

*Not an  
allocation*

493-0315

First Annual DDMP Assessment Report

November, 1982

<u>Contents:</u>	<u>Page</u>
I. Introduction	1
II. Capacity Building vs. Tambol Projects as Project Output	2
III. REGP/Loan Allocation Process	5
IV. Tambol Project Development	8
V. Project Implementation Roles and Responsibilities	11
VI. Other Implementation Issues	16
Annexes	18

## I. Introduction

This first annual assessment of DDMP is the result of a joint review by the REGP Secretariat and USAID of overall project performance as required by the Loan Agreement between the two governments. The discussion and conclusions are based on data collected between July and October, 1982. Data comes from field trip reports prepared by REGP, ARD and USAID staff as well as a systematic semi-structured interview process carried out by the technical assistance team (TAT), which covered the ten districts but focused on key project implementors and beneficiaries in five of those districts. (See Annex 6.)

Performance documented in this assessment must be viewed from a perspective which recognizes the following basic constraints to implementation during the first year of the project:

- 1) following the national REGP schedule, tambol plans from which the tambol projects were selected were developed during a period immediately following the signing of loan and grant agreements and before any technical assistance was brought to bear on the process;
- 2) the new system of technical support from district based ARD technicians was introduced in most cases only after basic tambol project planning had been completed;
- 3) tambol project implementation utilizing loan funds was initiated within five months of loan signing and prior to the deployment of contract technical assistance personnel;
- 4) the first year was planned as primarily a mobilization and learning period, with the recognition that only limited qualitative improvements could be attributed to the project.

## II. Capacity Building vs. Tambol Projects as Project Output

This assessment clearly identified the key issue at this time as being one of maintaining focus on basic project purpose and the institutional development objectives associated with it. While the basic purpose of DDMP is to set in motion a long term learning process that will constitute a force to support capacity building for self-sustained development, there are natural pressures to alter the focus so as to concentrate on tambol projects in a given geographical area. This tendency has been encouraged during the first year by late mobilization of the technical assistance team and by the fact that the first project inputs dealt almost exclusively with tambol project implementation in FY 1982.

This built-in tension results on the one hand, from pressure by local officials and beneficiaries in the ten-district "learning laboratory" area to build local projects, while on the other hand project purpose demands a systemic, process-oriented approach in which the relative quality of the tambol projects is indicative of systemic weaknesses or strengths. If project personnel succumb to the relatively easier and more clearly definable path of focusing on the tambol projects, DDMP has potential for becoming a small area development project with limited applicability and negligible impact on rural development in Thailand.

ACTIONS: To avoid this major failure, the assessment team recommends the following steps:

- an immediate and mutual effort by REGP, associated government departments, the TAT and USAID to deepen understanding of project purpose and refine the strategy for achieving it;

- completion of the FY '83 Workplan at the earliest possible date with distribution to all parties concerned, including Changwat and Amphoe officials in the DDMP "learning lab" area;
- mobilization of the national-level project working group as a dynamic force to review and monitor project progress and make recommendations based on learning from experience in the DDMP area; at a minimum this group should include senior representatives of the Department of Local Administration, Community Development Department, Office of Accelerated Rural Development, and designated resource institutions with coordination by the REGP secretariat;
- priority attention be given to selection and utilization of resource institutions which will provide the long-term support to the process of building capacity for self-sustaining local development; and
- further refinement of the framework within which the TAT operates as the short-term stimulus of the learning process; in addition to clarification of technical assistance outputs, key actions should include:
  - review of the scope of work for process documentors to assure that their reports serve as a dynamic, primary source of feedback to REGP and associated departments on ways to more effectively catalyze the movement toward self-sustained local development;
  - review operational relationship of field advisors to process documentors as basis for further refinement of roles and functions; and

- review role of Bangkok-based engineering advisor in relation to district engineers to achieve direct and continuous advisory relationship.

These steps are required at this time to assure that implementation is focused in such a way that the following system improvement questions can be answered positively at the end of the project:

- Have RTG policies and funding levels reflected continuing support, in increasingly effective ways, for a process that places decision making for development in the hands of local institutions?
- Has the experience in the ten-district area of intense focus by the project effected national policy in positive ways consistent with greater autonomy for local authorities?
- Are tambols in the ten-district area utilizing a multi-year tambol improvement program that results in technically and socially sound sub-projects, for which appropriate levels of technical support and assistance are provided by the district and for which funded maintenance arrangements are operational; and is such a process broadly applicable in other areas?

### III. REGP/Loan Allocation Process

Section 5.2 (a) of the Grant Agreement and Section 6.2 (c) of the Loan Agreement stipulate that the Borrower/Guarantee agrees to maintain a decentralized program for allocation of funds at a level not less than the amount allocated to Project districts in FY 1981. This guarantee of ongoing minimal Government Financial support to the project area will be critical to the development of a multi-year Tambon planning process.

The DDMP assessment reveals that while the fiscal year 1982 RTG contribution for the aggregate project area slightly exceeds that of the fiscal year 1981, there are five districts for which the allocations are less. This resulted from application of a revised allocation formula which focused more acutely on areas of greater poverty and which USAID concurred in. In FY 1982 the 74.3 million baht RTG investment in districts consisted of 44 million Baht channelled through the REGP and an additional 30 million Baht channelled through the Poverty Area Program and an MP Fund, both of which were new programs in FY 82. (See Annex 1). While increases in budget levels for the Poverty Area Program nationally have been programmed for FY 1983 and future years, it will be a virtual impossibility to measure investment by that program on a district by district basis. This is due to changes in construction of the budget whereby financial planning and program implementation information are based on sub-programs rather than administrative/geographical units.

Subsequent to being informed of the FY 1982 allocation levels, USAID forwarded PIL No. 4 dated February 11, 1982 to Secretary-General to the Prime Minister in which it stated that "while accepting an aggregate figure for this year, USAID requests your confirmation that in future years the RTG will ensure that the aggregate resource flow from decentralized programs to the Project area will continue to reach the FY 1981 level and that REGP allocations, on a district by district basis, are the equivalent or greater than those for this year". In his reply the Secretary General to the Prime Minister confirmed that the basis of future fiscal planning would be as laid out in PIL No. 4.

The disbursement of 25.3 million Baht of loan funds for FY 82 DDMP implementation was effected in two separate tranches. The disbursement of the loan funds was undertaken generally in agreement with REGP financial regulations and procedures (see Annex 2). It should be noted that disbursement of loan funds for FY 82 were made much later than normal REGP allocation disbursements (see Annex 3). Because of delays in initiating project implementation and due to uncertainty in the field regarding disbursement, loan funds were not co-mingled with the regular REGP allocation and were explicitly identified as "USAID funds" at the district level, leading to the following special conditions:

1. Selection of DDMP projects from the tambol plans tended to be made hastily and focused on activities that could be completed within the dry season. As a result, selected projects were mostly limited to roads, water tanks and wells. (See Annex 4).

2. REGP regulations governing tambol project construction were not strictly observed for the loan financed projects in some districts where they were seen as having special characteristics. As a result, there were a few cases in which local enunciated needs were not the basis of project selection. For example, in ~~one~~ district, a well was drilled behind the residence of the Nai Amphoe; in another, a water tank was built near the Amphoe Office.

3. Because the loan funds were separately disbursed to the district level, most tambol projects were known as "USAID projects".

4. Given the reduced time for implementation, technical services of the newly deployed ARD technicians were not used to full advantage. However the assessment reveals that local officials judged the tambol projects to be more technically sound than those of the regular REGP in two changwats, whereas in two changwats they were judged to have the same technical quality and in one to have less.

5. The delays in loan fund disbursement caused an additional administrative workload for officials at all levels.

6. Delays in delivery of the DDMP funds at the district level caused delays in payment of wages to villagers who had already completed construction tasks.

With regard to the progression of drawdowns of the FY 82 funds for tambol project construction, aggregate allocations for the five DDMP changwats indicate that about 5% of total funds were disbursed as of February 20, 33% as of April 20, and 56% as of May 20. (See Annex 5)

ACTIONS: The assessment team has, therefore, concluded:

1. That FY 83 loan fund disbursement for the DDMP districts should be co-mingled with regular REGP funds as provided for in project design. These funds should be provided, as in FY 82, in two separate tranches, with 50% of total funds available so as to allow REGP to consolidate them with regular funds to make a common disbursement to the changwats before January 1, 1983 and the remaining 50% available April 1, 1983 or earlier if a demonstrated need exists. As in FY 1982, standard REGP provincial reports will be the basis for determining expenditures. The funding level for FY 83 loan funds will be established at \$1.4 million.

2. That attainment by the REGP of allocations for FY 83 equivalent to or greater than those of FY 82 in the Project area be the basis for making the determination on adequacy of funding levels for tambol projects (USAID and REGP will also monitor the level of other decentralized program funds in order to document a satisfactory flow of RTG resources to the target districts). (See Annex 1).

#### IV. Tambol Project Development

While successful tambol project construction is not the primary objective of DDMP, it will absorb the largest share of project funds and is generally the primary concern of local beneficiary groups. DDMP-financed tambol projects should not be developed outside normal REGP channels, for the reasons already noted in section III of this assessment. Nevertheless, in FY 82 those tambol projects financed by the loan were clearly identified at the amphoe level, and, for the purposes of our review, will be the focus of this section.

A total of 322 tambol-level projects were built, essentially between March and July, 1982 with the \$1.1 million of FY 82 loan funds (see Annex 4 for list of these projects by Amphoe). The high degree of variation within amphoe, both in number and type of projects undertaken, was reflective of local official perceptions of how the "supplemental USAID funds" should be spent. Attitudes ranged from development of a few, large projects in the same sector (Chonnobot), to numerous, small projects in either different (Annat Chareon), or the same sector (Kosum Pisai, Chiang Yuen). In the last case (Maha Sarakham Province), the construction of some 160 household water tanks and shallow wells was clearly influenced by the development policy of the Governor. The tambol projects were all drawn from the Tambol Plan, but did not always reflect highest priorities within the Plan. As noted previously, this is a strong argument for better integration of DDMP funds into the national system - thus avoiding any misinterpretation that they are "special funds" outside the normal REGP program.

On the somewhat broader topic of actual Tambol Plan project selection, it is worth noting that considerable influence may be exerted by select special interest groups or individuals during the selection process. The data is, however, inconclusive. The current assessment survey indicated fairly high overall participation of Tambol Council members and local villagers, as well as low levels of input from the CD

worker and other officials. At a recent seminar on an evaluation of the nation-wide REGP program\*, however, it was felt that selection was generally undertaken exclusively by the Tambol Council, with little input from either villagers or officials. And, finally, in a special recent study by a Khon kaen University team led by Dr. Keawta Kanawan\*\*, selection was viewed as heavily dominated by the CD officials.

The response pattern registered by the assessment survey on the topic of tambol project construction quality was broadly indicative of other previous evaluations at the national level. Because REGP projects tend to have a high unskilled labor content and have generally in the past not benefited from qualified technical design or supervision, construction quality has often been low and results in serious maintenance problems over the years which follow. Some marginal improvement in construction quality was noted during this field assessment, but this may have been due as much to the greater use of equipment (compacting, excavating, leveling) by local authorities\*\*\* as the presence of the ARD technician. The impact of REGP issued technical manuals was very spotty, partly due to uneven distribution. In those cases where use of the manuals was demonstrable, it was usually due to the influence of the assigned ARD technician or a local person with some technical training.

---

\* Seminar on Evaluation of the 1980-81 REGP program, July 9-10, 1982, at Si Nakharin Dam, Kanchanaburi.

\*\* Dr. Keawta Kanawan, et. al., "A Follow-up Study on tambol Planning Process and Its Implementation in Connection to the Rural Employment Generation Program", January, 1982. (Translation from the Thai)

\*\*\* Globally, the ratio of labor to material/equipment costs was approximately 30:70 for FY 82 DDMP sup-projects.

## ACTIONS:

- TAT field personnel, particularly the process documentors should carefully document participation levels by individuals and groups in council meetings to determine patterns in selection decisions, as a basis for recommending areas for focus of behavioral/organizational change programs.
- Based on the 1982 experience, new regulations for the 1983 program allow greater use of machinery when needed. Tambol Council decisions on how they make use of machinery should be monitored and documented to determine impact on the labor intensive concept of the program.
- To instill more effective use of technical manuals and to determine required revisions in those manuals should be a priority activity during FY 1983 for the ARD technicians and the engineering advisor.
- It is recommended that every effort be made by the TAT Engineer and ARD staff to improve site selection techniques, improve local construction methods (especially labor-intensive) and develop viable proposals for long-term maintenance. Indeed, the development of funded maintenance arrangements by year three of the project is provided for in project agreements and must be a major concern of TAT and other project implementors in the coming year.

## V. Project Implementation Roles and Responsibilities

A review of roles played by key institutional actors involved in DDMP was undertaken with a recognition that each "actor" must develop new capabilities to participate in the learning process represented by this project. The major issue at this point deals with the need for greater integration of the various efforts under way. The natural focal point for such integration is the REGP secretariat. Beginning with the Secretariat, major observations on role of project actors and suggested adjustments are detailed below.

REGP Secretariat: With its limited professional staff the Secretariat has proposed and this report strongly endorses the need for a working group to be composed of senior level officers of key development departments who would serve on a part-time basis. They would, as a team, play a project monitoring role and as individuals, assume the vital linkage role with their respective departments in furtherance of the project's capacity building and management improvement initiatives. Of equal importance is the early appointment of a deputy to the Director of REGP Operations who would focus particularly on the capacity building objectives of REGP as supported by the DDMP Project. This person could simultaneously serve as coordinator for the working group. The REGP Secretariat believes that in order to successfully recruit an appropriate deputy to Director of Operations as well as to assure an adequate level of effort by members of the working group, it will be necessary to provide a monthly honorarium for these individuals.

### Technical Assistance Team (TAT):

The TAT has only been mobilized for three months and is still working out role and relationship to other institutional actors. The primary purpose of TAT is to increase the understanding of requirements for self-sustained local development. To achieve this it is charged with recommending improved processes based on field experience. In their

enthusiasm to demonstrate work output, there has been a tendency in the early months of TAT mobilization for the TAT field personnel to become operational arms of REGP in their respective areas rather than the facilitators of learning for policy and operational improvements. This tendency must be avoided if the TAT are not to become so emersed in local operations that they are unable to fulfill their major role. Two issues have emerged in regard to Bangkok-based TAT personnel. The first deals with as yet inadequate clarity on the functional relationship between the Bangkok and field-based personnel as well as appropriate role for TAT with key development agencies associated with DDMP. These role relationships must be quickly resolved. The second issue deals with questions which have arisen in regard to compliance by TAT personnel with the full-time provisions of the contracts. Continued involvement by the TAT Coordinator in other activities which carry compensation is considered a particularly serious matter. DTEC is taking steps at this time to resolve this issue. Early resolution is critical to project implementation.

USAID: With the limited professional staff in REGP secretariat and the late mobilization of the TAT, USAID staff have, in the first year, played a more direct role in project implementation than is advisable for the future. As planned system adjustments are put in place, the role of USAID staff should become characterized more as one concerned with monitoring and the facilitating of AID inputs to the Project.

Resource Institutions: The large number of competing priorities has resulted in a situation in which arrangements have not been completed for REGP to formalize long-term collaborative agreements with key resource institutes. The assessment team suggests that this is now a matter of urgent priority. The resource institutions are envisaged as being the vehicle for carrying the long term capacity building effort beyond the limited project mode. The initial three areas identified for focus by resource institutions include social sciences, management systems and technical services.

The Office of Accelerated Rural Development (ARD): DDMP design gives ARD special responsibilities to provide critical technical support to the project. ARD has responded in a very positive way, taking creative initiatives to fill the role effectively. ARD has formed a special working group on DDMP, composed of the chiefs of all key technical divisions (Survey Designs, Planning/Projects, Personnel, Accounts, Engineer/Technical Services), and assigned the working group secretary, Khun Vichit Thongchareon (Head, Water Resources Sub-Division) to coordinate ARD activities with the Project. The prime objective of the Working Group is to monitor, support and resolve problems of their technicians in the ten target districts. ARD interest in DDMP is probably high because it fits well with their current long-term objective of decentralizing their technical support programs to the amphoe level nationwide. DDMP is seen as their "learning laboratory", as well.

The Loan/Grant Agreements both contain a covenant requiring the RTG, by October 15, 1981, to "... have in place at least one technician/engineer at each of the districts participating in the Projects". Assignment decisions were made in early October, and some technicians were in place by the target date. These actions were followed by the official order by which the ten technicians were assigned to the target amphoe on November 23, 1981. All technicians had arrived at post by early January, 1982. This delay in rendering the covenant operational was reasonable, given other parallel DDMP implementation delays and the early confusion on roles as well as logistic support problems which are normally associated with new organizational arrangements.

This assessment reveals several positive aspects of ARD participation to date, notably: a) although not engineers, most amphoe-level staff are senior, experienced technicians and probably sufficiently qualified for the normal responsibilities assigned to them; b) generally, technicians are productively used by the amphoe for a wide range of activities

(costing, design, supervision) and for both REGP and non-REGP tasks; c) generally, technicians are favorably received by local officials and villagers, and are themselves pleased with and challenged by their new jobs.

Numerous start-up problems have been, or are in the process of being resolved, including vehicle support, per diem allocation and local office space/equipment support. The most important current issue is probably that of continuing to refine the most appropriate role for technicians, both in terms of their relationship to Amphoe/Changwat officials (esp. Nai Amphoe and ARD leadership) as well as in terms of the types of activities (costing, design, supervision, training, etc.) which should receive priority attention. The Secretary General of ARD has given these issues his personal attention and recently made a special trip to the Northeast for a one-day meeting with the ten technicians.

Actions should be continued to further delineate and promote creative uses of ARD technicians at Amphoe and Tambol. Current potential themes include:

- promotion of higher quality, but reasonable cost construction techniques (e.g., improved compaction, better soils analysis);
- introduction of simple cost/benefit or screening techniques to improve site selection and design appropriateness;
- better integration of construction into broader local development concerns (e.g., water management, crop production, environmental effects, etc.);
- introduction of locally-based, adapted construction/maintenance techniques; and

increased role with tambol technicians whereby these local people are provided training and guidance.

As the ARD technician's role evolves with the Project, careful attention should be given to providing them with appropriate training by the TAT, ARD\* and other support institutions to assure that their qualifications fit with the needs of the amphoe level job. A practical, field-oriented program would include such topics as simple construction/maintenance manuals, special agriculture/rural development training, and utilization of simple technical and socio-economic tools and methods. With active ARD participation such a training program could have nation-wide implications if ARD decentralization proposals become effective over the next few years.

---

\* ARD training activities are currently coordinated by the Technical Services Division

## VI. Other Implementation Issues

Vehicles: Twenty motorcycles were purchased with Grant funds and assigned to ARD technicians and Amphoe CD officers of the DDMP districts in late July, 1982. A delay in delivery of these motorcycles was a contributing factor to problems identified in section V of this report. The current DDMP assessment reveals the lack of a systematic repair/maintenance plan for these vehicles. To prevent problems in future years, districts should be instructed to immediately formulate and implement procedures for maintenance and use of these motorcycles, consistent with existing government regulations.

With regard to five jeeps (AMC CJ-8), procurement was started almost three months later than called for in the implementation schedule. The delay in the procurement was caused by a review of options as to what type of vehicle and engine should be purchased. The result was creation of a temporary problem of logistical support to the field TAT members. The delay in arrival of the jeeps also necessitated transportation expenditures of approximately Baht 100,000 which were borne for the period of September to early December 1982.

### TAT Office Space:

TAT Bangkok-based staff is now located in one corner of the REGP Secretariat building at Government House. While the planned and approved office space for the TAT was sufficient, the effectiveness of TAT personnel was reduced during the mobilization period by problems associated with the continued presence of the Water Resources Committee, the previously authorized occupants of the space. This problem was accentuated by the fact that the TAT coordinator continued to serve as secretary to the Water Resources Committee and expressed reluctance to move staff of the Committee. These problems have been resolved in large part, but final steps must be taken to divorce operations of the Committee staff and the TAT staff and provide the TAT with the full space planned for it by the REGP

Secretariat. Without such action there is inadequate space for creation of the operations room for the project. Also, it is necessary to have space for the field TAT members when they are on TDY and/or TAT meetings when held in Bangkok.

Contracting with TAT: The central reason for delays in Project Implementation from the schedule initially plotted in the Project Paper was clearly the contract negotiations with the TAT. The PP foresaw contract signature by December 15, 1981, the RFTP envisaged March, 1982, and the contract was actually signed on August 9, 1982. All proposals were received in DTEC by January 25, 1982, but the DAI/PDA/A&R group was not formally selected until April 23, 1982 due to difficulties in confirming the decision of the RTG selection committee. Another four months were then required to complete negotiations, due mainly to legal issues surrounding joint venture status and tax issues as well as appropriate qualification and salary levels of contract staff. Despite the delays, proceedings were found to have been conducted in careful compliance with USAID and RTG guidelines.

## ANNEX 1

(Cost in Baht)


FY 81 REGP Funds and FY 82 RTG Funds in the Project Districts

Districts	FY 81 REGP Allocation	FY 82 RTG Funds		
		<u>2</u> REGP	Other <u>3/</u> Projects	Total
Annat Chareon	10,752,520	9,385,000	2,084,420	11,469,420
Hua Ta Pan	4,129,000	3,640,000	3,186,128	6,826,128
Uthum Porn Pisai	17,597,000	8,222,300	2,757,312	10,979,612
Huey Tap Than	4,389,000	2,037,500	856,451	2,893,951
Chiang Yuen	6,367,390	4,251,000	1,431,660	5,682,660
Kosum Pisai	12,532,260	5,271,400	2,321,408	7,592,808
Mancha Kiri	7,795,555	4,082,890	2,806,025	6,888,915
Chonnabot	4,504,000	2,188,278	7,038,527	9,226,805
Maha Chanachai	4,575,342	4,665,500	1,595,732	5,261,232
Kor Wang	1,497,827	1,601,000	5,878,115	7,479,115
	74,139,894 <sup>1/</sup>	44,344,868	29,955,778	74,300,646

NOTE: 1/ Base for aggregate RTG funds for the Project districts.2/ Base for FY 83 REGP allocations.3/ Poverty Area Program and MP funds which flow to the Project districts.

Annex 2

REGP Budget Allocation Process



Annex 3

USAID Loan Fund Flow in FY 1982

Allocations	Requested by REGP	Released by USAID	Released by Controller-General 2/	Received by Changwat 1/
\$549,760 (first tranche of loan)	Feb. 11, 82	Feb. 24, 82	May 21, 82	One week after
\$550,239 (Second tranche of loan)	June 23, 82	July 9, 82	Aug. 4, 82	One week after
REGP Allocation	-	-	Dec. 25, 81	One week after

NOTE: 1/ Date of allocation arrival at Changwat is estimated.

2/ REGP Secretariat releases allocations thru Controller-General.

Annex 4


Type of Sub-project Funded by DDMP Loan

District	Type	No. of Sub-projects
Chonnabot	Weir	5
	Embankment	1
Mancha Kiri	Weir	2
	Spillway	10
Kosum Pisai	Water Tank	74
	Weir	1
	Drilled Well	1
Chiang Yuen	Water Tank	51
	Shallow Well	33
Kor Wang	Shallow Well	37
	Road Improvement	7
Maha Chanachai	Shallow Well	5
	Road Improvement	6
	Tambon Center Const.	2
	Weir	1
Amnat Charoen	Weir, Well, Water Tank	9
	Road, Bridge, Tambon Center	36
Hua Tapan	Road Improvement	7
	Well	5
Uthumporn Pisai	Road Improvement	18
	Tambon Center	3
Huey Tap Than	Road Improvement	5
	Water Tank	2
Total		322

Annex 5

(In Million Baht)

REGP Allocation/Expenditure: FY 1982 <sup>1/</sup>



- NOTE: <sup>1/</sup> Expenditures are defined as the point in time when REGP funds are released by the Changwat Treasury to Amphoe for actual payment of services completed.
- <sup>2/</sup> Aggregate allocation for 5 DDMP changwats.
- <sup>3/</sup> Expenditures for March are not available.
- <sup>4/</sup> Covers expenditures from Feb 20 - Apr. 20

Annex 6  
Survey Respondants

Questionnaire	Ubon	Si Sa Ket	Yasothon	Maha Sarakham	Khon Kaen
<u>Changwat:</u> Deputy Governor	-	1	-	-	-
Chief of Changwat Office	1	1	1	1	-
Changwat Finance Officer	1	1	1	1	1
Sameintra	1	1	1	1	1
Total	3	4	3	3	2
<u>Amphoe:</u> Nai Amphoe	1	1	1	-	1
Deputy Nai Amphoe	-	1	-	1	-
Amphoe CD Officer	1	1	1	1	1
ARD Technician	-	1	1	1	1
Total	2	4	3	3	3
<u>Tambol:</u> Kamnan	6	5	10	9	5
Secretary of Tambol Council	4	2	2	2	5
Other member of Tambol Council	6	3	-	-	2
Chang Tambol (Tambol Technician)	5	3	-	1	-
Total	21	13	12	12	12
<u>Village:</u> Headman	10	12	12	12	10
Villager	45	38	36	37	26
Total	55	50	48	49	36