

ISN=33426

1. PROJECT TITLE Vehicle Maintenance Training	2. PROJECT NUMBER 263-0114	3. MISSION/AID/W OFFICE USAID/Cairo
	4. EVALUATION NUMBER (Enter the number maintained by the reporting unit e.g., Country or AID/W Administrative Code, Fiscal Year, Serial No. beginning with No. 1 each FY) 83-12	
<input type="checkbox"/> REGULAR EVALUATION <input type="checkbox"/> SPECIAL EVALUATION		

5. KEY PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DATES			6. ESTIMATED PROJECT FUNDING	7. PERIOD COVERED BY EVALUATION	
A. First PRO-AG or Equivalent FY 80	B. Final Obligation Expected FY 84	C. Final Input Delivery FY 84		A. Total \$ 6.9million	From (month/yr.) August, 1981
			B. U.S. \$ 4.5million	Date of Evaluation Review September, 1983	

8. ACTION DECISIONS APPROVED BY MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE DIRECTOR		
A. List decisions and/or unresolved issues; cite those items needing further study. (NOTE: Mission decisions which anticipate AID/W or regional office action should specify type of document, e.g., airgram, SPAR, PIO, which will present detailed request.)	B. NAME OF OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION	C. DATE ACTION TO BE COMPLETED
1. Hire new Center Director.	GSLT/USAID	September 20, 1983 (completed)
2. Demonstrate support of bus and truck companies in participating in and contributing to Center.	Center Director	November 15, 1983
3. Complete company assessment of curricula and initiate changes as necessary.	Center Director	November 15, 1983
4. Initiate remainder of instructor training in Egypt (seven additional instructors).	RCA	October 29, 1983
5. Continue to expedite customs clearance of equipment.*	Center/USAID	December 31, 1983
6. Continue close monitoring of project progress.	USAID	June 30, 1984

*Center classes are scheduled to begin fifteen days after arrival of shipments of equipment.

9. INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS TO BE REVISED PER ABOVE DECISIONS			10. ALTERNATIVE DECISIONS ON FUTURE OF PROJECT	
<input type="checkbox"/> Project Paper	<input type="checkbox"/> Implementation Plan e.g., CPI Network	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)	A. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Continue Project Without Change	
<input type="checkbox"/> Financial Plan	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/T	_____	B. <input type="checkbox"/> Change Project Design and/or	
<input type="checkbox"/> Logical Framework	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/C	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)	<input type="checkbox"/> Change Implementation Plan	
<input type="checkbox"/> Project Agreement	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/P	_____	C. <input type="checkbox"/> Discontinue Project	

11. PROJECT OFFICER AND HOST COUNTRY OR OTHER RANKING PARTICIPANTS AS APPROPRIATE (Names and Titles) Norman Root, HRDC/ET Adolph Y. Wilburn, HRDC/ET Howard Lusk, AD/HRDC Norman Sweet, AD/DPPE	12. Mission/AID/W Office Director Approval	
	Signature <i>J. W. Stone</i>	
	Typed Name M. P. W. Stone, Director	
Date 3, NOV 1983		

VEHICLE MAINTENANCE
TRAINING (263-0114)

13. Summary: The subject project was evaluated by a two-person team in August, 1983. The report received from the team by USAID/Cairo (see Attachment A) was not considered wholly satisfactory, complete or objective. Subsequently, the USAID/Cairo project officer and the General Syndicate for Land Transportation (GSLT, the Egyptian entity in the project) wrote rebuttals or dissenting opinions (Attachments B and C respectively), and one of the team members, Engineer Reda Soliman, was asked (by the USAID) to review the team's report and reconsider the statements and opinions for possible revision (Attachment D). In order not to lose all benefit from this disputed evaluation and in the hopes of reaching a realistic plan of action in the remaining eight months of project life, the USAID/Cairo evaluation officer has attempted in the present document to reconcile the various points of view found in the attachments. While not a wholly satisfactory solution, the USAID did not believe that another evaluation would be sufficiently beneficial (especially given the valuable time that would be lost in mobilizing a new team) nor that anything could be gained by entirely rejecting the evaluation. We have tried to combine the various opinions and perspectives into as thorough, complete and objective a single report as possible.

This project was initiated in 1980 in response to a request for assistance (in 1977) by the GSLT to develop a Vehicle Maintenance Training Center. The purpose of this Center was to upgrade the skills of bus and truck repairmen in Egypt, and thereby to improve the efficiency of public transportation.

All parties involved with this project agree that it has not gone as planned in the Project Paper and has not achieved what was expected of it. The reasons for this poor performance are several:

- 1) There was not a complete agreement among the parties (USAID, GSLT, and RCA, the host country contractor) from the project's inception on exactly who was responsible for what and exactly what was expected to be achieved. This has been the fundamental problem and the cause of all subsequent problems. It also serves to explain the divergent points of view that emerged in the evaluation process.
- 2) The GSLT expected the project to be implemented for it, not by it. There has never been an active Center director who has taken the interest, initiative and command of the project necessary to keep implementation moving and to resolve problems and bottlenecks. As a result, RCA has not had the guidance and supervision it needed (and has not been willing and/or able to take the initiative to guide itself and/or to push the USAID and the GSLT into more active roles) to offer appropriate and priority services.
- 3) USAID/Cairo has played a relatively passive role in the project, expecting the GSLT and RCA to take the lead. Under ordinary circumstances, this might have been appropriate and reasonable for a host country contract. However, Mission monitoring should have shown that progress was delayed sufficiently and problems were severe enough to warrant stronger intervention.

The project is now too close to the PACD for major changes to be made; some project actions already taken would be too costly and too time consuming to be worth reversing or altering dramatically. Thus, this evaluation does not deal with whether or not the project's purpose will be achieved; instead, it focuses on what can be done to salvage some useful product in the time remaining.

14. Methodology: This evaluation, originally scheduled for March, 1983, was to be a mid-term evaluation to assess project progress and make any adjustments necessary to enhance the potential impact. The evaluation was delayed for five months because of implementation delays (the reasoning being that there was little to evaluate until all outputs had been achieved). In retrospect, the original timing should have been followed so that some problems could have been dealt with earlier.

The original evaluation team interviewed RCA and GSLT staff, reviewed AID and RCA project records, files and documents, reviewed RCA products and visited the project workshops and equipment. The current document is based exclusively on the written evaluation documents included as attachments (i.e., no additional site visits were made, no additional interviews conducted, etc.) and on discussions resulting from these attachments.

15. External Factors: While one unforeseen factor has affected the project's progress, this could have been controlled better by project management. Although customs clearance for project equipment has been an inordinately long and complicated process, project management (primarily GSLT leadership) could have pushed much harder and earlier to gain the release of commodities from customs. Thus, while problems with customs clearances originally may have been external to the project, failure to resolve them is indicative of internal project problems.

Many of the assumptions in the original logical framework should have been within the project's control rather than assumed (e.g., "salaries and incentives are sufficient to retain trained instructors and administrators at the GSLT training center"; "GSLT provides administrators and instructors to be trained as planned"). Because they were not controlled, many of these assumptions have worked against

project progress. For example, because the project assumed, rather than guaranteed, adequate salary and incentive benefits (and because sufficient action has not been taken on these assumptions), adequate staff members have not been forthcoming as well. Because the project assumed that construction of the training facility would be completed as scheduled (and did nothing to ensure completion), construction delays have served to hold up other aspects of the project. In retrospect, adequate salaries and other incentives as well as completion of construction should have been made conditions precedent to the project agreement (rather than assumptions) in order to have avoided many of the implementation problems that have arisen.

16. Inputs: In the original logical framework, the inputs were listed as follows:

1) Technical Assistance (curriculum development and workshop establishment)

- a) long term
- b) short term

2) Participant Training

- a) long term
- b) short term

3) Commodities

RCA, the project contractor, began work in July, 1981. The firm was to be responsible for all inputs listed above, although it appears from the many misunderstandings that have arisen that its role vis-a-vis the GSLT was never established clearly. How much authority did RCA have to make decisions? Where did its "technical assistance" role end and the GSLT's managerial/administrative responsibilities begin?

The long-term technical assistance was to develop the curricula. As of August, 1983, twelve of fifteen course curricula had been completed in English, and six of the twelve had been translated into Arabic. The remaining curricula will be completed and translated by the end of 1983. As discussed in Attachments A and B, however, the utility and appropriateness of these curricula have been questioned seriously. RCA initiated curriculum activities based on "performance based" criteria, an innovative method of instruction allowing a student to work at his own pace. This proposed approach was an unknown and untested concept for the GSLT leadership. In addition, the approach would have required a good deal of background knowledge of the target audience (bus and truck repairmen) in order to respond to the appropriate skill and need levels. The GSLT objected to this approach (presumably based on its innovativeness). Whether or not the USAID concurred in the GSLT's objection is unclear (Attachment A, page 14, says it did concur; Attachment B, page 6, says it did not; neither offer evidence to support their assertions), the end result was that RCA changed its curriculum approach to a traditional presentation of materials available in the U.S. and adapted to Egyptian circumstances. One of the original evaluation team members and the author of Attachment A (and an avid proponent of performance based instruction) charges that the traditional curricula developed by RCA are virtually worthless since they are based on the assumption that the target audience is literate. In attachment B, the USAID responds that the curricula has greater value than the team allowed, since (1) illiteracy is assumed not to differ significantly between the target audience and the average (34%) for employed males in urban areas, (2) while not innovative, the curricula follows widely used and accepted training principles and concepts and (3) while individuals from the target audience itself were not consulted in curricula development, Egyptian Center instructors have been involved actively in curricula revision and translation, therefore the curricula do take into account unique local needs and circumstances. This question of curricula

utility has yet to be resolved. Based on the evaluation and subsequent discussions, the USAID has requested that RCA and GSLT take the completed curricula to the bus and truck companies for review and comment of their appropriateness and utility.^{1/}

All attachments are relatively silent on the short term technical assistance; this aspect of RCA's work has been limited to setting up the equipment in the workshops and training the Egyptian instructors in the use and maintenance of equipment. Since not all equipment had arrived as of August, 1983, and since there have been numerous construction delays, it may be that RCA has not been able to fulfill its responsibilities completely in this area. However, the evaluation officer has understood from the USAID project officer that there have been disputes between RCA and the GSLT, for example, over who holds responsibility for installing equipment in the workshops. Thus, RCA's role on short term T.A. may not have been clearly understood or agreed upon, therefore project performance may have suffered.^{2/}

The long term (U.S.) participant training originally was intended to train 22 instructors at RCA headquarters (in New Jersey). These 22 instructors then were to return to the Vehicle Maintenance Training Center to train Egyptian bus and truck repairmen in improved skills. By mutual agreement of all parties, the originally planned 22 courses were collapsed to 16, thereby reducing the number of instructors to 16. Of these 16, to date 9 have received training in the U.S. Seven additional instructors have been hired but not yet trained; it has been recommended to GSLT that these remaining instructors be trained in Egypt rather than in New Jersey.^{3/}

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- ^{1/} Copies of curricula will be distributed for company review at a meeting to be held in late October (exact date to depend upon customs clearance and installation of the most recent shipment of equipment)
 - ^{2/} RCA accepted responsibility for equipment installation in March, 1983; this is no longer a problem.
 - ^{3/} In-country training for the seven remaining instructors is scheduled to begin October 29 at the Ministry of Industry Instructor Training Institute.

Instructor response to the RCA training is mixed, but lack of sufficient English capability was obviously a problem for all of the participants. There was one translator for the nine instructors trained in the U.S., but this individual did not have a background in the subject matter, therefore his ability to translate the concepts adequately might be questioned. The appropriateness of sending nine instructors for training in the U.S. without sufficient language capability seems dubious at best. (Although none of the attachments discusses the point, it also seems questionable to train Egyptian instructors in the U.S., when the buses and trucks used in Egypt are from a wide variety of countries, many of which do not exist in the U.S., and therefore with which RCA may not be familiar for training purposes.)

The short-term participant training was to send three GSLT administrators for observational training in the U.S. Attachment A notes that two of these three administrators have been trained to date. There is no mention in any of the attachments, however, either of plans to train a third administrator or of the value of the training received by the first two.

The commodities input was intended to bring vehicle maintenance equipment for use in training at the GSLT center. RCA was responsible for the procurement. As noted in Attachment A, as of August, 1983, RCA had expended \$1,126,000 for equipment and had obligated the remaining \$13,000 allotted in the original budget for commodities; in addition, RCA intends to request \$461,000 more from AID for additional equipment.

This aspect of the inputs has been particularly troubled. As noted under "External Factors," commodities have been delayed in customs clearance for inordinately long periods of time. The USAID has been working to resolve this problem in recent months on several fronts: the GSLT leadership has been urged to expedite customs clearance; the Mission itself has written to customs requesting clearance; and the assistance of the Ministry of Investment and International Cooperation has been solicited to encourage expeditious customs clearance.^{4/} Unfortunately,

^{4/} One air shipment that had been delayed in customs was cleared by October 10, 1983.

customs has not been the only problem regarding commodities. The GSLT was delinquent in approving the equipment lists submitted to the technical committee; in addition, the technical committee apparently changed its mind on certain equipment, further delaying procurement. Construction delays (a GSLT responsibility) on the Center have added more delays to installation of equipment. More importantly, RCA'S performance in procurement has been poor, to say the least. Some electrical equipment arrived with 110 voltage (instead of the necessary 220 v.), and some equipment arrived with English (rather than metric) calibration. RCA since has replaced this equipment, but it would appear to have been a mistake easily avoided initially. As of August, 1983, then, even project inputs were not complete. All curricula are expected to be finished by the end of the project, and all commodities should be released from customs shortly.

17. Outputs: The original logical framework lists the following outputs expected:

- 1) Trained Administrators
- 2) Trained Instructors
- 3) Curriculum Established
- 4) Shops Equipped
- 5) Classrooms Equipped
- 6) Administrative Procedures Established
- 7) Instructional Procedures Established

The status of these outputs is obviously heavily dependent on the status of the inputs discussed in the preceding section. Thus, the curricula, shops and classrooms are not yet complete, but reasonably can be expected to be finished by the end of the project.

The status and eventual achievement of the other outputs is less certain. None of the attachments discusses procedures, either administrative or instructional.^{5/} Furthermore, although two of three

^{5/} RCA's draft of the Center Operations Manual has been accepted by GSLT and is currently being translated.

GSLT administrators technically have been trained, their actual administrative abilities are subject to question. The GSLT leadership has not taken an active role in the development of the Center; in fact, the Director of the GSLT has held two jobs in addition to his job at the GSLT and often has been inaccessible to RCA, USAID and his own Egyptian staff. (Note: On September 21, 1983, the GSLT appointed a new, full time Director to the Center, based on recommendations in Attachment A and subsequent discussions with the USAID.) This one factor - the absence of active, interested GSLT leadership - has contributed significantly to project delays and problems.

The "trained instructors" output is also subject to some question. Although nine instructors did receive training in the U.S., the value of that training (given language problems) has been challenged.^{6/} In addition, the full complement of instructors necessary to staff the Center has not yet been trained. More importantly, the incentive for those instructors already trained to remain at the Center is uncertain. As noted in the "External Factors" section, the salaries and incentives for Center staff were assumed to be sufficient, rather than guaranteed. In Attachment A, page 22, the evaluation team notes the following:

"The GSLT incentives have been inadequate to attract the number of instructors required and to maintain morale of those already hired. It appears unlikely the incentives AID recommended will ever be paid."^{7/}

^{6/} The RCA technical expert has tested the instructors and found eight of the nine qualified. The one instructor deemed unqualified will be demoted and shifted out of teaching altogether. Ironically, this individual has a better command of English than most of the other instructors; his new position will be in an area (e.g., administration) in which his language skill will be utilized.

^{7/} Instructors were told they would receive LE 160/month when classes begin. Currently, the nine instructors' monthly salaries range from LE 105/month to LE 135/month.

Thus, while the GSLT Center may be fully equipped and curricula developed by the end of the project, adequate Center staffing will be a problem unless the incentive issue is addressed immediately and sufficiently.

The USAID should take a firm and active position on this matter with the new Director as soon as possible. In addition, an assessment of the existing instructors' skill and knowledge should be undertaken and remedial training given if necessary. The remaining (untrained) instructors must be trained -- in Egypt -- immediately.^{8/}

18. Purpose: The originally stated purpose is "to upgrade the skills improve the work habits of vehicle maintenance workers." Based on the numerous implementation delays across all inputs and outputs, achievement of the purpose within the project's remaining life is obviously impossible. However, in fairness, this purpose seems unrealistic within the given project time frame of three years. To have expected classes actually to have begun, let alone to have trained 200 workers by the end of the project's second year, and another 540 by the end of the third year, was unnecessarily optimistic, given the total absence of any of the required inputs (including the Center's physical plant) at the start of the project.

19. Subgoal/Goal: The stated project subgoal is "to increase the efficiency of vehicle maintenance systems" in Egypt. Needless to say, this subgoal cannot be achieved within the existing life of project;

^{8/} See footnote 3, page-6-

however, like the purpose, the subgoal appears unrealistic within the three year IOP. Furthermore, there is a considerable gap in the logframe's logic from outputs and purpose to subgoal: improving "efficiency" seems outside of a project's control. Training may occur, but efficiency may depend on factors well beyond a training center, e.g., economic, social and psychological incentives of bus and truck repairmen at their place of work.

The stated goal is "to improve the quality of bus and truck transport services provided to the public." While relatively long-range, it is conceivable that the subject project eventually could make some contribution to this goal.

20. Beneficiaries: To date, there are no beneficiaries to speak of. If and when the Center can begin to train repairmen, then these individual workers and their employing companies will begin to benefit. To what extent they benefit will depend upon the project inputs, i.e., how well the instructors were trained and how appropriate and valuable the curricula are. (The benefits to the population at large -- accruing from goal achievement -- are too long term and too indirect to be worth considering here.)

In the project design, the employing companies were envisioned not only as beneficiaries of the project (through better skilled workers), but also as contributors, both in terms of information for Center development and of financial support for eventual Center maintenance and operation. To date, there seems to have been relatively little bus and truck company involvement, although exactly how little is a matter of dispute; Attachment A says no companies have contributed

funds or substantive inputs to the Center as yet, whereas Attachment B claims that twelve companies to date have given LE 10,000 to the Center and that two companies are represented on the Center's Board of Directors. Since the USAID can document its claim and the team did not substantively reference its information, it seems that the latter opinion (that companies are involved, albeit not extensively) holds true.^{9/}

21. Unplanned Effects: It would seem that there have been no project effects to date, unplanned or otherwise. Once the Center is in operation, assessment of impacts, planned and unplanned, can begin.

22. Lessons Learned: The major lesson here may be that poor management yields poor results. All parties share responsibility in this. Lack of SALT leadership to date has been the most damaging problem for project achievement. It is to be hoped that the new leadership will take a more active role to change the Center for the better. Toward this end, the JSAID must maintain constant communications with the new Director to resolve the following problems: (1) commodities' release from customs and proper installation in the Center; (2) adequate salary and incentives for instructors; (3) assessment of instructors' capabilities; (4) completion of all training for instructors; (5) assessment of the adequacy and utility of the curricula; and (6) assessment of bus and truck company willingness to participate in the Center.

23. Conclusion: It is not unreasonable to expect that the Center can be functioning by the end of project life; the extent of its adequacy, however, is as yet an open question. We simply do not know the

^{9/} The new director, a former bus company chairman, is actively soliciting cooperation and involvement of the companies by visiting them individually. When the fifth sea shipment is cleared through customs (expected late October), the first of an on-going series of meeting will be held.

viability of the Center as yet, in the absence of knowledge (1) of the bus and truck companies' interest in such a Center, (2) of the adequacy of the curricula, and (3) of the instructors' capabilities and incentives to train workers. These must be known before viability, utility and sustainability of the Center can be judged.

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Evaluation Report
For

Vehicle Maintenance Center

Project No 263-0114 Grant

By
Eng. Reda M. Soliman
and
Richard McGuerty
August 23, 1983

Regular Evaluation
24th month

Recommended Action Plan for AID


1. AID to negotiate a reorganization of Center managements; a new Director and Advisory Committee made up of representatives from the nine bus and truck companies. Ideally this should be at two levels. The executive level working with the director of the institution and the operating level dealing ^{with} instructional staff i.e. company foremen advising on curriculum.
2. AID/RCA to obtain day-by-day accounting of all activities regarding equipment tied-up at the port and airport. AID to help GSLT and RCA to expedite the delivery of this equipment.
3. AID to request RCA/GSLT to mutually develop a work plan indicating the earliest possible date for opening the seven work shops included in phase I. This to include curriculum completion schedule, preparing work shops, and obtaining training equipment from bus companies. This schedule to be completed by August 25, 1983. AID can anticipate running into a problem on obtaining equipment from the bus companies. RCA has been trying since 1981 to obtain equipment. The first "scrap parts" arrived at the center after the evaluation team began work. GSLT has indicated it would buy equipment but none if any significant amount of money has been allocated. It seems inconsistent that a new six million dollar training facility have only scrap or salvage parts for training aids.

4. AID to request RCA to provide completion schedules for Arabic versions of all unfinished courses.
5. AID to request RCA to provide installation schedule of equipment now in customs. Upon arrival what is the work plan for installation. RCA has indicated all shops could be opened within 15 days after arrival of equipment at center.
6. AID to request GSLT to provide their best thinking on the following topics:
 - a. Length of each course?
 - b. Cost per hour of instruction?
 - c. Will the center provide "custom courses" designed to fit specific employer needs?
 - d. Hours of the ATC days only, possibility of night courses?
 - f. What is the present and projected labor market for truck and bus company mechanics?
 - g. If utilization level ^a falls below optional level what other public sector agencies might consider using the ATC?
7. AID to request RCA and GSLT to develop work plan covering the opening of the shops included in phase II.
8. AID to direct GSLT to hire additional instructors to complete the instructional staff.

9. AID to direct RCA and GSLT to prepare a training program for the remaining six instructors to be trained.
10. AID to request RCA and GSLT to develop plan for establishing temporary workshops for the shops that will eventually go in ^{the} new building, by the first week in September.
11. AID to request GSLT to develop a plan for hiring 15 additional instructors for OJT. These should be hired in accordance with opening of phase I and phase II workshops. These advertisement should be placed in the newspapers by September if not before.
12. AID to request from RCA the plan for an administrative program and from GSLT the plan to hire staff to implement the program.
13. AID to prepare periodic progress reports on the above and other activities considered appropriate.

Project Evaluation Summary*

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* The order of the contents follows the sequence suggested by part 11 of PES

Vehicle Maintenance Training Center

Project 263-0114 (GRANT)

Project Summary

Background

The General Syndicate of Land Transport approached AID in December of 1977 with a request for assistance in development of a Vehicle Maintenance Training Project. The site had already been dedicated by President Sadat in June of 1977.

The Objective of the project was the establishment of a heavy vehicle maintenance training center in the Matareya district of Cairo. The center to be owned and operated by General Syndicate of Land Transport, GSLT, and serve the training needs of the nine major Egyptian public sector bus and truck transport companies. These companies employ approximately 5000 vehicle maintenance workers. When operational the center was to provide training for 20 occupations for 540 mechanics each year.

The Egyptian contribution was approximately \$2.4 million covering land and physical facilities. Upon becoming operational, 60% of operational costs were to come from the participating bus and truck transport companies, 20% from GSLT and 20% from Ministry of Manpower.

The original AID contribution was to be \$4.5 million over a period of three years. The US contractor, RCA, was selected by GSLT and was to perform the following tasks: 1) develop curriculum for 20 occupations. 2) train instructors and administrators. 3) purchase and install equipment for shops.

The evaluation procedure followed was, to compare projected outputs with actual performance and where there were major gaps to look into these and try to find the cause or causes. Recommendations have been made for improving project management and implementation for the remaining 12 months of this project. These were based upon the findings of this evaluation and were presented as a separate report, see attachment No. 3, and was discussed with the principals of GSLT and RCA by the AID project officer.

Findings

There exists a considerable and serious gap, at this point, the 24th month of the contract, between the projected and actual outputs both quantitatively and qualitatively. Only parts of the anticipated objectives have been achieved, and what has been accomplished falls short of expectations. There exists deep disappointment with the project on the part of GSLT, RCA and AID.

Some examples of the accomplishments and shortfalls in performance on major project outputs are as follows:-

Institutional output The project anticipated 200 workers would be trained in the second year of operation. None were trained.

Instructors trained At this point in time the project assumed there would be 22 instructors trained, nine have finished stateside training, some of these are undergoing training at present and some are waiting to be trained. The stateside training program had significant problems.

Administrators trained Three administrators were to have been trained by this time - two have been trained, the other one will be trained in country.

Curriculum The curriculum is not complete, only 6 of the 15 courses have the first Arabic draft completed. Some of the GSLT instructors as well as the evaluation team feels the vocabulary level of the instructional material is above the reading level of the target population, of whom 50 to 65% are estimated to be illiterate.

Equipment The equipment requirements are complete for only two of the 8 shops. However, when the materials are released from customs and the airport, the remaining shops can be completed in 15 days according to RCA.

To answer the question, where and how, did this project get off track it is helpful to review the role played and actions taken by each of the organizations involved in this project, GSLT, RCA, and AID, GOE.

G S L T

1. While there are three members of the GSLT review committee there is only "one decision maker" when it comes to technical issues. In our interview with him, he made the following statements concerning the project which provide considerable insight.
 - a. "When I got rid of Pocsi, I should have gotten rid of the whole RCA team". (this was the result of a disagreement over instruction strategy contained in the RCA contract and occurred on December 1981). Pocsi was the RCA Chief of party. It is important to review Pocsi's first quarterly report (attachment 4) and his letter dated January 26 1982, (attachment 5). GSLT objected to the task analysis methodology. The AID project officer supported GSLT. Pocsi was removed from the project at the end of January 1982.
 - b. "GSLT made a mistake by leaving the job up to RCA".
 - c. "RCA came over too soon- the buildings were not ready" when asked why-GSLT did not postpone the arrival of RCA the GSLT expert stated, "he wanted to go to the states" referring to the GSLT project director. The fact is that the floors were being poured in some of the buildings in mid 1982 when the first shipment of equipment was arriving. Some were poured as late as spring 1983. The question is was the AID project officer aware

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of the fact that the buildings were not ready, no floors, no electricity? While the interview team was working at the center, one of the shops scheduled for opening in September was still occupied by one of the building contractors engineers, this is six years after the construction was started.

- d. When asked about mentioning known equipment shortages to RCA the reply was-"that's not my job, we are not working for RCA "the implication was that RCA is being paid to implement this project-let them do the work.

Comments

During the 24 months of the project, GSLT has not seen fit to provide the project with a full time director. The only contact the three man board has with the project is during their bi-monthly meetings. GSLT in effect abandoned any degree of leadership or responsibility for the project. There is no fundamental understanding by GSLT experts of the institutional strategy called for in the contract. The first major disagreement was over strategy - the methodology called for in the contract was modified considerably.

Each of the GSLT members has full time jobs. The GSLT project Director has been unwilling to delegate authority or responsibility to the Deputy Director. The GSLT group do not understand the contract they signed, nor were they prepared to carry it out.

RCA

1. The RCA procurement record indicates a lack of professionalism, and experience. Inexcusable errors have been made in sending 110 Volt equipment¹ instead of 220 Volt, and equipment calibrated in English measurements* instead of metric; and stretched out deliveries have delayed the setting-up of the shops.

2. The curriculum problem - RCA is using U.S. "off the shelf material" not specifically adopted for the unique differences of the Egyptian population. This is, to a degree, one of those problems where it is difficult to know where GSLT culpability stops and RCA's begins. It was GSLT that cancelled the performance based instructional design technique called for in the contract. AID's role in this issue is covered in the AID sector.

A major complaint of GSLT is that the curriculum was developed independently by RCA, without collaborating with GSLT instructors. RCA says this is true but this was an AID decision (discussed under the AID section).

3. The state side training for the instructors produced only marginal

* RCA has agreed to replace this equipment

results. The director of GSLT made a special trip to the U.S. to review the training centers, curriculum and program, which he approved. This individual has no qualifications whatsoever to make this type of review. This was the first trip to the states by the GSLT director and referred to under item 1, C of GSLT section. Second, there is a degree of AID involvement connected with the poor performance of this training, and is discussed under the AID section

4. RCA used some top professional names in the proposal who never arrived in Egypt.

Comments:

1. The RCA record to date does not set any model to follow regarding procurement, fellowship training or curriculum development. However had RCA had a full time partner and some support on performance issues their performance could have been better. They were capable of doing better but not alone.

AID

1. It was clear early in the project that GSLT was not taking any initiative or responsibility for project direction, erroneously assuming it to be a, "turn key operation". The RCA contract gave major authority for project direction and control to GSLT. Early RCA correspondence emphasized the need for a cooperative effort

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One of the most pressing needs of the project at present and the single most damaging error was the absence of a full time professional counterpart to work with and guide the RCA Chief of Party. This need must have been apparent before the 24th month. According to the project paper the AID project officer was to spend 40% of his time on this project. When it became clear after the first quarter, after the first six months, etc, that GSLT was not involved in project direction other alternatives should have been explored i.e. AID to force the hiring of a professional from: Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Industry, Public Truck and bus companies, Private Truck and bus companies.

To permit the problem to go unanswered for 24 months has been a disaster for the project. The absence of a GSLT director has jeopardized a \$6,000,000 plus investment as well as the reputation of AID. The question is has AID made maximum use of available Egyptian sources of leverage?

2. AID's desire to step-up project activity (program office), backfired on two critical componenets of the project. First, the RCA stateside training program was based on the assumption that the Egyptian students had a reasonable degree of English comprehension i.e. project agreement indicated that they would have to pass the English language test. Only one passed - RCA's preference was for the group to gain language competency before going to the states as it would improve their communication skills with the RCA experts when they returned. The interpreter approach used to overcome lack of English facility was grossly inadequate for the four-month technical training program.

Second, when project activity was not moving as expected, according to budget flow, the program office pressured the project officer who in turn pressured RCA. The students were in the states meaning the only activity that could be pushed was the curriculum. Since AID had backed the GSLT position that task analysis/performance based strategy was not to be used it meant that RCA experts could sit in Matareya and prepare course materials without the involvement of Egyptians. This would not have been an acceptable practice in the US and even less so in Egypt. i.e. development of curriculum without involvement of target group.

3. The GSLT expert was correct in his statement, as was borne out by Pocsis first report and subsequent events, that the RCA team should not have come until the buildings were ready. Had AID delayed signing of the contract until the buildings were ready it might have provided the leverage needed to get this troublesome problem out of the way. A year after the RCA contract was signed the contractor began pouring the floors. Apparently AID was pressured into signing before ready.

Comments

1. AID's role seems to have been dominated by expediency, internal administrative procedures and tempered by great flexibility and sensitivity to the host country agency. The cumulative effect of these actions has been very damaging to contract performance.

GOE/Customs

A great deal of time was lost and unnecessary expense incurred by the project because equipment was tied up at the ports or airports due to customs procedure. Tools and equipment needed to open shops scheduled for phase one have been tied up in the Alexandria customs since April of this year. This problem is probably not unique to the GSLT project.

Summary

In summary we are looking at two years of accumulated problems brought on in part by GSLT's unwillingness to be an active participant and a full time partner in the project. GSLT needed to hire a professional since none of the three GSLT representatives has any prior experience in this type of project. RCA for all its ineptitude, could have, with some direction and guidance performed at a much higher level, but were simply not able to pull it off alone. The prime consideration of AID was not focused on project performance. The evaluation team is aware there are other considerations that need to be balanced with project performance. In this project the other factors seemed to have completely dominated the AID point of view. There were options available for improving GSLT's performance that were not utilized.

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This project seems to demonstrate that the absorptive capacity of GSLT for technical assistance was far less than anticipated. In retrospect the project had unrealistic expectations - in terms of GSLT capabilities as shown by the performance gap. Based upon our discussions with the GSLT director and experts it is clear they do not understand even now the contents of the RCA contract.

Item. 14

Evaluation Methodology

Objective:

The objective was to evaluate the Vehicle Maintenance Training Project progress against goals, analysing performance shortfalls if they existed and offering recommendations for improving project management and implementation.

Data Sources:

1. In depth interviews with RCA staff in Cairo (see Att 1).
2. Interviewed All GSLT staff instructors and technical committee of Automotive Training Center (see Att 2).
3. Reviewed AID records, files and the AID project paper "Vehicle Maintenance Training Project No. 263-0114".
4. Reviewed the RCA contract and project file and materials covering budgets, fellow~~ship~~ training, equipment, and schedules for long and short term technical experts.
5. ^{le}Reveiwed curriculum materials.
6. An evaluation walk through of all work shops classrooms and examination of equipment.

Item. 15

External Factors

Not pertinent at this time.

Item 16

Project Inputs

Technical Assistance both long and short term

1.	Contract	Used	
	<u>Called for</u>	<u>Thru July 31</u>	<u>Left</u>
	217.5 M/M	173.5 M/M	44 m/m
	Short and Long term		Includes short and long term staff

2. Cost to date of all technical assistance \$210,293

3. RCA estimated m/m required to complete project: 29 mm of short term and 20 m/m of long term as defined below.

Shortterm

All curriculums are complete with the exception of parts management, power train and front end. The short term technical assistance required is limited to setting up shops and training ATC instructors on use and maintenance of shop equipment. RCA estimates that these activities will require an additional 29 m/m of short term technical assistance. After the month of August there are no additional m/m left for this activity according to RCA..

Longterm

An additional 20 m/m of staff time are needed to complete contract requirements according to RCA. (administration, logistics, technical supervision)

Curriculum Development

One of the most critical areas of this project was the instructional material. The AID Project paper allocated 15 person months for this function and RCA allocated more than 20 months of short term plus approximately 3 months of long term technical assistance for this component. Within the first quarter of this project the RCA methodology was challenged by the technical expert of GSLT. The issue was over task analysis. The RCA position was that it was essential for the development of performance based curriculum. That it was also essential to obtain first hand data on the educational, experience and other characteristics of the workers (Mechanics) for whom they were to develop instructional materials. The AID project officer agreed with GSLT that the RCA methodology was not necessary. The curriculum that RCA has prepared is derived from a number of stateside sources modified by their curriculum writers for this project. RCA's plan, and that contemplated by AID's project paper involved both RCA experts and ATC instructors working together on curriculum development. The project ran into a series of delays and to speed the project up the program office pressured the project officer

for activity which resulted in RCA short term experts preparing curriculum alone. The project time clock began July 8 1981 with 36 months to complete all activities. The end result is that without data on the client or target group of learners the stateside material is written at a vocabulary level too high for the Egyptian mechanics. According to the ATC instructors 50 to 65% of the mechanics are illiterate. The ATC instructors indicate that they have to revise 30 to 40% of the material, for those who can read. Obviously this curriculum was not designed for 50 to 65% of the target group if the instructors estimates are correct. How effective it will be for the balance of the students remains to be seen. We simply do not know at this time.

Participant Training: (Stateside training - consultants, travel, per diem, translators, institutional contracts).

1. The contract called for the stateside training of 3 administrators and 22 instructors. By mutual agreement between GSLT/RCA/AID the 20 courses were collapsed into 16 courses, reducing the instructor requirements to 16. The project called for an additional 22 instructors to be trained at the center by those who received their training in the US. This was the "on the job training" group. We can assume that the 22 group will now be reduced to 16 and will need to be trained during the last 12 months of the contract. The hiring and training of this additional 16 instructors must be synchronized with the phase I and phase II opening dates. Total budget for this component of the project was \$359,000.

To date 9 instructors and 2 administrators have been trained at a cost of \$200,000. There are 7 instructors and one administrator yet to be trained. The budget remaining for this group is \$159,000. It has been recommended to GSLT that this training take place in-country. Only five of these six instructors have been hired.

3. The instructors comments regarding their stateside training ranged from very poor to very good. There was one translator for nine students, who did not have an automotive background and doubled as the groups' chauffuer. Some shops were according to the instructors not adequately staffed. Comprehension was a general problem.

Equipment:

The dollar amount contained in RCA contract for equipment including modifications was \$1,139,000. To date approximate \$1,126,000 has been spent leaving a balance of \$13,000.

All of the remaining \$13,000 is committed. In addition the GSLT has requested \$461,000 additional monies for equipment and supplies. This modification to the contract has not yet been submitted to AID. Since the fifth and sixth sea shipments are still in Alexandria and the first and second air shipments are still at the airport it is difficult to make a final statement regarding equipment status. According to RCA when the equipment at the port and airport arrives all equipment needed for the shops will be at the center.

Unfortunately some electrical equipment arrived with 110 voltage instead of 220 voltage and some equipment arrived with English calibration instead of metric. RCA has indicated all this equipment will be replaced by RCA. All equipment lists were first submitted to the GSLT technical committee before being ordered. RCA indicated that the GSLT technical committee held some equipment lists as long as five months before approving them. In one instance a major piece of equipment (crankshaft grinder) was cancelled by GSLT only later to be reordered. Even considering the delays by the GSLT review committee and part delays, the evaluation committee feels the equipment should have been in country before now.

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RCA did purposely delay setting up some shops for security reasons and waited until GSLT had doors installed. In one case the instructors made and installed the doors.

Item. 17

Project Outputs:

The following comparisons permit a quick review of where the project stands at the two thirds mark in terms of final project outputs.

	Project Goals at 36th months	Project Output at 24th months	Comments
Instructors	22	9	7 to be trained in the next 12 months
On the job training	22	0	16* to be trained in the next 12 months
administrators Trained	3	2	1 to be trained during the next 12 months.

* By reducing the courses to 16 instead of 20 the number of instructors and OJT personnel are decreased proportionately.

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Curriculum	15 courses	6 courses are completed in Arabic	9 courses to be completed in Arabic during the next 12 months
Shops equipped	8	2	6 shops to be completed in the next 12 months. Nearly all the equipment needed to complete the remaining 6 shops is presently tied-up in customs. Expected out soon.
Classrooms equipped	9	Chairs only desks only	The balance of the equipment required to complete classrooms is presently tied-up in customs expected out soon.

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Comments

The six curriculums which have been finished are presently being reviewed by the ATC instructors. This first group of seven courses are requiring 30 to 40% revisions. It is reported that the content is too high, i.e. the vocabulary level is estimated at the 9th and 10th grade level. More than half of the mechanics who will attend the courses are illiterate. Pictures are being added, material is being removed and revised. The heavy revisions is due to the fact that the curriculums were prepared without knowledge of the workers educational background, reading level, experience, training and other relevant dates needed to prepare instructional material. Some of the ATC instructors do not know what's the workers educational level.

While only two shops are equipped at present virtually all the remaining equipment is at the port in Alexandria or the airport. The sea freight has been in Alexandria since April. Some of the electrical equipment is 110 volts instead of 220 volts. Some of the machines are calibrated in English measurements instead of metric. RCA has agreed to replace all equipment improperly ordered. It appears that the buildings and equipment were not synchronized i.e. the center is going to have more equipment than space. A new building is under construction and is expected to be ready in 1985.

There are two multiple purpose machines for teaching laboratory courses but none of the instructors have been scheduled for training on these machines.

The audio visual materials are off the shelf US materials. With English nomenclature.

Item. 18

Purpose

The project purpose was: "To upgrade the skills and improve the work habits of Vehicle maintenance workers". The goal at this point in the project i.e. at the end of the second year was to have trained 200 workers. The center is not scheduled to open until about October 1, 1983. During the coming 12 months 540 workers were to be trained in the center; the achievement of this goal is highly unlikely.

The GSLT incentives have been inadequate to attract the number of instructors required and to maintain morale of those already hired. It appears unlikely the incentives AID recommended will ever be paid. The instructors were provided during the past 10 days a 25% increase in salary. This brought their monthly compensation up to approximately LE100 per month. The project paper assumed a rate of LE160 per month when the center opened if not before. The main reason the project had only 9 instructors to go to the states instead of 22, was the low incentive offered VS the quality of instructor desired. For less than an incremental cost of 1% of the project cost the GSLT could have made a quantum leap in the quality of the instructional staff. Instead of having only 9 instructors and only 1 qualified in English the probability is that with the AID recommended incentive 22 would have been available with good English. RCA brought a top curriculum expert to the center in January 1983 to train the instructors in lesson planning. He had to be returned to the states because the instructors refused to attend class unless they were paid an incentive. GSLT asked RCA to pay them - in effect to attend class. RCA explained they had no money to pay for this purpose.

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The project made the assumption that there would be a working relationship between the center and the private companies. The center will be dependent upon the truck and bus companies for 60% of its revenue. The GSLT management has not involved the bus and truck operators at all in the center's development. At the present their support of the center when it opens, is unknown.

Item. 19

Goal/Subgoal

The goal was "to improve the quality of bus and truck transport services provided to the public. The assumption behind this goal was that the bus and truck companies would at this point in the project be providing financial support. A direct question on this point was put to the GSLT director and the answer was negative. There is some doubt if even the Ministry of Manpower or the Ministry of Transportation are paying any percentage of the current operating expenses.

The Sub-goal was "to increase the efficiency of the vehicle maintenance systems". Unless there are drastic changes in the management of the center, involving the hiring of a professional director and involving representatives from the bus and truck companies, the sub-goal is unlikely to be achieved.

Item. 20

Beneficiaries

It is premature to discuss this aspect of the program.

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Item. 21

Unplanned Effects

There have been several unplanned effects which have seriously damaged the performance of the project. There were:

1. The contract was signed by AID and GSLT in July 1980. The RCA/AID contract signed in July 1981, 18 months later in March 1983 the center was supplied with water and electricity. RCA's plans called for opening the center 16 months after signing the contract. Failure of GSLT to complete the buildings prior to RCA's arrival delayed the project.
 2. GSLT rejects methodology called for in contract for preparing curriculum. This caused some unforeseen problems and affected the quality of the curriculum.
 3. GSLT's incentives for instructors were inappropriate in terms of project cost and objectives GSLT obtains only 9 instructors instead of 22 for state site training.
 4. GSLT unwilling to provide qualified counterpart to RCA Chief of Party.
 5. GSLT fails to involve the management of truck and bus companies in the development of the training institution.
 6. That GSLT would be unwilling to pay for the training aids needed in the shops for demonstration and instructional purposes has caused delays. RCA's first request for these training aids was in 1981. More than 6 trips have been made to the truck and bus companies without success. After the evaluation team arrived one load of scrap materials arrived at the center.
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Item. 22 and 23

Lessons learned/comments

There were strong early warning signals that GSLT lacked the commitment, capacity and initiative to carry out their part of the agreement, even before the RCA contract was signed. Building construction began in 1978 and was behind schedule in 1980 when the GSLT/AID contract was signed. GSLT did not hire the instructors until spring of 1982. The principal reason for the delay in hiring instructors and those (the number hired) were insufficient, was GSLT's unwillingness to use appropriate incentives. The carrot that was used to attract the 9 who did sign was the AID provided incentive of a trip to the ^S states. AID's position was that LE160 per month was required to meet the salary levels of the private companies. After two years into the project, the salaries of the present group of instructors was just raised 25% (August 1983) to the LE100 per month level. As a group the instructors have a secondary technical education, 5 to 10 years of experience and with their language training__ theoretically bi-lingual. The lowest AID clerk /typist with two years on the/or will earn about LE200 or more. The point is lack of attention to incentives undercut this project from the beginning. This mentality continues today, of the last 6 instructors hired only 5 meet the centers standards. All have failed the first language test.

GSLT was able to justify over 2 million dollars for the land and buildings but not money for a qualified full time professional director, the salary of the Deputy Director was LE200 per month. The Deputy Director statement was that he did not have authority to spend one piaster.

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The one strong push for clearing up the building problems and establishing performance standards came from RCA's first chief of party. His over zealous approach (he apparently was too performance oriented for this culture) resulted in his dismissal. RCA read the message i.e. any future pushing will come from AID not RCA. The push never came and the result is the current status of the project.

The lesson, at least on this project is, insure that the incentives are adequate and second if the host agency is not willing or able to provide management AID must fill the gap with its own resources or hire Egyptian talent to do the job.

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Item 17. Project Outputs:

The following comparisons permit a quick review of where the project stands at the two thirds mark in terms of final project outputs.

Project Goals at 36th months	Project Output at 24th months	Comments
Instructors 22	9	13 to be trained in the next 12 months
On the job training 22	0	22 to be trained in the next 12 months
administrators Trained 3	2	1 to be trained during the next 12 months.

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USAID/CAIRO RESPONSE TO THE EVALUATION
REPORT ON PROJECT 263-0114

An evaluation of Project 263-0114, Vehicle Maintenance, was conducted between July 24 and August 24, 1983. Originally scheduled as a mid term evaluation for January, it was postponed until July because of delays in the project. The evaluation report is appended.

The Mission's response is in two parts: (1) A list of actions that the Mission should take to improve project implementation. These actions are consistent with the recommendations of the evaluation report. (2) Detailed comments on the evaluation report itself, noting Mission agreement and disagreement.

USAID/CAIRO ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
PROJECT 263-0114, VEHICLE MAINTENANCE TRAINING

1. Move to obtain full time, technically qualified leadership at Center.
Make high officials aware of problem and solicit support for either change of Director or appointment of Technical Director.

Actions taken

- a. Informed Minister of Manpower, who is also President of Egyptian Trade Union Federation. (8/16/83). He is scheduling meeting with GSLT President and Center Director in September.
- b. Met with Mr. Okeily, President of GSLT. (9/1/83). Mr. Okeily assured AID that GSLT is attempting to find a technical director for the Center. He raised the issue of FCA/AID funding the new position of technical director, citing scarce GSLT finances.

Action to be taken

- a. Press for hiring of technical director as soon as possible.
 - b. Arrive at a position on AID funding of the new position as soon as a qualified technical director has been identified.
-
2. Expedite clearance of shipments containing equipment through customs.

Actions taken

- a. Mission letter to Customs requesting clearance of shipments (8/7/83).
- b. Request assistance from Ministry of Investment and International Cooperation (8/21/83).

Actions to be taken

- a. AID to continue to follow up on progress by contacting both agencies until the shipments are released. Make contacts with higher level authorities as needed, if shipments are not released by September 8.
 - b. Letter from customs releasing Air Shipments was obtained by AID and forwarded to GSLT/RCA on September 5.
 - c. Letter to customs from Mr. Zaki (MIIC) telling them to clear all shipments related to the project was sent on September 6.
3. Request detailed work plans with completion dates from RCA and GSLT for starting classes as soon as equipment arrives. Plans to cover installation of equipment, completion of curricula, completion of operations manual, hiring of local support staff and in-country training for those instructors who were originally scheduled to go to the U.S.A.

Actions taken

- a. RCA has submitted draft of detailed work plans, which was approved by GSLT. (9/5/83).
- b. RCA is working with GSLT to develop similar plans for GSLT.

Actions to be taken

- a. Awaiting GSLT work plans for their areas of responsibility.
 - b. AID review and approval of both sets of work plans.
4. Increase bus and truck company involvement in development of the Center's training programs by:
- a. Requesting RCA and GSLT to have curricula reviewed by company training officials or maintenance foremen. GSLT to affirm company participation in center, as soon as an opening date is set.
 - b. AID to visit companies to survey training needs, company perceptions of the project, and company suggestions for center operations.

Action to be taken

- a. As soon as an opening date for the Center has been announced, company officials will be asked to attend a meeting at which RCA, GSLT and AID will be present. At that time, company views will be solicited and they will be asked to cooperate in the forthcoming visits by RCA/GSLT and USAID.

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USAID/CAIRO COMMENTS

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EVALUATION REPORT FOR PROJECT 263-0114

The report of the evaluation of Project 263-0114, Vehicle Maintenance, was submitted by Mr. Richard McGuerty and Eng. Reda Soliman on August 23, 1983.

The Mission agrees with the report of the evaluation that the project is significantly behind schedule and that there currently is a major gap between projected and actual outputs at this point in time. The Mission concurs that the major problem impeding opening of the Center at this time is obtaining release of freight shipments from Customs. The Mission agrees that Contractor (FCA) performance has been deficient in the following areas: procurement of equipment, U.S. training of instructors, and analysis of bus company training needs. The Mission also concurs that the contracting agency, General Syndicate for Land Transport (GSLT), has been deficient in failing to provide full time leadership at the Center, in recruiting the most appropriate instructors for the project, and in providing vital leadership during the construction phase of the Center.

The Mission, believes, however, that the report is not balanced in that it makes only cursory mention of considerable progress made to date (albeit slow). The Mission is aware and concerned that the project is behind schedule and is vigorously attempting to overcome the difficulties which have caused the delays.

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The Mission rejects the report's allegations of internal AID pressures on project management, which purportedly, underlie some of the problems. The Mission questions the totally negative evaluation of the curricula, which implies that it is worthless.

The report is flawed by obvious and significant omissions, assertions, and unsubstantiated assumptions, and errors of fact that not only do not contribute to project implementation, but are dysfunctional. These are detailed briefly below.

Omissions

1. The report makes no acknowledgement of the Mission's past activities to overcome the problems that it identifies, despite the large number of references in the files (to which the evaluators had free access) and the several discussions with the project managers.
2. The report makes no mention of the lack of rapport and common purpose between the leaderships of GSUT and RCA, a factor which contributed to the misunderstandings and problems of the projects and resulted in Mission intervention at a greater level than usual in a host country contract.

Assertions

1. In several instances, the report states that pressure from the AID program office contributed to the problems in this project. These are two examples:
"... When project activity was not moving as expected, according to budget

flow, the program office pressured the project officer who in turn pressured RCA." (page 9, first sentence) "AID's role seems to have been dominated by expediency, internal administrative procedures and tempered by great flexibility and sensitivity to the host country agency." (page 10.)

There is no documentation to support these allegations. If such allegations were based on interviews with RCA staff, it is apparent that it would be to RCA's interest to have this view prevail since it would provide them with a reason for deficient project implementation performance.

2. "Apparently AID was pressured into signing before ready" (page 9, last sentence). This refers to the fact that the building was not ready when the contract was signed. There is no documentation for the allegation. AID could have approved the contract which was signed August 1981, with good expectations that the building would have been ready in the 16 months preceding the return of instructors from USA training.
3. "GSLT objected to the task analysis methodology. The AID project officer supported GSLT. Pocsi was removed from the project at the end of January 1982." (page 4, para a.)

While each of the preceding three sentences is true, the implications drawn from the order in which they appear are not. AID did not object to task analysis and Pocsi was not removed because of this technical issue. Pocsi's dismissal, which was supported by AID, was due to his evident inability to cope with cultural differences (see page 27, second sentence). Despite Pocsi's technical competence, AID had no choice but to approve of the dismissal.

4. "To permit the problem [absence of a full time GSLT director] to go unanswered for 24 months has been a disaster for the project." "The question is has AID made maximum use of available Egyptian sources of leverage?" (page 8, para. 2)

For the first 16 months, the director's performance was not an issue. It was only after his return to the job from nearly 6 months of US training in January 1983, that the construction delays revealed his dilatory approach to the project. Efforts to increase the director's involvement through increased monitoring and convening of committee meeting were only partially effective. The customs clearance issue resolved any doubts about the need to obtain full time leadership at the Center. A long sought meeting with the GSLT President was finally arranged for September 1. At that time AID got a commitment that a full time technical director would be hired for the Center, at least through the remaining months in the LOP.

Unsupported Assumptions

1. One of the bases for criticizing the curricula developed by RCA for this project was that the vocabulary level was for a literate population, when " 50-65% [of the target population] are estimated to be illiterate." (pages 3 and 15). However, on page 21, the report acknowledges that "some of the ATC instructors do not know what is the workers [literacy] level." Furthermore, the 1980 report of the Egyptian Labor Force Survey shows that the illiteracy rate for employed males in urban areas was 34%. The

Mission does not believe that the rate has increased since then nor that company mechanics would have a higher than average illiteracy rate.

2. The report has three other criticisms of the curricula: it was not performance based, it was written without the involvement of the target population, and it was off-the-shelf-material. a) Performance (competency) based vocational instruction, which allows each student to advance at his/her own speed with few time constraints, is a concept well established in the U.S. and other industrialized nations. It would have been an innovative approach for Egypt, and it is regrettable that it was not implemented. However, millions of workers have been successfully trained using traditional methods (in Egypt and elsewhere). b) Involvement of the target group in developing curricula is the desirable approach. While the Mission agrees that greater efforts could have been made to obtain inputs from the companies, it is reasonable to say that the Center instructors could be considered representative of Egyptian automotive mechanics, and they are involved in revising the curricula, 30 to 40% according to the Report. This also contradicts the statement on page 6 that "the curriculum was developed.... without collaborating with GSLT instructors." c) Using off-the-shelf materials is an accepted cost-efficient practice as long as it is adapted to meet the cultural and technical needs of the students, including translation into Egyptian Arabic, which the report notes is being done. "Pictures are being added, material is being removed and revised." (page 21)

ERRORS OF FACT

1. "The GSLT management has not involved the bus and truck operators at all in the centers development." (page 23 and similarly on page 25) While it is true that the companies should have been more heavily involved, the fact is that the bus companies are represented on the Board of Directors and made their views known in many meetings.

2. On page 24, there is a question about whether companies are providing financial support. The report claims that the GSLT director said, no. Our files indicate that on January 12, 1983 the director reported that 12 companies had each given LE 10,000 to the Center, and the GSLT had given LE 200,000.

3. The Report states that "Cost to date of all technical assistance \$210,293." RCA field staff costs through June 30, 1983 were \$632,948.

Drafted:HRDC/ET: NRoot:am 061CE

GSLT RESPONSE TO Recommendations

PREPARED

Letter sent - 8/25/83

Agency for International Development

Dear Sirs,

The GSLT would like to thank AID for its efforts to assist the AIC by providing the evaluation team.

This is in reference to the recommendations, set up by the evaluators, and presented in the meeting held at the center on Sunday, August 14, 1983 in which AID, FCA and GSLT attended.

We hope that the coming phase will show notable progress to make up for the delay of project starting up date which was agreed to in the contract with FCA. We would like to comment on some of the remarks made by the evaluators in their report which was reviewed in the meeting:

- FCA is occupying Tahrir office temporarily according to the contract. As mentioned in the meeting held on 8/14/83, we agree that the offices of Mr. M.B. Seta and Mr. A. Kaiatico be moved to Matareya Training Center as their permanent headquarters, to facilitate management operation of the center.

- It was agreed previously, in the joint meeting (GSLT and RCA), that Eng. Hagez Sobehy, the technical assistant, and Mr. Parker Hellen, the technical advisor to work fulltime at the center to take care of the daily technical operations.
- GSLT disapproves of the evaluator's section D, 1&2 statement which gives GSLT full responsibility. It was discussed during the meeting, and RCA agreed, that it is their responsibility and that this statement should be corrected. It was also agreed that GSLT director should cooperate with RCA in developing the operational plan for the coming remaining short period of the project.
- We agree to move fast to free air shipments and Alexandria port shipments. We will seize this opportunity to comment on RCA importing equipment at different times, as a result many problems arose and efforts wasted to free it from customs.
- RCA does not promptly give us details of each shipment ahead of time, and before its arrival. Example we should have been informed of the other shipment, which already left US port so that we may be able to take the necessary action to expedite delivery procedures.
- We agree in principal to study the suggestion to train phase II participants in the Arab Republic of Egypt.

Best Available Document

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- We do not agree on Part 6 because this is FCA responsibility, and FCA agreed to that during the above mentioned meeting.
- We agree on the principal of hiring administrative staff, on condition there is a need. We gave instructions to the center management to start appointing immediate persons needed for the center's full operation. The idea is, if we appoint persons without any work to be done, it affects the person's morale plus unnecessary financial burden on the ATC.
- It was agreed in this meeting of 8/14/83 in No. 7 that this point is FCA's responsibility, but we do not object to appoint an administrative responsible person if the need arises.
- The ATC management got in touch several times with companies, and dates were set for the opening of the center without success. Therefore, it was decided, in the presence of all in the 8/14 meeting that no appointments will be set with companies before the ATC classes start. FCA will decide this date.
- In reference to the suggestion in Section E, to get in touch with companies for the repair of parts, it was decided during the 8/14 meeting that this suggestion is possible after the opening of the center.

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- We appreciate the efforts of the evaluators, but they might have overseen a fact during this meeting, in the presence of Mr. Foot, that there is no cooperation/harmony among FCA Cairo staff the result of which is no progress in curriculum programs ~~or equipment~~, or the presence of all the equipment needed to match the programs/curriculum.

- As a result of the lack of cooperation/harmony between the Cairo FCA staff and their head office in Cherry Hill in the USA, the technical persons were sent long before the classes start and before the actual opening of the center. Secondly is that equipment arrived at the Alexandria port without documents from Cherry Hill.

Mohamed M. A. El Ckeily
President for
General Syndicate for Land
Transport

Translated by Amal Nassar

0449E/am 8/30/83

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September 5, 1983

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THRU: HFLC/ELI/MORRIS Root
HFLC/CD/ET: Acolph Y. Wilburn

Mr. O'Kelly's letter to AID (August 25)

AL/HFLC: Edward Lusk

The letter is the GSLT's formal response to the recommendations of the Evaluation Team, which were presented to FCA/GSLT on August 14. The letter was written by Mr. Sheta (Center Director) and Mr. Abou El Naga (technical consultant for GSLT). While it identifies deficiencies of FCA performance, it carefully ignores GSLT's performance record, e.g. in construction. It is designed to assure Mr. O'Kelly that the GSLT team has been on the job and that the problems are with FCA.

The letter does not mention the opening remarks made orally at the meeting on August 14, in which the deficiencies of each party to the contract were briefly summarized. The parties were then told that the recommendations of the evaluation team were directed toward actions needed during the remaining months of the contract to make the center a viable institution. (see page 2 of the revised recommendations, attached).

Following are responses to your specific questions. I have numbered the paragraphs you questioned in your copy of the O'Kelly letter (also attached) for reference.

Para 1 (letter). The original statement in section 5 of the recommendations read ... "The GSLT Director will be responsible for developing in cooperation with FCA ..." The revised version, which resulted from joint agreement at the meeting, is seen on page 3 of the recommendations: "The GSLT Director will be responsible for cooperating with FCA ... as FCA develops ..."

Para 2 (letter). Notice that GSLT (now) agrees to move fast to free shipments. They are not commenting on their slow pace or before. The "Comment on FCA importing equipment at different times ..." refers to a long standing complaint GSLT has made as to why everything wasn't shipped in one load. This is not a real issue since GSLT has changed its mind over equipment needs several times during the LCP. Other FCA procurement practices deserve criticism, but this is a specious one.

Para 3 (letter). This again is a red herring to distract from GSLT's poor record in cooperating in the clearance process. The example cited illustrates this. The 6th shipment will leave USA this month and GSLT is already aware of it. FCA says that (as before) shipping list and other papers will be given to GSLT as soon as the papers arrive.

Para 4 (letter). The original version of the Recommendations called for the GSLT Director to be responsible for scheduling the installation of unpacked and arriving equipment. Both GSLT and FCA agreed that it was FCA's responsibility and so it was deleted from this section of the Recommendations. (As noted in the letter.)

Para 5 (letter). See page 4, item 6 of the Recommendations. GSLT response to this item was that why spend money when there isn't anything for them to do ... "it affects the person's moral plus unnecessary financial burden on the AIC." The evaluators were saying that GSLT should start to hire them now, particularly those who would need some training.

Para 6 (letter). This is associated with item 6 of the Recommendations. The original version went on to give examples of the kinds of things the AIC administrative staff would do ... "begin preparation of pamphlets/brochures describing the center objectives, staff, courses offered ..." etc. FCA agreed that this was its responsibility and so it was deleted from this section.

Para 6a (letter). Getting the companies more involved was the issue Maguerty (rightly) made much of. As the letter notes, GSLT wants to wait until there is a firm opening date based on the arrival of equipment at the center.

Para 7 (letter). The reference here is to item C, on page 5 of the Recommendations, which suggests that one way to get training aids is to offer to repair parts (or buses) for the companies.

Para 8 and 9 (letter). Mr. Malatico (FCA/CCP) has been frank and open in his own displeasure with FCA procurement practices in the States. The lack of harmony/cooperation among FCA Cairo staff, however, is something new that the writers of the letter are raising and is I believe unfounded in fact.

More to the point is the lack of communications between GSLT leadership and FCA. The absence of a full time Director has been frustrating for the FCA/CCP. Day to day issues went unresolved awaiting the Director's presence. These paragraphs are meant to distract from that issue.

Comments
By Eng. Reda Soliman

Translation

- 1- The evaluation team sees that inspite of what has been stated in the Report, as regards some problems which delayed project progress versus the project work plan, that RCA or GSLT are not to blame in some aspects. Example the completion of the ATC building construction as planned or the custom clearance of equipment etc-- We would like to state that some accomplishments have been made according to the project work plan, besides some problems could be overcome with the help of RCA and responsible staff in the center.

We cannot deny the efforts made by GSLT/RCA, and AID's efforts to make the project a success

- 2- The evaluation team would like to state the importance of this project as it will help a large number of workers in this sector who are under General Syndicate of Land Transport in the U.A.R. The project aims at upgrading the skills, quality of maintenance service of the bus companies. As a result we shall create a generation of trained workers who are needed by this sector. Therefore, AID is requested to help make this project a success as it is the first project which is directly involved with the (General Trade Union) Syndicate that aims at improving workers' skills to serve the community.

- 3- The team believes that the project should continue for the following reasons: The buildings are ready; the equipment has arrived; the instructors and RCA technical staff are there, but there remains to appoint a responsible experienced person who can organize the work for the staff. The team believes that GSLT can easily find that responsible person who can direct and organize operation of the center so that the project may fulfill its goals.

Translated by : Amal Nassar

