

PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY (PES) - PART I

Report Control
Symbol U-447

1. PROJECT TITLE EXPANSION OF FAMILY PLANNING SERVICE (CONTRACEPTIVE SOCIAL MARKETING COMPONENT)			2. PROJECT NUMBER 520-0288	3. MISSION/AID/W OFFICE OPHP
5. KEY PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DATES			4. EVALUATION NUMBER (Enter the number maintained by the reporting unit e.g., Country or AID/W Administrative Code, Fiscal Year, Serial No. beginning with No. 1 each FY) <u>85-01</u>	
A. First PRO-AG or Equipment FY <u>82</u>	B. Final Obligation Expected FY <u>86</u>	C. Final Input Delivery FY <u>86</u>	<input type="checkbox"/> REGULAR EVALUATION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SPECIAL EVALUATION	
6. ESTIMATED PROJECT FUNDING			7. PERIOD COVERED BY EVALUATION	
A. Total \$ <u>2,488</u>			From (month/yr.) <u>Aug. 31, 1982</u>	
B. U.S. \$ <u>2,488</u>			To (month/yr.) <u>Sep. 30, 1984</u>	
			Date of Evaluation Review <u>Dec. 19, 1984</u>	

B. ACTION DECISIONS APPROVED BY MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE DIRECTOR

A. List decisions and/or unresolved issues; cite those items needing further study. (NOTE: Mission decisions which anticipate AID/W or regional office action should specify type of document, e.g., airgram, SPAR, PIO, which will present detailed request.)	B. NAME OF OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION	C. DATE ACTION TO BE COMPLETED
Postpone detailed evaluation of CSM sub-project activities until 18 months after project launch.	BELCHER	01/05/85

9. INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS TO BE REVISED PER ABOVE DECISIONS

- | | | |
|---|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Project Paper | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Implementation Plan e.g., CPI Network | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Financial Plan | <input type="checkbox"/> PIO/T | _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Logical Framework | <input type="checkbox"/> PIO/C | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____ |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Project Agreement | <input type="checkbox"/> PIO/P | _____ |

10. ALTERNATIVE DECISIONS ON FUTURE OF PROJECT

- A. Continue Project Without Change
- B. Change Project Design and/or Change Implementation Plan
- C. Discontinue Project

11. PROJECT OFFICER AND HOST COUNTRY OR OTHER RANKING PARTICIPANTS AS APPROPRIATE (Names and Titles)

Clifford Belcher, Pop. Advisor
Manuel DeLucca, Resident Advisor
Jorge M. Ortega, Project Manager

12. Mission/AID/W Office Director Approval

Signature _____

Typed Name Charles E. Costello, Director

Date 1/14/85

13. Summary

In terms of the Implementation Schedule contained in the Project Paper this component of Project 520-0288 is badly behind schedule. Slippage occurred as a result of inordinate delays in the contracting process for essential inputs that could not have been reasonably anticipated by the Mission in the provision of essential inputs. Severe Congressional restrictions placed on assistance to Guatemala in FY 1984 and the resulting uncertainties about future funding availabilities was a contributing factor. These problems have now been surmounted and project implementation is proceeding (on a revised schedule) satisfactorily. There are no indications that any basic redesign of the project is called for at this time.

14. Evaluation Methodology

The Project Authorization letter establishes as a Condition Precedent the basis for this evaluation in paragraph 3, sub heading (b-2) which reads as follows:

"Prior to September 30, 1984 or prior to the obligation of A.I.D. funds for CRS S.A.* in excess of \$1,000,000 (whichever occurs first), A.I.D. will undertake a detailed evaluation of CRS S.A. activities, including a financial analysis, to determine whether further financial assistance is required for that organization. To the extent CRS S.A. activities are found to be financially self-sufficient, A.I.D. funding shall be reduced accordingly."

This C.P. assumed no delays in project implementation and that a sales launch would take place in July 1983 as originally scheduled. Had this been the case, the CSM company (IPROFA) would have been in full operation, selling products and recording income and profits. The evaluation would have served as a basis for estimating the need and level of further support by A.I.D. to the project. With the implementation delays encountered, however, product launch will not now take place until March 1985, as presently estimated. Under these circumstances, and given the fact that an evaluation of the kind and for the reasons envisaged by the C.P. would have literally nothing to go on, the Mission has decided that the most useful evaluation methodology would be an internal assessment utilizing the PES format in order to comply with the C.P. in question.

* Hereafter referred to as the CSM - Contraceptive Social Marketing project, or IPROFA.

15. External Factors

The PP budget calls for funding for operations over the LOP of \$1,908,000 for this component of Project 520-0288. The Cooperative Agreement establishing the CSM project was signed on August 31, 1982 and provided thereunder \$518,000 for operations. In the following month an additional \$18,000 was provided for the same purpose. (On February 28, 1983 an additional \$315,000, specifically earmarked for a contract to provide technical services to the CSM project, were obligated under Amendment No. 2 to the agreement and could not have been used for IPROFA operation.) No further funding for IPROFA operations has been made available since September 1982. The Congress placed restrictions on funding the entire Development Program in Guatemala for FY 1984 that prohibited adding monies to the project. The small amount of funds available to the CSM project, plus the uncertainties surrounding future funding, had the effect of slowing implementation, even if other inputs (discussed under 16 below) had been provided on a timely basis, which they were not. The funding problem was the cause, for example, for such actions as delaying hiring of personnel, deferring certain expenses and avoiding commitments involving funding that the project did not have and was uncertain about getting.

16. Inputs

For reasons of good project management it was determined at the outset that at least two inputs were essential to the eventual success of the project. One was a market survey upon which could be based a strategy for designing detailed implementation plans, advertising campaigns, selection of logos, etc. Upon inquiry to AID/W, the Mission learned that this survey should be carried out by the Futures Group (TFG) through its contract with S&P/POP, AID/W. TFG was considered by AID/W to be the best qualified around to conduct this work. The survey, including contracting negotiations, was estimated to take not more than six months. Instead it took 17 months to get the survey completed and the USAID did not receive its copy until January 15, 1984! There were unbelievable bureaucratic delays in AID/W and a slow response by TGF as well. Although the Mission brought all the pressure to bear that it could, it seemed that nothing could get the process moving faster. The resulting delays are a matter of record.

The second essential input (and a part of project design) was the provision of the technical assistance to the CSM implementing entity, IPROFA. This was to take the form of a full time Resident Advisor, plus short-term assistance in specific

areas of expertise as required, to be contracted with a qualified firm in the U.S. The Mission wrote a PIO/T in December 1982 which was sent in final to AID/W (the Authorized Agent) in February 1983. The Technical Committee met in August 1983 to rate the proposals, but it was not until December 3, 1983 that the contract was finally signed. At this juncture, the Resident Advisor approved by the Technical Committee refused to come to Guatemala. The contractor was forced to go through the recruiting process all over again. An acceptable Resident Advisor finally arrived on May 2, 1984.

Because of the contracting delays the CSM project element was forced to essentially mark time for nearly a year and a half, although a fair number of preparatory steps, anticipating the time when the project could be shifted into full gear, were taken. Nonetheless, the lack of timeliness in providing these inputs accounts, in major part, for delays in project implementation.

17. Outputs

Outputs for this portion of the project are listed as: "Contraceptives readily available at affordable prices in retail outlets throughout the country." The magnitude of the outputs are listed as "1200 commercial pharmacies and 5000 retail sales outlets". Obviously, since the sales launch has not yet taken place these outputs have not been achieved. However, there is no need to adjust either the outputs or the magnitude of same at this time. With the inputs at last in place, the project is moving at an accelerated pace and it is expected that the EOPS will show that the magnitude of the outputs will be close to original projections.

18. Purpose

The purpose of the project is: "To expand availability of family planning services through public, private and commercial sector activities." The EOPS in the logframe expects that together the several components of the project will increase the number of acceptors to 400,000 by FY 1986. (There are two other major components to this project: APROFAM and the Ministry of Health.) In the body of the PP, however, there is a statement that the CSM program should reach 200,000 acceptors by 1990. The Contraceptive Prevalence Survey, completed at the end of FY 1983 indicates that most Guatemalan women, both "ladina" and "indigena", know about some form of modern contraceptive practice but that actual use is relatively low. The

contribution of the CSM project will be a major factor in increasing usage.

19. Goal/Suogol

The goal of the project is: "Improve socio-economic welfare of the poor by increasing access to F.P. services and information". Since product launch has not taken place there are no verifiable indicators to judge whether the CSM project has contributed to this goal.

20. Beneficiaries

The PP states that the CSM component will impact most heavily on the rural poor in the Altiplano, South Coast, and Eastern regions of Guatemala. Those that will directly benefit from the CSM component are not quantified in the PP, although the total of beneficiaries from all activities under the PP is estimated at 400,000.

21. Unplanned Effects

N/A

22. Lessons Learned

The delays that can be expected to arise, particularly from AID procedures regarding contracting, should be more carefully and thoughtfully taken into account in setting up the original Implementation Schedule. In all fairness to the authors of the PP, however, the CSM component as designed was experimental and there was much that could not have been foreseen at the time. The Mission believes that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with the CSM component design and objectives. The problems arose because of inordinate and unanticipated delays in contracting. Now that these are in place the project is moving along at a satisfactory pace.

23. Special Comments

This project is an attempt to involve a for-profit private sector company in the attainment of a socio-economic development goal. AID funding is necessary until such time as the company reaches the break-even point. When this point in the project's progress is reached, AID would terminate its monetary support and the company was expected to continue on its own. The only AID input after the break-even point is

reached would be to supply IPROFA with low-cost contraceptives. This particular approach is new to AID and from the outset it was labelled an experiment. Even though hardly off the ground, the Guatemala CSM program already has its imitators. If AID is truly serious about involvement of the private sector in development, we should closely examine the mechanisms governing AID's operations with a view to achieving smoother, more efficient functioning relationship with the private sector in projects of this ilk.

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5