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AUDIT REPORT

ON

YEMEN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

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INTRODUCTION

Yemen is one of the least developed countries in the world. Until 1962 it was isolated from the modern world. Foreigners were forbidden entry, and secular educational facilities were non-existent. Since then the Yemenis have been trying to modernize, but having begun its efforts toward development only six years ago, with no industrial/educational base to build on, the country is still far behind even most less-developed countries.

Yemen's economy is a paradox. Imports exceed exports by more than 100 times, yet Yemen has a positive balance of payments. Foreign exchange reserves exceed 1.3 billion dollars, but government revenues barely cover current expenditures. There is virtually no unemployment and per capita gross national product (GNP) increased by almost 20 percent in 1976/77 to \$469. At the same time, all other quality of life indicators reveal Yemen's true relatively less developed country (RLDC) status.

Remittances from migrant labor are clearly the fuel of change in this economy. An estimated 550,000-600,000 Yemeni men (over one-third of the male work force) are working in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. In 1977/78 they sent home approximately \$1.3 billion, or \$245 per capita; a ten-fold increase in just five years. The domestic economy has responded rapidly to this stimulus; non-agricultural gross development product (GDP) rose by an incredible 25 percent (constant terms) in 1976/77. The fastest growing sectors are those most affected by remittances, i. e., construction and trade. Output in Yemen's only primary producing sector, agriculture, fell over 6 percent in 1976/77. This is partially reflective of weather conditions but also is indicative of the fact that economic growth is induced from outside sources and not based on progress in Yemen's own productive sectors.

paradoxes

Central government revenue from other than customs duties is low due to the small local tax base and collection problems outside the main towns. In 1976/77, tax revenue equalled only 17 percent of GDP, and because of the government's inability to tax remittances directly, it is unlikely that this share will increase greatly over the foreseeable future. Outsiders are quick to suggest the obvious solution, i. e., direct taxes on remittances. However, the Yemen Arab Republic Government (YARG) officials have been adamant in their position that even if it were administratively possible (which it now is not) it is politically infeasible to cut directly into so many Yemenis' new-found prosperity. Nevertheless, the present situation cannot continue indefinitely; the YARG must find acceptable policy measures to increase its share of GNP and to direct a higher proportion of remittance income into development programs. In the meantime it is important to keep in mind that virtually 100 percent of remittance income flows to private individuals - he who earns it, keeps it - a situation clearly on the side of equity. While this still leaves the central government relatively poor, it presents a unique opportunity for privately initiated development in the rural areas; something that is quite clearly happening. For example, villagers are taxing themselves on an ability-to-pay basis to finance local projects and recently-created city governments have been given limited taxing authority.

Yemen's first five-year plan covers fiscal years FY 1976/1977 to FY 1980/1981. It calls for a total investment of \$3.5 billion (constant 1975/1976 prices) or an average expenditure of \$700 million per year. This is four times the actual level of investments in 1975/1976, the last year before the Plan started. On a per capita basis, the Plan will spend \$135 per person per year. The basic push is for continued rapid growth in GDP (targeted average annual growth rate of 8.2 percent), with concurrent development of the infrastructure (primarily physical) to facilitate future growth. Of the total planned investment, 22 percent will go to industry, 14 percent to agriculture, 31 percent to transportation and communication, 13 percent to housing, 5 percent to education, and 2 percent to health; making the Plan heavy in infrastructure development.

The Plan will be financed largely by external loans and grants (53 percent) even though total government domestic revenues have increased eightfold since 1973 from \$62 million in FY 1973/1974 to an expected \$487 million in FY 1978/1979. Internal financing will come mainly from the private sector and is expected to be financed primarily from current remittance earnings.

Reliable statistics on other donor inputs to Yemen are not available, partly due to the largely unaccountable input from Saudi Arabia, but also because of deficiencies in gathering data from donors. The Central Planning Organization (CPO) frankly admits that it does not know how much foreign aid the country receives. The World Bank figures for foreign loans and grants are provided below. It estimates that more than half of the total aid received has been disbursed in the last three years.

	<u>ESTIMATED CAPITAL FLOWS (\$ Million)</u>				<u>Cum. Until</u>
	<u>1973/4</u>	<u>1974/5</u>	<u>1975/6</u>	<u>1976/7</u>	<u>June 1977</u>
Official Grants	\$33	\$93	\$114	\$104	\$420
Official Loans, Net	<u>29</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>290</u>
Total Official Capital	<u>\$62</u>	<u>\$126</u>	<u>\$158</u>	<u>\$146</u>	<u>\$710</u>

The major unknown is the assistance from Saudi Arabia. While specific project assistance from Saudi Arabia can be accounted for, a large portion of their assistance is provided informally in response to the requirements of the overall political situation.

U. S. assistance to the YARG began in 1959 and was abruptly terminated in May 1967, shortly before Yemen broke diplomatic relations with the U. S. at the time of the Seven Day War in June, 1967. Relations were resumed late in 1972 and an AID program was reestablished early in 1973.

Since 1973, through March 31, 1979, U. S. assistance to Yemen has totaled \$37.5 million (see Exhibit A). The largest portion of money allocated during this period was a \$10 million grant for the design and construction of an addition to the Taiz Water Sewerage System. On-going grant projects include a participant training program, a poultry development project, two agricultural research projects, a water and mineral survey, a rural water supply project, a rural development project and a land classification project.

Although our assistance to Yemen can be justified on the basis that it meets the Congressional mandate, there is little question that there also is a political motivation in maintaining good ties with Yemen because of the country's strategic position in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula and on the eastern flank of the entrance to the Red Sea.

This examination of USAID/Yemen's program was carried out as a limited scope review covering the period September 30, 1976 to April 30, 1979. Our efforts were directed toward determining those factors inhibiting AID activities in Yemen. We reviewed project papers, project and grant agreements, and evaluation reports pertaining to 12 active projects and 4 proposed projects. Discussions were held with appropriate USAID/Yemen, Contractor and Embassy officials relative to the purpose and objectives of the program. The objectives of the review were to present USAID/Yemen with our findings, conclusions and recommendations so that, where possible, they could initiate remedial action.

The examination was performed in accordance with generally accepted auditing practices and included such tests of the records as were considered necessary.

The findings contained in this report were reviewed by USAID/Yemen officials and their comments were given due consideration in finalizing this report.

SUMMARY

The most significant findings developed during the audit, and presented in detail in the following sections, are digested below:

- The constraints to managing an AID Program in Yemen are severe and numerous. Housing is, to say the least, marginal, and very expensive. Rents currently average \$18,934 per year and USAID/Y official indicate they will average \$25,000 within a year. Recreational facilities in Sana are very limited. Health conditions in Sana are very poor and medical services are limited. These problems coupled with the program problems of lack of host country financial and technical capability and virtual non-existence of any institutional capability contribute to AID's problem of recruiting and keeping an adequate number of qualified personnel in Yemen. We recommended that the Assistant Administrator for the Near East review the described management constraints and take appropriate action if it is determined that the unique conditions existing in Yemen warrant more intensive corrective action from AID/Washington sources. (See pp. 8 - 12).

Although Yemen, because of its status as one of the relatively less developed countries, qualifies for a waiver of the required 25 percent project input by the Host Country, we could find no request or approval of such waiver. USAID/Y is not keeping records of either the proposed or actual Host Country input to the projects. We noted that YARG is not providing the required 25 percent of project input and that USAID/Y is funding salaries of foreign national project employees that should be funded by the YARG. We recommended that USAID/Y determine the actual amount of YARG contributions to currently active AID projects and require YARG where necessary to meet the 25 percent requirement or obtain the appropriate waivers.

We also recommended that appropriate procedures be established to ensure that the 25 percent requirement is actually met or waived for future projects. In addition, we recommended that USAID/Y cease funding local project employees. (See pp. 12 - 14).

- Whereas the past and present program was and is directed primarily at infrastructure development, the proposed program is directed toward institution building. USAID/Y is well aware of the YARG's preference for turn-key projects as well as the present lack of professional capabilities in YARG offices. Under these circumstances we do not consider a recommendation necessary. (See pp. 14-15).
- In addition to the lack of YARG support our review of agricultural projects indicated there were delays in extending contracts, lack of implementations plans and an AID funded participant was assigned to work for other than the specified project. We recommended that the office of contract management AID/W expedite the extension of a contract to prevent future delays in project implementation. We also recommended that USAID/Y require the YARG to assign the specific participant to the appropriate project or obtain a refund from the YARG for the cost of her training. In addition, we recommended that a contractor be required to prepare and submit a detailed work plan and that if an acceptable workplan is not submitted, the project should be terminated. (See pp. 16 - 21).
- USAID/Yemen has devoted substantial funds for water development in Yemen. Progress has been made but much remains to be done especially in the areas of development of administrative capabilities. A PASA group completed their assignment and departed Yemen in October 1977. As of April 30, 1979, their much needed water resources report had not been submitted to AID. We recommended that the Assistant Administrator/Near East make representation at a sufficiently high level to cause preparation and transmission of the required report. (See pp. 21 - 23).

- We also noted additional delays in finalizing contracts to staff projects. Some of the delays were with AID but in two instances in which the YARG was to finalize the contracts there were delays due to YARG inexperience in International Contracting. (See pp. 23 - 26).
- USAID/Y recently entered into a Specific Support Grant (SSG) for implementation of a rural development project. The Grantee was delayed in staffing the project and the project is far behind schedule. In addition, the Grantee failed to provide management useful reports required by the terms of the SSG. The project design lacked the specificity required to reasonably evaluate the project. We recommended that USAID/Y require that the Grantee provide the required reports and that USAID/Y evaluate the project prior to making a decision relative to extending the project. (See pp. 26 - 27).
- USAID/Y has a very active participant training project. To date \$6.7 million has been obligated and USAID/Y anticipates obligating an additional \$10 million for this project. The initial group of long term trainees have only recently returned to Yemen. We noted that USAID/Y has not established a participant follow-up system and indicated that a contract will be executed to provide follow-up services. We recommended that USAID/Yemen establish an in-house capability to conduct participant follow-up as required in AID Handbook No. 10. (See pp. 27 - 29).

The report contains 10 recommendations which are listed in Exhibit B.

STATEMENT OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE YEMEN AID PROGRAM

The current AID assistance program in Yemen has been underway since 1973. From the very beginning, serious problems have been experienced with designing a program that could be implemented efficiently and effectively. There have been major constraints to managing an AID program in Yemen; Host Country support has been limited; and implementation of the program has not resulted in significant development of a Host Country institutional capability. Institution building is now a key priority of USAID/Yemen and in more recently designed programs it is being emphasized. However, achievement of this goal, in view of the political unrest that exists in this part of the world, and Yemen particularly, is very doubtful.

The above problems have been reported many times in the past by us (See Audit Report No. 5-279-77-8 dated December 30, 1976), as well as others. To be sure, there has been some progress, particularly in the last few years, but there is still a great distance to travel. Some of the areas of difficulty are controllable and are being addressed, but there is a need to direct more attention to those problems which are unique to Yemen and which, over the long-term, could result in substantially reducing the program constraints experienced thus far.

1. Constraints to Managing an AID Program in Yemen

Managing the AID program in Yemen is probably as difficult an assignment as there is in AID. To varying degrees, almost every walk of life in Yemen is sub-standard. Host Country financial and technical capability is extremely limited, infrastructure and institutional structure is virtually non-existent, recreational and cultural activities (at least for the foreign community) are not available, and the standard of living in terms of housing, communication, transportation, sanitation and medical services are so far below Western standards that it constitutes a major impediment to attracting competent American contractor and direct hire personnel to Yemen.

In the past, USAID/Yemen's ability to attract and retain U. S. direct hire staff has been hampered by a) extensive delays in nominating and staffing positions; b) frequent medical evacuations due to extremely poor health conditions in Yemen; c) unexpected retirements; and d) few personnel opting for second tours because of the adverse living conditions. In recent months this staffing situation seems to have improved because more suitable staffing nominations are being received and a few employees have requested second tours. In turn this seems to have generated more enthusiasm and a higher degree of employee morale within the remaining staff.

When one considers the primitive living conditions and the programming problems encountered in Yemen it is no wonder that AID/Washington has a difficult time providing adequate staff for USAID/Yemen. Basic in-country amenities are almost non-existent. Housing, although extremely expensive (about \$18, 934 per year and increasing rapidly) is very poor, road conditions are unbelievably poor, health conditions are among the worst in the world, cultural events are non-existent and prices on the economy are three to four times as high as U. S. prices. In fact, the person/year cost to maintain a U. S. employee in Yemen (direct hire or contract) is among the highest in the AID world. USAID/Yemen officials indicate that it currently costs about \$106, 000 for direct hire and about \$135, 000 for contractor personnel per person year.

Staffing, both direct hire and contractor, is one area of difficulty that is a major contributor to the overall factors impeding program implementation. We believe the situation in Yemen is unique, at least to some degree is controllable, and warrants the special attention of various offices in AID/Washington to expedite corrective action to the extent possible. Certain areas should be vigorously pursued at an early date:

a. The provision of adequate housing for direct hire and contractor staff is critical to maintaining a highly effective and efficient staff both in terms of morale and cost effectiveness. AID/Washington is currently seeking bids for construction/erection of twelve dwellings for direct hire American staff but attempts to obtain funding for 28 dwellings for contractor staff have been frustrated because of Congressional objections. We believe a construction program should be considered for both cost and adequacy reasons. First, the cost of housing in Yemen is extremely high and landlords are now seeking annual rents ranging from \$25, 000 to approximately

\$36,000 per year. Secondly, adequate housing is generally not available and even houses renting at \$36,000 per year do not meet Western standards. It should also be noted that USAID has about 15 leases that will be coming up for renewal within the next year and will necessarily have to deal with the exorbitant demands currently prevailing.

We realize the many implications of constructing housing in under-developed countries, but given the unique situation in Yemen, we believe such construction should be considered if title to all such dwellings can be retained by the U.S. Government (USG) with unrestricted use by any USG Agency so long as the need exists.

b. The lack of recreational facilities in Sana is a serious problem relative to maintaining an adequate staff. In constructing the above discussed AID compound, consideration should also be given to including some facilities for community use such as tennis courts, ball diamond, meetinghall/snack bar, and possibly even a swimming pool.

c. At present, USAID/Yemen employees are authorized to ship about 4,000 pounds of consumables per family at USG expense on their first tour assignment to Yemen. A similar allowance is not granted for second tours and therefore functions as a disincentive to employees who might otherwise request a second tour. Again, in view of the hardship and general difficulty of living in Yemen we believe this employee benefit should be further reviewed.

d. Due to the high cost per year of assigning individuals or families with only one employee to Yemen, it would be cost effective to assign working couples to the extent possible. Naturally, USAID requirements would necessarily be the controlling factor but there are possibilities of working out such assignments even where both working members do not work for the same USG Agency.

e. Health conditions in Sana, coupled with the lack of medical services, are a great deterrent to maintaining an adequate staff. Some consideration should be given to improving this situation to the extent possible. The Mission Director advised us that a contract physician presently located in Afghanistan has indicated an interest in an assignment to Sana. Further review of this possibility should be undertaken considering the size of the American Community in Sana, the health conditions existing, and the fact that the cost of such services could be shared by several agencies.

The lack of local staff availability and capability for other administrative and logistical support services in Sana has also been a major deterrent to effective management of the AID program in Yemen. In the past, USAID/Yemen has experienced a turnover rate of over 100 percent for direct hire Foreign National (FN) employees due to non-competitive pay scales. To a large degree, this situation has improved to a point where USAID is now able to retain its FN employees because pay scales were significantly increased, but certain skills are still not available. For example, Mission officials indicate the situation with skills such as mechanics, electricians, plumbers, and appliance repairs is still difficult. As soon as this type employee acquires even basic skills, they are off to the oil countries where they can earn considerably higher salaries. In effect, this lack of availability of basic craftsmen skills causes serious problems in maintaining USAID equipment and in providing an adequate level of logistic support services to employees. Considering the level of living standards in Sana, this type of situation probably impacts greatly on employee morale.

USAID officials have also attempted to solve some of their FN employee staffing problems by trying to hire capable Third Country Nationals (TCN's). For at least three years they have been trying to establish a reasonable package of benefits for this type employee but have not been successful. To some extent, their proposals have been unrealistic in that they have included salary scales up to a GS-16 level. AID/W has rejected some of the proposals but they have not given specific guidelines on what is required.

USAID/Yemen officials feel the present salary level approved for TCN's is reasonably competitive but the approved housing allowance of \$4,200 is unrealistic considering that average costs of U.S. employee housing is now about \$18,934 and will be increasing sharply in future months. Selected and limited use of TCN's in the maintenance area may be a solution to the present problems in vehicle, housing and general maintenance but certainly, the obvious high cost that will be encountered for this type personnel must be very carefully weighed in terms of cost/benefit relationships. Nevertheless, the need for full maintenance services is sufficiently great that an adequate and reasonable solution to the current impasse should be obtained.

Recommendation No. 1

We recommend that the Assistant Administrator for the Near East review the above described management constraints and take appropriate action if it is determined that the unique conditions existing in Yemen warrant more intensive corrective action from AID/Washington sources.

2. Host Country Support of Projects

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 requires that no assistance shall be furnished by the USG to a country unless that country provides at least 25 percent of the cost of the entire program. In the past, we found that the YARG had not met this requirement and that USAID/Yemen had not enforced project agreement provisions requiring such provisions.

In our current audit, we again reviewed the planned activities of eight active projects and noted that the YARG will not contribute the 25 percent of total project cost. As in the past USAID had no record of either requesting or receiving waivers of this requirement and they had no systematic means of determining actual contributions by the YARG.

Although Yemen's relatively high GNP of \$469 is an exception to the basic criteria of the RLDC concept, other factors such as the situation in education and health are such that Yemen continues to be considered one of the least developed countries by the United Nations. Such a determination may affect the amount of support provided to a project by the host government and the type of assistance provided by the various donors. A waiver system exists whereby an RLDC country may be absolved of the requirement to contribute at least 25 percent of the project cost.

Our Audit Report No. 5-279-77-8, dated December 30, 1976, included a finding and recommendation on this subject. We recommended "... that USAID/Yemen establish a systematic means of assuring that the 25 percent cost sharing requirement is either met or is waived for each project or activity ..." In reply to our recommendation, the Deputy Director advised in March 1977 that USAID/Yemen had devised a control sheet to record all project contributions for each project initiated on or

after January 3, 1974. Based on those control sheets, USAID/Yemen would monitor YARG project contribution to assure compliance with Section 110(a) of the FAA or initiate action for appropriate waivers. As a result of that action we closed the audit recommendation. However, our current review disclosed that USAID has not maintained the control records since 1977 and there still are no effective procedures for determining actual YARG contributions as compared to planned contributions.

During our review we also noted other unusual elements of YARG support or lack of support to AID projects. For example, USAID/Yemen employed and paid salaries for about 132 Yemeni project employees in CY 1977, and 56 in CY 1978. The annual salary costs were \$416,102 and \$312,212 respectively, with payments being made from US project fund sources. Virtually all these positions should be provided and funded by the host government instead of AID.

In other instances the YARG does provide Ministry employed counterparts for some AID projects. The counterparts receive base salaries from the YARG as authorized by appropriate local civil service pay scales but the YARG has requested that USAID/Yemen pay additional salary (topping-off) to the counterparts. The YARG logic is that the counterparts to AID employees must work harder and longer than regular Ministry employees, are therefore entitled to supplementary pay, and in all cases they have succeeded in passing costs on to the particular donor involved. USAID/Yemen officials indicate disagreement with both the funding of project employees' salaries and the "topping-off" practices and intend to discontinue them in the near future.

Recommendation No. 2

We recommend that the Director, USAID/Yemen determine the actual amount of YARG contributions to AID-funded projects in Yemen and require the YARG, where necessary, to meet the 25 percent minimum contribution to total project costs or obtain appropriate waivers of that requirement.

Recommendation No. 3

We recommend that the Director, USAID/Yemen establish appropriate procedures to ensure that the 25 percent cost sharing requirement is actually met in the future or that waivers are obtained for each project or activity where the requirement will not be imposed.

Recommendation No. 4

We recommend that the Director, USAID/Yemen take action to phase out current practices of funding local project employee salaries and salary topping-off expenses.

3. Program Direction Vs Program Objectives

A major objective for our assistance program in Yemen has been to assist in developing an institutional base from which the YARG could plan and direct their own development program. Thus far, progress toward meeting this objective has been relatively limited. For example, major future activities are being directed to the educational and agricultural sectors. USAID/Yemen acknowledges that the YARG Ministry of Agriculture capabilities are virtually nil and there are serious limitations in the educational sector. This situation will probably pose difficult program constraints in the future for the USAID to deal with.

The direction of the 22 active or completed projects with obligations of \$37.5 million is heavily skewed toward infrastructure and showing of a US presence. Three projects (Development Training, Water Systems and Development Training II) are directed almost entirely toward institution building and or human resources development, while three other projects (Poultry, Rural Water and Agriculture Research) have had a degree of institution building. The remaining projects are essentially construction activities and have contributed little to the institution building process. A listing of projects and their primary function is shown in Exhibit A.

The major objectives of USAID/Yemen future activities as stated in the FY 1981 Country Development Strategy Statement (CDSS) are directed to:

- a. Institutional development of the basic education system (primary, secondary and non-formal) to provide the skills needed for fulfillment of basic human needs and productive utilization of increased personal income;
- b. Establishment of a broad-based, nationally coordinated program of integrated agriculture development; and

c. Development of the potential for increased local and national development in the public and private sector.

USAID/Yemen in developing its strategy and objectives is aware of the labyrinth of constraints facing a basic development program in Yemen. For example, only 29 percent of primary aged children are enrolled in school and only 8 percent of secondary school age children attend classes. Literacy is 25 percent for males and 2 percent for females. Less than half of the primary school teachers have as much as a primary school certificate themselves. Four out of five workers are illiterate.

USAID/Yemen also acknowledges that while agriculture is the most important sector of the domestic economy, the ability of the YARG to lead and support agricultural development efforts is practically nil. Current donor activities in agriculture are of necessity largely self-contained and present little opportunity for replication.

Whether YARG support for future AID assistance will be adequate or not can only be speculative at the present time. There are some clear dangers. For example, USAID plans to conduct a teacher training program but with the limited capability of the YARG, in terms of budgetary support for the education sector, it is conceivable that there will be insufficient funds to operate some schools or hire the teachers. In another area, major USAID assistance will be provided to the agricultural sector where many problems exist, not the least of which is lack of support and interest by the YARG. Yet, USAID's primary future activity is planned for the agriculture sector where they expect to conduct a 20-year program that will cost upwards of \$100 million. The design team for this latter activity is expected in Sana in May 1979 and the project will be implemented by the Consortium for International Development from Title XII funds.

USAID officials are well aware of the circumstances that must be considered in their future assistance efforts. They are particularly aware of the limitation of the YARG and expect to be able to deal effectively with them. Under these circumstances we do not consider a recommendation is necessary.

B. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

In 1973, after an absence of about six years, U.S. development assistance to Yemen was re-established. Most of the initial priority was on establishing a visible U.S. presence with the primary emphasis on developing water and agricultural projects. Throughout this period, the Mission has had a history of concluding a project and starting a new one in the same area. For example, there have been numerous water projects (nine with obligations totalling over \$20 million) with many of them being developed as follow on projects. In agriculture, an earlier cereal project was concluded and a new one started and currently USAID/Yemen anticipates that most agricultural projects will be phased out and merged into a new agriculture sector project.

1. Agriculture Program

Yemen was nearly self-sufficient in food in 1960. Since then, in the aftermath of the Civil War, long periods of drought, and increasing local demand, the indigenous agricultural supply/demand balance has deteriorated drastically. Now its largely subsistence-type farming production comes nowhere near meeting the nation's demand for food. The substantial food deficit is offset by imports, which constitute more than 25 percent of Yemen's total import bill. So the need for assistance in agriculture is clear.

Many foreign donors are active in the agriculture sector and, for the most part, coordinate their various programs. USAID/Yemen's current agriculture program is in three areas; cereals, horticulture and poultry. The activities are included under the following projects:

<u>Title</u>	<u>Inception</u>	<u>Obligations and Disbursements</u> <u>(\$000) as of March 31, 1979</u>	
		<u>Obligations</u>	<u>Disbursements</u>
Sorghum Production Project (Completed)	3/73	267	267
Tropical/Sub-Tropical Horticulture Improvement Project	6/76	1,098	695

<u>Title</u>	<u>Inception</u>	<u>Obligations and Disbursements</u>	
		<u>(\$000) as of March 31, 1979</u>	
		<u>Obligations</u>	<u>Disbursements</u>
National Sorghum and Millet Crop Improvement Project (Agriculture Research)	3/76	2,377	1,665
Poultry Project Development	5/75	1,826	1,751
Land Classification/Soil Survey Project	9/78	486	30
		<u>6,054</u>	<u>4,708</u>

Although most of the current agricultural projects are well underway, we are unable to draw a conclusion on the impact of the program. The lack of YARG involvement, particularly as it relates to lack of YARG personnel, the lack of adequate YARG funding support (which is primarily an in-kind contribution of land) and uncertainty relative to YARG's providing adequate future budgets for those activities being turned over to the Ministry of Agriculture for continued implementation are the reasons for our concern.

Overall, USAID/Yemen has been fortunate in having two exceptional contractors who were willing and able to do far more than simply advise the YARG. These contractors proceeded to construct facilities, plow fields, fence fields, mix feed and gather eggs. Because of their willingness to work, the poultry and national sorghum projects have shown good progress. Nevertheless, because of the YARG's strong preference for "turn-key" operations and their hopes to get other donors to carry on when the present donor phases out, we are very concerned about the future of the agriculture projects. Individual projects are discussed below:

a. Cereals (Project Nos. 279-0018 and 279-0030).

The major AID emphasis in agriculture has been in sorghum and millet research. Activities have been concentrated in the Sana area where 80 percent of cultivated acreage is planted in sorghum. The first project was designed to identify new high-yielding seed varieties, field test them, and put together a package of cultivation practices. Although this project was considered a success because five new potentially high-yielding seed varieties were identified, successful field tests were not conducted nor was a package of cultivation practices fully developed. The project was phased out in March, 1976, but adaptive research is continued under the later project.

Research activities have continued under a contract with the University of Arizona. Two research specialists were on board for a two-year period ending March 1979. Large numbers of seed and field trials were satisfactorily conducted. One research station has been constructed on Yemeni provided land in Sana, and developed with AID funds but there has been substantial delay in locating and developing the second required lowland research center. It is not yet on-line and there is a strong possibility that the YARG may reclaim the original research station because of a high demand for land in Sana. Such an action would seriously impair local research capability since there is no indigenous capability within the YARG Ministry of Agriculture.

The YARG has provided two counterparts for the project but USAID/Yemen has had to provide and fund all other FN employees and has also topped-off salaries of the two YARG employees.

In September 1978 USAID/Yemen submitted a PIO/T to AID/W to extend the contract to August 1981 as the existing contract was to expire in March 1979. AID/W has not yet extended the contract and project implementation has been impaired by lack of contract staff. The problem has been further compounded because the contractor has not identified replacement candidates.

Recommendation No. 5

The Office of Contract Management AID/W should expedite contract extension of the University of Arizona contract in order that suitable replacement research candidates can be obtained.

b. Poultry Development (Project No. 279-0019)

The Poultry Planning project is designed to test the feasibility of small, family-type poultry enterprises. Ultimate expansion is keyed to successes in extending poultry raising capability by demonstration to the small farmer. Large scale success of this project would provide a basis for income generation for the small producer and supplement protein nutrition.

Early in this project there were problems in implementation. The project provides for the construction of nine poultry buildings; one training processing center, one feed mill and seven brooder and lay houses. According to the project agreement, the U. S. advisors were to arrive either after completion of, or six months after the start of construction. But the two advisors arrived in February 1976, when construction had just been started. The first brooder and lay houses were not completed until May 1976, and all nine buildings were not completed until February 1977.

Originally, project plans were for chicks and feed to be obtained from Beirut, Lebanon. Unfortunately, the Civil War in that country eliminated it as a source and no alternative source of supply was found until 1977. Good progress toward project objectives has been made since that time. However, one of the prime purposes of the project was to extend poultry raising throughout the country and much remains to be done in that area.

In May 1979 the project is to be turned over to the YARG. The Ministry of Agriculture, with AID assistance, has prepared and submitted a budget proposal for the period July 1, 1979 - June 30, 1980, that Mission officials feel is adequate to support the project. Our review of the budget indicates that operational costs of the demonstration center will exceed revenues by about \$145,000 per year. Initially, it is unlikely that this will cause problems if the YARG budget is approved but, over the long-term, a deficit situation could impact on continuation of the center. USAID has indicated that they anticipate providing additional assistance for poultry extension purposes which should clearly help to assure project continuation. Nevertheless, we suggest the USAID closely monitor this project in the future to assist in obtaining adequate YARG budget approvals that will ensure project continuation.

AID also funded training for four participants under this project: one remains in training, two are back and with the project and one has returned with an MS Degree and went to work for the Yemeni Agricultural Bank. A total of \$20,325 was spent in training this individual and there is a requirement that he return to work with the project. USAID/Yemen has not discussed this problem with the YARG in spite of the fact that the participant has been back about one year and his knowledge and training could be of great benefit to the project.

Recommendation No. 6

The Director, USAID/Yemen should take action to require the participant in question to fulfill his project employment responsibilities or obtain a refund from the YARG for the full cost of his training.

c. Horticulture Improvement (Project No. 279-0024)

The purpose of this project (started in 1976) is to increase the production of horticultural crops in Yemen. Through March 31, 1979 a total of \$695,000 has been expended and very little has been accomplished.

A contract with Tuskegee Institute for project implementation was signed in May 1977, 10 months after AID/W receipt of the PIO/T. The contractor required an additional 15 months to staff three positions, 1 remains vacant. However, delays in staffing were not attributable solely to the contractor. The YARG rejected two early nominees and this action directly affected the research station development. Two of the technicians have only one-year contracts which are about to expire. The contracts will not be renewed because the individuals have not been able to function well in-country or develop a workable relationship with their local counterparts. Much of the problem has evolved because a definitive work plan has not been prepared. As a result, there has been frequent confusion over whose responsibility it was to perform key functions. At the current stage of implementation, we see no alternative but to prepare an adequate detailed work plan or terminate the project.

In summary, the YARG requested this project in 1972. To date, the project must be construed as a failure. Implementation is far behind schedule. The contractor has not been able to field a complete staff and

interaction between the YARG, USAID/Y and the contractor has not been satisfactory. The YARG, USAID/Yemen and the contractor are well aware of the problems and are currently seeking reasonable alternatives to get the project on course. One viable option may be to merge it into the upcoming Agriculture Sector Project but, unless a viable option is realized soon we believe the present project should be terminated.

Recommendation No. 7

The Director, USAID/Yemen should require the contractor for the Horticulture Improvement Project to prepare and submit a detailed work plan that will ensure adequate implementation of the project. If an acceptable workplan is not made available within a reasonable period of time we recommend the project be terminated.

2. Water Resources Program

Yemen is an arid country and the scarcity of water is a major impediment to development. For this reason, USAID/Yemen has placed heavy emphasis on water-related projects since re-establishing the AID program in 1973. We made a review of the following major grant projects under this section.

<u>Title</u>	<u>Obligations and Disbursements</u> <u>(\$000) as of March 31, 1979</u>			
	<u>Obliga -</u> <u>tions</u>	<u>Expen -</u> <u>ditures</u>	<u>Incep -</u> <u>tion</u>	<u>Planned</u> <u>Completion</u> <u>Date</u>
Rural Water Supply Project	4,893	4,800	2/73	6/79
Water/Mineral Survey of North Yemen	2,072	1,639	3/74	6/81
Water Supply Systems Management	2,986	124	8/77	3/83
Taiz Water/Sewerage Construction	10,000	683	8/77	3/82

a. Rural Water Supply (Project No. 279-0022)

The basic objectives of this project were to a) provide potable water to villages for domestic use; b) strengthen the ability of the Ministry of Public Works/Rural Water Division (RWD) to plan and carryout rural water development programs; and c) help develop an organizational capacity for rural community self-help projects.

A variety of problems have plagued this project. It has progressed much slower and cost much more than expected. In March 1973, project costs were forecast to be \$2.0 million to bring water to a total of 75 village groups. In December 1975 a revised project paper was approved to bring water to only 60 village groups but to assist 40 to 70 small self-help projects. The additional small self-help projects were budgeted to cost \$175,000. The revised total project costs are \$6.0 million of which AID provided \$4.9 million, and the YARG per the PROP was to provide \$1.1 million.

Difficulties in this project were similar to other projects - i. e. - recruitment of personnel, high employment turnover, and delays in procurement. However, some progress has been made. Since inception of the project in 1973 through April 1979, 41 wells have been drilled of which 25 were successful and 16 dry. Sixty-nine self-help projects have been started of which 58 were completed, 9 are in process and 2 were cancelled.

USAID technical assistance to RWD on well drilling was completed on September 30, 1978, and this operation is now being handled by RWD personnel trained under the project. Other items transferred to RWD during CY 1978 included project commodities, system installation, shop operation, equipment maintenance, and final warehouse operation. USAID is still supplying the project some technical assistance in village self-help water projects. This technical assistance consists mainly of project survey and design and also supervision of project construction activities.

b. Water and Mineral Survey of North Yemen (Project No. 279-0025)

The basic purpose of the project was to develop a primary data base concerning groundwater and mineral resources in Yemen north of 15° North Latitude. The three main tasks to be accomplished were a) a groundwater survey; b) an Earth Resources Technical Satellite (ERTS) study; and c) a mineral survey. The mineral survey was later cancelled because another donor was doing a similar project.

The project was started in FY 74 and was expected to have a three-year life. It has been extended twice from October 1, 1977 to March 31, 1978, and from April 1, 1978 to March 31, 1979. The last revision incorporated certain elements including the institutionalization of a Department of Hydrology (DOH) under the Yemen Oil and Mineral Corporation (YOMINCO), a quasi-YARG organization. A later April 1979 revision of the project agreement has since been signed extending the completion date to June 30, 1981.

During the initial period of the first extension, the project was under the direct control and management of USAID. During that period the ERTS study was completed. Of the 5,000 geologic maps to be provided USAID by the United States Geological Service (USGS), 150 have been received and the balance are enroute.

However, USGS has failed to provide USAID/Yemen with a report on the Amran Basin Water Resource. The USGS project manager departed Yemen in October 1977 with the understanding that a draft report would be completed within six months. Although repeated efforts have been made by USAID and AID/W to obtain copies of the report, no copy had been received as of April 30, 1979.

Recommendation No. 8

We recommend that the Assistant Administrator/Near East make representations to the USGS at a sufficiently high level to cause preparation and transmission of a USGS report on the Amran Basin Water Resource to USAID/Yemen.

Inability of AID/W to execute a PASA agreement with USGS for a project manager and a PSC for a journeyman hydrologist has prevented the achievement of several targets of the project. PIO/Ts for these positions were submitted to AID/W in August 1978. Project implementation called for a USGS project manager to be on board in January 1979. The USAID has since been advised that USGS is unable to assign a project manager/hydrologist to a long-term position with the project. Delays have also been encountered in the recruitment of a journeyman hydrologist. Although the PIO/T was submitted to AID/W in August 1978 the position had not been filled as of the time of our audit. However, AID/W has negotiated a PSC and the contractor will be on board in May 1979.

In the meantime, items such as selecting participants, procurement of equipment, on-the-job training, and lower-level institutionalizing of the Department of Hydrology (DOH) are targets being hampered due to lack of technical assistance.

Notwithstanding some of the problems noted above, progress has been made in meeting some of the project objectives. Notably, the transfer of project activities to the YOMINCO on August 1, 1978, wherein the DOH is now located. As of April 21, 1979, DOH had a staff of 22, including 13 professionals. Three of these professionals had received training under the project prior to its transfer from the Ministry of Agriculture to YOMINCO.

YARG input to the project through the Ministry of Agriculture has been limited. Planned YARG inputs to the project for the period FY 74-77, were estimated to be \$716,000, consisting of contract services, commodities and other costs. However, in discussing this matter with the USAID project manager, we were advised that their input was nil, except for the use of two drilling rigs, that the YARG had obtained from another donor.

A 1978 revision of the Project Agreement provides for an additional YARG input of \$130,000. This consists of salaries for 17 Yemeni staff members (\$75,000), office equipment and supplies (\$5,000), and other costs (\$50,000). The other costs are to be provided in kind and consist of such items as office facilities, maps and aerial photographs required for project activities. A follow-on project has also been negotiated and the YARG has agreed to substantially increase their inputs.

c. Water Supply Systems Management (Project No. 279-0028)

The basic objective of this project is to develop the National Water and Sewerage Authority (NWSA) into an effective authority, capable of managing, planning, constructing and operating the urban water and sewerage systems of YARG.

The project will address this objective primarily through
1) provision of a U. S. consultant team to advise NWSA and provide on-the-job training to NWSA employees for a period of 42 months; and 2) training, both in and out of country, to meet NWSA personnel needs at professional and technical levels.

A total of 180 work-months of consultant services are planned for the project. In addition, a total of 500 work-months of overseas training are proposed. Twenty-one Yemenis will be programmed for overseas training, which will consist of both degree and non-degree training.

Implementation of the project has encountered delays since the signing of the Grant Agreement on August 31, 1977. The principal factors contributing to these delays are 1) the YARG's inexperience in international contracting as well as their own bureaucratic delays; and 2) their inability to quickly satisfy Conditions Precedent.

The YARG has experienced delays in finalizing a Host Government Contract primarily because of their inexperience in international contracting and particularly because of their unfamiliarity with AID requirements and regulations. Although this has been time-consuming, progress has been made. NWSA approved the Technical Management Services, Inc. contract on April 23, 1979. Following a review of this contract and AID/W approval it is expected that contract signing will take place in May, 1979. In the meantime, YARG has entered into a short-term contract with Haskins and Sells for financial advisory services and also a Host Country TCN contract with a Sudanese National to serve as a training advisor.

The thrust of this project will be institutional building.

d. Taiz Water and Sewerage Construction (Project No. 279-0039)

The basic objective of this project is to assist, along with other donors, in the financing of the construction of a water and sewerage system which will provide adequate services for the City of Taiz.

The project consists of a well field development (source of water), renovation and expansion of existing water system and construction of a new sewerage facility. Other inputs are procurement of materials and equipment and engineering supervision of the construction work. Total estimated cost of the project is \$77 million, of which the AID contribution is a \$10 million grant. Other donors' contributions are estimated to be \$40 million and YARG input is estimated to be \$27 million. The AID contribution will be used primarily to finance design and construction supervision costs plus equipment, material, and installation costs for the electro-mechanical phase of the project.

Implementation of the project encountered delays due to difficulties in the bidding process stemming from multi-donor financing and YARG delays in meeting Conditions Precedent. In other areas of the project, progress is being made. A Host Government Contract with Hazen and Sawyer was signed on November 7, 1978. Hazen and Sawyer were already in Yemen performing work on a prior Contract. Therefore, they were able to begin work immediately on this contract. The contract is for additional engineering and construction supervision and is being funded out of the USAID Grant.

A major action relating to project implementation was the signing of a construction contract between YARG and Stevin Co. (a Dutch firm) on April 3, 1979. Stevin Co. is the prime contractor for the project. A sub-contractor, Twombly, who will perform the electro-mechanical phase of the project and will be funded from the USAID grant, expects to sign a Host Government Contract in May, 1979, with mobilization about September 1979.

3. Rural Development (Project No. 279-0031)

The purpose of this project, which is being implemented by a Specific Support Grant (SSG) to Save the Children Federation (SCF), is to encourage village and community development activities in two local districts of the Governorate of Mahweit. SCF is to apply their techniques of local community development. In effect, this will be an innovative attempt to approach rural development from the grass roots level in Yemen where central government action in the field is minimal. Through March 31, 1979, \$1,040,000 has been obligated for the project and \$257,000 has been expended.

The SSG was obligated in September 1977 but SCF did not begin staffing the project until January 1978 when three staff came on board. It was not until August 1978 that SCF was able to provide the five required expatriate staff. SCF planned to recruit 11 semi- or professional Yemenis for key positions but to date, 8 months before scheduled project completion, SCF has been able to recruit only 3 Yemenis.

The Grant Agreement requires SCF to provide five reports each year. SCF is delinquent in providing the required narrative and indicator reports and the available reports are not management useful because they lack discussion of achievements, problems or proposals. Comprehensive, meaningful SCF reports are necessary to enable USAID/Yemen to adequately monitor this project.

Project implementation is about one year behind schedule. USAID officials acknowledge the delay and attribute it to unrealistic goals, SSG staffing problems and a lack of familiarity with doing business in Yemen.

The project is currently being evaluated with the evaluation showing that the benchmarks and output indicators of the grant must be revised. In view of the many problems and delays to date, we feel USAID/Yemen should evaluate implementation and determine if a one-year extension would enable SCF to reasonably meet project goals. Possibly SCF should have only the remaining period of the SSG and the project should be concluded on schedule.

Recommendation No. 9

The Director, USAID/Yemen should require SCF to submit all progress reports now due and not extend the project unless the evaluation now in-process indicates that extension is warranted.

4. Development Training I and II Grants
(Projects Nos. 279-0020 and 279-0040)

The Development Training Program funded by USAID/Yemen consists of two Grants. The first Grant was signed on April 29, 1973. Cumulative Obligations to date amount to \$2,395,000 of which \$2,275,000 has been expended.

The purpose of this Grant was to strengthen the YARG and private sector services through participant training of middle management and senior level officials in such areas as administration, finance, economics, planning and development as well as technical specialities. The basic

objective was to provide management and technical training to selected government and private sector officials who will occupy positions of responsibility in those YARG ministries, agencies, and institutions directly concerned with economic development and resource management.

The second Grant is a continuation project and represents a seven-year assistance effort of approximately \$15 million that will send at least 88 Yemeni students per year abroad for long-term and short-term study.

Of these 88, approximately 20 will be sent to the U. S. for graduate training; 20 to American University of Beirut (AUB) for under graduate programs; 25 to an Arabic-speaking university for undergraduate programs; 20 for specialized short-term training and three for conferences, particularly in the U. S.

This follow-on project is aimed specifically at assisting Yemen in its efforts to develop human resources required for Yemeni institutions. Before a participant is approved for training, an agreement is signed by the participant, by the Yemen Government and by AID ensuring that the participant will return to the original Ministry, institution, or agency for a period of time at least twice as long as the training period.

An additional component of the project will be a provision for two human resources planners to assist in institutionalizing within the YARG Central Planning Organization a Human Resource Planning Unit that will have the capability to assess human resource needs within the government and more effectively arrange future training programs.

Initial Grant funding for the second training project was provided on February 27, 1978 in the amount of \$1,522,000. Since that time, two amendments have been signed increasing the total funding to \$4,274,220.

A total of 267 participants have received training under both Grants of which 109 have completed their training and 158 are still in training. The following table provides a breakdown of training status as of March 31, 1979:

<u>Area of Training</u>	<u>In Process</u>	<u>Completed</u>	<u>Total</u>
Graduate (US)	38	4	42
Undergraduate (US)	22	5	27
Undergraduate (Third Country)	88	-	88
Short-Term	10	100	110
Total	<u>158</u>	<u>109</u>	<u>267</u>

USAID/Yemen officials advised us that of the eight long-term trainees who have completed their training, five are working for the YARG in appropriate positions, two have recently returned and are not yet working and the last one is enrolled in medical school at AUB. In this latter case USAID/Yemen officials indicate the YARG selected, and is funding the Medical School training of the participant now at AUB. USAID is also asking the YARG to ensure that the participant receives further training in public health and they do approve of this plan with the understanding that the participant will fulfill his training obligation after completing medical school. In our test checks, we also verified the employment status of two of the above five YARG placements and found they were working in appropriate positions that would require utilization of their training.

Overall, both training projects seem to be accomplishing their basic goals and objectives except that very few follow up evaluations have been made and there is no organized basis for conducting a participant follow-up program as required by AID Handbook No. 10. At the present time, USAID officials advised that they intend to contract with an individual for follow-up services instead of developing an in-house capability.

Recommendation No. 10

We recommend that the Director, USAID/Yemen establish an in-house capability to conduct a Participant Training follow-up program in accordance with the provisions of AID Handbook No. 10.

SUMMARY OF PROJECTS SHOWING OBLIGATIONS
EXPENDITURES AND PRIMARY FUNCTION
AS OF MARCH 31, 1979
(\$ 000)

<u>Project Title</u>	<u>Project No.</u>	<u>Obli- gations</u>	<u>Expendi- tures</u>	<u>Primary Function</u>
67 Taiz Water Rehabilitation	279-0017	\$ 378	\$ 378	Infrastructure
2 Sorghum Production	279-0018	267	267	Infrastructure
43 Poultry Development	279-0019	1,826	1,751	Some Institution Bldg.
69 Training for YAR Development	279-0020	2,395	2,275	Institution Building
53 Sana Emergency Water Supply	279-0021	743	743	Infrastructure
Rural Water - Community Self Help	279-0022	3,690	3,597	Some Institution Bldg.
62 Rural Water Supply (Support)	279-0022.1	1,203	1,203	Infrastructure
— Pre-Development Studies (Feasibility Study Taiz Water & Sewerage)	279-0023	432	432	Infrastructure
2 Tropical & Subtropical Horticulture	279-0024	1,098	695	Infrastructure
0000 ? Water & Mineral Survey of North Yemen	279-0025	2,072	1,639	Infrastructure
— Project Development and Support	279-0026	66	65	Infrastructure
Taiz Water & Sewerage Design	279-001- 002+003	1,350	1,350	Infrastructure
66 Taiz Water & Sewerage Design	279-0027	185	185	Infrastructure
Water Supply Systems Management	279-0028	2,986	124	Institution Building
31 Agriculture Research & Development	279-0030	2,377	1,665	Infrastructure
200 Rural Development (CDF OPG)	279-0031	1,040	257	Some Institution Bldg.
— Special Development Fund	279-0033	44	42	Infrastructure
51 Al-Olofy Hospital (CRS OPG)	279-0034	100	100	Unknown
51 Health/Nutrition (CRS OPG)	279-0035	496	316	Unknown
51 Taiz Water/Sewerage Construction	279-0039	10,000	683	Infrastructure
100 Development Training II	279-0040	4,274	504	Institution Building
100 Land Classification/Soil Survey	279-0042	486	30	Infrastructure
		<u>\$37,508</u>	<u>\$18,301</u>	

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

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We recommend that the Assistant Administrator for the Near East review the above described management constraints and take appropriate action if it is determined that the unique conditions existing in Yemen warrant more intensive corrective action from AID/Washington sources.	12
<u>Recommendation No. 2</u>	
We recommend that the Director, USAID/Yemen determine the actual amount of YARG contributions to AID-funded projects in Yemen and require the YARG, where necessary, to meet the 25 percent minimum contribution to total project costs or obtain appropriate waivers of that requirement.	13
<u>Recommendation No. 3</u>	
We recommend that the Director, USAID/Yemen establish appropriate procedures to ensure that the 25 percent cost sharing requirement is actually met in the future or that waivers are obtained for each project or activity where the requirement will not be imposed.	13
<u>Recommendation No. 4</u>	
We recommend that the Director, USAID/Yemen take action to phase out current practices of funding local project employee salaries and salary topping-off expenses.	14
<u>Recommendation No. 5</u>	
The Office of Contract Management AID/W should expedite contract extension of the University of Arizona contract in order that suitable replacement research candidates can be obtained.	18

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<u>Recommendation No. 6</u>	<u>Page No.</u>
The Director, USAID/Yemen should take action to require the participant in question to fulfill his project employment responsibilities or obtain a refund from the YARG for the full cost of his training.	20
<u>Recommendation No. 7</u>	
The Director, USAID/Yemen should require the contractor for the Horticulture Improvement Project to prepare and submit a detailed work plan that will ensure adequate implementation of the project. If an acceptable workplan is not made available within a reasonable period of time we recommend the project be terminated.	21
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We recommend that the Assistant Administrator/Near East make representations to the USGS at a sufficiently high level to cause preparation and transmission of a USGS report on the Amran Basin Water Resource to USAID/Yemen.	23
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<u>Recommendation No. 10</u>	
We recommend that the Director, USAID/Yemen establish an in-house capability to conduct a Participant Training follow-up program in accordance with the provisions of AID Handbook No. 10.	29

REPORT RECIPIENTS

USAID/Yemen

Director 5

AID/W

Auditor General 1

Auditor General, Office of Policy, Plans and Program
(AG/PPP) 1

Communications and Records Office (C&R) of the AG/EMS 12

Assistant Administrator/Near East (AA/NE) 1

Office of Near Eastern/North African Affairs (NE/NENA)
(Yemen Desk) 3

Bureau for Near East/Executive Management Staff (NE/EMS) 1

Assistant Administrator/DS (AA/DS/SA) 1

Office of International Training (DS/IT) 1

Office of Development Information and Utilization (DS/DIU) 4

Deputy Administrator (DA/AID) 1

Office of Contract Mgmt. (SER/CM) 1

OTHER

U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO/W) 1

Inspections and Investigations Staff (IIS/Karachi) 1

Area Auditor General/East Africa 1

Area Auditor General/West Africa 1

Area Auditor General/East Asia 1

Area Auditor General/Latin America 1

Area Auditor General/Egypt 1

Area Auditor General, AID/Washington 1