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**THE AGRICULTURAL DELIVERY SYSTEMS PROJECT  
IN SOMALIA HAS MADE LITTLE PROGRESS  
TOWARD ITS ORIGINAL OBJECTIVES**

**Audit Report No. 3-649-84-15  
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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Introduction

During 1977 and 1978, the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), in collaboration with the United Nations Development Program/Food and Agriculture Office (UNDP/FAO) and AID, designed the Agricultural Extension and Farm Management Training project. The project's goals are to increase production of the main food crops grown in Somalia: sorghum, maize, rice and sesame; and to raise average crop yield by expanding cultivated land area. It is a multi-donor project being implemented through the Somalia Ministry of Agriculture. The primary objectives of the project are (1) revitalization of the National Extension Service (NES) under the Ministry of Agriculture; (2) establishment of a Farm Management Extension Training Center (FMETC); and (3) formulation of a national agricultural research policy.

The AID component of this multi-donor project, called the USAID/Somalia Agricultural Delivery Systems project, is to assist in the accomplishment of the multi-donor project objectives. AID is providing to this multi-donor (World Bank, African Development Fund and the European Economic Community) project technical assistance, training and commodities to the NES, FMETC, the Central Agricultural Research Station at Afgoi, the station at Bonka and two extension training centers. Its purpose is to strengthen Somalia's agricultural extension capabilities through better trained agricultural technicians knowledgeable in adapting improved technology to Somali conditions and capable of delivering improvements to small farmers in Somalia.

The project grant agreement was signed on August 18, 1979 for an amount not to exceed \$7.752 million. The agreement was subsequently amended increasing AID's contribution to \$8.635 million. As of March 31, 1984, AID expended \$4,630,000.

### Purpose

The purpose of the audit was to (a) evaluate how well the project was progressing toward meeting goals and objectives; and (b) ensure that AID-provided resources were being utilized as planned and in conformance with applicable laws, regulations and agreements.

## Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Implementation of the Agricultural Delivery Systems project has not proceeded in accordance with the plans outlined in the project paper. Project implementation was delayed because of numerous problems. As a result, little progress has been made toward developing a Somali capability to promote and support sustained increases in food crop production.

During the first year of the project, the NES, although operating more or less in all ten agricultural regions of the country, was able to transmit little to farmers in the way of improved and economically usable technology. These problems and lack of progress were due primarily to the project design, an inappropriate extension methodology, delayed construction of training facilities, a two year delay in signing of the technical assistance contract, counterpart/contractor conflicts and a lack of coordination between donors. Accordingly, the project was revised in August 1983.

The revision calls for greater involvement of the Research Service to identify changes that can be introduced in farming systems and to determine how farmers can be induced to make these changes. Although the project has been revised, we feel that if past failures and problems cannot be overcome, USAID/Somalia should terminate the project and deobligate the remaining AID funds (see pages 5 to 8).

Other matters which need to be addressed are:

- The Project Management Unit (PMU) within the GSDR responsible for overall commodity management has not established an adequate system to control and account for the purchase, receipt, utilization and inventory of project commodities. As a result, it was impossible to account for all of the commodities purchased for the project. In view of the large amount of AID-funded project commodities yet to be purchased, further procurement of project commodities should be suspended until the PMU designs and implements an adequate commodity management system (see pages 8 to 10).
- An adequate system does not exist to ensure that routine periodic vehicle maintenance is performed. Unless regular service is performed, project vehicles will prematurely wear out and assistance funds will have been wasted. Also, control procedures need to be implemented to preclude the unauthorized use of AID financed repair facilities from being used to repair privately owned or other non-project vehicles (see pages 10 to 11).

Approximately \$1.49 million of AID funds had been expended for project commodities of which a significant amount is now excess to project needs. This is because major program changes reduced the technical assistance team from eleven to four persons. In some instances the commodities should not have been purchased. Accordingly, USAID needs to take action to determine which of the current AID-financed commodity inventory is excess to project needs and to transfer the excess to other AID-financed projects in Somalia or disposed of by other appropriate means (see pages 11 to 12).

At the conclusion of the audit, we discussed our findings with USAID personnel. Also, we sent a draft report to USAID for their written comments. Their views expressed during the exit conference and in response to the draft were duly considered, and where pertinent, have been included in this report.

## BACKGROUND

Somalia's 638,000 square km area consists of 42 percent unusable land, 45 percent rangeland, and 13 percent potentially arable land. Erratic rainfall ranges from less than 55mm to an occasional 600mm annually, but averages less than 450mm in the agricultural areas. Only two rivers of importance, the Juba and the Shabelle, flow through the country. Groundwater resources, though largely unexplored by modern methods, are believed to be limited and of variable quality. Partial or total crop failures caused by inadequate rainfall reportedly occur in some parts of the country in 2 out of every 5 years.

Somalis use less than ten percent of the 8.2 million hectares of arable land for cultivation. Agricultural technology, considered rudimentary, involves no marketed inputs, and relies on family labor and simple hand tools. Sorghum is the most important crop, followed by maize and sesame in the higher rainfall areas. Together, these three crops account for 90 percent of the cultivated area.

Irrigated agriculture is practiced mostly in large units that average 600 hectares in size, are generally state controlled and are partially mechanized. Starting in the early 1970's, and especially after the severe drought of 1973-75, the state farms became a major component of the government's attempt to achieve greater food security. Plagued by mismanagement and shortages of qualified technical personnel, these farms became a burden on the national budget.

Lack of qualified manpower also characterized the Ministry of Agriculture and its various subdivisions, including the Agricultural Research Institute (ARI) and the Department of Production and Extension. In 1977 the Extension and Training Service had no field agents, and was incapable of helping farmers to improve their production systems. The ARI had a limited and unstable staff that was virtually confined to the centrally located irrigated station at Afgoi and remained far removed from the problems of rainfed production.

1/ One hectare equals about two and one-half acres.

In 1977-78, the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), in collaboration with the United Nations Development Program/Food and Agriculture Office (UNDP/FAO) and AID, designed the Agricultural Extension and Farm Management Training project. The project's goals are to increase production of the main food crops grown in Somalia: sorghum, maize, rice and sesame; and to raise average crop yield by expanding cultivated land area. It is a multi-donor project implemented through the Somalia Ministry of Agriculture. It was designed to create a delivery system having three critical parts: a trained manpower base to deliver the technical package; an institution for supervising, coordinating, managing and supporting the extension agents; and a research arm to provide a constant stream of proven technologies for the system to pass on to farmers. The project focuses on three institutions, the National Extension Services (NES), the Farm Management Advisory Service, and the Farm Management Extension Training Center. The purpose of the project is to provide these critical institutions with the capability to provide the technical outreach in the agricultural sector.

The project consists of the following components:

1. The National Extension Service - In order to improve the production technology of the private farmers, the NES would be strengthened by the establishment of a headquarters at Afgoi. Two extension training centers would be upgraded, one each at Bonka and Janale, to train field extension agents and an extension methodology would be introduced which emphasizes regular contact with farmers and continuous training of extension personnel.
2. The Farm Management Advisory Service - To improve the performance of the state farms, a Farm Management Advisory Service (FMAS) was to be established at Afgoi. It would ultimately become a branch of the NES and would provide technical and managerial back-up to existing and newly trained farm managers and advise the government on large scale farming and related issues. The FMAS was to operate a 400 ha. demonstration state farm at Janale and would have access to two other existing state farms nearby to update their management.
3. The Farm Management Extension Training Center - A Farm Management and Extension Training Center (FMETC), including a 60 hectare farm, was to be built at Afgoi to provide both classroom and practical training to university and high school graduates in agriculture prior to their employment in the NES as regional officers, subject matter specialists, and district officers, and, as FMAS managers, assistant managers, and field managers for the state farms.

4. Training Abroad - A program of training abroad was to be carried out to prepare the Somali technicians who would eventually replace the expatriates and to otherwise strengthen the public agencies serving agriculture. The program was to include postgraduate training for 38 Faculty of Agriculture graduates; study trips for 52 district extension officers and six senior NES and FMAS personnel; and field visits for six senior staff members of the Ministry of Agriculture.

5. Research Strategy - A master plan for strengthening the Agricultural Research Institute and its links with extension was to be elaborated. It would develop research programs for later implementation.

6. Central Statistics Department and Afgoi Agricultural Secondary School - Technical assistance, training abroad and material and equipment were to be provided to strengthen the Afgoi Agricultural Secondary School (AASS) and to the Central Statistics Department (CSD) of the State Planning Commission. The school was to be a major supplier of trainees to the FMETC, while the CSD would contribute to proper monitoring of agricultural sector activities.

7. Project Management Unit - A Project Management Unit was to be established at Afgoi to implement the project and monitor its progress on behalf of the Ministry of Agriculture.

The total cost of the multi-donor project amounts to \$33.2 million. AID's \$8.6 million share represents 26 percent of total project cost. The GSDR will contribute \$3.8 million in salaries and taxes in addition to nearly 1,000 hectares of land and buildings as in kind contributions. Other major donors and their contributions include the World Bank (\$10.5 million), the African Development Fund (\$8.8 million) and the European Economic Community (\$1.5 million).

The USAID Agricultural Delivery System project is AID's component of the project. The grant was approved on July 27, 1979 for an amount not to exceed \$7.752 million. The original project agreement was signed on August 18, 1979. The agreement was subsequently amended, increasing AID's contribution to \$8.635 million. AID's contribution under the original project agreement consisted of providing (1) technical services for the elaboration of the agricultural research strategy; and (2) technical assistance, training abroad and some vehicles, machinery, equipment and miscellaneous items required for the establishment of NES and FMETC. The AID component of the project was revised in August 1983. Details regarding this revision are discussed in detail in the first section of the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations section of this report.

Under the revised project, AID's project budget allocates \$4.2 million to technical assistance, \$1.0 million to training, \$3.0 million to commodities, \$.2 million to research strategy, \$.16 million to other costs and \$.04 million to contingencies and inflation. As of March 31, 1984, AID expended \$4,630,000.

#### OBJECTIVES, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The objectives of the audit were to (a) evaluate how well the project was progressing toward meeting stated goals and objectives; and (b) ensure that AID-provided resources were being utilized as planned and in conformance with applicable laws, regulations and agreements. Audit work was performed in Somalia during March and April, 1984 and covered the period August, 1979 through March, 1984.

Our audit included a review of project files, an interview with regional World Bank officials in Nairobi, Kenya; and review of pertinent reference material at the Regional Economic Development Services Office library also located in Nairobi. Our on-site review included (a) review of the USAID's official files, which included procurement records and contracts; (b) discussions with USAID/Somalia officials, contractors, GSDR officials, and other project donor officials; and (c) other verification procedures considered necessary.

The review was made in accordance with the Comptroller General's standards for audit of governmental programs and accordingly included such tests of the program, records, and internal control procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Poor Project Design And Implementation Have Resulted in Poor Project Progress

Implementation of the project has not proceeded as planned in the project paper. Little progress has been made toward developing a Somali capability to promote and support sustained increases in food crop production.

Accomplishments, although delayed, have been primarily in the area of training. A case in point is the academic training program. At the time of our audit, 17 long-term participants were attending universities in the United States out of 18 planned. The remaining participant has not been selected. Also, other short-term training abroad has been provided. In addition, the Utah State University technical assistance team has provided an extensive amount of training to NES field agents as well as district and regional officers. Training has included lectures on extension philosophy and methodology, crop and livestock production, irrigation practices, soil management and farm management.

Although extensive training has been provided to the NFS, little usable technology has been transmitted to farmers. This is due primarily to the lack of consideration in the project paper for the extension service to receive support from the agriculture research service. According to the project revision dated August, 1983, the designers of the project assumed that a number of sound research recommendations were available which, in combination with common sense, could be used by the extension service and the FMAS to raise productivity without increasing risks to the producers. Actually, few recommendations, agronomically and economically adapted to Somali conditions, have been identified. Consequently, extension messages have been based largely on recommendations that have not been verified and on the U.S. experience of the expatriate specialists which, although considerable, is of only marginal use to Somali producers.

Another example of lack of adequate planning and foresight relates to the extension methodology which was to be used. The project paper prescribed that the NES would adopt a methodology that emphasizes continuous training of extension personnel and regular contact with farmers. This training and visitation (T&V) system called for NES headquarters staff to define the messages that should be transmitted to farmers over a given period of time, and to communicate these messages to the regional and district extension officers at monthly training sessions. These officers, in turn, would hold fortnightly training sessions for the field extension agents who would be expected to visit a predetermined number of farmers daily (four

days a week). The T&V system also assumed the existence of a network of research stations whose staff would develop and continually expand the content of the messages.

Experience to date indicates that the T&V methodology may not be appropriate for Somalia because of the large size of the country, its poor road network, the high cost of fuel, and the shortage of skills and facilities for vehicle maintenance and repair. This shortage of mechanical skills is so critical that it has been necessary for the project to recruit a U.S. mechanic to organize a garage and train its staff. Also, in the absence of improved technology that has been reliably adapted to local conditions, and in the absence of the capacity to produce such technology, both the need for and the high cost of the training sessions may well be questioned.

In addition, according to an internal evaluation conducted by REDSO/ESA and the USAID in December, 1982, the project designers were oblivious to the inordinate time required to construct training facilities. In their judgement, the project designers were inexperienced and used little forethought in scheduling implementation activities. In view of the delay in implementation of the civil works component, the contract team had to lease living quarters in the capital city of Mogadishu and use temporary training facilities there. As a result, the training program suffered from lack of adequate training facilities as well as practical farm training.

In discussions with senior AID officials, we were told that the IBRD had prepared a complete appraisal before requesting AID to participate in financing of the program. Since AID was just beginning their assistance program and had no current experience in Somalia, the IBRD appraisal was accepted with only limited review. Deficiencies in USAID management and lack of coordination were also cited as causes for implementation problems and delays.

Other problems which delayed project implementation were (1) a two year delay in signing the host country contract for technical services with Utah State University because of lack of host country contracting capability, (2) the planned number of trainees for the FMETC program were not made available by the agricultural secondary school and faculty of agriculture nor were those made available proficient in English, and (3) a low level of rapport between the contractor and GSDR counterparts.

Because of poor project design, the project was revised in August, 1983. The revision represents a shift in the organization of the project, but not in its purpose. Although it calls for the involvement of the research service, it is not meant to be a research project. The work to be performed is to

identify changes that can be profitably introduced in farming systems and to determine how farmers can best be induced to make these changes. Under the revised project, USAID will no longer finance inputs for the establishment of the Farm Management and Extension Training Center (FMETC) as originally designed. As a preservice training institution, it would be largely redundant and thus wasteful, since most of the courses it would offer are already being taught at the Faculty of Agriculture and at the strengthened Afgoi Agricultural Secondary School.

The FMETC will become instead an in-service training center. Except for the staff of the training division of the NES, the FMETC will not have its own permanent staff. Consequently, AID financed specialists who were in Somalia and assigned to the FMETC have been phased out. AID assistance will be limited to short-term technical assistance. In addition, AID will provide some of the basic commodities needed to equip and operate the center as well as the workshops and the demonstration farm at Afgoi.

AID assistance to the NES will be aimed at producing economically applicable technology, the training of functionally competent extension personnel and the development of an extension system which can both meet farmer's needs and be supported financially by the GSDR.

The applied research and extension program will be centered at the Central Agricultural Research Station (CARS) at Afgoi, where experimentation in both irrigated and rainfed production can be carried out, and at the Bonka Station which is rainfed only. The program will be carried out with the participation of selected farmers representing the various farming systems. From the CARS in Afgoi, program operations will be extended to the Extension Training Center (ETC) in Janale, and, as soon as human and other resources become available, to the Johar ETC.

Since the project has been revised, it is too early to say whether the project will achieve its objectives. According to USAID as well as contractor officials, they will be in a better position to assess project accomplishments and achievements after they have gone through one seasonal harvest under the revised project. Based on the lack of project accomplishment to date, the lack of infrastructure (roads, vehicles, etc.), and recurring cost problems, we have serious reservations that developing improved technology and training extension personnel will have much if any long term impact on agriculture production. Therefore, we feel that implementation of the revised project should be looked at closely after the one seasonal harvest and if past failures and problems have not been overcome, USAID/Somalia should terminate the project. We will look at project progress again in connection with a food

and nutrition sector review planned for Somalia in fiscal year 1985.

Controls Over Project Commodities Need To Be Improved

The Project Management Unit (PMU), the entity within the GSDR responsible for overall commodity management has not established a system to control and account for the purchase, receipt, utilization and inventory of project commodities. Thus, it was not possible to account for all of the commodities purchased for the project. USAID has been unsuccessful in getting the PMU to implement such a system.

The original financial plan for the project provided \$1.37 million in AID funds for commodities. Under the revised project agreement, a total of \$3.0 million is budgeted for commodity procurement. As of March 31, 1984, a total of \$1.49 million was expended. The vast majority of funds expended to date have gone for vehicles, appliances, furniture, and spare parts.

The USAID has done a good job of tracking commodities from the time the PIO/Cs were prepared until the commodities arrived in country and were turned over to the PMU. However, at this point, the PMU has not established a system which adequately accounts for the purchase, receipt, distribution and utilization of the commodities. Although USAID has made repeated efforts to get them to do so, they have been unsuccessful to date. The reason is that the PMU does not want controls. In other words, without controls they have more flexibility and latitude in the use of the commodities.

In late 198., an inventory of household appliances and furniture was made. As a result of this inventory, a listing of appliances and furniture at each of the project furnished homes was prepared. Also, an inventory listing all household effects at the main warehouse was made. However, they are not being updated. Also, we found no evidence that these inventories were reconciled with the PIO/Cs. In testing the validity of the warehouse listings, we attempted to account for selected items on the warehouse inventory. We found it impossible to reconcile our physical count with the warehouse inventory listing because the stock was commingled with previous project stock, part of the inventory was stored in shipping containers at the PMU vehicle maintenance garage and serial numbers were unavailable.

At the PMU vehicle maintenance garage, a much better system had been installed to control the spare parts inventory. Work orders and stock record cards were used to control inventory and recorder parts. In order to test the validity of the stock

record cards, we selected 15 items to count. We were unable to reconcile the stock record cards with our physical count for 10 of the 15 items selected. We find this especially significant in view of the volume of spare parts (over 3,000 different items) being stocked. Although we are not attempting to project our sample to the remaining inventory, we do believe that it is indicative of the significance of the problem. In our opinion, part of the problem is that a physical inventory has never been taken.

Control over AID financed vehicle usage also needs to be improved. This is especially significant in view of the number of vehicles purchased. A total of 19 vehicles (pickups, Blazers and Suburbans), 50 motorcycles, and 13 motorscooters were purchased. The only control over vehicles is a listing showing location and to whom it is assigned. Although USAID issued a vehicle policy statement in April 1983, it is not being complied with except for those vehicles assigned to the Utah State University team.

We were unable to ascertain why the policy has not been adhered to. The policy requires that a log book be kept in each vehicle. The person assigned the vehicle is responsible for keeping the log book, recording the date, mileage and purpose of each trip.

Further, responsible project officials told us that many of the vehicles are used for other than project purposes. For example, AID financed vehicles have been seen outside areas where they are to be used. It was estimated that 75 percent of motorcycle and 100 percent of motorscooter use was for non-project purposes. Contract personnel told us that the motorscooters are really not practical nor do they function well in the sandy conditions prevalent in Somalia. We were unable to ascertain why these vehicles were purchased other than they were planned in the project paper.

#### Conclusion and Recommendation

An adequate system has not been established to control and account for the purchase, receipt, utilization and inventory of AID financed commodities. USAID has been unsuccessful in getting the PMU to implement such a system. Accordingly, we believe that in view of the large amount of commodities yet to be purchased under the project with AID funds, USAID should withhold further funding of project commodities until the PMU designs and implements an adequate commodity management system.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 1

USAID/Somalia should immediately withhold further funding of project commodities until the PMU designs and implements an adequate commodity management system to control and account for the purchase, receipt, utilization, distribution and physical inventory of project commodities.

Vehicle Maintenance Program Needs To Be Improved

Although a central garage facility which the PMU operates has been established in Mogadishu, an adequate system does not exist to ensure that routine maintenance is performed. Without regular maintenance, project vehicles will become unserviceable prematurely and AID funds will have been wasted.

In addition to not having a maintenance system, many of the project vehicles (especially motorcycles) are located in the field where they are not easily accessible for routine maintenance.

Many privately owned vehicles are serviced and maintained at the PMU garage (supported by project funds). One garage employee estimated that of the approximately 30 vehicles a week being serviced at the central garage, 5 are non-project vehicles. We learned that in many instances, AID financed spare parts are used to repair these vehicles. As substantiation, we noticed two privately owned vehicles (Volkswagen bug and Suzuki) under repair during our site visit to the garage. One garage employee told us that in many instances the spare parts used to repair privately owned vehicles are taken from project stock. He assumed that any parts used for this purpose were charged against one of the project vehicles. Accordingly, the garage records did not reflect the extent to which spare parts were being misused.

Although a vehicle log book containing information on vehicle maintenance is to be kept for the vehicle, this is not being done. Also, a recently initiated maintenance record card system at the PMU garage is neither being properly maintained nor has a card been established for all vehicles. We found that only seven maintenance records cards had been prepared. Many of the required entries on these seven cards had not been recorded, such as mileage, repair parts, and nature of service. We were unable to ascertain why the maintenance record card system was not being properly maintained other than poor management.

## Conclusion and Recommendations

USAID/Somalia should take action to ensure that a maintenance system is established and implemented. This system should include sending a mechanic with spare parts to the field periodically to maintain and service field vehicles (primarily motorcycles). Also, controls should be established to preclude non-project vehicles from being admitted to the garage area for unauthorized repairs or servicing.

### RECOMMENDATION NO. 2.

USAID/Somalia should take action to ensure that the PMU establishes and implements a routine maintenance system which includes procedures for maintaining field based vehicles.

### RECOMMENDATION NO. 3

USAID/Somalia should ensure that the PMU establishes and implements a policy that prohibits non-project vehicles from being repaired or serviced at the PMU maintenance facility.

## Some AID-Financed Commodities Are Excess To Project Needs

As of March 31, 1984, approximately \$1.49 million of AID funds were spent for project commodities. Some of these AID-financed commodities are excess to project needs. This was because the technical assistance team was reduced from eleven to four persons. In some instances, the commodities should not have been purchased in the first place. These excess commodities include furniture and appliances, agricultural tools and machinery, and a printing press with related supplies and spare parts.

Over \$350,000 in AID funds has been expended for furniture and appliances. Originally, the furniture and appliances were purchased to furnish the quarters of the 11 Utah State University team members as well as the guest house at Baidoa. Also, office furniture was purchased to furnish the PMU's offices. In accordance with the revised project agreement, 7 of 11 of the Utah State University positions have been eliminated. Accordingly, most of the furniture and appliances are now excess to project needs.

In addition to what had been put in the quarters we noted that household effects, much of which was new, were stored in the central PMU warehouse. We found numerous refrigerators, air conditioners, ranges, washers and dryers still in the cartons. Many of the pieces of furniture were either new or in like new condition. USAID officials agreed that much of the furniture and appliances is now excess to the project's needs. Furthermore, they told us that there is a need for furniture and appliances on other AID-funded projects in Somalia.

We also found that approximately \$46,500 was spent for agricultural tools and machinery which has limited application on this project. Some of the equipment requires an old fashioned tractor with a belt pulley to power it which is unavailable in Somalia. According to contractor and USAID officials, they are looking for possible uses for this equipment but they are not optimistic that any of it can be put to practical use. This equipment was bought over two years ago by a former USAID project officer. No one in USAID could provide us with an explanation as to why it was purchased. The official files shed no light on the matter. USAID officials agreed that the equipment should not have been purchased.

The printing press is another example of nonuse of commodities. It was purchased along with related supplies and spare parts at a cost of \$60,000. According to USAID officials, it was purchased to reproduce training materials to be used at the FMETC. Under the revised project, USAID is no longer financing inputs to FMETC as originally planned. Thus, there is no need for the printing press.

#### Conclusion and Recommendation

USAID has not taken appropriate action to identify and dispose of commodities excess to project needs. We believe that USAID should determine which of the current commodity inventory is excess to project needs. Thus, USAID should initiate action to have it transferred to other USAID projects in Somalia or declared surplus and disposed of by other appropriate means.

#### RECOMMENDATION NO. 4

USAID/Somalia should determine which of the current AID-financed commodity inventory is excess to project needs and initiate action to have it transferred to other USAID projects in Somalia or declared surplus and disposed of by other appropriate means.

Sufficient Information Is Not Available At USAID To Adequately Monitor Participant Training Progress

USAID does not have sufficient information to evaluate each participant's progress in the project's participant training program. Although USAID has sent several cables requesting progress reports from United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the federal agency assigned monitoring responsibility for project participants, USDA has not responded. At the time of our audit, 17 long-term participant trainees were attending universities in the United States. It had been over a year since they had received any status reports on 6 of the participants. One individual had been in the U.S. for about 19 months without USAID receiving an academic report. Without progress reports, the USAID cannot assess whether the participant should continue in the program.

In accordance with AID Handbook 10, Chapter 5, the Office of International Training (DS/IT) has overall responsibility for establishing participant training policy and guidelines in coordination with AID Missions, Bureaus and Offices, and for the management of direct training participants and their programs in the United States. In the management of participants, DS/IT utilizes its resources and those of other federal agencies and contractors while maintaining responsibility within DS/IT for overall performance. Thus, it remains the responsibility of several project managers in S&T/IT to provide direction and management to assure that outside services are performed in a satisfactory and timely manner.

Conclusion and Recommendation

Although USAID has on several occasions erroneously attempted to obtain progress reports directly from USDA, we found no evidence that they had ever attempted to obtain the information directly from DS/IT, who has responsibility for obtaining the reports from USDA. Accordingly, we believe that USAID should request the reports from DS/IT so that participants' progress can be monitored.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 5

USAID/Somalia should request from DS/IT the reports needed to monitor participants' progress.

List of Recommendations

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<u>RECOMMENDATION NO. 1</u>	10
USAID/Somalia should immediately withhold further funding of project commodities until the PMU designs and implements an adequate commodity management system to control and account for the purchase, receipt, utilization, distribution and physical inventory of project commodities.	
<u>RECOMMENDATION NO. 2</u>	11
USAID/Somalia should take action to ensure that the PMU establishes and implements a routine maintenance system which includes procedures for maintaining field based vehicles.	
<u>RECOMMENDATION NO. 3</u>	11
USAID/Somalia should ensure that the PMU establishes and implements a policy that prohibits non-project vehicles from being repaired or serviced at the PMU maintenance facility.	
<u>RECOMMENDATION NO. 4</u>	12
USAID/Somalia should determine which of the current AID-financed commodity inventory is excess to project needs and initiate action to have it transferred to other USAID projects in Somalia or declared surplus and disposed of by other appropriate means.	
<u>RECOMMENDATION NO. 5</u>	13
USAID/Somalia should request from DS/IT the reports needed to monitor participants' progress.	

List of Report Recipients

	<u>No. of Copies</u>
<u>Field Offices</u>	
USAID/Somalia	5
REDSO/ESA	2
<u>AID/Washington</u>	
AA/M	1
AA/AFR	5
AA/PPC	1
LEG	1
GC	1
AA/XA	1
IG	1
AFR/EA	2
M/SER/COM	2
M/FM/ASD	2
PPC/E	1
PPC/E/DIU	4