

4920 310/18

PDAAAP-860


10N-36005

**BICOL INTEGRATED AREA
DEVELOPMENT II PROJECT:
MORE GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE WILL BE
NEEDED IF THIS PROJECT IS TO SUCCEED**

**USAID/Philippines
AUDIT REPORT NO. 2-492-84-10
September 21, 1984**

The USAID and the Philippine Ministry of Agrarian Reform need to develop a plan of action to assure the economic viability of the project. In addition, the Ministry needs to provide more financial and technical assistance to the irrigators' associations for effective operation and maintenance of the irrigation systems.

The Philippines



**BICOL INTEGRATED AREA DEVELOPMENT II PROJECT:
MORE GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE WILL BE NEEDED
IF THIS PROJECT IS TO SUCCEED**

Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
INTRODUCTION	1
Background	1
Prior Audit	1
Purpose, Scope, And Methodology	2
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS	3
AID And The Ministry Of Agrarian Reform Need To Develop A Plan Of Action To Assure The Economic Feasibility Of The Project	3
Some Original Project Assumptions Were Invalid	3
Farmers Unable to Repay Full Construction and Homesite Development Cost	3
Program Management Not Providing Agreed Upon Financial Support	4
Farmers Are Not Paying Assessed Fees	5
Conclusions and Recommendation	6
Management Comments	6
The Project Management Office Needs To Provide More Techni- cal Assistance To The Irrigators' Associations For Effective Operation Of The System	6
Conclusions and Recommendation	10
Management Comments	10
Evaluation Recommendations To Improve System Operation Need To Be Addressed	10
Conclusions and Recommendation	11
Management Comments	12
EXHIBIT 1 -- Project Status as of June 1, 1984	
APPENDIX A -- List Of Report Recommendations	
APPENDIX B -- List Of Report Recipients	

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 1978, the U.S. Agency for International Development loaned the Government of the Philippines (GOP) \$3 million for the Bicol Integrated Area Development II Project. The project is a combination of land reform and irrigation development covering 2,300 hectares (5,680 acres) in the Bicol River Basin, Southern Luzon. The Aid-financed component included the construction of access roads, drainage, and pump irrigation facilities, and the procurement of pumping equipment. The Philippine Government was to provide for homesite development, land consolidation and tenure reform, training, and applied agricultural research. By the end of the project, the GOP Project Management Office was to have organized two farmer associations that would manage the irrigation systems. The San Ramon Association is currently operational. The Minalabac Association has been organized but is not yet functional.

Erroneous projections made during the project design and changes in the economic environment have raised serious questions about the economic viability of this pump irrigation project. The potential economic benefits of this project were based on several assumptions. Because many of the more important assumptions are no longer valid, the achievement of a self-sustaining, small farm irrigation system is questionable. The project could also fail because the price of rice to farmers has not kept pace with the cost of production inputs. Between 1981 and 1983, the farmgate price of rice received by farmers rose 22.5 percent while the prices of fertilizer and electricity rose by 40 and 35 percent, respectively. In the past year there has been a 100 percent increase in electric rates, and the rates are still climbing. These substantial increases in costs have raised doubts about the ability of farmers to pay the full cost of system amortization, operation and maintenance.

The Project Paper estimated that the average annual water fee necessary to meet amortization and other expenses of the irrigators' associations, would be equivalent to 21 cavans (a cavan is a bag of rice weighing 50 kilograms) per irrigated hectare. Our estimate of these same costs for the project area when the project is completed is about 40 cavans per hectare -- substantially more than projected. The present annual water fee is 28 cavans per hectare.

Even at the assessed rate of 28 cavans per hectare, the farmers are not paying the full irrigation fees. For example, the San Ramon Association records showed the farmers were paying only about one-third to three-fourths of the assessed rate. Almost every farmer had paid something, but not the full fee. Officials of the Association stated farmers may not have paid their full assessed fees because of resentment towards the GOP's Project Management Office (PMO) which had not provided the agreed upon financial support to the project.

Because of the changes in the economic environment, the project may not be economically viable. AID and the GOP Ministry of Agrarian Reform need to develop and implement a plan of action to increase farm income and reduce costs if this project is to succeed. In this regard, the GOP needs to provide more financial assistance to the farmer associations during the start-up and phase-over of the irrigation system.

In addition to needing financial support, the farmer associations are not receiving adequate technical guidance for the operation and maintenance of the system. As a result, the irrigation canals and drainage ditches are not being properly maintained. The San Ramon Association was also not following the rotation water delivery schedule because it did not receive required technical assistance from the Project Management Office. The result was misuse of the irrigation system by the farmers. Inspection of the system revealed a number of illegal water diversions. The diverted water was flowing to fields not scheduled to be irrigated. Further, little to no water was getting to one of the four targeted irrigation blocks.

Both the cleaning and effective water rotation of an irrigation system are important ways to improve its efficiency and reduce electricity costs. If the Project Management Office and the farmer associations continue operating in the present manner, the viability of the project will be threatened because of higher operating costs and rehabilitation requirement.

A number of recommendations were presented in a 1984 technical evaluation, which were directed towards improving the efficiency of the irrigation system. These recommendations should have been but were not implemented by either the AID Mission or the Philippine Government.

This report includes several recommendations which, when carried out, should improve the chances of project success. These include the development of an action plan to ensure that the irrigation system is economically viable to the farmer (see page 6), provision of additional financial and technical assistance to the irrigators' associations (see page 10), and implementation of the recommendations contained in a recent technical evaluation report (see page 11).

Management Comments

USAID is in general agreement with the thrust of this report and has begun taking action on these recommendations. The USAID pointed out that actual electricity use to date has been lower than the projected rates, which may affect our finding on economic viability.

Where appropriate, the report was revised to reflect other management comments.

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

Since the early 1970s, AID has committed over \$30 million to the development of the Philippine Bicol River Basin--an area in southern Luzon characterized by severe poverty, land tenure insecurity, low agricultural productivity, poor irrigation and drainage land areas. The Government of the Philippines (GOP) more than matched the AID commitment with \$75.5 million. The overall objective of the development program is to raise the socio-economic level of the people living in the Bicol River Basin to the national average by 1990.

In January 1978, AID signed a \$2,250,000 loan agreement (No. 492-T-046) with the GOP in support of the Bicol Integrated Area Development II Project. In August 1978, this agreement was amended to increase the amount of the loan to \$3 million. Because of several recent peso devaluations, the US dollar cost of the project was significantly reduced. Consequently, in June 1984, the USAID deobligated \$675,000 in project loan funds.

This project is a combination of land consolidation and irrigation efforts covering 2,300 hectares in the middle Bicol River Basin. There are approximately 1,230 small-scale farm family beneficiaries.

Because rains are not dependable and adequate facilities are lacking for irrigation and drainage, dry season yields were extremely low. Project planners estimated that by providing year-round irrigation to this area, an annual yield of 180 cavans per hectare could be attained, an increase of over 200 percent. Irrigation water for most of the project area is to be pumped from the Bicol River and the remainder from ground water sources. The AID-financed components include the construction of access roads, drainage and pump irrigation facilities, and procurement of pumping equipment.

The Philippine Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) was appointed as the lead GOP implementing agency. The MAR is managing this project through a Project Management Office (PMO) located in Dula, Camarines Sur.

By the end of the project, the PMO was to have organized two irrigators' associations, which would be controlled and managed by the farmers. These associations are to operate and maintain the irrigation system and access roads. The San Ramon Association is currently operational. The Minalabac Association has been organized, but is not fully functional because the irrigation subsystems under its responsibility are not yet operational.

Prior Audit

There was one prior audit of this project -- "The Bicol Program-Philippines", Memorandum Audit Report No. 2-492-81-1, dated

October 6, 1980. This report reviewed three projects in the Bicol, including this project. At the time of the previous audit, only \$8,900 of the \$3 million loan funds for the Bicol II Project had been disbursed and \$500,000 accrued. Nonetheless, the audit concluded that implementation problems of the project appeared to preclude its successful conclusion. The principal inhibiting factor cited in the audit report was the inability of the MAR project management staff to efficiently award and administer construction contracts. The result was poor workmanship and slow progress on the part of construction contractors.

PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this audit was to (a) evaluate the integrity of the project and USAID and GOP compliance with applicable laws, regulations, rules, and established policies and (b) determine the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness with which financial, management, and program responsibilities were carried out.

In meeting our audit objectives we (1) reviewed GOP and AID project records, (2) visited the project site several times to inspect the irrigation facilities, and (3) held numerous discussions with officials of USAID, the Philippine Program Management Office, the two farmer associations, the National Power Corporation, and the two electric cooperatives serving the project area. The audit findings were also presented to GOP and USAID officials and their comments are reflected in this report as appropriate.

The review was made in accordance with "The Comptroller General's Standards for Audit of Governmental Organizations, Programs, Activities, and Functions".

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

AID AND THE MINISTRY OF AGRARIAN REFORM NEED TO DEVELOP A PLAN OF ACTION TO ASSURE THE ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY OF THE PROJECT

Erroneous projections made during the project design, and changes in the economic environment have raised serious questions about the economic benefits of the project. The project will need stronger support from AID and the Philippine Government to improve its chances of long-term success. The first step should be the development of a plan of action to assure the economic viability of the irrigation system.

Some Original Project Assumptions Were Invalid

Important assumptions made in the Project Paper in 1977 are no longer valid. Thus, the achievement of self-sustaining small farm irrigation systems is in question. Among the invalid assumptions are the following:

- "The farmgate price of rice relative to all other goods does not significantly decline." A January 1984 USAID study concluded that rice prices have not kept pace with production input prices. For example, between 1981 and 1983, the price for rice paid to the farmers rose 22.5 percent while the prices of fertilizer and electricity rose by 40 and 35 percent, respectively.
- "Stable economic and political conditions." Since the Fall of 1983, the political and economic situation in the Philippines has not been stable.
- "Economic, financial, and consumption incentives will be sufficient to encourage the use of irrigation systems and modern production technology to increase production." Because of changes in the economic and financial incentives (i.e., high inflation, several devaluations, and price controls on rice), this assumption does not reflect the present situation.

Farmers Unable to Repay Full Construction and Homestead Development Cost

The Project Paper assumed that all construction and homestead development costs would be charged the irrigators' Associations as a loan to be amortized over a 40-year period. The Project Paper analysis indicated the average annual water fee necessary to meet the amorti-

zation and other expenses of the Associations would be equivalent to 21 cavans of rice per irrigated hectare. Our estimate of these same costs for the project area when the project is completed is about 40 cavans per hectare -- substantially more than projected.

An evaluation of the project performed in 1982 shows that system user fee could be more than three times higher should 100 percent of the loan be repaid by the Associations. Only if the GOP absorbed 70 percent of the loan amortization costs would the farmer's fee be set at some reasonable amount. Below are fee rates calculated by the evaluation team under four assumptions.

<u>Amortization Amount</u>	<u>Irrigation Fee Under An Amortization Period Of:</u>	
	<u>25 yrs.</u>	<u>40 yrs.</u>
100 percent	82 cavans	77 cavans
50 percent	44 cavans	42 cavans
40 percent	37 cavans	35 cavans
30 percent	29 cavans	28 cavans

Program Management Not Providing Agreed Upon Financial Support

The two farmer Associations are supposed to take over responsibility for the operation and maintenance (O&M) of the irrigation subsystems as they are completed. Funds for O&M are derived from irrigation fee collections paid by member farmers. The project implementation plan calls for a gradual transition of financial and managerial responsibilities from the PMO to the Associations over a 5-year period, with the PMO paying all electric costs for the first 2 years of pump operations. In the third through fifth years, the Associations were to pay a percentage of electric costs ranging from 25 to 75 percent. The Associations' collection of irrigation fees during the transition period was to help build their capital base.

The PMO has not been providing the financial support as called for in the project implementation paper. The PMO has been so short of funds that the electricity to irrigation pumps has been cut-off several times for nonpayment of bills. Because the PMO has not received adequate funds from the GOP, the possibility of more power cutoffs for nonpayment of bills looms in the future. The San Ramon Association has loaned the PMO money to pay recent electric bills. As of May 1984, the PMO owed the Association \$12,900. This loan to the PMO has reduced the ability of the San Ramon Association to provide credit assistance to its members for seeds, fertilizers, and other chemicals.

The Associations could reduce their operating costs by making direct payments for electricity to the National Power Corporation. Such a move can save the Associations about 45 percent annually on electric cost. Currently, the two Associations buy their power from local electric cooperatives. These cooperatives purchase the electricity

from the National Power Corporation for resale to customers, which include the San Ramon and Minalabac Irrigation Associations.

Farmers Are Not Paying Assessed Fees

San Ramon Association farmer members are not fully paying their irrigation system user fees. Our review of the Association revenue statistics indicates the member farmers are only paying between one-third to three-fourths of assessed fees. The shortfall in fee collection has occurred during periods of good harvest. For example, the harvest of 92 cavans per hectare during the 1983 dry season was considered quite good. However, San Ramon Association members paid only about one-third of the assessed fees. The collection statistics for this season follows.

Potential Collections (480 hectares x 12 cavans)	5,760 cavans
Actual Collections	<u>1,918 cavans</u> (33%)
Shortfall	3,842 cavans (67%)

Upon inspecting the collection records, we noted that almost every farmer had paid something, but not the full irrigation fee. A San Ramon Association official stated that 30 hectares remained to be harvested, which would account for 360 cavans. Other reasons stated for the shortfall were

- farmers chose to pay off other debts incurred during the previous two poor harvests, and
- resentment that the Irrigators' Association has had to loan money to the PMO to pay electric bills.

The San Ramon Association also needs to improve record keeping for recording fee collections. Entries were not being posted for the following categories: area irrigated (by each farmer); total irrigation fee due; and outstanding balance for the season. The records also did not contain any columns for outstanding balance from prior seasons, and cumulative balance due. Entries for all of these categories are necessary to properly control fee collections.

Conclusions and Recommendation

Changes in the economic environment have significantly increased the cost of pump irrigation for project beneficiaries. Farmer income has not kept pace with those increases. Although aware of these changes, neither the GOP nor AID have taken action to counter this serious cost squeeze on the farmers. An important assumption in this project was that the Philippine Government would provide the necessary funding for O&M during the early years of the project.

This has not happened. In addition, the users of the irrigation system are not paying their assessed fees which are required to keep the system operating. If actions are not taken promptly to strengthen and improve project implementation, it is very likely that the project will fail. An imminent danger is that the electric bills will not be paid and the irrigation system will sit idle until further government support is provided. Accordingly, we recommend that:

Recommendation No. 1

USAID/Philippines, in conjunction with the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, develop and implement a plan to ensure the economic feasibility of the pump irrigation system. Such a plan should provide a course of action which addresses the following issues

- a) increasing production costs and the regulated price of rice,
- b) direct power purchases by the irrigators' associations from the National Power Corporation,
- c) cost to farmers for infrastructure amortization,
- d) appropriate GOP funding of O&M costs during the start-up and transition of system management to the irrigators' associations, and
- e) irrigation fee collection shortfalls and record-keeping.

Management Comments

The USAID agrees with our findings and conclusions contained in this section. USAID officials also are concerned that the increased electric rates threaten the economic viability of rice production under pump irrigation. The USAID plans to work with the Ministry of Agrarian Reform to develop and implement a plan which addresses the issues raised in the recommendation.

THE PROJECT MANAGEMENT OFFICE NEEDS TO PROVIDE MORE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE IRRIGATORS' ASSOCIATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM

The PMO needs to prepare detailed instructions on the operation and maintenance of the project irrigation system. In addition, more PMO technical assistance is required to orient the Associations to procedures for rotational water delivery and system maintenance to reduce operating cost and assure proper functioning of the irrigation system. If this is not done, improper maintenance of the irrigation system will certainly lead to project failure or substantial rehabilitation costs.

In November 1982, a USAID consultant recommended that an operations manual for the project should be developed as soon as possible. A 1984 comparative evaluation report on the three AID-sponsored small farmer irrigation projects in the Bicol also recommended that the PMO develop and publish a detailed operations manual with rules and regulations governing the use of water and the relationships between farmers and operating personnel. The manual has received a low priority because the PMO efforts have been directed towards completing the construction work. No target date has been set for the completion of this manual.

The rotation irrigation ^{1/} schedule, the only part of the operations manual developed by the PMO, is not being followed. The farmers at San Ramon were supposed to but did not follow a rotation irrigation schedule in May 1984, when the irrigation pumps were turned on. Association officials told us the rotation schedule was not followed because the PMO has not provided adequate assistance or information on how scheduled water usage was to be accomplished.



An illegal diversion
blocking water flow

^{1/} Rotation irrigation is one of the most widely used of modern water delivery methods. Basically, it consists of providing each user of a joint farm ditch the exclusive use of water for a specific period of time. The water is taken by each user "in turn".

Our inspection of the system confirmed this. Few, if any of the locks that were supposed to be closed were closed. Flashboards at most of the water turnouts were missing and there were numerous illegal diversions of water in the system. The result was that little if any water was getting to one of the four targeted irrigation blocks (R-12, Block 29). Further, most of the water was flowing to fields not scheduled to be irrigated.



(Above) Another illegal diversion is blocking water from being delivered to an end user.

(Below) An end user never expected water to reach his land and pumps his own water.



San Ramon Association farmers also were not cleaning the canals, laterals, and drainage ditches to allow for the proper flow of water. The carrying capacity of many of the farm ditches and laterals were restricted because of a heavy growth of vegetation within their channels. This growth retarded the flow of water, reducing its velocity, causing the water level to rise in the canal section. This increase in water surface or depth of water increases the length of time required to fill a canal section. The result is an increase in pumping expenses.

When we first visited the project site in March 1984, it was harvest time and the canals, laterals, and farm ditches were full of weeds. San Ramon Association officials told us that they planned to clean the system before the irrigation pumps were turned back on for the new planting season. However, when we visited the site in May 1984, the pumps were running, but many laterals and farm ditches were still not cleaned.



An irrigation lateral choked with weeds.

Conclusions and Recommendation

The irrigation system is not being adequately maintained by the recipient farmers. Improper maintenance of the system will lead to higher operating costs and substantial rehabilitation costs. Maintenance activities must be continuous to ensure the water channels are clear. Inadequate or delayed maintenance results in the inability of the system to deliver water economically and equitably to the targeted fields. In order to ensure that the irrigation system receives proper maintenance attention, the PMO needs to develop and implement an operations manual which provides detailed instructions for the operation and maintenance of the project irrigation system. Accordingly, we recommend that

Recommendation No. 2

USAID/Philippines require the Project Management Office to develop and implement an operations manual for the project irrigation system.

Management Comments

The USAID concurs with this recommendation.

EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE SYSTEM OPERATION NEED TO BE ADDRESSED

In January 1984, an evaluation report was issued on all three AID financed irrigation systems in the Bicol. The report, "Introducing Irrigated Production to Small Farmers: A Comparative Evaluation of Three Small Farm Irrigation Projects in the Bicol Region," had a number of recommendations which have not yet been addressed by either the PMO or the USAID. These recommendations deal with such topics as turning the system over to farmers, covering the cost of the system, and improving system productivity.

The evaluation report was the result of a joint GOP-USAID effort which focused on how the investments in these and similar projects can yield sustainable benefits to the target population and the Philippine economy. The evaluators found that:

1. The three projects provide a basis for achieving increased agricultural production, employment, net incomes and quality of life for farmers in the areas.
2. Technical designs were essentially sound, but meeting design standards required additional attention.
3. Institutional development appeared to be the weakest aspect of the projects.

4. The Bula-Minalabac project (the subject of this audit) had the greatest chance for success in generating sustainable benefits.
5. Farmer involvement in decision making from the beginning was important to high performance.
6. Integration and coordination mechanisms reflected an increased capacity.
7. Projects improved the areas' economies, but there is little analysis to allow evaluation and correction of project activities.
8. The process of establishing a mature water supply system requires at least 5 years after completion of the physical system.

The evaluators made a number of recommendations that would improve the projects' chances of success. The recommendations were addressed to these four problem areas:

1. The systems have the potential to deliver a reliable water supply, but actions are required to make them sustainable.
2. Expectations of the Associations were unrealistic and it is necessary to define their functions and build their capacities.
3. The pump irrigation systems may not be able to cover the costs of O&M and amortization.
4. Rice yields are lower than designs anticipated, but improved water management, crop technologies, and access to credit supported by agricultural services could bring improvements.

Conclusions and Recommendation

Several of these are problem areas covered by the findings of this report. If the GOP and USAID had taken action on the prior recommendations, improvements would have been well underway by now. We believe these recommendations are still useful and appropriate action may preclude the necessity of audit findings of deficiencies in other AID-funded projects. More importantly, timely action might make the chances for project success much greater. Accordingly, we recommend that

Recommendation No. 3

USAID/Philippines review with the implementing GOP agencies recommendations presented in the report "Introducing Irrigated Production to Small Farmers:

A Comparative Evaluation of Three Small Farm Irrigation Projects in the Bicol Region" and take appropriate corrective action.

Management Comments

The USAID stated that the lack of response to the evaluation recommendations stems primarily from the inadequate GOP funding to carry out MAR's responsibilities under the revised implementation plan. The USAID believes that until an adequate O&M budget is provided by the GOP, there is little possibility that any of the major recommendations can be implemented. We believe that each of the evaluation recommendations should be considered by MAR and the USAID, and either accepted or rejected. Further, a plan for implementation should be developed and appropriate funding from the GOP should be sought to carry out the recommendations which are accepted.

EXHIBIT 1**The project status, as of June 1, 1984.**

<u>AID Funded Activities</u>	<u>Planned</u>	<u>Actual</u>
Pumphouses Built	8	5
Pumps Installed	15	15
Irrigation Canals (Km)	154	<u>a/</u>
Drainage Canals (Km)	92	<u>a/</u>
Service Roads & Paths (Km)	76	<u>a/</u>
Hectarage Irrigated	2,062	480
Barangay Water Facilities	3	1
 <u>GOP Funded Activities</u>		
Multipurpose Buildings	7	6
Elementary Schoolhouse	1	-
Homesites Completed	7	2
Homelots Developed & Dist.	1,010	650
Pit Privies Const. or Approved	1,230	480
Certificates of Land Title Issued	1,230	1,230
Irrigators' Associations	2	2
Training (various individuals)	1,230	1,368

a/ Almost completed.

LIST OF REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation No. 1

USAID/Philippines, in conjunction with the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, develop and implement a plan to ensure the economic feasibility of the pump irrigation system. Such a plan should address the following issues

- a) increasing production costs and the regulated price of rice,
- b) direct power purchases by the irrigators' associations from the National Power Corporation,
- c) cost to farmers for infrastructure amortization,
- d) appropriate GOP funding of O&M costs during the start-up and transition of system management to the irrigators' associations, and
- e) irrigation fee collections shortfalls and record-keeping.

Recommendation No. 2

USAID/Philippines require the Project Management Office to develop and implement an operations manual for the project irrigation system.

Recommendation No. 3

USAID/Philippines review with the implementing GOP agencies recommendations presented in the report "Introducing Irrigated Production to Small Farmers: A Comparative Evaluation of Three Small Farm Irrigation Projects in the Dicol Region" and determine appropriate corrective action.

LIST OF REPORT RECIPIENTS

USAID/Philippines

Director 5

AID/W

Bureau for Asia:

Assistant Administrator 1
Deputy Assistant Administrator (Audit
Liaison Officer) 2
Office of the Philippines, Thailand & Burma
Affairs (ASIA/PTB) 1

Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination:

Office of Evaluation (PPC/E/DIV) 4

Bureau for Management:

Assistant to the Administrator for Management 1
Office of Financial Management (M/FM/ASD) 2
Office of Contract Management (M/SER/CM) 3

Bureau for External Relations

Office of Legislative Affairs (LEG) 1
Office of Public Affairs (OPA) 2

Office of the General Counsel (GC) 1

Office of the Inspector General:

Inspector General (IG) 1
Executive Management Staff (IG/EMS) 12
Policy, Plans & Programs (IG/PPP) 1
RIG/II/Manila 1

Regional Inspector Generals:

RIG/A/Washington 1
RIG/A/Nairobi (East Africa) 1
RIG/A/Dakar (West Africa) 1
RIG/A/Cairo (Egypt) 1
RIG/A Karachi (Near East) 1
RIG/A/Latin America 1