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AN EVALUATION OF THE CO-FINANCING PROJECT

No. 493-0296

OF USAID/THAILAND WITH THE
PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

Submitted by:

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. Problem and Overview. In the overall development strategy of the RTG there is interest in multiplying and improving local-level private sector development efforts. A history of voluntarism exists in Thailand and the buddhist encouragement of "making merit" through acts of generosity support this interest in involving private voluntary organizations (PVOs) in development activities.

B. U.S. Assistance. During the period of 1976-79, AID funded 18 PVO projects in Thailand under the Asia Regional Project, "Private and Voluntary Organizations. In 1980, the PVO Co-Financing Project was initiated to continue this funding (Project Number 493-0296; \$5 million over 5 years). PVO Co-Financing was to allow project review, approval and funding to occur at the Mission level, thus giving AID flexibility to respond to PVO proposals in less time. Each AID supported PVO project is reviewed by the RTG through the Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation which, in turn, clears it with the appropriate Ministries and governmental agencies.

C. Purpose of Evaluation. The purposes of this evaluation are 1) to assess the extent to which the project purpose has been achieved; 2) to assess the management of PVO sub-projects; 3) to assess the effectiveness and impact of PVO sub-projects; 4) to assess the effectiveness of the sub-project approval process; and 5) to make recommendations for the design of PVO Co-Financing II.

The evaluation team, consisting of two U.S.-based private consultants, reviewed all project documents, interviewed appropriate AID, RTG and PVO headquarters staff, met with PVO operational staff and visited project sites of fifteen projects.

D. Findings.

1. The PVO Co-Financing project has been effective and should continue into a second phase. A number of lessons have been learned about PVO work in Thailand which can be used to good advantage in the coming phase.

2. The financial management practices of the PVOs were good, while their progress reports were often late and sometimes non-existent.

3. The weakest aspect of PVO projects is in their project designs. While the agencies are good at identifying needs and target groups, they frequently fail to specify reasonable outcomes for their project efforts that can be assessed through monitoring and evaluation.

4. AID supported PVOs in Thailand have been effective in reaching the rural poor and many have worked with the poorest of the poor.

5. The projects we reviewed varied widely in their definitions and degree of participation and, in only two cases, the mode of participation seemed important to the distribution of benefits.

6. All projects except one have left behind a sustained aspect of activity. These ranged from new institutions, to on-going groups, to strengthened government activities.

7. Little replication has taken place from the projects reviewed. Many aspects would justify replication; the problem lies in a failure to disseminate lessons learned.

8. Direct support to IPVOs was not increased through the Co-Financing Project.

9. Staff assignments and responsibilities in AID O/HRT are unclear and in transition, and work loads are undermining staff morale.

10. The belief that PVOs are "management intensive" for AID was not borne out in our review.

11. Project selection criteria are more complicated than necessary and the selection process should be clarified.

12. Approval time for PVO sub-projects appears not to have been shortened by the Co-Financing arrangement.

13. The number of sub-projects receiving AID support, the funding schedules and project costs appear appropriate.

E. Recommendations and Policy Implications for USAID

1. USAID/T should concentrate its PVO management time on the design phase of projects and should encourage careful consideration of outcomes and impacts and ways of assessing these during and after projects.

2. AID O/HRT should undertake a review of staff responsibilities to clarify these. No additional staff should be hired until this is done.

3. The selection process for projects should be regularized and the selection criteria should be simplified and published to the PVO community.

4. USAID/T should determine its priority on strengthening Thai PVOs and make appropriate management arrangements to support its decision.

5. USAID/T should support an effort to collect and disseminate lessons from project experiences which warrant replication.

6. In project design, AID should encourage the use of revolving loan funds; insist that market research be done prior to any plans for production or training; and ensure that leadership training and community development efforts incorporate an action component around which changes in participants' skills may be assessed.

II. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Identification Data

1. Country: Thailand
2. Project Title: PVO Co-Financing
3. Project Number: 493-0296
4. Project Dates:
 - a. First Project Agreement: 11/16/76
 - b. Final Obligation: 8/31/84
 - c. Project Activity Completion Date (PACD): FY 85
5. Project Funding:
 - a. A.I.D.: \$5,000,000
 - b. Other Major Donors (PVOs): \$4,000,000
 - c. Host Country Counterpart Funds: \$1,000,000

TOTAL \$10,000,000
6. Mode of Implementation: PVO Co-Financing to Registered U.S. and Thai PVOs (103, 104, 105, 106)
7. Project Design: Primary Responsibility of PVO with Consultation with USAID/T and RTG/DTEC
8. Responsible Mission Officials:
 - a. Mission Director: Robert Halligan
 - b. Deputy Director: Carol A. Peasley
 - c. Project Officer(s): Robert Traister (outgoing)
Thomas L. O'Connor
9. Previous Evaluations and Reviews: None of Co-Financing Project
10. Cost of Present Evaluation:

Contract: \$33,373

B. List of Sub-Projects Reviewed

1. Catholic Relief Services (CRS)/Women's Development Through Non-Formal Education/493-8021-T
2. International Human Assistance Programs (IHAP)/Youth Development/493-0296-G-SS-1005-00
3. International Human Assistance Programs/Reaching the Unreached--Thailand's Deaf Community/493-0296-G-SS-1035-00
4. National 4-H Council/Development of Rural Youth Agricultural Clubs (4-H/Y-K)/493-7017-T
5. National 4-H Council/Y-K Promotion Foundation Initiating (YKPF)/493-0296-G-SS-1048-00
6. National 4-H Council/Y-K Thailand/493-0296-G-SS-1005-00
7. National Council of Women of Thailand (NCWT)/Promotion of Rural Development Through Women/493-8015-T
8. Overseas Education Fund (OEF)/NFE for Low Income Women in Northeast Thailand/493-0022-T
9. Pearl S. Buck Foundation (PSBF)/Amerasian Outreach/493-8008-T
10. Pearl S. Buck Foundation/Assistance to Amerasians/493-9021-T
11. Thai Hill-Crafts Foundation (THCF)/Hilltribe Youth Leadership Training/493-8004-T
12. The Asia Foundation (TAF/MALAN)/Rural Infant and Child Care Centers/ASIA-G-1305
13. Tom Dooley Heritage Foundation (TDH)/Development of Ban Nam Yao Hospital/493-9026-T
14. World Education, Inc. (WEI)/Integrated NFE to Promote Development Among Hilltribes in Northern Thailand/493-7002-T
15. YMCA/Rural Vocational Training and Nutrition Project/493-0007-T

III. MAJOR CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Following are summary statements and condensed discussions of our major conclusions and recommendations. The body of the text provides the data and information on which these are based.

A. AID Management

I. Project Design

Recommendation: We recommend that AID put more of its PVO Co-Financing management time into working with the PVOs in the conceptualization and design phases of their proposal development.

Discussion: PVO project designs we reviewed were almost consistently weak, especially in defining reasonable outcomes and impacts and devising ways of assessing these during and after the project. We recognize that there is a sensitive balance to be achieved between assuring that the quality of project design is adequate to warrant AID support and giving AID too much involvement in or control over PVO activities. We do not recommend, therefore, that AID initiate projects or promote project directions. Rather, the origination of project ideas, the determination of target groups, goals and approaches should all remain with the PVOs. When a PVO comes to AID with a proposed project, however, it should be incumbent on AID to be sure that the proposed design--the methods and goals--are as well thought through as possible and that they have access to and reflect the learning which is available from past experiences. AID is in a particularly good position to accumulate lessons from a comparison of projects precisely because it funds a range of PVOs. It,

therefore, has a responsibility to accumulate these lessons and aid others in applying them to subsequent project design for overall improvement.

Well designed projects also facilitate monitoring and evaluation.

II. Project Approval Process

Recommendation: We recommend that the review process be clarified and regularized and that the selection criteria be reworked, simplified, and publically announced to the PVO community. We further recommend that records be kept on the reasons for project approval and rejection.

Discussion: There is some variation and lack of clarity in the project approval process which leaves AID open to criticism regarding the bases on which decisions are made. It is important to have a clear system for project review which ensures that each receives sufficient attention to anticipate difficulties and incorporate past learning. It is also important, however, that the selection criteria not be dogmatically applied, but that the review committee retain enough flexibility and independence to be able to respond to new ideas and new designs.

III. Project Personnel

Recommendation: We recommend that AID recognize the central role of PVO staff in project success and that AID 1) analyze the importance of staff roles in project effectiveness at the time of project design; 2) if it is of particular importance, take special care in reviewing the PVO's proposed method of staff recruitment and training to be sure that there is

a high probability of finding effective staff; 3) put emphasis in project design on training, orientation and in-service support of untested staff; and 4) consider developing an orientation program for PVO staff who are new to AID or Thailand.

Discussion: On many, many occasions, people remarked to us that PVOs' project success depends almost entirely on their staffs. Often they would cite an example of a badly designed project which was saved by a creative staff or a good project which was ruined by a bad staff. It is our experience that both of these things do happen at the extremes. Between remarkably good and remarkably bad staff, however, are many who may be helped to do a good job by sufficient support and a well thought out project design.

IV. O/HRT Staffing

Recommendation: We recommend that a careful review of responsibilities, job definitions and relationships be carried out by O/HRT to clarify work loads and areas of responsibility.

Discussion: There is some confusion about the roles and work loads of staff in O/HRT resulting from a recent loss of two staff people and the period of transition from one Director to another. Our review of the PVO projects led us to conclude that these projects are not intrinsically management intensive as is often claimed. We noted also that staff in O/HRT are heavily overworked, yet we could not find clear designations of responsibilities nor agreement among various staff about the proportions of time they spend on various tasks. We conclude that it is important to

clarify and rationalize these functions in order to work effectively and to improve staff morale. No additional staff should be hired until such a review is complete.

V. 25% Counterpart Funds Requirement

Recommendation: We recommend that the present 25% counterpart funds requirement stand as is without modification.

Discussion: All projects meet the 25% counterpart funding requirement and it does not pose a barrier to any PVO proposing a project for AID funding. There is a great variation in the ways the 25% is provided reflecting the variety of funding arrangements among the PVOs. While these funds do not always come from the PVO, they do provide non-AID support for the projects. We do not see any way in which strengthening the requirement to mean that the PVOs actually contribute the 25% would improve the program. This might in fact hinder PVO participation.

VI. Project Duration

Recommendation: We recommend that the PVO office seriously re-examine the implicit rule of approving projects for no more than three years.

Discussion: Three years is too short a period to make some significant social and economic changes. If the approval of longer projects is not possible we recommend that AID/T remain flexible in granting both more time and money to projects in the form of extensions and amendments. A portion of each year's allocation could be earmarked to meet these needs.

B. Programmatic Recommendations

These recommendations are based on our observations of the sub-projects. They incorporate program elements we see as particularly successful or problematic in the PVO context.

1. Projects providing general leadership training should include an action component which provides the opportunity to use what has been learned.

Our thinking on this recommendation comes from a number of sources. In pedagogical terms the inclusion of a practical component reinforces the learning of concepts. Often leadership training courses do not have a clear idea of how the skills they teach will or could be used. Adding an action component will require the PVOs to make the connection between what they are teaching and how it is to be used as they design the project. By making this connection, project evaluation becomes more straight-forward and the criteria for assessing success become clear.

2. We recommend the use of revolving loan funds to provide small amounts of money for income generating project start-ups.

A third of the sub-projects we examined have revolving loan funds (CRS, NCWT, IHAP Youth Development, 4-H/Y-K I, and 4-H/Y-K II). We were impressed with the impact or potential impact of this component. Most of the loan funds were carefully monitored, applicants were well chosen, and the people supervising the funds provided help in writing feasible loan requests. A carefully monitored revolving loan fund provides continuing support for local projects. The interest on loans can increase the fund or be earmarked for community development projects. Revolving loan

funds require careful planning to assure funds are allocated equitably, that they are used as planned, and that they are repaid. Their impact is potentially large but they must be well planned.

3. Projects with income generating components should incorporate market research into the project proposal.

Most projects handle marketing or job placement in an ad hoc way. There is little prior planning as to the marketability of products or skills. PVOs plan to train people for jobs, or to initiate production of goods (often crafts, but also foods) without first determining the job opportunities, in that area, for use of the skills or the access to or stability of the markets for the goods. Many projects made costly mistakes because they failed to do this market testing as they designed their activities.

4. Lessons on marketing and management gained through PVO experience should be collected and disseminated to other PVOs undertaking similar activities. Each PVO develops its skills from experience, often repeating other PVO's mistakes. For example, poultry raising, especially of the new broilers, is one element in the YMCA, 4-H/Y-K I and II, and OEF projects. Marketing the chickens was always difficult and commercial chicken feed was expensive. All three projects have drawn the same conclusion: that though it appears profitable to raise high quality chickens, it often is not. The experience of the PVOs in areas such as this should be collected, organized, and made generally available.

There are two possible approaches to this information collection and sharing. One way is to organize a committee of PVOs with these experiences to work together to provide general information on types of

markets available, how to do basic market research, etc. In addition to these guidelines for the PVOs, simple explanations of general business information--simple accounting, inventory keeping, responsibilities of borrowing, etc., should be produced for project participants. However, this type of committee work could take more time than the individual PVOs are able to give and competition among PVOs could make such cooperation difficult or impossible. Alternatively, an outside PVO with marketing skills could be brought in to work with the local PVOs and coordinate their efforts. The outside PVO must be sensitive to the Thai context and willing to accept the local PVOs experience in past marketing or job placement ventures. The choice between these alternatives depends on the local PVOs' interests and on the availability of funds for an outside PVO.

IV. INTRODUCTION

A. Approach to Evaluation

The purpose of evaluation, in our view, is to accumulate past experience in a thoughtful and systematic way so that future decisions may be based on and informed by that experience. Its justification is developmental--i.e., that it is possible to learn from the past in order to do better in the future.

Our job is to evaluate the USAID/T PVO Co-Financing Project to determine 1) if AID's funding to Private and Voluntary Organizations activities in Thailand is accomplishing what AID intends for it to accomplish, and 2) if AID's intentions for PVO projects in Thailand are reasonable and based on an accurate assessment of PVO capabilities. To do this, we reviewed 15 of the 40 projects which have been supported by AID in Thailand in order to gain some sense of their specific intentions and outcomes. (Summary reports of these 15 are found in Appendix D). However, as is surely clear to all our readers, it was not possible to do an in-depth impact evaluation of 15 projects in the five weeks of our assignment. Our approach, therefore, was not to judge each project as a success or failure per se. Rather, we examined each project in the light of all the others and in the light of AID's stated goals for the Co-Financing project in order to look for cumulative lessons, from comparative experience, which could be useful in future PVO programming and funding.

Whenever one is doing an evaluation, it is important not to misuse the advantage of hindsight simply to judge the past. Our approach was to try to understand as thoroughly as possible the considerations and factors that went into past decisions at the time they were made and the context

and constraints on past actions that influenced the projects as they were carried out.

We have found that this approach has several advantages. First, by becoming aware of the influences on decisions and actions in the past, it is possible to filter and judge these same influences more consciously in the future. Second, if it is possible to see where constraints appeared in past projects, anticipation of these in the future can lead to much clearer and technically superior project design. And, third, most project staff and participants also like to try to understand why things happened the way they did in the past so that they will usually engage in this kind of exploration with much greater openness than they would into a backward looking judgment on success.

Finally, we have written this report with a focus on AID policy toward and involvement with PVO programming in Thailand rather than on individual PVOs and project types. We have looked for the indicators of probable project effectiveness in the project designs, evaluation and reporting plans, organizational arrangements, and conceptual approaches of all the projects we have reviewed. By comparing these and the outcomes of so many projects, we have been able to draw some conclusions about things which are more apt to work, ways to gain impacts commensurate with costs of both time and money, and factors in project design and conceptualization which are critical influencers of outcomes. This is the advantage of comparative study. However, the application of these lessons will have to be carried out sensitively and flexibly in actual circumstances by the able staff of the PVO office of USAID/T.

B. Methodology

1. Team

The scope of work called for a 5-member team consisting of an economist with knowledge of PVOs, an anthropologist, an AID representative, an RTG PVO representative, and a Thai PVO representative. Problems of timing and other work of the AID Mission reduced the team to two U.S. based evaluators, Dr. Mary B. Anderson, an economist and team leader, and Dr. Nicola Tannenbaum, an anthropologist. Consequently, the team visited each site together, rather than dividing into two groups. Each site visit was shorter than ideal and some issues could not be examined in depth. Nevertheless, the team was able to investigate all the issues raised in the scope of work (see Appendix A). Without the able support of the Mission PVO office this would not have been possible.

2. Approach

The team spent 2 days with the Washington Asia Bureau going over the scope of work and preparing for the evaluation. Ms. Sharon Pines and Ms. Maureen Norton from the Bureau prepared the briefing.

After arriving in Bangkok and being given a more detailed briefing on the projects to be evaluated, the team developed the following list of issues to be raised for each project.

- a. How well did the project fit with the selection criteria for PVO Co-Financing projects?
- b. Who chose the project? Did AID, the RTG, or the PVO initiate it?
- c. How much time elapsed from the first mention of the idea (when available) or first draft of proposal to approval?

- d. Did the PVO make the required 25% contribution to project costs?
- e. What were the projects' direct and indirect costs?
- f. Were the reporting requirements met in a timely and adequate way?
- g. Did the project terminate on time or did it require an extension?
- h. How adequate was project planning and design, including scope of project statement, expected outcomes, timing--the ability to reach the goals in the time period of the project?
 - i. How adequate was the project's technical design?
 - j. Who were the project beneficiaries? Were they limited by gender, by class, by access to resources? Did the project actually reach the intended beneficiaries?
 - k. What was the impact of the project? Did it do what it set out to do? Were the project goals suitable? Did the project use suitable methods to achieve its goals?
 - l. Was the project replicable? Has anyone else used the same methods? Has anyone asked for advice from the PVO in designing similar projects?
- m. Did elements of the project survive after its end? What was sustained and how?

The projects to be examined were chosen by the Mission PVO Officer from a list selected by Maureen Norton when she developed the scope of work. (See list of PVO projects in Appendix D.) The selected projects include some projects begun under the Operational Program Grant (OPG)

program, some terminated projects, some projects considered a success by the Mission PVO Officer, and some considered failures. The Mission PVO Officer felt that the selected projects covered the full range of PVO activities.

3. Schedule

The team spent three days in Bangkok reading project files, interviewing Mission staff, and establishing the schedule for the rest of our visit. Given the number of projects, each file was read by only one team member. (See Appendix E for list of Mission staff and others interviewed.)

The following five days were spent visiting projects in the Bangkok area/or interviewing the Bangkok based staff of up-country projects. Three projects are based entirely in Bangkok, while all but one of the rest maintain Bangkok offices.

The team made three field trips spending three days in Nan and Phitsanuloke (two projects), five days in the North (five projects) and three days in the Northeast (three projects). (See Appendix F for schedule of team activities.) Some projects were direct extensions or outgrowths of others so that one visit covered the current project and its predecessor.

During site visits and interviews, the team member who read the particular project file directed the interview. This person also wrote the project report found in Appendix D. The second team member monitored the interview and made sure all the topics were covered. In field visits where it was possible to interview participants in the project, Tannenbaum concentrated on these interviews while Anderson interviewed the project staff. (See Appendix D for individual project reports.)

V. PROJECT CONTEXT

A. Country Context and Development

Thailand has an area of 514,000 sq. km. with a population of almost 50 million. Population density is 273 persons/sq. km. of arable land. Between 1970 and 1981 the total fertility rate fell from 5.6 children per average family to 3.7. Child mortality is 30 per 1,000 and infant mortality remains a serious problem at 60-70 per 1,000 live births (compared with 12 in North America, 16 in Europe, 67 in Latin America, 121 in Africa and 91 in Asia as a whole). Thailand's average GNP growth rate between 1970 and 1980 is estimated at 7% by the AID publication USAID/Thailand: Partners in Progress (p. 6) and at 18.08% by the Far Eastern Economic Review, 1983 Asia Yearbook (p.7). Average annual per capita income in Thailand is \$875 compared with \$1,797 in Malaysia, \$170 in Burma, \$520 in Indonesia, \$160 in Vietnam.

The problems of development are not evenly distributed in Thailand. With approximately 10% of the population, the Bangkok metropolitan area has 70% of Thailand's doctors. Forty-nine percent of the country's districts have no doctors. Fifty-seven percent of all infants 0-5 years of age suffer from some protein-calorie malnutrition. The problems are particularly acute among the hilltribes of the Northern region who make their livings through slash and burn agriculture. Even more serious is the poverty in the Northeastern region where one third of Thailand's population lives and one half of the poor population lives. Investment and government services lag in this area, rainfall is irregular and inadequate, and hundreds of thousands of refugees have crossed the borders into Thailand from neighboring countries.

B. AID Responses

From FY 1976 through FY 1979, the USAID Asia Regional Project funded 18 projects of private voluntary organizations in Thailand. In 1980, the PVO Co-Financing Project (493-0296) was initiated "to multiply and improve local-level development efforts in Thailand within the priority sectors of AID assistance (Food and Nutrition, Health and Population, and Education and Human Resources Development) by promoting PVO development activities which are consistent with and in support of AID strategy." (p. 1, PVO Co-Financing Project Paper, May 1979). The Co-Financing Project was to build upon the previous experience with AID support of PVO projects in Thailand. By allowing all review, approval and funding to occur at the Mission level, Co-Financing was intended to give greater flexibility to the Mission in supporting PVOs, to allow for greater responsiveness to PVO requests for support and to reduce processing time for these decisions.

C. PVO Program Focus in Thailand

Volunteerism in Thailand is based in the Thai Buddhist concept of "making merit" which encourages generosity to create the conditions for a favorable rebirth. In addition, the Royal Family, and other wealthy people emulating the Royal Family, undertake a number of charitable and development oriented activities to help the poor. These factors lend support to the increasing emergence of PVO activity in Thailand.

On the other hand, concern with communist infiltration and organization in the more remote villages and hills has led to a kind of suspicion and official reluctance to sanction PVO activities that are village-based and focussed on grass roots organization and participation.

Thus, ambivalence toward PVO activity seems to persist within certain agencies and departments of the RTG and no overall government/PVO policy has emerged. While there are almost 500 Thai PVOs operating in Thailand, only about 50 of these are active in any real sense.

The forty PVO projects supported by USAID since 1976 have been focussed in the areas shown in Table I (many of these projects had more than one component; they are listed here by primary focus only):

TABLE I: Focus of 40 PVO Projects Supported by AID

General Community Development.	16
Training/Education	10
Credit Creation.	1
Food and Nutrition	3
Agricultural Development	6
Training for PVOs	1
Health Care.	<u>3</u>
Total	40

Of the 15 projects we examined in this evaluation, the division is shown in Table II:

TABLE II

Focus of AID-Supported PVO Projects Included in Evaluation

General Community Development.	6
Training and Education	4
Food and Nutrition	1
Agricultural Development	3
Health	<u>1</u>
Total	15

VI. SUB-PROJECT APPROVAL AND MANAGEMENT PROCESS

A. Process

USAID Order AID:HB 13-2 of March 28, 1979, specifies the Policy and Procedure for Projects to receive OPG and Co-Financing support (see Appendix B). In summary, the process requires:

1. Any PVO submitting a proposal to AID must first be registered and eligible with AID and the RTG.
2. A PVO should submit a concept paper for informal review by AID/T. (Prior to 1979, no concept paper was required.)
3. After agreement on the concept paper, the PVO submits a proposal.
4. RTG/AID Review Committee consisting of representatives of USAID, DTEC, NESDB and other concerned technical ministries review the proposal.
5. USAID Sub-Committee consisting of representatives from Office of Human Resources and Training (O/HRT), Office of Program (O/PRO), Office of Project and Engineering Support (O/PES), Office of Finance (O/FIN), and concerned technical office(s) review proposal and recommend approval or disapproval of USAID Director.
6. If approval is recommended, O/HRT either notifies Washington requesting funding (for OPGs) or drafts a grant agreement (for Co-Fi).

The timeline proposed for these steps from initiation to approval is fifteen or more weeks (see Appendix B).

A memorandum of 2/11/83 alters this process to state that when AID agrees to a concept paper, it forwards this to DTEC for approval in

principle (now worded as "non-objection") before a full proposal is developed. DTEC then confers with the relevant agencies within the RTG to determine their concurrence with the project concept. When AID approves a final proposal, DTEC again consults with appropriate RTG agencies. Work with Hilltribes is singled out to require prior clearance by the PVO with the Ministry of Interior before even a concept paper may be considered. DTEC is also to be involved in project follow-up and evaluation.

The 1983 memorandum reflects, in part, the practice which preceded it. In about half of the projects we reviewed, no concept paper was submitted but early discussions about project ideas and their probable interest to AID were carried out between PVO representatives and staff of AID. Project proposals were then circulated to members of the USAID Project Review Committee which regularly included the USAID Director (since Robert Halligan's arrival), the PVO Officer (Bob Traister), PVO Project Officer (Khun Lawan), a member of the O/PES (Dr. Basharat Ali) and a member of the Finance Office (usually John Coughlin). Technical personnel were sometimes consulted but not always. Written comments on the project proposal were invited from these committee members. If these were generally supportive and/or only minor questions were asked, the Committee was not called into a meeting but the PVO Office staff negotiated suitable changes in the proposal. In the majority of cases the Committee did not actually meet but the written comments were felt to be sufficient for approval. It is impossible to tell which projects proceeded without a meeting of the Review Committee since no records are kept of these

meetings. In addition, no records are kept of proposals which are rejected so we could not know the reasoning behind the rejections. When the Committee had serious questions about a proposal they did meet, and, often, a representative from the proposing PVO was invited to be present for the discussion.

When the USAID review was completed, a copy of the proposal was then forwarded to DTEC with a letter asking for approval (or "no objection"). When this was secured (which occurred in all but one instance), the AID Director signed his approval and the grant was drafted and signed.

Average time lapse for the process in the fourteen projects we reviewed was 7.9 months. (One project is omitted from this calculation because the time lapse of one month which the file shows is clearly not accurate and memories are not clear either.) From the first recorded contact in the files until the contract signing for each project is shown in Table III.

TABLE III: Time Lapse for Project Approvals

<u>Project</u>	<u>Source of Funds</u>	<u>Approval Time</u>
Y-K I	OPG*	1 month
THCF	OPG	1 month
TDH	OPG	3 months
Y-K II	Co-Fi	3 months
WEI	OPG	4 months
PSBF II	OPG	4 months
NCWT	OPG	6 months
IHAP/RUR	Co-Fi	6.5 months
OEF	Co-Fi	7 months
IHAP/Youth Dev.	Co-Fi	8 months
PSBF I	OPG	9 months
Y-K PF	Co-Fi	11 months
TAF/MALAN	OPG	22 months
YMCA	Co-Fi	25 months
CRS	OPG	Omitted because records are not complete

*Some of these projects have an OPG and Co-Fi aspect. We have referred here to the initial grant procedure.

Six of the seven projects which took six months or less to approve are, surprisingly, OPGs.

TABLE III/B

Co-Fi Projects Approved Since those Included in Evaluation

TAF/Prince of Songkhle	7 months
YWCA/Vocational Training	6 months
TAF, Food & Nutrition Center	12 months
CRS Rural Develop. through NFE	9 months
WEI/S. Thailand Exp. Project	2 months
PSBF	6 months
IHAP Southern Youth Enterprise	4 months
SAVE	?
THCF II	15 months

Evaluation of the differences between the time required for OPG and Co-Fi approval is difficult. AID/T records concerning OPGs do not include information on discussions which took place in Washington. The average project approval time for all projects we examined was six months (n=21), with a standard deviation of 6.04; for Co-Fi the average was 9.19 months (n=13) with a standard deviation of 5.76; and for OPGs the average was 6.25 months (n=8), with a standard deviation of 6.88. (The 21 projects include 14 of the 15 we examined and 7 of the 9 projects funded after 1981 because the information on approval time for 2 projects was not clear.)

From this evidence we conclude that the expectations in March 1979 Order were not realized. Only one of the projects we reviewed fell within the guidelines for timing specified in the Order.

AID does not directly solicit or initiate project proposals. However, having decided in early 1983 to close off the review process after

the end of March, the PVO Officer did send a letter to the PVOs he knew of who had ideas and proposals in the pipeline to inform them of this deadline and to invite submissions before that date.

The average number of proposals explored or submitted each year of Co-Financing is estimated by different people as between 8 and 20, of which five have, each year, been approved. Of the 40 PVO projects supported by AID, 34 have been conducted by U.S.-based PVOs and six by indigenous Thai PVOs. Of the 25 grants of projects and extensions supported under the Co-Financing arrangement, 22 have been to U.S. agencies and three directly to Thai PVOs. (Several of the 22 grants to U.S. PVOs have been sub-granted to Thai organizations. This will be discussed under Section VII A on the Management Effectiveness of PVO Sub-Projects.)

B. Project Approval Criteria

Six project criteria are listed in USAID Order No. AID:HB 13-2 of March 1979 (Appendix B). These are:

1. Help bring about one or more of the following changes in communities and target groups: increased agricultural productivity through small farm labor intensive agriculture; reduced infant mortality; controlled population growth; greater equality of income distribution; and reduced rates of unemployment and underemployment;
2. Directly improve the lives of the target groups, especially the rural poor;
3. Have an education and training component and help increase the capacity of communities and target groups to plan and execute self-help local development;
4. Promise continued benefits following the end of the project and/or can be replicated elsewhere in Thailand;

5. Encourage and bring about local participation and financial support which along with the PVO's and other contributions would comprise a minimum of 25% of the project in-kind and financial costs. Merits of proposals being comparable, preference will be given to proposals having larger non-AID and sponsoring PVO contributions;

6. Are in consonance with the established priorities of the Royal Thai Government and USAID.

These six criteria have been revised on at least three occasions. None of these revisions has assumed permanent, agreed-to status, however. Additions have been made through the revisions. These include:

- productivity is increased
- women are included in development
- goals of project are realistic
- cost/effectiveness is assured
- time frame is appropriate
- approach is unique
- PVO characteristics (such as number of projects previously run in the country, experience of AID with PVO, indigenous, etc.) are weighed
- Relationship with government (worded as independence from government control in one listing) is assessed

No criterion in the original Order has been dropped.

It is impossible to compare the degree of compliance of projects approved with that of projects rejected because no files are kept of rejected projects nor of the reasons for the rejections.

It is clear from reviewing the fit of the fifteen projects that we examined with each selection criterion that few projects fit many of the

criteria and most projects only fit them in the broadest sense. This is reported on a project-by-project basis in Appendix D. While most projects have some kind of a training or educational component (only the Tom Dooley Hospital and MALAN projects did not), only one had any explicit concern with population growth (TDH). That is, there was no expectation--or evidence--that the greater the fit with the selection criteria the more likely a project was to receive AID support.

In addition, some of the criteria as they are now written confuse goals, methodologies and target populations all in a single criterion. For example, #1 from AID:HB 13-2 specified the goal of increased agricultural productivity, the method of labor intensive agriculture, and the target group of small farmers. It is exceedingly difficult to assess criteria and project fit when so many things are lumped together. An alternative way of listing AID's criteria is by categories as follows:

a. Target constituencies

- rural people
- women
- poor people
- small farmers

b. Methods of work or project approaches

- labor intensive agriculture
- education or training
- encouragement of local planning
- encouragement of local participation
- promotion of self-help activities
- promotion of financial contributions from local groups
- innovative, experimental, unique

c. Project goals

- increased agricultural productivity
- reduced infant mortality
- controlled population growth
- increased income equality
- reduced rates of under and unemployment
- direct improvement of lives of target groups
- increased capacity of target communities to plan and execute development projects
- increased incomes
- sustainability of benefits
- replication of project

d. Project context

- consonance with established priorities of USAID and RTG
- relationship with RTG agencies (listed as independence from in one revision of criteria)

e. PVO track record

- previous experience
- reputation
- new
- indigenous

f. Financial soundness

- cost/benefit ratio
- contribution of AID and of PVO/Others
- sustainability

g. Reasonableness of time frame

When all the criteria taken from all the revisions are listed in this manner, there are a total of 31 criteria! However, a project may be selected which meets only one criterion under categories a, b and c.

Selection criteria can either be very precisely specified and enforced, or they may provide useful guides to priorities and approaches. The plethora of criteria that has developed for PVO projects has meant that they are applied in only the most general way. People seem to have

in mind the general characteristics of a good PVO project and to look for these in proposals. It makes little sense for AID either to over-specify criteria or to operate so loosely as to make them virtually meaningless. The Selection Committee should consider carefully what its priorities for funding should be in Co-Financing II and set out the several, clear criteria which would be helpful in interpreting these priorities to the PVO community.

No PVO staff person whom we asked could give any precise representation of the current AID selection criteria. All thought that they might have seen a list at some time in the past, and each thought that he/she could roughly list them. Usually, they emphasized those that most closely fit their own agency's directions and approaches. None of these staff expressed any uneasiness with AID's criteria though some noted that the histories of relationships between their PVOs and USAID/T and/or the working relationships of their staffs with USAID PVO staff were more important in decisions about project approval than the stated criteria. Three people with whom we spoke were quite concerned about the potential for good projects to be turned down, or less good ones to be approved, on the basis of personal relationships between USAID and PVO staffs. Because we spoke only with people who had received support from AID, we think it probable that these concerns might be more prevalent among those whose projects were rejected.

C. Recommendations:

1. In order to prevent the personalization of project grants and to protect USAID staff from accusations to this effect, we recommend

closer adherence to the project review process by Committee. The collection of written comments on project proposals by Committee members prior to a meeting is sound and should be continued. In addition, written comments should be invited from appropriate USAID technical staff on a regular basis. Each project decision should be made in a meeting of the whole of the Review Committee and simple (hand written) notes should be kept of the major points determining the decision either to approve or disapprove.

In each case, project compliance with simplified selection criteria or reasons for overriding the criteria should be recorded.

2. To facilitate the assessment of fit with selection criteria, we recommend that they be reworked to specify categories of target groups, goals, methods, PVO characteristics, financial and time frame assessments.

We further recommend that thought be given, at this stage, to criteria by which effectiveness in 1) reaching target groups; 2) utilizing project methods, and 3) attaining project goals will be measured during and at the conclusion of the project. That is, we urge that monitoring and evaluation be built into project design and implementation.

Caveat. Even as we recommend that criteria be clarified and explicitly considered in the review process, we also note that the Review Committee should be free to respond to projects which may not fit the given criteria. For example, the IHAP Project with the deaf would not appear strong in relation to specified target groups in the current criteria (small farmers, rural poor, women, etc.) but it is among the best that USAID supports because it reaches a disadvantaged, unreached

group and empowers them to act for their own development. It is our experience that clarification of selection criteria is as important to making wise exceptions to rules as it is to application of these rules.

D. Indigenous PVOs:

Evidence above showed that few indigenous PVOs receive direct AID support and that Co-Financing has not served to increase this involvement. The Thai PVO people with whom we spoke uniformly indicated that the USAID proposal process and required reports are a barrier to their seeking and acquiring AID support. In some cases, Thai PVOs had used an American PVO as a front to handle these aspects of AID relations for them (CRS for the Foundation for the Promotion of Welfare for Women and Youth, U.S. YMCA for Bangkok YMCA, 4-H for Y-K and YKPF, TAF for MALAN). When the overhead costs of the U.S. PVO are reasonable, this may be a sensible use of U.S. PVO expertise and access. On the other hand, when these costs are high (as for TAF), the actual project benefits relative to costs are greatly reduced. Also, if USAID emphasizes the development and strengthening of indigenous PVOs, then continued reliance on U.S. PVOs to "front" in this way postpones the goal. Development of Thai PVOs is directly related to staff time. To encourage more Thai PVOs to apply for USAID funds, AID may either 1) provide support through its own staff or through contract staff to these PVOs for proposal writing, and subsequent reporting (including financial reports) or 2) undertake activities to develop the capacity of these PVOs to perform these functions themselves such as workshops, direct counselling services or in-service training.

We recommend that USAID/T clarify its policy regarding Thai PVOs and, if development of these PVOs is a priority, work out the necessary agreements with AID/W's rulings on IPVOs and initiate a support and training system appropriate to this goal.

E. USAID Staff Requirements:

We found it impossible to determine the staffing requirements for the O/HRT work with PVOs in the Co-Financing Project. We questioned people extensively about this, sought written job descriptions that would specify time allocations and responsibilities, and tried to ferret out the facts by cross-checking the various information that we got. No clarity emerged.

USAID PVO staff feel overworked. Most people believe that PVO support is "management-intensive." But estimates of time spent on different activities by different people varied so widely that we are forced to conclude that there is a genuine lack of clarity about responsibilities in the PVO Office.

Example: In two separate interviews, we asked the proportion of time spent by the Chief O/HRT on PVO support activities. One person answered 10-15% of time; the other answered 85-90%. These widely disparate answers reflected a serious problem with job definitions, responsibilities and time commitments.

We conclude that this confusion is counterproductive and undermining of staff morale and effective work, and we recommend that attention should be given to clarifying the management needs and staff time commitments in relation to PVOs. This is particularly important during

this period of transition from one Chief to another. Following are the issues we identify for further exploration and clarification.

1. We made a list of the projects we reviewed classifying them according to a scale of management time for USAID that they required ranging from Very Heavy to Very Light.

TABLE IV AID Management Time for PVO Projects

Very Heavy	Medium	Very Light
TDH	-----PSBF (2)	
	IHAP/Deaf _____	
	IHAP/Youth Dev. _____	
Y-K I	Y-K II _____	
	_____ YKPF (should have more)	
	_____ NCWT (should have more)	
	YMCA _____	
		TAF/MALAN
		CRS
	OEF	
		THCF
WEI		

This list is based on our rough comparison of time spent in approving projects, crises of management or personnel and issues surrounding programs which required AID attention, and was reviewed and agreed to by AID staff.

Only three of the fifteen projects required substantial time from AID. (In addition, one project was cancelled due to non-performance also occupying much AID management time.) IHAP/Deaf had a period of crisis but, since its resolution, has been very light in its requirements. Two projects were very light throughout. All others were in the medium to light range though we note that YKPF and NCWT could have used more AID direction, if a decision were made to help with Thai PVOs, than they actually received.

From the projects we reviewed, therefore, we do not find that PVO projects are highly management-intensive from AID's side. (This is not to say that they are not management-intensive from the PVO's side.) AID staff continue to disagree with us about this and indicate that much time spent does not show up in written form available to us as evaluators. This, we suggest, requires further examination and clarification.

2. The issue of AID management responsibilities raises the question of where AID time is best spent to maximize its effectiveness. Because of our concern with project design, discussed elsewhere, we urge that more AID time be concentrated at this point rather than in ongoing review. It is possible that more care taken in design and planning will lessen management requirements later. (Our own review does not confirm this, however, as there is no clear correlation between weakness of design

and heaviness of AID management time!) If five projects are approved each year, it would be possible to plan this time more systematically.

3. Based on our review and the lack of clarity about where time is now spent, we suggest that the addition of two staff to the O/HRT be postponed until job responsibilities are redefined.

4. We recommend that O/HRT staff keep time budgets for several weeks in order to clarify the demands on time. This would also show where the heaviest burdens fall. Seasonal factors should be considered in reviewing these.

We observed in our days around the office that staff are constantly busy and hard-working. Our suggestion is not to challenge or question the commitment of staff or their work. This is beyond question. Rather if time sheets are accurately kept, job designations may be clarified, overlap if it exists identified and reduced, and coherency in responsibilities achieved. Job satisfaction may also be increased by such a review.

5. Finally, any decision by AID to place higher priority on support and development of Thai PVOs will have implications for staff responsibilities and allocations of time. This decision should be made as the review of job responsibilities proceeds.

F. Project DurationTABLE V: Project Durations

<u>Duration</u>	<u>Of the 40 Projects</u>	<u>Of the 15 Projects Reviewed</u>
Less than 1 year	2	0
1 year	2	1
1½ years	3	2
2 years	4	2
2½ years	1	1
2 3/4 years	2	0
3 years	15	4
3½ years	3	1
4 years	6	3
4½ years	1	2
5 years	1	0

Most projects last three years (37.5% of all projects). While AID/T does not explicitly limit projects to three years, the duration is implicit in the budgeting process. As the Co-Financing period is five years, projects initiated in the later periods must be of shorter duration; the two 2 3/4 year projects were initiated in FY 83. Of the fifteen projects examined in detail, all projects lasting more than three years received extensions either to spend money already obligated or to get both additional time and money to achieve project goals. Half of the shorter projects also received extensions.

The frequent use of extensions has two causes. Delays in project start-up often result in unexpended funds at the projects' expiration dates, and these projects are usually allowed to continue in order to use the money to achieve project goals (see Section VII A-3 for further discussion). The other reason for extensions is that a project may

require both more time and more money to achieve its goals. In these cases (7 of the 15) the PVOs sought more AID funding, and six of the seven received additional AID funds.

These are management problems for AID and design problems for the PVOs. Extending projects beyond their termination dates and allocating additional funds limits AID/T's capacity to fund new projects. On the other hand, if additional funds are not allocated, the projects begun will not achieve their goals and the earlier monies may be wasted.

We recommend that the three year project period be re-examined. Projects seeking to make significant social changes often require more than three years. If the three-year period cannot be changed, then the PVO Office should be flexible in granting extensions and part of each year's funding allocation should be reserved for this purpose. The PVO Officer should also help the PVOs consider a reasonable length of time to allocate to project start-up in project designs, based on the experience of the past projects.

VII. MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT OF PVO SUB-PROJECTS

A. Management

1. Counterpart Funds

All projects have met or exceeded the 25% counterpart fund requirement. In most cases, 13 of the 15 we examined in detail, the counterpart funds are monetary; in 2 cases, goods and services constituted part of the 25% requirement. This 25% rarely comes entirely from the PVO. Often the money comes from RTG or other agencies. We suspect that on occasion the AID money is used to meet other agencies' counterpart funds requirement, while those funds help meet AID's requirement.

2. TABLE VI: Project Administration Costs

<u>PVO</u>	<u>Project</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Explanation</u>	<u>% of all AID funds to project</u>
1 WEI	Integrated Non Formal Ed.	\$15,870	45% of salaries	<u>8.8</u>
2 4-H	Y-k I	\$45,000	\$20,000 overhead \$25,000 direct administrative costs	<u>15.1</u>
	Y-k II	\$74,357	\$67,597 direct costs \$6,760 overhead, 10% of direct costs	<u>15.1</u>
	Y-k PF	\$39,675	\$26,325 direct admin. costs; \$13,350 - 10% of total direct costs	<u>26.8</u>
3 TAF	MALAN	\$78,116	32% of total direct costs; 12.6% of total expenditures	<u>24.2</u>
4 THCF	Youth Training	0	-----	0

2. TABLE VI (continued)

<u>PVO</u>	<u>Project</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Explanation</u>	<u>% of all AID funds to project</u>
5	PSBF			
	Amerasian Outreach	0	-----	0
	Assistance to Amerasians	0	-----	0
6	CRS			
	Non Formal Education	\$10,000	CRS Thailand admin. costs	<u>6.6</u>
7	TDH			
	Tom Dooley Hospital	0	-----	0
8	NCWT			
	Rural Develop- ment	0	-----	0
9	YMCA			
	Nutrition and Vocational Training	\$24,493	12% of total costs	<u>12</u>
10	OEF			
	Non Formal Education for Women	\$10,072	35% of total direct costs	<u>26</u>
11	IHAP			
	Deaf Project	\$11,000	65.14% of salaries and benefits	<u>18.5</u>
	Youth Develop- ment	\$57,546	69% of salaries and benefits	<u>22.6</u>

Average % of AID Funds for indirect costs = 11.7%

Average for 10 projects with indirect costs = 17.56%

The above table presents the administrative costs for the 15 PVO projects examined. The way in which the administrative costs are figured varies among the PVOs according to their direct negotiations with AID/W. Thus, the figures given here are not entirely comparable from PVO to PVO. The range of costs is wide, from 0-26.8% of all AID money. When more than

20% of the AID money is going to the PVO rather than the project, the management costs are too high. In these cases, AID/T should examine the project design to determine whether the project benefits from such institutional back-up warrant this expense. There may be projects which require large amounts of administrative or management support. If this is the case AID/T should determine whether the PVO is capable of providing such support. If these assessments are negative AID/T should raise this issue with the PVO and consider not funding the project. The 20% figure should not be a fixed cut-off point, but PVOs with higher administrative costs should be required to justify their receiving such money by the necessary back-up they provide to the project in question.

Most indigenous PVO's do not charge overhead. Consequently administrative costs are considerably lower when a project is run through or by an IPVO. This is not necessarily good, since project management is a problem for most Thai PVO's which frequently depend on volunteers who may be too busy to devote the necessary time to project paper work. In these cases, AID should urge that appropriate management be provided and be willing to pay for it with increased project funds.

3. Disbursement of Funds

There have been few problems with money disbursements. The sub-project budget process provided for reasonable levels of expenditures in conjunction with project goals. From the AID/T perspective there were few problems with the actual disbursements of funds.

Delays in project start-up often resulted in amendments which extended project duration to allow unexpended funds to be used for

project purposes. Of the 15 projects examined in detail, the following 8 projects received such extensions. 4-H/Y-2 I, THCF, YMCA, OEF, CRS, NCWT, PSBF Amerasian Outreach, and TAF/MALAN. This problem is addressed in the recommendation on project duration (Section VI/F).

4. Financial and Progress Reporting

PVO financial reports were usually required on a quarterly basis. The financial report for the previous quarter was required before the current quarter's funds could be released. Consequently financial reports were filed on time. These financial reports tend to be adequate though there are a few problems with accounting for the 25% counterpart funds.

Progress reports are more of a problem; 9 of the 15 projects had at least one late report. Usually a letter from the AID/PVO Officer was required before the reports were filed. In some cases the reports are missing entirely.

The progress reports usually provide adequate descriptions of the projects' current status. Better reports compare achievements to date with planned achievements and discuss problems and solutions where goals are not being met. In the best possible conceptualization, progress reports provide a chance to step back from the day-to-day project activities to analyze where the work has gone, where it should be going, and what should be done next. They provide an opportunity to reexamine the project goals and methods in light of current experience and to modify the project as necessary. We believe that progress reports

should serve this function and that PVOs should be encouraged to present analytic progress reports. Nevertheless the value of such reports must be balanced by the time and thought necessary to prepare them. Too frequent reports with only short intervals between them require disproportionate amounts of PVO staff time and the interval may be too short to discern any differences in results. We recommend that progress reports be required semi-annually and that they be used as an important element in on-going project redesign based on learning.

One barrier to this development is the lack of seriousness with which the reports are treated. For the effort required to be worthwhile, AID must be willing to respond to issues raised in the reports and to provide management support for the PVOs to encourage them to present more thoughtful progress reports.

Failure to write timely progress reports potentially damages the projects. The most coercive way to assure timely reports is to require the report before releasing the project funds. This is a drastic step and one we hesitate to recommend. It would be better if PVOs could begin to understand the value of progress reports. Rather we prefer to hold the threat back until it is needed and recommend that on-going evaluations be required as a part of the project design and that the progress report be the method to report on evaluations.

5. Evaluation

This issue is discussed more fully in the next section on project design. Only a few comments are necessary here on the current state of evaluations.

Evaluations are the weakest element in project management. While some statistics are collected in almost every project and presented when discussing project impact, these figures are rarely appropriate. Numbers of people participating in training courses or joining agricultural clubs is not evidence of the project's success. Appropriate statistics and analyses which make the connection between project goals, methods, and project outcomes are rare. Baseline information is rarely available; consequently it is difficult to interpret statements about impact or effectiveness with no sense of the situation prior to the project.

AID staff should not participate in on-going project monitoring. Project staff should be capable of handling these evaluations. AID's role is in project design to assure adequate conceptualization of a design, project outcomes and how to assess them.

6. Overall Management

In technical matters such as financial accounting PVO management is adequate. Problems with progress reports and evaluations are more failures of imagination rather than management problems. All of these issues are exacerbated with the Thai PVOs, given their limited experience, and the difficulty with English language reporting. This issue is addressed in the recommendations for Thai PVOs.

7. Home Office Support

Home office support was rarely an issue and seldom came up in the discussions we had with field office personnel. We did not interview

any home office personnel, with the exception of a brief conversation with the President of TDH.

In a few instances there were differences between the field and home offices. For example, goals and policies from the home office may be modified or altered quite significantly as they are implemented by the field office. In two cases, one of high administrative costs for little active participation (TAF/MALAN) and one where the home office failed to live up to its contractual responsibilities (4-H), home office support interfered with the projects' effectiveness. In two other cases, YMCA and OEF, project staff praised the home office support and stated that it was central to the projects' effectiveness.

B. Effectiveness

1. Project and Technical Design

Given the large number (15) and broad range of sub-projects we studied, we were clearly not technically qualified, nor did we have time to gain sufficiently detailed knowledge, to judge each project's overall and technical design as it measures up against the "state of the art" in each field. Our own past experience and areas of expertise helped more in some areas than in others (nonformal education, agriculture, and marketing more than in nutrition, hospital and health care, for example).

Nonetheless, our comparative study produced several interesting findings about project and technical design.

The clarity of project design and technical design vary according to the degree of "technical" or "scientific" precision or purpose of the projects. For example, the design for developing, testing and assessing results from the nutritional intervention in the MALAN project was technically very high. With this at the center, the overall project design for developing community participation and support of the activities of the ICCs was also sound. At the other extreme, the projects dealing with leadership training (THCF, CRS, NCWT, etc.) had a "soft" purpose which was not so easily measured or assessed.

Among the projects with non-technical or non-scientific purposes, there was also a clearly observable difference in the quality of project and technical designs. Those projects that linked leadership training with actual program actions (of which the best example is IHAP/Youth Development) included clearly defined components, clarity regarding the staging and sequencing of activities, planned interconnections among these and conscious expectations about outcome that could be assessed. Other projects (OEF and WEI) had tightly defined methodologies for training and nonformal education with less clarity about activities around which the methodologies would be focussed. Both the YMCA and 4-H/Y-K projects had clear programmatic activities and purposes, and their project designs reflected this (for Y-K I after a design revision) in clarity and interrelations of project components.

Some projects can also have very clear project design and still be poorly designed because of a mistaken purpose or wrongly estimated inputs. YKPF, for example, was clearly designed, but a number of problems existed in the design. The goal of the Foundation was to

raise Bh 6 million/year. In a quick survey of similar foundations in Bangkok, we found that these on average find they can raise only Bh 500,000 to Bh 1 million per year. Expectations for YKPF were, thus, not based in a realistic appraisal of what is possible. Similarly, the division of labor contained in the bylaws of YKPF effectively deny any day to day decision-making powers to its Executive Director. Such a situation becomes unworkable when Board members are too busy for daily consultation, and there is no gain to such a designed dependence on the Board. Problems of the project could have been anticipated in the design phase itself and prevented. (Currently we recommend a complete redesign to address these and other problems. See Appendix D.)

Often, the "softer" projects confuse clarity of design and project outcomes with numbers. For example, both the NCWT and CRS projects for training rural women specified in exact detail the numbers of women to be trained and the locations where they would be trained. Given a "soft" purpose--leadership training--they confuse counting with impact assessment. In fact, very little is learned about impact from knowing how many people went through the sessions. (This is also true of Y-K, YMCA, WEI, MALAN, etc.) Far more important in project and technical design is the anticipation of specific desired outcomes (activities, income changes, businesses started, agricultural output changes, nutritional status improvements, etc.) and, built into the project design, a method for keeping tabs on these outcomes. Such assessment should be related to, but not the same as, numbers of participants and activities.

From our survey, we conclude that technical design has been most difficult for the training/community development projects but that this is not a necessary characteristic of such projects. Projects with qualitative goals such as these can and should devise ways to assess these as they are manifested in outcomes of participants' actions, rather than in a focus on the participants per se.

2. Costs

The following Table shows the projects' estimates of direct and indirect beneficiaries and the project costs/beneficiary.

The main conclusion to be drawn from this Table is that the assessment of projects by costs/beneficiary is subject to wide variation and not an adequate measure of project benefit. The projects we reviewed range from a high of total costs/beneficiary of \$876.42 (THCF) to a low of \$.99 (YKPF). The former project cost only \$52,585 while the latter cost about four times as much at \$197,935. There is no clustering of costs/beneficiary according to (1) how expensive a project is; (2) quality of project (see Appendix D); or (3) sector of project. One reason for this is, of course, the tendency for project proposals to inflate the figures of beneficiaries.

The more useful question to ask regarding costs is whether they are reasonable for the intended outcomes. Many judgments are incorporated into the reasonableness assessment including quality of project, experimental nature of the project, staffing requirements (labor intensity); equipment/facility requirements, severity of problem addressed, importance of need of target group, and relation to costs of

TABLE VII PROJECT COSTS PER BENEFICIARY

Project	Beneficiaries	Aid Costs	AID Costs/ Beneficiary	Total Costs	Total Costs/ Beneficiary
IHAP/Deaf	about 400 people involved in Center	\$59,315	\$148.29	\$97,925	\$244.81
IHAP/Youth	1500 young adults	\$311,886	\$207.92	\$440,886	\$293.92
TDH	10,000 D.P.'s 12,000 Thais	\$455,000	\$20.68	\$791,700	\$35.96
YMCA	800 students 400 parents 60 unemployed	\$32,340	\$183.60	\$327,555	\$259.96
OEF	Direct: 250 women Indirect: 1,000	\$38,695	\$30.96	\$54,420	\$43.54
YKPF	200,000 young adults	\$147,935	74	\$197,935	99
MALAN	Difficult to deter- mine; total village populations=88,351	\$322,409	\$3.65	\$527,213	\$5.97
NCWT	Direct: 185 women Indirect: 1,000	\$29,000	\$24.47	\$53,250	\$44.94
WEI	Direct: 3750 trainees 150 facilitators	\$172,515	\$44.23	\$312,160	\$80.04
Y-K I	12,000 members	\$297,825	\$24.82	\$483,825	\$36.57
Y-K II	Direct: 54,000 Indirect: 81,000	\$492,466	3.42	\$1,348,466	9.99
THCF	60 young adults	\$35,485	\$591.42	\$52,585	\$876.42
CRS	Direct: 2400 Indirect: 10,000	\$478,300	\$38.57	\$1,094,300	\$88.25
PSBF I	4000 children	\$200,00	\$50.00	\$266,700	\$66.68
PSBF II	1700 children	\$160,000	\$94.12	\$213,400	\$125.53

other projects both similar and different. In our project review, we conclude that the most important consideration of cost/effectiveness is in the quality of the project impact. Again, we stress the importance of project design in focussing on realistic and important outcomes so that the judgment of reasonableness of cost may be made accordingly.

One comment we heard repeatedly was that because PVO projects do not cost much relative to bi-lateral projects, they do not need to live up to the same standards of quality. Our reaction to this was to assume that excuses were being made for project failures. There is no reason to assume that small amounts of money cannot be spent with as much care and responsibility as large amounts. Our assessment of the projects we reviewed confirms this. Of those we judged to be particularly effective, five cost below \$500,000 and only one over \$500,000 was excellent. Projects that cost over \$1,000,000 were not consistently superior to those costing less than \$100,000. Similarly, there was no correlation between project quality and percentage of overhead charged by operating PVO.

3. Reaching the Poor

PVOs often claim that they are particularly able to reach the poor, especially the rural poor, with their programs. Our review of 15 projects substantiated this claim (see Appendix D for project-by-project discussions of beneficiaries). Table VIII shows the list of projects and the constituencies they reached. Following the suggestion of Tandler (in *Turning Private Voluntary Organizations Into Development Agencies:*

Questions for Evaluation, April 1982, AID), we divided the population roughly into thirds by income/wealth. In Thailand, however, the division is distorted by the fact that there are these three groups only in urban areas. In rural areas, we chose to distinguish the poorest of the poor as those who are landless or whose land is unable to sustain them. (In the Northeast, only 5% are landless but over 50% of the country's poorest citizens live there. Average per capita annual income is estimated at one-fourth to one-half that of the country as a whole.) We designate as poor the majority of rural people, and some urban, who live in very simple houses, who have no more than the legally required 4 years of schooling and whose family members all must work to sustain life. In rural areas, we also saw a number of families who are distinctly better off than their neighbors but, by no means, upper income. These include those families who have a shop or other income producing business (such as weaving, sewing, food sales, etc.) as well as land and where the parents can provide some capital to a child starting an economic venture. These we designate as middle income. Our three categories of middle, poor and poorest of the poor actually, then, represent the poorest third of the population of the country as a whole.

It is important to note two limitations of TABLE VIII. First, it is based primarily on target groups as designated by the projects rather than on any independent assessment of who might or should have been included in a target population but was not. Second, we were not in any position to assess the proportion of target groups actually reached by any project. Nevertheless, based on the classification of

poverty groups we developed described in the preceding paragraph and our observations, we feel that TABLE VIII provides a fair assessment of the projects' reach to the poor. In the cases of CRS and IHAP/Youth training projects, we judged that, because they required that a trainee be released from family labor for up to 6 months, they did not reach the poorest of the poor. The YMCA training project, on the other hand, by paying its trainees was in a position to include this group. The degree to which its participants were the poorest--or slightly less poor--is not known to us.

TABLE VIII: REACHING THE POOR

<u>Agency Project</u>	<u>Upper Income</u>	<u>Middle Income</u>	<u>Poor</u>	<u>Poorest of the Poor</u>	<u>Unreached</u>	<u>Urban Rural</u>
WEI			X	X		R
YKI		X	X			R
Y-K II		X	X			R
YKPF		?	?	?		R
IHAP/Deaf	X	X	X	X	X	U/R
IHAP/Youth Dev.		X	X			R
TDH			X	X	X	R
MALAN			X	X		R
OEF		X	X	X		R
NCWT		X	X	X		R
THCF			X	X	X	R
YMCA		X	X	X?		R
CRS		X	X			U/R
PSBF I			X	X	X	U/R
PSBF II			X	X	X	U/R

All projects reached the poor and all reached rural people. Nine or ten projects involved work with the poorest of the poor. Five reached otherwise unreached and disadvantaged populations. Eight worked

also among the better-off poor, or relatively middle income people and one project (IHAP/Deaf) also includes people from upper incomes who are disadvantaged by their deafness.

4. Participation in Decision-Making

PVOs also often claim that their project approach is basically developmental in that it is participatory. Definitions and classifications of participatory styles vary widely, however. The concept of participation has become almost meaningless in its undifferentiated state. It is used to describe projects ranging all the way from those that arise from felt and expressed needs of a population who conceive of, design and implement a project to those in which there are simply a lot of participants.

In the projects we reviewed, we found several distinct styles of participation.

a. Outside Methodologies Requiring Participation. Those with methodologies--designed by the outside PVO--which require participation in the process of designing the content of the project. Examples include WEI and OEF.

b. Outside Project Designs Requiring Participation. Those for which the purpose and goals are externally decided but which involve a great deal of consultation with the target group to develop appropriate methods for reaching these goals. Examples of this include MALAN and the YMCA.

c. Inclusive Projects/Usually Small Group Model. Those which are totally designed on a concept and method originated from outside and which are then widely announced and anyone can come. These are better described as inclusive and are usually organized in small group or club activities--an organizational form often described as participatory because participants are closely and directly engaged. These have lots of people who participate in their activities. Examples include 4-H/Y-K, THCF, TDH, CRS, and NCWT.

d. Participatory Redesigning or Adaptation. Those for which a concept and design are developed externally in order to coalesce a group and get an activity underway. Then, as the project proceeds, there is growing involvement of the participants in its redesign and redirection. IHAP/Deaf is a good example of this and IHAP/Youth is an example of a variant where there is adaptation of the project design to participants' priorities and directions.

e. Non-participatory. The PSBF projects are examples of an approach completely directed from outside for the welfare of those for whom it is designed.

In the fifteen projects we reviewed, then, we found none that was participatory in the fullest sense of the word, i.e., entirely conceived of, designed and implemented by the participants. We doubt that this model is ever a reality. We do note that the very fact that PVOs tend to work with small group structures provides opportunities for consultation, involvement, redesign and adaptation described in a, b, c

and d above. In only some of these cases, however, is participation a major determinant of project impact: IHAP/Deaf, MALAN, and to a lesser extent, YMCA, IHAP/Youth, THCF and WEI.

The methodologies of OEF and WEI required that people become actively engaged in defining the content of their projects. This may have helped in developing a sense of "ownership" by the participants. We doubt, however, that the curriculum developed by WEI would have been any less successful had it been designed by thoughtful and informed outsiders rather than through group involvement. It may also have been produced more quickly. And, our assessment of the problems of the OEF project indicates that more external advice and knowledge would have saved the women from making some of the mistakes they made and improved project impact.

The central issue in participation is "When does participation make a difference to the distribution and impact of project benefits?" Only MALAN and IHAP/Deaf projects reflect this difference with any clarity. (See Appendix D for details on all the above.)

5. Local Institutions

Closely related to the issue of participation is the PVO claim to be effective in mobilizing local support and strengthening local institutions.

Following is a breakdown of the impact of AID-supported PVOs in the projects we reviewed as it affected local organization and/or groups.

TABLE IX

a. Established Local Institution	
MALAN	3 ICCs
NCWT	3 Day Care Centers
CRS	Training Center in Bangkok
IHAP/Deaf	Center for the Deaf
YMCA	Training Centers (mixture of AID funds and others)
TDH	Ban Nam Yao Hospital
b. Created Local Groups	
4-H/Y-K	
OEF	
IHAP/Youth	
c. Created or Strengthened Thai PVO	
IHAP/Deaf	
THCF	
CRS	
YMCA	
4-H/Y-K	
PSBF (to some extent; staff is entirely Thai except for Exec.)	
d. Strengthened RTG Program	
WEI	MOE/Dept. of Nonformal Educ.
4-H/Y-K	MOAC/Dept. of Agr. Extension
IHAP/Youth	Community Dev. Dept.

✓ Forty percent of the projects actually created new institutions around which, in all but one case (TDH), local group organizing also occurred (see discussion below on sustainability and replicability). Three programs were instrumental or very important in creating or strengthening an activity of the RTG at the community level. Five US based PVOs worked directly through local PVOs (or, as in the case of IHAP/Deaf created a Thai PVO) and strengthened these efforts.

We conclude that there is evidence that PVOs in our study were effective in local organization and institution building.

5. Sustainability and Replicability

Neither sustainability nor replicability is a unitary concept. Some aspects of PVO projects may be sustained while others are not; some aspects may be worth replication while a project, as a whole, may not.

a. Sustainability. The following Table shows the activities which are continuing and those which have ceased of the projects we reviewed.

TABLE X: SUSTAINABILITY

<u>Project</u>	<u>Activities Continue</u>	<u>Activities Ceased</u>	<u>Date of Termination of Project</u>
OEF	Five of 10 women's groups	Five of 10 groups	10/31/81
WEI	Revised curriculum is still in use/adopted by NFE Dept. of MOE and extended in large bi-lateral project	No longer developing curriculum	9/30/79

TABLE X (continued)

<u>Project</u>	<u>Activities Continue</u>	<u>Activities Ceased</u>	<u>Date of Termination of Project</u>
MALAN	ICC III virtually self-sustaining; ICC II nearly so. ICC I continues with MALAN support. Nutrition supplements are available for broad use. Income generating and food preservation activities continue and expand.		11/30/82
IHAP/Deaf	Center has expanded to new building; new sources of funding developed.	Job placement no longer major part of program; work with children basically left to HM the Princess.	12/31/83
IHAP/Youth	Training will be continued at lesser level by CDD; existing revolving loan funds will continue.	CDD not in position to pick up entire program; for full continuation would require funding.	1/31/84
THCF	Training will continue; THCF is strong institution.		10/20/82
CRS	Training will continue		9/28/78
Y-K	Groups will continue and Ag. Extension Service will support them but at a reduced level.		I 7/31/81 II 7/31/83 YKPF 8/31/84
NCWT	Women involved in this will continue activities; day care centers continue		8/28/78
PSBF I	PSBF picked up all expenses of project funded by AID/program continues in full.		8/23/82
PSBF II	Still underway.		8/31/82

TABLE X (continued)

<u>Project</u>	<u>Activities Continue</u>	<u>Activities Ceased</u>	<u>Date of Termination of Project</u>
YMCA	YMCA continues to work on problem of self-sufficient school lunch program. Not yet achieved but activities continue in full.	From experience with problems with poultry have ceased this in most places.	6/30/82
TDH		Hospital will close when refugee camp closes; MOPH will not use hospital facility.	9/30/83

The record on sustainability is very good.

b. Replicability. The following Table tabulates the aspects of the fifteen projects which have been or may be replicated. ✓

TABLE XI: REPLICABILITY

<u>Project</u>	<u>Now Replicated/In Use Elsewhere</u>	<u>Could Be Replicated</u>
WEI	Hilltribes curriculum	
OEF	---	---
TDH	---	Use of para-medicals from refugee population
MALAN		Nutrition supplements; approach to community organizing
PSBF	---	---
THCF	---	Marketing system for crafts
YMCA	---	Effort is to develop a model usable in other areas for self-sufficient lunch

TABLE XI (continued)

<u>Project</u>	<u>Now Replicated/In Use Elsewhere</u>	<u>Could Be Replicated</u>
		program. Approach is to discover cut-off points, marketing systems, etc. to give guidance to others.
Y-K	Groups are opening all the time/volunteer leaders model is spreading/Revolving Loan Fund	---
IHAP/Deaf		Structure of Center; Approach to dictionary
IHAP/Youth	Revolving Loan Fund; new training project starting in South on same model	Curriculum for training; concept sheets for starting small businesses
CRS	---	Reliance on Buddhist nuns for village work
NCWT	Revolving Loan Fund	---

The record on replicability is far less impressive than that on sustainability. One major reason for this is a failure by the PVOs themselves or by an external agency (AID?) to gather the generalizable and useful models and/or lessons as they are developed and to disseminate them to groups which would use them.

For example, we observed three projects attempting to use the idea of a revolving loan fund (and one other--OEF--with a variant on a fund for its women's groups). The successful use of these funds varied widely and experience has taught some lessons about organization and management, loan procedures, repayment timing and methods, etc. which increase effectiveness. These have not, however, been shared among

agencies. There are other examples of this which emerged in our review. These include experience (positive and negative) with marketing, experience with training, curriculum development, experience with starting small business, doing market research, etc.

We recommend that AID develop a system for supporting the dissemination of effective and tested models beyond the projects themselves. This could involve sharing of experience among AID funded PVOs in Thailand on a regular basis. In some instances, PVO competition will impede this. Perhaps an outside agency could be helpful. Broader dissemination through articles, pamphlets and conferences is also desirable. The methods of dissemination should be tailored to fit the information and the potential audiences. No single model is appropriate for all types of lessons.

C. Impact

1. Human Resource Development, Vocational Education, and Income Generation

The projects examined cover a wide range of planned impacts. These include human resource development, vocational education, and income generation. The projects we examined fall into these categories as follows:

TABLE XII

<u>Human Resource Development</u>			<u>Vocational Education</u>	<u>Income Generation</u>
PSBF	TAF/MALAN	WEI		4-H/Y-K
	CRS	THCF	YMCA	
			IHAP/Deaf	
			NCWT	
			OEF	

IHAP Youth Development

Two projects fall outside of this range, YKPF and TDH. For details concerning the effects of specific projects, see Appendix D.

✓ The projects group into two main categories: primarily human resource development (PSBF, TAF/MALAN, CRS, WEI, and THCF) and a combination of human resource development with vocational education or income generation (YMCA, IHAP/Deaf, NCWT, OEF). The 4-H/Y-K project and IHAP/Youth include some human resource development components but the major emphasis is on skills training with income generation.

The impact of general human resource development projects is difficult to assess. The assumption is that this process provides basic skills without which development cannot occur. Evaluation of this assumption requires long term observation. At present there is little evidence of the programs' effectiveness beyond the number of participants (CRS, PSBF). Education projects such as WEI or THCF provide more concrete evidence of effectiveness through the number of participants who become literate or fluent in Thai. As before, any direct developmental impact

is difficult to determine, given the long range nature of education. Nevertheless the education programs, especially for minority or other disenfranchised groups do have the advantage of allowing participation with the majority population on a more equal basis.

Two projects dealt with basic human nutrition: TAF/MALAN and one aspect of the YMCA project. An assessment of improved nutritional status based on comparisons of before and after figures provide objective evaluative criteria. The MALAN project shows a rather significant impact. However, this is difficult to substantiate because the number of intervening variables makes it difficult to assign causality to any one factor.

Mixed human resource development projects with either a vocational education or income generating component have a potentially more measurable impact. The developmental aspect is increased as people use the skills learned to improve their situation, reinforcing their learning. While all projects involving this mixed impact have not been equally successful, the design is a useful one.

Vocational education and income generation are main elements in the 4-H/Y-K and IHAP/Youth programs, one aspect of the YMCA project, and an outcome of the NCWT and OEF projects. The skills involved are primarily agricultural, skilled labor such as carpentry, and handicraft production. Since a number of these projects are rural, the emphasis on agricultural skills is appropriate although there is potential for excluding rural wage workers who do not have access to land from participation in the programs. Skilled labor provides a chance to increase income, and construction work appears to be widely available. Handicraft production involves upgrading traditional skills such as weaving and providing an outlet for these

products. The choice of these skills is appropriate and they are often ones requested by the participants.

Vocational training and/or income generating projects should improve household income. Determining the impact of these projects requires information on previous conditions and on the post-project situation. Most of the time this information is not available. Often we were given anecdotal evidence about income earned by project participants. Lack of evidence about impact is a consequence of project conceptualization and design weaknesses.

2. Women in PVO Projects

Three projects dealt specifically with women--NCWT, CRS, and OEF. These three projects focused on human resource development, primarily leadership training and improving the self image of women. The NCWT and OEF projects also included problem solving training with a related action project.

All other projects included both men and women in approximately equal proportions as both beneficiaries and project staff. There were two exceptions. The YMCA vocational training program only trained men and the 4-H/Y-K staff were primarily men.

3. Unanticipated Impacts

We are aware of only two projects that developed unsought effects. WEI resulted in extended staff recruitment for the Ministry of Education and MALAN developed an added on income generating component. Our failure to note more unanticipated impacts may be a consequence of

the nature of our evaluation, in which with our effort to evaluate Co-Financing as a whole, we were not able to investigate any one project in depth.

VIII. ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT PURPOSE

A. Relationships with the RTG

PVO Co-Financing is a bilateral project between USAID and the RTG. Sub-projects undertaken with Co-Financing money require DTEC "non-objection." Minimally PVOs must be registered with some agency of the RTG, usually the Ministry of Interior or DTEC. The DTEC sub-project approval process is an abbreviated one because it relies on the USAID/T PVO staff to approve the project design. DTEC sends project papers received from AID to the ministry(ies) most concerned with the project's area for comments and objections. If there are no objections, DTEC sends a letter informing USAID that it does not object to the project. This process occurs twice, once for the concept paper and once for the proposal. While DTEC usually moves on project review with dispatch, in some cases a ministry may take a long time to respond to the proposal causing a delay in project approval.

Sub-projects' relationships with RTG agencies varies from project to project. Two PVOs brought into projects at the RTG's request, WEI by Ministry of Education and 4-H by Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, have extremely close working relationships with these ministries. At the other extreme, three PVO projects, PSBF I, PSBF II, and IHAP/Deaf, have limited interaction with RTG agencies. Most projects fall in the middle range where they have good working relationships with the local representatives of following departments and ministries: Ministry of Education--THCF, YMCA; Ministry of Health--TDH, TAF/MALAN;

Department of Public Welfare--THCF, OEF, WEI; Community Development Department--CRS, NCWT, IHAP/Youth Development; and Forestry Department--YMCA.

Technical cooperation has been good. Many PVOs commented positively on the helpfulness of local RTG representatives. We were impressed by the high quality of the RTG representatives we met and their commitment to the work done in conjunction with the PVOs.

RTG financial support is limited to those projects working closely with the government. At present, the RTG has invited PVO involvement in family planning programs and has provided financial support for a number of PVOs working in the area. However, the Co-Fi sub-projects are not in this area. Currently the RTG is working on policy statements for PVOs in non-formal education, nutrition, and agriculture.

B. Sub-Projects Initiated

There have been 40 projects funded to date through OPGs and Co-Financing. The Co-Financing total is 25. ✓ (See Appendix C for the complete list and dates.) Seven Co-Financing approvals were extensions of previous projects. In 1980, four projects were approved; in 1981, five; in 1982, six; and in 1983, three. Currently, three project concept papers or proposals are in the pipeline, though none of these will be funded until 1984. The 1983 approved projects run through and past the end of the current Co-Financing Project, the latest ending in 2/86. Of the three projects funded in 1983, two are for Thai PVOs and one is for a US based PVO.

Thus, the Co-Financing project is, in terms of project approvals, on schedule. The goal of a continuing portfolio of about 20 projects has not been realized. Prior to 1981, 12 projects were running consecutively; in 1981, 16; in 1982, 20; in 1983, 18; in 1984, 11; and currently planned for 1985, only 9. See Table XIII. It is very likely that a total of about 45 OPGs and Co-Financing will have been funded as projected in the project paper.

TABLE XIII Schedule of Projects under Co-Financing

Continuation	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
1.					
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					
16.					
17.					
18.					
19.					
20.					
21.					
22.					
23.					
24.					
25.					
Total:	12	16	20	18	11

(to '86)

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C. Geographic Location of Projects

TABLE XIV: PROJECT LOCATIONS OF AID-SUPPORTED PVOs

<u>Region</u>	<u>All Projects</u>	<u>Projects Visited</u>
Bangkok	9	2
North	8	5
Northeast	7	4
West	2	2
Central	2	0
South	6	0
Countrywide	<u>6</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	40	15

The above Table provides an overview of PVO projects by region. Though some projects occurred in more than one area, we listed them in the region where most of the activity occurred. (See Appendix H for maps with all project locations.)

Projects working closely with the RTG are located in target areas of RTG concern, primarily the North and Northeast. This emphasis is reflected in the number of PVO projects in these regions. While the CDSS focuses on the Northeast, PVO projects are not required to match this locational emphasis.

The Bangkok area has the greatest number of projects. This reflects project planning activities with a nationwide emphasis rather than an emphasis on the urban poor.

The geographic dispersal reflects the PVO response to RTC needs, to their own programmatic goals, and their knowledge of local Thai conditions. We recommend that AID continue not to limit the regions for PVO project support.

IX. CONCLUSION

The field of comparative evaluation for the purposes of setting future directions is still relatively new. This effort to survey fifteen different PVO projects in one country in order to extract from these experiences the lessons for future project design--both for particular and for overall AID support of PVO work--was especially interesting.

While each of the fifteen projects did not fit a single evaluative model, we were able to ask a series of questions of all the projects and to find, in the individual answers, sufficient commonality to justify some generalizations about PVO work, about design of small-scale projects, and about methodologies of working with the poor for development. As more such evaluations are done, both in Thailand and in other countries, the cumulative effect of gaining these lessons should be important. As we said in the beginning of this report, the only justifiable purpose of evaluation and of the expenditure in time, money and effort which this entails is that lessons may be learned from the past to improve the effectiveness of work in the future. It is our hope that this evaluation has served this goal for the AID Mission and the PVOs in Thailand.

Appendix A

SCOPE OF WORK FOR EVALUATION OF THE PVO CO-FINANCING PROJECT (493-0296) USAID/THAILAND

I. BACKGROUND

During the period 1976-1979, a total of 18 Private Voluntary Organization (PVO) sub-projects were funded under the Asia Regional Project, "Private and Voluntary Organizations", (498-0251). For these sub-projects, AID provided \$2,281,252 which represented 49% of the total PVO project values of \$4,448,281.

In 1980, the PVO Co-Financing project was initiated to continue to provide a mechanism for funding PVO projects and to provide greater flexibility for USAID/Thailand to respond to PVO proposals. The PVO Co-Financing project was designed to expedite the project approval process by providing USAID the authority to review, approve and fund PVO proposals at the mission level rather than in AID/Washington. The PVO Co-Financing project was approved for 6 years (FY 1980 through FY 1985) of grant funding at \$300,000 for FY 80 and approximately \$1,000,000 per year thereafter or for \$5,000,000 over the life of the project.

To date, there has been no overall evaluation of the PVO Co-Financing project. Therefore, after approximately three years of project implementation, it is appropriate to assess what has been accomplished under this project, as well as the earlier PVO regional project.

II. PURPOSE

The purposes of this evaluation are:

- (1) to assess the extent to which the project purpose has been achieved--"to multiply and improve local level development efforts in Thailand within the priority sectors of AID assistance (Food and Nutrition, Health and Population, Education and Human Resources Development) by promoting PVO development activities which are consistent with and in support of AID Strategy";
- (2) to assess the management of PVO sub-projects;
- (3) to assess the effectiveness and impact of PVO sub-projects;
- (4) to assess the effectiveness of the sub-project approval process;
- (5) to make recommendations for the design of PVO Co-Financing II.

III. QUESTIONS THE EVALUATION REPORT WILL ANSWER

The evaluation team will answer the following questions and will adhere to the report format outlined below.

1. Executive Summary (according to the format provided by USAID attached)

Project Identification Data Sheet (according to the format provided by USAID - attached)

2. Major Conclusions and Recommendations (according to the format provided by USAID - attached)

3. The Project Context

- A. Problems and Overview. What are the development problems the PVO Co-Financing Project is designed to address?

- B. AID Response. How does the design of the PVO Co-Financing Project respond to these problems (identify inputs, and expected outputs, goals and purposes)?

- C. How have PVOs thru their sub-projects responded to these problems?

- D. PVOs in Thailand. Which PVOs have been supported under the Co-Financing Project and what is the general nature of their activities? Briefly, what is the magnitude of non-AID PVO activity in Thailand?

4. The Sub-Project Approval and Management Process

- A. Are sub-project approval criteria appropriate to meet the problem? Describe the sub-project approval process.

- B. Project Approval Criteria. Are the criteria for project approval clear to the RTG and the PVOs and are they, for the most part, consistently applied by USAID?

- C. Project Approval Process. Does AID solicit proposals? How many, on the average, are received in one year and how many are approved? Is the average time for processing project proposals generally consistent with the time for action set forth in the USAID order, "Policy and Procedures for Project Proposals under OPG and PVO Co-Financing Project" (March 28, 1979) and is it acceptable to USAID staff, the RTG and PVOs?

- D. Needed Changes in the Project Approval Process. Should modifications be made in the current USAID order on PVO policies and procedures to expedite and improve the project review and approval process?

- E. Indigenous PVOs. Has AID support to indigenous PVOs under this project been adequate?
 - F. USAID Staff Requirements. With an annual program level of approximately \$1 million, what are the appropriate USAID staff requirements for effective management of the PVO Co-Financing project?
 - G. DTEC or Other RTG Staff Requirements. What are the appropriate DTEC or other RTG staff requirements?
5. Management Effectiveness and Impact of PVO Sub-Projects

(Note: This section is intended to provide an analytical overview of the management, effectiveness and impact of AID assisted PVO sub-projects, rather than a description and summary of the achievements of each individual sub-project. Nevertheless, it should be based on an assessment of the individual sub-projects identified for evaluation in Section V, Methodology.)

A. Management

- 1. Counterpart Funds. Has the required 25% counterpart funding for individual sub-projects been provided by the PVOs supported under this project?
- 2. Administrative Costs. What are the direct and indirect management costs for each of the sub-projects implemented under the Co-Financing Project? Are any unacceptably high and, if so, what should be done? How do U.S. PVO and indigenous PVO administrative costs compare?
- 3. Disbursement of Funds. Is the annual disbursement of funds for the sub-projects at an acceptable level? If not, how can disbursement be improved? Are PVO financial systems adequate to manage the funds made available?
- 4. Financial and Progress Reporting. Is PVO financial and progress reporting adequate? How can or should it be improved?
- 5. Evaluation. What steps should be taken to improve the evaluation of PVO sub-projects? How can baseline and other data collection efforts be improved? Should AID staff participate on a more regular basis during sub-project evaluation?
- 6. Overall Management. In view of the above, and any other relevant factors, is PVO management of sub-projects adequate and effective?

B. Effectiveness

1. Technical Design. Is the technical design of sub-projects adequate? Are there any types of sub-projects that are better technically designed than others? How can technical design be improved?
2. Costs. What are the per-direct beneficiary costs for each sub-project? What can be done to lower per-direct beneficiary costs? Are there any types of projects that appear to have higher than average per-direct beneficiary costs? Are the sub-projects financially viable?
3. Reaching the Poor. PVOs say that they are particularly capable of carrying out the New Directions mandate to target assistance to the rural poor. What evidence is there that PVO sub-projects are actually reaching the poor?
4. Participation in Decision Making. PVOs also state that their programs are more likely to involve the poor in decision making. What evidence is there that PVO sub-project design and implementation reflects the views and needs of poor beneficiaries?
5. Local Institutions. PVOs assert they are effective because they have a special ability to strengthen local institutions. What evidence is there that PVO sub-projects have mobilized local support and have strengthened local institutions?

Impact

1. Vocational Skills and Human Resource Development. To what extent have the sub-projects designed to improve vocational skills and human resource capabilities resulted in employment, higher household income or strengthened local institutions? The response should include a discussion of the women specific sub-projects.
2. Income Generation. To what extent have the income generation sub-projects resulted in higher household income? The response should include discussion of women specific sub-projects.
3. Unanticipated Impact. To what extent have sub-projects resulted in unanticipated impacts at the local level?

6. Achievement of Project Purpose

- A. RTG Support. An important issue of the PID approval cable (State 165508) was the degree of RTG support for this project. What is the degree of the RTG financial and technical support to PVO sub-project during the life of this project?
- B. Sub-Projects Initiated. The project paper estimated that approximately 5 new sub-projects per year would be initiated which would create an on-going portfolio of approximately 20 sub-projects. It was further estimated that approximately 45 sub-projects (including OPG's from 1976) would be completed at the end of the project. Are these numbers of sub-projects likely to be achieved?
- C. Geographic Location. In what areas of the country have the sub-projects been implemented? What meaning, if any, does geographical dispersal or concentration have?
- D. Sustainability. A number of the AID supported PVO sub-projects have recently terminated (identified with an * in the next section) and this presents a unique opportunity to examine sustainability. For these projects, to what extent have villages or local institutions maintained or carried on the activities initiated under the PVO sub-projects? To what extent have donor agencies or local institutions incorporated lessons or development approaches learned as a result of PVO projects?
- E. Achievement of Project Purpose. In light of these and any other relevant factors, to what extent has the project purpose been achieved, i.e. improved local development capability?

7. Recommendations

- A. Recommendations. What recommendations would the evaluation team make to improve the Co-Financing Project as a whole and to improve the management, effectiveness and impact of PVO sub-projects?

(Note: If there are a number of detailed technical recommendations, it is suggested that all recommendations be included in this section and that only the major recommendation be included in Section 2, Major Conclusions and Recommendations. On the other hand, if there are only general recommendations to report, this section can be eliminated and all recommendations can be included in Section 2.)

IV. TEAM COMPOSITION

The evaluation team will be composed of 5 individuals representing the following institutions or having the following areas of disciplinary expertise.

- (1) Familiarity with PVOs
- (1) Economics
- (1) Anthropology
- (1) AID Representative
- (1) RTG PVO Representative
- (1) Thai PVO Representative

V. METHODOLOGY

- A. General Approach. The evaluation team should be prepared to spend approximately 5 weeks in the field. The evaluation team will spend approximately three days in Bangkok to assess the general co-financing mechanism and to prepare for and plan sub-project assessments. For sub-project assessments, the team will divide into two groups and each sub-group will then spend 2-1/2 to 3 weeks in the field evaluating approximately 6-7 sub-projects or a total of approximately 14-15 sub-projects. A detailed assessment of each sub-project that provides information requested in Section III, 5 (Management, Effectiveness, and Impact) will be prepared. It is recognized that not all categories of information will be available for all sub-projects. The individual sub-project assessments will be included as appendices to the report. At the end of the fourth week, the team will reassemble in Bangkok to prepare the draft report. At this time, the team leader will take responsibility for weighing and assessing the findings and conclusions of the field investigation and will prepare an analytical overview of the management, effectiveness and impact of PVO sub-projects. This will become Section 5 of the evaluation report. The team leader will also assign to team members the tasks necessary for completion of other sections of the draft report. To the extent possible, all findings or conclusions should be supported by empirical information and the data sources should be clearly specified in the report.
- B. Sub-Projects To Be Evaluated. It is recommended that the team conduct field investigations of the 15 sub-projects identified with a check mark in the attachment. The following criteria were used to select sub-projects for field investigation:

- (a) Total dollar funding level (for the most part, projects funded at \$200,000 or more);
- (b) Sponsoring PVO receives between 5-10% of total co-financing project funds;
- (c) Sub-project recently completed or nearing completion.

Not all sub-projects selected for field investigation are fully consistent with these criteria. The sub-projects marked with an * have been recently completed and provide an opportunity to examine the issue of sustainability.

VI. REPORTING

The team must commit at least 5 weeks to field work, during which time a draft report will be completed. The team should submit two copies of the draft report to USAID/Thailand two days prior to departure. After submission of a draft report, the team should make an oral presentation of their findings, conclusions and recommendations on a mutually agreed upon date. After the team's departure, USAID/Thailand, the PVOs and the RTG will review the draft report and will submit their comments to the team leader. Six weeks after receipt of these comments, the team will submit a final report to USAID/Thailand and AID/Washington (ASIA/Development Planning). It is the responsibility of the team leader to ensure that the final report is completed in a timely and professional manner, according to the format provided by AID and that, to the extent possible, all statements and conclusions are supported by the appropriate documentation.

USAID ORDER

UNITED STATES AGENCY Appendix B
FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
BANGKOK, THAILAND

DATE ISSUED: March 28, 1979	EFFECTIVE: Immediately	ORDER NO: AID:HB 13-2
Subject: Policy and Procedure for Project Proposals under OPG and PVO Co-Financing Project	SUPERSEDES: REFERENCE:	

I. PURPOSE

This Order establishes USAID/Thailand policy and procedure for approval of project proposals submitted by eligible U.S. and Thai private and voluntary organizations (PVOs) under the Asia Regional Operational Program Grant (OPG) program and PVO Co-Financing Project (#0293).

II. BACKGROUND

The purpose of PVO (also known as "Vol-Ag") Co-Financing and "OPGs" is to help increase and improve local-level development efforts in the RTG and AID priority areas of agriculture/rural development, population/health, and education/human resources development. Both of these programs make available AID financial assistance to Thailand's development which is in addition to the on-going Government-to-Government program. The AID financial assistance is matched with similar contributions from the PVOs and cooperating local groups to Co-Finance small scale socio-economic development projects which are planned, proposed and implemented by the PVOs.

To be eligible for participation in the programs a PVO must have an appropriate operating agreement with the RTG permitting the PVO to engage in socio-economic development activities.

Although the OPG program is administered by USAID/Thailand, each OPG is funded separately on a project-by-project basis by AID/Washington. PVO Co-Financing is conducted completely within the authority and funding of USAID/Thailand. These guidelines for making available AID financial assistance to PVOs are applicable to both Regional OPG and Thailand Co-Financing programs.

III. APPROVAL OF PROJECT PROPOSALS

A. Joint RTG/USAID Review Committee: A joint RTG/USAID review committee is established to review and recommend approval or disapproval of PVO project proposals. The Joint Committee will consist of representatives of USAID, DTEC, NESDB and the concerned technical ministry or ministries.

B. The USAID sub-committee of the joint PVO project review committee is established to (1) review PVO proposals formally submitted by eligible PVOs and (2) to recommend approval or disapproval to the USAID Director who makes the final decision on project proposals.

C. The USAID Sub-Committee, which will review each formally submitted proposal, is composed of representatives of the Office of Human Resources and Training (O/HRT), Office of Program Planning and Evaluation (O/PPE), Office of Project Development and Support (O/PDS), Office of Finance (O/FIN), and the concerned technical office. The representative from O/HRT will chair all Committee meetings.

D. O/HRT is responsible for assuring that all appropriate USAID staff competence is brought to bear in considering proposals. It is not intended that USAID technical offices always make an indepth assessment of these project proposals. Proposals for relatively small-scale development project would not warrant the large expenditure of technical staff time for an indepth assessment of project feasibility. It is intended that a brief technical review of a project be conducted to identify any major impediments likely to effect the success of the project, and to recommend corrective action when appropriate.

E. The guidelines for "Processing of PVO OPG proposals" are attached to this order.

F. PVO project proposals are the responsibility of the PVOs and their counterpart organizations. Proposals submitted for USAID consideration will be reviewed in accordance with the guidance offered in Appendix 7A ("Major Steps in Planning and Implementing Development Projects") of AID Handbook 3 ("Project Assistance") and/or AIDTO CIRC. A-134. Project proposals should generally follow the form and substance of the above guidance.

IV. PROJECT CRITERIA

In evaluating project proposals, the Committee will give preference to PVO development activities which:

A. Help bring about one or more of the following changes in communities and target groups; increased agricultural productivity through small farm labor intensive agriculture; reduced infant mortality; controlled population growth; greater equality of income distribution; and reduced rates of unemployment and underemployment;

B. Directly improve the lives of the target groups, especially the rural poor;

March 28, 1979

C. Have an education and training component and help increase the capacity of communities and target groups to plan and execute self-help local development;

D. Promise continued benefits following the end of the project and/or can be replicated elsewhere in Thailand;

E. Encourage and bring about local participation and financial support which along with the PVO's and other contributions would comprise a minimum of 25% of project in-kind and financial costs. Merits of proposals being comparable, preference will be given to proposals having larger non-AID and sponsoring PVO contributions;

F. Are in consonance with the established priorities of the Royal Thai Government and USAID.


V. GRANT AGREEMENT

In those cases where the Committee's recommendation for approval of a PVO proposal has been accepted by the USAID Director, O/HRT will take one of two actions:

A. For an approved proposal which will be funded from the Regional PVO Project, O/HRT will draft a message which summarizes the proposal, states USAID approval, and requests AID/W funding.

B. For all approved proposals to be funded by the Thai PVO Co-Financing Project, O/HRT will draft a grant agreement fully describing the project, and incorporating the current AID Standard Provisions for such grants as contained in AID Handbook 13 (Grants). The Grant Agreement will prescribe payment provisions phased to the time frame of the project as well as evaluation and reporting requirements. Prior to submission of the Grant Agreement to the Director for his final approval and signature, the Agreement is to be submitted for clearance by each USAID office represented on the Project Review Committee which reviewed the project and the Regional Legal Advisor.

FOR THE DIRECTOR


Paul V. Coles
Executive Officer

DIST: D

ANNEX

Processing of Private and Voluntary Organizations (PVO)
Co-Financing and Operational Program Grant Proposals

<u>USAID ACTION STEPS AND RESPONSIBLE OFFICE</u>	<u>MAXIMUM TIME FOR ACTION</u>
1. Initial informal discussion and screening of project idea with PVO; establishment basic feasibility and appropriateness for AID Financing. (O/HRT)	N/A
2. Initial submission proposal outline, review and feedback to PVO (RTG-USAID Committee)	2 weeks
3. Formal submission of PVO proposal, distribution of proposal to USAID project committee and RTG project review committee. (Includes duplication translation if required) (O/HRT)	1 week
4. Review of formal proposal and written or oral comments by project review committee. (USAID PVO Sub-Committee)	2 weeks
5. RTG-USAID PVO Committee meeting (RTG-USAID Committee)	2 weeks
6. If further development of the proposal is required it will be returned to the PVO for re-submission. In this case steps 2-5 will be repeated.	N/A
7. Upon RTG-USAID committee acceptance of the proposal, an Action Memorandum will be submitted to the Director with the Committee's recommendations. (O/HRT)	1 week
8. Approval by Director (O/DIR)	1 week
9. If applicable, a message will be prepared, to forward OPG proposal to AID/W for funding and preparation of Grant Agreement (O/HRT)	2 weeks
10. Prepare Grant Agreement (O/HRT)	2 weeks

USAID ACTION STEPS AND RESPONSIBLE OFFICEMAXIMUM TIME FOR ACTION

- | | |
|--|-----------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Obtain clearance of Committee Members b. Obtain clearance of Legal Advisor c. Prepare "Memorandum of Negotiation" for Grant file d. Arrange for signing of Grant Agreement by Director and PVO Representative. | |
| 11. Notify AID/W of the execution of Grant Agreement and distribute copies of agreement to AID/W and other concerned parties (O/HRT) | 1 week |
| 12. Process required documentation for payment waiver, etc., as provided for in Agreement (O/HRT) | 1 week |
| 13. Monitor PVO project progress, assure timely submission of reports as specified in Grant Agreement, and take corrective action as necessary. (O/HRT-Project Committee) | Life of Project |

84.

Appendix C: Complete List of OPG-CO-F1 Supported PYO Projects

USAID/THAILAND
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PYO/OPG PROGRAM ACTIVITIES -- FY-1976

Revision 9

PROJ. NO. 498-0251: Private & Voluntary Organization

Date: 2/01/83

NO.	PROJECT/GRANT No.	AGENCY	TOTAL \$	USAID \$	PYO/OTHERS \$	PROJECT BEGAN	PROJECT ENDS	STATUS
1.	Rural Women's Development Program. AID/EA-G-1103	TAF subgrant to Girl Guides Assn. of Thailand (TAF/GGAT)	77,845	55,000 (70.65%)	22,845 (29.34%)	9/30/75	9/30/79	COMPLETED
2.	Credit Union and Credit Union Training Development AID/EA-G-1104	TAF subgrant to Credit Union League of Thailand (TAF/CULT)	130,160	77,000 (59.16%)	53,160 (40.84%)	9/30/75	9/30/79	COMPLETED
3.	Food & Nutrition Devel. AID/ASIA-G-1152	TAF subgrant to Prince of Songkhla Univ. (TAF/PQSU)	167,565	133,765 (79.82%)	33,800 (20.17%)	6/25/76	2/09/79	COMPLETED
4.	Village Community Devel. AIG/ASIA-G-1167	'Y' USA subgrant to 'Y' Chiang Mai	513,128	142,678 (27.80%)	370,450 (72.20%)	6/25/76	12/31/79	COMPLETED
5.	better Family Living AID 493-126-T	Thai Home Economics Assn.	152,293	99,918 (65.60%)	52,375 (34.40%)	9/28/76	9/30/79	COMPLETED
TOTAL			1,040,991	508,361	532,630			
PERCENTAGE AVERAGE			100%	(48.83%)	(51.17%)			

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USAID/THAILAND

PVO/OPG PROGRAM ACTIVITIES -- FY-1977

PROJ. NO. 498-0251

No.	PROJECT/GRANT No.	AGENCY	TOTAL \$	USAID \$	PVO/OTHERS \$	PROJECT BEGAN	PROJECT ENDS	STATUS
6.	Integrated NFE to Promote Development Among Hilltribes in Northern Thailand AID 493-7002-T	World Education, Inc./ Adult ED. Division, MOE (VEI/MOE)	312,160	172,515 (55.26%)	139,645 (44.73%)	11/16/76	9/30/79	COMPLETED
7.	Artificial Fish Propagation Project AID 493-7015-T	Foundation for the Promotion of Scouting in Thailand (FPST/RST)	200,000	125,000 (62.50%)	75,000 (37.50%)	7/01/77	3/31/82	COMPLETED
8.	Development of Rural Youth Agricultural Club AID 493-7017-T	National 4-H Council/Min. of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC)	438,825	247,825-OPG 50,000-COPI 297,825 (67.87%)	141,000 (32.13%)	8/30/77	7/31/81	COMPLETED
TOTAL			950,985	595,340	355,645			
PERCENTAGE AVERAGE			100%	(62.60%)	(37.40%)			

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USAID/THAILAND

PVO/OPG PROGRAM ACTIVITIES -- FY-1978

PROJ. NO. 498-0251

No.	PROJECT/GRANT No.	AGENCY	TOTAL \$	USAID \$	PVO/OTHERS \$	PROJECT BEGAN	PROJECT ENDS	STATUS
9.	Rural Infant & Child Care Centers AID/ASIA-G-1305	YAF - subgrant to MALAN Institute (YAF/MALAN)	527,213	322,409 (61.15%)	204,804 (38.85%)	2/01/78	11/30/82	COMPLETED
10.	Training for PVOs AID 493-8001-T	Development Assistance Services (DAS)	29,051	21,351 (73.49%)	7,700 (26.50%)	3/28/78	9/30/78	COMPLETED
11.	Development of Ban Nam Yao Hospital AID 493-8002-T	Tom Dooley Heritage, Inc. (TDH-1)	211,550	75,000 (35.45%)	136,550 (64.54%)	3/14/78	9/30/79	COMPLETED
12.	Development of AG Cooperative in Thailand AID 493-8003-T	Cooperative League of USA/Coop. Resources Committee of Thailand (CLUSA)	239,350	165,000 (68.93%)	74,350 (31.06%)	5/11/78	3/30/79	COMPLETED
13.	Milltribe Youth Leadership Training AID 493-8004-T	Thai Hill Crafts Foundation (TRCF)	49,585	3,485 COEI 32,000 OPG 35,485 (67.48%)	17,100 (32.52%)	6/21/78	10/20/82	COMPLETED
14.	Skills Training for Rural Youth AID 493-8007-T	YAF - subgrant to Girl Guides Assn. of Thailand	226,701	166,701 (73.53%)	60,000 (26.47%)	8/18/78	3/31/82	COMPLETED

FY-78 cont. on p. 4

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O/WHO:
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FY-1978 ON-GOING ACTIVITIES -- (continued)

PROJ. NO. 498-0251

No.	PROJECT/GRANT No.	AGENCY	TOTAL \$	USAID \$	PVO/OTHERS \$	PROJECT BEGAN	PROJECT ENDS	STATUS
15.	Amerasian Outreach AID 493-8008-T	Pearl S. Buck Foundation (PSBF)	266,700	(74.99%) 150,000-OPG <u>50,000-COFI</u> 200,000	(25.01%) 50,000 <u>16,700</u> 66,700	8/24/78	8/23/82	COMPLETED
16.	Promotion of Rural Develop- ment Through Women AID 493-8015-T	National Council of Women of Thailand (NCWT)	53,250	29,000 (54.46%)	24,250 (45.54%)	8/28/78	8/27/80	COMPLETED
17.	Istanbul Development Project AID 493-8020-T	International Human Assis- tance Program (IHAP)	357,200	249,200 (69.76%)	108,000 (30.23%)	9/28/78	11/30/80	COMPLETED
18.	Women's Development Through Non-Formal Education AID 493-8021-T	Catholic Relief Services (CRS)	1,094,300	478,300 (43.70%)	616,000 (56.29%)	9/28/78	3/31/82	COMPLETED
TOTAL			3,057,900	1,742,446	1,315,454			
PERCENTAGE AVERAGE								
				(56.98%)	(43.02%)			

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PVO/OPG PROGRAM ACTIVITIES -- FY-1979

PROJ. NO. 498-0251

No.	PROJECT/GRANT No.	AGENCY	TOTAL \$	USAID \$	PVO/OTHERS \$	PROJECT BEGAN	PROJECT ENDS	STATUS
19.	Implementation of Agricultural Coop. Plan AID 493-9018-T	Cooperatives League of the USA (CLUSA II)	300,150	225,000 (74.96%)	75,150 (25.04%)	7/01/79	6/30/80	COMPLETED
20.	Educational & Medical Services for Children in Klong Toey Slum AID 493-9020-T	Catholic Relief Services (C.R.S. II)	129,000	58,000 OPG 10,000 CO-FI <u>25,000 CO-FI</u> 93,000 (72.10%)	36,000 (27.90%)	8/31/79	8/31/83	FY-82 (\$25,000) FY-80 (\$10,000)
21.	Assistance to 4merasians AID 493-9021-T	The Pearl S. Buck Fdn. (PSBF II)	213,400	135,000-OPG <u>25,000-COFI</u> 160,000 (74.98%)	53,400 (25.02%)	8/31/79	8/31/82	COMPLETED
22.	Devel. of Ban Nam Yao Hosp. (Tom Dooley Memorial Hosp.) AID 493-9026-T	Tom Dooley Heritage Inc. (TDH II)	814,520	380,000 <u>137,000-COFI</u> 517,000 (63.50%)	200,150 <u>97,370</u> 297,520 (36.50%)	9/28/79	9/30/83	\$140,000-FY-79 \$240,000-FY-80 \$137,000-FY-92
TOTAL			1,457,070	995,000	462,070			
PERCENTAGE AVERAGE				(68.30%)	(31.70%)			

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USAID/THAILAND

PVO/GOVT PROGRAM ACTIVITIES -- FY-1980

PROJ. NO. 498-0296 -- PVO CO-FINANCING

No.	PROJECT/GRANT No.	AGENCY	TOTAL \$	USAID \$	PVO/OTHERS \$	PROJECT BEGAN	PROJECT ENDS	STATUS
23.	Rural Vocational Training & Nutrition Project AID 493-0007-T	YMCA (USA) sub-grant to 'Y' BANGKOK	327,555	231,340 (70.63%)	96,215 (29.37%)	3/01/80	6/30/82	COMPLETED
24.	NFE for Low Income Women in Northeast Thailand AID 493-0022-T	Overseas Education Fund (O.E.F.)	54,420	38,695 (71.10%)	15,725 (28.90%)	7/23/80	10/31/81	COMPLETED
25.	Community Services Center for Disadvantaged Children AID 493-0026-T	International Human Assistance Programs, Inc. (I.H.A.P. II)	111,297	73,945 (66.44%)	37,352 (33.56%)	8/31/80	9/30/82	COMPLETED
26.	A Village Management System for Integrated Rural Development AID 493-0034-T	Thailand Rural Reconstruction Movement (T.R.R.M.)	221,862	138,000 (62.20%)	83,862 (37.80%)	8/31/80	8/31/83	Start-up date delayed until 1/01/81
TOTAL			715,134	481,980	233,154			
PERCENTAGE AVERAGE				(67.40%)	(32.60%)			

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O/INT:
USAID/THAILAND

PVO/COFI PROGRAM ACTIVITIES -- FY-1981

PROJ. NO. 893-0296 -- PVO CO-FINANCING

No.	PROJECT/GRANT No.	AGENCY	TOTAL \$	USAID \$	PVO/OTHERS \$	PROJECT BEGAN	PROJECT ENDS	STATUS
27.	Expansion of Yuse-Kaset-born (4-H) Program 893-0296-G-SS-1005-00	4-H/NOAC (2)	1,348,466	492,466 (36.52%)	856,000 (63.48%)	1/27/81	7/31/83	FY-81 (\$425,260) FY-82 (\$67,206) provided under A-1 for HQ direct costs.
28.	Youth Development Project 893-0296-G-SS-1008-00	I H A P (3)	440,886	311,886 (70.74%)	129,000 (29.26%)	2/02/81	1/31/84	
29.	Thailand's Deaf Community Project 893-0296-G-SS-1035-00	I H A P (4)	177,425	59,315 <u>59,500</u> 118,815 (67.00%)	38,610 <u>20,000</u> 58,610 (33.00%)	6/30/81	12/31/83	FY-83 (A-1 provides \$59,500 w/one year ext.) until 12/11/83
30.	Y-K Foundation Initiating Project 893-0296-G-SS-104A-00	4-H/YKF (3)	197,935	147,935 (74.74%)	50,000 (25.26%)	9/01/81	8/31/84	FY-81 (\$74,740) FY-82 (\$73,195)
31.	Training for Social Development 893-0296-G-SS-1050-00	TAP/CSWT	151,599	75,349 (49.70%)	76,250 (50.30%)	9/01/81	2/28/83	FY-81 (\$75,349)
TOTAL			2,316,311	1,146,451	1,169,860			
PERCENTAGE AVERAGE				(49.50%)	(50.50%)			

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O/WTY:
USAID, THAILAND

PVO/COFI PROGRAM ACTIVITIES -- FY-1982

PROJ. NO. 493-0296 -- PVO CO-FINANCING

No.	PROJECT/GRANT No.	AGENCY	TOTAL \$	USAID \$	PVO/OTHERS \$	PROJECT BEGAN	PROJECT ENDS	STATUS
32.	Food & Nutrition--Rural Evel. Center for Southern Thailand 0296-G-SS-2018-00	TAF/PSU (FAN Phase II)	605,311	437,111 (72.20%)	168,200 (27.80%)	3/30/82	3/30/85	FY-82 \$300,000
33.	Rural Devel. thru W.F.E. Training for Women 0296-G-SS-2033-00	C.I.S. (3)	277,126	152,100 (54.90%)	125,026 (45.10%)	6/09/82	6/09/85	FY-82 \$100,000
34.	Rural Outreach Program 0296-G-SS-2042-00	TAF/PSU (Koo Yau)	237,948	171,714 (72.20%)	66,234 (27.80%)	8/16/82	8/16/85	FY-82 \$100,000
35.	Vocational Center for Young Girls in Korat 0296-G-SS-2043-00	Y.W.C.A.	99,589	66,700 (67.0%)	32,889 (33.0%)	8/25/82	8/25/85	
36.	Southern Thailand Experi- mental Project 0296-G-SS-2049-00	WEI/DWFE	670,515	405,285 (60.50%)	265,230 (39.50%)	8/31/82	8/31/85	FY-82 \$267,329
37.	Assistance to Older Americans 0296-G-SS-2058-00	P.S.B.F. (3)	84,000	63,000 (75%)	21,000 (25%)	9/28/82	9/28/85	
TOTAL (FY-82)			1,974,489	1,295,910 (65.6%)	678,579 (34.4%)			
TOTAL ALL YEARS			11,512,880	6,765,488 (58.8%)	4,747,392 (41.2%)			

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O/INT:
USAID/THAILAND

PTD/OPR PROGRAM ACTIVITIES -- FY-1983

PROJ. NO. 493-0296 -- PTD CO-FINANCING

No.	PROJECT/GRANT No.	AGENCY	TOTAL \$	USAID \$	PVO/OTHERS \$	PROJECT BEGAN	PROJECT ENDS	STATUS
38.	Southern Youth Enterprise Development 493-0296-G-SS-3009-00	International Human Assistance Programs Inc. (I.H.A.P.)	666,275	478,074 (71.80%)	188,201 (28.20%)	3/01/83 (33 months)	12/31/85	FY-83 (\$376,000)
39.	Community Based Integrated Yambol Development 493-0296-G-SS-3011-00	Save the Children Federation, Inc. (S.C.F.)	528,153	385,000 (72.90%)	143,153 (27.10%)	2/15/83	2/14/86	FY-83 (\$136,000)
40.	Hillside Youth Training Village Development	Thai Hillcrafts Foundation	120,000+ 91,084	120,000	91,084	3/83	12/85	

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Appendix D

PROJECT REPORTS

1. CRS/Women's Development through Non-Formal Education
2. IHAP/Youth Development
3. IHAP/Deaf
4. 4-H/Y-K/Development of Rural Youth
5. 4-H/Y-K/Promotion Foundation
6. 4-H/Y-K I
7. NCWT/Promotion of Rural Development through Women
8. OEF/Non-Formal Education for Women in Northeast Thailand
9. PSBF/Amerasian Outreach
10. PSBF/Assistance to Amerasians
11. THCF/Hilltribe Youth Leadership Training
12. TAF/Rural Infant and Child Care Centers
13. TDH/Ban Nam Yao Hospital
14. WEI/Integrated Non-Formal Education to Promote Development among Hilltribes
15. YMCA/Vocational Training and Nutrition

- I. Project Title/Number: Women's Development through Non-Formal Education/493-8021-T
- II. PVO: Catholic Relief Services with the Sisters of the Good Shepherd
- III. Project Description: A training center was built in Bangkok at the Sisters of the Good Shepherd for leadership training for rural women who then were to go back to their villages to become community organizers, teach skills to rural women and provide information on family planning, health and child care. These Bangkok trained women received salaries for their village work for two years after training. They were not paid while in training for six months so tended to be recruited from better-off village families. Project goals were specified in the proposal as: (1) to train 140 rural women leaders; (2) to train 300 students in vocational skills; (3) to hold 60 demonstration classes in rural areas; (4) to teach child care, health, domestic and handicraft skills to 2,100 women; (5) to establish a job placement program for the urban community; (6) to establish a marketing system for the handicrafts; and (7) to establish a functioning Vocational Training Center.

The project was actually initiated by a Khunying who formed a Foundation for the Promotion of Welfare for Women and Youth to try to provide opportunities for girls in rural areas so that they would not be drawn into prostitution in Bangkok. CRS acts principally as a management agency and conduit of funds between AID and this project. In addition to the involvement of the Catholic Sisters, the project has developed a training center for Buddhist nuns at the Sa-ngobchitr Nunnery in Bangkok.

IV. Project Dates: 9/28/78-3/31/82. Originally a three-year project, it was extended for eight months because of a lag in funds disbursements.

V. Project Approval Time: Unknown. The file shows only a one-month approval time, though there are letters discussing a redesign of the building which must have taken longer than one month. In conversations, we conclude that the file records are wrong, but no one remembers exactly how long the project consideration actually took.

VI. Fit with Selection Criteria: The project focused on training, income generation and the direct improvement of the quality of life among rural women and their families. It also stressed human resource development.

VII. Financial Information:

USAID	\$478,243	=	43.7% (OPG)
PVO/Other	615,957	=	56.2%
TOTAL	\$1,094,200		

VIII. Reporting Requirements: Semi-annual. In file: Reports covering 11/78-10/79; 10/79-3/80; 3/80-9/80; 10/80-6/81; 10/81-4/82; and final evaluation, November 5, 1982. Missing: period from 6/81-10/81.

IX. Assessment of Planning and Project Design: The project design was very specific about numbers and locations of women to be trained. It also named a number of areas in which training would focus--health, child care, handicrafts, etc. It did not anticipate difficulties in recruitment of women for the Bangkok training or the necessity for follow-up supervision and support of these trainees. It did not attempt any

design to assess results of the training, though some surveys have been carried out to try to assess its impact. The assumption was that training is, itself, a sufficient goal and that it, inevitably, leads to an improvement in the quality of life. Experience shows that this is a weak assumption in project design.

X. Assessment of Technical Design: Architectural designs for the Training Center were carefully reviewed and revised by experts. Very little attention was given to design of teaching methodologies, assessment of levels of skills acquisition, or use of training in the villages.

XI. Beneficiaries: The project was aimed primarily at rural women and it has, in fact, trained over 4,200 girls in villages. Those recruited to the Bangkok leadership course (60-70 in each of two years) have tended to be from better-off families who could afford to lose the income and/or labor of the girl during the training. These were not by any means economically secure girls; the training was free and, often, the nuns supplied the basic necessities for the girls who could not afford them.

XII. Assessment of Impact:

A. Skills training: Project focused in this area and 1,319 girls have received vocational training, but assessment of the skills actually gained has been minimal.

B. Income generation: Twenty of those who received leadership training say that they have increased their income annually "a little." More than 50 of the leaders have been employed elsewhere. Of 169 who

received dressmaker training, 65 percent are employed. Of 494 who received training in typing, 70 percent passed their exams in commercial school. Of 95 who were trained as hairdressers, 75 percent are employed--10 percent in their own shops. A total of 450 girls are employed at B1500-2000/month.

C. Strengthening local institutions: One hundred and forty Rural Village Training Centers have been conducted. There are requests for more than CRS can handle.

XIII. Replication: The project as designed is not easily replicable because of its cost. This was due largely to the construction of the Bangkok Center. CRS is planning to continue and extend the rural training and to add to it a revolving loan fund to help those who receive training put their new skills to use. The project as it runs for training is frequently copied. It would be a stronger model if it were re-designed to include more specific uses of the training (see below).

XIV. Success: The project has exceeded all its goals in terms of numbers of women to be trained, and a number of these are now employed. However, the project's own evaluation report claims only a 50 percent effectiveness rate. This stresses that girls have been able to gain "more self confidence" and "a proper sense of value and direction." These are, of course, difficult gains to assess and no criteria for assessment are specified by the project.

XV. Evaluation/Recommendations: This project has shown that there is a vast interest among rural girls and women for skills training. It has

established an apparatus for providing a great deal of training. With the advantage of our comparative review of a number of skills training/ leadership training projects, we recommend that: (1) leadership training always be focused around an activity (for example, without going into detailed project design, the girls in training at the Sisters of the Good Shepherd could be rotated through the Child Care Center there and receive practical instruction and experience in how to set up a center, plan nutritious meals, manage attendance and financial records, plan curricula for children, etc.); (2) skills training be closely linked to actual local job opportunities and markets for products; (3) job placement or assistance with starting one's own business (or a joint business with other trainees) be always linked to skills training; (4) that marketing not be left to chance; (5) that capital be made available to trainees as they have good projects for investing; and (6) that pedagogical methodology be matched carefully (using the vast and growing experience in this area) to the teaching environment and purpose of any skills training course.

- I. Project Title/Number: Reaching the Unreached (RUR)/493-0296-G-SS-1035-00
- II. PVO: International Human Assistance Programs, Inc.
- III. Project Description: The project planned to provide training and job placement and counselling services for 150 deaf adults; to assist in the development of a curriculum to emphasize daily life and job training for the Sethsathian School for the Deaf; to focus on early intervention for 600 deaf children primarily by working with their parents; to conduct public education on deafness; and to advocate affirmative action for the deaf.

In fact, emphasis has shifted away from job placement and work with children. Both of these goals are seen as important in the long run, but the current focus, by a decision of the Advisory Council and Membership of the Deaf Center, is to develop the spirit and self-reliance of the Center and to engage deaf adults in its activities. The mood and liveliness of the 18 staff whom we met was remarkable. A group formerly marginalized and with little prospect for self-directed activity now has a Center with three major programs: Membership Services and Job Placement (with the emphasis on the former); a Production Workshop; and a Sign Language Research Department. Membership rose from 210 to 310 between January 81 and August 82. The plan is to utilize the greater awareness and involvement of the deaf community to bring pressure to bear on the Department of Labor to help locate jobs for the deaf unemployed.

- IV. Project Dates: 6/30/81-12/31/82 with a one-year extension to 12/83.
- V. Pre-project Approval Time: 6 and 1/2 months from initial contact to grant. Preliminary proposal received from IHAP 12/17/80. DTEC first approval 3/26/81. Final approval 7/3/81.
- VI. Fit with Selection Criteria: The project addresses unemployment and underemployment of the deaf and training. It also fits with the overall AID and RTG goal of human resources development.
- VII. Financial Information:
- | | |
|-----------|-------------------|
| USAID | \$59,315 (60.57%) |
| PVO/Other | \$38,610 (39.43%) |
| TOTAL | \$97,925 |
- Indirect Costs: 65.14% on salaries and benefits = \$11,000
- VIII. Reporting Requirements: 6 month and 12 month plus 3 months before end of project.
- IX. Assessment of Planning and Project Design: Those involved in planning and designing this project had clearly identified a group in need of some specific programming support. In particular, they were clear that the deaf needed job skills and daily living skills in order to be productive and involved in society. They are aware of and in contact with the existing program of Her Majesty the Queen through the Foundation for the Deaf, The Ministry of Education, and the Center for Deaf Alumni in Bangkok. The project's work with deaf children has been postponed and job placement has been diminished as a project goal. Work with deaf

children has been begun by Her Majesty the Princess so the Deaf Center has decided to wait to determine if there is a need for their involvement. The Center has decided to work with the resources of the Department of Labor for job placements rather than doing it themselves.

Thus, the original project design has undergone serious revision. Still, the shift in focus has emerged from the decision of the deaf members and workers in the Center reflecting the high level of participation and involvement built into the project design. The shift also reflects a sufficient flexibility to respond to changed external circumstances (the interest of the Princess).

X. Assessment of Technical Design: As the project changed significantly from its original plans, it also took on an increasingly focused and expert direction. The care and knowledge employed in the Sign Language Research Department is impressive. The Head of the Department and her staff looked at a number of existing Sign Dictionaries (she speaks English, French, Chinese and Malay--possibly others--sign languages) and developed from this review their own trial format for a Thai sign dictionary. They have tested and revised their approach twice and are now developing their comprehensive dictionary of over 1,500 signs. One staff member travels around Thailand meeting various deaf people and photographing their sign dialects. These are then rendered into stylized sign drawings by an artist in the Bangkok office.

The technical quality of the Workshop is also very high. Processes have been developed for silk-screening patterns for puzzles, toys, t-shirts, etc. so that production is speeded up and quality control is maintained.

Hand painting of the toys, etc., is carefully supervised and non-toxic paints are used. Marketing is focused on the non-Thai community because the Workshop workers have found that their products are more acceptable there. Sales support the Workshop, and some job training occurs there.

XI. Beneficiaries: The beneficiaries are a clearly disadvantaged and previously marginalized group though many of those involved in the Center come from wealthy and middle class families as well as from poor ones. The criteria for benefit (deafness) crosses all socio-economic boundaries.

XII. Assessment of Impact: In sheer numbers, the impact of the Center has been small. Of the estimated 90,000 deaf in Thailand, only 300-400 are involved in the Center's activities. More are affected by the outreach to catalogue signs for the dictionary, and more will be affected by its publication because the MOE has expressed interest in using it as an official textbook. Insofar as the Center increases awareness of problems of the deaf and represents an organizing focus for deaf interests, more may be benefitted in the years to come.

A. Training: Has accomplished some but not in vast numbers.

B. Income generation: Some trainees have been placed in outside jobs and some are retained at the Workshop; insignificant numbers.

C. Local institutions: The Center is clearly a strong local institution as a result of this project.

XIII. Replication: Visitors from a number of countries, particularly Malaysia and Singapore, have come to the Center to learn lessons from its programs for their own activities with the deaf. Members and staff from

the Center are active in meetings and executive activities of the International Council for the Deaf. The Center's Director will serve on a panel of Third World deaf leaders at the upcoming meeting of the International Council this summer. The major asset this Center has to offer to others is the dominance and self-sufficiency of the deaf, themselves, in running it. In most other countries the deaf programs are run by hearing people for the deaf.

The IHAP staff person has learned to speak Thai sign so his relationship and support is extremely important, especially as an interpreter with the Center and others. Plans are in the early stages for opening two additional centers in Chiang Mai and Songkhla.

XIV. Success: The project is successful as a small example of people being given an opportunity to take on a project and to develop it on their own terms to meet their own needs. The change in project design was directly decided by the participants, and IHAP and USAID supported this participatory decision-making. It is ideal as a model for other deaf programs.

XV. Evaluation/Recommendations: This is the kind of project that only comes along every now and then. It is difficult for AID to seek or initiate projects of this sort. It is important for what it does and deserves AID support. The principal recommendation we can draw from this experience is that the AID/PVO Office should remain sufficiently flexible in its review process and its selection criteria to be able to respond to programs of this sort. Identifiable characteristics of this program which make it worthy of support are: (1) clearly unreachable, marginalized

constituency; (2) central organizing activity and/or location for bringing them together; (3) sufficient talent within the group, itself, to take on growing responsibilities in running the project self-reliantly; and (4) small amounts of money and focused support have high probability of coalescing additional support for sustained activity.

- I. Project Title/Number: Youth Development Project/493-0296-G-SS-1008-00
- II. PVO: International Human Assistance Programs, Inc.
- III. Project Description: Focused in 3 districts (250 villages in 25 Tambols) of the Northeast, this project was to provide comprehensive vocational training and leadership development for 1,500 young adults. It was organized through and with the Community Development Department of the Thai government. Skills training concentrated on radio repair, small engine repair, agriculture, masonry, hair dressing, sewing and weaving. Training courses range from 3 weeks to 3 months. Courses are publically announced through Tambol Councils. Youth who want to attend must complete a written application and he/she and his/her parents must be interviewed by the CDD to determine if both are genuinely interested in the youth's participation. References are gathered from the Tambol Council as well. In addition, a revolving loan fund of Baht 100,000 per Tambol was made available for youths, who had successfully completed a skills training course, to borrow enough capital to set themselves up in business using the newly acquired skill. Interest was set at 27%/year.
- IV. Project Dates: 2/2/81-1/31/83
- V. Pre-Project Approval Time: 8 months. Proposal submitted 11/15/80; granted 2/2/81. (Conversations revealed that this delay was due to a decision by IHAP to delay this project until several other activities were completed. Apparently, the actual time for approval was about 2 months.)

VI. Fit with Selection Criteria: The project focused on rural youth in the primary area of USAID assistance, the Northeast. It was concerned with skills training, employment and income generation.

VII. Financial Information:

USAID	\$311,886 (70.74%)
PVO/Other	\$129,000 (29.26%)
TOTAL	\$440,886

Indirect Costs: \$57,546 on \$254,340 or 69% of direct base salaries and wages.

VIII. Reporting Requirements: Quarterly, with two annual reports and a final evaluation. In file: Reports covering 2/1/81-7/31/81 and 8/81-3/82. Missing: 6/82, 9/82, 12/82 and 3/83.

IX. Assessment of Planning and Project Design: This project followed a USAID supported Tambol Development project which had proven too expensive in its training design for continuation by the Thai government. The design emphasized leadership training, with skills training as the means to leadership training. In the course of the project, the planner had realized that skills training and the provision of capital through the revolving loan fund are the central elements of the project and leadership is an outcome of these. Thus, the design has become increasingly focused on skills (for which research is done to determine their marketability in each specific location). Job placement and training in business management (marketing, simple accounting, etc.) have been developed as project components. Though it was not made explicit in the project design,

we are told that a principal motivation of this project from the Thai government point of view was counter-insurgency.

X. Assessment of Technical Design: Originally, technical design was, because of the emphasis referred to above, not strong. However, over the life of the project, curriculum materials and simple but very useful concept skills for business management have been developed. The project has added job placement services (with, we are told, 100% success) and research on needed skills prior to training. There is now an effort to think about the organization of workers' cooperatives as, for example, among the students of sewing classes so that they can gain more from their work than if they continue to hire out as wage laborers as they now do.

XI. Beneficiaries: In the one province we visited about 400 youths have been trained. We interviewed students of sewing, weaving, hair dressing, masonry, electrical repair and gardening courses. They were relatively poor though, because of the requirement for parental support, the youth appeared to come more often from families with land (who could afford to lose the labor of the youth during training) than without. (We are told that 5% of people in the Northeast are landless; estimates of average per capita income in the region range from B2500 to B5,000.)

XII. Assessment of Impact: Project records show a significant success of the training in leading to employment and income. The repayment rate for the revolving loan fund is 94% (smallest loan of B500 to largest of B30,000 with B1,500 average. Average length of loan equals one year.)

In our interviews we found consistent evidence of employment and increased income. These interviews cannot, however, be conclusive as they were not sufficient to represent a legitimate sample. These, with project data, however, indicate a direct and positive impact.

XIII. Replication: IHAP has just begun a similar project in the Southern area of Thailand based on the experience of this project. The focused training and the management training and follow-up with the loan fund seem to us to warrant serious consideration by other groups and AID in future training projects. (See text on recommendations.)

XIV. Success: The project has trained approximately the number of youth projected in the proposal. The shift of emphasis to skills training and employment has proved successful. Leadership development--the original goal--is not measurable; nor is there any attempt to do so.

XV. Evaluation/Recommendations: This project has moved through a number of the exploratory and experimental stages that we found in several other projects we reviewed. We recommend that AID use this experience as a basis for helping design and focus future leadership and skills training programs. We also recommend that AID utilize the experience of this project with management of a revolving loan fund to develop basic, general materials for use by other projects.

- I. Project Title/Number: 4-H Assistance to Expand and Strengthen the Yuwa-Kasetkorn (Y-K) Program in Thailand/AID 493-7017-T
- II. PVO: 4-H
- III. Project Description: The project goal is to assist in developing and expanding the Y-K program through staff training, expansion of Y-K clubs, increasing Y-K membership and developing a program to involve the teenage children of small and poor families. Originally the project was to operate throughout Thailand. After the first year, the project was limited to 4 provinces---Nakhon Prathom, Ratchaburi, Prachuap Khiri Khan, and Surat Thani. The project focused on identifying youth needs, developing literature to work with club members, training Y-K staff and local leaders, and providing technical support and guidance for local club projects. The project provided for 6 Y-K staff people to go to the United States for three months to observe 4-H activities and for six 4-H Youth Development Program people to spend two years in Thailand working with local Y-K officials. In the final year an additional grant of \$50,000 was made to start a revolving loan fund in the 4 pilot provinces. The funds were granted and the management system organized but the actual loan operations began in Phase II of the project and will be discussed in that report.
- IV. Project Dates: 8/30/77-1/31/81
- V. Project Approval Time: First reference to project in file is in 1976, first proposal July 1977, Mission approval July 20, 1977.

VI. Fit with Selection Criteria: Increase in agricultural productivity through increased technical skills and guidance; work with poor, small-farmers to improve conditions; work in labor intensive ways to provide income generating projects for under-employed rural youth; income distribution through providing skills and training to improve earning capacity; and help employ rural youth. Training for rural youth, Y-K leaders, and DOAE Y-K staff. Continuation project conceived of as a pilot project to be replicated throughout Thailand; the Y-K program is part of the on-going work of the DOAE. Fits with RTG goals of improving rural standard of living and staff development for the DOAE.

VII. Financial Information:

USAID	\$247,825 from OPG
	<u>50,000</u> through Co-Financing for revolving loan fund

TOTAL AID \$297,825 (67.87%)

RTG/4-H \$141,000 (32.13%)

4-H overhead is 12.3% of total project.

VIII. Reporting Requirements: Quarterly financial and progress reports-- turned in on time; reasonable discussion of project progress, problems, etc.

IX. Assessment of Planning and Project Design: Original proposal called for increasing Y-K staff effectiveness through a development program, development of literature, training for volunteers, and development of a private support framework. Final outcomes and methods for achieving them were not specified.

After working within the scope of this proposal for a year and having difficulty in achieving goals and coordinating the project, the 4-H

country manager working with the AID PVO office developed a revised proposal. The revision changed the project organization adding a project steering committee, provincial level advisory committees, and village planning workshops. It provided for the 4-H consultant to live in country and coordinate and supervise the project. Additionally, the revision limited the project to 4 pilot provinces. It developed a list of measurable outcomes including increases in Y-K members, leaders, and clubs; increased agricultural yields and development and use of educational materials. Club record books and Y-K leader observations were to provide the measures. The project plan also included a bench mark survey to determine level of membership, problems, and interests.

X. Assessment of Technical Design: For original proposal, bad. The 4-H consultant was to make a series of short trips. The lack of a project administrator/coordinator made it difficult to communicate with DOAE Y-K people and other consultants. The revised project with project steering committee provided for coordination among the various agencies and the 4 pilot provinces provided a structure to focus attention.

XI. Beneficiaries: By the end of the project (Nov. 1980), there were a total of 6,127 Y-K members in the pilot provinces up from 2,245 in April 1978 and 214 clubs, up from 69 clubs in 1978. The participants were primarily female ranging from 54% to 68% female. The average number of rai (4 rai = 1 acre) held by participants' families were: 22 in Nakorn Prathom; 19 in Ratchaburi; 25 in Prachuap Khiri Khan; and 17 in Surat Thani.

The figures are from the project's final report. We do not have more detailed information on club members and their backgrounds since we did not visit the original pilot provinces.

- XII. Assessment of Impact: One goal was to develop income generating projects. Most club projects were small scale, learning projects. The project did strengthen the ability of DOAE Y-K workers to do their jobs through improved training skills and educational materials. Specific impact on members is unclear in the final report.
- XIII. Replicability: This project is clearly a pilot project aimed at developing programs, materials, and skills applicable throughout Thailand. Continuation is assured through the RTG support for DOAE and the Y-K program.
- XIV. Success: Overall, good; the project developed the organizational skills necessary to carry out the project's goals. DOAE Y-K leaders were trained, some educational materials were developed; membership, local leaders, and clubs all increased. Income generating projects were limited. However, the final report developed a mechanism to solve this problem and to channel funds to clubs capable of undertaking income generating projects.
- XV. Evaluation/Recommendations: If AID is going to fund projects using short term consultants, they need to have assurances of capable administrative back up to assure program continuity.

While the necessity of revising the project proposal is not a good sign, AID's response to this was good. The revised proposal greatly

improved the project's ability to achieve its goals. We would like to see AID continue this flexible approach to projects when they encounter difficulties. The impetus for redesign can come from either AID or the PVO.

We would like to see this redesign experience applied to other 4-H/Y-K projects, particularly to the Y-K Promotion Foundation Initiating Project.

- I. Project Title/Number: Yuwa Kasetkorn Promotion Foundation (YKPF)
Initiating Project/AID 493-0296-G-SS-1035-00
- II. PVO: 4-H
- III. Project Description: This project is one of two projects which were developed as a consequence of initial 4-H project to help develop rural agricultural clubs. These projects are supported by AID through OPG's and through the Co-Financing mechanism, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Department of Agricultural Extension (DOAE), and 4-H International.

At the end of the first project the evaluator recommended a continuation and expansion of the club project and the initiation of a project to develop the foundation to provide financial support to the Yuwa-Kasetkorn (Y-K) program. The Y-K Foundation was established in 1979 but had not undertaken many projects. The goal was to have an effective foundation by 1984 capable of generating sufficient voluntary support to sustain the Foundation and providing support for Y-K programs. AID funding, the bulk of which provided salaries for an executive director, assistant director, and secretary was to decline during the project period as the foundation raised its own funds.

Administratively the Foundation project was linked to the second phase of the Y-K club program. The in-country 4-H manager was to provide knowledge and administrative skills during the Foundation's infancy. The 4-H country manager also was to coordinate with 4-H Washington in the provision of a consultant to help with the establishment of the Foundation.

After the second year the Foundation was to be administratively independent.

IV. Project Dates: 9/1/81-8/31/84

V. Project Approval Time: The Foundation was first suggested in the final evaluation dated May/July 1980. Draft proposal dated September 1980, revised proposal dated July 1981, approval August 1981.

VI. Fit with Selection Criteria: Improve agricultural productivity through financial support of the Y-K programs. Training through training in fund raising to the provincial and district Y-K programs. Encourage local participation and support through the establishment of self-supporting foundation. Fits with RTG goals of expanding and supporting agricultural extension.

VII. Financial Information:

AID \$147,935 (74.74%)

RTG/4-H \$ 50,000 (26.26%) This is a minimum figure for
RTG support.

VIII. Reporting Requirements: Quarterly reports. Reports delayed, often not sent to AID/T without a letter to 4-H Washington requesting reports. Financial reports do not include an accounting of non-AID funds which is required in the contract.

IX. Assessment of Project Planning and Design: Given the close connection between the Y-K program and the DOAE and budget problems facing the RTG, a foundation to raise money to provide private sector support is reasonable.

The proposal does not specify the relationships among the DOAE, the 4-H/Y-K project, and the YKPF. It calls for an overly broad scope of activities including fund raising; publicity about Y-K; Y-K supplies (caps, t-shirts, etc.); Y-K club programming activities; training local clubs in fund raising activities; administering seed money for income generating projects by Y-K clubs; and administering funds for a national awards competition. The proposal sets the goal of raising 6 million Baht per year to make the Foundation self-sufficient. We found through discussion with other PVO's that 500,000-1,000,000 Baht can be raised through fund raising activities--clearly the 6 million Baht figure is too high.

The proposal did not allow any time to develop public awareness of the Y-K Foundation, in spite of the fact that it was recently established and relatively unknown.

- X. Technical Design: See above IV.
- XI. Beneficiaries: At present limited, given the state of the Foundation; potentially large as it could provide funds for revolving loans, international exchange programs, etc.
- XII. Assessment of Impact: May have increased population awareness of the YKPF through a series of television programs. It does provide caps and t-shirts for some DOAE programs.
- XIII. Replication: Not replicable since the YKPF initiating project is a consequence of the particular sets of relationships among the DOAE, Y-K program, and 4-H International.

XIV. Success: Limited; has raised approximately 1 million Baht over two years through a number of fairs and direct donations. It has brought the Y-K program to public attention through a series of television programs.

A. Problems with proposal/project design:

1. Relationships with DOAE and 4-H/Y-K people changed when staffing in those offices changed. DOAE obligations were not clearly spelled out both in daily programming details and in the larger issue of general DOAE/YKPF relationships. Consequently relationships between DOAE and YKPF have become strained.

2. Different perceptions of Foundation role. The executive director perceives her role as increasing public awareness of the Y-K program and raising money primarily through relatively large donations from wealthy donors for specific programs. The failure to specify priorities produces different perceptions of the Foundation's role in the DOAE, 4-H/Y-K program, and among the Foundation board members.

B. Problems with the Foundation:

1. The constitution gives the executive director responsibility for the day-to-day activities of the Foundation but does not give the executive director any independent decision making power. All decisions including spending small amounts of money must first have board approval.

C. Problems with 4-H International:

1. The proposal called for 4-H International to provide administrative support for the YKPF including processing and forwarding progress and technical reports. This has not been provided in a timely way; project

reports often take 8 or more months to reach AID/T. Financial reports do not provide all information required in the contract.

2. The proposal called for a consultant to arrive early in the project to help establish Foundation procedures and to help train the executive director who had no previous fund raising experience. The consultant, who arrived 12 months late, perceived his role to be to evaluate the Foundation rather than helping establish procedures.

3. The relationship between the 4-H in-country manager and the Foundation was unclear. Different perceptions of roles led to considerable communication difficulties.

XV. Recommendations:

A. For the Foundation:

1. We recommend that AID call a meeting of all parties involved to decide whether they are willing to continue the Foundation program. If all parties agree, the Foundation project proposal needs to be revised to a manageable work load and a specific plan of work. It requires the cooperation of the DOAE, the executive director, and the board members to clarify expectations about the relationship between the Foundation and the DOAE Y-K program. We believe that the Foundation is an important adjunct to the Y-K program and should be continued on the condition that all the interested parties agree to its continuation. Without this assurance, the Foundation cannot succeed.

2. That the current executive director continue and technical advice be provided for fund raising and assessment of publicity campaigns.

3. That the Foundation's goals be limited, at least initially, to publicity and fund raising.

4. That specific procedures be developed for the use of Foundation money including where the responsibility for managing and accounting for the money lies.

5. That the constitution be rewritten to give the executive director necessary authority to carry out Foundation activities.

B. For AID: If AID's goals justify the establishment of similar other Foundations, we recommend that:

1. AID discover reasonable levels of fund raising for PVOs in-country; and

2. that it not fund Foundations without evidence that it has surveyed potential contributions and accurately assessed potential levels of funds.

- I. Project Title/Number: Expansion of the 4-H/Yuwa Kasetkorn (Y-K) Program/AID 493-0296-G-SS-1005-00

- II. PVO: 4-H

- III. Project Description: This project is an extension and expansion of the first Y-K project which terminated in January 1981. In 4-H/Y-K II the area covered is expanded to 14, then 15 pilot provinces. The area focus is on the western region, the location of the 4 original pilot provinces and one province from each of the other regions. The goals are to improve the organization of and the communication among Y-K clubs; increase educational and monetary benefits; provide professional development for the Department of Agricultural Extension (DOAE) Y-K staff and the volunteer leaders; and to develop and implement a system of competitions and awards. Educational goals were to be achieved through the development of appropriate literature such as the poultry raising pamphlet of Y-K I. These, combined with improved volunteer leader training, were to provide one way of increasing benefits. Y-K staff development included 8 staff participating in the 4-H professional rural youth program and a number of staff workshops. Y-K II extended the \$50,000 revolving loan fund for the original 4 pilot provinces.

The Y-K Promotion Foundation (YKPF) initiating grant was linked administratively and conceptually to Y-K II. While it is a project which received separate funding, Y-K II was to provide administrative and technical help to the YKPF.

- IV. Project Dates: 1/27/81-7/31/83
- V. Project Approval Time: The extension was first mentioned in the final report of 4-H/Y-K I, a revised proposal was submitted in November 1980 and approved February 20, 1981 but it authorized expenditures back to January 15, 1981.
- VI. Fit with Selection Criteria: see 4-H/Y-K I
- VII. Financial Information:
- | | |
|----------|--------------------|
| USAID | \$425,260 (36.52%) |
| 4-H/DOAE | \$810,000 (59.88%) |
| Other | <u>\$ 46,000</u> |
| TOTAL | \$1,281,260 |
- USAID contribution is \$386,600 plus 10% for indirect costs.
- VIII. Reporting Requirements: Reports due quarterly. Long delays before quarterly reports reached AID/T--up to 8 months. Initial report was brief and inadequate; subsequent reports provided information on project status, problems, and detailed financial reporting on the \$50,000 revolving loan fund.
- IX. Assessment of Planning and Project Design: Proposal and project planning reflect lessons learned in the redesign of 4-H/Y-K I. The proposal includes specific goals, job descriptions, and techniques for achieving goals. The proposal does not reflect the changes in the capability of the Y-K staff as the result of the first project. Some assessment of these changes would have been appropriate in redefining the 4-H in-country manager's role in this project. The project duration was reduced

from 36 months to 30 months without reexamining the scope of work and reducing it in light of the shorter duration.

X. Assessment of Technical Design: The project design was adequate. Staffing and administrative problems made it difficult to implement the design. 4-H International's slowness to provide administrative support resulted in long delays in sending reports to AID/T; delays in sending consultants was a major cause of this difficulty.

Design problems mentioned above also weakened the ability of the project staff to implement project goals.

XI. Beneficiaries: No figures are available for overall Y-K membership. There is some feeling among the Y-K staff that the program is reaching the poorer farmers and that both young men and young women participate. Hopefully the in-depth evaluation will provide accurate figures about the beneficiaries. Eight Y-K staff people participated in the 4-H Professional Rural Youth Leadership program in the United States.

XII. Assessment of Impact: Difficult to assess, as in-depth final evaluation of this project is pending. The \$50,000 revolving loan fund provided 395 loans for income generating projects. The success of this loan fund has inspired other smaller revolving loan funds of the provincial district levels.

The new literature has recently gone to press and has not been available to club members so it is not possible to assess its impact.

XIII. Replication: Development of literature, training, techniques, and organizational structure makes continued development of Y-K clubs

throughout Thailand plausible, providing there are sufficient funds and staff to organize and support new clubs.

XIV. Success: Expansion of clubs in the western region and one province in each of the other regions has occurred. Literature development has not occurred at the pace suggested in the proposal. What literature development there was focused on the volunteer level. Staff members participated in the 4-H program in the United States and have, according to the 4-H country manager, returned with new ideas and enthusiasm for the Y-K program. Staff training has occurred at the regional and provincial level but its effectiveness has not been evaluated. An award program has been established with local, district, provincial and regional competitions in the western region, and local district and provincial competitions in the pilot provinces.

The revolving loan fund established in the 4 original pilot provinces is doing well according to the 4-H country manager; 100% of all the loans have been returned. Income from these loan projects is good. The selection process assures that only well-designed projects which have the potential to succeed are funded. Projects which are unacceptable are redesigned with the help of Y-K staff until they are acceptable and then the loan is made.

XV. Evaluation/Recommendations: It is difficult to sort regular Y-K activities from those receiving 4-H support. The visit to the Chiang Mai provincial agricultural officer, his assistant and the provincial Y-K officer was encouraging. The club visit showed a group of enthusiastic young adults who clearly enjoyed the Y-K program and stated their desire to remain farmers.

At the national level, where the organization and development of literature and programs should occur, our response is less enthusiastic. We were unable to determine what the 4-H element in the Y-K II project was. It appears likely that the Y-K staff trained in Phase I would have been able to carry out developmental staff programs on their own. In the one area where 4-H skills could have had a large impact, literature development, few developments occurred.

The different nature of farming systems and government involvement in the U.S. compared to Thailand raises questions of the appropriateness of the U.S. 4-H model to the Thai system. Some investigation prior to the initiation of the Y-K project itself might have led to a more appropriate Thai form of agricultural clubs suited to the budgetary and bureaucratic limitations of the DOAE. We recommend that the in-depth evaluation of the 4-H/Y-K II project examine the impact of the project both in terms of achieving its original goals of improving income opportunities for poor rural youth through extension in the club format and in terms of the appropriateness of the whole 4-H program in Thailand.

- I. Title/Number: Promotion of Rural Development through Women/
493-8015-T
- II. PVO: National Council of Women of Thailand
- III. Project Description: This project was a follow-on to a USAID grant in 1976 to the NCWT in conjunction with Thommassat University to conduct a major survey on the status of Thai women in the rural sector. Based on the findings of that survey, this project was designed to:
1. Train 25 field staff in leadership and communications (5 from NCWT/Bangkok, 10 each from Lampang and Chacheongsao);
 2. Train 80 village leaders from villages in Lampang and Chacheongsao areas in organizing, planning and implementing activities to be chosen by the women based on their felt needs;
 3. Training 120 women from villages in these Provinces in vocational skills of their choice;
 4. Establish a revolving fund to provide small amounts of capital to women who needed it to put their vocational training to use.
- The training was organized in two "workshops," one in Bangkok for leadership training and the second actually being a series of training sessions for village women.
- Evaluations in 10/79 and 2/80 led to an extension of the project to include three more Provinces: Kohn Kaen, Mahasarakham and Udon Thani.
- IV. Project Dates: 8/28/78-8/27/80

V. Project Approval Time: Six months. First proposal is dated 2/24/78 and grant began 8/28/78.

VI. Fit with Selection Criteria: The project focused directly on training and human resource development. It also indirectly intended to address income distribution and employment issues.

VII. Financial Information:

USAID	\$29,000	OPG = 54.4%
PVO/Other	\$24,250	= 45.5%
TOTAL	\$53,250	

VIII. Reporting Requirements: Every 6 months. In file: 1 year, 18 months, final. Missing: First semi-annual report.

IX. Assessment of Planning and Project Design: The survey of the status of rural women in Thailand provided an excellent starting point for this project. The project proposal is extremely specific in terms of numbers of women to be trained in each targeted location. However, the project design does not specify the criteria for assessing the content (as opposed to the process) of the training. Also, while the criteria for use of the revolving loan fund are clearly specified (14 criteria in all), the procedure for follow-up and criteria for assessing its value in income generation are not thought through.

X. Assessment of Technical Design: In projects where training is the thrust (see also CRS and OEF as examples), but no focus on the measure of the effectiveness of the training is specified, the technical design all concentrates on trainees, locations and methodologies. Experience with

these projects shows this to be a weakness in project and technical design. In particular, pedagogical methodology should not stand on its own in a vacuum, but should relate directly to intended outcomes if it is to have any developmental impact.

XI. Beneficiaries: The NCWT training project reports that 20 people received training in Bangkok; 53 women (from Lampang, 25, and from Chacheongsao, 28) were given leadership training as facilitators; 62 (28L and 34C) were given one week courses in village organizing; 35 from Lampang were given training in poultry raising; 62 (30L and 32C) received training in crafts; 83 in Chacheongsao received vocational training. In addition, day care centers were started in three villages. No records are available regarding the benefits or beneficiaries of the revolving fund.

XII. Assessment of Impact: We visited one of the day care centers where 40-60 children come daily (52 were there on the day we visited). The managing committee of the Center (women volunteers) with whom we met said that the main outcome of the center was that mothers were now free to do field work alongside their husbands. Because we were there in the dry season, few people were in the fields; yet 52 children were at the Center anyway! The impact on the children is less clear. Two new and inexperienced teachers were in charge and having a difficult time. The NCWT woman who took us to the Center was concerned and intended to follow up on training for these teachers.

The impact of the training programs, per se, was impossible for us to gauge. The numbers of people who attended training sessions do

not seem to us to be adequate indicators of impact. No other data or information were available--a weakness of project design. We were particularly disappointed not to have access to any records of the revolving loan fund though some people we talked with indicated that it had been helpful. It was the impression of the NCWT central office that repayment had been good but there was no knowledge of the actual failure rate.

XIII. Replication: The original project design was extended from the original two Provinces to three additional ones based on the NCWT's evaluation reports. Our major concern is that this kind of project has been done by PVOs more than the results warrant. Projects have followed the training model and the revolving loan fund model; we are interested in a tightening of the training design to focus on outcomes which have been seen to have important development consequences and which make good use, with significant returns, of the loan funds.

XIV. Success: The project trained more women than the original design proposed. It fulfilled and surpassed its goals. As we have said, however, the impact of the training courses remains elusive.

XV. Evaluation/Recommendations: As noted, this project raises the issue of training impact as do several other projects (CRS, IHAP Youth, OEF, etc.). Our basic conclusions from a comparative review of this and other projects is that AID should support training programs that are focused around specific activities and not training for training's sake. Much experience has been gained in this area and should be used in project

design in the future. This is also true in the program uses and managerial supports for revolving loan funds. The NCWT is a very interesting and potentially very strong Thai PVO which deserves solid and continuing support on projects which are designed to benefit from the organizations' broad reach into a number of women's groups.

- I. Project Title/Number: Non-Formal Education for Low Income Women in Northeast Thailand/AID 493-0022
- II. PVO: Overseas Education Fund (OEF)
- III. Project Description: The project's objectives were to teach 120 rural low income Thai women skills for participating in and initiating activities for income generation and community development and enable these women to develop support and action groups for identifying and surmounting obstacles to their participation in development. It also includes an institution strengthening component of developing the Department of Public Welfare's (DPW) ability to implement non-formal educational activities for low income women.

The course curriculum had been developed by OEF for Latin America. The work book was translated into Thai. An OEF consultant trained 2 DPW staff people and 10 village facilitators; the DPW staff supervised the village facilitators. At the end of the 6 month course the OEF consultant returned to evaluate the text and the course and make revisions. The last element of the project involved distributing seed money, B2,500-3,000/group, to the groups to undertake projects developed during the course.
- V. Project Approval Time: First proposal January 1980; contract signed July 23, 1980.
- VI. Fit with Selection Criteria: Improve income through developing women's ability to undertake income generating projects. Training women to identify and solve problems through group techniques and train DPW staff in non-formal education.

VII. Financial Information:

AID	\$38,695	=	71.1%
OEF	\$15,725	=	29.1%
TOTAL	\$54,410		

OEF indirect costs = \$10,072 - 35% of salaries and fringe benefits and 36% of rest as overhead.

VIII. Reporting Requirements: Semi-annual progress and financial reports. Filed on time and informative about project status.

IX. Assessment of Project Design and Planning: OEF, working from material developed for Latin America, created a similar non-formal education program for low income women in Thailand. The design of the course, teaching method, and participatory orientation derived from previous OEF experience. The project design provided for a high degree of DPW staff participation and control over the course with minimal OEF supervision. OEF provided adequate back-up to handle difficulties even while the OEF consultant was in the United States.

The broader issues of the appropriateness of the OEF participatory approach to Thailand were not raised in the proposal.

X. Assessment of Technical Design: Both course design and the translation of materials into Thai were done adequately. OEF has both the skill and experience to train staff and supervise the course. Care was taken to translate the materials into culturally appropriate forms.

The group project component appears as an afterthought to the course. There was little planning and, consequently, no research about the feasibility of the projects.

- XI. Beneficiaries: 226 women participated in the program. Of the 226 participants, 196 women became involved in income generating projects at the end of the course. Two DPW staff people were trained in non-formal educational techniques.
- XII. Assessment of Impact:
- A. Of the course: According to the OEF final evaluation, 38 of 50 women interviewed reported that they were more confident in expressing ideas and 41 women stated that their family situation had improved. Nine of the ten groups planned action projects at the end of the course.
- B. Of the project: Two were community development projects. One group dug a well and one group built a village meeting place. The remaining 7 projects were income generation projects: 4 chicken raising projects and 3 weaving projects. None of the chicken raising groups earned any income. At the time of our visit, 3 groups were still active and planning to try chicken raising again. The weaving projects produced cloth for home use and small amounts of money. Two weaving groups are active but with only 15 members of the original groups participating.
- C. On DPW: The DPW has incorporated some of the non-formal educational techniques into its broader agricultural and community development programs for the Northeast Resettlement Region.
- XIII. Replication: The course has not been replicated.
- XIV. Success: In OEF terms the course was a success because the women participants stated improvements in their ability to work together and solve problems and because half of the groups remain active 1-1/2 years

after the course. As an income generating project it was a failure. Its direct impact on the DPW staff in Loom Paaw and in the resettlement region is indeterminant. The regional chief stated that the experience was useful and that they incorporated some aspects of the experience in their community development work.

XV. Evaluation/Recommendations: The course content is little remembered. Both staff at the Loom Paaw Resettlement and course participants view the OEF project as an income generating project. The course was simply the way to form groups to decide on projects. We think that this perspective is valuable and would have liked to see action projects at the center of the proposal. This is not OEF's approach since they emphasize the leadership and problem solving elements of the course. We think that these goals would be better served through an action project oriented proposal which would include project feasibility investigation. OEF achieved what it set out to do but we suggest that the developmental impact of such programs could be improved by the focus on an activity.

Recommendations to AID: (1) Any income generating project should include feasibility studies which indicate local suitability, potential for income, and marketing strategies; and (2) Projects which provide general training in leadership, problem solving, etc. should be linked to action projects which provide an immediate opportunity to use what has been learned.

I. Project Title/Number: Amerasian Outreach Project/493-8008-T

II. PVO: Pearl S. Buck Foundation

III. Project Description: A 1971 Thai government decree removed Thai citizenship from children of alien fathers. In 1978 the Thai Court ruled that this decree did not apply to children of US G.I.s except where the G.I. had legally married a Thai wife. Citizenship is very important in Thailand for, without it, a child may be refused a place in government schools and, later, may be refused employment.

The USAID funding to the PSBF allowed them to open up seven branch offices and to expand their staff in order to locate and document Amerasian children. Originally, funding was for three years, but the project was extended one additional year. In the four years, 7,500 documents were collected, 1,178 children were enrolled in the Foundation's sponsorship program (where U.S. families sponsor a child for \$9/month); 2,300 children were completely documented; and 29 caseworkers were employed. The caseworkers found that there were not as many problems of Thai citizenship denial as had been expected. In fact, only 168 children were identified who had been denied Thai citizenship and, of these, only 30-40 were actually eligible. Thus the plans of the project to represent 1,000 children to the RTG courts for legal citizenship were unnecessary. By 1983, 19 children had been represented successfully by PSBF and gained Thai citizenship while 10-15 other cases were bogged down in the courts. (The Thai legal system is complicated, and PSBF continues to pursue these cases.)

- IV. Project Dates: August 1978-August 1982. Three years originally with one year extension.
- V. Project Approval Time: Nine months. File shows first contact made 11/77 though there is reference to an earlier initial contact not specified by time.
- VI. Fit with Selection Criteria: The project does not fit any of the selection criteria except insofar as the \$9/month sponsorship support is intended to help pay a child's education costs. Some children are, also, living in rural areas.
- VII. Financial Information:
- | | | | |
|-----------|---------------|-------|--------|
| AID | \$150,000 | OPG | |
| | <u>50,000</u> | Co-Fi | |
| | \$200,000 | = | 74.99% |
| PVO/Other | 66,700 | = | 25.01% |
| TOTAL | \$266,700 | | |
- VIII. Reporting Requirements: Semi-annual with evaluations after the 18th and 36th months. (Amended to the 48th month.) In file: 6 month; 12 month; 18 month; 24 month; 42 month. Final evaluation in 48th month. Missing: 30th and 36th months.
- IX. Assessment of Planning and Project Design: The project design was based on an expectation of a much greater denial of citizenship than actually existed. The demand for the project did not come from children (or their guardians) who had been denied citizenship but, rather, from the U.S. based PSBF which assumed a need which did not exist. Some preliminary

research might have resulted in a more accurate assessment of the problem. The experience of the project has borne out the assumption that the Amerasian children are a needy population. This is not so much because of prejudice against these children in Thailand as it is because they mostly (95 percent) come from poverty families and live with relatives other than their mothers (50 percent--a not uncommon occurrence in Thai villages).

X. Assessment of Technical Design: For its intended project, the PSBF designed its technical effort well in that it hired a sufficient number of qualified case workers to locate a large number of Amerasian children and to serve them. It also retained a lawyer to handle the legal work for the children.

XI. Beneficiaries: The project had a clear target population in mind. The PSBF estimated that there were 4,000 Amerasians in Thailand (other estimates go as high as 9,000-10,000). They located 3,300 children and included in the sponsorship program 1128 of these.

XII. Assessment of Impact:

- A. Skills training--none except primary education
- B. Income generation--none
- C. Strengthening local institutions--none

XIII. Replication: This project is not designed for replication. However, it is important to note that, at the end of AID funding, the PSBF did pick up all expenses of the branch offices and of the expanded staff so that the level of operations begun under the project continues.

XIV. Success: The project exceeded its goals of document collection. It located a significant number of Amerasian children and it provides sponsorship for many. It did not change the citizenship status of many children (only 19 over 4 years).

XV. Evaluation/Recommendations: This is one of the most difficult types of projects to evaluate. There is a real merit in supporting a program with AID funds which is targeted on a population which exists because of an American presence in Thailand. However, there were no elements of this project design which could be said to be essentially developmental. For this reason, it would seem that funds for support should not have come from the Co-Financing project budget.

- I. Project Title/Number: Assistance to Amerasians/493-9021-T
- II. PVO: Pearl S. Buck Foundation
- III. Project Description: Because more children were located by the Amerasian Outreach Program than could be sponsored PSBF designed this project to provide them and some of the poorer sponsored children with medical and educational support. (Funds for this kind of assistance are very limited from the U.S. based Foundation.) The medical program hired one nurse whose job was to visit each of the 7 district offices of PSBF during the school vacations two times each year. In 1982, he saw 1,233 children or over one-half of the children involved with PSBF. The first report of 1983 indicates that he saw 1,151 children.

The education component of the project had three elements: (1) assistance with high school fees; (2) assistance with vocational training fees; and (3) assistance with costs of living away from home to continue schooling.

After 6 months of the project, 22 children had received help with living expenses (average Baht 584); 18 received help with high school fees (average Baht 662); and 8 with vocational training fees (average Baht 1,500). An education/vocational counselor was hired (a woman).
- IV. Project Dates: 8/79-8/82 (with two budget amendments). A follow-on grant has been given as Assistance to older Amerasians to continue this assistance through 1985.

V. Pre-Project Approval Time: 4 months. (File shows first contact as 4/79 and proposal submission as 5/8/79. DTEC approval is 8/15/79 and project effective contract date is 8/31/79.)

VI. Fit with Selection Criteria: The project fits with two criteria-- the emphasis on training and the overall fit with the CDSS emphasis on human resources development.

VII. Financial Information:

Total Costs	\$213,400	
USAID	135,000	OPG
	<u>25,000</u>	Co-F
	\$160,000	= 74.98%
PVO/Other	53,400	= 25.02%

VIII. Reporting Requirements: Semi-annual. Reports in File: 6 month, 12 month, 30 month. Missing: 18 month, 24 month, 36 month.

IX. Assessment of Planning and Project Design:

A. Medical component: All branch offices are in areas where access to government hospitals and other medical services exist. No restrictions exist in these facilities regarding citizenship. No thought was given to the duplicative nature of this aspect of the program with existent government systems and no consideration was given to design of a method for testing whether this program aspect reaches children not otherwise serviced or whether it might cause children to postpone treatment at government facilities awaiting the arrival of the PSBF nurse.

B. Educational component: The project assumption is that children who stay in school longer have a better chance of employment and security for the rest of their lives. This is borne out by evidence in Thailand. Without the final report, we do not know the proportion of children with and without sponsorship who received this assistance.

PSBF keeps the bank books of all sponsored children and sends them regular monthly statements of savings. No child continues to receive sponsorship funds who drops out of school. Funds from this project may be used to support schooling of these children if they decide to reenter school. It is also used by pay fees in private schools where sponsorship funds are not sufficient.

X. Assessment of Technical Design: Hiring a nurse and an education/vocational counselor was correct for the project as designed. However, the care of the project design in actually making sure that its effort provided the greatest aid in health and education possible for the money seems unimaginative. PSBF is by intention of its home office a social welfare agency rather than a development agency. Even so, little effort has been made to think about new and possibly further reaching ways to increase the welfare of these children in the context where they live.

XI. Beneficiaries: The beneficiaries are Amerasian children and many are reached through PSBF's total programs of which this is a part. Half-siblings of the targeted children do not receive any aid, and families are discouraged (sometimes prohibited) from using funds for general family or household improvement.

XII. Assessment of Impact:

- A. Skills training--some
- B. Income generation--too early to assess
- C. Strengthening local institutions--none

XIII. Replication: The project is not designed for replication. In fact, as this group of children grows into adulthood, the need for the program in Thailand will cease to exist. The PSBF country director is considering other target groups at that point.

XIV. Success: The success of this project in improving the health of the children is unknown relative to care they could otherwise receive. Forty-eight children received educational help in the one year for which we have the figures. Without this assistance, they would not have been able to attend these schools. (In the follow-on grant, PSBF is beginning to work on job placement after skills training with the older children.)

XV. Evaluations/Recommendations: This project is developmental only in the long run impact of education on life opportunities. Other, possibly more effective, educational approaches were not considered and adequate systems for assessing success with this approach as compared to others were not built into this project design. For example, no comparisons are made of educational attainment or health status of these children with their peers in age and/or socio-economic status.

We note, again, that the project as designed and as run fits only marginally with USAID's stated criteria for Co-Financing projects. AID seems to have three possible options: (1) to continue to fund this type

of project with Co-Financing funds as a clear and explicit exception justified by special (preferably specified) circumstances; (2) to fund projects of this nature from some other funds not designated as "developmental"; or (3) to use its funding in this case as it does in others to urge and prompt the receiving agency to be more developmental in its approach. We recommend the third option and, as the country director for PSBF expressed his interest in this approach, feel that it could be successful. While we cannot suggest a suitable project design from our short involvement, we conclude from our review that such a design should look for ways to expand the impact to the families and neighborhoods of the Amerasian children and that the possibility of working with an IPVO should be considered.

- I. Project Title/Number: Hill tribe Youth Leadership Training/AID
493-8004-T

- II. PVO: Thai Hill Crafts Foundation

- III. Project Description: This project is an expansion of THCF project which had trained two groups of 10 students prior to the OPGs. The project then trained 60 Hilltribe youths over a three year period. Its goal was to provide non-formal educational training to Hilltribe youths to up-grade agricultural and health skills, Thai literacy, tribal crafts, and consumer skills. The training lasted 10 months and covered the following topics: Thailand--as a nation, as a combination of ethnic groups; how to interact with lowland Thai; systems of production; community development; agriculture; animal husbandry; craftsmanship; and Hilltribe and RTG relationships. The program was to increase the participants' ability to deal with Thai people and government, but to also include a sense of pride in their tribal identity. After the course students were to return to their home villages. THCF planned yearly follow-ups of graduates. If the graduate were interested, the THCF provided land, equipment and technical skills in his/her community for development projects.

- IV. Project Dates: 6/21/78-10/20/82

- V. Project Approval Time: A revised proposal was received 3/8/78, approved by AID/T on 3/29/78 with an activation date of 6/21/78. A letter dated 9/6/77 requests a revision of the first proposal but it is not in the file.

VI. Fit with Selection Criteria: Improving agricultural productivity through new crops and improved techniques. Income distribution--provide skills necessary for tribal people to participate better in the lowland economy. Training in agriculture, crafts production, and Thai literacy. Supplements RTG formal education program.

VII. Financial Information:

USAID	\$31,485	in proposal
additional	1,000	
	<u>3,000</u>	
	\$35,485	
THCF	\$17,100	plus accommodation for students
TOTAL	\$62,585	USAID 73% THCF 27%

VIII. Reporting Requirements: Semi-annual reports. Reports filed late, usually after a letter from USAID/T sent requesting reports. The reports are generally short and provide little information on class composition and problems.

IX. Assessment of Planning and Project Design: Since the proposal for the AID OPG is based on two years' previous training experience, the proposal represents a developed approach to education and leadership training. The proposal includes the training course curriculum which had received prior RTG approval, trainee selection criteria, and general expected outcomes. It also provides for trainee follow-up.

X. Assessment of Technical Design: The proposal provides no information about how the project is going to achieve its goals beyond the selection

criteria for students. Teacher selection, training, curriculum development are not mentioned.

XI. Beneficiaries: Sixty people participated in the training course. A total of 38 men and 22 women received training. They came from the following groups: Miew, Akha, Lahu, Karen, Thai Lue, Akha, Liso, Khamu, and Shan.

XII. Impact: Four graduates of the program are now working for the Hilltribe Welfare Division. 25 graduates will receive further vocational training. All students are reported to return to their villages and work to improve the condition of their families. Approximately 30% are reported to work to develop their communities.

XIII. Replication/Continuation: Program has continued without USAID support for a year; THCF has recently received 3 additional years of funding from USAID to expand the program.

XIV. Success: In terms of training and the number of students set out in the proposal, the project was a success. The question of long term impact is unresolved. Information is not available to determine whether income, health status, or agricultural productivity has improved.

XV. Evaluation/Recommendations: The educational portion of the project is well developed. We suggest that the curriculum developed for the Hill Area Education Project be used here. Information on students with the follow up program should be collected so that the THCF can monitor the effects of their program and modify the program to fit current needs or problems.

- I. Title/Number: Rural Infant and Child Care Centers/AID/ASIA-G-1305
- II. PVO. The Asia Foundation and the Research Institute for Health Sciences, Chiang Mai University (formerly MALAN).
- III. Project Description. The project opened Infant and Child Care Centers (ICCs) in three villages in northern Thailand near Chiang Mai. The activities of each included:
 - a. Day Care Center for malnourished children from 6 months to 3 years which provided supplemental feeding and a demonstration area for the childrens' families to learn about balanced nutrition, cleanliness and health.
 - b. Health services through regular visits by a Nursing Aide and a program of immunization, first aid, a well-baby clinic and family planning;
 - c. Agriculture as an adjunct to diet by providing good quality seed grain to villages and arranging training and technical back-up through other parts of Chiang Mai University and various government and private agencies;
 - d. Income generation through promotion (and later marketing) of traditional weaving, mushroom cultivation and bamboo shoots preservation.

Work in the three villages proceeded with careful and sometimes slow consultation with and involvement of village headmen and other leaders. The three villages were quite different in their ethnic makeup, levels of literacy, distance from urban centers and village organization. Results varied among the villages with the most remote and lowest literacy village lagging behind the other two (even though it was the area where the project started its work first). Nonetheless, all three ICCs were successfully begun, nutritional status was improved and infant mortality dropped.

The plan was that each village would move toward self-sufficiency in supporting the ICCs and that the Institute would become less directly involved after three years and serve only as a source for continuing advice. Thus emphasis was placed on training local people in the teaching, nutrition and health, and management aspects of the ICCs. Again, success in this varied among the three villages with one becoming almost entirely self-sufficient, one moving from dependency toward autonomy and the third still requiring direct back-up from the Institute.

IV. Project Dates: 2/78-11/82 including one extension and seven amendments.

V. Pre-Project Approval Time: One year and 10 months. MALAN (the Research/Institute for Health Sciences) submitted a first proposal to TAF on 4/1/76. This came to AID on 5/18/76 and the grant was approved on 2/1/78.

VI. Fit with Selection Criteria: The project fits with a number of the criteria including addressing agricultural productivity; infant mortality

reduction; family planning/population control; encouraging local participation and financial responsibility; continuation; and human resources development.

VII. Financial Information:

USAID	\$322,409	OPG = 61.15%
PVO/Other	<u>204,804</u>	<u>= 38.85%</u>
TOTAL	\$527,213	

Indirect Costs: Program Operational (Indirect) Costs = 35.5% of Total Direct Costs (\$73,067) and Administration Expense = 12.6% of Total Direct Costs (\$244,293).

VIII. Reporting Requirements: Semi-annual.

All are in files.

IX. Assessment of Planning and Project Design: The project was based on a hypothesis of its originator, Dr. Ousa, that the Institute could be effective in prevention of malnutrition if it would work over an extended period in an integrated multidisciplinary approach with villages where nutrition was a problem. Originally her idea met skepticism from her staff as well as from others because they were accustomed to the Institute's previous emphasis on research and curative care. The design of the project was broad--to gain the confidence of the villagers and help them develop ways that they could prevent malnutrition--and the approach chosen was the establishment of Infant and Child Care Centers. Dr. Ousa reports that she was not necessarily committed to ICCs as the only, or best, way to gain

village participation. She knew that participation was essential and she was prepared to experiment with other activities if the ICCs had not proven a good organizing focal point. As it happened, they did.

The project maintained an excellent balance between keeping the original goal clearly in mind and adapting its methods or approaches flexibly to respond to the differences among villages and various unanticipated village ideas. For example, in Village I the monk headman was a vegetarian and insisted that the village follow him in this. The project, therefore, had to develop nutritious food based on locally available foods that did not violate this man's injunctions.

X. Assessment of Technical Design: The Institute was, and is, an extremely well-designed and run professional research institute and its staff is of the highest calibre. This was reflected in the care and quality of the project's technical design. Baseline data were meticulously gathered and records regularly kept so that all changes in nutritional status and mortality rates are documented. The Institute uses a computer and sophisticated analysis. Furthermore, the laboratory backup for the development and testing of nutritious foods and supplements was excellent.

XI. Beneficiaries: Of the three villages chosen for this project, one was very poor, one a somewhat better-off new resettlement area where people had not yet managed to develop a community or an adequate agricultural base, and one was rather well off but with evidence of child malnutrition. The children were selected for attendance at the Centers according to age (six months to three years) and according to their levels of malnutrition (all suffered some malnutrition). They clearly benefitted according to the

statistical evidence. In addition the broad focus of the project was to improve the socio-economic status of the whole villages by improving agriculture, getting the public works engineers to improve water supplies and roads, etc. There is evidence that this occurred also, especially in Villages II and III.

XII. Assessment of Impact: Data show that the growth patterns of children attending the ICCs are better than for their peers not attending the ICCs. No child attending an ICC became clinically malnourished though some of their siblings were admitted to the hospital for treatment of malnutrition. Children who interrupted their attendance at an ICC and then returned showed depleted nutritional status upon re-entry and improvement thereafter. In two ICCs anemia was averted among children receiving the supplied nutritional diet. In the third (vegetarian) ICC, an iron supplement was required to prevent anemia. As an indirect benefit of the program, infant mortality rates for all villages included in the ICCs fell significantly. The ICCs provided post natal and early childhood training and follow-up. The reduced infant mortality may have been due to this--and the nutritional aspects of the program. (Complete data sheets are available in the files of this project; here we only summarize the impacts.)

XIII. Replication: Costs of the total nutrition program preclude exact and extensive replication. However, the project developed eight nutritious foods based on locally available resources which may be produced cheaply in other villages as well. Several villages near ICC II and III have asked for help on starting their own centers. ICC III is almost self-

sufficient (receives supplemental help from the Institute each month ranging from \$5 to \$25) in that the community is able and willing to support it. ICC II is also near self-sufficiency while ICC I is probably, according to project personnel, never going to attain self-sufficiency.

Staff of the Institute have given papers on the program, and its results, in other Southeast Asian countries at conferences. WHO, UNICEF and FAO are all interested in the project's results and may provide avenues for disseminating its findings to other developing countries.

XIV. Success: The project did not achieve total self-sufficiency for the three ICCs in its designated time. However, as sections IX, X, XI and XII show, there were a number of real successes in this effort. Longer term follow-up will be continued by the Institute to assess the Centers' long-term impact on the children of the villages and general trends in village socio-economic status, infant mortality and birth rates.

XV. Evaluation/Recommendations: The project seems to have been well worth supporting. The project design and the competence of the staff of the Institute assured quality. The role of TAF is subject to more question. It is not clear that their role, after the project was funded, was necessary for the project's running (since the Institute is fully staffed with managerial competence as well as technical resources), and, therefore, justifies the high overhead rates of TAF. Still, because the Institute did not qualify on its own for PVO funding, an intermediary was necessary for original support.

We recommend that when AID funds a program of a highly competent operation which requires little intermediary support, that it do so through

an agency with a low or insignificant overhead rate. We also recommend that additional assistance be given the Institute in 1) assuring a steady marketing outlet for the cloth woven by the villagers for income; and 2) dissemination of the scientific and organizational findings of the project to other PVOs and governments.

- I. Project Title/Number: Development of Ban Nam Yao Hospital (Tom Dooley Memorial Hospital)/493-9026-T
- II. PVO: Tom Dooley Heritage, Inc.
- III. Project Description: The purpose of this project was to develop a hospital to serve the population in the Ban Nam Yao Refugee Camp and to provide services to nearby Thai villages and Tambols. The plan was that the hospital should be run until the refugee camp dispersed and then it should be taken over by the Ministry of Public Health to serve the Thai communities.

The hospital began in a small thatch building in 1976 and runs now from a modest but good-sized building with out-patient facilities (including dentistry), 60 beds (two separate wards for measles and patients), X-ray room, operating room, delivery room, laboratory, pharmacy and supply room. Out-buildings include a laundry and kitchen, an opium detoxification center, and a skills training center, plus some staff homes. Over the years of its operation, the hospital has moved from serving almost entirely refugees to serving about 50% refugees and 50% Thai people. It averages 60 in-patients/day and serves 60-100 adult out-patients/day plus 25-30 children out-patients/day. The hospital operates extension services including a major public health program (in conjunction with government workers) including outreach and health education in twelve Thai schools (about 3000 students), antenatal and postnatal clinics, nutrition programs for children under 5, and a sanitation program in the refugee camp and nearby villages. Two clinics are operated daily for out-patient services and health education within the camp. The hospital is located just outside the camp. Staff include five M.D.'s, nine R.N.'s (including a

midwife whenever possible) and about 70 trained refugee medics who screen in-coming patients and help in the hospital.

IV. Project Dates: 9/28/79 - 9/30/83 (including a one-year extension).

V. Pre-project Approval Time: 3 months. First reference in file is 6/20/79. Proposal submitted 7/30/79. Grant signed 9/28/79; effective date 10/1/79.

VI. Fit with Selection Criteria: The project fits with two of the criteria:

- 1) To improve directly the lives of a rural constituency; and
- 2) To fit the overall AID and RTG goals of human resource development. In addition, it has elements of training, reducing infant mortality and addressing population control.

VII. Financial Information:

AID:	\$380,000 OPG
	<u>137,000</u> Co-Fi
	\$517,000 = 63.5%

PVO/other:	\$200,000 OPG
	<u>97,370</u> Co-Fi
	\$297,520 = 36.5%

VIII. Reporting Requirements: Semi-Annual plus Monthly compilation of medical statistics and accounting.

In-file: 1980, 1981 and 1982 Annual Reports.

IX. Assessment of Planning and Project Design: The project was started in response to a refugee crisis by a relatively new and inexperienced PVO, Tom Dooley Heritage, Inc., which was a disenchanted break-away from the older and better established Tom Dooley Foundation. From the advantage of hindsight, the project appears to have been somewhat naively planned in several respects. First, the assumption that the hospital facility would be taken over by the Thai government when the camp was closed was never guaranteed by the RTG, not supported by experience and apparently will not occur. Second, certain aspects of the running of the hospital (such as the system for record keeping and the level of surgical care to be provided) were left more to staff preference than carefully thought through. This failure led to a major crisis midway in the project in which certain staff and others brought serious charges of negligence and malpractice against the hospital. These were resolved by a neutral evaluation board composed of M.D.'s, appropriate representatives of the Thai public health system and others, but consumed a great deal of time and attention. Third, partly in reaction to the accusations and partly because a member of the medical staff wanted to concentrate in his specialty of surgery, the hospital board (located in New York) decided to build a more elaborate operating room than has since been justified by usage.

X. Assessment of Technical Design: The hospital is evaluated by the Thai Provincial Hospital Director, Dr. Boonyong, who is a highly regarded physician, as providing very good medical care. Its opium detoxification center has been visited by others who run similar centers because its early success rates seemed outstanding. The statistics now seem less spectacular but well within the norm for effective centers. The Medical Director of the hospital did not have figures to compare the performance of TDH with nearby Thai hospitals but the figures for the hospital, itself, reveal a decline in certain diseases which could be related to the broad quality of care for in & out-patients provided. Little effort was made, however, to learn from other refugee hospital experience prior to planning this hospital.

XI. Beneficiaries: Beneficiaries are clearly drawn from among the poorest populations in that the hospital serves the 13,000-15,000 refugees in the camp. In addition, it serves the nearby Thai villages estimated at about 9,000 people.

XII. Assessment of Impact: It is extremely difficult to assess in any precise way the impact of the TDH project. Baseline data were collected regarding child height/weight standards, life expectancy and infant mortality when the project began. All of these figures have, however, been questioned in relation to other statistics for Thailand. Monthly medical records show decreasing problems with malnutrition though no significant decline in premature births (one of the highest causes of death). Also, there are improvements in t.b., measles and malaria rates and death from these causes is declining, but, as the Medical Director

points out, these could be due to factors other than the TDH activities as, for example, availability of food and the more stable political environment.

XIII. Replication: Neither the TDH nor others seem to have had any plans for or made any efforts to encourage replication, except as noted of the opium detoxification center. However, there are some clear and useful lessons learned from this experience which could be applied in other refugee hospital situations and these are referred to below under point XV.

XIV. Success: The TDH has served a number of ill refugees and Thais and has developed elements of a public health and health education program used by these populations. If TDH had not provided medical services, someone else would have had to do so as the refugees had access to no other care, especially initially. The project did not succeed in adding to the stock of medical facilities of Thailand since the Thai government has said it cannot afford to take over and staff these facilities in the future. (This is because the Thai Ministry of Public Health has an extensive and effective health service already in place or planned for the near future in the area. The TDH is very close to two Thai hospitals and, therefore, effectively serves the same Thai population.) Thus, the project provided effective health care and some public health services, on an immediate basis, but it did not contribute developmentally to the Thai public health system.

XV. Evaluation/Recommendations: Our evaluation of this project is mixed. It did one of the main things that it set out to do--provide health care to refugees. In addition it served a number of nearby Thai people. Inadequate preliminary planning and design, however, led to some major faults (see IX). We would recommend for future AID funded hospital projects that: 1) evidence be required that the planners have reviewed and assimilated lessons from the vast and growing experience in refugee hospital situations (there is no need to keep reinventing the wheel!); 2) that more than one (possibly three) local doctors and/or hospital administrators be consulted on the plans and included in the decisions about facilities, staffing and other quality-control issues; 3) that relationships with official governmental health authorities and systems be clearly specified and agreed to in early planning so that resources and expenditures can be decided based on an accurate assessment of future usefulness; 4) that each decision of direction (such as new building, balance between health care and public health education, relations between professional and paramedical staff, etc.) be made in consultation with either the hospital board or other supervisory body with broad knowledge rather than at the sole initiative of the staff in residence at the time. (This is not a direct criticism of TDH; decisions there occurred in both ways over time.)

I. Project Title/Number: Integrated Non-Formal Non-Education to Promote Development Among Hill Tribes in Northern Thailand/AID 493-7002-T

II. PVO: Word Education, Inc.

III. Project Description: The general goal of the project was to determine educational needs, develop curriculum materials to meet those needs and to establish village level education programs to meet the needs through an adult education program utilizing non-formal, educational techniques. Specifically, the project sought to increase the critical thinking and problem-solving abilities of participants and increase knowledge of health care, nutrition, agricultural practices, and basic or commercial and agricultural skills. It would provide participants with the basic literacy tools and linguistic skills necessary for them to function more effectively in Thai society. The project also included an institution building component to strengthen the capacity of the Adult Education Division (AED) of the Ministry of Education to design and implement programs for minority ethnic groups in Thailand.

During the three-year project period, the project was to hold 60 courses for Hmong, 45 courses for Mien (Yao), and 15 courses for Karen. The courses were based on curriculum developed to fit the communities' perceived needs. The teaching was to involve the participants through discussion rather than utilize traditional teaching techniques.

IV. Project Dates: 11/16/76 - 9/31/79.

V. Project Approval Time: Proposal was submitted 7/26/76 and signed 11/16/76.

VI. Fit with Selection Criteria:

- Agricultural productivity through education about agricultural techniques; directly improve quality of life through increased ability to interact with lowland Thai; training in basic literacy and numeracy skills; this was pilot project with the intent of the AED to expand it to other tribal populations; fit with the RTG goal of creating a literate population and integrating the ethnic minorities into the Thai polity.

VII. Financial Information:

AID	\$172,515 (55.263%)
WEI/RTG	\$139,645 (44.73%)
Total	\$312,160

Direct Administrative Costs \$15,870 consisting of 45% of direct staff salary.

VIII. Reporting Requirements: Reports due every six months; reports provide accounts of progress, developments, and difficulties.

IX. Assessment of Planning and Project Design: The focus is on curriculum development based on assessment of issues and conditions within the hill-tribe communities. The stress is on participant involvement. Given the number of different agencies involved with tribal welfare, the proposal deals with problems of organization among the species. It includes an on-going evaluation of the curriculum as it is developed and used.

X. Assessment of Technical Design: Proposal provides for development of curriculum based on a survey of tribal needs. The staff had sufficient knowledge of non-formal education techniques to develop the curriculum and texts.

Teacher training and supervision were weaknesses. The training period was short--originally 15 days reduced to 7 and then increased to two weeks. Teachers were sent to their villages and were given little supervision or encouragement. The bilateral project, corrected this weakness by instituting a system of "master" teacher in each village responsible for supervision and in-service training for a number of teachers in "satellite" villages.

Implementation of the project was flexible. After the first year's evaluation the curriculum goal was modified to develop a core curriculum applicable to all ethnic groups. This was in response to mixed ethnic villages.

XI. Beneficiaries: First year, 780 learners and 13 teachers; second year 1,472 learners and 48 teachers; and third year 7,398 learners and 151 teachers. The learners were self-selected ranging in age from 14 and up. The ethnic groups participating were: Hmong, Mien, Akha, Lahu, Lisu, and Karen. The teachers were members of these ethnic groups with a minimum of ten years formal education.

XII. Impact: Program taught 7,398 learners and trained 212 teachers. It led to the Non-Formal Education becoming a full department in the AED. This project led directly to the bilateral Hill Area Education Project (HAEP).

XIII. Replication/Continuation: The pilot project is being expanded in the HAEP. Thailand with its extensive non-formal education program for both lowland and upland people has served as model for other non-formal education programs throughout Asia.

XIV. Success: A qualified success. The curriculum was developed, there were problems with teacher recruitment, training and supervision, and delays in the availability of texts and teachers' manuals. These resulted in teachers not teaching in a style consistent with the principles of non-formal education.

According to Khun Somchart Ubolchart, the World Education representative in Thailand and Director of Non-Formal Education, the project encouraged intelligent, enthusiastic people to participate in the program, both as teachers and the project's secretariat, who, he felt, would not otherwise have come government employees.

XV. Evaluation/Recommendations: While the first project had some difficulties, the second bilateral project has attempted to deal with them, especially those of teacher recruitment, training and supervision. We visited one of the villages, added in the bilateral project and were impressed with the activities of the school teacher--he was working with the people to dig a trench to lay a water pipe to bring drinking water to the villagers. Both adults and children conversed freely with us on this. We realize this is only one community with an above average teacher (on Ken Kempe's of HAED evaluation), but it is an indication of what can be achieved with this project. The OPG served to support a pilot project in

the true sense of the world. The project had its difficulties but it served as an important and necessary base for the bilateral project.

- I. Project Title/Number: Rural Vocational Training and Nutrition
Project/AID 493-0007-T
- II. PVO: YMCA (USA) Sub-Grant to YMCA-Bangkok
- III. Project Description: The project consists of three related projects--vocational training in carpentry and masonry, development of self-supporting lunch programs in four schools; and the development of vocational/agricultural training center. The students in the masonry carpentry courses constructed the facilities necessary for the school lunch program and the vocational/agricultural center. When the kitchen facilities were built, the schools started vegetable gardens and some poultry raising. These products were to provide both food for lunch and income to pay the salary of a cook and gardener. The students received agricultural training by doing the garden work--part of the elementary school curriculum. Lack of available garden land made this impossible for one school. The grant provided funds to hire the cooks and gardeners during the project period, after which the program should be self-sufficient. Parents of the school children participated in preparing school lunches. Cooks, gardeners, and teachers received training in agriculture, nutrition and accounting during summer vacation at the vocational training center. The center also provided an area to try out garden crops and poultry techniques before introducing them to the schools.
- IV. Project Dates: 3/1/82 - 6/30/82

V. Project Approval Time: First proposal sent to AID in February 1978; funding deferred in 1979; funded in March 1980.

VI. Fit with Selection Criteria: Training 60 unemployed men in construction skills to provide employment; directly improve condition of population through improved nutrition for school children; training 60 people in carpentry and masonry; teachers, cooks, and gardeners in nutrition, agriculture through teachers and cooks to train school children and parents about nutrition; the school lunch programs and the vocational training centers were to be self-supporting; encourage local participation through parent student involvement in the program; and fit with RTG goal of improving nutrition.

VII. Financial Information:

AID	\$231,340	(70.63%)
YMCA	<u>\$ 96,215</u>	(29.3%)
Total	\$327,555	

VIII. Reporting Requirements: Progress reports due semi-annually-- deadlines met; reports include progress to date in comparison to the work schedule and explanations for the differences or changes. Initially monthly financial reports were required but this proved too cumbersome and the grant was amended to require financial reports every two months.

IX. Assessment of Project Planning and Design: The project integrated the separate pieces--the lunch program, masonry and carpentry training, and the development of the vocational training center. Their integration required careful planning to allocate responsibility for the sub-projects

and to coordinate work on them. The proposal indicated an awareness of these requirements and included statements of specific tasks and responsibilities. It included a work schedule, what work was to be done by whom and who was to be responsible for it, and a list of expected outcomes.

X. Assessment of Technical Design: The work schedule with its task by task breakdown and how these were to be achieved provided the technical framework for the project. When there was a specific problem such as insufficient water supply for the school gardens, implementation was flexible enough to develop a solution for the problem. Goals were modified as it became clear the original goals were unachievable or because other intermediary steps, not in the original project proposal, had to be completed.

The technical competence of the staff was high. Crops and livestock techniques were tested before introducing them to the schools. The teachers in the carpentry and masonry course were themselves carpenters and masons who had practical knowledge and an understanding of the level of their students. They showed the required flexibility to modify the project as needed as in the case of water supply for gardens and in response to the participants' need as when the carpentry and masonry courses were combined when it became clear the students wanted both skills.

XI. Beneficiaries: The project focused on two groups: teachers and students in the school lunch program and participants in the carpentry and masonry courses.

The school lunch program fed 304 pupils and teachers in the first year (228 regularly for three months and 86 occasionally in two schools). In the second year with four schools participating, 776 students and teachers participated in the program; 454 were fed regularly for 35 months while the remaining 320 were fed occasionally over a longer period.

The carpentry and masonry program trained 18 men the first year and 12 in the second year. While the courses were not limited to men, only men participated in the training. One woman applied for the first course but did not meet the criteria. The lack of women in the program is due to the Thai division of labor where men do the skilled construction jobs. Women do construction work, but primarily the unskilled digging and hauling work. The YMCA did not go and search for women to be trained and they do not plan to do so.

Participants in the project are poor. The schools for the lunch program were selected because of the poverty of the surrounding areas. The selection criteria for the training course exclude people who are employed or have a high school diploma. They do require participants be able to read and write which may exclude older uneducated people.

XII. Impact: Six teachers, four cooks, and four gardeners received training in nutrition, gardening, and accounting procedures. The teachers used this information in organizing the school gardens and teaching about nutrition. The cooks working with the mothers of the school children did some practical nutritional teaching when preparing lunches. In the two schools added in the second year, community participation led to home garden projects and an increase in food production for home use.

The effect of the school lunch program on the nutritional status of the children is not clear. The duration of the feeding program was too short to determine impact. In comparing the height or weight of students actually receiving school lunches with those only participating in a gardening project, the project found that the lunch students gained more weight and grew taller than those students in the gardening group. However, numbers are too small and there are too many intervening variables to assert that the school lunch program was the major cause of the difference (a fact which the project staff also recognizes).

Employment opportunities exist for people with building skills in rural and semi-urban Thailand. The average wage earned by graduates of the program is Baht 65/day; the highest was Baht 80/day on skilled construction, the lowest Baht 45/day while receiving advanced training from the YMCA. Of the thirty graduates, 15 work for the YMCA, seven in the Pitsanuloke area, and the remaining seven unknown. Of the 23 graduates whose work is known, the average monthly wage is Baht 1410. (All figures here are from the project's final report.)

XIII. Replication: A project goal is to develop assessment techniques to determine the cost of implementing self-sustaining school lunch programs in other schools. The four project schools were chosen because of the difficulty in implementing the programs in agriculturally poor areas. The rationale is, if they can establish lunch programs here, it will be relatively easier to do so in better areas.

XIV. Success: In terms of meeting the goal of a self-sustaining school lunch program in four schools--none are yet self-sufficient. In terms of

building skills training, goals met, though with 30 instead of 60 people trained. In terms of constructing training center which was 60% self-sufficient, met.

The clearly stated goals makes assessing success in those terms simple. However, this does not do justice to what the YMCA project achieved. This issue will be examined on the next section, "Evaluation."

XV. Evaluation: The project, while not achieving its goals, has made real progress. The staff uses an incremental approach, slowly but steadily achieving their goals. Problems with soil, poultry, and vegetable marketing has delayed achievement of self-sufficiency in the school lunch program. The number of people to be trained was reduced because the smaller class size could receive better training. Neither of these programs terminated at the end of the AID-funded project. Other funds, both from YMCA-Bangkok and other funding agencies have been found to support the projects. The YMCA continues to provide technical and supervisory assistance to the school lunch programs while they seek other solutions to the financial problems.

This is the first self-sustaining school lunch program undertaken in Thailand. The YMCA became involved in this experimental program which the RTG could not. If the program is assessed in experimental terms, the knowledge gained about developing school lunch programs, potential income generating projects to support the program and the managerial and administrative training necessary is considerable and the project more successful than the goal/outcome comparison indicates. We were impressed with this project, especially with the masterful planning and the staff's enthusiasm.

Recommendations: The lack of objective success--the goal/outcome comparison rests on the short life time of the project. If AID supports projects which plan new programs or make basic changes, duration needs to be longer. We recommend consideration of PVO-Co-Financing Projects with a longer time spent to allow enough time to achieve project goals.

Appendix E

PEOPLE INTERVIEWED BY PVO BY PROJECT

AID/W

Maureen Norton, Asia Bureau, Evaluator
 Sharon Pines, Asia Bureau, Evaluator
 Bryant George, Asia Bureau, PVO Officer
 Ed Ploch, Asia Bureau, Thai Desk

AID/T

Robert Halligan, Mission Director
 Carol Peasley, Assistant Mission Director
 Jack Williamson, Evaluations
 John Coughlin, Controller
 Robert Traister, OHRT Director (out-going)
 Tom O'Connor, OHRT Director (current)
 Lawan Ratanaruang, PVO and WID Officer, OHRT
 Khun Prasit, Contract Employee
 Dr. Basharat Ali, Project Officer

IHAP

Reaching the UnReached
 Owen Wrigley IHAP Country Representative
 Khun Kampol Suwanarat, Director, Deaf Center
 Khun Manfa Suwanarat, Head of Translation Dept., Deaf Center
 Khun Nok Nuchnoi, Head of Workshop, Deaf Center
 Khun Kritsana Lonlua, Head of Membership, Deaf Center

IHAP

Youth Development Project
 Owen Wrigley, IHAP Country Representative
 Khun Phongchan Nabengchang, IHAP Programs
 Khun Authit Theverong, IHAP Loan Officer
 Katherine Newffer, IHAP Field Worker
 Khun Apha, Asst. Director, Khon Khaen Community Development Dept. (CDD)
 Khun Samrong Khamsonroj, Amphor Nong Rue CDD Officer
 Khun Udomlak, Bangkok Youth Division, CDD
 Khun Wanthana, Assistant Director Youth Division, CDD

WEI

Integrated Non Formal Education
 Khun Somchart Ubolchart, WEI representative in Thailand, also MOE,
 Division of Non Formal Education (DNFE)
 Martha Keehn, WEI Consultant
 Ken Kempe, on AID Contract to Hill Area Education Project (HAEP)
 Khun Damri Janapiragent, HAEP
 Khun Sewing, HAEP teacher in Mae Tam Noy Village

TDH

Tom Dooley Memorial Hospital
 Lorna Stevens, President, Tom Dooley Heritage
 Dr. Tim Russell, Medical Director, Tom Dooley Hospital (TDH)
 Khun Siwaporn, Administrative Director, TDH
 Khun Vavaporn Varnscuong, Thai Public Health Program Nurse, TDH
 Susan Bassett, Education Coordinator and Nurse, TDH
 Dr. Boonyong, Director Nan Provincial Hospital and Acting Director,
 District Public Health Program
 Other doctors, nurses, medics at TDH

YKPF

Initiating Project
 Khun Suree, Executive Director, YKPF

PSBF

Amerasian Outreach and Assistance to Amerasians
 Jim Steele, Regional Director, PSBF
 Michael Nebeker, Country Manager, PSBF
 Khun Pornthip Peiper, Head of Udorn Office, PSBF
 Teachers, children sponsored by PSBF and their guardians

4-H

Y-K II
 Chuck Dunham, Country Manager, 4-H
 Khun Suphalok, Chiang Mai Province Agricultural Officer
 Khun Sekhorn, Chiang Mai Province Asst. Agricultural Officer
 Khun Virot, Chiang Mai Province Y-K Officer
 Y-K Club members and volunteer leader in Been Khlut Patana Village,
 Chiang Mai

TAF

Malan Project
 Ed Anderson, Assistant Country Manager, TAF
 Dr. Ousa Thanangkul, Former Director, Research Institute for Health
 Sciences (RIHS) and MALAN Project Director
 Dr. Kosin Amatayakul, Director, RIHS
 Khun Somsri, Project Supervisor, RIHS
 Khun Phong, Nursing Aide, RIHS
 Donald Gibson, Manager, RIHS
 Infant Care Center staff at ICC 3, Mae Rim

NCWT

Promotion of Rural Development through Women
 Khunying Orawan Futrakul, President, NCWT
 Mrs. Ruenkeo Kuyyakanon Brandt, Assistant Secretary General, NCWT
 Mrs. Bhanibha Ruangwiset, Executive Committee, NCWT
 Khunying Valai Leelanuj, NCWT Lampang
 Child Care Center Teachers and committee members at project village

CRS

Women's Development through Non Formal Education

John M. Klink, Program Director, CRS

Khun Pornsiri Chatayanonda, Thai Projects Program Director, CRS

Khunying Dithakarn Bhakdi, Director Foundation for the Promotion of
Welfare for Women and Youth

Sr. Euphasia, Teacher in charge of training course at Sisters of the
Good Shepherd

Boonliang Ae-vorn, Head of Center for Leadership Training for Buddhist Nuns
Additional staff at Sisters of the Good Shepherd Center

YMCA

Rural Vocational Training and Nutrition Project

Richard Ortmeyer, Program Support Services, National Board of YMCAs of USA

Khun Lanjul Chairakans, Executive Director, Bangkok YMCA

Khun Pannee Peerasthien, Staff, Bangkok YMCA

Additional staff at project sites

THCF

Hill Tribe Youth Leadership Training

Khun Chutinaan, Assistant Director, THCF

Additional staff and students at THCF Center

OEF

Non Formal Education for Low Income Women

Khun Supheen, Chief Northeast Region Resettlement Districts, Department
of Public Welfare

Khun Prawitt, Director, Laad Praaw, Resettlement, Department Public
Welfare (DPW)

Khun Boobphaa, Coordinator for OEF project, DPW

Women who were trained in the OEF course

Save the Children

David S. Belskis, Director, Indochinese Refugee Operations,
Save the Children

Ann Kennedy, Project Manager, Save the Children

Appendix F

SCHEDULE OF TEAM ACTIVITIES


April 18-20	In Bangkok USAID Office talking to OHRT employees and reading files
April 21	Site visit to IHAP Deaf Project and central office visit to WEI
April 22	Central office visits to YKPF, PSBF, 4-H/Y-K
April 23	Read files
April 25	Central office visits to TAF and NCWT
April 26	Site visit to CRS and central office visit to YMCA
April 27	Nan, Tom Dooley Memorial Hospital visit
April 28	Visit with Dr. Boonyang and extended interview with Dr. Tim Russell, Medical Director of TDH
April 29	Phitsanuloke - YMCA site visit
April 30	Bangkok, project reports
May 2	Chiang Rai THCF site visit
May 3	Chiang Mai TAF/MALAN site visit
May 4	Lampang WEI site visit
May 5	Lampang NCWT site visit
May 6	Chiang Mai 4-H/Y-K II site visit
May 7	Bangkok, project reports
May 9	Meeting with Save the Children
May 10	Meeting with DTEC
May 11	Load Praaw Resettlement, Kalasin OEF site visit
May 12	Khon Khaen, IHAP Youth Development site visit
May 13	Udon, PSBF site visit
May 14, 16-19	Bangkok, Writing report
May 20	Bangkok, Briefing for AID Mission

Appendix G

ACRONYMS


AED	Adult Education Division
AID/OFIN	Office of Finance
OHRT	Office of Human Resources and Training
Co-Fi	Co-Financing
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DOAE	Department of Agricultural Extension
DPW	Department of Public Welfare
DTEC	Department of Technical and Economic Cooperatio
4-H/Y-K	4-H/Yuwa-Kasetkorn (Young Farmers)
4-H/YKPF	4-H/Yuwa Kasetkorn Promotion Foundation
HAEP	Hill Area Education Project
ICC	Infant and Child Care Center
IHAP	International Human Assistance Programs, Inc.
IPVO	Indigenous Private Voluntary Organization
MOAC	Min. of Agriculture and Cooperatives
MOE	Min. of Education
NCWT	National Council of Women in Thailand
NFE	Non-Formal Education
OEF	Overseas Education Foundation
OPG	Operational Program Grant
PSBF	Pearl S. Buck Foundation
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
RUR	Reaching the UnReached (an IHAP project)
RTG	Royal Thai Government
TAF	The Asia Foundation
TDH	Tom Dooley Heritage
THCF	Thai Hill Craft Foundation
WEI	World Education Incorporated
Y-K	Yuwa Kasetkorn (Young Farmers)
Y-KPF	Yuwa Kasetkorn Promotion Foundation
YMCA	Young Men's Christian Association

Appendix H



OPG/CO-FI ON-GOING ACTIVITIES (FY 78-82)

1. MALAN/TAF: Rural Infant & Child Care Centers
2. THCF: Hilltribe Youth Leadership Training
3. CRS 2: Education/Medical Services for Children
4. CRS 3: Rural Development thru NFE Training for Women
5. TDH 2: Development/Expansion of Ban Nam Yao Hospital
6. YWCA: Vocational Center for Young Girls in Korat
7. TRRM: A Village Management System for Integrated Rural Development
8. 4-H: Expansion of Yuwa Kasatkorn (Y-K) Program
9. IHAP 3: Youth Development Project
10. IHAP 4: Thailand's Deaf Community Project
11. YKF-4H: Y-K Foundation Initiating Project
12. CSWT: Training for Social Development
13. TAF/PSU*: F&N Rural Development Center for Southern Thailand
14. TAF/PSU*: Rural Outreach Project
15. WEI: Southern Thailand Experimental Project
16. PSBF 3: Assistance to Older Amerasians



1. BST: Artificial Fish Propagation
2. MALAN INST.*: Rural Infant and Child Care Centers
3. THCF: Hilltribe Youth Leadership Training
4. GGAT* 2: Skill Training for Rural Youth
5. PSBF 1: Amerasian Outreach
6. PSBF 2: Assistance to Amerasians
7. CRS 1: Women Development thru Non-Formal Education
8. CRS 2: Education/Medical Services for Children in Klong Toey Slum
9. TDH 2: Development/Expansion of Ban Nam Yao Hospital
10. YMCA: Rural Vocational Training and Nutrition Project
11. OEF: Non-Formal Education for Low Income Women in N.E. Thailand
12. IHAP 2: Community Services Center for Disadvantaged Children
13. TRRM: A Village Management System for Integrated Rural Development
14. 4-H MDAC: Expansion of Yuwa Kasatkorn (Y-K) Program
15. IHAP 3: Youth Development Project
16. IHAP 4: Thailand's Deaf Community Project
17. YKF/4-H: Y-K Foundation Initiating Project
18. TAF/CSWT: Training for Social Development.