES: To upgrade and expand Pakistan's agricultural research capability, both national and provincial, to effectively deal with problems in priority commodity/crop areas so as to increase agricultural production for domestic consumption and exports

OUTPUTS:

- o Establishment of national goals relevant to agriculture
- o Translation of goals into research objectives
- o Refinement of objectives into actionable research programs that focus on the important impediments to increased efficiency of production, marketing and utilization of specific commodities or required resources
- o Development of a National Resource Center

INPUTS:

- o technical assistance
- o training
- o commodities

*These funds represent the original proposed budget. The final total AID contribution was $4,792,000 in grant monies, and $6,200,000 in loaned funds for a total of $10,992,000.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Pakistan

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Research (391-0296) 1973-1982

DESCRIPTION:

This project was originally designed to run for five years to develop and upgrade Pakistan's agricultural research institutes and colleges and to establish and equip a National Research Center to coordinate and carry out priority research projects. Commodities, expatriate advisors and academic and practical training for professionals and sub-professionals were financed.

A review of the project showed that the project overemphasized developing research programs without giving adequate attention to developing the institutional base for managing and supporting that research. To address this problem, the project was amended in 1978. The loan was reduced from $7.6M to $6.2M, the schedule was extended, and activities were refocused for more specific capacity building outputs. In 1982, the project was again amended, after having been extended again between 1979 and 1982. The purpose of this last change was for AID to add $3.2M in ESF grant funds plus 29.7 million in excess local currency to the project to complete the construction of the Pakistan National Agricultural Research Center, equip the facility, and further strengthen, through technical assistance and training, the managerial and research capabilities of the staff at the Center.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Commodity production
- Marketing
- Efficiency of resource use

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Pakistan

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Research (391-0296) 1973-1982

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: Evaluation Summary, May, 1979; and Project Amendments, August, 1978, and April 1982.

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular ___x___ Special _____ Amendments ___x___

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

- Research trials at the Research Center have been severely constrained by the slow pace of the physical development and lack of experienced managers.
- Despite early problems, the project established a relatively strong institutional base.
- 44 participants were placed in advanced degree programs in the U.S.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED: (Impacts not assessed in 1979 evaluation.)

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

None identified

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

None identified

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

None identified

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- In 1981, 56 out of 58 participants trained were employed in agricultural research work.
- 44 participants were enganged in advanced degree training.
- The project developed a relatively strong institutional base.
- A National Agricultural Research Center was being constructed and staff were being trained.

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

None identified

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None identified

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None identified

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

1) Early on, the project overemphasized developing research programs without giving adequate attention to developing the institutional base for managing and supporting that research.

2) The project was initiated before adequate staffing and internal management capability within the Council could be established. Consequently, the project fell behind schedule and had to be revised.

3) As a result of the imposition of section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act in 1979, $737,950 of grant funds originally authorized were never obligated. Later in 1979, many resident technical advisors were sent home because of associated events, and some of these advisors were unable to return.

4) Project delays led to less disbursement of project funds than planned.

ENHANCEMENTS:

None identified

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

None identified

Institutional

Project emphasis needs to address institution building as well as reseach projects.

Other:

- Close monitoring of project activities is necessary to achievement of management system objectives.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Pakistan

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Inputs (391-0419 and 391-4041)

LEVEL OF FUNDING	**ENTIRE PROJECT**	**PLANNING COMPONENTS**
Total	$90,000,000	$500,000 (est.)
Grant	0	0
Loan	90,000,000	500,000 (est.)
Country	112,500,000 (est.)	0
Other (Other Donors)	247,500,000 (est.)	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Federal Directorate of Agricultural Supplies (FDAS) (importing agency), and Ministry of Agriculture (policy and implementation agency); survey work was conducted by a joint AID/National Fertilizer Corporation (NFC) team

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

USAID

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: Increased agricultural production and increased farm incomes.

PURPOSES: Increased and better balanced use of fertilizer and other production inputs by all farmers, especially low income farmers.

OUTPUTS:

1. Network of retail sales points for agricultural production inputs throughout the country
2. Supplies of phosphatic and nitrogen fertilizer and HYV seeds available at each respective sales point adequate to meet all effective demand at that sales point
3. Adequate farmgate prices for farm products

INPUTS: USAID:

1. Funding of phosphate imports
2. Funding of nitrogen imports
3. Funding of HYV seed imports
4. Funding of other agricultural imports

5. Technical staff for #6 below

Joint USAID/GOP:

6. Field sample survey of barriers to fertilizer use by farmers

   a. farmer survey
   b. credit survey
   c. dealer survey

GOP:

7. Changes in administrative practices governing marketing of fertilizers:

   a. phosphates being made available to all wholesale marketing elements
   b. margins legally allowed dealers were increased to provide incentive for aggressive marketing of fertilizer
   c. automatic licensing of retailers advertised
   d. territorial restrictions on fertilizer marketing removed

8. Support prices for agricultural production at a level that maintains a ratio between prices of agricultural inputs and farm outputs sufficient to prompt farmers to use a package of improved technology and inputs.

   a. determination of adequate support prices
   b. timely and wide announcement of support prices
   c. avoidance of practices that convert support price into a ceiling price for farmers

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Pakistan

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Inputs-Third Tranche (391-4041) 1976-1978

DESCRIPTION:

The purpose of this loan was to assist Pakistan in financing needed imports of basic agricultural inputs, primarily fertilizer, and thereby help insure that these inputs continue to be available at reasonable prices in all parts of Pakistan so that farmers, particularly small farmers, would not be hindered by their nonavailability. AID's total contribution to this effort was $90M, $40M of which was paid in January 1975, $25M in 1977, and a final $25M in December, 1977.

A small component of this massive project was a set of four closely intertwined field surveys jointly conducted by AID and the GOP; two of farmers, one of credit sources and one of retail fertilizer dealers. The farmer survey was conducted to obtain a baseline data on farmer use, purchase and knowledge of fertilizer. The intent of all three was to examine hypotheses about barriers to greater farmer use of fertilizer and to design further steps to eliminate these barriers.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

Entire project:

- Expansion of the input distribution system by freeing it from unnecessary restrictions and providing greater distribution allowances for private distributors.

- Provision of more credit for purchase of production inputs, particularly by small and medium size farmers.

- Maintenance of fertilizer/crop price relationship at incentive levels by raising crop prices, establishing price supports, and taking other measures such as:

  i) shifting the emphasis of Government wheat market operations from that of meeting needs of ration shops, military, and other institutions to that of supporting farm prices;

  ii) lifting restrictions on internal movement of wheat to permit farmers in surplus areas to benefit from strong market demand in deficit areas;

  iii) subsidizing fertilizer prices in times of sharp temporary upswings in world prices.

- Undertaking to keep domestic supplies of fertilizer adequate by improving internal transport and handling, and by arranging needed imports.

Survey Component:

- Increased fertilizer use by farmers

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Pakistan

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Inputs (391-0419 and 391-4041)

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: USAID, Project Paper: Agricultural Inputs-Third Tranche, August 1977

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular _____ Special _____ Other ___x___

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

The purpose of this massive loan was to assist Pakistan in financing needed imports of basic agricultural inputs, primarily fertilizer. One component of this project involved the conduct of four surveys on farmer use, purchase, knowledge of and barriers to fertilizer use. This evaluation summary focuses only on the survey component. As of August, 1977, about midway through the project, the first phase of the survey, called the "General Farmer Survey" had been completed, and results, including policy implications documented in a full report.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

None intended

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

None intended

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

None intended

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- Completion of the first phase of the General Farm Survey with full analysis of results and policy implications

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

None intended

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None intended

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None intended

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

- The survey started a few months late because it took several months to finalize grant arrangements with the National Fertilizer Corp. (NFC) and for NFC to hire professional staff.

ENHANCEMENTS:

None noted

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

None noted

Institutional

None noted

Other:

None noted

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Philippines

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Small Farmer Income and Production (492-0259) 1974-79

LEVEL OF FUNDING	**ENTIRE PROJECT**	**PLANNING COMPONENTS**
Total	$2,471,000*	$2,471,000
Grant	2,471,000	2,471,000
Loan	0	0
Country	5,614 million pesos	5,614 million pesos
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

National Food and Agricultural Council
Bureau of Agricultural Economics

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: Attainment of self-sufficiency in national rice and corn production, with special emphasis on increasing the productivity of small-scale farmers and developing additional sources of farm income for these farmers through crop diversification.

PURPOSES: Establish (within the National Food and Agriculture Council and other agencies) a management information and communications system and an analytical/technical capability for planning and implementing effective programs which will significantly increase the income and production of small farmers.

OUTPUTS:
1. Management Information System
2. Economic Analysis Staff Unit
3. National system of farm trials/demonstrations
4. In-service extension training
5. Baseline study on small farmer
6. Expanded and improved small farmer credit system

INPUTS: Personnel and consultants, participants, commodities

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*Total is $2,770,000. Since the small scale irrigation and KSU components were dropped, the total was adjusted as much as possible given the data in 1976 version.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Philippines

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Small Farmer Income and Production (492-0259) 1974-79

DESCRIPTION:

The activities described vary greatly from multiple versions of the project proposed. The most comprehensive description of the proposed activities include:

a) a series of regular MIS reports by province and agricultural activity

b) analyses by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics concerning farm production, income and other variables

c) "test-bed" experiments concerning land use, credit, water control, and cropping patterns

d) corn team appraisal

e) baseline study on small farmers: survey covering age, sex, family size, educational level, housing, farm size, land use, income, etc. Three surveys were proposed (beginning, middle, end of project)

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Technical assistance to support self-sufficiency in rice and corn production through increased productivity
- Capacity building through maintenance of a management information system and an economic analysis staff

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Philippines

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Integrated Agricultural Production and Marketing Project (492-0302) 1977-83

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$19,922,000	$4,200,000
Grant	12,782,000	2,940,000
Loan	1,722,000	0
Country	5,418,000	1,260,000
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Central Luzon State University
University of the Philippines at Los Banos
Ministry of Agriculture

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

Kansas State University

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To achieve self-sufficiency in key food commodities.

SUBGOAL: To increase small farmer income.

PURPOSES: In specified project impact areas, to increase small farmer productivity and improve efficiency of the marketing system for his product.

SUB PURPOSES: To strengthen national food planning capability; to develop integrated packages of production/processing/marketing technology; to systematically extend new technological packages to small farmers and small rural enterprises.

OUTPUTS: 1. Trained and experienced agricultural marketing experts available to key government and private institutions. 2. Alternative policy approaches and strategies for operating integrated production and marketing system for key commodities. 3. Proven and documented technological packages on integrated food systems for use by small farmers, processors, and exporters. 4. Provision of vital agriculture-related government services on production, processing and marketing to small farmers in the project area.

INPUTS: AID: technical assistance, participant training, commodities and equipment. Philippines: physical facilities, local currency support, staff support.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Philippines

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Integrated Agricultural Production and Marketing Project (492-0302) 1977-83

DESCRIPTION:

Academic Component: train masters degree level specialists in agricultural and food systems development; train B.S. level majors and minors in agricultural marketing

National Policy Component: enhancement of linkages between analysts and decision makers; improvement of agricultural data bases; enhancement of computer capacity; development and utilization of agricultural subsector models; enhancement of technical skills of policy analysts

Technological Package Component: enhancement of capability to provide tested technological packages for optimized farm production and farm management to small farmers, processors, distributors, and exporters. Packages include irrigation systems; processing, storage, marketing, and transportation equipment; seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, tools, etc.

Outreach/Extension Component: assistance in identifying markets, identifying technological innovation, financing, management, and contracting to farmer cooperatives and agribusiness serving small farmers; assistance in developing cooperative marketing by small farmers; assistance to small farmers in identifying markets, adopting new technology, and obtaining credit.

Food, Feed Grain Processing Center to process and market farm output was also proposed

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Improvement of analytical capacity with regard to policy
- Improvement of delivery system for implementing policy at the farm level
- Delivery of improved technology to farmers, technology that is economically viable and implementable by small farmers
- Improvement of small farmer productivity and income

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Philippines

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Integrated Agricultural Production and Marketing Project (492-0302) 1977-82 or 83

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: Project Evaluation Summary/1979
Evaluation of the IAPMP/:/1981
Evaluation of the IAPMP//1979
Final Evaluation of IAPMP/1983
Semi-Annual Report Between GRP and KSU/1980

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular ___x___ Special _____ Final ___x___

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

- National Policy: statistical analyses have been improved, decision makers have interacted with agricultural analysts, many Ministry of Agriculture participants have been involved in training programs. Research pertaining to small farmers was rarely carried out, however. Little actual policy analysis has been carried out -- instead statistical analyses have been undertaken and policy analysis has been provided by U.S. based consultants, not by Filipinos. Relatively little is known about how the agricultural economy works as a process -- hence policy is difficult to analyze.

- Academic Programs: agriculture programs at two universities were developed and faculty for these programs were trained in the U.S. Non-degree agriculture training programs were also developed and implemented. The program at universities tended to emphasize the public sector and agribusiness, not small farmers. The goals of the academic programs were vague with respect to the ultimate beneficiaries of the training -- small farmers, agribusiness, etc. The university programs suffered from a shortage of teachers.

- Technology Packaging: ten packages were developed to increase farm production by adding new production activities to rice cropping; processing and marketing aspects were largely ignored, however. Farmer adoption of technology packages has been very slow and may even be declining. The technology packages actually developed are not suitable for small farmers, but for medium size farmers. Baseline data gathered under this component supplied valuable information in designing technology packages.

- Extension/Outreach: eight towns were selected for demonstrating the feasibility of the extension delivery system process. (Other activities were incorporated in the National Policy Component.) Workshops and training programs were implemented. Success is difficult to evaluate, especially because of the many simultaneous activities of government technicians in this program. Marketing activities were largely ignored in extension program.

A Food, Feed Grain Processing Center was also included in the project. This component of the project has proven infeasible. Demand was overestimated, costs underestimated.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

None noted

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

- Greater understanding (within Ministry of Agriculture) of linkages between production and marketing
- Increased appreciation by leadership for timely and accurate economic information; however, decision makers still do not appear to place a high premium on such information (as of April '81)

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

- Interinstitutional linkages were never well established. Thus linkages among data, policy analysis, and decision makers were weak.

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- Improvement in capability of Bureau of Agricultural Economics to produce better, though not yet fully reliable, statistics
- Improvement in quality of research through graduate training of staff
- Project coordinator and his staff have taken on larger projects
- University staff capacity to implement technology packages has improved, especially because of on-the-job experience with implementation of technology packages
- Analysis capability was increased through the use of consultants but was not institutionalized into Filipino agricultural system

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

<u>The Agricultural Sector</u>

- apparently very small, especially with regard to small farmers

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None noted

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None noted

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

- No one agency was clearly in charge of integrating the entire project -- it was dispersed over many agencies and organizations
- No person or committee had charge of project policy once the project was started
- Farmers are unlikely to adopt new technologies unless profits will greatly increase and then only if the technology is demonstrated to be workable under actual farming conditions
- Authority for agricultural planning and policy was split up into several agencies after the project was started, thereby diluting the coherence of the project and causing large staff turnover
- Low salaries contribute to high turnover in technical positions such as computer analysts
- Policy analysis emphasized short term problems over long term strategies
- A lack of capable experienced personnel to replace the consultants is likely to impede future policy analysis
- Shortages of teaching materials and support equipment (audio visual equipment, for example) hampered training efforts in the Philippines
- Start up problems in coordination, organization, etc. delayed progress in the first year but these were overcome during the course of the project
- The relationship between the policy component of the project and small farmer income was not defined

ENHANCEMENTS:

Some Kansas State University consultants were extremely helpful and valuable to the Ministry of Agriculture

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

- In sending individuals abroad for training or in hiring consultants, it is necessary to carefully plan activities and prepare individuals. Mid-course corrections are generally not feasible

- Policy analysis should be more directly focused on small farmers and their problems

- Large scale economic models take a long time to set up and a sophisticated staff to run. These requirements may not be met in a developing country

- Academic training is too strongly based on western conditions (not Filipino conditions) and is too theoretical (i.e., not applicable)

- Surveys should be designed so that the data can be processed and analyzed -- processing voluminous data is a major problem

- Coordination of statistical analyses carried out by different agencies is necessary to avoid discrepancies in data

Institutional

- If project leadership is to be taken by the host country, institutions providing technical assistance should accept a more cooperative role

- A consortium of institutions providing technical assistance may be necessary if many areas of expertise are required

- In complex projects an executive or committee must be in charge to set coordinated policy

- Higher pay for policy analysts is necessary to retain an experienced staff

- Stronger, deliberately planned linkages need to be established between the Ministry of Agriculture and other food-related agencies such as the National Food Authority

Other:

- A two year learning period or "break in" period was necessary. This period was not anticipated in the project paper

- It is necessary to determine manpower needs of policy analysis agencies when designing academic programs to train policy analysts

- The beneficiaries of academic training should be identified so that training programs can be more clearly focused

- Farmers are reluctant to adopt new technology unless it greatly increases profits and unless it can be demonstrated to work under farm conditions

- A larger stipend is needed to attract participants to out-of-country training programs

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Philippines

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Philippine Agricultural Research Loan (492-0280) 1975

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$24,553,000	$24,553,000
Grant	0	0
Loan	5,000,000	5,000,000
Country	19,553,000	19,553,000
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Philippine . for Agricultural Research (later called Philippine Council for Agriculture and Resources Research Land Development)

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

Technical advisors, educational institutions

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: Increased agricultural production by small farmers, increasing their income, and contributing to national self-sufficiency in selected food grains.

PURPOSES: Improve research capability of the La Granja, southern Mindanao, Bicol and Central Luzon agricultural research centers to provide a continuous stream of information and technological improvements for the production of rice, corn, sorghum, soybeans, other legumes and other food and feed crops which may become important in the future.

OUTPUTS:
1. Consolidate the Philippine Council for Agriculture and Resources Research (PCARR) as the national agency for development, coordination, programming, and evaluation of research policy and agricultural programs.
2. Four research centers adequately staffed and equipped.
3. An information system established for PCARR to provide access to key scientific literature for researchers.
4. An improvement in the quality and quantity of output in related organizations, such as other research centers and training institutions.

INPUTS: Short-term advisory services, equipment and machinery, library books, journals and materials, physical facilities.

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ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Philippines

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Philippine Agricultural Research Loan (492-0280) 1975

DESCRIPTION:

This project focused on the decentralization of agricultural research efforts by strengthening regional research centers concentrating on local agricultural problems, and by simultaneously strengthening the National Council for Agricultural Research to coordinate regional centers.

The project provided partial funding for the development of four regional research centers. These loans were to be used for training, library materials, infrastructure (buildings, housing, utilities, land development), equipment and machinery, and technical advisory services.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Institution building -- i.e. of research institutions. This project was to establish regional research capability for future contributions to small farmer production.
- Improved research capability, with ability to provide technical assistance to extension agents, credit agencies, cooperatives.
- Increased small farmer productivity -- increases in productivity due to adoption of new crop varieties, management practices concerning disease, insects, weed and pest control, soil fertility, and water.
- Increased small farmer income, due to increased productivity.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Philippines

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Philippine Agriculture Research Loan (492-0280) 1975

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: USAID, Project Evaluation Summary, March 1980 and Special Evaluation Report, November, 1980*

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular x Special x Final _____

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

- In-country training of Ph.D.'s and MS's was close to that planned. This would lead to improved research in terms of both quantity and quality.
- International training goals were not met due to lack of qualified candidates, insufficient per diem living allowances, and delays in processing paper work. More short-term and refresher courses were proposed to partially offset this problem.
- PCARR's library services were expanded.
- Procurement of documents and equipment was successful after long delays in the early phases of the project.
- Technical assistance to be provided by consultants was limited due to delays, incomplete infrastructure, and workload of PCARR staff.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

None identified

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

- National government increased budget of PCARR to support expanded functions.

*This document principally reviews PCARR and not the research loan *per se*.

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

- o PCARR attached to national science agency for better coordination of scientific programs.

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- o Facilities and personnel at four regional research centers upgraded; research programs underway.
- o PCARR itself increased publications and library services (not indicated how that affected four regional research centers).
- o Training and research have been improved at centers other than the four at which the loan was targeted.

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

Not analyzed

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None intended

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None intended

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

- o 16 month delay in initial release of funds due to PCARR's unfamiliarity with budgeting procedures and inadequate coordination between planning entities and Ministry of the Budget. This problem was eventually resolved and project was nearly on schedule by 1980.
- o AID procurement regulations caused some delay but PCARR staff familiar with regulations by 1980.
- o Small research staff and lack of reference catalogs at research centers.
- o Delays in port and customs in receiving documents.
- o Few Ph.D. candidates available for training outside Philippines.
- o Not all infrastructure was fully able to be used since another loan was required.
- o Philippine government did not provide sufficient per diem expenses for short term and refresher course training outside the country.
- o Lengthy nomination and approval process for candidates for international training greatly reduced participation in the foreign training program.

ENHANCEMENTS:

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

- Sites for structures should be adequately surveyed to ensure no delays due to changes in location.
- Candidates for international training should be identified more expeditiously.
- Significant research findings are likely to occur at regional centers only after five to ten years of experience.

Institutional

- Greater coordination needed with Ministry of the Budget to ensure that funds are available on time and to prepare budget with AID.
- PCARR and AID should accelerate review of bids so that contracts can be promptly executed.
- PCARR and AID should develop procedures for procurement of library references.
- Need strong leadership in research at the regional centers.
- Occasionally, lack of interinstitutional coordination has resulted in idle infrastructure.
- Future commitments by the Ministry of the Budget to staff and maintain the regional research centers is uncertain.
- The complexities of AID procurement regulations require one to two years of learning time by the host country.

Other:

- In allocating resources, a trade-off between a more even geographic distribution of funds and concentration on installations with strong research bases in place had to be made.
- Economic incentives will be needed in the future to attract and retain scientific staff.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Philippines

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Research II (492-0286) 1979-84

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$46,076,000	$46,076
Grant	0	0
Loan	10,000,000	10,000,000
Country	36,076,000	36,076,000
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Philippine Council for Agricultural and Resources Research (PCARR), later called Philippine Council for Agriculture and Resources Research and Development (PCARRD)

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

USAID technical advisors, educational institutions

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: National self-sufficiency in key agricultural commodities suitable for production. A subgoal is increased productivity and income of small farmers.

PURPOSES: Increase national and regional agricultural research activities carried out on key commodities produced by small farmers -- rice, corn, sorghum, soybeans and other legumes, root crops, vegetables, meat and fish.

OUTPUTS: 1. A strengthened role for PCARR as the apex for national agricultural policy and program development, coordination, programming and evaluation functions. 2. Localized research flowing from national and regional research centers. 3. Agricultural research flowing from related research organizations. 4. Information and data flowing to researchers. 5. Trained research technicians and support personnel.

INPUTS: Technical assistance, participant training, commodities and equipment, library materials, infrastructure, all supplied by USAID. The government of the Philippines provides research support, infrastructure, equipment and maintenance and operations

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ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Philippines

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Research II (492-0286) 1979-84

DESCRIPTION:

The loan is provided to the Government of the Philippines (GRP) to strengthen the small farming research capabilities of eight national and regional research centers and to improve the rate and quality of information flowing from the research center network to small farmers. The Philippine Council for Agriculture and Resources Research (PCARR) will implement the project. Out of the total PCARR network of 16 research centers, five national and three regional agricultural commodity centers will be the targeted beneficiaries.

The quantity and quality of researchers at the eight centers will be improved by providing Ph.D. training abroad for seven candidates; enrollment in local institutions' M.S. programs for 237 candidates; 6-12 month refresher courses in crop improvement and management, soil and water management, economics and other related topics for 24 current research center staff; and short-term or observation study for 71 participants.

Field, laboratory, and library equipment and materials will be provided to enhance the research capabilities of the eight targeted centers and to contribute to the efficient management of the national research network.

About 50% of loan funds will be used to support infrastructure outlays, especially staff housing. Research laboratories, greenhouses, screenhouses, service buildings, experimental farm site development, water supply, and power distribution will be eligible for partial funding. In no case shall reimbursement from the loan exceed 75% of the agreed-upon costs for infrastructure development. The provision of this infrastructure to the eight centers will also indirectly improve the PCARR's leadership and management of the national network.

Finally, the PCARR system to retrieve and publicize up-to-date small farmer-appropriate information and technology among research centers will be strengthened. Extension of research center results to the farmers will also be improved through the increased use of simplified information, extension agents, field tests, and mass media communications.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Institution building -- i.e. of research institutions. This project was to establish regional research capability for future contributions to small farmer production.
- Improved research capability through improved infrastructure, training, and provision of technical services.
- Increased small farmer productivity.
- Improved interinstitutional linkages with respect to agricultural policy analysis.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Philippines

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Research II (492-0286) 1979-84

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: USAID Report of the External Evaluation of Agricutural Research Development Project III 1984. Report of the Review Team: PCARR (International Agricultural Development Service), 1980.

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular ___x___ Special ___x___ Final _____

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

o PCARR has been successful in:

- -- establishing priorities among research goals
- -- organizing research efforts to reduce duplication and to utilize results
- -- improving linkages with extension, farming, communities, and other agencies concerned with research and development
- -- completing 58% of infrastructure planned by 1983, and having anoth 30% underway
- -- obtaining 84% of the equipment on the project by 1983.
- -- awarding 820 training grants for in-country education and 195 gran for international training
- -- increasing the volume of research taking place in regional centers instead of in Manila
- -- dispersing research to regional centers from national center

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

None noted

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

None noted

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

- PCARR influences research in other institutions through its budget allocations, and through endorsements of these institutions' budgets.

- PCARR provides a "climate" for communications among researchers extension workers, and policy makers at regional and national levels.

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- Improved and more focused research efforts are now taking place in regional centers instead of being concentrated in a national center.

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

- Research results are applied by farmers, in part because researchers take farmer feedback seriously.

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None noted

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None noted

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

- Lack of hard knowledge about impacts of research on farmers, farms, and farming

- Some infrastructure was built with no likely demand for it (e.g., a slaughterhouse)

- Some construction is incomplete or unstarted due to inflation; some buildings are not yet equipped

- Ministry of Agriculture's regional offices often unaware of PCARR's activities

ENHANCEMENTS:

- Researchers are generally involved with farmers and farm problems

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

- Leadership and management capabilities need to be improved through workshops, training, job performance evaluations

- A critical mass of highly trained researchers should be developed, using innovative training schemes and awarding assistance to institutions

- The right mix of skills is needed at research centers -- there are too few technical specialists, too many education specialists

- Manpower and capital capacity should be planned simultaneously to avoid idle capital or overcrowded facilities

Institutional

- Research agendas of regional centers must be reviewed to better match needs and goals with research capabilities

- Specific research roles should be assigned to each regional research center to coordinate inter-institutional linkages

- Inter-institutional cooperation must be based on mutual advantages of cooperation -- not on issuing mandates. This cooperation can be attained from regular planning sessions, development of research consortia, etc.

- A simpler funding allocation system is needed to award funds for various projects

- High quality work should be recognized publicly to boost morale

- PCARR should document and publicize its achievements to build a constituency of popular support

- Applying research results to agriculture requires an interdisciplinary approach to problem solving

- Linkages between researchers and users and policy makers must be strengthened

Other:

- Unutilized and underutilized capital should be reassigned, to be used for other purposes

- By underpaying scientists, scientists maximize the number of projects they work on at the cost of the quality of their work

- Scholarships for outstanding students should attract better people into agricultural policy, economics, and other research

- Due to lack of amenities, many researchers prefer to work in the national research center rather than in regional centers; a monetary incentive to move to regional centers may be required

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Sri Lanka

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Sector Assessment
February, 1979

DESCRIPTION:

A five person team observed agricultural conditions in Sri Lanka for 2 weeks in March and April 1978. The findings of the team with regard to agricultural policy were:

- o Agricultural development is managed by many dispersed organizations -- a coordinated effort is needed.
- o Inadequate technical guidance is provided to small farmers.
- o Credit and agricultural inputs are sometimes difficult to obtain.
- o Unstable agricultural prices are serious constraints on increased production.
- o The Mahawali Project is likely to require extensive technical and financial resources, so much so that other projects are likely to suffer from lack of manpower or funds.
- o Food imports depress agricultural prices thereby reducing rural incomes.
- o The government is embarking on a program to remove many agricultural subsidies.
- o There are several resource development opportunities receiving relatively little attention:
  - -- Improved water delivery and management
  - -- Farming and livestock production in the Dry Zone
  - -- Livestock production
  - -- Managed forestry

AID should support up to five major long term development activities and avoid involvement in scattered small projects. One such project should be studies and institutional development activities which will improve Sri Lanka's capability for defining needs, preparing development plans, and implementing those plans.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- o Prices--level and stability
- o Rationing of food
- o Availability of credit for farmers
- o Subsidies for food and agricultural imports
- o Planning capacity

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Sri Lanka

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Development Services and Training (383-0044) 1978-82

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: Project Paper Supplement 1981

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular _____ Special _____ Project Paper Supplement ___x___

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

- 64 persons received training as of December 1980. Training was for various planners, university faculty, government program directors, and other governmental staff.
- Studies on the Mahaweli Development project, irrigation, and night work for agricultural laborers were conducted by December 1980.
- Consultants were employed on a coastal zone management plan, water law studies and equipment maintenance.
- Support for the Agrarian Research and Training Institute Library consisted of advice on establishing the library and of purchases of books and equipment.
- A workshop on planning for action in community welfare was held in 1980.
- The grant has supported a wide range of small but important activities and training not appropriate for discrete projects.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

None noted

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

None noted

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

None noted

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- 30 Rural Community resource planners were trained to assist in assessing needs, preparing viable project proposals at the village level

- Government officials and university professors received additional training in manpower analyses, economic analyses, environmental management, etc.

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

None noted

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None noted

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None noted

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

None noted

ENHANCEMENTS:

None noted

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

None noted

Institutional

None noted

Other:

None noted

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Thailand

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Planning Project (493-0317), 1980

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$4,212,000	$4,212,000
Grant	3,200,000	3,200,000
Loan	0	0
Country	1,012,000	1,012,000
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Office of Agricultural Economics

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

USAID technical adivsors, international training institutions

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: Policies and programs of benefit to low-income farm households.

PURPOSES: Strengthen the Royal Thai Government's Office of Agricultural Economics in carrying out its policy advisory, problem identification and analysis, planning, data management, and integrated project preparation functions.

OUTPUTS: 1. Decision calendar installed. 2. Procedures for project development installed. 3. OAE staff trained. 4. In-service training established. 5. ASF farm survey.

INPUTS: 1. Technical assistance. 2. Training. 3. Commodities

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Thailand

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Planning Project (493-0317), 1980

DESCRIPTION:

Project to strengthen the capacity of the Thai Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives' (MOACs) Office of Agricultural Economics (OAE) to carry out its recently expanded policy advisory, planning, budget analysis, and project preparation functions by developing improved procedures and training OAE personnel. The OAE will manage the project.

To strengthen the MOAC's project identification, formulation, design, and monitoring capability, 6 person-years of technical assistance (TA) will be provided. TA advisors will work with the Implementation and Evaluation and the Agricultural Statistics Divisions to develop in-service training courses; and identify and send up to 10 staff for overseas Masters and non-degree training; and hire additional TA as needed.

To upgrade the OAE's agricultural research and modeling skills, limited TA will be offered in the following areas: using existing Thai linear programming models; establishing a staff development program in the area of consumption analysis; and modeling the economic linkages between the farm and non-farm sectors.

To improve the data collection methods of the OAE's Center for Agricultural Statistics, several interventions are planned: expanding the use of the Area Sampling Frame (currently constructed for only 10 provinces) to the remaining 62 provinces; implementing the proposed plan to register all land planted in sugar cane, cassava, and corn; and purchasing selected equipment and computer software and training computer programmers at the Asian Institute of Technology (AIT) in order to strengthen the Data Processing Center.

In all, the project will fund the following training: 5 doctoral degrees (in statistics, computer science, modeling of market operations, demand/project analysis, and/or consumption economics); 8-10 M.A. degrees at the ASEAN Center or Kasetsart University; 9 M.A. degrees in programs such as those offered by the AIT, the National Institute of Development Assistance, and the National Research Council; and non-degree training in computer science/statistics at the U.S. Department of Agriculture or the U.S. Bureau of the Census.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- This is a capacity building project that should result in improved capabilities of OAE to evaluate outcomes of alternative plans/strategies; and to pose policy type questions or anticipate policy decisions for improvement of economic growth in the rural sector.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Thailand

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Rural Off-Farm Employment Assessment (493-0306), 1979-1982

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$670,000	$670,000
Grant	500,000	500,000
Loan	0	0
Country	170,000	170,000
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Royal Thai Government's (RTG) Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation, Kasetstart University, Khon Kaen University, Chiang Mai University

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

USAID, Ohio State University, Michigan State University, other U.S. consultants

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: Increase incomes and employment of poor in rural Thailand.

PURPOSES: Develop sound policies and projects aimed at increasing non-farm employment.

OUTPUTS: 1. Studies and analyses. 2. Conferences and workshops.

INPUTS: RTG: 1) personnel and data, 2) office space and support.
AID: 1) project monitoring, 2) technical assistance, 3) evaluations.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Thailand

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Rural Off-Farm Employment Assessment (493-0306) 1979-1982

DESCRIPTION:

This two-year project consisted of a USAID grant of $500,000 to the Royal Thai Government (RTG) for non-farm enterprise surveys, farm household studies, field surveys, case studies, and two conferences and 3 workshops on rural industry for rural researchers.

The grant was to assist the Royal Thai Government (RTG) to identify problems and prospects for development of its rural non-farm enterprise sector. Agricultural incomes were to be increased through changes in technology and introduction of new crops, use of irrigation to intensify improvements in the supply of financial and marketing services and investments in social infrastructure. Off-farm employment was to be promoted as a means of raising rural incomes. Also, stronger emphasis was to be placed on the establishment of small-scale, labor intensive, rural industry promoting employment, and decreasing migration to urban areas.

Data and analytical background was to be compiled to identify and develop appropriate projects and programs for stimulating the rural, non-farm enterprise sector and enhancing the employment and the reduction of rural poverty. In addition, RTG's local universities were to be provided with funds and technical assistance to conduct and analyze necessary research, and compile data related to developmental techniques useful in rural non-farm sector development.

After development strategies were underway, 2.5 to 3 years were to be devoted to start-up activities. During the start-up phase, Kasetsart University was to assume major responsibility for managing and implementing the data collection component and supplying staff resources through cooperation with local universities in project areas; Ohio State University and Michigan State University were to provide research advisors and consultants.

Project objectives would be achieved through the establishment of: 1) the Small Industries Finance Office (SIFO) which was to provide credit facilities; 2) the Industrial Service Institute (ISI) which was to provide technical extension and advisory service; 3) the Thai Land Management Development and Productivity Center (TMDPC), which was to provide management training and advisory service; and 4) a marketing center for products of small industry, particularly handicrafts, with a retail center in Bangkok.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

Policies will be identified that could assist in the expansion of non-farm employment and income opportunities in the rural areas and market towns of Thailand.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Thailand

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Sector Analysis (493-1084) 1973-1979

Note: the following information was extracted from a project paper submitted mid-way through the project and from evaluations, rather than the original project paper.

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$3,285,000	$3,285,000
Grant	2,230,000	2,230,000
Loan	0	0
Country	1,055,000	1,055,000
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC)
Division of Agricultural Economics (DAE)

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

Iowa State University

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: To increase employment and income equity while providing for expanded food production to meet projected consumption and export requirements

PURPOSES: To improve the ability of the Royal Thai Government (RTG) to make decisions affecting agriculture policy by developing a research and planning capability which included: (a) participation in problem identification, (b) responsibility for assembly of data, specification and construction of models, (c) responsibility for the conduct and analysis of research, (d) the dissemination of research results, and (e) continued further problem identification - policy analysis.

OUTPUTS:

INPUTS: Technical assistance, training

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Thailand

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Sector Analysis (493-1084) 1973-1979

DESCRIPTION:

The purpose of this project was to establish an operational and self-sustaining agricultural sector analytical capability and plan implementation system within the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC). USAID contracted with Iowa State University to provide the technical assistance to develop the planning capability in the Division of Agricultural Economics (DAE) and to implement a program of in-service training and advanced degree education for DAE staff members. Project strategy was focused on two objectives: the training of DAE staff in data collection and processing, statistical methods of analysis, computer programming, economic analysis and sector modeling; and the construction and application of large-scale national and regional models using linear programming, statistical and econometric techniques.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- To increase employment and income equity while providing for expanded food production to meet projected consumption and export requirements

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Thailand

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Sector Analysis (493-1084) 1973-1979

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: USAID, Project Evaluation Study, October, 1978; and the Thai Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and Iowa State University, Final Report: Agricultural Sector Analysis in Thailand, July 1979.

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular x Special _____ Final x

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

The purpose of the Agricultural Sector Analysis project was to improve the ability of the Royal Thai Government to make decisions affecting agriculture. In support of project goals, large-scale national and regional models have been constructed that allow evaluation of tradeoffs and comparison of alternatives in agricultural policy and developmental programs. The first generation models and complementary research activities have provided detailed and operational policy planning information for use by policymakers and planners in evaluation of agricultural development potentials and policy alternatives. Effective utilization of project output and successful accomplishment of project goals was confirmed by the 1978 Project Evaluation Team which included the following evaluation statements among its numerous positive findings:

- The project has succeeded in its mission of establishing a high caliber operational capability for applying agricultural economic analysis to government policy problems in an action setting.
- The basic economic logic underlying the modeling of the agricultural sector is sound and the results obtained are reliable.
- Models have been used in a variety of ways to aid policy making at national and local levels.
- Activities of the project have impacted rural poverty because of the emphasis on incomes in agriculture and low income regions such as the Northeast.
- The capability which has been developed has been successfully institutionalized.
- Because an influence on major policies affecting agriculture is achieved by a project of this kind at a low cost, relatively speaking, it is a cost effective way of promoting agricultural and income distribution objectives, and thus is cost effective in favorably affecting the lives of Thai rural farmers.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

- The analysis of seven development policy alternatives was used in formulating Thailand's Fourth Five Year Plan.

- Other shorter and longer-term policy activities have included planning for MOAC irrigation and extension activities, evaluation of investment possibilities in connection with World Bank loans, planning of specific marketing facilities, analyses of effects of land reform, and analyses of implications of minimum wages. The models have been used to aid policy making at both the national and local levels for agencies such as the NESDB, the Ministry of Commerce and agencies within the MOAC.

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

- Aside from the uses of the model developed, other project products are used, including data generated and background analyses prepared for the models such as the demand and cost production studies. Among the important project outcomes are the insights developed which contribute to building up knowledge about the agricultural economy and which are used in answering requests, in framing policy suggestions and in policy discussions.

- A benefit of the project can be deduced to include benefits resulting from avoidance of policy mistakes.

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

- The by-product of interactions of Agricultural Sector Analysis personnel with other agricultural economists enhanced the agricultural economics profession in the nation. Also, project research has been effectively disseminated to research institutes, government offices and universities.

- DAE has developed good working relationships with other government agencies.

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- The project succeeded in establishing a high caliber operational capability for applying agricultural economics analysis to government policy problems in an action setting. Government personnel and resources are now capable of maintaining the models and carrying on policy work.

- Agriculture sector analysis has been added as a new component to the agricultural economics profession in Thailand.

- The DAE has been upgraded organizationally within the Ministry. Formal and informal training was provided to almost all DAE staff. At least 16 new Ph.D.s and 35 M.A.s were earned.

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

- (1978) "Most of the activities of the project have impacted rural poverty because of the emphasis on incomes in agriculture and low income regions."

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None noted

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None noted

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

ENHANCEMENTS:

- The DAE has been extremely responsive to any possibilities for responding to any requests for policy analysis, both within and outside of the MOAC.
- When key DAE were selected for graduate work, other staff replaced the departed students with minimal disruption.
- There was a complete integration of the Iowa State University (ISU) and Thai staff. This accomplishment was made possible through excellent working conditions and complete interpersonal trust as well as through intensive person-to-person training activities on behalf of the ISU staff with the DAE staff.
- The models developed are detailed and can relate economic impacts back to the zone level. In this sense they contrast to other models which can generate results only at the national level.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

- Because an influence on policies affecting agriculture is achieved by a project of this kind (which examines policy alternatives) at a low cost, relatively speaking, it is a cost effective way of promoting agricultural and income distribution objectives. This project is complementary to other activities concerned with development and rural poverty since it helps in the choice of policies and programs which importantly determine other activities.

- Compared to other possible planning approaches, Agricultural Sector Analysis has several advantages. First, being comprehensive, it forces a total and consistent view of agriculture, helping to maximize the likelihood that all important effects will be included and that estimates will be accurate. Second, it gives quantitative answers to the effects of policy alternatives and helps to select policies that contribute to more rather than less goals. Third, it is an operational policy tool, not just academic.

- The input-output technique for analysis of local and regional effects is a tool that is very compatible with linear programming. On the other hand, the macro-modeling suffers from data problems and partially overlaps macro-modeling being done elsewhere in Thailand. The problems of linking it usefully with the linear programming models are great. A strategy that emerges, then, is to concentrate the analysis of nonfarm activities in the input-output modeling and de-emphasize the macro-modeling.

- Efforts to relate the modeling to long run factors determining economic development and per capita incomes of segments of the farm and nonfarm economy should be initiated in order to keep the sector analysis consistent with the long run determinants of development in the country's economy. Fully extending the models to consider credit and other factors is also recommended.

Institutional

- The primary and successful means used for developing a local staff research capacity on this project was through staff members' participation in the research process. Organization of host country and technical advisors reflected a problem focus rather than scientist/counterpart strategy. An open door policy was observed at all times. Formal post graduate training was supplemented and extended by in-service training and daily participation in all phases of the research process.

- Inputs into policy making from agencies other than the MOAC, and from universities should be maximized.

- Two-way communication between DAE and policy makers will be enhanced if top echelons of the MOAC take steps to ensure that the agencies within the Ministry make their views and needs known to DAE and that DAE makes known its capabilities and policy results.

- It will be important to continue to train people to advanced levels to ensure an ongoing process, whereby those now newly trained mature professionally and move to positions of higher responsibility to be eventually replaced by other qualified professionals. There also might be a need for refresher programs to ensure that staff remain professionally current.

Other:

- The accomplishment of this project has been recognized by other LDC's of Southeast Asia who have suggested that an Agricultural Sector Analysis Training Center be established by the DAE in Bangkok to train personnel and catalyze similar developments in other countries in the region.

B-3 NEAR-EAST

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Egypt

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Development Systems (ADS) (263-0041) 1977-82

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$19,349,000	$19,349,000
Grant	11,000,000	11,000,000
Loan	0	0
Country	4,743,000	4,743,000
Other (Other Donors)	3,606,000	3,606,000

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and the Project Policy and Planning Board (Egyptian, AID, and Cal-Davis membership) established under this project

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

University of California, Davis (U. Cal-Davis or UCD)

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: Increase agricultural productivity and the total contribution of the agricultural sector of Egypt.

PURPOSES: To create within the Ministry of Agriculture and related agencies an improved capacity for planning developmental programs and for delivery of services which will enable farmers to increase production profitably.

OUTPUTS: 1. A comprehensive set of developmental activities in one or more commodities; 2. an agricultural economics organization capable of (a) continued and comprehensive analyses of the agricultural sector and (b) planning actions; 3. a critical mass of agricultural scientists trained in contemporary science and technology, organized and equipped to participate in problem solving; 4. joint research activities on critical agricultural sector problems; 5. an established procedure and set of institutional relationships whereby benefits of U.S. technology can be brought to bear on Egyptian agricultural sector problems.

INPUTS: Egypt: major contribution of staff, logistic support, and leadership; University of California: administrative direction, advisory, and institutional support; AID: major funding and institutional support.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Egypt

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Development Systems (ADS) (263-0041) 1977-82

DESCRIPTION:

There was a perceived need to improve institutional and, (as a consequence) technological capabilities for agricultural development in Egypt. Under a Collaborative Assistance Relationship (CAR) between GOE and U. Cal-Davis (UCD), this 5-year grant intended to create the institutional capability to plan and implement programs of research, training and extension that aid in the development of agriculture. A Joint Policy and Planning Board (JPPB) consisting of about 10 representatives of GOE, Egyptian institutions, U. Cal and AID, was to be established to identify agricultural policies, advise GOE, determine development priorities, and (through a Joint Directorate and ad hoc committees) administer research, training and extension activities of projects to be developed. The JPPB was to also evaluate project accomplishments and serve as the principal planning and advisory board for USAID projects in Egypt. Continuing work was to be delegated by the JPPB to a Joint Directorate, including resident Co Directors from Egypt and U. Cal., and their staffs.

Pursuant to the priorities and actions of the board, ad hoc expert committees composed of UCD and Egyptian scientists were to be formed to develop subprojects. Such committees were to identify problems in a subject or commodity area, and develop proposals for research, training, or extension activities. Proposals were to be submitted to the JPPB for review and approval. Subprojects were to be multi-year technical/capital assistance efforts designed to have a marked effect upon a specific problem. Other JPPB activities included: joint research (medium-term programs); technology transfer (short-term, problem specific); economic, social, and technical feasibility studies of sub-projects; and general training. A majority of ADS funds were intended for subprojects. Three types of subprojects were initially selected: 1) a technical effort to identify and solve problems in horticulture; 2) an assistance effort in agricultural economics and statistics; and 3) a feasibility study to improve the agricultural extension. Research in the first area was to include study of fertilizer, irrigation, cropping, and pest control practices; varietal/genetic research; plant nutrient analysis, assistance in the second area was to be the MOA, and was to stress creation of a marketing analysis capability, formulation of investment programs; improvement of agricultural data and data systems, and training in price, sector, and policy analysis.

Overall the project stressed collaboration between both the MOA and Egyptian agricultural scientists and between Egyptian and American scientists.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Institutional capability to plan and implement projects in the agricultural sector
- Establishing greater level of continuity

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Egypt

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Development System (ADS) (263-0041) 1977-82

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: USAID, Interim Evaluation, January 1981

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular _____ Special ___x___ Final _____

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

Success in meeting ADS goals, which were too broad and comprehensive (and non-specific) to be implemented successfully, were mixed at best. The project got off to a slow start. A contract between the MOA and U. Cal-Davis was not signed until January, 1979 and significant activity was not apparent until mid-1979. U. Cal-Davis was inexperienced in international work and not fully committed to it. The administration having difficulty getting support from the university's scientific community. USAID was not directly involved in the process, had little influence over decisions and increasingly turned away from ADS in developing its portfolio for Egyptian agricultural aid. Changing MOA leaders and the absence of a single Egyptian institution through which the project was managed also hampered progress. Still, with some reorganization late in 1979, a number of activities got under way. A large number of Egyptian scientists have been enrolled and energized in the agricultural economics and horticulture subprojects. About 20 agricultural economics research activities are expected to be completed by September, 1983, with 150-200 Egyptian scientists involved. There is substantial research being undertaken in horticulture, but quick utilization and impact appears unlikely. The project has made a good start in developing collaborative relationships between MOA professionals and academic scientists.

Overall, however, the project will not come close to meeting its ambitious goals. It is questionable wisdom to expect any major institutional change involving nearly the entire agricultural sector to be implemented by one AID-funded project. The expectations for this project were too broad, the time frame too short and success dependent on external factors not within the control of JPPB. It is unlikely that a very "high level" commission or policy board could be established as a superstructure responsible for bringing order and coherence to Egyptian agriculture without assigning the board enormous power resources, neither of which was available.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

None identified

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

None identified

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

- Start at a greater collaborative relationship between MOA and academic scientists

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- 100-150 Egyptian economists involved in and "trained" in agricultural economics research projects

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

None identified

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None identified

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None identified

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

- Substantial delays in negotiating and signing contract between U. Cal-Davis and MOA
- Incentives for participation lacking for U. Cal-Davis scientists
- AID not in decision-making loop and tending, eventually, to seek other avenues for project definition
- Visits by American scientists to Egypt too short, averaging 14 days
- Absence of single Egyptian institution as focal point
- Egyptian priorities and objectives not determined or communicated with any precision; broad, scattershot project
- Egyptians feel that Americans were not providing the "best people"
- Financial and accounting difficulties. Difficult to ascertain what has actually been spent
- U. Cal-Davis inexperienced and not fully committed to the project
- Need for laboratory for horticulture

ENHANCEMENTS:

None identified

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

- Longer visits by Americans, with more follow up
- Drop any proposal to generally improve Egyptian extension services (except for horticulture), develop horticulture information service for farmers
- 24-month tour of duty for long term U. Cal-Davis personnel with overlap between outgoing and incoming staff
- Consider improving access to agricultural library resources (a good idea) as a separate project
- Consider more training of MOA Egyptians at MS level
- Focus future economics research on aspects of the horticultural activities

Institutional

- Improve communication between project and USAID and get USAID involved
- Activities such as livestock and food sciences projects need careful and close coordination with USAID
- Must develop plan for management of planned central horticultural laboratory
- AID must find ways to reward project officers for substantive implementation and project progress

Other:

- Building institutions and supporting agricultural research involves long term commitment, not short-term efforts to obligate funds or develop projects.
- Develop definite strategy for training and institutional development within the project
- USAID should revise project paper, make objectives more realistic and specific, less global
- Extend the project 2 years, particularly to see fruits (sic) of horticultural research

- AID cannot expect to "wholesale" large sectors of their responsibilities for project design and implementation and still retain substantive influence over them

- Special care must be taken in selecting in-country contracting organizations in host country contracts, since this is one of the few projects where AID has control

- Care was needed in selecting experienced, capable and committed American universities with understanding that they can only carry out programs for which they are prepared

- Broad based programs with many different purposes and activities may be incompatible with AID's project format

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Egypt

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Data Collection and Analysis (263-0142) 1980-85

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$6,106,000	$6,106,000
Grant	5,000,000	5,000,000
Loan	0	0
Country	1,106,000	1,106,000
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), specifically the Statistical Research Division of MOA's Agricultural Economics Research Institute (AERI)

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

U.S. contractor technical team

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: Increased agricultural growth and more equitable distribution of income.

PURPOSES: To improve the capabilities of the Government of Egypt's Ministry of Agriculture to collect economic data and to carry out analytical and planning work across the agricultural sector; and to increase the use of relevant analytical materials in policy development and planning activities.

OUTPUTS: 1. Research studies. 2. Policy papers. 3. Project/program plans. 4. Additional agricultural statistics. 5. More accurate, reliable and timely statistics. 6. Trained staff.

INPUTS: A. Egypt: 1. Personnel. 2. Facilities. 3. Operating funds. B. AID: 1. Funding for long-term and short-term technical assistance. 2. Funding for local analysts. 3. Funding for training. 4. Funding for equipment. 5. Funding for computer software and computer time.

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ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Egypt

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Data Collection and Analysis (263-0142) 1980-85

DESCRIPTION:

Although Egypt's agricultural performance ranks relatively well among all nations of the world, development policies to emphasize other economic sectors at the expense of agriculture constrain agricultural expansion. While the Government of Egypt (GOE) recognizes that added agricultural output is needed and of high priority, a shortage of economic data and analyses impedes the translation of this recognition into concrete policies and program. The Data Collection and Analysis project, a five-year effort, is intended to improve the Ministry of Agriculture's capabilities to obtain data and perform analyses of use to policy decision making and to increase the use of analytic materials and methods in agricultural policy development and planning. The project combines TA, training and computer equipment. It provides a resident project administrator, 46 person-months of data collection TA, 68 work months of analysis and planning TA, a minicomputer, 20 person-years of advanced degree training for 5 persons in data collection, 37.5 person-years of training for 30 persons in data processing and agricultural statistics, 12 academic years of training for six persons in analysis and planning and 1.5 years of short courses for 15 persons in analysis and planning. It is felt that current constraints in Egypt to increased agricultural production are not (as in many countries) technology or institutions, but are planning and policy development expertise based upon economic data and national economic analysis. As part of the project, GOE will establish a senior agricultural policy advisory group including AERI personnel and individuals in other government agencies whose involvement will improve the likelihood that AERI data collection and analytic efforts will be utilized by GOE in policy development and planning.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Availability of meaningful and appropriate data and analyses for use by policy decision makers
- Enhancing the importance of agricultural sector development among policy decision makers

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Jordan

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Economics and Planning (278-0134) 1790-75

LEVEL OF FUNDING	**ENTIRE PROJECT**	**PLANNING COMPONENTS**
Total	$1,229,000	$1,229,000
Grant	449,000	449,000
Loan	0	0
Country	780,000	780,000
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Directorate of Agriculture Economics

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

USAID technical advisors

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: Better agricultural planning and development programs from agricultural agencies in GOJ.

PURPOSES: Develop manpower and institutional capabilities to make sound policy decisions in agricultural economics and planning.

OUTPUTS: Basic statistical studies in land use, production, yield and other agricultural components. Studies for agricultural planning, resource development, and policy formation. Research programs in farm mangement, production economics, evaluations of economic problems of small farmers, research needs and marketing problems, and a marketing development study. GOJ personnel trained in all areas of agricultural economics and agricultural planning.

INPUTS: USAID technical assistance (short- and long-term)

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Jordan

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Economics and Planning (278-0134) 1970-75

DESCRIPTION:

For this project, USAID provided short- and long-term advisors to assist the Government of Jordan (GOJ) in organizing a Ministry of Agriculture, setting research priorities, choosing participants, training, and providing advice in planning and development, agricultural statistics, agricultural production economics, and specific priorities as they are identified. The GOJ was to reorganize, transfer personnel as needed, choose priorities, and provide participants.

The purpose of this project was to develop trained personnel in all aspects of agricultural economics, the setting of priorities for the allocation of relatively scarce national resources and manpower, and making profitable farm management and marketing decisions. Information was to be gathered and developed which would allow the private sector to plan and develop supporting agro-business. Successful achievement of the targets of this project would greatly strengthen other GOJ agencies such as the Agricultural Extension Directorate, the Agricultural Credit Corporation, the Jordan Development Board, and other USAID/J assisted projects such as for Wheat Research and Production, Vegetable Research and Production, and various rural development and on-farm irrigation projects.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- o institutional capacity building for better overall agricultural policy and program analysis

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Tunisia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agriculture Economic Research and Planning (664-0237) 1967

LEVEL OF FUNDING	**ENTIRE PROJECT**	**PLANNING COMPONENTS**
Total	$3,488,000	$3,488,000
Grant		
Loan	3,488,000	3,488,000
Country	0	0
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), Bureau of Plan and Agricultural Development (BPDA), University of Tunis

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

University of Minnesota

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: The development of effective Tunisian agriculture sector policies to achieve sustained agricultural growth.

PURPOSES: Central institutional capability for data accumulation, applied agricultural economic research and planning which is necessary for determining GOT policy and strategy in agriculture sector and for planning development programs.

OUTPUTS: Formally established, functioning and effective units or services, for conducting applied agricultural economic research, analysis and planning, characterized by: organization and staffing plan with established functions, qualified Tunisian staff employed and properly assigned and adequate in number, ongoing program of research appropriate to the needs of the MOA, a workable technical information collection, storage and retrieval system for the BPDA.

INPUTS: (Remaining life of project from 7/76) U.S. Department of Agriculture provide short-term consultant services for ongoing agricultural data collection activities and work-study programs in the U.S. for specialized training in agricultural statistics; approximately 50 man/weeks of consultant services in FY 76-78. Est. 90 man/weeks of work-study programs to develop research skills. USAID direct funding: training of 13 candidates in agricultural economics and some in statistics and the supply of certain commodities including vehicles, thresher and small equipment.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Tunisia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Economic Research and Planning (664-0237) 1967

DESCRIPTION:

The objectives of this contract are for the University of Minnesota to assist Tunisia in building effective institutions for agricultural economic research and planning and to assist the University of Tunis in economics and related subjects. The services to be provided include:

1. Assisting the Government of Tunisia in the establishment of a Bureau of Economic Studies in the Ministry of Agriculture and providing of both resident and short-term University of Minnesota staff for the Bureau to initiate and carry out a program of economic research needed for agricultural development.

2. Training Tunisian agricultural economists and selected agricultural scientists to staff the Bureau of Economics Studies and related agricultural research institutions.

3. Assisting the University of Tunis by providing short-term staff for assignment in Tunisia and accepting staff and students for training at the University of Minnesota in such areas as Econometrics, Agricultural Economics and Public Finance.

The functions of the Bureau of Economic Studies will be to engage in economic research and analysis of agricultural production and marketing, to determine priorities for agricultural research, to determine training requirements, and to formulate policy recommendations to the Minister of Agriculture.

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Capacity building

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Tunisia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Economic Research and Planning (664-0237) 1967

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR:

USAID, Project Evaluation or Appraisal Reports: July, 1968, September, 1969, January, 1970, August, 1971, November, 1974, and December, 1975; and USAID, Project Evaluation of Technical Assistance Project 237.1, Agricultural Economic Research and Planning, September, 1975.

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular x **Special** x **Final** _____

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

The goal of this project, initiated in 1967, was to assist the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) in developing central institutional capacity, primarily in the Agricultural Planning Bureau, for applied agricultural economic research analysis and planning. The strategy for doing this involved providing long term and short term assistance for carrying out this research and training Tunisian staff at U.S. universities. As of 1975 with few exceptions, the formal training objectives were met with good results. The quality of the researchers was good, but the research component was constrained by the lack of data. Also, research tended to be underutilized, mostly because the Tunisians encountered difficulty in applying the results of the economic research to analyzing policy problems. On the other hand, a capacity for research was institutionalized within the Bureau of Plan, pointing to the general achievement of project objectives. In 1975, this project was extended to 1978 in order to further strengthen the planning, quantitative, research and data processing capabilities in the MOA.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

None noted

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

None noted

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

- The first effective collaboration between the Ministry of Plan and the Agricultural Development Department in the MOA was the result of contract staff initiative.

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

- As of 1975, a competent core staff existed in the Bureau of Planning and four trained participants occupied other key positions in the MOA.

- A capacity for research was created within the Bureau of Plan.

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

None noted

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None noted

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None noted

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

1) During the first year, the cooperativization of the Tunisian agricultural sector placed demands on the limited number of trained personnel. Therefore, the GOT did not assign counterpart staff to be work with advisors.

2) During the first year, a considerable amount of time was devoted to the resolution of administrative problems related to the establishment of the contract group in Tunis, resulting in delays and underspending of appropriations.

3) The project was designed to establish a Bureau of Economic Studies that would be entirely autonomous from other research bureaus, even other existing agricultural research offices. The creation of a virtually independent facility for the University of Minnesota contract team, taken together with the physical separation from the Ministry, not only limited the daily contact of the American staff with those in the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), but also kept the contract team out of the operational and policy making mainstream of the Ministry. This problem was aggravated by the limited knowledge of French by the American staff.

4) Intermediate: when trained counterparts returned from the U.S. their role in ongoing research was not always clear.

5) Heavy demand upon staff to respond to immediate needs of the MOA, and too few personnel resulted in limited on-the-job training and failure to engage in long-term research on key sub-sector policy problems.

6) The quality and quantity of research was constrained by lack of data and a research base on which to build.

ENHANCEMENTS:

- The project team did not develop a collaborative relationship with host nationals.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

- Ph.D. level Tunisians should be accessed, if available. If not, M.S. level Tunisians should be trained.

Institutional

1. In order for the project to obtain full GOT support, and for it to obtain ready access to policy makers, the contract team must first "sell" the value of the type of institution it seeks to develop.

2. Original studies conducted by the project team were suggested by USAID and approved by the GOT. Full acceptance by the GOT would be hastened if the GOT could have recommended its own research projects.

3. Projects developed at the instigation of the U.S. and separated from related GOT offices should not expect to gain instant and full acceptance by the host government and plans should not be based on such immediate acceptance. However, in such cases it is especially important, to a) establish appropriate procedures for the eventual integration of the project into the regular governmental machinery and b) define as precisely as possible the contributions expected from the host government. In the event the host government is subsequently unable to meet its commitments, vigorous efforts should be made at an early date, and at the highest appropriate levels, to remedy the situation lest it become the norm.

4. To remedy the particular problem facing the University of Minnesota group, efforts should be initiated once the group has established itself as a separate unit to bring it into closer physical contact with the existing research and planning facilities of the Ministry of Agriculture.

5. In order to facilitate constant contact and the exchange of ideas with appropriate host government officials, project leaders should be able to communicate freely in French.

6. While the USAID/T Controller and Executive offices in the past have provided very extensive assistance to incoming contract groups, and are prepared to do so again in the future, contract groups should be encouraged to engage the services of a Tunisian administrative assistant at the earliest possible opportunity to assist in the resolution of the many local administrative problems. These tasks are especially time-consuming for someone

with limited administrative experience, little knowledge of local procedures and customs, and difficulties in communicating in French and Arabic. The employment of an administrative assistant should enable the professional contract personnel from the very beginning to devote the major part of their energies to their professional tasks. The Controller and Executive offices should provide such training and assistance to the administrative assistant as may be appropriate.

Other:

1. In order to avoid delays in training, future projects that require for their success the training of a certain number of participants should have a time phased training program prepared at the same time the project is initially planned. The agreement of the host country to provide the required participants should be obtained.

2. Returned participants were to be given on-the-job training (OJT) under the guidance of resident advisor staff. There was an increasing belief that OJT needs would be better served by highly qualified short-term consultants rather than full-time economists. As trainees return from the U.S. with an M.S. they need further training in econometrics, planning, and the establishment of an agricultural data system. Such training could be conducted by short-term specialists.

3. Future M.S. candidates should follow a curriculum requiring a thesis; preferably with thesis work conducted in Tunisia.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Yemen

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Title XII Agricultural Development Support, Core Subproject (279-0052) 1979-85

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
Total	$37,700,000	$37,700,0000
Grant	32,900,000	32,900,000
Loan	0	0
Country	4,800,000	4,800,000
Other (Other Donors)	0	0

COUNTERPART POLICY AND PLANNING INSTITUTION(S):

Ministries of Agriculture and Education

SOURCE OF POLICY AND PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

Oregon State University
Consortium for International Development (CID - 11 U.S. Universities)

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK:

GOALS: Increased income and improved quality of life for rural inhabitants; improved capacity of the YAR government and Yemeni agricultural producers to develop and sustain an effective, efficient, and economically integrated agricultural sector.

PURPOSES: To improve the capacity of the YAR government to plan and implement a national agricultural development program.

OUTPUTS: 1. Technical/administrative in-service training. 2. Training at CID institutions. 3. Third-country training. 4. English language training. 5. Sector and sub-sector assessments, studies, and analyses. 6. Agricultural documentation and learning center. 7. Subprojects designed and implemented. 8. Ongoing subproject technical, administrative, and logistic support. 9. CID/YAR governmental linkages.

INPUTS: 1. Quantification: A. Long-term TA; B. Short-term TA; C. U.S. support; D. Participant training; E. Commodities; F. YAR personnel and institutions. 2. Costs: 15 person years over five year period U.S. backstop support; 34 person years long-term TA; 45 person years short-term TA; 40 or 90 person years participant training; $1.8 M commodity support. A. AID grant; B. YAR government direct contribution; C. Indirect YAR government contribution through institution building efforts.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

COUNTRY: Yemen

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Title XII Agricultural Development Support, Core Subproject (279-0052) 1979-85

DESCRIPTION:

The core subproject of the Agricultural Development Support Project is intended primarily to build institutions, directly addressing current constraints to increased agricultural production, leading toward solution to identified future constraints. The program and its core subproject are viewed as long-term (10-15 years) with Phase I being five years (3/80 - 2/85). Under the core project, the Consortium for International Development (a group of 11 U.S. universities) will provide staffing for the entire project (3-4 U.S. personnel in the country plus up to 25 local-hire persons) at the MOA, complete agricultural sector and subsector assessments already begun, design and evaluate (and provide technical and logistical support in implementing) specific agricultural subprojects and provide to MOA (particularly MOA Directorate of Planning) staff substantial in-service training (50-100 people), degree training (3 Ph.D., 15 MS, 6 BS) at CID institutions, specialized non-degree academic and non-academic training at CID institutions or in Arab countries (for 40); English language training (for 200) and a variety of conferences and seminars. CID will also organize and equip a Documentation and Learning Resource Center at the MOA, and develop effective long-term linkages with the Yemen Arab Republic government (YARG).

MAJOR POLICY AREAS ADDRESSED:

- Principally institution-building; addressing severe need for trained personnel in agricultural research and management, weak supporting institutional infrastructure in Yemen, and establishing effective policy, planning and implementation linkages between the MOA and other YARG institutions.

- Help farmers to better manage soil, water and production technologies.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Yemen

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Title XII Agricultural Development Support, Core Subproject (279-0052) 1979-85

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR: USAID, Agricultural Development Support Program Evaluation, February, 1982.

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S):

Regular _____ Special ___x___ Final _____

SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS:

At the time of this evaluation, less than half-way through the first (five-year) stage of the project, potential major successes were still in the future. However, the evaluation finds that "the core has certainly brought improved planning and greater program development activity to YARG." In addition, the Ibb School Project, a separate subproject, is "recognized as an important national resource to YARG agricultural development." The Core Subproject has been hampered by communication/coordination/reporting shortcomings, especially between different AID offices and between CID and AID offices, but the list of "accomplishments" of the core subproject during its first 1 1/2 years is lengthy. Oregon State University (the CID lead university) established offices in Sana'a (Yemen) and Corvallis, Oregon, provided 30 technical specialists to Sana'a for temporary duty totalling about 1,500 person days, located and assigned 11 permanent staff to Sana'a, carried out a six-month training course at OSU in agricultural management and English for 8 MOA Yemeni staff, prepared an Agricultural Sector Assessment and provided study recommendation and planing support to anticipated or ongoing subprojects on horticulture, poultry, integrated crops and water management, training a faculty of agriculture at Sana'a University, establishing a documentation and learning resource center and the ongoing Ibb school subproject. In addition, CID provided adapted citrus seeds and successfully established over 50,000 citrus seedlings at a nursery in Jarnba, procured over $200,000 in commodities to support activities of CID/Sana'a office and subprojects.

These are really process achievements, not evidences of permanent success in meeting goals, but the project was quite young when the evaluation was performed.

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED:

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS:

None identified or yet intended

DECISIONMAKERS IMPACTS:

None identified or yet intended

INTERINSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS:

None identified

CAPACITY BUILDING IMPACTS:

Increased planning and program development activity and capability in evidence.

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS ON:

The Agricultural Sector

None identified

The Suppliers of Agricultural Inputs

None identified

The Purchasers of Agricultural Outputs

None identified

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES:

Constraints, or difficulties discerned by the evaluation in early project implementation are principally administrative in nature. These include:

a. imperfect communication between AID and contractor

b. little attention to promoting and providing information on the program to key people in Washington

c. problems in timely draw-down of funds and local currency advances

d. inadequate financial support of subprojects, and in estimating pre-subproject activity costs

e. contracting and reporting shortcomings

f. untimely personnel shifts among AID field-based technical staff

g. lack of a continuous Chief of Party in Sana'a

ENHANCEMENTS:

Not identified

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:

Technical

Not identified

Institutional

a. improving communication, particularly between CID and AID, with and between USAID/Sana'a and AID

b. involve BIFAD and Science and Technology Washington bureaus in program

c. provide more timely financial reports

d. request local currency advances two months in advance (instead of one)

e. more timely and complete reporting to AID with contracting and program officers

f. clarifying how specific accomplishments and subprojects are to be implemented

g. achieving a better balance between long-term human resource and institutional development goals and the provision of more tangible project ouputs in subproject development

h. making unambiguous the total in-country program authority of the COP.

i. COP must spend appropriate time cultivating good relations in the ministries

j. review of OSU core operation by small CID study team

k. review of Sana'a office operation by small team of AID, YARG and CID representatives

Other:

Not identified