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EVALUATION

OF THE

A.I.D.-FUNDED PVO DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

IN

THE WEST BANK AND GAZA

(1975 - 1984)

Prepared for
The United States Agency for International Development

by

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The views and interpretations expressed in this report are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Agency for International Development.

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I. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Assessment. The AID assistance program administered by five U.S. private voluntary organizations (PVOs) in the West Bank and Gaza is successfully fulfilling its overall goals of demonstrating American concern for the Palestinian people and its specific purpose of providing practical projects in the areas of health, education, services, infrastructure and economic development.

2. Administration. AID technical support has been sympathetic to the special situation of these programs, and much of the credit for the increasing sophistication of the PVO programs over time goes to timely AID suggestions, evaluations and monitoring from Washington.

The responsible officers of the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv and in the Consulate-General in Jerusalem provide particularly effective local support of the AID programs. The coordination among the Embassy, Consulate-General and the PVOs is close.

The dedicated and seasoned field personnel of the PVOs are the major factor in the program's success. They accomplish seemingly impossible tasks in a tense political environment. Both the expatriate and Palestinian staff of the PVOs are professional and effective.

An important aspect of the program's overall success is the variation and complementarity of the five PVOs and their programs.

3. Impact. Throughout the West Bank and Gaza, AID-funded PVO projects have helped in the construction of 60 village and town water systems, 60 road projects, 40 schools, clinics, community centers and other buildings. Over 10,000 mothers are receiving full courses in preventive health, nutrition, first aid and hygiene.

Other important and large programs help cooperatives, universities, students, and institutions. Altogether, about 50% of the people of West Bank and Gaza (excluding refugee camps) have benefited from one or more of the AID-funded activities.

Most of the activities were only partially funded by AID. The AID grants provided leverage to induce matching investment into the West Bank and Gaza.

The PVO programs concentrate on poorer areas of the territories. The evaluation focused its efforts on one such area and found that over half of the villagers had received important benefits such as roads, water, clinics or health education.

In many instances, villagers had been stimulated by the AID-funded project to go on and add complementary and extra facilities on their own or to undertake other types of community self-help activities.

Measuring the impact of the program on the overall socioeconomic development is difficult. Only during the last several years has the program reached a size capable of having a general impact. The evidence suggests strongly that the continuation of the program at present and gradually increasing levels will quickly accumulate an important and greater economic impact.

4. Policy. The program operates successfully in spite of the complex political and diplomatic context in which it functions. For AID, the program is unusual in that there is no national entity of West Bank and Gaza with which to work and no AID representation.

The program is subject to the nature of the status of the occupied territories which is viewed differently by American, Jordanian and Israeli policies. The PVO activities and modes of action are in line with American policy of nonrecognition of Israeli sovereignty over the areas, and the program continues to serve U.S. policy.

At the same time, the program attempts pragmatically to work within the realities of Israeli control and administration of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Israeli administrative actions in the West Bank and Gaza have at times made it difficult for American PVOs to operate in an efficient manner and for the program to fulfill its mandate from Congress.

Recommendation 1. The size of the assistance program should continue to increase. An expansion of the program is justified for the following reasons: (a) the demand and the need exist, expecially during the economic downturn when Arab sources of funding are becoming less available; (b) the PVO

organizations are able and interested in handling expanded programs; and (c) local Palestinian capability for project management is strong, although more technical assistance in this area should be included in future projects.

Recommendation 2. The PVOs should make more use of international and local consultants. In the few instances when they have done so, their programs improved significantly. More expertise on agriculture, cooperatives, appropriate technology, income generation and other areas needs to be focused on the West Bank and Gaza situations. Use of the consultants should be combined with small coordinating workshops aimed at bringing together the professionals interested in a specific program area or pressing problem. We are not suggesting an avalanche of so-called experts as a panacea. But we urge the PVOs to include in their new proposals relevant and judicious combinations of small workshops and carefully selected consultants.

Recommendation 3. We strongly recommend that the present trend of increasing help to Gaza be continued. Gaza has traditionally been poorer than much of the West Bank and poses special problems. It is more tightly controlled than the West Bank. On the positive side, this means that proposals for routine projects receive relatively quick clearance (three months instead of six months or more than in the West Bank). On the other hand, there is much less freedom of action in Gaza, both for creative PVO programming and for the residents in general. An expanded Gaza program will need to be implemented with care.

Recommendation 4. More should be done in the area of preventive health care training and support. The health care situation is approaching a crisis which needs to be addressed in a more coherent and effective manner.

Recommendation 5. For preschool education, Holy Land Christian Mission should organize workshops with other organizations involved in preschool education to discuss and make available the curriculum developed with AID assistance. Interest in preschool education is growing in the West Bank and Gaza. Most programs are operated by small charitable societies which could benefit from a curriculum and other means of improving teacher capabilities.

Recommendation 6. Since the early years of the program, PVOs have been moving gradually from social services work toward programs designed to strengthen the development of the area.

This trend continues as PVOs are now planning to expand their activities in the areas of agricultural development, village income-generation activities and loan programs. We strongly recommend that the PVOs continue to pursue programs in these and other such areas.

It is important that the program be balanced between economic development, social services and infractructure. Programs of economic and agricultural development have been significantly restricted by Israeli actions, and further efforts are necessary for the advancement of the U.S. program of assistance.

II. PROGRAM BACKGROUND AND CURRENT ISSUES

1. The program of development assistance to the West Bank and Gaza is administered by AID through grants and cooperative agreements with five PVOs: American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA), Holy Land Christian Mission International (HLCMI), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Community Development Foundation (CDF) and America-Mideast Educational and Training Services (AMIDEAST). The program began at a level of $1 million a year and is currently at a level of $8.5 million a year.

2. The Congressional language authorizing the program stresses that the goal is to demonstrate American concern for the residents of the West Bank and Gaza and to "help build the socioeconomic underpinnings of peace." The program is in support of U.S. diplomatic policy in the Middle East as well as a program of economic development, as reaffirmed in 1983 by Secretary of State Shultz.

An important aspect of the program is that it is a program between the United States and the people of the West Bank and Gaza. On the other hand, due to Israeli control of the territories, the PVOs and their activities come under close GOI scrutiny.

3. The program presents some anomalies within the AID system. There is no AID mission or officer in the territories or in Israel proper. Because it is viewed as a program to the Palestinian people, there is no host government and no Country Development Strategy Statement under which the program operates. AID administers the program and provides technical support from Washington and relies on the Consulate-General in Jerusalem and the Embassy in Tel Aviv to oversee the program.

There is no comprehensive AID statement concerning the program's goals and the AID strategy for accomplishing these. This, combined with the sparse Congressional language setting up the program raises some difficulties for an evaluation of the overall program. There are few benchmarks. On the other hand, given the difficult and changing environment of the area, there is an advantage to this flexibility.

4. The Israeli occupation authorities are very sensitive about foreign-funded, participatory, self-help development

programs in their zones of control. The PVOs must submit every project and subproject to the military authorities for clearance, including the smallest activity. The delay for subproject approvals is normally six to nine months, and some subprojects only receive approval after years of persistent negotiating.

The following types of activities are most often vetoed or subject to the longest and most difficult delays:

(a) subprojects in aid of cooperative economic societies, especially agricultural cooperatives;

(b) subprojects in villages which the Israelis consider "uncooperative"; and

(c) subprojects aimed at economic development (in terms of increased production and marketing), especially agricultural development.

Of 47 subprojects that have been disapproved (or still waiting approval after one to four years), 35 are agricultural projects. The proposed AID funding for these "disapproved" subprojects is $4.7 million. The effect of the pattern of disapprovals is greater than these figures indicate. Villagers and PVOs avoid proposing many projects which they know from experience will be disapproved (irrigation wells, for instance).

Nonetheless, the majority of projects eventually do get clearance and are implemented. The PVOs are persistent and patient.

5. An important current issue affecting the program is the publication of a report as part of the West Bank Data Base Project, headed by Meron Benvenisti[1/], the former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem. Regarding the AID projects, Benvenisti alleges that the pattern of disapprovals of subprojects has distorted the American program away from its goals of helping

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1/ U.S. Government funded projects in the West Bank and Gaza (1977-1983) West Bank Data Base Project, working paper No.13. 1984

"the socioeconomic underpinnings of peace" towards a program of building the infrastructure of an irreversible Israeli domination and "pacification." This publication has raised the profile of the American program both in Israel and in the occupied territories during a crucial period of political and economic change.

6. The strength of the AID program is the ability of the PVOs to operate largely in a businesslike and non-political manner. This evaluation has attempted to keep to this tradition and to emphasize issues of project management rather than of politics. Nonetheless, there is no avoiding all political aspects. We deal with political issues in the following ways:

(a) We attempt to use the nomenclature that represents what we understand to be official U.S. policy regarding such things as the status of the occupied territories or the desired relationship between the PVOs and the Israeli authorities. If we have erred in the presentation, we can only remind the reader that we are technicians and not diplomats.

(b) Where Israeli strategies, regulations and actions adversely affect the efficient operation of the AID/PVO program, we discuss frankly these constraints.

III. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

1. Tasks. The evaluation team had four separate tasks:

(a) Evaluate Catholic Relief Services' Rural Development Projects I (1975) and II (1979). In nine years of operation there had been no outside evaluation of these projects.

(b) Evaluate the Community Development Foundation's Rural Community Development Project activities since the 1981 evaluation.

(c) Evaluate the Holy Land Christian Mission's project for preschool education in refugee camps in the West Bank and (indirectly) in Gaza.

(d) Provide a general review of the entire AID effort to support PVO activities in the occupied territories

since 1975. This program has totalled over $34 million in nine years and has never been subject to an evaluative overview.

2. Audience and Uses of Evaluation Reports. The three specific project evaluations and the general evaluation are intended primarily for use by AID's Near East Bureau for its general planning and management of the West Bank and Gaza program, as well as for specific evaluation and monitoring of the three evaluated projects.

The evaluation reports are intended to be used by the PVOs for self-assessment and for their preparation of future proposals.

The evaluation reports are also intended to provide information helpful to the Consulate-General in Jerusalem and the Embassy in Tel Aviv in their responsibilities to oversee the program.

The overall evaluation report is also intended for officials responsible for U.S. policy regarding Israel's activities in the occupied territories. The general evaluation of the entire program contains recommendations for "high level resolution" of impasses between the U.S. and Israeli authorities regarding important aspects of the program. Although the team intends this to be largely an internal AID technical document, our findings in the field stress that certain critical constraints are beyond purely technical considerations.

3. The Evaluation Team was composed of five members. The Evaluation contract was performed by the International Science and Technology Institute, Inc. (ISTI), which provided the team leader and two Palestinian social scientists. AID's Near East Bureau provided the project officer and an education officer, from its Office of Technical Support (NE/TECH). This team represented three important perspectives -- the AID view and background knowledge, an external professional assessment and a local Palestinian perspective. The cooperation of the Consulate-General and Embassy officers, who oversee the programs, provided important official perspective and background.

The team also represented an important range of professional expertise -- namely rural development, agricultural economics, education, evaluation and anthropology.

4. Procedures. The team closely followed the scope of work and schedule prepared in advance. Certain minor modifications of the scope of work will be mentioned below. The scope of work specified broadly the areas of investigation but did not spell out how much detail or quantification should be provided in all these areas. In its preliminary meetings, the team decided that the main focus should be on the subprojects. Issues of administration would receive descriptive treatment. It was agreed that the assessment of impact must realistically be largely descriptive due to the lack of reliable statistics on the overall economy and society.

The American members had one week in Washington for document review, orientation discussions in NE/TECH and meetings with home office representatives of the PVOs.

In Jerusalem the team conducted initial briefings with each of the five PVOs. Additionally, we had individual staff interviews with the three PVOs slated for specific evaluations at this time.

The drafts of the four reports were completed in Jerusalem and distributed to the five PVOs. (Each received the general evaluation plus the separate evaluation of its program.) Drafts of the general evaluation were distributed to the Consulate-General and the Embassy. Final discussion and feedback meetings were held with all five PVOs, the Consulate-General and the Embassy.

The team also met with Israeli authorities. In Jerusalem, we met with the representatives of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. In Tel Aviv, we met with a representative of the Civil Administration. We are grateful for the full and frank discussion in both offices.

5. Site Visits. The major focus of the evaluation activity was the site visits to over 100 subprojects and villages in the West Bank and Gaza. These visits generally involved briefings by the PVO staff, a session of interviews with village leaders or other persons locally responsible for the subproject, discussions with beneficiaries, discussions with local technicians responsible for operation and maintenance and inspection of the subproject facilities.

Some visits, say to a long-completed road, involved mainly "windshield" surveys. The team visited a cross-section of subproject types and modified the approach accordingly.

Generally, the team split into two or three groups for a day's site visits. This division involved specialization in terms of subproject type and team member expertise (agriculture, water and roads or social services, health and education). Having team members bring the expertise to bear on both CDF and CRS programs had certain advantages in terms of fairness and the quality of the site visits. However, a division into groups to specialize on the PVO programs might have increased our understanding of some of the project complexities.

The HLCMI evaluation was run largely independently by the AID education officer, who was on a shorter schedule than the rest of the team. However, three other team members participated in HLCMI general briefings and in the Gaza site visits.

We visited 46 of the 95 CRS subprojects from Grants I and II. We visited 57 CDF subprojects, mostly from the post-1981 period (the date of the previous CDF evaluation). For both CDF and CRS, we purposely visited some of their older subprojects to see if they continue to be used and maintained.

6. Strategy. One strategy of the evaluation scope of work was to focus on two districts, Hebron and Ramallah, in order to get a picture of the combined coverage and impact of AID programs on a certain population. Once in the field, we modified this strategy, limiting the case study to one area, Hebron, and expanding the Ramallah visits throughout the northern districts. We felt that the opportunity costs of not viewing the north (an area of much recent and important PVO activity) outweighed the advantages of two case study districts instead of just one. The Gaza visit, although brief, turned out to be more comprehensive than we had planned, largely due to the compactness of Gaza. Other differences between the situation in Hebron, the north (Ramallah, Tulkaram, Jenin, Nablus) and Gaza are discussed in Section V, "Impact."

7. Caveats. We made all of our visits in the company of the PVO personnel responsible for the subprojects. In theory, a more independent style of travel and operation would have brought forth more frank and perhaps critical responses. However, this was not possible under present circumstances. In most cases, the PVO set up our visit in advance, thus preparing people for an evaluation event. To counteract this to some degree, we spent some days simply travelling with a PVO staff member on normal rounds rather than for evaluation site visits. In this way, we observed meetings to open

tenders, a ritual to celebrate the roofing of a community center, arguments with engineers and other activities. We were grateful for these days of less formal travel.

Given the political environment, it was rarely possible for us to hear totally dispassionate reponses to our questions. In most instances, the presence of the PVO staff, known to the villagers, allowed us to have freer discussions than if we had been able to travel independently.

IV. PROGRAM AREAS

1. Health. The health area has received support from the PVO programs. Much of this support has been in the form of purchasing special equipment for community out-patient clinics, dental clinics, eye clinics, blood banks, etc., which are operated by local charitable societies. CRS runs the only large-scale preventive health care training program. This program has trained 150 village teachers and reached over 10,000 mothers in a sustained fashion.

The health care situation is approaching crisis. Much more needs to be done in the area of primary health care training and support. This is especially important because of the inadequacy and low capacity of in-patient hospitals. The Israeli authorities have allowed the hospital system to atrophy. Two large hospitals built by the Jordanians were turned into policy and military headquarters, and the authorities are now closing down the hospice in Old Jerusalem. In the Hebron area, for instance, a badly equipped 100-bed hospital is supposed to serve 250,000 Palestinians. The situation is little better in Ramallah or Nablus districts or in Gaza. Not only have the authorities not constructed adequate hospital facilities, but they have also forbidden charitable societies and doctors' associations from building any in-patient care facilities with available funds from other donors.

We discussed the health issues with the Israeli representatives of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. They stressed that it is first of all a political matter and secondly an economic one. They view the Palestinians as trying to avoid dependence on government health facilities. They say that, by not allowing new facilities to be built, they force the Palestinians to use the government-run hospitals. The economic response was that hospitals are

expensive to operate and that the government is assuring full utilization of existing facilities by disallowing the construction of new ones. The evaluation team was not satisfied with this explanation of the situation of four-children-to-a-bed that it had witnessed in Hebron or of reported deaths of sick children while being transported to Bethlehem or Jerusalem.

Given the shortage of facilities, we recommend that programs of assistance to charitable societies running clinics be continued. Most of these subprojects are of relatively modest cost and benefit a large number of people. However, it is primary health care programs which are most desperately needed and should be pursued.

2. Education. The major focus of U.S. aid to education has been in the area of higher education. Through AMIDEAST, students have received scholarships and faculty members have studied in the U.S. under faculty development grants. The program developed at a time of high demand in the Arab world for highly trained personnel. With growing unemployment in the West Bank and Gaza among university graduates, this emphasis needs to be reassigned.

The balance between vocational training, applied skills, practical professional education and liberal arts and sciences university programs needs to be reviewed as part of the forthcoming review and evaluation of AMIDEAST's Human Resources Development Project.

Another area of education supported by AID grants is special education for physically and mentally handicapped. Such programs are not normally recipients of AID grants in other countries, but they are important in the West Bank and Gaza for several reasons: (a) the charitable societies deserve support as part of the overall purpose of the AID program; (b) under the situation of occupation, there are far fewer facilities for such people than might otherwise exist; and (c) the PVOs would lose credibility as organizations concerned with humanitarian issues if they had to refuse all such requests on the grounds that they are not developmental programs.

HLCMI carries out an important and successful preschool education program funded by AID, and AID support is also given to a similar program in Gaza through HLCMI. These programs are limited to the refugee camps.

CDF supports local charitable societies' preschool programs. UNICEF has now agreed to support a kindergarten program directly under the auspices of the Israeli government. The authorities have been insisting that U.S. PVOs also work directly under the government system, threshing out project ideas before drawing up final proposals. The PVOs have refused, since this would lead them into a situation of supporting Israeli programs rather than following their "American people to Palestinian people" mandate.

3. Village Infrastructure and Services. This is the area of largest impact of AID-funded programs. Through the projects of CRS and CDF, piped water systems have been introduced into 60 villages serving over 125,000 people and electricity has been brought to five villages. In the CRS program the narrow dirt lanes within 13 villages have been widened and paved. Additionally, 44 unpaved agricultural and access roads have been constructed. Village schools, clinics and community centers have been built with the support and help of villagers.

All of the programs are self-help programs in which the villages and village leaders (traditional family leaders, council members, project committee members) contribute significantly to the selecting, financing, planning, implementing and operating of the system or facility. The projects also provide work for local private contractors and their workers. These are old-fashioned, community developent type projects which succeed in involving people and in increasing local capacity to solve local problems.

Benvenisti reflects a widespread view among Palestinian intellectuals and leaders that such infrastructure projects are nondevelopmental activities which save the Israeli authorities the expense of what the government should do. However, it seems unlikely that the authorities are prepared to invest in such projects in the near future, since they have done little during the last 17 years when their financial situation was stronger. AID policy has long viewed development as more than income-generation. These projects provide important and necessary underpinnings for development and also meet some of the most important basic needs and desires of the people. Over and over, the team saw water, road and school projects that had transformed the attitudes of villagers and given them the hope and self-confidence to prepare and carry out further plans for their betterment.

The expertise to maintain the village water systems, electrical nets and buildings is largely intact. The roads

constructed under these projects seem to survive very well with little or no maintenance. We travelled on roads from eight years ago and often found them in perfect condition. Recently, CDF has become involved in major urban infrastructure projects. In this area, they are planning to provide some short-term vocational training to the municipal technical personnel responsible for operating these greatly expanded systems.

4. Agricultural Development. Agriculture is the sector most hurt by Israeli policies. AID stresses that the West Bank and Gaza program needs to focus on development and income-generation programs. The area is largely agricultural and CDF and ANERA have initiated projects in agricultural development. However, specific public Israeli regulations place major constraints on agricultural marketing and production.

Agricultural development depends first of all on markets. The Israelis forbid West Bank and Gaza products (except for rare temporary exceptions) to be marketed in Israel, but allow similar Israeli products to be sold extensively in the territories. Additionally, West Bank and Gaza produce is forbidden to be exported overseas to any country where it would compete with Israeli products. Jordan also applies some restrictive marketing policies regarding crop quotas and packing. Many other marketing restrictions impede marketing even within the West Bank.

The other ingredients necessary for agricultural development are land and water. Israeli authorities have confiscated much of the land within the West Bank and Gaza for settlements, roads to settlements, "nature reserves" and military installations. Benvenisti, drawing upon official Israeli government plans, shows that "the Israelis are in the process of obtaining direct control of over 40 percent of the West Bank land mass and 31 percent of the Gaza Strip area."1/ Regarding water, the Israelis have almost without exception forbidden the drilling of any new Palestinian agricultural wells since they took control in 1967.

1/ Benvenisti, Meron, The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel's Policies. American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C. 1984. p. 19.

The farmers must make the best use of what lands remain to them. Even here, there are regulatory constraints. The authorities block or greatly delay efforts to protect the remaining lands from erosion through the construction of simple terracing and erosion control barriers. They also place restrictions upon the planting of trees on Palestinian lands (Laws 1039 and 1015), although such reforestation is an important element of Israeli conservation of their own lands.

In our discussion with Israeli officials, we came away convinced that they are adamant in their opposition to Palestinian agricultural development. They are especially opposed to land reclamation because such work allegedly leads to encroachments on so-called state land thereby hindering the settlement process. The fear of competition is an apparent factor also in their consideration of agricultural and cooperative development projects.

A comment needs to be made about the traditional livestock sector. The shepherds in the Bethlehem and Hebron areas have had much of their traditional grazing land taken away from them by the Israeli authorities ("security" areas and "nature reserves") and are desperately trying to survive on the inadequate water and grass resources left to them. The closed-off areas include a number of cistern projects aided by CDF with AID funds only a few years ago. The shepherds are selling off their flocks in order to pay for water which they must now purchase from the authorities and to pay for fodder to replace the lost grazing land. This is the context within which CDF and ANERA programs to help farmers must currently operate.

The PVOs are helping farmers:

(a) reclaim lands to replace some of what they have lost;

(b) develop access roads so they can reach these hitherto remote areas;

(c) build simple cisterns to collect rainwater in these dry regions and to store the water which they must purchase during droughts;

(d) to build rock walls to stop the erosion in gullies; and

(e) plant olive seedlings so that these new lands can earn an income for farmers.

The PVOs are helping small agricultural cooperatives to purchase the equipment needed for land clearing operations. These machines are then made available to individual farmers at reasonable cost.

Future projects currently being developed by PVOs include a loan fund so that individual farmers can make further improvements on land and programs in appropriate agricultural mechanization.

Although these projects have been strongly resisted by the authorities, they are slowly moving forward.

V. IMPACT

1. The impact of development programs on people and societies is never easy to assess or quantify. The situation in this case is perhaps more difficult than usual. First, overall data on population and economy are scarce, especially data that are comparable over time and which might indicate trends. Second, even the most careful statistics are distorted one way or another. Third, the regional economy has been adversely affected in recent years by the global recession. It is always difficult to disaggregate the impact of a specific program from other operative forces. In a declining situation, one is left in the twilight zone of speculation on how much worse things might have been had there been no AID-funded activity.

2. As one way of getting a handle on the impact of the program, the team focused on one district, Hebron, a poor area which has seen a concentration of PVO activity during the last nine years.

The subproject coverage of the district is significant. The CRS Rural Development Projects (I and II) and the CDF Rural Community Development Projects (I and II) have aided important activities in almost 50 different Hebron villages. Most of these subprojects are of types that benefit the great majority of village families - e.g., roads, water, electrification, schools and clinics. Various estimates indicate that these villages comprise the majority of Hebron villages and that

more than half of the rural people in Hebron district have benefited.

In addition to these village community development projects, CRS's Health Education program for mothers has trained 23 teachers and reached over 5,600 mothers in the district with an ongoing program of preventive health information and training linked to food distribution. The mothers of perhaps 20 percent of all the families in Hebron are participating in this program (many in the same villages with other projects). An important AID-supported Hebron institution is the Hebron Polytechnic Institute. AID grants of over $200,000 supported initial construction and equipment in 1978 and 1979. The Institute was intended to be the first of several complementary polytechnics in the West Bank. The Israeli authorities have also disapproved a proposed third AID grant, for expanding the Hebron Polytechnic Institute. AMIDEAST has sent 16 of the Institute's faculty members to the U.S. for advanced degree work as part of its faculty development program. AMIDEAST also currently provides scholarships for 120 Hebron students.

ANERA has provided tractors and equipment to six small agricultural cooperatives in the Hebron area. Additionally, the large Tarqumia Olive Press Cooperative has received AID grants totalling $570,000 since 1978. This cooperative began with a membership of 600 but today has 1,700 active members and expects soon to reach 2,000. Among other things, the Tarqumia Cooperative provides olive seedlings to farmers throughout the district, as well as use of land reclamation equipment to members and others for a reasonable fee.

AID grants through ANERA helped six village electrification cooperatives within the Union of Hebron Electrification Cooperatives to expand the hours of service, thus servicing small village industries and workshops. Hebron charitable societies have received AID support for women's training courses, health facilities, libraries and much more.

As the PVOs operate more in Gaza, however, that area will soon surpass Hebron in terms of proportion of the total population to receive benefits from the program. Most communities in Gaza already have received some form of assistance. Ramallah and the north (Hablus, Tulkaram and Jenin areas) present a different situation. These areas are generally more prosperous than either Hebron or Gaza; however, amid this "prosperity" are many individual villages suffering from very difficult conditions. A major goal of PVOs working in the north is to seek out and help these pockets of poorer villages.

3. There is what might be called the impact on morale which is a particularly important factor under condition of prolonged military occupation and increasing restrictions and pressures. In quite a number of the sites visited by the team, it was apparent that the AID-funded PVO subprojects were a major factor in improving people's individual and group self-images. Often villagers would tell how people initially refused to support, say, the building of the first school. But once they saw the reality of the small building overflowing with children, they went ahead on their own and added extra classrooms and additional amenities. No subproject comes easy; the completion of even a minor project is a source of great pride.

VI. PVO FIELD ORGANIZATION

1. PVO Coordination and Cooperation. The five PVOs receiving AID grants (or party to AID cooperative agreements) vary greatly in (a) type of projects they aid, (b) types of local groups they aid, (c) level and types of office staffing and (d) their perceived place in the local political spectrum. This variation is a real strength of the AID program as it tries to show a non-political face in a strongly politicized environment. Shifts in the sensitivities, regulations and procedures of the Israeli civil and military authorities do not affect the entire program at the same time.

On the other hand, PVO personnel are sometimes inaccurately aware or uninformed about each other's precise activities to a degree that seems strange given the smallness and closeness of the community. Competition is to be expected and it derives partly from people's pride in their own work and in their own way of doing things.

Cooperation among PVOs involves tacit agreements to keep off of each other's turf. ANERA and CDF have worked together in aiding some cooperatives, and CRS and CDF are cooperating on new complementary proposals at the present. The Association of Voluntary Agencies meets monthly.

The evaluation team feels that PVO staff (expatriate and Palestinian) could benefit from workshops and discussion meetings in specific program areas. For one thing, opinions about the work of other PVOs is often out-of-date, thereby causing the blame of others for shortcomings that have already

been corrected. An informal workshop on health, for instance, with the participation of perhaps six to twelve professionals working in the field would provide a useful way of exchanging views and information and of establishing a stronger network of professionals.

Similar workshops could be held in areas of rural development, cooperatives development, agricultural development, preschool education and special education (handicapped). Conditions in the occupied territories are changing rapidly with increasing unemployment and economic slowdown, on one hand, and the cumulative effects of development projects on the other. Annual workshops would help the PVOs take stock of changes and clarify the most effective future program directions.

2. PVO Administration and Staffing.

(a) CRS is currently undergoing an important change in its expatriate staffings, and in the extent of senior staff responsibilities. The Jerusalem office is being upgraded to a type of regional office responsible for the West Bank, Gaza and Jordan programs (direct responsibility for the occupied territories and oversight responsibilites for the Amman CRS office). CRS is taking over CARE's Gaza food distribution program, offices and local personnel. CRS will need quick success in recruiting personnel in order to get through this period of transition and expansion. Fortunately, each of CRS's projects operates with a great deal of autonomy and the senior project personnel are seasoned professionals at operating these programs. The reorganization and expansion of the CRS Jerusalem office strike us as a timely and positive step.

The strength of CRS's operation is its field staff, some of whom have as much as 20 years experience in carrying out their work in the same rural areas. They know every turn in every road. They are well-known to villagers and to civil servants throughout the territory, and this is one factor in their success at getting village cooperation. They are, however, relative neophytes in Gaza.

As CRS is finishing up its Rural Development II project and rearranging its personnel, it is time for them to step back and think through their overall rural development strategy for the next period. Their current approach has been virtually unchanged since the first proposal in 1975. This is not to suggest that there is a problem with their activities, only

that they need to be placed in a broader and more contemporary context. CRS has recently reworked and rethought its health education strategy. The Rural Development Project might profit from a similar exercise.

(b) CDF operates two full offices, one in Gaza and one in Jerusalem. They also maintain the closest contact with their home office of any of the PVOs. Their personnel, both Palestinian and expatriate, are highly-educated professionals and intellectuals. Their strength is in conceptualizing and preparing sector assessments and in articulating overall development strategies.

They are unique among the PVOs for the extent to which they work with a wide range of local organizations: villages, municipalities, cooperatives, Bedouin lineages, charitable societies, regional utility organizations and individual farmers. They also carry out a greater range of subprojects in terms of levels of funding, from tiny cisterns costing about $1,000 to regional water schemes with budgets in the millions of dollars (CDF's share being $500,000 to $700,000). This range of activity calls for flexibility on the part of CDF personnel. They seem to keep track of all their projects, although they leave much of the details of implementation to the local groups.

CDF is also planning some expansion of their professional staff. Some senior technicians are currently working in Gaza and providing part-time support for West Bank projects; others, vice versa. Both the West Bank and Gaza programs have grown too large for this approach, as CDF recognizes.

Since the 1981 AID evaluation, CDF has developed sector strategies in basic village services, rural economic development and institutional development. CDF is the only PVO with senior agricultural technicians on its staff, and we recommend that they continue to develop an overall strategy for aiding and expanding agricultural development. Along this line, the team recommends that they explore ways to obtain assistance from organizations specializing in small farmer-oriented, multidisciplinary farming systems research and extension in rainfed areas similar to the West Bank.

(c) HLCMI presents a very different situation from either CRS or CDF. Rather than expanding their staff, they are phasing out their expatriate volunteer coordinators and

turning their preschool education program entirely to the Palestinian director. The currently volunteer coordinators are finishing up the compilation and publication of Arabic language curricula which will be useful to many groups in the region. The team recommends that before they leave, the American coordinators make a special effort to hold workshops with all those interested in the curriculum and in preschool education possibilities for Gaza and the West Bank.

VII. TRENDS

Several important trends combine to encourage close monitoring of the functioning of the AID program at a time when development in the West Bank and Gaza is growing.

The economic trend is important and is only beginning to be felt. In the early years of the program, both the Israeli and Arab economies were booming. Palestinians found steady employment in Israel and throughout the region. This created a certain false prosperity in the West Bank and Gaza as standards of living rose but with no matching rise in local productivity or investment. With the economic downturn, Palestinians are finding less employment in the Arab countries and in Israel. Among other things, the reversal of the economic situation adds to the importance of the U.S. assistance because the need is increasing at a time when other sources of aid and investment are drying up. Moreover, the economic trend reinforces the U.S. emphasis on economic development activities.

The programs' of the PVOs also have changed over time. With AID's encouragement, they gradually have become more oriented toward overall social and economic development and less involved in providing social and humanitarian services. If the developmental aspects of the assistance are frustrated, the overall program loses credibility in the eyes of the residents of the West Bank and Gaza and, furthermore, the real needs of the people will not be met.

ATTACHMENT A

CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES

SUMMARY REPORT

ATTACHMENT A

WEST BANK/GAZA PVO PROGRAM EVALUATION

Catholic Relief Services (CRS)-- Rural Development Project (I & II)

SUMMARY REPORT

A. General Conclusions.

1. The CRS Rural Development Project is an excellent participatory, community-building program. The subprojects themselves are almost all successes in that they are completed, needed, wanted, used, maintained and relevant to the village situation. They also are the vehicle for CRS's main task of building community morale and improving local capability to deal with local problems.

2. A major reason for the success of the program is the leadership and dedication of CRS's senior local staff.

3. Another reason is that the program sticks close to tried and true activities with which both CRS and villagers are familiar:
roads, water systems, primary schools, community centers and clinics.

B. Recommendations.

1. The CRS Rural Development Project should continue with the same type of village development and construction activities it has been successfully performing for the past nine years. There is a real need for this work with villagers on projects of this size and type. Rarely does the American A.I.D. program accomplish so much with so few of its dollars. We recommend the expansion of these activities with the addition of another Palestinian field project manager.

2. The Rural Development activities should be expanded in Gaza. The most important impact of this program is when it gives hope for the first time to villages where very little has ever come their way. Many Gaza areas seem to be places in need of both basic rural services and hope.

3. CRS should set up a full office in Gaza with a resident expatriate head. Gaza is very different from the West Bank in

terms of the nature of the villages and topography, the psychology and politics of the people, the nature of the occupation and the legal system. A successful Gaza program needs someone with the same sort of close knowledge that CRS personnel have of all areas of the West Bank. Since CRS has inherited the CARE/Gaza office and Title II program, CRS should utilize this opportunity to expand the office to include rural development, health education and handicapped programs.

4. As part of the preparation of the next proposal, CRS should conduct the sort of full rethinking of its overall rural development strategy as was carried out for the health education activity. The current Rural Development strategy has been unaltered since 1975. The situation in the occupied territories has changed much since 1975 as a result of the Israeli settlements and the general economic decline. The subprojects of the program, successful as they are, need to be placed within a broader strategy. Within this strategy, other types of village activities should be considered for inclusion along with the construction subprojects. A program to support individual small income-producing activities, perhaps for women who are no longer hauling water, should be added to the subproject mix. This would build on the construction projects already completed and at the same time address some issues of the growing economic downturn.

(For more information on the CRS program, refer to the separate evaluation report completed by the evaluation team.)

ATTACHMENT B

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION

SUMMARY REPORT

ATTACHMENT B

WEST BANK/GAZA PVO PROGRAM EVALUATION

Community Development Foundation (CDF)-- Rural Community Development Project II

SUMMARY REPORT

A. General Conclusions.

1. CDF is the strongest overall AID-funded PVO organization operating in the West Bank and Gaza. Their organization is strong in terms of the size of its senior staff, the quality and range of personnel expertise, the quality of headquarters support, and in the effective use of local consultants.

2. CDF's project is diversified in terms of the range of local organizations with whom they cooperate -- municipalities, villages, cooperatives, charitable societies, regional utilities, universities, bedouin leaders and individual farmers. Additionally, CDF handles a very wide range of project types and sizes.

3. CDF is unique in having a full office and large diversified program in Gaza as well as in the West Bank. For the expansion of the AID effort in Gaza, CDF plays the leading role and has a comparative advantage over other PVOs. CDF's Gaza operation impressed the evaluation team by its commitment, sensitivity and skill in a difficult situation.

4. CDF has the strongest program in aid of agricultural development and is the only PVO with senior trained agriculturalists on its permanent staff. This is of special importance in a largely agricultural region such as the West Bank and Gaza.

5. CDF has the largest and most diversified water program, covering rural and urban areas, drinking water provision and waste water removal. They aid large regional distribution systems but give just as much attention to channelling small village springs and helping shepherds with cisterns to catch rainwater. Water is a precious commodity in this region and CDF is active in all facets of its management and conservation. In our opinion, this broad and meticulous attention to water does much to convince the people of the seriousness of American concern for their attention.

6. CDF is the only AID-supported PVO aiding preschool education activities in villages and towns. (Other PVO preschool education activities are limited to refugee camps.)

7. The 1981 AID evaluation recommended that CDF develop sector strategies in order to clarify the directions of its myriad activities. This has been done to the great enhancement of its program.

8. The same AID evaluation recommended that CDF expand its work in economic development and continue its work with cooperatives. Although CDF plays a leading role in these areas, it has not expanded. This is partly an AID error, for it approved the list of specific subprojects for Grant II. Partly, it seems that CDF is sensitive about interfering with ANERA's work with cooperatives. However, there are many ways to help cooperatives and enhance economic development which would complement and not compete with the work of ANERA.

9. The above mentioned programs do not exhaust CDF's effective activities, but indicate the areas in which CDF is unique in the region for its size, comprehensiveness, or focus. CDF, through its work with charitable societies, aids a blood bank, a school for the mentally retarded, a dental clinic, an eye clinic, and other health and education activities. Additionally they have provided important support for struggling cooperatives, such as the Fishermen's Cooperative in Gaza.

B. Recommendations.

1. CDF should build on its strength in agriculture, for there is much that needs to be done in this field and no one else is in a position to expand on the necessary scale. They need to build a package program for aid to agricultural mechanization, somewhat like their integrated approach to agricultural roads, land conservation, and water sources that the team witnessed in the Hebron area. If possible, CDF should cooperate with ICARDA in assessing and planning such a program, which would include modest systems for experimentation and extension. CDF is already developing a necessary agricultural credit component. Agricultural development should be CDF's priority area for new program directions.

2. As CDF's program continues to grow, it will need a deputy director in Jerusalem. As part of their expansion of senior staff, one person should be given the responsibilities of deputy director in addition to his or her technical responsibilities.

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3. CDF should continue to sharpen its sectoral strategy papers. We suggest that they add a Gaza area development strategy paper as well. We recommend that CDF consider presenting some of its next round of proposals as separate sector projects, rather than all under the large rubric of "rural community development". However, we recognize that the authorities are sensitive to having others do any comprehensive development planning for the occupied territories. CDF will have to move with caution.

(For detailed information on the CDF program, refer to the separate report completed by the evaluation team.)

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ATTACHMENT C

HOLY LAND CHRISTIAN MISSION

SUMMARY REPORT

ATTACHMENT C

WEST BANK/GAZA PVO PROGRAM EVALUATION

Holy Land Christian Mission International (HLCMI)--Preschool Education Project

SUMMARY REPORT

A. BACKGROUND

Holy Land Christian Mission International (HLCMI), with partial funding of $489,500 from A.I.D., operates its Preschool Education Program (PEP) for five-year-old children in eight preschool centers in six refugee camps in the West Bank, and in the city of Bethlehem. The program uses a complete kindergarten curriculum which offers a developmental approach to early childhood education, including whole group instruction in general subjects and small group instruction using structural lessons aimed at creating readiness to cope with school situations that will be encountered in the first grade.

The kindergarten program for five-year-olds is complemented by a 26-week Mothers In-Home Program (MIHP) providing a structured, developmental course for four-year-olds. Printed lessons and support materials are supplied to 184 mother-child units over each six-month period.

Both programs are well-received by parents and teachers and are considered to be very beneficial to the child's social, emotional and academic development. The number of parents seeking to participate in the programs exceeds HLCMI's present capabilities to accommodate them.

In addition to the West Bank program, A.I.D. provided $215,000 to UNWRA, through HLCMI, for similar activities in the Gaza refugee camps. As indicated above, the MIHP materials initially were developed in Gaza and the PEP materials are to be shared when completed. Generally, the Gaza program has experienced the same favorable results as those in the West Bank by HLCMI. During the two-year grant period, 2,400 children have benefited from PEP. The UNWRA preschool program director is seeking assistance for an additional three-year period from outside donors and, at the same time, is studying ways in which the program can become self-sustaining.

B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. HLCMI is operating successful, well-received preschool education programs on the West Bank. They meet an educational

need of the population. The people participating in the two programs are fully aware of and appreciate the benefits accruing to their children. The programs merit A.I.D.'s continuing support.

2. Preschool Education Program (PEP)

a. Curriculum. Use of the curriculum by HLCMI for PEP is providing participating children with a significant head start for elementary school. It enables teachers with a minimal amount of formal preschool education training to present to kindergarten children a relatively complex, structured educational program. Other organizations, such as the Union of Charitable Societies and the Red Crescent, working with the Community Development Foundation, an American private voluntary organization, are also engaged in preschool education activities and working on the development of their own curricula. Very little interaction between these groups and HLCMI has taken place, and therefore minimal cross-fertilization and exchange of ideas and concepts concerning curriculum development in particular and preschool education in general.

Recommendation. HLCMI should take the lead in organizing a series of workshops with other organizations in the West Bank and Gaza involved in preschool education activities to foster interaction and discussion of preschool education. It is recommended that HLCMI, before "final" printing of its curriculum, make it available to those interested and involved parties, soliciting their comments. Interaction of this nature could lead to further improvement to the curriculum and greater acceptability to its potential users.

b. PEP Teacher/Aide Training. HLCMI developed a structured curriculum in part to alleviate a situation in which its kindergarten teachers and aides lacked formal preschool education training. The project coordinators and program supervisor conduct in-service training which has been effective. Teachers and aides in PEP, and teachers in MIHP, are doing a good job despite this lack of formal training. Progress of children participating in both programs evidence this.

Preschool education teacher training on a limited scale is available on the West Bank at Bethlehem University and Tireh, an UNWRA teacher training facility for refugee camp teachers. The Jerusalem Union of Charitable Societies also provides in-service training for its member societies. Preschool education training offered at Bethlehem University is an in-service, five-semester, nondegree program with the fourth and

fifth semesters being two hours monthly of observation by the university program staff of the kindergarten teacher in her classroom. Feedback from these observation visits is given to the teacher. The Tireh program is a more formal two-year teacher training program.

Recommendation. HLCMI should examine these programs and weigh their potential benefits in the improvement of HLCMI PEP teacher efficiency in the classroom. If deemed appropriate, HLCMI should encourage the teachers and aides in PEP to enroll.

3. Mothers In-Home Program (MIHP)

a. Selection of Mother-Child Units. HLCMI's MIHP is benefiting the participating mothers and children. Enrollment in the program is on a first-come, first-enrolled basis, with little if any consideration for selection criteria. This evaluation was unable to determine if the comparatively more economically and socially needy are being served by this program or not. Perhaps the differences in social and economic well-being are insignificant within the camps. In the event that there are discernible differences, they should be factored into the selection process to provide an advantage to the more needy.

Recommendation. Selection criteria for enrollment in MIHP should be developed. Selection should be based on criteria giving priority to the most economically and socially disadvantaged within the refugee camps. An application for enrollment similar to that used in the MUMS program in Gaza would be appropriate.

b. Teacher Preparation/Training. Teachers in MIHP are presenting the materials and follow-up guidance necessary for a successful program. Most of the teachers, however, have not had formal training in preschool education. In-service training is capably provided by the program supervisor, but could be augmented to create an even more effective program.

An excellent training resource not currently being utilized by MIHP is one of the creators of the MUMS program who currently operates that program in Gaza. She has indicated a willingness and availability to provide assistance in in-service training.

Recommendation. HLCMI should contact the UNRWA preschool program director to arrange for her assistance in the provision of in-service training for teachers in the Mothers In-Home Program.

(For more detailed information on the HLCMI program, refer to the separate report completed by the evaluation team.)

ATTACHMENT D

ANERA OVERVIEW

ATTACHMENT D

WEST BANK/GAZA PVO PROGRAM EVALUATION

America Near East Refugee Assistance (ANERA)--Development Assistance Project

OVERVIEW REPORT

A. Background.

1. The ANERA program in the West Bank and Gaza has received over $8,000,000 in AID funding in the past nine years for activities in the areas of vocational training and education, agricultural production and cooperatives development, sanitation and health, and water/wastewater systems. A total of 108 subprojects ($14.5 million) have been approved for funding under six separate AID grant agreements. Of these, 71 subprojects have been completed, five are being implemented and 32 have been disapproved or are still being considered by the Government of Israel. An evaluation of ANERA's program under the first five grants was completed in September, 1981, and the next evaluation is being considered for early 1985.

2. As indicated in the 1981 evaluation report, ANERA first became involved in the West Bank in 1975, and its initial activities related mainly to vocational training and education. Little difficulty was experienced in receiving approvals from the authorities for these types of activities. With encouragement from AID, ANERA began to move toward income producing activities in 1978 and began to experience more difficulty in obtaining subproject approvals. Under the current two grant agreements, of 49 subprojects proposed, only 15 have been approved for implementation. These include the following: agriculture (cooperatives)--8, electricity (cooperatives)--2, water systems (Gaza Municipality)--2, education (Red Crescent Society)--1, market construction (municipality)--1 and light industry center (municipality)--1.

3. It is difficult to determine exactly why the 34 remaining subprojects have been disapproved or remain to be approved by the Israeli Government. It appears that in many cases, political and security considerations--political activity in the subproject area or fear of strengthening Palestinian institutions--are involved; in other cases, economic considerations--competition with the Israeli economy and farmers--are involved. It also is known that Israeli

authorities feel that the ANERA representative is too openly pro-Palestinian. Two reports recently completed by The West Bank Data Base Project in 1984 (USG Funded Projects in the West Bank and Gaza and The West Bank Data Project--A Survey of Israel's Policies) provide an analysis of and additional information on potential reasons why income-generating and agricultural projects are being disapproved by the government.

B. Issues and Concerns.

During the course of this review of the ANERA program, a number of general findings, impressions or observations were obtained which will require additional study during the upcoming evaluation. These are summarized below.

1. Since ANERA's program generally is in the area of agricultural production, a closer look at Israeli agricultural and land policies in the West Bank and Gaza should be taken. These policies appear to be constraining agricultural production severely and imposing extreme hardships on many inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. They also may be directly related to the poor approval record ANERA has experienced in the past four years.

2. Agricultural cooperatives are still strong and viable institutions in the West Bank, but they are suffering because of agricultural restrictions and constraints imposed by the authorities. Two significant studies of the cooperatives, which were completed recently, outline the situation of the agricultural cooperatives and potential activities that should be pursued. One study, "West Bank Development Programme and the European Communities", by Ian Gibson (February 1984), contains a comprehensive set of activities that could be considered or supported by the cooperatives and donor organizations. The other was completed earlier this year by U.S. Overseas Cooperative Development Committee and concludes that the three urgent needs of the West Bank and Gaza cooperatives are technical assistance, training and capital in the form of credit.

3. ANERA, together with its local counterparts, the Jordan Cooperative Organization and other interested organizations and donors, should address the needs of cooperatives in the West Bank and Gaza in a coordinated and cooperative manner. The recommendations contained in the two reports cited above should be taken into consideration. It is apparent that a number of feasibility studies on production and marketing still are required and should be undertaken.

4. The assistance provided by ANERA to cooperatives and other organizations during the past nine years has been effective in building up institutions and community services and continues to benefit large numbers of people. However, a number of major and important cooperative projects which have received ANERA assistance are experiencing difficulties and require additional attention and aid of one kind or another. These include:

a. The Ramallah Cooperative poultry project--the egg, fryer and feedmill activities are functioning but it is experiencing serious financial and mangerial problems;

b. The Hebron Olive Cooperative soap factory--recent management problems reportedly have been resolved and the factory is beginning to produce soap but the operation is not yet financially viable; and

c. The Tarqumiya Olive Cooperative nursery and olive oil activities--the nursery is not producing to its capacity and has been hurt by increased competition and a drop in prices for seedlings. Also, the olive oil press is not yet in operation.

(Note: The ANERA program was not evaluated in detail by the evaluation team; only a review of the program within the context of the total West Bank/Gaza PVO program was conducted.)

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ATTACHMENT E

AMIDEAST OVERVIEW

ATTACHMENT E

WEST BANK/GAZA PVO PROGRAM EVALUATION

America-Mideast Educational and Training Services (AMIDEAST) Human Resources Development Project

OVERVIEW REPORT

A. Background.

1. AMIDEAST initiated its West Bank/Gaza Human Resources Project in 1978 with faculty development and undergraduate scholarship programs at three West Bank universities and a short-term training program, primarily for community service and development organizations. As a part of the program, AMIDEAST completed an assessment of the education sector in the West Bank and Gaza to identify major sector deficiencies. The assessment was less successful than hoped for due to a general lack of data availability.

2. The objectives of these activities is to strengthen the capabilities of indigenous post-secondary institutions and community service organizations in the West Bank and Gaza. A.I.D. provides the major portion of the funding for project activities through two grants, both of which have as their purpose "to provide support for a program of institutional development in post-secondary education and manpower training." A.I.D. funding to date totals $8,816,000 for the project. West Bank institutions are contributing over $25,000 yearly for faculty development scholarships, with additional financial assistance provided by U.S. educational and philanthropic institutions in the form of tuition waivers, teaching and research assistantships and stipends totalling in excess of $50,000 yearly.

3. The main thrust of AMIDEAST's Human Resource Development Project is the faculty development program which currently involves seven institutions on the West Bank and Gaza*, with Gaza Islamic University initial participation starting in the 1984-85 academic year. A total of 181 faculty started degree training in the U.S. since project inception. Of these, 102 are currently enrolled, 70 have completed their degrees and nine have withdrawn from the program.

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*The institutions are Arab College of Medical Professions, Bethlehem University, Birzeit University, College of Science and Technology/Abu Dis, Gaza Islamic University, Hebron Polytechnic Institute and An Najah University.

4. Obtaining Israeli clearance for candidates to depart for training is currrently cause for concern as the process is delaying some participants' departures. Several candidates have been refused permission to leave.

5. The project has provided 995 undergraduate scholarships at three universities: Bethlehem, Birzeit, and An Najah. A fourth institution will be added to the program for the 1984-85 academic year.

6. AMIDEAST plays no direct role in participant selection. Institutions participating in the programs select the candidates for the faculty development program and submit their names to AMIDEAST. AMIDEAST's Jerusalem office submits the names to the Israeli authorities for clearance and makes arrangements for their departure. AMIDEAST's headquarters office in Washington handles the placement procedure.

7. Lists of undergraduate scholarship recipients are forwarded to AMIDEAST/Jerusalem with an accounting of program expenditures. The institutions and AMIDEAST jointly determine the fields of study in which scholarship recipients can be assisted.

8. The project has provided short-term training in the U.S. for over 100 persons from community agencies, government ministries and private institutions that are working in fields relevant to West Bank and Gaza development needs. Individual programs have included observation tours, technical courses and a mix thereof.

9. AMIDEAST, in addition to the above noted continuing activities, works with individual participating institutions on discrete activities which have included: assistance to Bethlehem University to upgrade its computer facilities and conduct an agricultural project, consultation and planning assistance to assure institutionalization of long-range development planning for most institutions, assistance to develop institutional relationships with U.S. institutions, and to Birzeit, assistance to conduct a research project in environmental and occupational health.

10. AMIDEAST and A.I.D. jointly evaluated the project in 1981 finding that project objectives were on target. A second evaluation with participation by an outside consultant is planned in 1985 to provide an in-depth assessment of the project and factors influencing its implementation.

B. Issues and Concerns.

1. An AID/Washington review of the recent AMIDEAST request for additional project funding raised several questions and concerns. The faculty development program has expanded at a rapid rate. Concern was expressed that the number of faculty being trained should be consistent with realistic institutional development plans, and that the institutions have reliable financial resources to maintain the increased faculty size.

2. There is concern that the number of higher education institutions is excessive given the geographical confines of the area, resulting in unnecessary duplication of programs creating an excessive demand for faculty. Community colleges are springing up, also. An examination of the factors underlying the rationale for the increase in the number of institutions and whether or not some consolidation and specialization is feasible or desirable.

3. Unemployment, accelerated by the return of Palestinians from the Gulf states, is increasing. Manpower needs studies for the area are nonexistent. Yet, the expanded number of universities will be graduating a growing number of students. Concern was expressed that "education for education's sake" and not considering its effect on employment may prove detrimental.

4. Israeli approval requirements for program activities of other PVOs are impacting on implementation. The Israeli authorities request AMIDEAST to submit lists of all candidates selected for training in the U.S. and have disapproved several individuals for participation in the program and have caused delays in the departures of several others. The impact of this approval process on the project needs to be assessed.

(The AMIDEAST program was not evaluated by the evaluation team; only a review of the program was conducted within the context of the total West Bank/Gaza PVO program. The upcomimg evaluation will address the above concerns as well as review the overall appropriateness of the project, given the current realities in the West Bank and Gaza.)

ATTACHMENT F

SCOPE OF WORK

STATEMENT OF WORK

I. Introduction. A program of development assistance to the Administered Territories of the West Bank and Gaza was initiated by Congress in FY 1975 to express American concern for the humanitarian and development needs of the Palestinian residents there and to support progress towards peace in the region. This program is administered by the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) through grants to private and voluntary organizations (PVOs). See further, Attachment 3.

II. Purpose. The purpose of this procurement is to obtain the services required to evaluate the overall progress and impact of the AID-financed programs of three PVOs in West Bank and Gaza -- namely, Catholic Relief Services, Holy Land Christian Mission, and Community Development Foundation -- and to conduct a general assessment of the impact of A.I.D.'s total support in the West Bank and Gaza since the inception of the development assistance program.

III. Evaluation Team Composition. The team will be composed of five persons--three to be provided by the contractor and two by AID/NE/ TECH. The three contracted personnel will include a team leader and two Palestinians to be recruited from the West Bank or Gaza. The AID/NE personnel will include the West Bank/Gaza program backstop officer (Bernard J. Salvo), who also will serve as the facilitator/liaison person for the team, and an officer responsible for human resources and education programs.

A. The team leader should have the following qualifications:

-U.S. citizen
-fluent in both English and Arabic
-capability and experience in conducting project evaluations
-a good, non-political, non-biased understanding of the situation in the West Bank, Gaza and Israel
-ability to lead the team and develop a good, useful report.
An understanding of AID and PVO programs is desirable.

B. The two Palestinian team members, who will be recruited in the West Bank or Gaza, should have the following qualifications:

- fluent in Arabic and English
- capability and experience in participating in project evaluations
- some expertise in the areas of water, health/sanitation, agriculture, education, social welfare and/or general rural development.

An understanding of AID and PVO programs is desireable.

C. The two AID officers will include a general development officer with extensive experience in rural development and an education officer with experience in formal and non-formal education-related activities from pre-school to university.

IV. Evaluation Schedule. The evaluation is for a six-week period to begin on or about July 30, 1984, with the following illustrative schedule:

- Days 1-3: Review of materials in AID/W and meetings with appropriate personnel as arranged by NE/TECH/SARD
- Days 4-5: Travel to Westport, Conn. and New York City to meet with CDF and CRS headquarters staffs
- Days 6-7: Travel Status to Israel
- Days 8-11: Consultations with Embassy, Consulate and PVO staffs in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem
- Days 12-30: Inspection of projects in field
- Days 31-33: Meetings in Jerusalem and complete first draft of report
- Days 34-35: Travel status
- Days 36-40: AID/W--Debriefing and complete final report

V. Evaluation Reports. There will be four separate reports--CRS, CDF, HLCM and an overall assessment of program. The organization and content of the report is outlined in the Evaluation Scope of Work which is attached. The first draft report is to be completed before the team leaves Jerusalem and the final report is to be completed the week following the return of the team to AID/W. The contractor is responsible for obtaining clerical assistance relating to all typing requirements of the team and for the typing and printing of the report. Ten copies will be submitted to AID/NE/TECH/SARD within two weeks of completion of the final report.

VI. Logistical Support. The contractor is responsible for providing clerical, transportation and other related support for the team while it is in the West Bank and Gaza. Funds are being provided for this purpose.

VII. Evaluation Scope of Work.

A. PURPOSES AND TIMING

The purposes of this evaluation of the West Bank/Gaza PVO Program are as follows:

1. To evaluate overall progress and the impact of Catholic Relief Services' Rural Development I and II Programs implemented since 1975;

2. To evaluate overall progress and the impact of Holy Land Christian Mission's Preschool Education Program since its inception in 1979;

3. To evaluate overall progress and the impact of Community Development Foundation's Rural Community Development II Program since the previous AID/NE evaluation conducted in 1980; and

4. To summarize general conclusions, trends, cross-cutting issues and broad impact of the AID support in the West Bank and Gaza since 1975. In addition to the three PVOs being evaluated, elements of the programs of ANERA and AMIDEAST also will be reviewed for this purpose.

The evaluations of the three PVOs listed above were programmed in individual grant agreements and projected for implementation in the NE Bureau evaluation plan in the Spring of 1984. The general assessment of the total program, never conducted previously, is required for planning purposes.

B. QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED

The questions to be addressed are concerned with administration -- that is, the program policies and strategy of the grantee PVOs, their administrative structures and operational policies and procedures, and their personnel and staff structures; program -- that is, the sectors and types of activities in which the PVOs are engaged and the nature of their processes of project design, implementation, and evaluation; and impact -- that is, the immediate results and effects, the longer-term potential consequences, and the policy relevance of the AID-financed PVO programs and activities in West Bank and Gaza. Each of these

categories is outlined in more detail below. A considerable portion of the inquiry can be completed in the USA, not only in AID/W but also at the headquarters of the PVOs. Refinement of those findings and further inquiry would be made during the evaluation team's field visits.

1. Administration

   a. Organizational and administrative structure
      1. headquarters and field mission structures
         (a) relationships and roles
      2. funding sources
      3. allocation procedures and practices
         (a) administrative and staff support
         (b) project costs
         (c) other costs

   b. Personnel and staff structure
      1. number and types of personnel
      2. how staff is organized
      3. competency and relevance of personnel

   c. Program policies and strategy
      1. overall grantee (PVO) policies
      2. policies specific to West Bank/Gaza programming
      3. strategy for carrying out policies
      4. appropriateness and relevance to West Bank/Gaza context
      5. appropriateness and relevance to development assistance programs
      6. appropriateness and relevance to AID and USG goals and programs

   d. Operational policies and procedures
      1. criteria for project selection
      2. relationships with local community, governmental, and other organizations
      3. efficiency of project identification and implementation
         (1) management, supervision, and follow-through
      4. effectiveness of program operations
         (1) results related to planned objectives

2. Program

   a. Sectors of activities
      1. agriculture

2. health and sanitation
3. education
4. electrification
5. roads
6. other

b. Types of project activities
1. infrastructure development
   (a) roads
   (b) electrification
   (c) water supply
   (5) other
2. development of social service facilities and services (schools, clinics, etc.)
   (a) building construction
   (b) supply of equipment and other materials
   (c) program and curriculum planning and development
   (d) on-the-job, in-service, and other training
   (e) development of training, teaching, and other materials
   (f) other
3. institutional development
   (a) staff development
   (b) program planning and development
   (c) other

c. Project design and resources
1. design of projects
2. local contributions
3. PVO contributions
4. AID contributions
5. other contributions

d. Project implementation
1. staff needs and availability
2. institutional requirements and availability
3. other resource requirements and availability
4. technical assistance needs and TA resource availability
5. nature and kinds of local participation
6. completion time
7. nature and kinds of implementation problems and how addressed

e. Project evaluation
1. projects completed, continuing, "on hold," abandoned
2. purposes achieved
3. unintended consequences
4. lessons learned

3. Impact

a. Immediate results/effects
   1. on target population/institution(s)
   2. on cooperating institutions
   3. on others locally
   4. on grantee PVO in terms of
      (a) meeting basic human and other needs
      (b) increasing capacity to identify, plan, design, implement, and evaluate projects
      (c) improving working relationships between target communities and governmental and other agencies
      (d) using appropriately and effectively self-help, other local resources, and external assistance
   5. on project design and redesign

b. Longer-term potential consequences
   1. local self-help capability
   2. working relationships
   3. governmental responses and capacity and resource allocations
   4. external assistance: kinds, levels, implementation modes
   5. project selection and design

c. Policy relevance
   1. to overall USG goals
   2. to AID program priorities
   3. to use of PVOs in development assistance programs

C. METHODOLOGY

The evaluation team will collect information by reviewing documents, conducting interviews and making field observations. The evaluation will take about six weeks from the assembling of the team to completion of the final report.

1. Documentation Review

a. General descriptions of the program contained in CPs, ABSs and briefing papers
b. Project proposals of the PVOs and related grant agreements, narrative and financial reports, technical papers and other pertinent documentation
c. Evaluation reports of earlier evaluations
d. Correspondence and other relevant materials as identified by NE/TECH/SARD
e. Guidelines used in the design, implementation and evaluation of projects/subprojects

2. Interviews

a. NE Bureau staff: TECH/SARD, TECH/HPN, EUR, DP, PD
b. STATE/NEA/IAI
c. Randomly selected staff of PVO headquarters staff
d. American Embassy and Consulate General Officers
e. PVO field staffs
f. Target beneficiaries
g. Others as identified by AID or PVOs

3. Site Visits

a. Randomly selected subprojects in several districts of the West Bank and in Gaza.

D. REPORT FORMAT

1. Project Identification Data Sheets
2. Executive Summary (two or three single-spaced pages)
3. Major Conclusions, Recommendations and Lessons Learned (not to exceed eight single-spaced pages)
4. General Background and Status of the Program
5. Process for Implementing the Program
6. Impact of Subprojects on Target Beneficiaries
7. Impact of Program on PVO Direction and Capacity
8. Impact of Program of USG goals and AID program priorities
9. Lessons Learned
10. Annexes
    (a) Summary Reports on Individual PVOs (format to be provided by NE/TECH/SARD)
    (b) Written Reactions of PVOs
    (c) Methodology (including Scope of Work).

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