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Comparative Evaluation of Three
Haitian Rural Development Projects

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Preface

This comparative evaluation of the three Haitian rural development projects is divided into five parts. The three central parts deal with each of these projects separately while the introductory part, the conclusion, and various annexes are designed to make broad comparisons possible.

The authors are Glenn R. Smucker (Part Two), Drexel G. Woodson (Part Four), and Uli Locher (Parts One, Three and Five). Their authorial responsibility is limited to their respective parts.

Many people have been generous with their help to the evaluation team, and the list is too long for all to be named. I would, however, like to express my special gratitude to Michel Baldwin of USAID/Haiti and to Angelamaria Michael of Creative Associates, Inc., who provided essential logistical support, and to the directors of three projects, Marc-Antoine Noel, Chavannes Jn-Baptiste, and Claude Bouthillier, whose warm hospitality and many other forms of assistance were of great support to the evaluation effort. Finally, I should like to thank Harold Kursk, who was responsible for editing and typing the text.

Uli Locher

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PART ONE

1. The Planning of the Comparative Evaluation

1.1 The team and its mandate

In March of 1983, CREATIVE ASSOCIATES, a Washington D.C.-based consulting firm, signed contracts with three project evaluation specialists for the design and implementation of the evaluation of three Haitian Rural Development Projects:

- Gros-Morne II (CRS): "GM" 5220129... 3210142
- Groupement Pilot Project (CRS): "GPP"
- Chambellan Community Development Project (Save the Children): "CCDP" 52101

This evaluation entailed a comparative analysis of institutional and cost effectiveness of these projects in the context of their particular objectives as stated in the respective project agreements ("project papers"). In more precise terms, the task of the consultants was to:

- 1) assess the social, economic, and technical impact of the project inputs;
- 2) evaluate the ability of the projects to benefit a broad spectrum of the local population;
- 3) assess the relative effectiveness of the non-formal education methodologies employed in bringing about attitudinal changes in the rural population;
- 4) measure the monetary value of financial inputs against benefits accruing to the target population.

Prior to this assignment, the team members had accumulated considerable experience in social scientific and evaluation

research in Haiti and other Caribbean locations. Based on this experience and on some preliminary acquaintance with the three projects, they designed a "common scope of work" (see annex) which took account of particular project ideologies and features within the context of the four major tasks mentioned. The team was allowed a considerable amount of flexibility in doing so and even in adapting this common scope of work at regular intervals during the field work. Such flexibility was both needed and appreciated because, as the work progressed, it became increasingly evident that the definitions of "impact", "output", and "success" implied in the team's mandate were at odds with the various projects' own internal definitions of principal aims and achievements.

To put this discrepancy bluntly: what evolved from the team's mandate was an interest in the economic impact of the projects. This stands opposed to the project staff's view that peasant organization is their principal aim. The evaluation team tried to assess progress along both lines and to do justice to both of these - clearly legitimate - preoccupations. But it soon became clear that the projects by and large did not possess sufficient data to allow a full exploration of their economic impact. The team members did their best to secure information, opinions, and estimates from a wide variety of sources ranging from a houngan to a bishop, from landless peasants to local elites, and from development administrators in air-conditioned offices to development practitioners on rocky hillsides. Only one of the projects (GPP) has an adequate household-level baseline

census which will, if replicated after four years, allow for a precise measurement of project impact upon the participating peasant families. None of the projects listed impact measurement as an ongoing activity on its agenda.

However, it must be added on the positive side that all three projects had some sort of documentation concerning the membership and activities of the peasant organizations. This permitted an indirect estimate of project impact via the organizational accomplishments so crucial to project staff.

1.2 Short presentation of the three projects

1.2.1 Gros-Morne

The Gros-Morne Rural Development Project (CRS) has been in existence for seven years. The first phase (1976-79) "has led to many qualitative results - attitudinal and psychological..." (Klein, 1980a:15). It should be noted that 197 small groups of around ten farmers each ("groupements") have been formed as well as thirty-five "health clubs". In the eyes of the project members, these are the foundations of the economic results to be expected during later phases of the project. They are the principal project outputs anticipated since the thrust of the project is "the preparation of men rather than of land" (ibid.). This type of peasant organizations is important for its symbolism (it makes peasants feel that their investments together create a powerful force), its orientation towards production (rather than consumption), and the increase of

local, low-level administrative skills.

For the second phase (1980-83), the following goals were established (this list is drawn from several places in Klein, 1980a):

1. Formation of twenty cooperatives, each carrying out one project.
2. Doubling of groupements to 400, executing 120 projects.
3. Training of 100 cooperative administrators.
4. Formation of eighteen local service councils.
5. A public awareness service reaching 1200 cultivators.
6. Introduction of agricultural technology.
7. A credit service financing 600 small projects of groupement members.
8. The application of 100 groupement projects towards wood-for-charcoal production.
9. A school service reaching 7000 children.
10. A technical service for sanitation and health issues.

1.2.2 Groupement pilot project (GPP)

The groupement pilot project at Bayonnais (CRS) began in September of 1980 with a social and economic baseline study. After approximately two years of operations an internal evaluation was conducted by Ira Lowenthal (1983). None of the baseline data has thus far become available to either the project administrators or to Mr. Lowenthal.

The project is an offshoot and extension of two older projects which various evaluators have described as great

successes: the Gros-Morne Rural Development Project (CRS) and the Papaye Cooperative Movement (Catholic Diocese at Hinche). In essence, these projects focus on themes of peasant organization and education in a departure from Community Council models.

The goals of the GPP project are expressed in such a way as to make it difficult to reduce them to a single principle or a few basic points. However, the project paper does contain several lists from which the following pertinent remarks have been culled:

1. Initiation of formation of small peasant groups (groupements); 200 such groupements, encompassing some farmers, are planned by 1984.
2. Provision of education and technical services.
3. Stimulation of self-help efforts.
4. Establishment of a private institution (Rural development Resource Center) offering appropriate resource-sharing and training services to a wide range of development organizations operating at the local level throughout the country.
5. Implementation of two surveys (baseline and end-of-project studies) to collect social and economic in a random sample of households. The comparison of the results should "demonstrate substantive changes in the lives of the target population consequent to participation in the project." (Klein, 1980b).

1.2.3 Chambellan community development project (PDCC)

The Project de developpement communautaire de Chambellan was launched in 1979 and became operational in 1980. It is under the direction of the Save the Children Federation. The emphasis of the project is on the formation of strategic

groups of peasants which seek to identify problems and then proceed to implement appropriate solutions.

This project has attracted considerable interest of late from various funding agencies. It is already highly diversified in terms of its specific objectives and this diversification may be expected to increase further with respect to both goals and funding. The staff appears to be conscious of the possibility of over-diversification; hence they foresee the next two years as a consolidation phase.

One of the special characteristics of this project is the foundation of peasant organization upon which it has grown. Groupement members are in fact recruited from the traditional 'Conseils d'action communautaire which must make for a special relationship between these two otherwise competing forms of peasant organization.

This project has formulated long lists of specific goals which are to be realized according to a tight schedule. These objectives fall into the following categories (summarized from PDCC, 1981, Table 1):

A. Rural Infrastructure

1. Penetration road Cadette/Hainault/Boucan
2. Installation of small electric turbine
3. Upgrading of Chambellan town square

B. Agriculture

1. Courses in agriculture and animal husbandry
2. Tree nurseries
3. Demonstration of agricultural techniques

4. Tool and seed bank
5. Training of two husbandry agents

C. Education and Training

1. Refurbishing the national school of Chambellan
2. Literacy centers
3. Formation of women's groups
4. Training of twenty primary school teachers
5. Construction of five social centers
6. Community development training
7. Completion of the Bon Berger school
8. Renovation of the center for domestic education

D. Health, Nutrition, and Environmental Sanitation

1. Potable water
2. Center of nutrition education and recuperation
3. Completion of Chambellan dispensary
4. Construction of slaughterhouse in Chambellan
5. Construction of low-cost latrines

E. Small Enterprise Development

1. Sewing and embroidery instruction for women
2. Installation of metal workshop and provision of training in metal work

1.3 Bases for comparison

It is by no means accidental that this "groupement-oriented project evaluation" does not start with a definition of the term "groupement". There is actually no common denominator other than that of size (it is small) and membership (composed principally of peasants). The term "groupement" is an Haitian innovation; it does not exist in the French language. Its meaning in each of the three projects will become clear in the following chapters. Squabbles over its semantic content have been endemic amongst the Gros-Morne and GPP leadership. This is demonstrated in the exchange of angry letters in 1983. Further, it is common practice in Chambellan to employ such terms as "strategic group" to distinguish one form of groupement from another.

The "groupement" factor is thus a point of both agreement and division among the three projects. Yet, in a deeper sense, the spirit of groupement is the essential element in each.

The common scope of work included a documentation of:

- a) project history, including a history of funding
- b) current organization
- c) advancement or implementation of project goals
- d) orientation towards the future, including an account of major successes and failures
- e) justification of the continuation of the project

The data assembled under these headings will allow for a

comparative evaluation that is to focus on the following three themes:

1. Peasant organization. Here the main questions are the present state of the groupement organizations in terms of number and type, the perceptions of the groupements by their constituent members, area non-members and local and other staff, the life span and survival potential of groupements, and the relationships between groupements and other forms of competing peasant organizations.

2. The tangible benefits of groupements for members and the community at large as well as the attitudinal and behavioral changes introduced by the groupement movement. Tangible benefits can be measured most easily for Bayonnais due to the availability of household-level baseline data, although approximations are possible for other projects as well. Intangible results are more difficult to assess; yet they are of high priority in that they will be critical to the continuation and future directions of the projects.

3. The traditional focus of evaluations on the progress towards goals specified in the project paper. This will be maintained by use of a standardized procedure and agenda permitting a clear definition of goals and the progress made towards their attainment.

There are two recurring considerations for all three themes: 1) the state of advancement of the project, and 2) the nature of the spread of its effects and its impact upon the participant and non-participant populations. Furthermore, since non-formal education of all varieties has been an integral part of all three projects, special attention will be given to its effects and to potential areas for improvement.

1.4 A note on the functions of evaluation

Outside evaluators are intruders. They descend upon a project with frequently only a minimum of preparation and are supposed to pass judgement in a matter of days or weeks on the results of many years of often difficult and frustrating of work. Sponsoring agencies may act quickly but local communications are often slow. One of us arrived at a project site to the complete surprise of the project team; our man had to prove his legitimacy by presenting a letter of reference.

That an evaluator comes from outside may have its advantages, however. Local problems can be seen in a wider context and analyzed as distinct from personality issues. All three of us viewed our mission as a means of contributing to project success by raising issues in a new way, pushing ahead the codification of results, and making evaluation an ongoing concern for the project teams. Each of the three projects has some outstanding qualities and we have taken care to give equal consideration to the

documentation of strengths as to that of weaknesses.

If an evaluation is an exercise in consciousness-raising for a project team, then it is at the same time one of bringing problems to the surface and the attention of administrators. This applies to all levels of administration. In this particular case, it has become evident that the local agencies responsible for project administration could benefit from a general shake-up and overhaul. How can anyone expect these overextended administrators at AID/Haiti and CRS to keep abreast of developments unless outsiders bang on their doors, awaken them to certain issues, and put questions to them? It might be useful to mention that we found that one - very efficient - administrator was actually responsible for sixteen projects at the same time!

Finally, I have witnessed over the years the spread of profound disenchantment among foreign aid personnel stationed in Haiti. The poverty and stagnation of the country alone cannot explain this phenomenon. Further, there is deep-rooted uncertainty over the value of development work as well as suspicions of its futility. Here again, evaluations of a comparative sort may serve an important function. They may help determine which approach to development produces desirable results and distinguish such approaches from those yielding unsatisfactory returns. Comparative evaluation should allow for the measurement of benefits and the tracking of these benefits through time and space. Evaluations may make it possible to answer the

question, "development for whom?", in a clearly circumscribed context. The concluding part of this report will attempt to do precisely this.

PART TWO

EVALUATION OF THE
GROS-MORNE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

by

Glenn R. Smucker

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Prepared for Creative Associates, Washington, D.C.,
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I. INTRODUCTION

The Gros-Morne Rural Development Project is the oldest of the three programs examined in the present study. It is a project of the Catholic Relief Services and the Catholic Diocese of Gonaives, with major funding from USAID. Field offices are located at Grepin, a rural locality near Gros-Morne (Gonaives). The work of the Grepin center is of special interest due to its evolution from a conventional training program into an innovative rural movement effectively grouping small farmers and mobilizing savings. The Grepin center was established in 1976 by a Catholic brother and the staff from Alma Mater Hospital. In 1977, the program became a CRS project with AID funding. In 1980, the second phase of the project was inaugurated with renewed funding from CRS and AID.

The present goal of the project is as follows: "To assist rural peasants to organize small self-help groups (groupement) to work collaboratively to mobilize savings and to plan and execute commercial and other small-scale production activities." "Groupement" is the French word for "grouping". It is written in Creole as "groupman" and may be freely translated as "small group". In the Haitian context, it has come to refer to various types of groups formed by community organizers.

The present evaluation takes place in the final year of Phase II funding, a thirty-three month period from September

1980 to June 1983, recently extended to the end of 1983. This evaluation focuses on the achievement of stated objectives and provides an assessment of the groupman movement. During the month of April (1983), the evaluator spent three weeks on site at Grepin and the surrounding region. A number of days were also spent in Port-au-Prince in the offices of USAID and CRS. This study is based on personal observations, interviews, project reports, internal evaluations, program data and budget information. The evaluator interviewed staff members, group members, community council members and officers, as well as local staff members of the Office Nationale d'Alphabetisation et d'Action Communautaire (ONAAC). The evaluator also accompanied staff members in their work, attended groupman meetings and training sessions, regional meetings, association meetings, preschool committee meetings, planning sessions for the mango trade, staff meetings, and vaccination campaign sessions. With a view to better understanding of the dynamics of groupman, interviews were sought with current and past members of groups in order to gather information on group histories, investments and sources of income. An effort was made to contact model groups and others judged to be mediocre or immature. In most cases, group members were interviewed in the absence of Grepin staff members. The staff proved to be open and flexible in supplying information.

The project data used here include a complete listing of credit supplied to groups since 1978. There are no complete

data files on groups in the region; rather there are large samples of those groups which cooperate with the Grepin staff. One assessment of group functioning is based on a sample of 112 groups representing about twenty-five percent (25 %) of the groups. Data on group membership, age, assets and investments are based primarily on two sets of reports collected in the past six months. One is based on 306 groups (sixty-seven percent 67 % sample) and the other on 237 (fifty-two percent <52%>). These are not random samples; rather, they are large samples representing the most active groups in the program. Estimates of the total number of groups are based on staff appraisals rather than concrete data. The staff has a procedure for verifying groups but it is not based on regular updating or through coverage of the area in a systematic way. Furthermore, the organizational strategy has the effect of encouraging groups to form outside of direct contact with Grepin staff.

Comparative material is available from earlier evaluations including Lowenthal and Attfield (1979), Monde and Oriol (1981), Murray and Alvarez (1982), and Koppenleitner and Koppenleitner (1982). Like earlier evaluations, the present study had limited time to conduct a thorough verification of the project. Nevertheless, certain data are available and certain conclusions may be drawn from these short-term observations. Any apparent criticism in this report is intended as purely constructive criticism offered in a spirit of cooperation and with deep appreciation for one of the most creative efforts to mobilize small farmers in the

Haitian countryside. I remain grateful for the hospitality and good humor of the staff at Grepin and the friendly cooperation of numerous community people in the Gros-Morne Commune.

II. PROJECT HISTORYObjectives

There have been significant changes in the Gros-Morne project since the mid-1970's; however, there is an underlying continuity to its basic objectives. Initially, the center developed as an extension of the medical work of a hospital founded by Brother Philippi in 1971. The Grepin center was built as a response to health problems stemming from conditions which the hospital program could not hope to treat. Malnutrition among children of pre-school age was perceived as the principal problem of the region. Other problems noted were poverty, illness, as well as a lack of water, roads and schools, trained persons, technical assistance, and agricultural equipment. Despite later changes in goals and strategy, the original priorities of the Grepin center have remained as follows:

- 1) "Conscientisation" and active grouping of the population, i.e., the community organization functions,
- 2) Increase in revenue and agricultural production,
- 3) Diminution of child malnutrition and improvement of the health situation.

Note that the term "conscientisation" derives ultimately from the work of Paulo Freire (1970) and refers to a "critical consciousness" of the world, implying a willingness to change one's circumstances in life and to take action against oppressive conditions of existence.

Phase I Project

Brother Philippi submitted a proposal in 1976 to undertake a four-year project. The project was funded by USAID (\$104,000) and CRS (\$55,000) with additional support from Misereor (\$8,500), Deutsche Welthungerhilfe (\$31,000) and the Archbishop of Munich (\$11,470). Between 1977 and 1980, the project operated out of the Grepin center located on two hectares of land, a gift from of the Gros-Morne hospital. The project was initially oriented to thirty-four community councils, the hospital program, and the mothercraft centers working to alleviate malnutrition. Project goals included "conscientization" of 320 council members as well as the training of agricultural agents, medical-social agents and potential community leaders. The trainees were to return to their home communities and organize health clubs and agricultural groups in cooperation with community councils. The objectives of the project were to achieve a one hundred percent (100 %) increase in agricultural production, 30 percent reduction in third degree malnutrition, 40 percent reduction in malaria, 50 percent reduction in navel tetanus and a 50 percent reduction of infant and child mortality under the age of four.

These goals proved elusive given the magnitude of the problems and the limited resources of the program. Elaborate efforts to train local leaders included three periods of twenty-two days in residence at the center for each stagiaire. This was later replaced by shorter training periods of five or six days, also in three cycles, for

trainees called antennes. In practice, the training of volunteer specialists did not result in growing networks of community organizations, new agricultural technologies, improvement in health standards or diminution of illness. The stagiaires came recommended by community councils. This tended to feed into traditional patterns of hierarchy and privilege rather than promoting popular education. The lengthy training under the Grepin subsidy gave people the impression that training would result in salaried employment. Choice of candidates for stagiaires focused on young people with a better than average formal education. The additional training further distanced them from other community members in terms of social status. The extensive technical training did not result in practical applications of new technologies.

By 1979, key elements of the project had been modified or dropped. The training program was eliminated; the literacy program abandoned. Early experiments with credit proved discouraging due to lack of demand for credit and lack of interest in capital-intensive technologies. The program was re-oriented toward small groups rather than community councils or leadership training. Seminars were held away from Grepin. With the growing focus on small groups, the staff inaugurated a program of groupman verification. As a result, forty percent (40 %) of the 180 groups were dropped from the rolls. This loss was quickly recouped by the formation of sixty new groups within the year. By the end of the project period (1980) there were 197 groupman and

thirty-five health clubs. The groups had assets of 23,00 gourdes with seventy percent (70 %) invested in projects for profit.

Phase II Project

In 1980, the Gros-Morne project obtained renewed funding for another three years. These funds, provided by USAID and CRS, totaled \$498,000 (see Annex I and II). In effect, the annual budget for the program tripled in size to meet the needs of an expanding program with redefined goals.

The new project maintained the underlying objectives of Phase I with a new set of goals based on a refocused groupman strategy. The group movement was intended as a means of fostering cooperative formation based on the gradual acquisition of competence in management, collective action, bookkeeping books, investment activity, and literacy skills. New goals included the formation of cooperatives, enhancement of administrative skills, introduction of new technology, establishment of local service councils, and the provision of agricultural extension services, a credit program, a school service for children and technical support in sanitation and preventive health. The following specific goals were targeted for achievement by June 1983: 400 groupman, 20 cooperatives, 100 cooperative administrators, 18 reformed community councils, 1,200 cultivations touched by agricultural campaigns, credit for 600 projects totaling \$30,000, another \$20,000 of credit for 20 cooperatives or

associations, \$8,400 in credit for 120 group projects, \$5,000 credit for wood charcoal projects, 7,000 children attending pre-school centers, and the formation of a number of local service councils. In general, it was hoped that groups and cooperatives would spread throughout the commune of Gros-Morne including eight rural sections with a total population estimated at 100,000 people.

Midway through the funding period, the Grepin staff conducted a self-evaluation (first quarter of 1982). At this time, it was clear that the essential elements of the new goals had been engaged: continuation of group organization, introduction of new technology, use of credit to increase investments, planning for an education program, and continuation of the health clubs. The organization of new groups had continued with a new focus on zones of group concentration. In 1981, the first group associations were formed, but formation of cooperatives had proceeded much slower than expected. Several of the more mature groups were designated as Groupman Animate Lokal (local animator groups), taking on outreach and verification activities heretofore performed by Grepin staff. This development showed movement in the direction of local service councils. Efforts to reform community councils were dropped.

III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

(See Table 1 for an overview of the current organization and program of the Gros-Morne development center.) In the following discussion, the project history of the last chapter is extended into the present.

AdministrationStaff

There are presently thirteen professional or paraprofessional staff members. There are also nine pre-school monitors and one pres-school inspector, all

Table 1. Current Organization of Gros-Morne
Rural Development Project

Funding Sources ----- CARITAS
 Port-au-Prince Catholic Diocese
 AID/Gonaives
 CRS

Project Administration
 Grepin (Gros-Morne)

Project Manager
 Assistant Manager
 Administrator
 Coordination Committee

Program

Community Organization	Education	Technology	Health
Organizer & trainer Animators (4)	Educator Monitors (9) Inspector	Agronomist Agents (2) Technician	Coordinator Health Agent
Trains and verifies groupmans, inter-group associations and local animator-groupmans. Supervises credit program.	Operates nine pre-school centers thru groupmans, education committees & parent organizations.	Provides research & extension services in storage, livestock & agriculture.	Promotes health education through groupmans and health clubs promotes construction of latrines and potable water sources. Collaborates with Hospital Alma Mater (Gros-Morne).

local people. The Grepin payroll includes additional support staff (watchman, animal care staff, typist, mechanic, yard worker, nurse aid) for a total of thirty-two employees, including part- and full-time workers. Two of the professional staff (project manager, educator) are part-time employees who live in Port-au-Prince and spend a fixed number of days in residence each month. Three of the animators are from Gros-Morne and live in town. The remainder of the professionals are from other regions of Haiti and live at Grepin. They perceive themselves as "strangers" in the area although most of them have lived at Grepin for the past six years. None of the staff maintain families in Port-au-Prince although a number of them do have families in other towns (North, Artibonite). The pattern of commuting weekly to the capital is widespread among staff; however, there is a serious problem of extended separation from families. This has been addressed by granting monthly leaves for staff whose families live at a distance.

Since the beginning of the project, the composition of staff has been very stable. A conspicuous exception to this is the position of administrator which has been filled five times in the course of the project. The administrator keeps books, maintains vehicles and the physical plant, and handles the payroll and disbursements. This position is subject to special stress as it entails considerable responsibility with little formal authority.

In general, the staff is well trained for its

responsibilities. The project manager is both creative and conscientious. Three key members hold diplomas in agronomy, two from Damien and one from France. The head of the technical section has a strong specialization in animal husbandry and a diverse work history in France. The educator has received specialized training in France and the United States (Creole Institute, Indiana University), and is presently affiliated with the Institut de Pedagogie National (Port-au-Prince). The health agents have several years experience in the community health program at Albert Schweitzer Hospital. One technical agent, also has experience at Albert Schweitzer in the livestock program. The other was trained at the Ecole Pedagogique Rurale and has one year of experience as director of a CREP school. The animators are either local people or have been raised in local areas. All have primary school education and have further received on-the-job training at Grepin. Two of them had prior experience in the community council movement of the early 1970's.

Physical Plant

The Grepin center is constructed on a two-hectare plot about two kilometers from Gros-Morne on the road to Port-au-Paix. It has four buildings. One houses staff members, office space and storage, while the third building is being modified for warehouse space. It also houses a workshop (car repair, carpentry) and may be expanded for manual arts training. Finally, a less substantial building houses

rabbits and chickens. The property includes irrigated land for gardening. Staff members note a shortage of space in the sleeping accommodations for women. A small section of land is planted in fast growing leucena trees about two years old.

Collaborating Agencies

As Table 1 demonstrates, the project is legally a program of the Catholic diocese in Gonaives. At present, this is strictly a pro forma relationship. No staff members in the diocese have anything to do with Grepin beyond the necessity for the Bishop to cosign cheques. It is anticipated that someone will be assigned additional responsibility for projects in August 1983.

The Gros-Morne program is also a project of the Catholic Relief Service. Despite this arrangement, the program in Gros-Morne functions quite autonomously. CRS staff do not have an intimate understanding of the ongoing program, while reporting channels are slow between the Grepin administrators and the CRS staff. CRS has also had its own share of complications due to overburdened staff members and delays in new appointments.

Grepin has long enjoyed a special relationship to Alma Mater Hospital in Gros-Morne. This tie has grown more distant over the years. The program has gradually de-emphasized medical issues in comparison to other program

areas; indeed, the health posts and health clubs have been far less successful than the groupman movement. At present, a medical resident (M.D.) at the hospital serves as advisor and "active collaborator" with the health component of the project.

Two of the staff agronomists are affiliated with the Ministry of Agriculture. The assistant project manager is the local representative of the District Agronomist in Gonaives. In practice, he does not spend much time in departmental activities apart from the assignment in Grepin as he is only occasionally called upon to attend meetings or to submit reports. The other ministerial agronomist is officially seconded to the Catholic Diocese and has no formal duties beyond the Grepin assignment. Both departmental affiliates are on the Grepin project payroll and subject to project administration.

Budget

(See Annex I and II.) Total funds allocated to the Gros-Morne project amount to U.S. \$498,049 for three years. This includes a seventy-five percent (75 %) share of the funding from USAID and twenty-five percent (25 %) from CRS. Between September 1980 and April 1983, the program disbursed \$338,010, approximately two-thirds of the budget, with only four months remaining in the funding period. The project has not kept pace with its goals. Up to the present, expenditures have been running at seventy-six percent (76 %)

of the level targeted. This is due in large part to changing conditions and slow development of the project during the first half of Phase II, although disbursement of funds picked up dramatically in 1982. The project was recently granted an extension of its existing funding to the end of the current year (1983). This is entirely appropriate given the current level of activities. A glance at detailed budget lines for personnel, credit, cooperatives and education suggests that there are several areas of program underexpenditure. At the time of evaluation, there had been no expenditure on reforestation or wood charcoal. There was little expenditure for credit in 1980 or 1981, although this increased substantially in 1982. At present spending levels, credit will actually exceed target levels by the end of the year. In contrast to the expansion foreseen in the health budget, there has been a contraction of personnel and operational expenditures. There is no engineer presently under contract while cooperative formation is behind schedule. This reflects a policy change as well as the difficulties inherent in cooperative formation among Haitian peasants. In general, it is evident that the program shifted rather suddenly in 1982 towards an accelerated pace of expenditure.

Community Organization

The program devoted to community organization may be subdivided into two primary facets: 1) formation of groupman and inter-group organizations; and 2) administration of credit.

The basic feature of the Rural Development Project is the formation of groupman - all facets of the project depend on this basic organizational unit. Small groups constitute the building blocks of inter-group activities leading to cooperative formation. The groupman was first introduced into the area by the Grepin center and it remains the oldest continuously functioning group, dating back to 1977. New groups continue to be organized each week while others disband. The project may be assessed in terms of the evolution of the groupman movement and the effective use of credit as a developmental tool. Credit is disbursed through the groupman movement and addresses the primary function of groups: to undertake income-producing activities as a group through an uninterrupted chain of investment, savings and reinvestment.

The Groupman Movement

(See Tables 2 and 3.) The Phase II plan projected the formation of 400 groups by June 1983. This goal had already been surpassed by June of 1982. In April of 1983 the number of groups was estimated at 459, nearly three times the number in 1979, and assets have increased by four and

one-half times that of 1979. In contrast, the actual membership of groups merely doubled during that time-period; the average group size dropped from eleven to just under eight people. In general, the groupman movement has continued to grow in line with targeted goals; however, the pattern of growth has not been a steady one.

In terms of growth patterns, it is interesting to note that groups increased by only fifteen percent (15%) in 1981 but jumped by fifty percent (50 %) in the past year.

Table 2. Characteristics of the Gros-Morne Groupman Movement, 1979 and 1983.

	1979	1983
Number of groups (estimate)	160	459
Number of group members (estimate)	1,760	3,488
Average assets per group (gourdes)	74	336
Groups receiving credit (%)	3	10
Average size of groups	11	7.6
Range of age of groups (months)	3-21	3-64
Average age of groups over 3 months (in months)	11	20
Average age of groups over 12 months (in months)	--	30
Groups 3 to 12 months in age (%)	--	44
All male groups (%)	30	5
All female groups (%)	--	3
Average number of females per group	2	3
Female membership (%)	19	37
Number of associations of groups	--	11
Groups participating in associations (%)	--	10
Average no. of individuals per association	--	35
Number of groups designated as local animators (AL)	--	17
AL groups plus their group affiliates (%)	--	36

SOURCE: 1979 figures from Lowenthal & Attfield (1979).

Table 3. Group Assets by Category of Investment in Gourdes, Based on Reports from 67 percent of Gros-Morne Groups (N = 306).

	Gourdes	Percent
Commerce	14,000	14
Storage	33,000	32
Agriculture	6,800	7
Livestock	25,000	24
Treasury (cash)	19,000	18
Other (e.g., crafts)	5,000	5
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	102,800	100

What seems to account for this sudden growth? The answer seems to lie in policy changes responding to several conditions. First, up to the middle of 1981, the groups were widely dispersed and relatively isolated from each other. Second, the ratio of staff members to groups had greatly diminished as the groups attained greater numbers. Another limiting factor was the politicization of community councils by the central government after 1980. For a time this put a damper on the organization of groups. Finally, the failure of the mango crop in 1981 exerted economic pressures against group activities.

In response to these conditions, the staff began to focus their efforts on specified zones of concentration. They sought to saturate areas rather than organizing dispersed groups in all eight rural sections. This made better use of staff time. It fostered more intensive contact among neighboring groups in informal ways while enhancing the use of regional group meetings. Another key issue was the introduction of local animator groups trained to take on animator functions. Finally, the growth spurt correlates directly with growing use of credit (see Tables 4 and 5). Between 1981 and 1982, credit increased by more than 1,250 percent. This included credit campaigns initiated by the Grepin center as well as individual forms of credit previously unavailable. In this light, the sudden growth of new groups in the past year or so is readily appreciated.

Another issue in growth patterns is the question of group stability. Groups presently range in age from less than a month to over five years. Among groups over three months, the average age is twenty months. This is clearly an improvement over 1979, with an average age of eleven months although the movement was also much younger then. Groups over a year in existence average two and a half years in age. This suggests that new groups are highly vulnerable to disbanding as there appears to be a high rate of turnover in group existence. Without including groups organized in the past three months, there is still a large proportion of groups (forty-four percent <44 %>) under one year old while seventy-nine percent (79 %) of all groups are less than two years old. Only eleven percent (11 %) are over three years old.

Table 4. Amounts of Gros-Morne Credit by Category of Recipient, Sept. 1980 through April 1983.

<u>Recipient</u>	<u>Amount (\$)</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Group Projects	15,916	61
Individual Credit	6,824	26
Association Projects	3,194	12
Total	25,934	99

Table 5. Use and Volume of Credit by Year, Gros-Morne Groups, 1978 - 1983.

	----Phase I-----			----Phase II-----			<u>Total</u>
	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	
Storage	190	200	100	960	1,980	--	3,430
Storage Campaigns	--	--	--	--	3,360	6,680	10,040
Commerce	--	--	--	--	750	--	750
Agriculture	40	--	--	--	416	110	566
Land	--	--	--	--	490	320	810
Animals	--	--	--	--	350	500	850
Individuals	--	--	--	--	2,419	4,405	6,824
Associations	--	--	--	--	1,834	1,360	3,194
Totals	230	200	100	960	11,599	13,375	26,464

Source: The information in Tables 4 and 5 above is based on a complete list of entries showing disbursement of credit (Gros-Morne project office).

In short, the number of groups has grown remarkably but there has not been a steady pattern of growth. Secondly, there is a high rate of dissolution. The staff estimate that 300 groups may have formed and subsequently dissolved between 1977 and 1979. Overall, as many as 800 groups may have been organized in the course of the project. By this measure, the 459 groups existing at present constitute about fifty-seven percent (57 %) of all groups organized over the years. The project has clearly been successful in meeting its goals for an expanding group movement with growing assets. How does this dramatic growth fit with the significant rate of group dissolution?

Part of the explanation seems to lie in the deferred character of benefits accruing, at least in the short-term, to group members. A key principle of group investments is their indivisibility (see Annex III, point 3, in the text of group contracts). Each group member holds an individual share of all assets held by the group; however, no group member can gain access to these assets for personal use except by leaving the group. Furthermore, membership in the group cannot be used as leverage for outside sources of credit (other than Grepin). Given the periodic crises in peasant households, the existence of private but unattainable assets threatens the very existence of groups. This conflict is built into the very structure of groups in order to safeguard savings. The contingent nature of agriculture constantly threatens peasant savings of any kind. Those more well-to-do are thus better protected, but

these wealthier peasants fall outside of the target population for the project.

In reality, for the groupman movement to be effective, it must be able to assure capital accumulation through profitable ventures and the capacity for savings. In order to maintain continuity, groups must also be able to cushion vulnerable members from the threat posed by scarce cash needs in the normal agricultural cycle. At Grepin, it became evident that many groups disbanded or lost members during crucial periods such as spring planting and fall schooling. In 1982, the staff reponded to this problem by instituting the option of personal drawing rights on credit resources. This has been a successful program and has tended to protect groups from dissolution during high risk seasons.

There are other reasons why groups disband. One key issue is the organizational strategy. The Grepin staff do not automatically interpret the failure of groups as a program failure. Rather, it is assumed that many groups will form only to disappear shortly thereafter if they cannot sustain the discipline of group life. Hence, the loss of an inherently unviable group may well be deemed a success. This is in good part the consequence of a strategy in which many groups are formed outside of direct contact with staff members or staff training. Staff stress the idea that the Grepin center is only a temporary presence in the area, and the group movement must be able to reproduce itself

independently.

If the groups that form are not of equal potential, then how do they compare with each other overall? What percentage may be judged as having the maturity to survive in the absence of Grepin? The staff indicates that the groups most likely to survive would be the local animator groups, the few town groups, and perhaps forty percent (40 %) of the groups in zones of concentration with special ties to animator groups. This amounts to about twenty percent (20 %) of existing groups. Some groups would likely come under the domination of key members or other rural authorities. Most would disappear while the greatest continuity would be maintained in the areas of more intensive inter-group ties.

The staff has developed an index to classify groups according to relative maturity. The index takes into account a group's participation in animation, inter-group associations, various forms of credit, health clubs and income-producing projects, and greater age of the group. Given these points of reference, the staff classifies a twenty-five percent (25 %) sample as follows: ten percent (10 %) excellent, sixteen percent (16 %) good, twenty-seven (27 %) satisfactory, and forty-seven percent (47%) weak. This conforms roughly to the assessments by AL Group members. The AL groups assess the groups they work with as fifty-six percent (56 %) "good" and forty-four (44 %) "weak".

Another measure of group evolution is the emergence of new organizational forms built upon the group model. Phase II projected the development of cooperatives and reformed community councils. In the wake of politicized councils, project efforts to work with councils have been dropped completely. Cooperatives have not been formed; however, new pre-cooperative forms have emerged at a sophisticated level. Grepin goals have shifted away from officially-recognized cooperatives to "associations" which exercise cooperative functions (see Annex IV for the terms of an association contract). Phase II also projected the development of local service councils to carry out their own group projects. Other local service councils are present in the education committees organized around pre-school centers.

Mid-course evaluations projected the development of five stable associations by January 1983. There are now eleven associations incorporating about ten percent (10 %) of groups and averaging thirty-five people per association. Most of the associations are organized around the mango trade. The Mango Francisque is very prolific in the region, and a significant percentage of the crop goes to waste due to marketing difficulties. In addition to the development of an internal marketing (Artibonite) strategy, the associations have banded together to negotiate with an export group. This constitutes an important step toward cooperative formation.

There are three types of associations. Those organized solely for the mango trade are considered "temporary" associations by the staff. There are four "permanent" associations engaged in other ventures such as the development of a rural store (tools, tin roofing, cement), purchase of land, gardening, grain storage and plans to purchase a corn grinder. In a third category lies an association of two groups which have purchased land, tools and storage facilities in common.

There are now seventeen local animator groups with special ties to 150 groups. These relationships touch thirty-six percent (36 %) of all groups and reflect a strategy of more intensive organization in three geographic zones. Their task is to help consolidate existing groups and to reach out and form new groups.

Credit and Investments

The drive to increase revenues is one of the fundamental objectives of the project. Given the economic basis of groupman perhaps the most tangible measure of effectiveness is the increase in group assets. With the spurt of growth, group assets increased by forty percent (40 %) in 1981 and then by seventy percent (70 %) in 1982. Average assets per groups were seventy-four gourdes in 1979, rising to 336 gourdes in 1983. The amount of assets invested in money-bearing projects increased from sixty-one percent (61 %) in June 1982 to eight-two percent (82 %) in the first

quarter of 1983. In a 1983 sample of group assets (Table 3), it was found that about forty-six percent (46 %) of assets is invested in commerce or grain storage, and thirty-six (36 %) is invested in productive endeavors (agriculture, livestock, crafts). Total assets of all 459 groups are estimated to be 137,000 gourdes. Assets combined with credit amount to approximately 230,000 gourdes, with credit making up forty percent (40 %) of the total. This brings the average per group up to 553 gourdes or seventy-three gourdes per individual member. The growth in assets reflects the sudden increase in groups during 1982. However, the rate of economic growth is significantly higher than growth in groups. This reflects the growing use of credit. Investments are focused more strongly on commerce (forty-six percent <46 %>) than on production (thirty-six percent <36 %>). Investment in livestock (twenty-four percent <24 %>) is far more significant than garden projects (seven percent <7 %>). The credit program has tended to orient the flow of investment funds in the direction of commerce and storage as sixty-nine percent (69 %) of funds were devoted to these projects in 1982.

Credit is highly selective. It is based on a careful review of the group, its level of functioning, current assets and the nature of the proposed project. The rate of reimbursement is close to 100 percent (100 %). The entire group serves to guarantee credit, even in the case of individual debt. Where credit is desired on short notice, four other groups must be willing to vouch for the group

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making a request. This type of multi-group guarantee forces groups to manage their affairs in new ways. Credit is available to group projects, individuals (group guarantee) and associations (see Tables 4 and 5). Most of the credit is extended to groups (sixty-one percent <61 %>), although a growing percentage has been allocated to individuals (twenty-six percent <26 %>) and associations (twelve percent <12 %>). Individual credit accounts for thirty-three percent (33 %) of the total during the first four months of 1983.

In sum, the volume of credit has increased greatly since 1982. The chief focus of credit has been storage campaigns undertaken at the initiative of Grepin following consultation-training sessions with groups. In 1982, about twenty-nine percent (29 %) of the credit was channelled through storage campaigns, while the first four months of 1983 saw campaign credit jump to fifty percent. Supervised credit is presently the key factor in the introduction of new technology (storage) and the significant growth in assets. Rapid growth in credit during the past fifteen months reflects the late implementation of the credit program. It also reflects the development within the past year of associations operating along cooperative lines. The primary focus of credit thus far has been on storage and commerce rather than production; however, the figures for production may be somewhat underestimated due to lack of detailed information on individual credit. In 1983, the staff are attempting to employ credit as a form of incentive

in a campaign devoted to reforestation for future charcoal production.

Education

Phase II goals include a school service for children and a literacy program for adults. There is presently no formal literacy program although group members are encouraged to learn Creole literacy in order to maximize their participation in group matters. School services targeted for children include pre-school centers, primary schools and martial arts training. At the present time, the only established program along these lines is a system of nine pre-school centers which opened between December 1982 and February 1983. Both primary education and manual arts training are viewed as further developments of a successful pre-school program. All educational services are collaborative ventures between Grepin and local groups. It is the intent of the program that education eventually be turned over directly to inter-group organizations. In effect, the future of the educational program is linked directly to the evolving capacities of the groupman movement.

The pre-school centers are a program in non-formal education. The program focuses on education of parents and children in the domains of health, hygiene, parenting and socialization, development of psychomotor and verbal skills. Enrolment varies from twenty-seven to forty children per

center. About half of the children enrolled are from non-groupman families. In a given center as many as two-thirds of the children may come from families that are not groupman members. In the short time since the centers opened, problems confronted at the local level include the management of funds, domination by strong individuals, a lack of clear understanding of committee work, and a lack of parental participation in pre-school sessions. The longer range problem is the feasibility of transferring financial and management responsibility over to local groups and education committees.

Technology Section

The overall objective of this section is to introduce improved technology into group projects and local farm practice. This objective is met by staff activities in research, popularization of new cultural practices and agricultural extension. The most active projects have been undertaken in storage, animal husbandry and vegetable farming. New campaigns are launched and coordinated through inter-group meetings called congresses.

Technical congresses have been convened to discuss credit storage, corn, livestock and compost issues. The most successful congress has been that devoted to storage. Its success may be attributed to a multi-pronged approach combining investment credits with technical innovation. Storage has been emphasized due to the problem of heavy

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losses to predators and the market. Since August of 1982, eighteen groups and one association have rented or purchased tin silos. There have been other storage campaigns for millet and congo peas: twenty-three groups borrowed money, and ten groups and two associations rented or purchased silos.

The major production area is animal husbandry. There have been three major distributions of breeding cocks. There is a longstanding vaccination campaign against New Castle's disease, and two major vaccination campaigns for livestock. In April 1983, the staff vaccinated 2,040 animals against anthrax. The staff has also introduced fish farming (two ponds), a beekeeping project (fourteen hives) and rabbit raising.

The technical staff has experimented with methane gas as an energy source, a small incubator for poultry production, fruit conservation and the use of fibro-cement for rabbit pens. Silos and spray pumps are available for rental or purchase.

Health

(See Koppenleitner (1982) for a recent evaluation of the health program at Grepin.) The basic objective of this section is to improve the health of the rural population, propagate information on preventive health and encourage people to use the facilities of the hospital. Grepin health

agents give seminars on health topics, organize health clubs, provide technical and material aid for capping springs, encourage the construction of latrines and discuss home treatment measures including traditional remedies as well as modern first aid. Current policy toward health clubs is to organize in the context of mature groupman. The clubs maintain their own funds as a form of medical insurance. There are presently seventeen health clubs with assets of 1,000 gourdes invested primarily in commerce or storage. The health clubs have built fifty-two latrines since 1981 while Grepin has capped thirty-four springs in order to assure pure water supplies.

The Koppenleitner report recommends that broader-based funding be established to make the health insurance plan more effective. Health posts built in Phase I have been closed while there has been little demand to open five new health posts budgeted in Phase II.

IV. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

The Gros-Morne project is of special interest due to its focus on economic investment among small peasant farmers whose level of income puts them within the poor majority. Over the years the project has maintained a continuity of objectives: organizing in local communities, increasing local revenues and agricultural production, improving the health situation. However, the strategic emphasis of the program has tended to change. The initial concerns were oriented to community councils, food for work, medical problems, leadership training, and the facility at Grepin. In the course of time, staff have re-oriented the project from a rather conventional development effort to an experimental program in peasant organization focused on savings mobilization. The emphasis shifted away from leadership training to direct ties with groups of community council members, and then away from the council structure entirely and instead towards a dispersed group movement. The project shifted its locus of activity from the facility at Grepin to a broad range of rural communities. The interest in medical services has largely been supplanted by a growing interest in various types of non-formal education. The strategy of extension through widely dispersed groups has shifted toward a policy of more intensive organization in zones of concentration. Local animation is presently undertaken by groups rather than by individuals singled out for training. Staff services are channelled primarily through the groupman movement rather than through the

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community at large.

Analysis and Documentation

The Gros-Morne staff has good skills in writing project plans and reports. The management personnel are adept at articulating the philosophy and broad range goals of the program. An unusual strength of the program is the willingness of staff members to engage in self-evaluation and reflection as a group in the assessment of the state of the project.

One of the drawbacks of the project is the reporting system. Maximum use of the analytic skills of the staff is limited by a lack of solid information on key features of the project. Some of this information would be readily available through the regular reporting system. Other types of information would require special studies.

Reports and Verification

In terms of regular reports on group activities, the key problem is one of incomplete reporting. For example, reports received from 306 groups prior to the evaluation accounted for only sixty-seven percent (67 %) of the groups known to the staff. This is a large sample of groups; however, it is not a random sample, and it does not serve as an adequate monitor of group activities and investments. It is not clear exactly how many groups presently exist nor

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their level of dispersion, rate of dissolution and longevity. The system of naming groups by number and locality does not clearly distinguish between new groups and extinct groups. The name of a prior group may simply be transferred to a new one without distinction. In short, if the reporting system cannot account for all groups, then it is difficult to respond appropriately to the needs of the groupman movement as a whole. More complete reporting need not raise questions of confidentiality or the voluntary nature of reports. It is more a question of putting into place a reasonable reporting procedure and then administering it. The network of AL Groups makes it possible to gather information quite readily. Failure to receive reports from one-third of the groups suggests less an unwillingness to report than a lack of personnel time devoted to eliciting the information.

The reporting procedure is an occasion to foster contact between groups. It serves to encourage better management skills at the level of groups as they keep their own records up to date in terms of membership, investment and planning. It may also be used to increase the skills of AL Groups and structure their roles in animation. This type of information benefits staff in planning and justifying their program, but it is also useful information for the groupman movement itself. As an independent group movement becomes less an agglomeration of dispersed groups and more of a united group, it will need community-wide communication networks as a source of clout. The reporting procedure

could also be incorporated into the verification process. There should be a clear sense of the rate of dissolution of groups and the specific reasons for disbanding. These issues are crucial for appropriate planning in the final phase of the project in looking to the future.

Social Character of Groups

The second category of data useful for program planning would be based on special studies rather than a regular reporting system. This would delve into the social composition of groups, relative wealth between groups, internal diversity within groups (sex, wealth, age), special group ties (kinship, labor sharing), ties to other institutions (religion, community council members). This type of information would have a bearing on the determination of the prospects for individual groups. Group functioning could be monitored through better information on rotation of responsibilities, efforts to broaden literary skills, distribution of benefits, economic pay-off to individuals, varied commercial strategies and project management (sales, profits margins, tactics, etc.). How do re-sale prices and strategies compare with conventional market networks in the area?

The credit program offers special opportunities for gathering useful information while maintaining a dialogue over the management of investments. At present, there is no clear information on use or distribution of individual

credit. It is quite likely that credit devoted to productive activities is conspicuously underestimated due to a lack of information on individual credit. Individual decision-making on investments is a vital piece of information for further agricultural extension. It is a clue to credit shortages, production requirements and the vested interests of peasant farmers. As a developmental tool, credit constitutes an opportunity for education and dialogue.

Productive and Commercial Characteristics

More effort should be made to gain a better knowledge of the local area in terms of agricultural and commercial strategies. This would include the range and variation in micro-climates, an inventory of crafts skills and other special features of the division of labor. A better understanding of the natural and human endowments of the area can only be beneficial to project planning. It would be useful to have better census data and land tenure information on the zones of group concentration. This data would be useful in determining the level of program saturation. It would help in orienting the program to its target population, the poor majority of rural inhabitants. This type of data points up the structures of domination and allows groups to intervene appropriately in the existing social and economic order.

Agricultural Extension

The technical section is in a unique position to contribute to maximizing group investments. It has shown itself to be flexible in experimentation at Grepin and in local group projects. The current strength of the program lies in effective diffusion of storage technology. This has had the effect of increasing production by reducing losses to pests (rats, insects, molds). Even more important, effective storage reduces loss to the market, permitting delayed sales to take advantage of favorable prices. Perhaps most important, storage protects local food and seed supplies and thus retains them for use within the community.

Given the specialized training of the agronomist, livestock production is a strong domain for extension. The work in animal and poultry breeding, vaccination, upgrading local stock by interbreeding, and introducing new forms of production (fish, rabbits) has the potential to help fill in the gap left by the disappearance of the Haitian pig.

In general, the focus of agricultural extension has been on protection against losses (grain storage, vaccination) rather than increased production per se. The most successful projects have built on existing forms of production. The education based on the congress and seminar projects is a strong feature of the program. Maximum benefits from this non-formal education have been obtained through a multi-pronged approach to specific issues. The projects are most effective where non-formal education is

combined with technical innovation, credit and existing forms of production. The educational effort has been robbed of maximum benefit where there is no direct follow-up on meetings and discussion. The credit component offers the opportunity to underwrite investment costs and defray risk. The best projects build on the existing expertise of peasant farmers. This suggests an area in need of strengthening - a more detailed knowledge of local agricultural strategies. This would point up problem areas and key pressure points in the local economy.

Finally, the agricultural extension program should be more closely integrated into group projects. Peasant farmers have only rarely had access to extension services. The Grepin project is a special opportunity for field visits and discussions of land use. A heightened focus on production would be advisable in light of the long term goals for group investments and economic development.

Administration

Project administration has been strong in the areas of funding, program flexibility and in philosophy of rural development. The administration has been honest and productive. The project has recruited and trained a competent all-Haitian staff that is committed strongly to project goals. The staff members take a personal interest in the project and local client population. There are staff members present on site at all times including weekends.

Staff are careful to limit periods of time spent away from the project in order to safeguard continuity of relationships. The staff has learned to work cooperatively using peer supervision and self-evaluation as a team. Relations with the client population are outwardly free of the authoritarian markers which so commonly characterize relations between professionals and peasant clients.

The continuity of objectives has been complicated by a pattern of setting unrealistic goals. Specific goals have often been overly ambitious in scope. As a result, the project has had a tendency toward under-expenditure of program funds. It has often been necessary to revise goals to be more in keeping with staff resources and client response to the program. This has been further complicated by a problem of focus affecting community organization (dispersion, lack of inter-group contact) as well as domains of programming, e.g. medical versus agricultural strategies, production versus commerce, education versus organization, provision of services versus protection of group autonomy, groups as locus of economic investments versus groups as managers of community services. The staff has taken various positions on the issue of how much initiative to take in a program destined to be self-sustaining and independent of outsiders. The problem of focus has sometimes prevented a satisfactory integration of different domains such as education plus credit and technical services.

In the interest of flexibility and collegial relations, the

project has tended to have rather loose administrative ties among staff, and between staff and client groups. In the interest of limiting outside intervention, the staff has adopted a policy against the thorough documentation of its client groups. The lack of close supervision has contributed to underexpenditure of funds and delayed the achievement of goals while contributing to the high rate of group dissolution.

A problem confronting the project is the future role of intermediary groupman such as the local animator groups. How do AL Groups fit into the current program? Are they agents of the Grepin staff or do they act as local service councils responsible to the movement? In practice, the AL groups fulfill both functions; but there is a possible confusion of roles, especially in relation to the future of the group movement. A related issue is the distinction between the provision of community services versus fostering self-generating economic ventures. Are groups potentially able to manage such self-sustaining ventures in addition to the task of generating sufficient funds for the management of expensive public services such as education or health? At least, in the short- and medium-term, this may be an unrealistic expectation.

In terms of future relations with outside institutions, ties to Caritas and the Diocesan offices are worthy of further examination. Grepin is presently grappling with the orchestration of its final project theme with a view towards

developing mature local peasant organizations capable of acting in the absence of the Grepin center. In this eventuality, what is the future of the relationship with the Catholic bishop? In the absence of "official" status (a clear advantage for groupman autonomy), the group movement stands to gain from special relationships for its own protection. However, not all group members are Catholic, and the movement does not have a religious character. Nevertheless, the offices of the clergy provide legitimacy to a grass-roots movement which has sought deliberately to avoid the encumbrances and political intervention of state organs. This poses a problem which is heretofore unresolved.

Non-Formal Education

Non-formal education is built into all aspects of the Gros-Morne project. It is implicit in the strategy of group organization, and it is incorporated in service domains such as technology transfer, education and health. To a certain extent, it offers an alternative to existing formal institutions (agriculture, education and public health ministries). In most localities touched by Grepin it is the sole source of education of any kind, and it reaches both adults and children.

Key points of contact include meetings held primarily at the initiative of Grepin staff, e.g. the congress - a large inter-group meeting on a particular topic such as credit or

storage, and the seminar - a meeting in which the principles of groupman theory and practice are discussed. Meetings also include inter-group sessions held at the initiative of groups, e.g. the regional and association meetings. These various points of contact foster collective action and new disciplines. They build on the vested interests of groups while eliciting an orientation towards the community in various zones of concentration. In short, education is combined with new organizational forms, concrete projects and personal benefits. This approach has proven to be an effective learning strategy. It is based on the unity of theory and practice in a context where the vested interests of group members (time, money) are secured in pragmatic ways.

Not all domains of non-formal education have proven to be equally effective. The new pre-school program is still in its early stages. It enjoys excellent staff support, but there remains the possibility that the pre-school centers could well go the way of the health program. The health clubs have not expanded rapidly while the former health posts were closed for lack of adequate local management. It may be that the emergence of local service councils for health and educational services is somewhat premature given the current level of collective management experience. The most promising of Grepin ventures in non-formal education is the groupman model.

Peasant OrganizationPhilosophy of Groupman

The strength of this program is the groupman philosophy. It should be of interest to any program desiring to organize in rural Haiti. Underlying principles of groupman stress its independence as a social unit, its basis in pre-existing ties, i.e. affective ties based on friendship, neighborhood, labor exchange or kin ties, and its focus on investment in revenue-generating projects. It is intended to be undifferentiated and non-hierarchical in its internal organization. It works best among income peers. At the same time, it is flexible enough to allow participation of both men and women, old and young, within a single group. Its growth is potentially independent of outside organizers once groups are already introduced into a locality. The ideology of groupman stresses an expanded vision of community extending beyond the bounds of a particular group. Where several groups exist in close proximity, there is the possibility of creating a network of relationships bringing large numbers of people together and opening up the possibility for collective action on a significant scale. Small numbers allow maximum participation of all members in both labor and decision-making aspects of group life. The use of written contracts incorporates existing peasant practices in matters of importance (see Annexes III and IV).

The basic goals of groupman relate to capital accumulation through production, storage, and marketing - familiar modes

of action in peasant economy. Long range goals foresee wholesale purchase of manufactured goods, local distribution networks and the establishment of rural transformation industries. In short, the groupman is intended as the first step in cooperative formation, with the ultimate goal being to enable peasant farmers to assume a new degree of control over systems of production and exchange. In the groupman process, farmers create a context for acquiring competence in literacy, bookkeeping, management and decision-making.

Strategy

The strategy of the Grepin project has been to engage simultaneously in organization and education. Training does not precede the formation of groups. Groups may form outside the knowledge of the Grepin staff. Once they come to the attention of the program, their existence is verified and they are available for ongoing training within the group context. The policy of unmonitored group formation is linked clearly to a high rate of group dissolution. It has also tended to create large numbers of groups. The rationale for this approach is that the groupman movement sells itself. Groups which dissolve are clearly not working properly and should dissolve of their own inertia. The best groups tend to survive and mature with time. Groups must view themselves as autonomous and self-sustaining, united only to other groups like themselves.

The problem with this approach is the lack of consistency in

group training. It may be that the notion of spontaneous group formation is reasonable in the long-term; but it is unduly ambitious in the short-term. For authentic groups to emerge, the groupman philosophy is not simply caught - it must also be taught. Ideally, the full cycle of group development should be monitored by staff in order to make maximum use of its time in the community as well as to leave a solid structure behind once the program is finished.

With the expansion of groups in the area, it appears that the rate of group dissolution is actually increasing. The movement has had good success in mobilizing savings and growing levels of investment. Even if the dissolution of groups is perceived as a sign of success, the high rate of dissolution still raises a number of questions. What are some of the issues in group dissolution? The problem of personal cash needs has already been discussed as a key factor in causing groups to disband. This issue has been addressed by the credit program. It is an extension of the problem of deferred benefits in group projects. Groups also address this issue in the way they organize projects. Creating a project also tends to create work of immediate personal benefit to groups members.

Group members cite certain indications of poor functioning which lead to group dissolution, e.g. irregular meetings, lack of discipline, absenteeism, unequal rotation of work, unequal sharing of work, irregular procedures, borrowing from group funds. These may be the outward symptoms of

other group problems. There is a "normal" tendency toward domination or factionalism - normal, that is, in the absence of supervision/education or where there is a failure to acquire competence. This may result in the deliberate exclusion of an unwanted group member by dissolving the group and then re-forming it. Where there is a lack of peer relationships (income, social ties), there is a tendency for domination by one or two individuals. In general, peasant communities are composed of diverse classes of people with varied incomes and sources of livelihood. Problems of absenteeism and inequality may reflect the conditions of particular livelihoods such as daily wage labor or travelling market intermediaries. The investment of time may well be more of an issue than money. Personal economic crisis may serve to exclude current or potential group members.

Dissolution could be addressed more strongly by closer monitoring of groups. There are severe limitations on this procedure, however, in light of the low ratio of staff to groups. This is only partially resolved by the efforts of local animator groups. The presence of intermediary groups has its own pitfalls. The primary danger is the development of unequal power relations and domination. This issue is best addressed by close monitoring on the part of Grepin staff. It may be that staff size should be increased, or that staff members should reside in closer proximity to the zones of concentration, or that they focus their time in more circumscribed areas.

Groupman and Community Councils

An issue of special interest is the relation between groupman and community councils. Councils are the officially designated organs of rural development. They are under the direct supervision of ONAAC. Prior to the 1980's there was little central control for the councils. Most were active to the degree they received material aid or services from outside agencies - primarily private and foreign in origin (see Smucker 1980). Between 1980 and 1982, the structure of rural councils came under an unprecedented degree of politicization from the government. Councils are now subject to supervision by COLAAC, composed of civilian and military authorities of the town, and CONAJEC, an agency charged with political surveillance.

In the eight rural councils of Gros-Morne, there are eight community councils and eighty-two related "groupements" serving as local sub-councils within the section-wide council structure. These council groupements are not to be confused with the groupman of Grepin. Grepin does not take a public stance against councils; however, the groupman movement has distanced itself from council activities and politics. Councils are official organizations with an impersonal membership including, de facto, all rural residents over the age of eighteen. In contrast, groupman are small, autonomous groups with a highly personal character. Councils work on roads, water supplies, social centers and other public works projects, whereas groupman serve as channels for personal investments oriented toward

cooperative formation. Grepin is careful to make the distinction that councils are public and groupman are private. Given the bureaucratic tendencies of the community council structure, relationships between the two movements are politically sensitive and require utmost discretion on the part of Grepin staff and funding sources.

Staff Training

The training and levels of education represented by the staff are quite varied. The staff in general has considerable work experience. There is no regular pattern of in-service training outside of internal project supervision. The staff in general might benefit from a retreat oriented to matters other than internal evaluation of the program. There is an issue of training in relation to the next stage of the groupman movement focused on inter-group levels of cooperation. It might be useful for some staff members to be exposed to cooperative management principles as well as to principles of the organization and funding of health insurance.

Periodic visits by staff and group members to other projects is a very useful practice, especially in technical matters such as animal care, fish farming, or vegetable gardening. In the past, there has been staff contact with collegial groupman movements. These contacts should be continued in order to foster a sense of unity among various local movements even though they may vary in terms of

organizational strategy or local conditions. In the long run such contacts can only be helpful to the basic interests of the groupman movement. Informal ties can be maintained with other collegial movements while protecting the decentralized grassroots character of the movement.

Costs and Benefits

Key information is summarized in Table 2 on group characteristics, Table 3 on categories of investment, and Tables 4 and 5 on credit. A pattern of conspicuous growth in groups, assets and credit is documented clearly. Group impact in zones of concentration is estimated at forty percent of the population touching over half of the families. In one locality, eighty percent (80 %) of the people eligible for membership are active group members. Total investment and cash reserves amount to 230,000 goudes. This represents a significant level of savings, especially in rural Haiti. With several family members in many of the groups, the level of savings per family is much higher than the seventy-three goudes per capita for nearly 3500 members. About eighty-two percent (82 %) of groups assets are invested in revenue-generating projects.

Costs

Program costs for the Gros-Morne project are indicated in the annexes showing budget formation. In addition, group members make a significant investment of time and money.

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The direct costs to peasant farmers include an estimated 137,000 gourdes raised by group members through their own resources (not including the credit input). Initial capital is raised by dues payments usually amounting to less than five gourdes per person each month. This is often supplemented by selling wage labor to outsiders and more commonly to members of the group.

This investment of scarce cash resources is not inconsiderable given the feeble income levels of most peasant farmers. The World Bank (1978) estimates average per capita income in rural areas at 116 dollars per annum. Perhaps the most significant investment on the part of groups members is the tremendous investment in time. This includes labor time for group projects plus considerable meeting time in regular group meetings, regional meetings, and training sessions with Grepin staff. In the case of AL groups and education committees, the time requirement is greatly increased. Interviews with community people suggest that the time factor is more important than lack of funds in discouraging people from joining groups.

Other costs to groups members include factors of stress and risk. Stress to group members is a function of management requirements and the intensity of rural social relations, especially in groups. Closely related is the element of risk. In peasant Haiti, collective transactions with scarce cash resources are subject to considerable risk. Some of this is the normal calculated risk in any investment, but

there is also a special risk linked to the crisis in trust which tends to accompany collective management of financial resources.

Benefits

The benefits of the program may be divided into the obvious benefits of services offered by Grepin, the intrinsic benefits of group investments, and other more hidden benefits of group projects. Closely related is the distinction between long- and short-term benefits.

Program benefits are hard to measure in terms of dollar value. Much of the program is devoted to non-formal education and community organization. In the long run, this represents a large front end investment with a deferred payoff in terms of a successful groupman movement. Other program benefits include tangible savings through the vaccination programs and the curtailment of crop loss through secure storage. The credit program is also a highly valued benefit. Group assets serve as a source of leverage for credit amounting to forty percent (40 %) of all investments and cash reserves. Public health efforts also have a bearing on production by safeguarding the domestic labor pool. Potable water and control of human waste are important contributions to the health of group members.

The question of motivation intrudes on the issue of group membership. What is the motivation for people to join in

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view of the long-term deferment of personal income from group investments? The idea of groupman is sold on the promise of material improvement in the standard of living. Yet, group savings stem from an uninterrupted chain of reinvestments without short-term dividends. Group members note ideological factors such as working for development, fighting against misery and protection from abuse. Further discussion evokes other more concrete reasons. The idea of secure savings is tremendously attractive to peasant farmers. To a certain extent, the lack of immediate access is perceived as an advantage. The hard-won savings are thus protected. More than one respondent indicates that group membership provided the very first opportunity for savings. Members also take note of the future benefits from a long range "mother project" (large target project). Farmers are very interested in secure storage of grain and bean crops - key harvest in the region. The farmers are acutely aware of the benefits of avoiding the vicious cycle of buying and selling to disadvantage on the market. Recent changes in the credit program give farmers personal access to credit at reasonable rates of interest. This is no small advantage in a context where interest rates are commonly twenty percent or more per month (see Smucker 1983). Finally, people place great stock in special ties to outsiders such as the staff at Grepin. Special relationships are viewed as a kind of insurance.

Other more hidden advantages to group membership are implicit in the investment strategies of groups. In

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purchasing grain, group members essentially buy from themselves to assemble stocks for storage. The group thus provides a ready market for grain and saves costs of transportation. During periods of food shortages, these stocks are available to group members by purchase. The group projects also create work for members through investment in livestock. The cost of livestock care is paid in traditional fashion - a share in the offspring. Investment in animals thus gives individuals access to animals personally. Similar arrangements hold for specialized skills such as crafts or petty commerce. Group projects create work for members with special skills. Finally, groups often use collective labor arrangements. Some groups serve as mazinga (traditional rotating labor gangs), exchanging labor within the group and selling to outsiders. In these circumstances, not all activities of a group are groupman activities. A particular group of people will sometimes function as a mazinga and other times as a groupman alone. In other cases, the mazinga function is sold only within the group so as to raise money for the groupman cause. In this instance, the rate of pay is considerably lower than the going market rates for agricultural day labor. Group members thus benefit from a cheap and readily available labor supply for personal use. In sum, group membership entails a whole range of tangible advantages in both the short- and long-term.

Distribution of Benefits

Between 1979 and 1983, the number of all-male groups in the program dropped from thirty percent (30 %) to a mere five percent (5 %). Female membership rose from nineteen percent (19%) in 1979 to thirty-seven percent (37 %) in 1983. Interviews with group members indicate that women often take an active role in accounting for group funds. The groupman movement still tends to be dominated by men; but women play a growing role in group matters.

The Gros-Morne movement is primarily a rural phenomenon. However, there are also town groups, including peasant farmers, in existence. One such town group is composed primarily of school teachers and skilled craftsmen. In this case, members are drawn from an intermediary, well-educated class. As a means of gaining an impression of class status, land tenure information was gathered in several rural areas. Group members tended to vary in holdings from the land-poor to those with mid-range holdings. No members of the six groups studied had more than two carreaux of land available personally. This information and other data suggest that the groupman movement is composed primarily of members of the poor rural majority.

The ratio of assets devoted to storage versus production raises the question of speculation. At least one-third of all group assets, and half of the credit funds, are devoted to the storage projects. In view of the groupman ideologies of community and fairness in economic matters, it is

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important to monitor this issue. Grepin staff are careful to counsel groups against unfair practices such as moneylending and unbridled speculation. Many groups clearly benefit from seasonal price rises; however, in the cases observed, the sale of stocks has been restricted to local people, retailed in small quantities for food or seed, while being withheld from outsiders and travelling intermediaries desiring wholesale purchases. One group was observed discussing whether to sell corn at 4.0 or 4.5 gourdes when the market price was 6.0 gourdes per marmit at the time. In this case, the difference between purchase price in August and resale price in May appeared to be in keeping with overhead costs (purchase, storage, labor) plus a premium for risk. Nevertheless, the resale price was at least twenty-five percent (25 %) less than the market price.

Group investments in grain storage and the mango trade have been somewhat controversial in the region. The groups appear to be having a discernible impact on the market. Traditional speculators complain about a smaller profit margin and reduced supplies of grain. The complaints about grain and bean stocks have generally come from well-to-do intermediaries rather than the poor. This suggests that groupman storage policy has had the effect of cushioning both producers and consumers from the extreme fluctuations of the market. Complaints about the mango trade have come from both local and outside intermediaries. Small traders fear they will be unable to protect cheap access to mangos although this has not proved to be a problem thus far. The

largest mango buyers have generally been wealthy exporters from urban areas. The mango associations of groupman are now competing directly with the large exporters. The mango associations have renounced the use of traditional buying practices such as purchasing in advance at very low prices. In 1982, the associations distributed a ten percent (10 %) dividend to their suppliers when the mango season was finished. This had the effect of assuring mango supplies in the following year. Unlike grain and bean harvests, the mango crop is perceived as an export crop in that the primary market is outside the region, primarily in Artibonite, Port-au-Prince and abroad.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Organizational Strategy: The Gros-Morne project has created an innovative method of organizing peasant farmers. This groupman strategy evolved over a period of time as an experimental approach to peasant organization. The strength of this approach is its basis in pragmatic organization around savings and investment, with a long range focus on production.

2. Funding: Despite setbacks in certain areas, the success of the groupman strategy justifies a third and final phase of major funding. The groupman movement has now reached the stage where it has the potential to sustain more sophisticated levels of collective action and economic impact. The benefits of this program will be lost unless the project is able to follow through on the next logical steps in a cycle of organization and investment under the supervision of the Grepin staff. This would require renewed funding by the end of 1983.

3. Documentation: The program should strengthen its information function in order to maximize feedback and analysis. Better information control is needed in the following areas:

a. The existing report form for groupman activities is fine, but special efforts should be made to have reports from all active groups submitted on a quarterly or semi-annual basis. This procedure could be

incorporated into normal verification activities or AL Group networks. It should monitor group longevity and dissolution.

b. Special studies should be commissioned to gain better knowledge of the social composition of groups, the nature of investments, and the distribution of benefits.

c. The credit program should be studied for better information on the use and distribution of individual drawing rights and emergency credit.

d. Special studies should be undertaken on local agricultural strategies, the range of crafts skills and the range of micro-climates and soil types in the area. Such information can aid in planning and make better use of highly-trained technical personnel.

4. Administration:

a. Communications channels with CRS and Caritas should be reviewed and improved. This can help to safeguard the basic interests of the project and protect its funding. In the interest of fairness and efficiency, it would be appropriate for CRS to establish a policy of parity and salary and expense arrangements among its groupman projects.

b. There should be closer supervision of staff by project administrators. This would help ensure the advancement of the project in the pivotal final stages.

5. Focus: Maximum use should be made of the strengths of the project, i.e. a competent staff, integration of technology with credit and non-formal education, and the groupman model focused on savings and investments. This can be accomplished by maintaining a disciplined focus on realistic goals. There should be a greater focus on production in the next stages of the project.

6. Community Organization:

a. The current strengths of the project should not be sacrificed prematurely to the long range goal of local autonomy. As a time-limited program, the Grepin project should maintain close supervision of the groupman movement in order to have maximum impact. Groups should be monitored closely, especially new groups, with a view towards reducing the rate of dissolution. In the coming stages of the movement, there should be heightened focus on inter-group ties, local animation functions, associations, and regional meetings.

b. There should be careful review of the function of groups as economic units and as service units. Is the group movement fundamentally an economic unit with a

cooperative orientation toward the investment of labor and funds? Or, is it a public works agency for health and educational services? In the short run, it may be expecting too much for groups to generate funds for economic development as well as managing a network of schools. Above all, the groupman movement should protect its basic source of strength - a solid economic base.

c. The staff should closely monitor issues of fairness in the realm of group investments, especially commodity speculation. There is a strong consciousness of these issues in some groups. It may not be a general characteristic of all groups. This is just one aspect of the specter of domination which is present in Haitian social traditions.

d. The most effective approach to a strong groupman movement is the policy of saturation, or regional concentration of groups. This enhances the future possibilities of inter-group activity and fosters a stronger sense of community. The earlier re-orientation of the program in this direction should continue to have a high priority.

e. The groupman movement is now entering a stage of particular vulnerability. Group associations are voluntary and private in nature. With the development of highly visible ventures such as mango exports, they

become vulnerable to competitors and politicians. This problem should be monitored carefully with a view to the future when the Grepin center will no longer be present as a protective umbrella.

f. In general, the next stage of groupman development is crucial in light of long range goals for a self-sustaining community movement. The key consideration should be to assure a solid financial base as the only realistic basis for independent action.

7. Fraternal Movements: Staff should seek to maintain amical ties with other groupman movements such as Bayonnais, IDEA, Papaille, Verrette, etc. Ideally, informal ties and ongoing dialogue should take place among both staff and group members. There is no room for ideological disputes which amplify schismatic tendencies and increase the likelihood of outside intervention. The ties between other groupman movements can help assure the future continuity of the movement as a whole.

ANNEX I

BUDGET SUMMARY, GROS-MORNE RURAL
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, 1980 - 1983

	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Total
Personnel	\$ 46,580	53,305	60,835	160,720
Installations	3,200	3,900	2,200	9,300
Transportation	56,600	23,500	16,000	96,100
Program Funds	11,300	41,300	31,300	83,900
Supplies	12,250	8,870	14,390	35,510
Miscellaneous	19,300	15,300	19,300	53,900
Subtotal	149,230	146,175	144,025	439,430
Contingency	12,076	10,902	9,788	32,766
Total	\$ 161,306	157,077	153,813	472,196

FUNDING SOURCES

CRS	\$118,049	
USAID	\$354,147	
	25,853	(7.3% overhead)
Total	\$498,049	

CRS Share	25 %
USAID Share	75 %

Total funds allocated to Gros-Morne Project: \$498,049.
Disbursements to present, from September 1980 to April
1983: \$338,010.

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ANNEX II

GROS-MORNE CREDIT PROGRAM: BUDGET AND DISBURSEMENTS

	Budget	Disbursements 9/80 to 4/83
Groupman Project	\$ 9,800	\$ 13,166
Association Projects	7,000	2,560
Loans to Individuals	8,700	5,727
Charcoal Projects	1,000	--
Equipment Sale/Rental	15,000	3,547
Total	41,500	\$ 25,000

Source: Phase II Project Paper and Grepin Report
to CRS and AID, April 1983.

ANNEX III

TEXT OF GROUPMAN CONTRACTS (GROS-MORNE)

When a groupman forms, all members agree to the following points and sign a contract. The text which follows is translated from Creole:

With this contract each member is personally and lawfully responsible for what is written below:

1. As group members who have signed this contract, we agree to do projects for profit such as agriculture, animal husbandry, storage, commerce or other things.
2. We agree to keep records of each member's share, including group income, in order to report our activities to any collaborators we choose to have.
3. We agree that all profits are to be reinvested in the growth of current projects or the establishment of new ones. No member has a right to withdraw any portion of group funds even though each member owns an equal share of the group funds as personal property.
4. To determine the value of these shares, each year in the month of _____ the group will calculate its total assets in terms of monetary values and the amount of cash on hand. This will be noted as a written record.
5. We also agree to join together with other groups of our own choosing in order to do a project too large for a single group. The groups involved will write up a contract.
6. We agree that interest payments to group members will be made only after the group has achieved its long range target project ("mother project"). Therefore, member contributions to the group should not include funds needed for personal or household use.
7. If we accept a new member in the group, we will do so only after calculating each member's current share of assets.
8. A member may leave a group only after we calculate each member's current share of group assets. If the group has no debts, there may still be a delay in returning the departing member's share in order to permit funds tied up in projects to be liquidated when appropriate. However, if a new member joins the group at this time, we will give the departing member his full share at once. If the group owes money, a departing member will have to await payment until the group pays debts incurred while the one leaving was still a member.
9. If the group breaks up entirely, we will sell our

assets, pay any debts incurred, and divide what remains in equal portions.

10. If a member dies, the deceased one's heir should select another group member to receive his share. No outsider has any right to intervene in group matters. The member who handles affairs for the deceased may not claim payment for this service.

11. No group member can borrow against a personal share of group funds for personal use outside of the group.

12. We commit ourselves to studying literacy, either within the group or outside of it, so that at least three-quarters of the members can read within a year. This is done to assure that all members can participate in handling group matters.

This contract is made in several copies in the Commune of Gros-Morne. Date. Name and signature or thumbprint.

ANNEX IV

TEXT OF ASSOCIATION CONTRACTS (GROS-MORNE)

When the groupman principle of cooperation is extended to the level of several groupman working together, this is known as asosiasion unit. The asosiasion form for a limited time around a specific project. Others form as permanent ongoing associations parallel to groupman organizations. The following text (translated from Creole) is the contract used by permanent associations:

The primary goal of this association is to seek greater means in order to attract the broader community to join groups and climb together.

Article 1. All groups in this association have already signed group contracts.

Article 2. These groups have decided to do a project together. (Details of each project are written on a sheet in the association file.)

Article 3. Each group contributes the same amount of money, but a group may purchase several shares initially - on condition that these shares later be sold to other groups who join the association. In the end, each group is left with only one share each. The amount of each share is based on the amount of funds available to the member group with least funds.

Article 4. When the association settles its accounts after completion of a project, each member ends up with the same amount of money after expenses and repayment of debts.

Article 5. The present contract is valid from one year from _____ to _____. The contract may be renewed every year.

Article 6. If an association disbands, its assets should be sold to other associations or groups if at all possible.

Article 7. A committee is selected to run projects undertaken by the association. This committee is composed of one member from each group (if necessary, more than one member may be chosen from each constituent group). The association selects three members from this committee to represent it in any dealings with state functionaries.

Article 8. Each member of the committee is to be paid for work he or she furnishes to the project. The amount of payment should be discussed beforehand in the constituent groups and in association meetings. There should be general

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agreement on this point. All expenses incurred by committee members while working on association projects are the responsibility of the association.

Article 9. For a decision to be made by the committee to be valid,, it must be a unanimous decision. If one committee member is not in agreement, the matter should should be taken to the group to which the dissenting member belongs. The committee should wait for a response from the group before taking any action.

Article 10. If a group withdraws from the association, all of this group's members will sign a statement attesting that they have sold their share back to the association.

Article 11. One year after the present contract has been signed by this association, no more than one-third of the constituent groups may change the member who sits on the committee. This member may be changed every six months so long as this does not interfere with the operation of the association.

Article 12. As witness to this document, the association selects another organization or association with at least twelve months of existence.

Here are the groups which make up this association:

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PART THREE

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An Evaluation of the
Groupement Pilot Project
(Petite Riviere de Bayonnais)

by

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1. Introduction: Project Goals

The Groupement Pilot Project (GPP) is located in the upper Bayonnais watershed, some twenty-five kilometres northwest of Gonaives. The site was selected because of its all-weather accessibility and the fact that it had not yet been "inundated by the usual host of both foreign and Haitian development organizations" (Proposal, vii). The notion of development as an imported good or handout could thus be expected to be largely absent. Furthermore, emigration and an urban lifestyle did not appear to be the primary preoccupations of the peasant population. At the same time the area offered sufficient ecological, social, and technological variation so as to provide a ready laboratory for the testing of socially-appropriate development methodology.

The experimental mission of the project - appropriately labelled a "pilot project" - is its dominant characteristic. It has determined the selection of the staff and their activities, it has justified its apparently lopsided budget (allocating over seventy percent <70 %> of all funds to non-operational costs), and it will have to be the chief criterion for any evaluation. (For a report on the 1983 evaluation of the project, see Annex 1.) In 1980, Caritas/Gonaives, the agency bearing legal responsibility for the project, Catholic Relief Services/Haiti, the agency responsible for project administration and implementation, and USAID, the chief sponsor, were all agreed on one point:

it was worth exploring new methods that would have the potential of fostering a more equitable, autonomous, and effective development of rural Haiti.

The formulation of project goals was in many ways influenced by the experiences of two other community development projects which had already been operating successfully for several years: the Gros-Morne Rural Development Project and the Papaye Cooperative Movement. Ira Lowenthal, one of the fathers of GPP, had in fact done a thorough analysis and comparison of those two projects (Lowenthal and Attfield, 1979) before writing the first draft of the GPP proposal (Lowenthal 1979b). It contains an explicit recognition of the qualities of these two projects and further advocates the incorporation of these qualities into a new institutional form, the Rural Development Research Center (RDRC).

GPP was thus born out of the satisfaction of having discovered a rural development strategy which "works" without penalizing or marginalizing small peasant producers, and out of the desire to make this discovery bear fruit for other regions in Haiti. The purpose of the project was therefore formulated in the following way:

(1) To develop and test a replicable methodology for reaching Haiti's rural poor directly through the establishment of local development centers seeking to initiate small-group formation, the provision of educational and technical services, and the stimulation of self-help efforts.

(2) To move toward the creation of a private institution

dedicated to the dissemination of this methodology through the provision of resource-sharing and training services to a wide range of development organizations, public and private, operating at the local level throughout the country.

The distinctiveness of GPP as compared to other rural development projects consists in its use of the groupment as the organizational unit carrying out "development". Groupments are small groups of peasants "that engage in common, income-producing activities, whose returns remain undivided, continuously augmenting the assets of the group through reinvestment" (Lowenthal 1983: 7). The thrust of GPP's work goes to develop, test, and improve upon methods to create such groupments. All other activities, be they the construction of the Center, agricultural extension, or the operation of experimental plots, must be seen as ancillary to the goal of making groupments come into existence, take off, survive and thereby enhance the social and physical well-being of the peasants. It would be completely inappropriate were this evaluation to apply the traditional input/output framework where outputs would be counted as the only tangible economic benefits. In this new project, the most vital "output" to be realized is a "methodology" - an intellectual artifact - whose value can only be assessed by examining the socio-economic organizations which this methodology generates.

In this paper, I shall provide much detail concerning both the positive elements as well as the shortcomings of the project. My criticisms will be many and, at times, severe. But I want to state at the outset that I consider the GPP to

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be, in many ways, a great success. It has made significant progress toward its stated goal. The emerging peasant groupments have good training, great potential, and already occupy an important position within the social structure of the target area. Their mortality is astonishingly low while their spread is so rapid as to suggest that these groupments do fill a need. In comparison with the long string of failures in Haitian development work, this project is indeed a good success and may even be one of the best ever to have been undertaken in Haiti.

2. Project History

The Second Annual Evaluation by Lowenthal contains a very complete and thorough account of project history. In addition to this valuable source, this section of our report also draws on documents prepared by project staff since August 1982 - the time of Lowenthal's field work - and on interviews with project staff conducted during April 1983. Project history is summarized here only briefly in order to leave more room for the actual evaluation commentary.

GPP, as both a concept and a concrete project, has grown out of the collaboration of two very different kinds of specialists. On one side, there were two Haitian experts in rural development, Marc-Antoine Noel and Chavannes Jean-Baptiste, both of whom had acquired many years of experience as practitioners of rural community development. On the other side, there was USAID/Haiti which possessed the material resources, its particular string of experiences, and a heightened interest in integrated community development. Between June 1978, when USAID/Haiti initiated its Integrated Community Development Project, and September 1980, when GPP became operational, the basis was laid for GPP to benefit from more reflection and analysis than had generally been the case in the preparation of most other projects.

Three major papers emerged from this reflective process. The first of these, (ICD Project Paper Draft), explored the role and use of the community council as a development tool.

It pointed to the hierarchical structure of the council, its failure to promote peasant participation, its perpetuation of locally-established power structures, and its vulnerability to manipulation by existing economic and political interests. This paper proposed to improve the community councils and increase their numbers - a proposal which was ultimately rejected by AID as inappropriate.

The second paper took a different direction altogether (Lowenthal and Attfield, 1979). The idea here was to develop peasant organization at the base in the form of groupements instead of using the established intermediate-level structures such as the community councils. It was proposed that the peasants' own tools be upgraded both in terms of the diagnosis of needs and problems and in the technology applied to take care of them. Best of all, the paper could point to two existing success stories that had been built upon a similar ideological base. Both projects had succeeded in organizing peasants into small groups around income-producing activities whose proceeds were reinvested into further such endeavours. But these projects had remained rather particular and thus their success could not be replicated easily. The paper therefore proposed a project to do precisely this: to explore the full implications of the groupement approach, to elaborate fully this methodology of peasant organization with everything from animation materials to leadership seminars in addition to finding ways to apply outside technological and organizational advances to the context of the groupement

movement.

The third paper presented these same ideas, but this time written into an OPG proposal draft (Lowenthal 1979b). Aside from documenting the substantive context concerning the formation of groupements and various other activities, this paper inserted the GPP into an appropriate institutional framework. It was proposed that CARITAS/Gonaives act as the institutional sponsor, that CRS/Haiti serve as the agency bearing administrative responsibility, and that USAID provide seventy-five percent (75 %) of the funding.

In its final form, the GPP project paper deviated from the OPG proposal draft in minor aspects only. It was approved in August of 1980, thus setting the stage for four years of operation of a rigorously-conceived, highly innovative project encompassing two basic aims: (1) to elaborate and test all aspects of a peasant community development methodology centered on groupements, and (2) to erect an institutional framework to conduct research on and disseminate this methodology so as to exert a broad and lasting effect in rural Haiti.

The next section of this report will discuss the implementation of the various goals and activities of the project in the course of its nearly three years of operation. However, some of the major phases of this operational history may be summarized here. They are:

First Year (September 1980 to August 1981)

The first year's activities fall into three main categories: staff hiring, staff training, and baseline study. The team hired in this initial phase included a project administrator (the only non-Haitian ever to have played a major role in the project), a (Haitian) co-administrator, a project coordinator, two agronomists and an ethnologist. In addition, the current director had already been made a team member and served in an advisory capacity. All of these individuals stayed on into the second year with the exception of the ethnologist whose appointment was terminated at the end of the first year.

During the first year, staff training was both unusual and productive. It was unusual in the sense that the staff participated in articulating, evaluating, and refining different aspects of the GPP "methodology", rather than merely accepting and absorbing an existing approach. This has certainly contributed to the high level of motivation that has prevailed throughout most of the history of the project. Staff training was productive in that it was only slightly more than a year into the project that the team had become sufficiently skilled and motivated as to be able to work autonomously with little need of the foreign technical assistance characteristic of most projects.

It was also necessary during the first year to plan generously and flexibly. For the staff was obliged first to "find itself", define its priorities, develop new skills,

and familiarize itself with the Gros-Morne and Papaye models before becoming fully active on the project site. This sort of flexible and patient planning paid off: staff training proved a success.

All staff members became fully acquainted with both the Gros-Morne and Bayonnais project sites while most also spent some time at Papaye. By the end of the first year of the project, the professionals as well as the animators had clarified and focused their approach to rural development and were thus ready to proceed.

The baseline study was the third major activity of the first year. Although its preparation was not the responsibility of the project staff itself, the study nevertheless profited from the advice and comments of staff members. The project paper dealt with this study under the heading of "evaluation" but did not include it in its time chart. However, the importance of the study in the activities of the first year should not be underestimated. Since many of the interviews were lengthy and required considerable travel, there is little doubt that the baseline study accounted for a very large part of the contacts between the project and the local population, in terms of both the number and duration of these contacts. The study was a highly visible activity which the population necessarily considered to be an important element of GPP work during the first year.

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Second Year (September 1981 to August 1982)

The second year of operations gave GPP a completely new character. That which had previously been a theoretical exercise, often proceeding in Port-au-Prince, now became a real and practical enterprise in Bayonnais. Construction of the center began, team members established full-time residence in the project area, and the first cohort of groupements were formed.

The construction of the GPP center at Cator started in August 1981 and was ordered stopped in March of 1982. This was the one project activity which had followed an approach that GPP tried consistently to avoid. This part of the project had fallen under the directions of a Port-au-Prince civil engineer, an out-of-town contractor, and the lone foreigner on the project staff. These three had undertaken to build a structure according to foreign concepts and proceeded to overrun their budget by an enormous amount. As a result, construction was finally brought to a halt by the combined action of CRS and AID; one year later, construction had yet to be resumed.

On-site residence of the staff made it possible to begin sustained activities in the technology, animation, and analysis sections of the project. Such residence also constituted GPP as an entity to be reckoned with locally, both in economic and local political terms. Finally, it allowed for intense visiting activity and large number of meetings that heralded the formation of twenty-eight

groupements. (There are reports which put the number at thirty; however, while this may well be true, I have been able to document only twenty-eight groupements in the first cohort.)

The second year was one of impressive activity - some of the intervening accomplishments and failures will be discussed below. In this brief overview, I can point only to the most significant developments. They include the fact that GPP, by the end of the second year, was firmly established in the valley in terms of its social and physical presence. Further, GPP was thriving despite the problems experienced with the construction program.

Third Year (September 1982 to April 1983)

Only eight months of the third year are covered in this report. This was a year when the number of groupements was doubled while the agricultural extension activities of the technology section were intensified. It was also a year of renewed self-identification in the sense that the project staff made several key decisions with respect to administration (by changing on-site project administrators), ideological approach (by replacing the Gros-Morne model with the Papaye model that had been favored since 1981), agenda (by rewriting the implementation schedule of the original project paper), and relations with the sponsor agencies (by assuming a more autonomous position).

The third year was also the year of the evaluations. The

second annual internal evaluation was undertaken in August and September, at the same time as the first external evaluation (by Lowenthal). Although both evaluation reports would become available only much later, some of the results were already incorporated into the planning of activities for the latter part of the third year. Finally, the present evaluation took place during the thirty-second (32nd) month of the project. While I tried to carry out the field research in a low-key manner, it would appear nevertheless that this evaluation similarly acted to some extent as a catalyst precipitating developments which otherwise might have occurred later.

3. Project Implementation

3.1 Goals and Implementation

The project paper contained a detailed implementation schedule, only part of which shall be discussed here. The items selected are those most closely connected with the project goals stated in the project paper. These can be summarized in the following way:

(The project will)

(1) "...build upon and systematize a nascent strategy for peasant organization that will represent a synthesis of two related, indigenous organizational movements already operating successfully in several parts of the country...";

(2) "...design and test non-formal educational materials and methods suited to a developmental program based on the groupement organizational approach." (They will) "...concern such topics as farm and household management, health, rural economics, local development, etc.";

(3) "...assemble information, test prototypes and provide technical assistance in the application of labor-intensive, low-cost technologies for the improvement of peasant agriculture, food processing, storage, rural sanitation, etc.";

(4) "...provide both practical and theoretical technical training to a limited number of qualified Haitian personnel" (who) "will form the core of the team necessary to operate the resources and training center that is the expected institutional output of the project.";

(5) "...begin to cultivate informal and collaborative relationships with both local and national level development organizations. These relationships are expected to set the stage for the provision of more regular support and advisory services through the resource and training center, once established." (Project Paper, ii-iii.)

These five goals are arranged in a hierarchy: groupement organization in the widest sense is the


dominant goal to which the others are subordinated. Non-formal education and the introduction of appropriate technologies are aimed at strengthening the peasants; groupements are the instruments through which this social and economic strengthening is to be realized. The training of Haitian staff and their insertion into a new institutional structure again feature a single, common goal: to help spread the groupement movement beyond the limits of the project area.

Even if we recognize this hierarchy, it must be admitted that the dominant (organizational) goal can be reached only if the various parts of the project achieve their individual objectives in a coordinated way. Thus, for the remainder of this chapter, I shall proceed to discuss the main project components in a standard fashion. Only in the next chapter will I raise the question of whether, and the extent to which project goals have been reached.

3.2 Project Administration

3.2.1 The distribution of responsibility

Since its inception in 1980, GPP has undergone several organizational changes. At the outset, an organizational diagram might have looked similar to the one below:

GPP organizational diagram for 1980/81

What was characteristic of this organization was that it was clear and hierarchical. The coordinator had "final responsibility for the design and implementation of Project activities in all program areas" and made "binding recommendations concerning the termination of all staff contracts." In other words, the coordinator (Marc Antoine Noel) was fully in charge, as long as he chose to be in charge. However, he was expected to be at the project site "for no less than one week per elapsed month" which means very much less than full-time. (Quotes from Project Paper, p. A1-9).

The man in charge on a day-to-day basis at the project site was the project administrator (Phillip Richter). His job description assigns him more subtle roles; he is supervisor, "catalyst and facilitator". Further, he "coordinates recruitment and selection for all unfilled positions" - for which, however, the project coordinator is responsible ("in conjunction" with him). There may have been weaknesses in the precise delimitation of the authority of the two men in charge of GPP at the beginning, but the fact is that as long

as they worked closely together the project could be run in an efficient manner.

A variety of personality clashes, redefinitions of roles and needs, ideological divisions and other factors led to a radical change in the organizational structure. Lowenthal's evaluation touches upon these in a cautious way and I have little to add here. To summarize the outcome, I will list those changes which have left their mark on the project:

- The hierarchical structure has been replaced by a more democratic and egalitarian one.
- The presence of foreigners has been reduced from one to zero (Mr. Richter has had two Haitian successors and a decision has been made not to fill the staff positions planned for foreigners in the Project Paper.)
- Mr. Noel has withdrawn from the project for all practical purposes. The present executive director (Chavannes Jn-Baptiste) is in charge of the project.
- The number of staff is now very near to the level planned (there is still one position open in the analysis section) and the three main sections enjoy a considerable amount of autonomy.

GPP organizational diagram for 1983

Analysis Section		Documentation Section
Communications Section (animation)	Executive Director	Administration Section
Technology Section		"Intendance" Driver

The executive director has de facto taken over the combined functions of the coordinator and the administrator in the old administrative setup. This has inevitably meant three things: (a) a workload which the coordinator would not have been able to carry since his presence at the project site was limited to one week per month; (b) a considerable degree of autonomy for the various sections, especially as far as the influence of the administrator is concerned; and (c) a limitation of the latter's role to purely day-to-day administrative matters without any say in policy and planning of future project activities.

The autonomy of the sections is balanced by regular exchanges of information and advice between the entire staff. This happens almost daily on an informal basis and more formally at the monthly staff meetings. On those occasions past activities are reported on and the immediate future is discussed. But the problems brought to the fore by the section reports demand inevitably to be dealt with in a wider context. This is the point where the personality of the executive director comes into play. He is the one who, after listening to the other team members and their experiences, will talk about the experiences of other projects, the options discussed and solutions adopted there, and the possibility of transferring such solutions to GPP.

One can draw organizational diagrams and define roles and functions on paper at leisure, and they may even prove adequate in reality. At GPP, however, the whole administrative design mapped out in the project paper has proved to be largely impractical - anyway, it does not bear much resemblance to the actual functioning of the project in 1983. What has evolved is a structure centered around a charismatic and effective director who depends upon a small number of highly motivated collaborators. It is thanks to the presence of these gifted individuals that the project has survived despite all its administrative shortcomings.

3.2.2 Administration

Administration refers to a multi-faceted process of (a) setting broad organizational policies and goals, (b) giving supervision to implement policies effectively and achieve the goals, and (c) managing the day-to-day affairs of the project. The Lowenthal report contains detailed observations on the first two years of the project and I will not repeat all that is said and recommended there. I will instead comment on the present administrative procedures and problems, commenting first on managerial and then on financial aspects.

One of the major achievements of the project was that it has managed not only to survive but actually to reach several of its goals despite some administrative

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problems of major proportion during the first two years. To list only a few:

1) The project paper never defined in precise terms what the various organizational units were expected to do. Instead, it speaks of "liaison", "supervision", "mutual understanding", and the like. The major units (CRS, CARITAS, GPP, and to some extent AID) might well work in a responsible and harmonious way, but questions remain: what if norms are misunderstood, procedures are violated, or personalities do not get along well? Bureaucratic red tape, unsatisfactory communications, and long distances might well, and indeed have amplified minor mishaps into major problems.

2) The project administrator (whose position was maintained until January 1982) was the one person fully in charge, on-site (and, if needed, in Port-au-Prince), on a full-time basis. It was natural that he would develop this position into one of considerable power, surpassing, in effect, all the CRS, AID, and Caritas personnel who had, timewise, only a partial if not even marginal involvement with GPP. When the first administrator - a very capable man who was burnt out by the nettlesome and inadequate administrative arrangements - was replaced by an incompetent successor, it followed that the project had to suffer.

3) Up to this day, the project has not developed an

adequate balance between resources, authority, and accountability. There have been an unending stream of problems with the disbursement of petty cash, vehicle maintenance, irregularity of salary payments, and other details which must work smoothly in order to avoid unnecessary frustration. Yet even the present executive director with all his considerable authority has been unable to solve many of these persistent difficulties.

4) AID, as the chief sponsor, has exercised its authority to bring the construction of the center to a halt - and quite justifiably given the heavy cost overruns. This, however, is where things have remained. Instead of redefining construction priorities in collaboration with the staff and ensuring that things start rolling again, construction has yet to be restarted. At the time of our evaluation, there was still no functioning cystem, no running water, no generator, no storage space, no silo, no adequate housing for part of the staff, no office for the administrator (not even a filing cabinet!), no adequate kitchen, no protection of food reserves against rats, and so on. Those who controlled the purse had simply stopped the flow of cash; they cannot be held responsible for the failure of the project to advance. On the other hand, those who will be held accountable for failing to implement project goals on schedule do not have the authority to restart even essential


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construction. All this is occurring, of course, at a time when the project is operating at its highest level of activity.

5) GPP has always been just one of many projects on the minds of CRS, Caritas, and AID administrators. This did not initially do much damage - benign neglect by bureaucrats can sometimes be a blessing. The first administrator filled the demanding roles of on-site manager, Port-au-Prince lobbyist, and general communicator. But when he was replaced, no adequate structure was put into place to execute the tasks he had performed. Many of his functions are now carried out by the executive director, a man who, despite his outstanding qualities, is retained only on a half-time basis on the GPP staff. None of his last thirty letters to CRS, he told me, have been answered.

6) To aggravate the already unsatisfactory setup, there have been significant changes in personnel. The person originally responsible for GPP at CRS (Wilma Klein) resigned, and her functions were only incompletely assumed by others whose time and efforts were preoccupied by work on other projects.

The complexity of administration has a parallel in the design of the cash-flow system. The diagram below shows how funds are channelled into the project.

The Channelling of Funds to GPP

According to this chart, it would seem that on the surface the flow of funds should not pose any major problems. The sources of funding (AID: 75% ; CRS: 25%) are separate and so are the budget items paid from these sources. Even the personnel of GPP fall into different budgets (see Annex 2). In reality, however, there are significant bottlenecks built into this scheme. I have been by several people that while the AID account in Port-au-Prince was always covered and regularly supervised, the CRS account had "frequently" dried up to the extent that encumbrances could not be picked up, commitments could not be honored on time, and even small but essential items such as gasoline had to be handled as out-of-pocket advances.

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Similar problems seem to exist in Gonaives but there they appear to derive mainly from precautionary measures requiring every cheque to bear two signatures. The GPP side was evidently quick to sign, but it was frequently time-consuming to obtain the Caritas signature since even the Caritas director's own accountant was not entrusted with the power to countersign. Delays and frustration are inevitable and it is not sure whether the Port-au-Prince administrators were ever close enough to project operations to realize the extent of demoralization such procedural awkwardness can create.

One thing can, however, be said on the positive side. The (new) local administrator at GPP is a considerable asset, combining accounting competence, patience, and the ability to put day-to-day operations in order after a year of confusion and chaos. It will be to the credit of the project and its leadership if they succeed in keeping him in Bayonnais for an extended period of time.

To summarize, then, I follow previous administrators, the GPP staff, and even some CRS and AID staff in stating that administration has been the single most serious problem of GPP. It will be critical to achieve a more satisfactory administrative design if the project is to realize its potential.

3.2.3 The communication/organization section

The c/o section is the most important section of GPP. Its

success in promoting groupement formation is the only justification for implementing the project in the first place. If everything else were to run smoothly except for the animation function, then the project would still deserve to be terminated.

I have made an assessment of four aspects of evaluation: (1) the training and motivation of the staff; (2) the production and use of animation materials; (3) the establishment of groupements; and (4) the performance of the groupements.

(1) Training

The c/o section (formerly called the animation section) is headed by the executive director, no doubt one of the most gifted peasant organizers in the country. Given that he is also director of the Papaye project, it is only natural that he puts the valuable experience gained there to good use in Bayonnais. Indeed, almost all of the GPP staff have spent time in Papaye as part of their training. Some of them also had extensive experience working in other projects. Training in these cases was therefore concentrated not so much on the skills required in organizing meetings and maintaining peasant enthusiasm, but rather in absorbing and practicing the particular GPP approach which is so diametrically opposed to the hand-outs and food-for-work techniques dominating the foreign aid landscape in Haiti. Jake Pfohl, a non-formal education specialist acting as a consultant to GPP made a significant contribution in this respect during September and October of 1981.

Animator training is really an ongoing process. The inter-animator meetings scheduled frequently at the center serve that function on a continuing basis. They are especially important for the female animators who were taken on much later. For these female personnel receive systematic training to enable them to deal with the arduous task of mobilizing women in a society where practically all forms of organization are male-dominated and where the inclusion of women as active participants in development work is a recent innovation. It is too early to judge the success of their work at this time since women's groupements have yet to reach a formal phase of activity. However, there can be no doubt that GPP has assembled a group of capable and motivated female animators and is giving a high priority to improving the status of women within peasant households and the project area itself.

(2) Animation materials

The formation of groupements in GPP is achieved in three distinct steps. First, the animators make informal contacts with their assigned districts. Second, there is a period of meetings at a particular peasant's house. Finally, the groupement is formed and engages in economic activities.

Annex 3 contains a list of the documents and animation materials produced and used by GPP staff. For the informal contact phase they consist of a number of drawings in a cartoon form prepared by the GPP team's own artist. In addition, the animators have lists of questions, largely

memorized, which are used to raise the awareness of the population concerning such issues as the distribution of power and resources in the community. Most importantly, the animators keep their own journals in which they record their experiences during this phase of the project.

In the second phase, called non-formal phase, the animators come exceedingly well-prepared with pictures, lists of questions, song booklets, and the like. Furthermore, their presentations are conceived intelligently and prepared assiduously, inasmuch as models for every theme, session, and picture have been written up and studied. Some of these materials are adaptations of materials used in Papaye, but GPP, with its larger staff, resident artist, and larger budget, has to all accounts taken the lead and is currently setting the standard for all peasant organization projects in Haiti. The themes treated in the second phase are as follows:

Table 3-1 Animation Themes at GPP

<u>Series</u>	<u>Theme</u>	<u>Number of Drawings</u>
1	Division - reconciliation	5
2	Many members - one body	3
3	Patience - perseverance	6
4	Slavery yesterday and today	6
5	The value of a person	6
6	Community	11

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The skillful orchestration of the meetings and use of animation materials turn the meetings into memorable events. Rounded off with prayers and songs they have in fact much in common with church assemblies which may be indicative of a deep-rooted similarity. To grasp the meaning of the peasants' lives and their potential is, after all, what rural animation at GPP is all about.

(3) The establishment of groupements

During the first years of GPP, the staff became increasingly aware of the fact that its original mission to amalgamate the approaches practiced at Gros-Morne and Papaye was heading for trouble. The principal difference between the two is ideological in nature. Gros-Morne limits the activity of animators to some organizational assistance. After a limited number of hours, a groupement is essentially ready for its first economic venture. Papaye, on the other hand, has a long phase of motivational animation - one could call it indoctrination, although of a participatory kind - which precedes any common economic activity. Gros-Morne thus counts on the compelling force of material benefits while Papaye insists that an organizational unit be established before the group can do anything of lasting importance.

The GPP team discussed the merits of the two projects and the possibility of deriving a unified approach from them at length. In June 1981, it made a decision to follow the Papaye approach. It took little time to adjust the

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methodology of GPP accordingly. However, it was not until one year later that the inevitable consequence of that fateful decision materialized with the de facto withdrawal of Marc-Antoine Noel, the Gros-Morne director, from GPP.

As mentioned above, the establishment of groupements by GPP is a lengthy process divided into three phases. The phase informelle can last for several months. Its prime goal is to make the animator familiar with the target area (production system, organization of work, community council activities, VSN, systems of land tenure, and marketing) and to familiarize the population with GPP (as covered by Caritas and the Bishop of Gonaives and opposed to food-for-work incentive schemes). The phase non-formelle consists of a series of twelve weekly meetings called by the animator and leading at the end of this series into the proposal to form a groupement. These meetings can attract initially up to fifty people; however, this number grows smaller as it becomes clear to participants that no quick and tangible benefits or hand-outs can be expected. The phase formelle maintains the weekly meetings but they are now normally taking place in a garden where work is being done. Animators continue to be present at most times, but several steps are taken to ensure that the groupements become autonomous organizations. These steps are as follows:

- a responsible is chosen who is later replaced by a committee of responsables comprised of president, secretary, and treasurer;

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- a set of statutes is elaborated (emphasizing the need for regular attendance and methods of exclusion of members who default on contributions), entitled the reglement de fonctionnement interne ;

- training sessions for responsables are organized at the GPP center;

- a common fund (caisse) is established, the balance of which the treasurer must be able to show in cash at any meeting upon demand.

A planned fourth phase of groupement organization was just in the planning stages during my visit. It will consist in the formation of an association of groupements whose goals are seen at this time as (a) the operation of a cooperative store for agricultural inputs and some basic consumer items, and (b) the organization of a more systematic campaign of non-formal education.

(4) The performance of the groupements

Not a single one of the thirty-one groupements founded thus far by GPP has gone under (although splits over personality issues have, in a couple of instances, led to the creation of new groupements).

Table 3-2 Number of Groupements and Members by Zone

Zone	Number of Groupements	Number of Members	Mean Number of Members
Cator	11	117	10.6
Odige	12	164	13.7
Savane Ronde	8	136	17.0
Total	31	417	13.5

In addition to the thirty-one groupements that are functioning fully, there are at present thirty-eight in the

phase non-formelle stage of training. Most of these inchoate groupements will have become fully operational by the time this report is circulated. Their mean membership appears to be higher than that of the first cohort, probably around fifteen or sixteen members per groupement.

All groupements start out with very little capital which in the case of poorer groupements is raised in the form of workdays contributed to a groupement project. Members work in the garden of one member according to the traditional bout kod arrangement for about one-half of the going rate. The owner thereby obtains cheap labour and contributes to the common fund. After a few months of such activities (usually on Saturdays), the caisse can begin making investments. Many other fund-raising arrangements have been observed but they all engage in the common practice of putting a traditional technique of labor mobilization (such as job , bout kod and kolonn) into the service of this innovative form of peasant organization. Many of the newly-formed groupements seem to move into these activities much faster than those of the first cohort, mainly by holding two weekly meetings and thus shortening the phase non-formelle to only five to six weeks in duration.

The first groupements entered the phase formelle in March 1982. By January 1983, they had accumulated the following amounts of capital:

Table 3-3

Capital Accumulation by Groupements

from March 1982 to January 1983

<u>Name of Groupement</u>	<u>Cash(gds)</u>	<u>Products</u>	<u>Estimated Total Value(gds)</u>
xxx	210	80 marm pistache	530
Dieu seul maitre	100		100
Fraternite	50	120 " "	530
L'union	64	55 " "	284
Pap Kraze	150		150
Ke ensemb	70	80 " "	390
Mon premier	869		869
Champion	320		320
La foi	400		400
Verite	257		257
La foi en action	69	20 " "	149
Decide	253		253
Eclerasion	---	? " "	---
Bon dieu bon	195		195
Bayonne a vie	---	44 " "	176
Victorieux	194		194
Kimbe pa lage	182	65 " "	442
Bon berger	105	22 " "	193
Patience	175	50 " "	375
Progres	220	40 " "	380
Lafolia	400		400
Lamou	230	60 " "	725
		+ 255 g tole, clous	
Viv ensam	109		109
Combattan	117		117
La victoire	193	65 marm pistache	453
+ patates			
Limie	115	12 marm pistache	163
Kimbe fem	61		61
Totals	Approx. 5100		Approx. 3100

Total Capital = Approx. 8200 gds = \$1640.00
Mean assets per groupement = Approx. \$61.00
Mean assets per member = Approx. \$4.50

The GPP groupements are still young and nothing definitive can be said about their performance. But a few observations may be made. Their mean size is almost twice as large as the target size proposed in the project paper, whereas the number of groupements is far smaller. The number of peasants organized into these groupements is therefore not far off the targeted level. The survival rate of the groups is so astoundingly high that the reasons for this must later be explored in detail. The level of capital accumulation, although respectable, is on the low side: \$4.50 per person after all those efforts is not much. It is, however, a significant beginning. (More about this in the chapter on costs vs. benefits).

3.2.4 The analysis section

Little needs to be said about the GPP analysis section. It initially started work slowly, suffering through a period when it was understaffed seriously while losing its key member (Michele Oriol). It then passed through a dormant state of several months while it endured a lack of staffing. Yet it has achieved a standard of excellence quite likely unparalleled in Haitian rural development projects. This is all the more astonishing since the conditions under which it was forced to work were poor. The section suffered from insufficient staffing, funding problems, and the unavailability of even the most basic demographic and economic data on the area. (The baseline survey data are only now being analyzed, a fact for which the analysis section cannot be blamed).

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Annex 3 contains a list of the studies done by the analysis section. They are frequently of a very high quality, asking important questions and gathering good data to arrive at well-founded conclusions. Some of them are classified in the GPP documentation as products of the technology section - this is true only in a technical sense. They are analytical documents produced under the guidance (and frequently authorship) of Carl Monde who later came to head the analysis sections. His works form the bulk of the analytical work at GPP.

The most significant of these analytical papers deal with:

- Les associations de travail a Savane Ronde.
- Systeme de production dans l'axe Odige - Savane Paguol - Cator.
- Dynamique des groupements paysans a Gros-Morne.
- Organisation paysanne a Bayonnais.
- Place du systeme foncier dans le systeme agraire.

One of the ways by which the analysis section was able to gather such considerable amounts of data was the mobilization of assistance from the Groupe de recherche sur le developpement, an association of young Haitian professionals active in rural development. Besides this, students from the Faculte d'agronomie at Damiens could be selected and persuaded to donate some of their time, partially supported by some small fellowships. It goes without saying that the head of the analysis section deserves much credit for what was achieved there.

Finally, it should also be mentioned that this section is thoroughly integrated with the rest of the team. It is at all times involved in the formulation of new policies and priorities. Further, it monitors the activities of the other sections, although perhaps using a more intellectual than administrative approach. This in itself is a rare occurrence in development projects.

3.2.5 Coordination

The project paper devotes much space to the coordination functions and especially to those of the "Project coordinator". We have already seen in the previous chapter that the shift in control over the project from the original coordinator/administrative team (1980) to the present executive director (1982) has made the coordinator's role a very tenuous one. What remained for him to do was essentially to comment and criticize from the outside without practically ever being on site in Bayonnais - a very delicate assignment even under the best of circumstances. In reality, to assign this role to the man previously in charge of the Project and who had fallen victim to something akin to a palace revolt, could not be more than an exercise in face-saving.

The conflict between the personalities and governing project ideologies has become evident on many occasions. The exchange of letters which poured forth in the end - 25 March 1983 - resembles the exchange of accusations between estranged and separated spouses. The coordination section

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is dead and the coordinator's role no longer serves any purpose.

3.2.6 The technology section

The mission of the technology section was defined as an attempt to help improve the technology used in peasant agriculture. First steps in this direction were taken almost immediately once the staff was assembled in Bayonnais. These first steps were necessarily required to be tentative: they served staff training much more than the actual development of new processes.

To a certain extent all activities of the technology section depend upon the existence of a certain infrastructure. It has been hampered more than the other sections by the unfortunate delays in the construction of the Center. To give just one example: despite the absence of drying and storage facilities, the technology section went ahead with systematic tests of several varieties of improved corn seeds under different planting conditions. The products were harvested, sorted, labelled, and stored in a provisional fashion in the Center's coolest locations. In practical terms, this meant that bags were lined up along the walls of the large meeting hall. The use of this hall by construction crews, visiting peasant groupements, and some of the center's staff produced the almost inevitable consequence that bags were mishandled, seeds were confused, and labels disappeared. The whole experiment was thus curtailed to its least significant part: the measurement of

one harvest. Planting of seeds carried out under controlled conditions was thus forced to be abandoned.

The following table gives a brief overview of the activities in which the technology section is presently involved.

Table 3-4 Activities of the Technology Section

Activity	Source of Initiative	Systematic Exploration	Start/End of Activity
1. Center construction	staff	x	1981 - 1983
2. Research + analysis	staff	---	1981 -cont.
3. Education and Public Awareness	staff	---	Dec. '81 -
4. Capping of sources	groupement	x	late '83(?) - ?
5. Fountain drilling	groupement	x	July '83(?) - ?
6. Chicken vaccination	groupement	x	Dec. 82 - cont.
7. Control of goat	groupement	---	--- ---
8. Experimental garden	staff	---	1982 - cont.
9. Improved chicken race	groupement	---	--- ---
10. Introduction of rabbit colony	staff	---	1983 - cont.
11. Introduction of bees	staff	---	1983 - cont.
12. Lafygma frugi- perda campaign	groupement	---	1982 - cont.

The technology section tries to practice a "soft" approach. It refrains from propagating new technologies without being invited to do so by the groupement members. It is not clear, however, how long this approach can remain the only one. The introduction of the project and the construction of the Center and experimental gardens (approximately 1.5

hectares) by themselves are powerful stimuli, as was the passage of a foreign expert fervently advocating the rabbit as the solution to most of Haiti's problems (peasants in the area have nothing but contempt for rabbit meat).

In sum, it can be said at this point that the technology section has implemented or started to implement a good number of its goals. It has achieved at least two significant successes in the hastily-planned emergency campaigns against Newcastle chicken disease and the infestation of corn fields by *lafygma frugiperda* (chenilles). Despite a two-month absence of the section head (in France for continued training), the section has undertaken several new projects, frequently upon invitation by the groupement members. The past record, the insufficient infrastructure, and the frequent lack of systematic, scientific exploration and analysis makes it unlikely, however, that all of the activities planned for 1983 and 1984 will be concluded successfully. Such a modest technology section cannot do the work of a full-blown agricultural experimentation and extension service.

3.2.7 The other sections

The administration section is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the projects. This comprises tasks ranging from bookkeeping to getting food on the table to keeping the motorcycles running on the trails. Since the Center today is so different from what it was supposed to be when the project paper was written, the administration has also been

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forced to adapt. Instead of locally-adapted housing, there is a massive cement complex, surpassing in grandeur the most impressive efforts of the state and the churches in the area. Instead of horses and mules there are motorcycles. Instead of a smoothly organized and supervised project there is one which has survived thanks mainly to charismatic personality and great individual efforts.

At present, the administration in Bayonnais is in competent hands, it runs smoothly under difficult conditions, and is staffed by willing and honest collaborators.

The documentation section has seen its documentalist and two secretaries turn out credible work in producing documents (more than in many other projects) and building up a library. The former function is essential for the stimulation of analytical efforts, self-reflection, and the maintenance of outside ties. The latter could be important, too. In effect, the library has so far been confined almost exclusively to English-language publications. This, of course, is absurd in a context where none of the staff members are able to read English with ease. but since the entire section was set up mainly with a view to a future Resource Center (RDRC) to be located at GPP, the unsatisfactory state of its library is not of great consequence at this point.

3.2.8 The current state of goal implementation

At the beginning of this chapter I cited the five major goals of GPP as stated in the project paper in 1980. To what extent have these objectives been attained as of April 1983?

(1) GPP has indeed built "upon a nascent strategy for peasant organization". But instead of reaching a "synthesis of two related, indigenous organizational movements already operating", it has chosen essentially one of them (Papaye) as the model to be followed and transcended. Given the personalities involved, it could not have done otherwise. The choice is completely defensible, especially in light of the administrative history of GPP.

(2) The "design and test" of non-formal educational materials concerning "such topics as farm and household management, health, rural economics, local development, etc." has made limited progress. Rural economics and local development are themes in the very effective series of pictures and in the well-structured groupement training meetings. Some health and household management topics are treated systematically, especially by the female animators, but non-formal education materials are not yet used there extensively. The biggest health issue in the project paper, the latrines, has simply been dropped from the agenda because (a) acceptance of the latrines was bad on the side of the target population, and (b) the use of compost to upgrade soil fertility was defined as non-essential by the

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staff. (The main problem at Bayonnais is water, not soil fertility.)

(3) The third objective - to improve agricultural technology - was given some attention but it is still far from being reached. Some farmers have tried new seeds and different spacing techniques, but the production system at Bayonnais is by and large the same as what it was in 1980. Even if the technology section were finally to obtain the necessary infrastructure, it is doubtful whether many of the ambitious goals will be within reach or should even be aimed at. Haitian peasants are willing to adopt new technology if the risks and pay-offs appear reasonable. GPP is still some distance from making a significant progress towards upgrading the inefficient local production system with all its built-in safeguards.

(4) The provision of training for Haitian staff is advancing well. Whether this staff will remain on site to form the core personnel of a future resource and training center is a separate question. This matter should not be a major concern at this stage of the project.

(5) The establishment of personal and institutional links was formulated in a rather vague way in the project paper. Again it is linked to a rather elusive future institutional output of GPP. The basic aim to "begin to cultivate informal collaboratuive relationships" is in my view either trivial - everyone does that - or premature and misdirected. Either

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GPP will prove a success and word of this will spread like fire, or it will turn out to be a failure in which case it would not form an appropriate base for a future institutional framework.

The project paper (p. 42-3) contains a checklist of project goals which at the beginning guided the activities of the project staff. One of the effects of the project's administrative changes was that the team decided to re-write parts of the project paper in order to give itself an agenda more in line with its own ideas and potential. At the time of my evaluation, this new project paper was not available yet although some of the changes had in fact been clarified. They are contained in the following table (with the original project goals in brackets). All of them refer to achievements on site at Bayonnais. Year One of the project is for this reason omitted.

Table 3-5Revised Project Goals at GPP

	Year 2 (81-82)		Year 3 (82-83)		Year 4 (83-84)	
Cumulative no. of groupements formed	(100)	30	(140)	60	(200)	100
Average no. of groupement members	(8-12)	8-20	(8)	15	(8)	15
% of gr. formed without direct project intervention	(0)	0	(15)	0	(40)	0
No. of federations of gr. org'zed around comm. service	(0)	0	(0)	0	(3)	3
No. of gr. engaged in direct animation and extension program with field agents	(30)	0	(60)	0	(105)	0
No. of local animators/agents trained from gr. members	(0)	0	(20)	10	(40)	20
No. of gr. with at least one prod. project using innovations in either agric. or husbandry	(0)	10	(60)	40	(105)	180
No. of indiv. farmers adopting one or more new techniques in agriculture or husbandry	(0)	0	(150)	150	(600)	600
No. of households with composting latrine	(0)	0	(200)	0	(600)	0
No. of households with a subsistence-oriented home-site garden/husbandry project	(0)	30	(200)	150	(600)	400
No. of potable water projects completed	(3)	0	(8)	4	(0)	8

A look at the revised project goals leads to three major conclusions. First, although the number of groupements to be formed has been halved, there has not been a significant reduction in the number of peasant participants aimed at. It increases from 420 in year two to 1500 in year four - this may be no more than a realistic adjustment to the delays in starting the project and building the Center.

The second conclusion is that the whole section of the original table treating the measurement of individual groupement performance has been omitted. As far as I can determine, the accumulation of assets per member is below target (\$4 instead of \$8). However, this is not a significant discrepancy since the groupements are so young and since their assets were measured in January of 1983. I anticipate the groupements to exceed this performance goal as they grow older (see next chapter). Overall, we can say that the groupements are performing well; but the staff does not seem concerned with either following the original plan or measuring performance.

Third, there are three goals (besides the latrines already commented upon) which have been scrapped entirely, or cut in half, from the agenda: groupement formation without direct intervention and the agricultural extension activities of groupements have both been eliminated while the number of local animators has been cut in half, from forty to twenty. These are significant departures from the original plan in that they all serve the same purpose. They emphasize that

groupements and local animation services are innovations introduced by outsiders (even though these "outsiders" are Haitian). There is no confidence expressed in the new list of goals to enable the movement, in the short run, to become an autonomous, locally self-sustaining process. This fits well with the comments of two animators who, when asked about the survival chances of the groupements should project funding be withdrawn, assessed them as nil.

I shall not expand on this aspect further other than to remind the reader that these changes must be considered serious: they represent a departure from the orientation towards contagious, locally self-sustaining, and autonomous peasant organizations as specified in the papers leading up to GPP. The GPP staff is certainly well-advised to set itself new and more realistic goals. However, any such changes must be seen as a revision of GPP's original experimental ("pilot") mission. An excellent staff has decided that, under the given conditions, the most realistic course of the project is to adopt those practices that more closely adhere to the notion of development as that stimulated from outside the peasant community.

4. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Project

4.1 The experimental mission

A successful experiment will usually be characterized by a well-conceived experimental design, strict adherence to evaluations at regular intervals, follow-up procedures for the measurement of short, medium, and long-term effects and flexibility in staff and resource allocation. GPP has shown strength in the latter point. Throughout its sometimes turbulent administrative history, there has never been a vacuum in leadership, and the team has never strayed from its chief goal and ideological commitment to a form of "bottom-up development". The groupements are strong, their membership is selected with a distinct preference for the poorer peasants, and resources have (with the possible exception of the construction program) been allocated in line with project objectives. This has been true even when these objectives had changed to a significant extent (and, I might add, changed for good reason).

What is less clear is whether methodologies, approaches, organizational options and the like have really been tested thoroughly. The Gros-Morne approach has received much discussion and reflection at Bayonnais; it has been abandoned, however, not because it was fully tested and found wanting, but rather because the team found the Papaye approach and leadership more to its liking. Despite all its very impressive achievements, the analysis section has yet

to stage a fully developed experiment, under controlled conditions, and with adequate follow-up procedures. Experimentation has thus been left in an analytical grey area where it cannot be evaluated rigorously.

Having made these criticisms, I hasten to add that I find that the project paper failed to provide a sound framework for an experimental design. It remained exceedingly vague in this respect, quite in contrast to the precision in the table on anticipated project outputs. What has resulted is thus not a rigorous test, but a trial of one methodology, adapted over two years according to individual experiences, collective discussion and decision-making, and the fortunate availability of a few highly-qualified animation professionals.

One element which might have contributed to a more truly experimental outcome of the project is that of evaluation. For the internal functioning of the project, the regular meetings, the open discussions, and the generally egalitarian treatment of team members combine to provide a sufficient feedback and ongoing evaluation. For the purposes of charting the general course, however, and especially for a fruitful and helpful exchange with the sponsor agencies, those evaluations carried out thus far have proven inadequate. The first internal evaluation took place in December 1981, two months late, and it failed to provide a useful document. Quite the contrary, the evaluation turned out to be neither critical nor analytical

and for these reasons was probably of no consequence. The second internal evaluation was performed in December 1982. By April of the following year, it was still not available in report form. It is hard to imagine any constructive impact resulting from such delay in feedback. The first external evaluation, conducted by Ira Lowenthal, was carried out in August and September of 1982. The document - an excellent report - became available only in January 1983, and only in an English version. By April of 1983, the project team in Haiti had still not received a copy of the Lowenthal study (aside from whether a French translation would be sent). The blame must be laid somewhere for these inexcusable and exasperating delays, and the most likely culprit would appear to be CRS. But whatever the explanation for such inefficiency, the project has clearly lacked adequate evaluation procedures. This has done damage to its experimental mission.

4.2 The physical set-up and impact

The truncated construction program has sabotaged many of the experiments and agricultural extension efforts of the technology section. By the time of this evaluation, frustration over this issue has risen to the point where the technology section had pronounced itself "on strike". Inadequate facilities were the major grievance.

Yet at the same time a point can be made about the physical facilities of GPP being enormously more massive and expensive than what the project would have needed. There is

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a strong symbolic message emanating from physical structures, and the message in the Upper Bayonnais valley is that foreigners are pumping in massive amounts of money. Animators may in all honesty (while riding on imported motorcycles the likes of which none of the target families could ever afford) convey the following message in their training sessions: "We are not here to bring money but to help you help yourselves." However, the physical structure at Cator belies that message and undermines the credibility of the project, despite the fact that it offers only very modest living quarters to educated Haitians.

Some development projects emphasize physical elements: roads, irrigation systems, lakes, buildings, terraces, and the like. With the exception of the Center construction, GPP has thus far - and much to its credit - avoided this. But, perhaps by de-emphasizing physical impact a project may tend to downgrade all material development. In listening to some talk by Center staff, one can see Paolo Freire smile behind every tree; only time will tell whether the emphasis on peasant autonomy will also foster material improvements in peasant livelihood.

4.3 The staff

GPP has never undertaken a systematic evaluation of staff performance. The closest thing to it was an internally circulated questionnaire that asked every team member to comment on fellow members - an exercise which should be viewed as anything more than a popularity contest. Indeed,

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some of the team members perceived it as no more than a ploy to find some basis for forcing the second project administrator to leave (if that was its purpose, then it succeeded). My own observations on staff preparation and performance are extremely tentative and should be recognized as such. I shall limit them to two paragraphs beyond what has been said in previous chapters.

One thing that strikes the observer is the considerable variation in staff qualifications and training. One team member may have ten years of experience or more (as in the case of the executive director) while another may have none. The administrative secretary has spent more than a decade in New York City (working as a beautician, among other jobs), and from the way she dresses, talks, and behaves, I cannot imagine her lasting at Bayonnais for more than a few months. But such impressions can be misleading. One female animator has spent five years in France, yet she strikes me as someone who can work with rural women, discuss things on their own level, and thereby dispel their mistrust of urban people.

The second striking impression is that staff training is seen at GPP as an ongoing process. During the 1982-83 period, for example, one member of the technology section spent time training in France, four female animators underwent training from a few days to eight weeks in Papaye and other projects, while three other team members received technical training in agriculture, the raising of rabbits

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and goats, and the reproduction of non-formal education materials.

Staff morale may not always have been at a high point (see the Lowenthal report), and it has taken a long time to bring staffing (almost completed) up to the present level.

But there can be no doubt that GPP has put together a highly competent staff, one which is highly motivated and continually being upgraded by ongoing training. In addition, the team has been able to mobilize outside human resources, such as students from Damiens and professionals from the Groupe de recherche sur le developpement, to enhance its work and fulfill its requirements at a low cost.

4.4 The organizational framework

While the local administration of GPP is presently being managed competently, the general organizational framework remains inadequate. This is the single greatest weakness of the project and it may well lead to its termination unless a satisfactory solution can soon be found. I shall summarize my comments under three headings: overcommitment of staff; administrative weaknesses of CRS; and built-in contradictions in the project design.

In the second half of 1982, staff overcommitment was a very serious problem. The "man in charge" (the coordinator) was director of two other projects (at Verrettes and Gros-Morne) and had only just been relieved of another function at the

ODN project. Even with all the best intentions, he could not have kept control of GPP. The other coordinator (the present director) similarly held two other jobs besides one at GPP, acting as head of the Papaye movement and director of Caritas/Hinche. Good development professionals are rare, but how much responsibility can be reasonably loaded onto one man's shoulders?

Finally, as a consequence of this overcommitment of the two key staff members, the (second) administrator carried more responsibility than he should ever have been entrusted with. His contribution to the "Rapport Trimestriel October-December 1982" gives vivid testimony to the state of his extreme confusion and incompetence. Why it took five months to dismiss this man is explainable only by the overcommitment of everyone else connected with the project, from GPP all the way back up to New York.

The administrative weakness of CRS with respect to GPP may have many causes which escape the attention of this observer. How could the agency in charge permit the delays, the construction cost overruns, and the persistence of inadequate lines of communication? The project began operations in 1980, yet in January of 1983 it had yet to hire "an analyste, a secretary-documentalist, an administrator, two secretaries, one member of the communications section, and between two and four female animators" (quoted from the same Rapport Trimestriel). How could this happen? Certainly not as a result of anyone's

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planning or as a response to evaluation reports (since no one had been able to read the 1982 reports).

The solution apparently devised to regain control over the project, to streamline the administrative apparatus, reduce bottlenecks, and facilitate communications, was to transfer more responsibility to the Bishop of Gonaives, Msr. Constant. This is what I was told by CRS/Haiti and by the Bishop himself, and what I read in that same Rapport Trimestriel. In concrete terms, Msr. Constant has been asked to:

1. take a more active role in project administration, and
2. function as a liaison between CRS on the one hand, and the GPP, Gros-Morne, and Verrettes projects on the other hand.

This arrangement might work if the Bishop had the necessary staff. However, this is not the case and he is not likely to obtain the required professionals trained in accounting and project administration before 1984, i.e. before the GPP project runs out. We are thus once more observing a perpetuation of the central administrative problem which has plagued GPP throughout its history - the imbalance between authority, responsibility, and resources. Msr. Constant agreed, when questioned, that his new function for CRS implied coordination, the establishment of new priorities, and even some project direction. He does not have the resources appropriate to the fulfillment of these functions. Since nothing had been defined clearly or put into writing, then nothing good can therefore be expected when good people are forced to assume impossible roles.

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The built-in contradictions in the project design will become more evident as it moves into its fourth year of operation. It really combines two ambitions, two visions, and two projects which are quite incompatible with each other. One is GPP, a local, community-oriented rural development project; the other is RDRC, a center with a national vocation which will necessarily have a relatively high profile. Ideally, GPP would have nothing visible, the least possible number of outside visitors, a standard of living for the staff which is low by comparison with urban levels, etc. The RDRC would need much larger buildings, a huge documentation center, an a visible display of "success" to suit the donors, politicians, and analysts to be paraded in by a fleet of jeeps in a never-ending procession. This is not a caricature: one has to choose whether one wants autonomous rural development or an operation like the Baptist Mission at Fermathe. Both may be beautiful and make sense in some respects, but they definitely do not mix well. GPP should remain low-key, low-cost, and modest if it aspires to promote effective and autonomous organization of poor peasants. If it succeeds, it will make its mark on the course of Haitian development; but it does not need the RDRC to spread the word.

4.5 Project output

At the time of this writing, the project will have achieved a large part of its organizational and animation goals. It will have had (as we shall see in the following chapter) a significant and beneficial economic impact, not only among

groupement members, but in the target are in general. Further, it will have trained a significant number of staff for rural development work of a new kind: that which is both socially and technologically appropriate for the target population.

Project output can therefore be noted as a strength of GPP, not in the sense of having changed the appearance of many hectares of land, but rather in the sense that a significant number of peasants have (a) engaged in collaborative agricultural activity, (b) formed social and material bonds which will help better protect them from abuse and exploitation, (c) started to bring some of the pests affecting local agriculture and animal husbandry under control, (d) engaged cooperatively in the upgrading of land (dry walls), various other agricultural chores, and the marketing of products, and (e) experienced a measure of control over their destiny in an environment that generally invites a fatalistic attitude towards life.

5. Costs and Benefits of the GPP

5.1 Tangible benefits to local farmers

GPP is not a local development project aimed at improving per capita incomes, rural infrastructure, and the like. It is thus not a legitimate goal of this evaluation to explore whether monetary benefits to Haitian farmers match the project cost to the American taxpayer. If one were to try this, one would quickly discover that project benefits in monetary terms could in no way come even close to approximating project costs over the four year lifespan of the project. For example, if the project were to organize fifty percent (50 %) of the area's adult population and raise their incomes by twenty-five percent (25 %), this would represent a yearly benefit of \$75,000. This would be an extraordinary success for any project, yet it would still represent only one-third of annual project costs.

Nevertheless, this project does have some direct, measurable benefits. These are due to both the accumulation of savings achieved at the groupement level and the agricultural extension services provided by GPP staff to groupement members and, quite frequently, to their neighbors as well.

The savings accumulation of twenty-seven groupements could be documented up to January 1983. It amounted to a total of \$1640, or about \$61 per groupement (with a range from \$12 to \$170). One can venture to estimate that this figure will rise to \$7900 by the end of 1983. (I would estimate that

the twenty-eight "old" groupements earned a \$400 return from their 1982 savings and \$3360 from their 1983 contributions, as compared to the thirty-eight new groups' earnings of \$2500 from 1983 contributions.) The selling of labor by some groupements might bring it to around \$10,000.

Benefits from agricultural extension services are always hard to measure. For two distinct activities, however, some reasonable estimates can be made. In 1982, the chicken stock of the entire project area was once again ravaged by Newcastle chicken disease. The GPP staff was ill-equipped to combat this particular plague but nevertheless managed to inoculate 924 chickens and save 878 of them. Assuming that one-half of them would have been doomed, the action of the staff provided local farmers with a saving of \$3640 over a one year period. It should be noted that while the market value of 439 medium chickens is only \$1317, the productive value is \$4390 (in eggs, laying hens, fighting cocks, etc.). The meat value of a diseased chicken is only \$1. If the number of inoculations can be tripled to 2700 for the current season, the saving achieved by this activity will amount to \$10,920. Of course, the 1982 inoculation campaign represents only the first step in preventing destruction of the chicken flock. Many groupements have expressed great demand for a much-expanded 1983 campaign as Newcastle disease is endemic in the area and returns every year at a specific time.

An even more impressive benefit might be achieved in 1983 by

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the control of "chenilles" (*lafygma frugiperda*) that attack corn fields periodically. Only five hectares were treated in 1982 as an emergency measure; but this amounted to a saving of \$870 if the 389 marmites harvested on those 5 ha were sold at an average price of three gourdes. Indeed, a corn field is totally lost once it has been attacked by the pest. Of course, one can replant after a few weeks; however, only twenty-five percent (25 %) of a normal harvest should be expected as the lost time reduces the harvest by one-half while there exists a fifty percent (50 %) probability that the plague - depending on the rainfall - will return. Fourteen groupements have already announced plans for spraying insecticide on 104 ha of land during the current season. Extrapolating the same estimates, this will mean a saving on the order of \$1700.

Another direct benefit of GPP comes from the time group members spend on other members' fields. This expenditure of time can be allocated either on the day of the regular groupement meeting or on any other working day, although the former appears to be more frequent. Most frequently, however, the groupement will perform an activity - such as clearing a field - as if it were a traditional work gang. However, we have also observed the construction of drywalls for soil protection, an activity which traditional work gangs would not normally undertake. The owner of the plot will obtain the labor of his fellow members either for free or at a cut rate. Meanwhile, the proceeds do not go to the members but rather into the savings of the groupement.

Such a cooperative work arrangement has at least three distinct advantages: (1) it makes the "hiring" of labor possible in a population starved for cash without forcing members into unattractive credit arrangements; (2) it spreads around the benefits from the groupements' available labor power instead of concentrating them on the well-to-do as traditional work arrangements tended to do; and (3) it accelerates the savings accumulation of the groupement and thus moves the groupement further ahead to the point where more profitable investments can be made.

5.2 Intangible benefits for the project area

The most important benefit of the project so far has been the creation of twenty-eight fully functioning groupements and thirty-eight more which are nearing the completion of their training period. This is a significant step in the direction of the ultimate goal: the creation of a more autonomous peasantry capable of defining and defending its own best interest in social, economic, and political terms. The project area has an estimated population of 4000 adults engaged in farming (accepting, at this point, the overall population estimate of 9000 for the project area as determined by the project staff). Almost one thousand of them are participating in groupements in one form or another and 410 are fully signed up. As the numbers increase, so will the social and economic importance of the movement.

The quality of the groupements might well be even more important than their number. They are small, operate in

relatively democratic ways, and have stayed alive despite the absence, over considerable periods of time, of direct material benefits to the individual members. It appears that a unique new component has been introduced into the social structure of rural Haiti. This component has the potential of mobilizing the poor into becoming significant partners in the development process.

Other intangible - or at least not easily measurable - benefits for the project area consist in the public information campaigns as well as the infrastructural improvements GPP has embarked upon. Fountains have been dug out, the capping of water sources is under way, and a process of non-formal education covering topics from women's and family problems to alphabetization has started. But it should be stressed that the success of GPP does not depend on such "traditional" development activities. If it can create functioning groupements and codify a methodology of rural animation by which this is achieved, then it will have fully justified its existence and cost.

5.3 Monetary costs of GPP

An evaluation mission cannot and should not play the role of an audit of project finances. Nevertheless, I cannot conceal my amazement at the difficulties of obtaining even approximate figures concerning project expenditures. Neither the local administrator in Bayonnais (who was new on the job), nor Caritas/Gonaives, CRS/Port-au-Prince, nor AID produced any breakdowns of project expenditures when asked

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to do so. (This may in part be attributable to the short amount of research time in the capital city that was available to the evaluation team.) Budget items (i.e. expenditures anticipated at some time in the past) were the best information I could obtain, followed by assurances that the project had overall remained well within its budget and even been slow in spending in certain budget categories.

These comments should in no way be read as criticisms of the staff persons involved. Quite the contrary, they all strike me as competent and honest professionals. Their experience may even tell them that, as long as there are no burning budgetary problems, it is better just to leave things alone. It was nonetheless clear that not only did they not have the figures at their fingertips; but neither were they using accounting procedures designed to facilitate the breakdown of expenditures by year and by budget item. Accounting is an important aspect of administration and administration is the weakest aspect of the GPP project.

According to budget, year one of the project cost \$296,000, year two cost \$253,000, and year three, \$262,000. By April 1983, two-thirds of year three had elapsed and with it a proportional amount of the financial resources had been spent, i.e. \$175,000. It appears that the cost overruns in construction have been made up by reduced expenditures on salaries and other items. According to administrators in both AID and CRS offices, overall disbursement is somewhat behind schedule, indicating that the \$724,000 allocated up

to April 1983 has not been spent entirely. But it can be estimated reasonably that by the time of this writing (June 1983), close to \$725,000 have been spent on the project (not including CRS overhead), three-quarters of which funds were provided by AID with the remainder coming from CRS.

5.4 Non-monetary costs of GPP

There are some recurrent problems which can be observed in Haitian development projects and to which GPP is no exception. One of them is that rural projects tend to stimulate urban growth because most of the funds allocated to a project find their way back to Port-au-Prince, if, in fact, they ever left the capital in the first place.

The following estimates can provide no more than a general idea of the demographic effect of urban-centered project expenditures. At present, some \$15,000 are spent on the project during an average month, or \$180,000 per year. Most of it is going into salaries and, out of that total, only a very small part is spent on local salaries and living expenses, probably amounting to no more than \$20,000 per year. Adding to this the rents and salaries paid for animator housing and work on the experimental plot (less than \$10,000 per annum), we find that no more than twenty percent (20 %) of current operational expenditures are disbursed in Bayonnais. The remainder flows back to urban and foreign locations. This happens despite the explicitly rural focus of the project, its very low dependence on imported goods, and its exclusively Haitian staff.

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Part of the \$150,000 going to the city will eventually move on to foreign places in payment of imported goods. But the profits, taxes, and multiplier effects are concentrated in Port-au-Prince, and if one-half of the money is put to work there, it will create an estimated 250 lower class jobs in the capital, and finance the survival of 500 people.

These estimates may be open to debate. However, there can be little doubt that these urban-centered expenditures increase the rural-urban disparities and stimulate migration to Port-au-Prince. The migrants may not actually come from the project area, and there may be little that can be done about the process in general. The 1971 census methodology does not permit an assessment of rural emigration rates by arrondissement, and the pertinent Bayonnais baseline study data have yet to be analyzed as of this writing. However, initial qualitative data suggest that migration from the project area has thus far been weak and of recent origin. But, while migration may be a good thing for the migrants involved (indicators such as protein intake, morbidity, and infant mortality show that life in Port-au-Prince slums and squatter settlements is actually "better" than in the starving countryside), it clearly drains the countryside of its most educated and, in some respects, its most enterprising elements.

There are other non-monetary costs of the project which are even less tangible but just as real. We might, for example, mention the agricultural extension services previously

listed as benefits. Both the control of Newcastle chicken disease and of the pests attacking corn can have the potential of creating substantial savings, but these savings come at the cost of greater dependency on imported vaccine and other chemicals. If successful, these campaigns will increase the peasants' investment in chicken and corn as well as their vulnerability in the event that the imported chemicals are not supplied in time when needed. Currently, the project staff have been able, thanks to their excellent connections in Damiens and their willingness to pay cash, to supply these items at about one-fifth of market prices. It is not at all certain that peasants will have these resources available once the project ends. Such activities have the potential to benefit the larger farmers disproportionately since they are the ones most likely to be able to mobilize the necessary resources on their own account.

If the project succeeds in institutionalizing effective peasant organization, the increased dependency on foreign inputs will be far outweighed by the increased earnings made possible by the modern technology. At this point, however, we do well to take increased dependency into account as one of the non-monetary costs of the project.

5.5 The balance of costs and benefits

All of the monetary cost of the project so far is borne by foreign donors, mainly the U.S. government. Long-term multiplier effects may well offset this cost, dollar for

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dollar, in the future. However, it would be unreasonable to expect this to happen within the operational life-span of the project. Although there have been some costly errors, especially in the construction program, the money seems generally to have been spent wisely. The administrative personnel have been honest and accountable, and, in light of the pace of advancement, this has not been an expensive project. It should be noted that only one foreign staff member has been hired. This allows for an enormous saving on salaries, accommodations, equipment, etc., and represents a departure from the great majority of foreign development projects where foreign staffing is one of the largest budget expenses.

Benefits have now started to accrue to the project area in terms of peasant organization, agricultural extension, and the provision of infrastructure and non-formal education. But the non-monetary costs have also been borne by the local peasant population and a concern about these costs will have to rank high on the priority list of project staff. They appear to be able and willing to face the challenge of promoting "development for autonomy" at the grass-roots level.

5.6 The spread of benefits

Foreign-sponsored development aid has long been notorious for spreading the benefits unequally among and within target populations. Rural credit, irrigation, and agricultural extension services have a tendency to favor larger land

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owners as have many other projects. The worst offenders are usually those schemes which introduce new technology, new crops (of the "miracle" variety), mechanization and the like. They provide new resources which disproportionately benefit those farmers who already rank high in the local stratification system.

GPP has an excellent record as far as the spread of benefits is concerned. Groupements are expected to function in a democratic and egalitarian fashion, to be open to members of all economic strata, and to counterbalance existing local hierarchies. The lengthy process of training preceding the formation of each groupement stresses these elements and illustrates them with visual material prepared by the project's artist. There can be no doubt that the members accept this egalitarian orientation with enthusiasm.

The practice of groupement activity tends to support this ideological orientation in at least three ways. First, there is the emphasis on productive activity (as opposed to commerce). All members gather at least once weekly for work in the fields. Since none of the local elite (speculators, miliciens, pasteurs, policemen, merchants, and the like) will agree to perform manual labor, the recruitment into groupements is a selective process that necessarily excludes the top stratum of the local hierarchy. Second, membership in most of the groupements has been acquired by participation rather than by payment of membership fees or acquisition of shares in a common venture. I have raised

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this point repeatedly in discussions with both peasant members and project staff since the monthly contributions appear to me to be more than what the poorest peasants could afford. I have become convinced that cash contributions to the groupement treasury quite frequently consist of the salaries paid for participation in groupement work gangs. In other words, the members in many groupements contribute their labor, in effect, rather than dues taken out of other savings. Finally, the conflicts reported by animators and groupement presidents invariably involve groupements standing up for the "little guy" victimized by official abuses, exploitative credit arrangements, or just plain bad luck. It is also quite evident that at least some of the groupements see themselves as an organizations distinct from and at odds with the local community councils. The latter, of course, are dominated by the local economic elite.

The picture should not, however, be overdrawn. There are also indications of overlapping membership and leadership between groupements and community councils. I have been able to determine the CAC memberships among the "responsables" (presidents, secretaries and treasurers) of twenty-four groupements. Out of the total of seventy-two groupement "responsables", there were thirteen who stated CAC membership and another thirteen who were holding an office in their CAC. Since the total CAC and groupement memberships among the local population is not known at this time, we cannot say whether this overlapping membership is more or less than might normally be expected (based on

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statistical probability). Yet it is quite clearly wrong to see all groupements as standing completely outside of and in opposition to the CAC. Such is not the case. CAC members by and large rank above average in the local stratification system. The Bayonnais baseline study has found them to possess a significantly greater number of consumption items (such as tin roofs, furniture, and radios) than CAC non-members. It is thus likely that those groupement office holders who are also CAC members rank above the local average, too. But at this point it is impossible to say whether this is indicative of the groupements' disproportional recruiting of the better-off peasants. In view of what has been said above, this is quite unlikely. Once analyzed, the baseline study data will provide the answer to this question.

A similar point can be raised with respect to religion. Preliminary evidence from the baseline study indicates that there are roughly twenty-five percent (25 %) Protestants (including all non-Catholics) in the project area. The study further shows that their consumption status is significantly above average, irrespective of CAC membership. I have been able to determine the religion of eighty-two "responsables" from twenty-eight groupements and have found that fifty-three percent (53 %) of them were Protestants. Again, we cannot determine at this point if this percentage holds for the general membership of the groupements nor whether it is a product of selective recruitment among the not-so-poor. Some aspects of groupement member training

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resemble Protestant Church meetings quite closely and it is not impossible that the two movements have a common recruitment base. Further analysis of groupement developement will show whether this should constitute a reason for concern for project staff and the egalitarian thrust of their work.

Yet these comments concerning membership in CAC and Protestant Churches do not point to serious problems at this stage. As long as commerce is shunned and labor-intensive work is emphasized, then GPP will continue to be one of the most egalitarian efforts at rural development of which I am aware.

6. Recommendations

The following recommendations are based on three premises. First, I accept the basic ideological orientation of GPP as developed in the papers leading up to the project paper. That is, small-scale, cooperative, relatively autonomous peasant groups engaging in common economic ventures and capital accumulation - in short, what are called groupements - are a promising tool for rural development in Haiti. Second, given the availability of foreign aid funds, it is likely that GPP will survive in any event. These recommendations are thus aimed not at saving the project but rather towards helping it achieve its original objectives. Third, there is always a hierarchy to recommendations. The first recommendation is so preeminent that, were it to be followed, the others become irrelevant by comparison. Conversely, should it be disregarded, then the other recommendations by themselves will hardly be of much use. For this reason, my recommendations are of a general nature.

1. THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE PROJECT MUST BE COORDINATED BY ONE PERSON, BACKED BY A BOARD OF GOVERNORS, ENJOYING BROAD POWERS, CLEARLY DEFINED LINES OF COMMUNICATION, SPECIFIED SHARES OF AUTHORITY, AND SUFFICIENT RESOURCES AT HIS DISPOSAL.

This coordinator is not to be placed in competition with the Executive Director, but rather to become his collaborator. There is no way in sight of making the current executive director work even approximately full-time for GPP. Yet

there must be one person who will implement decisions, follow up on policy changes, has at all times a precise idea of the major developments and options, and has access to sufficient resources.

He must be given direct access to the director of CRS and the director of Caritas/Gonaives and their assistants. He must be present most of the time in Bayonnais; however, he should meet once each week with CRS in Port-au-Prince or Gonaives and with Caritas in Gonaives or Bayonnais.

He must be supported by a board of governors consisting of the directors of CRS and Caritas/Gonaives, a delegate from AID/Haiti, the executive director of GPP, and the heads of the technology, analysis, and communications (animation) sections. (This board should meet once a month in Gonaives to consult with the coordinator.)

Much of the bureaucratic nonsense, the frustration and anger, and the inefficiencies and delays in GPP could have been avoided if lines of communication had stayed open, if decisions had been implemented, and if mistakes had been caught before they became too costly. CRS is preoccupied with its own problems and other projects; meanwhile, the one person at CRS who enjoys the complete trust of the GPP team is overextended. AID does not and should not mingle too much in the affairs of the project, while Caritas cannot spare staff for GPP. The person must come from the GPP team.

There is one person who combines the required personal and intellectual qualities and the trust of all sides: Carl Monde. A new job description should be drawn up for him.

2. The combination of GPP and RDRC in one project should be abandoned. It involves too many contradictory needs and it is by no means sure that anyone will ever need an RDRC beyond the successful continuation of GPP.

3. The new board of governors is to endorse the re-written project paper as submitted by the executive director. If he has not yet submitted it formally, the he should receive energetic help in doing so.

4. The connection of Marc-Antoine Noel with the project should be terminated officially. This is to be done, in recognition of his considerable service to GPP, in an atmosphere of gratitude and festivity.

5. A schedule should be drawn up for all remaining evaluations of GPP including a mechanism for the rapid communication of results and for compelling and enforcing necessary changes should the evaluations believe such measures to be important.

6. The relations between groupements and the local Community Councils and other centers of power and authority should be monitored closely. GPP has now moved into a phase where members and groupements may become targets of outside

pressures. Such problems must be anticipated so that the appropriate responses can be devised ahead of time. Further, good relations with political and church officials should be maintained at all times.

7. The data collection activities of the project must be strengthened. This should involve keeping a journal for each groupement's activities and membership, the systematic documentation of the evolution of the numbers of groupements, their members, the amount of groupement savings, etc.

8. A follow-up to the original baseline study should be carried out (as planned) by an individual possessing the necessary skills and experience. The collaboration of the analysis section should be solicited in this regard. The entire operation should be clear and straightforward, and the results of the study should be made available as soon as possible at the end of the fourth year of GPP financing.

9. The technology section should limit its activities to a small number of experiments promising low risk and high return. It should receive the necessary budget and infrastructure for those activities as soon as possible.

10. The upgrading of animators should be continued. Particular attention is to be given to the training and the activities of female animators since they carry out a mission almost unknown to the area.

11. The project should push ahead with plans for agricultural credit, storage facilities, and a cooperative store. It should not, however, attempt to provide a full range of agricultural extension services.

12. At the start of the fourth year (September 1983), there should be an official recognition of the GPP team by the sponsoring agencies, including cash bonuses for each member in reward for having worked with devotion, intelligence, and stamina under extremely difficult circumstances. Such a celebration should help disperse the clouds of confusion and distrust between GPP and CRS.

13. The construction of the center at Cator should be terminated at once, leaving a functional structure. Highest priority should go to those items necessary for the operations of the technology section.

14. The financing of GPP should be extended, at approximately current levels (indexed for inflation), contingent upon:

a) a satisfactory solution to the administrative problem.

b) the continued monitoring of all groupements and the creation of a sufficient number of new ones (which number is to be taken from the revised project paper).

c) the continued maintenance of close relations and exchanges with similar projects.

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Annex 1 Report on the 1983 evaluation of GPP

The field work of this evaluation was carried out between 7 and 30 April 1983 in Haiti. Most of this time was spent on site in Bayonnais although weekends in Port-au-Prince were used to coordinate the activities of the three evaluators (see Annex to Part Five, Common Scope of Work). The evaluation team was preceded by a preparatory phase in Montreal (fifteen days) much of which time was devoted to the preparation of the GPP baseline data so that these could be of some use for the evaluation. These data have considerable value despite their having been collected by personnel unfamiliar with quantitative analysis of census and survey materials. After the field work, data analysis and the writing of the report took place in Montreal.

The evaluation received support from the staff of the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in Haiti, the agency responsible for project administration; however, since CRS was at the time undergoing some re-organization and being headed by an interim director flown in from Senegal, the agency was unable to take initiatives and follow the evaluation in detail. USAID provided logistical support whenever necessary. Special mention must be made of the support provided by Creative Associates of Washington, D.C; its staff proved

exceptionally capable and cooperative.

The outstanding feature of this evaluation was that it was part of an effort to compare the performance of three projects. The emphasis was thus on analysis much more than on description, especially since an enormously detailed descriptive evaluation had been submitted only three months earlier (by Ira Lowenthal). Differences between the three projects made this comparison more challenging and difficult. But it is to be hoped that it nevertheless succeeded in articulating both the strengths and the weaknesses of the project.

The GPP baseline study is still in the process of being analyzed. Only a very few of its results have been included (as an annex) in this report. However, the data are now finally available to project staff, the agency, and hopefully to other interested parties. The results contain detailed descriptions of the target population and their economic activities - more so than the data available for either Gros-Morne or PDCC. A follow-up study ("End of Project Study") will thus be particularly worthwhile if it is so structured as to measure the project benefits accruing to the target population.

ANNEX 2 CURRENT GPP STAFFMONTHLY SALARIES: YEAR III: GROUPEMENT PILOT PROJECT

CRS FUNDS

TECHNOLOGIECANTAVE JEAN-BAPTISTE (AGRONOMIST) (TECH. I) HEAD OF
SECTION;

FRITZ LEGER (ASSISTANT AGRICOLE).

USAID FUNDS

TECHNOLOGIE

DAVID NICOLAS (AGRONOMIST)

ANALYSE

CARL MONDE

GUY DALLEMAND (CONSULTANT)

ADMINISTRATION

NORMAND ETIENNE (ADMINISTRATEUR)

JEAN JOUBERT (CHAUFFEUR)

DOCUMENTATION

YANNICK BOULET (SECRETAIRE DE DIRECTION/DOCUMENTALISTE)

UMIDE FRANCOIS (DACTYLOGRAPHE)

MARIE-LUCE AUDATE (DACTYLOGRAPHE)

COMMUNICATION/ORGANISATIONCHAVANNES JEAN-BAPTISTE (ALSO EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
& DIRECTEUR DE SECTION)

FRANTZ JEAN MARIE (ARTISTE)

GONTRAN JEAN-BAPTISTE

MARIUS TELUS

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JEAN-CLAUDE JEAN-LOUIS

JEAN-ROBERT DELINOIS

ANTENOR JOSEPH

CHARITABLE JEAN-LOUIS

GERTRUDE MONDESIR

MARIE-FRANCOISE PAUL

MARGUERITE ETIENNE

DELIVRANCE DECIUS

PERSONNEL D'APPUI (INTENDANCE)

NICOLE JEAN-CHARLES

DACIUS ALCENAT

JAUSLINE JOSEPH

RESILIA LOUIS

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PART FIVE

5. The Three Projects Compared

5.1 Original goals and current priorities

As we have seen in the previous chapters, the three rural development projects under review here have very different histories of conceptualization, funding, and goal implementation. They have in common not so much an objective as a strategy. Indeed, there is considerable disagreement over the nature of the legitimate objectives of such projects. This disagreement has led to some low-level conflict between the GPP and the Gros-Morne leadership. Perhaps a vague statement about the stimulation of local initiative and the improvement of local living standards and infrastructure can best describe common areas of project agreement.

At the initial planning stage - this refers to the project papers of GPP and the PDCC and to the phase II plans of Gros-Morne - we observe some similarities in project goals: center construction, animator training, non-formal education programs, introduction of new agricultural technology, agricultural extension, and some popular hygiene items like latrines. However, as time went by, these items acquired very different priority rankings in the daily operations of the three projects. Alphabetization programs are pursued actively at Gros-Morne and Chambellan while they are at most a discussion topic at GPP. Infrastructural improvements such as roads and fountains have been implemented at PDCC, hardly even begun at GPP, and treated as items of secondary

importance at Gros-Morne. Further, the very concept of leadership is given different interpretations in all three projects. Leadership training can thus hardly be considered the same thing for each of them.

All three projects have undergone significant changes over the years. At GPP, these alterations have been associated with a de facto change in leadership. But the most significant changes have, predictably, taken place at Gros-Morne, the eldest of the three projects. This project began as a rather conventional rural development project with the objective of improving conditions by building upon existing institutions where the key stimulus comes from outside and from above. It has since evolved into an innovative experiment pursuing largely economic goals without relying much upon the existing local leadership.

At the risk of exaggeration, one can generalize that at this point PDCC pursues largely conventional goals by conventional means. Their list of goals reads as if it were drawn up by a model project that followed early 1970's AID guidelines; it is even drawn up in the form of a "Logical Framework Matrix" used widely a decade ago. PDCC appears also to have few qualms about strengthening local institutions despite the fact that more recent writings, including analyses produced by AID, have pointed consistently to the role these institutions play in perpetuating economic inequality.

Gros-Morne has shelved this conventional approach in favor of an alternative effort to pursue essentially conventional goals by innovative means. The conventional goal is economic - the mobilization of savings - but the means for achieving this no longer include any reliance upon community councils, neither as an administrative tool nor as a recruitment base. Even the training of new groupements has shifted away from a centralized staff and facility; the policy has now moved towards the training of groupements by groupements themselves.

GPP appears to be the most radical of the three projects. Peasant autonomy, consciousness-raising, and the testing of methods to achieve these ends have been declared to be the paramount objective of this "pilot" project. Everything else is seen as secondary. The instrument for the realization of this goal is the powerless peasant himself - only in this way can he be given a sense of his own worth, self-determination, and capacity to better his living conditions. No aid is disbursed, only advice is given. It can thus be said that, in the context of development aid, this project is pursuing an unconventional goal by innovative methods.

Of course, there are significant differences between rhetoric and action and this results in a higher degree of convergence between the three projects than the generalizations about means and ends would otherwise lead us to expect. There is, for example, considerable pressure

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upon GPP to "deliver", that is, to achieve the more conventional goals simply because they are less elusive, more tangible and directly measurable. These sorts of traditional results are more readily seen as compelling evidence of "success" in the eyes of some agency personnel in Port-au-Prince and abroad. PDCC, on the other hand, seems to have learnt that the policy of satisfying the wishes of local leaders (by providing infrastructure on a food-for-work basis) may well do more for the leaders than for the target population itself.

There are also similarities in the mechanisms for dispensing aid resources. All three projects have had problems with their local administrators in this regard. These administrators occupy an intermediate position between the down-to-earth practitioners in the field and the administrative personnel at the head office. They have to respond to difficult and often conflicting demands: the practical necessities and enthusiasm of the field practitioners pull them in one direction while the demands of the entrenched bureaucracy pulls them in another. It is not surprising then that these contradictory forces have overwhelmed many such administrators and caused them to leave. GPP currently has on staff its third administrator, Gros-Morne a fifth, while PDCC has similarly undergone many administrative changes. Administrative turbulence is endemic to these projects, a phenomenon which is bound to have negative effects on the continuity of project work and upon staff morale. However, the high rate of administrative

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turnover has not created any leadership vacuum at GPP or at Gros-Morne, probably due to the exceptional personal qualities of their directors. In the case of PDCC, we have been unable to explore this particular issue in any depth.

5.2 The pace of advancement

The only previous comprehensive evaluation done of GPP concluded that the project had been progressing "at a breackneck" speed despite serious staff shortages. Such exaggeration is no longer necessary. GPP has achieved considerable progress of late, realized several of its objectives, and above all has developed and tested a very successful technique of peasant mobilization.

In some respects, however, GPP is behind schedule. Many of the activities planned for the technology section have barely begun, the center remains incomplete in several key areas, staff is still one member short of the planned number, and several goals have quite simply been eliminated from the project paper. It is likely that GPP will reach its fundamental objective and that the quality of the groupements will surpass the most optimistic expectations. In overall terms, however, GPP has made no more than normal progress, a situation that derives mainly from a series of administrative errors and bottlenecks. This is in itself a considerable achievement; all other aid and development activities in the Upper Bayonnais Valley (ONAAC, Fonds Agricole, et al.) have proven far less successful.

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The pace of advancement at Gros-Morne has been more spectacular. Some 800 groupements have been formed, more than 450 of which are said to be functioning at present (conservative estimates put the active number at around 300). It is quite evident from the results of the present evaluation that, on the basis of several objective measures (number of groupements, amount of credit extended, agricultural extension activities, non-formal education) this project has made good progress. It has been able to attain certain objectives ahead of schedule on occasion and has generally proven to be a success.

It must be added immediately, however, that Gros-Morne groupements have very different characteristics from those found at Bayonnais. They can be short-lived while at GPP they are seen as permanent. Gros-Morne groupements are permitted to limit their activity to a single commercial venture that, although may be financed jointly, may be carried out by one individual alone. Meanwhile, all GPP groupements demand a much more regular, dedicated, and time-consuming involvement on the part of their members. The training of Gros-Morne groupement members can take only a few hours (although this is not necessarily the rule) whereas training takes six to twelve weeks at GPP.

The pace of advancement of PDCC has not been studied systematically in this evaluation, but we can make some brief comments on the nature of its activities. As is the case with most other "young" projects, PDCC does not attempt

to accomplish everything at once; rather, it begins by emphasizing certain tasks ahead of others. This initial period of emphasis has come to favor its construction program. To date, eight kilometers of road have been completed, a slaughterhouse and several social centers have become operational, and many peasants now have access to potable water where they did not have it before.

The pace of groupement formation at PDCC is more difficult to evaluate. The project "works with" the existing community councils and community groups and only the "strategic groups" can be considered, to some extent, to have resulted from PDCC stimulation. These strategic groups become involved in the usual spectrum of activities that seek to upgrade agricultural production techniques and the like. At this point, it is difficult to say how far these groups have advanced or whether PDCC has succeeded in enhancing a significant portion of members' economic activities.

One element common to all three projects is that they have all spent less than their total allocation of funds. In the eyes of some administrators, this may be a sign of project delay or inaction or that the target area lacks the necessary absorptive capacity. PDCC is said to have spent close to ninety percent (90 %) of their allotted funds, GPP around eighty-five percent (85 %), and Gros-Morne approximately seventy-five percent (75 %). Such figures, however, may be very misleading. GPP, for instance, has

saved significant sums each year by declining to hire foreign professionals. Yet at the same time it has overspent on center construction, the baseline survey, and on a few other items. Taking this into consideration, GPP is certainly not behind schedule in disbursing funds for the attainment of stated project goals. Gros-Morne has accumulated the largest reserves while also engaging in a rapidly accelerating agricultural credit campaign. This credit program is eminently sensible in an economy starved for capital; however, this sort of operation can have a snowball effect which might deplete project coffers and thereby leave unfulfilled the high expectations of the area population. Reserves are thus essential to this enterprise and it would not be wise to conclude from past disbursement patterns that the Gros-Morne project does not require all of its allotted funding.

5.3 Project impact


5.3.1 The target population

All three projects share the goal of improving the conditions of the rural poor in Haiti. Yet none of them at this point has any objective means of assessing whether their activities are "on target". All three enjoy some measure of cooperation from individuals who are clearly not amongst the poorest of rural residents. Ideally the projects would be aiming towards improving the living standards of something like the lower sixty percent (60 %) of the target area population, as illustrated in the

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following figure:

FIGURE 5-1: TARGET POPULATION OF THE THREE PROJECTS



- 1: Carreaux of land worked
- 2: Ownership of consumption items
- 3: Value of animals owned

Source: GPP baseline data; n = 888 households (ownership of consumption items) and n = 142 individuals (carreaux of land worked and value of animals owned)

Figure 5-1 shows the extremely high degree of economic inequality found in the Bayonnais target population. The distribution of land, animals, and consumption items is extremely skewed, with a small number of families controlling most of the means of production (land and animals) and enjoying the highest levels of consumption. Comparable data are not available at this time for PDCC and Gros-Morne, but it can be safely assumed that the level of inequality amongst their respective area populations is similar to that of Bayonnais.


Do the three projects really reach deep into the heart of their respective target populations? There are some indications that they have experienced limited success in incorporating poor peasants into groupements and "strategic groups". At GPP, poor landowners have benefitted from rotating work arrangements which have reduced their costs for a variety of activities by as much as fifty percent (50 %). At Gros-Morne, groupements have purchased products at harvest time from their own members and have thus provided a guaranteed market. In the case of PDCC, group members have obtained temporary employment in infrastructural construction work.

But this is not the whole story. While the emphasis on manual work and the discouragement of commercial ventures have dissuaded better-off residents from becoming groupement members in GPP, the Gros-Morne emphasis on commerce has attracted many of the more well-to-do peasants to the latter

project's groupements. With respect to PDCC, close cooperation with the Conseils d'action communautaire has made it quite likely that well-to-do peasants and the local elites rank amongst the chief beneficiaries of that project. Figures 5-2 to 5-4 provide the estimated ranges of beneficiaries for the three projects as they would appear to be effectively distributed over the target area populations.


FIGURE 5-2:

ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFICIARIES
OF THE THREE PROJECTS: GROS-MORNE




- 1: Carreaux of land worked
- 2: Ownership of consumption items
- 3: Value of animals owned

FIGURE 5-3: ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFICIARIES
OF THE THREE PROJECTS: GPP



- 1: Carreaux of land worked
- 2: Ownership of consumption items
- 3: Value of animals owned

FIGURE 5-4: ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFICIARIES
OF THE THREE PROJECTS: PDCC



- 1: Carreaux of land worked
- 2: Ownership of consumption items
- 3: Value of animals owned

The estimates in Figures 5-2 to 5-4 will require verification by ongoing research on each of the projects - research activities that GPP staff seem better equipped and more highly motivated to conduct than their counterparts at Gros-Morne and PDCC. The ultimate verification of this evaluation's findings can only be obtained by conducting household-level surveys once the projects have been completed. Comparison of the results of these surveys with the baseline studies will yield a vast amount of useful and important evaluative information.

With respect to PDCC, it is the conventionality of its approach and its smooth insertion into the existing system of stratification which leads us to expect an inegalitarian spread of project benefits. Road construction, rural infrastructure improvement, and agricultural extension activity are undertakings whose top-down organization will always tend to benefit farmers in direct proportion to the quantity of land owned. It is clear that better-off peasants should be expected to reap far more from such structure of activity than the mass of poorer peasants. It would thus come as a great surprise were this not to be the case at PDCC.

GPP, on the other hand, has no official involvement with the local authorities and the Conseils d'action communautaire, and it has an effective mechanism for the exclusion of better-off peasants from membership. Its level of goal attainment, savings accumulation, and application of new

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technology will have to be understood on the basis of such a deliberate policy of bottom-up development. Of all the three projects, GPP is the one which appears to be most closely "on target" in terms of reaching and organizing the rural poor.

5.3.2 Economic Impact

All three projects seek to have a direct economic impact on three separate levels:

1. improvement in productivity
2. raising of incomes of project participants
3. raising of incomes and general improvement of living conditions in the target area.

In addition to the above objectives, the three projects aspire to attain several other objectives which will have an indirect but nevertheless substantive economic impact, too:

4. upgrading of project staff skills (human capital) which will increase their income-saving capacity
5. location of service centers far from the capital city which will have multiplier effects in rural areas and provincial towns
6. raising local literacy levels which will serve to increase the earnings potential of the local population
7. improving health conditions which will, through reduction of morbidity and mortality, increase the local labor force

Let us now address these seven general objectives and assess their respective degrees of attainment in each of the three

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projects (where information allows). By evaluating the impact of the projects on their respective target areas, we shall be in a better position to discuss the potential for further accomplishments should these projects be continued for another three years.

(1) Improvement of productivity

At Gros-Morne, productivity has been increased in a variety of ways, principally in the area of animal husbandry. There have been three major campaigns undertaken to upgrade poultry production. The battle against Newcastle chicken disease is conducted vigorously and there have been several vaccination campaigns for livestock. Fishfarming, beekeeping, and rabbit-raising have also been introduced into the area. Unfortunately, there are no available records or estimates of the amount of loss prevented or productivity gains added by means of these activities. But given that the project is relatively old, large, well-established, and accustomed to working with hundreds of groupements, the productivity improvements must certainly amount to well into the tens of thousands of dollars.

For GPP, we can make some more precise estimates of productivity gains. Although the project and its activities are younger, there is nonetheless evidence of significant potential. The savings achieved in the campaign against Newcastle chicken disease came to \$3640 for the first

campaign and can be expected to rise to \$10,920 during 1983. The lafygma frugiperda campaign, run initially on a small scale, saved \$870 in 1982 and can be expected to save \$17,000 in 1983 (based on orders received from groupements by April of 1983). The technology section estimates that the combination of using improved varieties and better spacing can increase corn yields by ten to twenty-five percent (10 to 25 %) during the first year. Controlled experiments have been run among several groupements with excellent results. Should the animation (communications) section reach its goal of enlisting 1500 groupement members (approximately one-half of the adult population - see annex for population estimates) and improving one-half of their production activity by twenty-five percent (25 %), this would result in the addition of \$62,500 to the \$500,000 annual product of the target area. This would represent a very promising 12.5 % increase in productivity. It is the opinion of this evaluator that this figure is well within reach.

In the case of PDCC, there is no adequate information available at this time with respect to productivity increases and savings accumulation. In view of the more conventional nature of this project, one would expect certain agricultural extension activities to work rather well. It should also be added that it is likely that the larger landowners have profitted disproportionately from the availability of such services.

(2) Raising incomes of project participants

Assuming rural per capita incomes of \$100 per year - which may be a realistic figure for Gros-Morne and Chambellan but a rather optimistic estimate for the Bayonnais region - it is evident that a single successful intervention by an aid project may well have the potential of increasing rural incomes significantly. Just one year without Newcastle chicken disease in the Bayonnais area would probably alone produce a two percent (2 %) rise in PCI. But there are other activities which offer far greater income potential. Post-harvest storage silos that have begun operation in Gros-Morne can easily double or triple profits for farmers. One could anticipate a sharp multiplier effect in that profits now accruing to urban-based travelling intermediaries (madam sara and their agents) would stay within the region and in part be re-invested in the project areas.

These travelling intermediaries nevertheless continue to fulfill some important functions at present. Although the purchase of harvests ahead of time serves to depress peasants' profits, it also supplies credit for small-scale peasant farmers who would be otherwise unable to obtain such funds through official channels. Sadly enough, the peasants have quite frequently used this credit for consumption - survival between harvests - as much as for the financing of the next planting. They frequently have no alternative other than to accept the credit and pay the exorbitant interest costs (30 % per month is quite common). It is

quite apparent, however, that the general principle of providing limited credit to the farmer has the potential of generating comparatively large savings.

Gros-Morne has taken the lead in both storage and credit projects. Although it is not possible to determine the number of farmers profiting from the storage silos already installed and the proportion of their produce that goes to the silos, we can at least assess the role played by credit schemes under project guidance. During the first four months of 1983, over \$13,000 has been injected in the form of credit. This is merely the latest result of an expanding credit program that has witnessed enormous yearly increases in the amount of credit extended to peasants in the project area, averaging about 530% per annum since 1981. If this program is continued, it will prove of great benefit to all groupements and have a major impact in augmenting household incomes.

PDCC and GPP have yet to introduce their planned storage and credit programs, hence we have no systematic information on the potential for raising incomes in their project areas. However, the productivity increases discussed earlier are bound to increase peasant earnings within the target populations. Of course, these projects have little chance of catching up to the Gros-Morne level of achievement in this regard, even with another three years of activity.

(3) Raising of incomes and general improvement

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of living conditions in the target area ..

PDCC is one of the three projects which is most clearly oriented towards the target area population, at large rather than newly created peasant groups. The first two objectives of this enterprise are the "increased accessibility to at least three localities" and "increased accessibility of at least one new source of energy for commercial purposes." The ongoing collaboration with ONAAC, the Department of Agriculture, and local community groups gives a clear indication that the project wants to do good for the area as a whole in addition to helping the participating "strategic group" members. Whether this dual ambition will be realized remains to be seen.

Some of the activities in all three projects will necessarily benefit the entire regional populations. A slaughterhouse, potable water supplies, and the control of certain animal pests will enhance the living conditions of all area residents and not simply those of groupement members.

It would be naive, however, to interpret this general benefit as the most important output of these projects. The GPP and Gros-Morne projects are both dedicated to the cause of mobilizing peasant participation in a way that appeals to the self-interest of the peasants themselves. Tangible benefits that arise from such participation provide a powerful motive force and must therefore continue to remain visible and attainable if the movement is to endure. For

unlike malaria eradication campaigns or the upgrading of a public school system, the activities of the three projects must assume the nature of self-help efforts rather than the indiscriminate doling out of goods, services, and "foreign aid". In this way, peasants will come to appreciate their own capacity for improving their living conditions and remain actively engaged in the pursuit of a development that is both economic and humane.

The population at large will benefit in direct proportion to its participation in groupements rather than as a passive recipient of benefits that automatically derive from project activity. There are, however, some doubts about this which surface occasionally in regard to the "altruism" of groupement projects. One of the key accusations made by GPP staff against Gros-Morne is that the latter's heavy emphasis on commerce may actually increase local income disparities by effectively lowering the competitive position of non-members. In response to this charge, the Gros-Morne staff appears puzzled and annoyed and points to examples of patently generous, open, and unselfish attitudes and behaviour on the part of some of their groupements. They view commercial success as a blessing for the peasants. But, more importantly, they insist that the real "victims" in this zero-sum struggle over scarce resources are not villagers but rather urban-based intermediaries who are deprived of their lucrative Gros-Morne "turf" and must take their exploitative schemes elsewhere.

The point may never be proven conclusively. Suffice it to say that the projects can be extremely proud if they are able to improve the conditions of their members without adversely affecting the lives of non-members in the area.

(4) Upgrading of project staff skills

We have learnt much about staff training in these projects. Training seminars, trips to other projects and even to foreign universities have been financed by the projects. There is no doubt that, under the leadership of the GPP and Gros-Morne directors, dozens of local and professional animators have improved their skills and marketability. We have no means of assessing the economic impact of this training upon the target populations. However, it should be observed that only GPP has made the effort to channel upgraded staff directly into positions of greater responsibility at the future Rural Development Resource Center. This evaluator nevertheless finds this particular idea to be ill-conceived and does not recommend it as an appropriate project step. It would make considerably more sense to apply the improved human resource capacity to the project itself: this is where the personnel are most needed and where they can be put to good use without further delay.

(5) location of service centers and multiplier effects

The evaluations of Gros-Morne and PDCC make no reference to this issue. The case of GPP, however, may be taken as a standard illustration. The center at Cator was designed by a Port-au-Prince architect and built by a contractor from

nearby the capital city who brought in materials were largely imported to the area. Indeed, the only truly local input was sand and some menial labor which accounted for a negligible part of the construction budget.

Out of the total project operating costs, no more than twenty percent (20 %) goes toward local expenditure and even that proportion is almost entirely channelled back to urban areas. The dream of local multiplier effects is likely to remain just that: a dream. It would be most astonishing were the situation to be any different in NORE (PDCC) or GREPIN (Gros-Morne) from that which we have just described at CATOR (GPP). Even the most radically rural-oriented development projects have a tendency to stimulate urban and foreign economies more (in dollar values) than and often to the exclusion of the rural target areas themselves.

(6) Raising local literacy levels

As an economy modernizes, literacy becomes a prerequisite of upward mobility. The Gros-Morne and PDCC projects have taken measures to improve the literacy of participants and their families, although PDCC is presently refraining from school construction. Literacy in rural Haiti is a preparation for migration to cities and therefore cannot be a prime goal of projects whose chief objective is to enhance the capacity of peasants to survive the harsh life of the countryside. (Non-formal education is of course a completely different matter. It will be treated separately below.)

(7) Improving health conditions

Gros-Morne features a hospital, "health club" groupements, and other elements which are aimed directly at reducing morbidity and mortality rates. Their specific economic impact has yet to be measured, although it is much too early in the health campaign to see anything more than a modest gain to rural survival and any immediate benefits to the existing labor force. It should be mentioned, however, that an evaluation of health-related activities in the Gros-Morne project context has levelled heavy criticism at the whole operation (Koppenleitner and Koppenleitner, 1983).

A successful campaign to improve health in rural areas might actually produce results akin to those foreseen of literacy programs. As health and the treatment of illness improves, population pressures will mount. As the population level rises, an even greater proportion of rural residents will be compelled to leaving the starving countryside in hope of a better life in the cities and abroad. Only increased agricultural productivity and elevated rural income levels could keep an increasing rural population at home, yet these have proven to be elusive goals in the history of Haitian development.

5.3.3 Hypothetical extrapolation of income
increases in the three projects

Over the last two years the three projects have emphasized a wide range of activities. In the following analysis, I shall attempt to extrapolate the impact these activities are

likely to have upon the income levels of project participants. Two variables are taken into consideration as prime factors influencing the evolution of income streams: (1) the type of activity currently being undertaken, and (2) the stratification of the target population.

These projections are based not on plans which may or may not be realized, but rather on those programs which have already been implemented. Rural credit, for example, is a reality at Gros-Morne but only a fond hope in planning at GPP. Should GPP implement a credit scheme, then the extrapolation would have to be adjusted. The definition of the target population is taken from the descriptions of the evaluation team while my own assessment is based on the "conventionality" of a project (conventional project activities have inevitably favored the higher strata in the past).

All the estimates that have been made assume that the projects will perform optimally; in reality, there will no doubt be need for downward adjustments. In order to estimate the impact of project activity, project membership had to be standardized. We set the likely number of participants according to effective target strata and assumed an identical target area population of 4000 adults.

For GPP we assumed that it had succeeded in enrolling one-half of the adult population. We have seen that the GPP "saturation approach" in a relatively small target

population puts this goal within project reach. In the case of Gros-Morne where groupements are more temporary, we have assumed a high turnover rate but a constant average of thirty percent (30 %) of the adult population as members. The PDCC approach is very different, directing its activity much more towards infrastructural improvements which effectively benefit local elites. PDCC is thus able to organize only a much smaller proportion of the rural poor into capable and autonomous new groups. We assume that this project will reach directly about ten percent (10 %) of the area population.

Summarizing our estimates in a simplified form, we arrive at the following distribution of project beneficiaries according to economic strata (defined as quartiles of the overall income distribution):

Table 5-1 Estimated project beneficiaries
and their 1982 per capita incomes

Rank in local stratification	<u>GPP</u>		<u>Gros-Morne</u>		<u>PDCC</u>	
	<u>No. of members</u>	<u>PCI</u>	<u>No. of members</u>	<u>PCI</u>	<u>No. of members</u>	<u>PCI</u>
Quartile IV (Highest)	--	--	100	\$400	100	\$400
Quartile III	--	--	400	\$160	200	\$160
Quartile II	1000	\$80	400	\$80	100	\$80
Quartile I	1000	\$40	300	\$40	--	--

To repeat once more: this simplified estimate does not do justice to the real project operations. It accentuates difference, standardizes the 1982 base and serves only one purpose: to estimate and extrapolate existing results and to indicate that the projects de facto do not favor the same socio-economic strata. The per capita incomes of these strata differ (our basis for estimating them are World Bank yearbooks and our own observations) and the various programs pursued by these projects allow these strata to reap different benefits.

The final series of assumptions is presented in the table below. They pertain to the amount of annual real income improvement which can be expected from the project's most promising activities. In the case of GPP, the income impact of agricultural extension activities has been estimated with

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some precision. In the other projects, we have only been able to make rather loose approximations. The key message of the table is that programs such as extension services and credit tend to benefit farmers in proportion to the amount of land owned.

Table 5-2 Estimated annual income increase of development activities in three projects, by social stratum (in quartiles) in percent

Quartile	GPP			Gros-Morne			PDCC		
	<u>ext.</u>	<u>cred.</u>	<u>oth.</u>	<u>ext.</u>	<u>cred.</u>	<u>oth.</u>	<u>ext.</u>	<u>cred.</u>	<u>oth.</u>
IV(top)				25	20	10	25	--	45
III				20	15	10	20	--	30
II	15	--	5	15	10	10	15	--	20
I	10	--	5	10	5	10	--	--	--

Note: ext. = agricultural extension services
 cred. = small credit program
 oth.= other activities (including storage silos)

The benefits from extension activities increase with the strata due to the fact that these services, of which seed distribution and vaccination have been conducted by all three projects, are accentuating economies of scale. Credit is a big factor only in Gros-Morne, and although limited efforts are being made to keep access to credit open to all strata, there is every indication that "strong" groupements and "family" groupements enjoy a competitive advantage. The argument that none of the members of six documented Gros-Morne groupements were working with more than two carreaux of land does not prove the contrary. Only thirteen percent (13 %) of the population in Bayonnais have more than two carreaux of land with which to work; it can be assumed that the situation in Gros-Morne is quite similar. Further, Gros-Morne groupements do not confine their

recruiting campaigns to poor peasants.

Having made these assumptions, we can now assess the impact of (a) the selection of beneficiaries in the local stratification system, and (b) the selection of project activities. The results are summarized in the following table and graph.

Table 5-3 Total income projections of three projects assuming optimal performance and standardized 1982 membership, by quartiles of membership

		<u>GPP (n=2000)</u>	<u>G-M (n=1200)</u>	<u>PDCC (n=400)</u>
1982 (basis)	IV	--	\$40,000	\$40,000
	III	--	\$64,000	\$32,000
	II	\$80,000	\$32,000	\$8,000
	I	\$40,000	\$12,000	--
			<hr/>	<hr/>
	totals	\$120,000	\$158,000	\$80,000
1983 (Year 1)	IV	--	\$62,000	\$58,000
	III	--	\$96,000	\$41,600
	II	\$96,000	\$43,200	\$9,600
	I	\$46,000	\$15,000	--
			<hr/>	<hr/>
	totals	\$142,000	\$216,200	\$109,200
1984 (Year 2)	IV	--	\$96,100	\$84,100
	III	--	\$144,000	\$54,080
	II	\$115,200	\$58,300	\$11,520
	I	\$52,900	\$18,750	--
			<hr/>	<hr/>
	totals	\$168,100	\$317,170	\$149,700
Percent increase				
1982 - 1984		40.1 %	100.7 %	87.1 %

(Note: All figures are in U.S. dollars.)

The most striking result of this table is the doubling of total income over a two-year time span estimated for Gros-Morne. The average income of the 1200 beneficiaries is expected to rise from \$132 to \$264 while it is anticipated that the sum of incomes will reach \$317,000. The performance of PDCC is not far behind: an increase in average income levels of eighty-seven percent (87 %) which adds \$69,700 to the total sum of incomes realized. The gains of GPP are modest by comparison: a forty percent (40 %) increase in average incomes, adding \$48,100 to the local economy. In overall terms, however, GPP is expected to remain of greater importance to the local population (standardized at 4000 adults for each project area). This conclusion stems from the projection that the sum of incomes earned by project participants at GPP will reach \$168,000 in 1984 as compared to \$149,700 for PDCC.

A second important result in the table concerns the distribution of increments to income across socio-economic strata. The top quartile at Gros-Morne is estimated to augment its income by 140%, from \$40,000 to \$96,100, while the top stratum at PDCC is projected to increase income by 110%, from \$40,000 to \$84,100. By comparison, the lower strata profit far less from project activities. Stratum II, for example, is expected to witness its income rise by 82% at Gros-Morne and only by 44% at PDCC.

It is thus evident that the activities at Gros-Morne and PDCC, under the given assumptions, should prove


spectacularly beneficial for the respective local economies; but at the same time the spread of benefits will be such as to increase existing economic disparities amongst the target populations.

GPP is seen as having a negligible impact on upper strata income levels while the lower fifty percent (50 %) of the population should experience a significant although relatively minor increase in average incomes, 14.4% in the case of stratum II and 13.2% in stratum I. It must be understood, though, that a much larger population is to profit from these more modest increases in income levels. Based on project goals, animation characteristics, and the selective mechanisms observed, we have estimated that fifty percent (50 %) of the target area's population will benefit from these additions to income at GPP, as compared to only thirty percent (30 %) at Gros-Morne and barely ten percent (10 %) at PDCC.

Finally, the table provides us with some clues as to the stratification outcome between rather than within project areas. The curves in Figure 5-5 tell the story here. The benefits accruing to Gros-Morne are such that, over the next few years, it will leave the other project areas far behind. Even PDCC will surpass GPP soon after 1984 if the projections hold. The aid money flowing into these projects will thus have the effect of making one area comparatively richer and the other poorer. Inequality will thus increase on both a macro-structural level as well as, although less

FIGURE 5-5:

HYPOTHETICAL PROJECTION OF TOTAL INCOME
OF GROUPMENT MEMBERS BASED ON OPTIMAL PERFORMANCE
AND STANDARDIZED 1982 MEMBERSHIP



rapidly, on a local level.

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This exercise should of course be viewed with extreme care and caution. It is founded upon many assumptions not all of which can presently be sustained empirically. But we may nevertheless draw certain tentative conclusions.

1. The choice of project activity is the single most important factor in raising average income levels of both project participants (groupement members) and target area populations as a whole.
2. Agricultural extension services and the provision of small credit can have a cumulative impact of considerable magnitude. This impact, however, is inherently structured so as to favor the various upper socio-economic strata, unless the spread of benefits is redirected right from the outset.
3. The recruitment base of project participants will directly influence the economic outcomes. It has been learned that the higher the average economic standing of participants, the less egalitarian is the distribution of new increments to income.
4. Projects enjoy considerable leeway in the allocation of resources (and, therefore, the dispersion of multiplier effects) to certain strata. In the "other" category listed in Table 5-2, we can find storage silos included among various activities. The Gros-Morne project has attempted to make this resource accessible in an egalitarian way and has

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enjoyed some success in this regard. It is in the nature of the PDCC structure that area elites and larger landowners will have far greater access to this resource than other residents.

5. The nature of the development process implemented at GPP comes at a significant cost to the overall average of increases to local incomes. The focus on peasant autonomy and the inherent bias towards the poor peasant are the factors responsible for this comparatively poor performance. It should be realized, however, that the other projects do not share the particular GPP approach to development, and this produces different income results in each of their respective target areas.
6. The various factors in the equation work independently. It is entirely possible to proceed from a "low" recruitment base, but this requires choosing activities (such as credit and silos) which offer a high savings and income potential that generate fast-paced economic development without exacerbating local income disparities.
7. All three projects, if permitted to continue, are capable of producing significant increases to the average level of incomes earned in the respective project areas.

5.3.4 Social impact

Three issues must be raised concerning the social impact of these rural development projects: (1) do they upgrade social conditions and relations among groupement participants?; (2) do they foster more egalitarian conditions in the target areas?; and (3) will the project efforts have a lasting impact?

"Upgrading social conditions" may mean as little as reducing competition, friction, and hostility at the village level or as much as creating an integrated system of cooperative production and marketing and the replacement of a caste system by more democratic forms of organization. It is clear from the evaluations that all three projects have achieved some measure of improvement in social conditions. GPP has introduced a truly novel intermediate social structure in an area where most relations outside the family had been monopolized by the state. There is a great process of awakening underway - a situation which is noted frequently and enthusiastically by peasants and animators alike. Groupement solidarity has protected members against usurious intermediaries, defused fights and arguments before they reached the attention of the magistrate, and undermined the legitimacy claims of those who enjoy power but lack a sense of responsibility. There are many expressions of this solidarity and the lengthy training process that preceded groupement formation certainly made a major contribution in fostering a spirit of confidence and collaboration. Farmers are in the process of regaining a modest amount of control

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over their social and economic destiny.

At Gros-Morne our evaluation has detected a similar tendency towards an awakening of peasant consciousness, self-confidence, and autonomy, although such events are probably less visible in this project. The focus here is less on production and more on commerce. Groupements are more often short-lived, smaller, and more directly oriented towards more immediate and tangible economic gains. Yet via this mechanism, the social standing of groupement members is improved considerably. The very fact that economic success is tangible must create a powerful motivating force for future collaboration.

PDCC must be viewed more critically in this regard. The project works so closely with the established structures of social and economic power that cooperative peasant mobilization is more a matter of hope than reality. In this project, foreigners dispense "goods" in collaboration with all the representatives of state authority, a situation which clearly fails to promote the cause of an autonomous peasantry. Our evaluator points to the continued and complete dependence of the local participants upon the initiative of outsiders. This, together with the (in all likelihood) extremely inegalitarian distribution of goods and benefits, leads us to doubt the capacity of this project to upgrade social conditions. The most that can be said is that the strategic groups have a long way to go before they reach the levels of self-confidence and autonomy attained by

the groupements at GPP and Gros-Morne.

Creating "more egalitarian conditions in the target area" is a goal that is a long way from realization in each of the three projects. Economic disparities are probably being increased in Bayonnais and are certainly not being diminished by the approach taken by PDCC. The relationship with the local Conseils d'Action Communautaire is crucial in this respect, and it is difficult to summarize this connection for each project. GPP has a considerable number of CAC members in its groupements but this means little in a context where CAC membership has been almost automatic in the past. The de facto relations between the CAC and the GPP staff are at a standoff with both sides planning activities in direct competition with one another (e.g. the opening of the first store in town), although open conflict is carefully avoided. Relations are less controlled, however, at the level of groupement membership. Some members have refused to donate free labor to CAC projects - this can have grave consequences for the individuals concerned. This tension may well remain unrelieved for some time as the groupements gain in strength and membership.

The evaluation of Gros-Morne has found that the project staff has kept a discrete distance from the CAC without having taken a public stand against the organization (which has its own groupements, not to be confused with those under the aegis of the project). Relations between the two groups are sensitive. The specialization of goals and functions is

probably that which keeps the peace; CAC handles public works projects while the project's groupements serve as channels for personal investment with the aim of accumulating and re-investing savings collectively.

Little can be added with respect to the PDCC operation. It is linked in many ways to the community councils, the very organizations which are widely seen as prime impediments to achieving a more egalitarian distribution of resources in rural Haiti. The project would need the most radical restructuring of its activities were it truly to seek a diminution in local inequalities.

In order for project activity to achieve "a lasting impact" upon local social structures, peasant groups must be able to function independently following termination of project work. It will be most instructive to see whether the Gros-Morne groupements, with their low training levels but compelling record of achievements, will stand the test better than their counterparts at GPP which boast of higher levels of training, solidarity and motivation, but also a much poorer list of economic accomplishments. Any new social formation will require a solid material base - the economic foundation upon which the long-term success of groupements must rely.

5.4 Non-formal education and ongoing evaluation

The organization, staffing, funding and performance of public education in rural Haiti leaves much to be desired. This is undoubtedly one of the principal reasons for the recent and substantial efforts of both government and foreign donor agencies to develop non-formal education (NFE). It is hoped that this will help overcome the weaknesses in the public school system. Further, this non-formal instruction is expected to deliver a far more substantive and appropriate "syllabus" that goes beyond mere literacy and is more in harmony with the needs of the rural populace.

All three projects under evaluation have a significant NFE component. Gros-Morne, for example, considers all its work to be NFE, including the pre-school centers, women-oriented activities, and, above all, the formation of groupements themselves. A similar attitude can be observed at GPP where animation, motivation and education of peasants constitute the almost total sum of project activity. Even agricultural extension work and the cultivation of experimental gardens fit into this context - not a single step is taken without explicit and lengthy discussion with groupement members beforehand. GPP has at various times engaged the services of NFE specialists (such as Jake Pfohl) and the staff continues to profit from the contribution of these specialists to the project.

PDCC also professes to use a particular concept of NFE as an

integral part of its rural development work. The organization of women's groups, the work on household sanitation, the provision of agricultural extension services are all viewed as essential elements rather than separate annexes of the project. The notion of instruction proceeding outside the classroom is the guiding principle of such an approach. To this end, PDCC has refrained from hiring teachers and organizing formal education (which it considers the duty of the state); it has, however, contributed some infrastructural improvements of benefit to formal education. These contributions include the construction of classrooms for the national school and the placement of a roof atop a missionary school. The application of NFE is nevertheless more a matter of rhetoric than a sustained activity at PDCC - much more so than is true at Gros-Morne or GPP. NFE is only an occasional activity undertaken at PDCC rather than a serious, ongoing and integrated project concern. This is probably the inevitable consequence of a project heavily centered on infrastructural rather than organizational improvement.

The evaluation missions themselves pose a certain value to the cause of NFE. They help the project staff to articulate problems and locate appropriate solutions. They bring an outsider and an outsider's viewpoints onto the scene - this serves to amplify critical reflection in projects inherently bent on achieving tangible results. The Gros-Morne staff clearly perceived our evaluation mission in this manner; whereas the GPP staff, much more wary of outsiders and

foreigners, probably saw our effort as a useful but non-essential exercise to satisfy aid agencies. PDCC seemed to take the same line as GPP: the evaluation might provide useful feedback but could hardly be construed in itself as part of NFE.

This impression is reinforced by the role of previous evaluations. All three projects have specified procedures for ongoing internal evaluation including monthly staff meetings, internal evaluation documents (produced on a yearly basis), and regular consultations with the Port-au-Prince headquarters of their respective sponsor agencies. One expression of the successful functioning of these informal and/or internal evaluations is that all these projects have extensively reformulated and re-written their goals and agendas. Internal feedback procedures have thus resulted in an upgrading of staff from the lowest (animator) all the way up to the highest (executive director) level.

The following Table 5-4 presents a summary of our appraisal of the evaluation procedures and results of the three projects. It reveals significant differences in the numbers of evaluations having taken place among the three projects. It further points to the uneven effects such evaluations have in influencing activities in respective projects.

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Table 5-4 Evaluations of the three projects

	<u>Gros-Morne</u>	<u>GPP</u>	<u>PDCC</u>
Period evaluated	9/80 - 4/83	9/80 - 4/83	81 - 4/83
Previous available evaluations	Lowenthal & Attfield (1979) Monde & Oriol (1981) Murray & Alvarez (1982) Koppenleitner & Koppenleitner (1982)	Lowenthal 1983)	Bros (1983)
Distribution and use of earlier evaluation reports	adequate	inadequate	inadequate
Degree of agreement between earlier evaluations and the present one	medium	medium	high
Implementation of recommendations of earlier evaluations	adequate	none	inadequate
Quality of internal evaluation procedures	(informal) excellent (formal) adequate	excellent delayed	adequate inadequate

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GPP and PDCC have undergone fewer evaluations than Gros-Morne given that the latter is the older of the three projects. More serious, however, is the inadequate distribution of the evaluation reports. The implementation of recommendations has thus been either non-existent or inadequate. In the case of GPP, the main reason for this lies in the inadequacy of the administrative procedures which have beset the project since its inception. With respect to PDCC, the report of our evaluator leads us to suspect that communication problems between the expatriate and the Haitian staff have contributed towards undermining the efficacy of evaluations.

A further point should be added as regards the content of the evaluations. There are obviously many varieties of assessment techniques. Some evaluators do little more than take an inventory of activities and make a comparison of stated versus attained goals. Others de-emphasize the descriptive work and focus instead on the assessment of program effectiveness, searching for reasons contributing to success or failure. Either approach can produce significant benefits for a project and contribute to the cause of non-formal education. But it is crucial that project teams be allowed both to participate in the evaluation process and to receive the reports promptly upon completion so as to be able to criticize and reflect on the substance of the findings. The former requirement seems to have been observed in the course of all project evaluations; whereas the latter stipulation has only been respected at Gros-Morne

while being ignored at GPP and probably at PDCC as well.

In sum, NFE is an important, perhaps even one of the most important components of all the three projects. Their application of this principle has, however, varied in intensity between the projects. At the level of the target population, Gros-Morne and GPP have performed so well that they can become models for future work in this regard. PDCC has been to some extent hindered by its conventional approach to development and its close collaboration with the governmental agency formally responsible for NFE. This agency does not have a record of brilliant accomplishments. Rather it has politicized the community councils and largely ignored the essential nature of NFE: the provision of intellectual tools to achieve a higher level of peasant autonomy.

5.5 A comparison of project inputs and outputs

There is no means of calculating any single factor of cost effectiveness common to each of the three projects. Despite certain similarity of approaches, what has been produced in one project is not directly comparable to a similarly-labelled output in another project. Nevertheless a look at Table 5-5 below allows some rather interesting observations.

Peasant organization is by far the most important output of the GPP and Gros-Morne projects. If one were to abstract from all other objectives and calculate cost effectiveness

in the most basic way by comparing dollar input to the output in groupements (even controlling for groupement size), then Gros-Morne would look great and GPP very bad indeed while PDCC should not even be discussed in this respect owing to its enormous "infrastructural" expenditure. The cost of organizing one peasant member works out to \$143 at Gros-Morne, \$1013 at GPP, and a horrendous \$2700 at PDCC. Of course, this sort of comparison is meaningless. The training, character, and functioning of the GPP groupements is so different from those at Gros-Morne that only an obsessed statistician would dare to accept the validity of such a simplistic comparison.

Overall output of the projects is summarized in Table 5-5 below. It is clear that the PDCC and Gros-Morne projects are generally more diversified than that at GPP. Many of their activities in education, health, infrastructure construction, and agricultural extension simply have no parallel at GPP. The cause for this may simply be the age of the projects. Gros-Morne has been in existence since 1971, while PDCC activities at Chambellan began in 1978 although under different sponsorship.

Table 5-5 Comparison of major project inputs and outputs

<u>Inputs</u>	<u>Gros-Morne</u>	<u>GPP</u>	<u>PDCC</u>
Financing of current phase	\$500,000	\$1,000,000	\$1,000,000
Admin. staff	3	3	3
Animators (outside)	4	12	-
(local)	-	--	33
Literacy and pre-school monitors	9	--	17
Other staffing (agronomist, technicians, support)	adequate	adequate	adequate
<u>Outputs</u>			
<u>groupements organized</u> (PDCC: group. strat.)	459	31 + 38	30
total gr. membership	3488	987	365
accumulated assets	\$27,000	\$17,000	unknown
other groups trained	4 assoc. 17 LA groups 17 health clubs	-- -- --	25 community 1 cooperative --
<u>Agricultural credit provided</u>	\$26,000	--	--
<u>New technologies</u>	silos animal husbandry vegetable gardens vaccination	-- -- -- vacc.	soil improvement rabbits vegetable gardens -- 35,000 trees
<u>Other outputs</u>	1 project center 9 preschool centers 52 latrines 34 springs and fountains	1 project center	1 project center 5 social centers 6 " " (started) 6 km road 100 latrines 16 springs and fountains 1 slaughterhouse

It should be understood that the differences in output also reflect differences in staff priorities. The "bricks and mortar" approach of PDCC and its reliance on many existing community activities make the PDCC balance sheet appear very impressive. Of course, once this project is completed, local conditions for the poor may be expected to deteriorate rapidly. In contrast with PDCC, the GPP staff has placed little emphasis thus far on visible infrastructural improvements and it considers collaboration with the existing community groups completely out of the question. PDCC has done comparatively little in the area of groupement (strategic group) formation while GPP has thrown its whole weight in that direction. It would thus be inappropriate to derive any quick conclusions from Table 5-5 without first taking into consideration the fact that output differences may result from differences in staff priorities rather than from disparities in project efficiency.

The overall output at Gros-Morne is in many ways the most impressive of the projects. When the hospital first opened its doors twelve years ago, no one would have anticipated that a large, integrated, and dynamic rural development program would grow around it. The project and the hospital are separate operations today; but it is plain that, despite their weaknesses, they have both benefitted a broad spectrum of the local population.

5.6 A final remark

As is the case with the development efforts of PDCC and GPP, the real test for Gros-Morne will arrive when funding comes to a halt. There is always a justification for "helping" a needy population. However, the most significant benefits derive from genuine changes in the behaviour and economic practices of the Haitian peasantry. Infrastructural improvements have never survived beyond the termination of a project unless an individual, group, family, or community believed it to be in their self-interest to maintain such enhanced infrastructures. It is not certain at this point whether the Gros-Morne groupements will have the strength, determination, and self-confidence required to sustain the internally-generated growth expected of them. In this regard, the more autonomous groupements of GPP may well offer greater long range potential.

In the end, the success or failure of these projects will be determined by the peasants themselves. Their present range of economic activities may not be highly productive, but they include complex arrangements to reduce the risks of losing what little they have. The dangers to peasant livelihood are many: bad weather, pests, animal and human predators, and plain bad luck. Traditional peasant behaviour is such that many individual attempts are made to overcome these persistent obstacles; rarely is collective action taken to protect common interests. If the

Gros-Morne, Bayonnais and Chambellan projects succeed in establishing collective action as a means of raising rural autonomy, income, and productivity without increasing risk and dependency, then they will have achieved the one objective most worthy of the aid effort. It is high time that the Haitian peasantry break free from the chronic cycle of misery and dependence on relief from outside.

Annex 1 Common Scope of WorkCOMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF THREE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
RELYING ON SMALL PEASANT ORGANIZATIONS1. Common scope of work

The three projects to be evaluated are the Gros-Morne Rural Development Project (Catholic Relief Services), the Groupement Pilot Project at Bayonnais (Catholic Relief Services) and the Chambellan Community Development Project (Save the Children). They differ in terms of age, history, focus and methodology, but they share in common the reliance on a form of small-scale peasant organization called groupement. The evaluation will discuss the individual characteristics of each project as well as the common points of concern. To assure comparability of the results, a common scope of work has been adopted, supplemented by an agenda facilitating the coverage of the many sub-projects. The common scope includes the following points:

1.1 Project history

- start: project paper, funding, initial staffing, relations between the original designer of the project and current project staff
- goals and implementation schedule as planned originally
- collaborating agencies and services planned, and

definition of their expected contribution

- the role of the Government of Haiti
- evaluations planned and conducted
- the original context of the project: physical, social and political
- major changes that occurred

1.2 Current organization of the project

- administrative context: donor agencies, government, private voluntary organizations
- chart of administrative responsibilities
- for each administrator and group of administrators: descriptions of tasks for the project and responsibilities for others.
- description of staff, qualifications, experience, ongoing training
- comparison of local, national and expatriate staff and their roles
- description of staff relations (past and present)
- physical aspects of the project

1.3 Advancement of the project

- discussion of current goals and deadlines
- list of planned outputs as per original project paper
- updated list of outputs resulting from in-course revisions and evaluations
- assessment for each of the planned outputs, of the following:

- a) operational definition
 - b) method of measurement
 - c) staff and populations involved
 - d) success or failure in meeting original deadlines
 - e) reasons for success, delay or failure
- role of local and expatriate staff as change agents
 - significance of outside material and financial support for the realization of project goals
 - procedure for selecting project activities (who took the initiative, when for what purpose?)

1.4 Orientation towards the future

- results of previous evaluations (recommendations and implementation)
- investigation and evaluation of the project and its various sub-projects
- major successes and failures

1.5 Justification for the continuation of the project

- definition and distribution of the benefits
- community participation
 - a) conseil d'action communautaire versus groupement
 - b) relationship of project and groupements to the local resident population

2. Bases for comparison

The comparative evaluation of the three projects will focus on the following three themes:

1. Peasant organization. Here the main issues are the present state of groupement organizations in terms of number and type, the perceptions of the groupements by their members and non-members in the area and by local and other staff, the life span and future potential of groupements, and the relationships of groupements to other forms of competing peasant organization.

2. The tangible benefits of groupements for members and the community at large as well as the attitudinal and behavioural changes introduced by the groupement movement. Tangible benefits can be measured most easily for Bayonnais because of the availability of household level baseline data, although approximations for the other projects are also possible. The intangible results are more difficult to assess, yet they are of high priority; they will be critical for the continuation and future directions of the projects.

3. The traditional focus of evaluations on the progress towards goals specified in the project paper will be maintained by using standardized procedure and agenda permitting a clear definition of goals and progress achieved.

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The recurring questions for all three themes are: what is the state of advancement of the project and how are its effects spread and felt among the participant and non-participant population. Furthermore, since non-formal education of various forms has been an integral part of all three projects, special attention will be given to its effects and possible improvement.

3. Work schedule

The work is divided among the three members in the following manner: each member is responsible for visiting, documenting, and evaluating one project. Smucker is assigned to Gros-Morne, Woodson to Chambellan, and Locher to Bayonnais. The major part of each week will be spent there, with weekends and Mondays reserved for discussion and comparative evaluation in Port-au-Prince. The schedule is as follows:

SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT
				7	8	9
				ARRIVE	PAP	PAP
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
PAP	PAP	FIELD	FIELD	FIELD	FIELD	PAP
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
PAP	PAP	FIELD	FIELD	FIELD	FIELD	PAP
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
PAP	FIELD	FIELD	FIELD	PAP	PAP	PAP

1
LEAVE

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Mr. Woodson will spend all of the last week in Port-au-Prince in order to write up his part of the report. Mr. Smucker and Mr. Locher have write-up time available in May and they will complete their individual project reports in Milwaukee and Montreal, respectively, by May 20. Following this, Mr. Locher will produce the final report complete with an introduction and comparative chapter by July 15.

ANNEX 3

Index of Texts Produced at GPP

Classification of Documents

000 - 099	Rapò dé réyinion PPG
100 - 199	Dokimantasyon
200 - 299	Administrasyon
300 - 399	Diréksyon/koòdinasyon
400 - 599	Animasyon/kominikasyon
600 - 699	Analiz
700 - 799	Téknoloji
800 - 899	Jénéral

ANNEX 3 Index of texts
produced at GPP

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- 000 Program dé réyinion PPG
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- b. Program de Travail - Analyse: Avril 1981 - Mars 1982
- 006 a. Réunions CRS/PPG
- b. Réunion 11 - 17 Novembre, 1981
- c. Réunion 8 - 9 Mai, 1981
- 007 Evaluation Interne - Decembre, 1981
- 008 a. Rapport Bi-Mensuel (Juil - Sept 81)
- b. GPP Progress Reports (GRS)
- c. GPP Progress Reports (GRS) with financial reports
- 009 Rapport Trimestriel - Mars 1982.
- 011 Rapò Mansiyèl. Avril, 1982
- 012 Rapò Mansiyèl. Mai, 1982
- 013 Rapport Trimestriel. Avril - Juin, 1982
- 014 Rapò Mansiyèl. Juiyè, 1982
- 100 Formulaire pou sikilasyon dokiman.
- 101 Fiche - Itineraire et Travaux
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- 103 Requisition - Documentation
- 104 Pour Une Bibliographie Analytique du Monde Rural. GRD. Nov, 80
- 105a. Document de Base PPG - Francais
- b. " " " " Anglais
- c. " " " " - Annexe I: Description des Taches
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- 202 Rapport Journalier du Mouvement des Vehicules.
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- 204 Compte...Balance
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- 301 Sijésyon pou PPG - Pfohl - Mars, 1982.
- 401. Chan dé fòmasyon.
- 402 Gid pou nòt réyinion animatè.
- 403 Fich Ekspérians
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- Séksyon Animasyon/Kominikasyon. Jin, 82
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- 406. Enquete Sür Odigé et Dessources. DELINOIS, PICARD, TELFORT.
- 407 Ankèt Sou Odigé. JN-BAPTISTE, JM-LOUIS, TELUS.
- 408 Rapò Sou Séminè PPG - Tèknik SARAR. 16 - 21 Séktanm, 1981.
- 409 Developpement de l'Education Non-Formelle. J. PFOHL. (Anglais et Francais)
- 600 Fiches pour Enquete sur Les Groupements Paysans Dans La Zone de Bayonnais.
- 604 Cartes
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- 701 Les Associations de Travail a Savanne Ronde. Document No. 1
Cantave JN-BAPTISTE, Carl MONDE. 24 Février, 1981.
- 702 Systeme de Production a Savanne Ronde et Cachotte. Document No.2
Cantave JN-BAPTISTE, CARL MONDE. Avril, 1981
- 703 Systeme de Production Dans l'Axe Odigé - Savane Pangnol - Cator.
Document No. 3 Cantave JN-BAPTISTE, David NICOLAS. Août, 1982.
- 800 Maladies et Conservation des Produits Recoltés.
F.A.M.V. Pathologie Végétale. Ph. Lucas
- 801 Mode de Conservation Traditionnel du Maïs; Evaluation des Pertes
Pendant la Periode du Conservation. F.A.M.V. DAMIEN 2ème Année.
- 802 Késionè pou Résansman Nan Bayonè.
- 803 Késionè pou Sondaj Lan Bayonè.
- 805 Questionnaires - Enquete d'Exploitation Agricole Dans la Zone
de Hinche.
- 806 La Traction Animale dans la Plaine Des Cayès. GRD. Mai, 1981.
807. Dynamique des Groupements Paysans a Gros-Morne. GRD. Juin, 81.

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- 606 Questionnaire - Evaluation Gros Morne - 11/79. (sans stencil)
- 308 Developpement Rural Integre en Haiti. - Problèmes, Progrès,
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- 016. Rapport Trimestriel - Septembre 1982.
- 017. Réyinion Trimèstriyèl - Séktanm, 82.
- 018. Rapò Mansiyèl - Oktòb 82.
- 019. Plan Annuel d'Activités 82-83.
- 350. Reflexions sur la préparation de la 2ème phase.
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- 414. Gid invèstigasyon sou lavi fanm andéyò.
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- 021b. Gid: Evaliasyon travay ak konpòtman chak manb ékip la.
- 021c. Gid: Lidé chak manb sou PPG an jénéral.
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- 206b. Controle des Deplacements Quotidien des Vehicules. RETOUR.
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608. Rapport de Stage. H. JOSEPH, N. DATHIS, et F. GERMAIN.
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610. Rétou infòmasyon ankèt-la nan groupman yo. H. JOSEPH,
N. DATHIS, F. GERMAIN.
704. Protocole Essai Sur Conservation des Grains.
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416. Kontrandi vizit Gro-Mòn Sant Grépin é Papay Sant Emayis.
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609. Organisation Paysanne a Bayonnais. Implantation et Problemes.
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- Annexe: Questionnaires remplis. (sans stencil)
611. Vers une codification de la méthodologie d'organisation
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418. Evaliasyon séminè réskonsab yo ki té fèt nan Sant
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421. Réfléksyon sou PFG pa rapò sitiyaasyon mas la an Ayiti.
Jean-Robert Delinois. Avril 1983.
613. I page de questionnaire: Histoire système Troc dans
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614. Les groupements de Gros-Morne. (Extraits des observa-
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706. Rapò patisipasyon seksyon teknołoji nan réyinion ani-
matè yo.
Cantave Jean-Baptiste. 8 Fèvriyé 1983.
707. Rapport de stage Gret/Unesco (France) 6 Septembre -
17 Décembre 1983.
Cantave Jean-Baptiste. Mars 1983.
708. Participants a réunion GRD.11 - 14 Février 1983.
Cantave Jean-Baptiste. Mars 1983.
709. Fich pou souiv jadin - Ekspéryans seksyon Teknołoji.
Mas 1983.
811. Réflexions de l'équipe du PFG autour de la note que
vous lui avez adressée à propos des discussions du
21 Février.
25 Mars 1983.

9/12

ANNEX 4

GROUPEMENT PILOT PROJECT

SUMMARY BUDGET

<u>Summary Budget</u>	YEAR ONE	YEAR TWO	YEAR THREE	YEAR FOUR	
<u>Item</u>	<u>Cost</u>	<u>Cost</u>	<u>Cost</u>	<u>Cost</u>	<u>Total</u>
Salaries	\$78,348	\$152,640	\$167,537	\$105,515	\$504,041
Construction	47,671	5,290	---	---	52,961
Transport	22,990	182	200	220	23,592
Equipment	36,405	5,346	4,073	4,482	50,306
Materials and Operations	19,182	30,748	33,818	37,201	120,949
Development Activities Fund	20,000	20,000	10,000	---	50,000
Staff Training Out-of-Country	---	12,100	16,640	---	28,740
Evaluation and Consultation	20,500	22,150	25,310	54,547	122,417
Pre-Operational Costs	45,738	---	---	---	45,738
Direct Costs	5,200	4,510	4,961	5,457	20,128
Total Project Cost	\$296,034	\$252,966	\$262,539	\$207,333	\$1,018,872

ANNEX 5

SOME GPP BASELINE DATA

ETUDE DE BASE - BAYONNAIS

Variables pertinentes pour fins d'évaluation

Uli Locher
McGill University
Montreal

1. INTRODUCTION

Les données de base de l'étude Bayonnais ont été recueillies au début de 1981 par un consultant haïtien indépendant à la demande du "Catholic Relief Services" (CRS) dans le but d'élaborer une documentation démographique et socio-économique de base sur le champ du projet qui augmenterait les connaissances générales en ce domaine tout en permettant de préciser les buts ultimes du travail de développement et en fournissant une base valable pour une évaluation future de l'impact du projet. Plusieurs retards ont rendu impossible l'utilisation des données pour les deux premiers des trois buts mentionnés. Une partie des données, le recensement du village, est enfin devenue disponible en avril 1983. Le présent rapport traitera cette partie seulement. L'autre partie, une enquête par sondage, est accessible au moment de l'écriture de ce texte mais ne l'était pas encore au moment de l'évaluation comparative du projet en avril 1983.

Les données du recensement comprennent un total de 888 entrevues qui ont été reproduites sur des questionnaires standard puis transférées aux casiers codifiés en marge des pages du questionnaire, ensuite poinçonnées comme données brutes sur bande et enfin enregistrées sur bande et sur disque. L'information a par la suite été programmée en SPSS ("Statistical Package for the Social Sciences"), le programme le plus largement utilisé dans le domaine des sciences sociales.

L'evaluation de 1983 du projet du Bayonnais (PPG ou Projet pilote Groupement) a ete faite a peine un peu plus d'une annee apres le debut du travail dans le domaine. Une mesure exacte de l'impact du projet ne peut donc pas en core etre faite.

2. COMPOSITION DES FOYERS

Les 888 foyers visites lors du recensement se repartissent en 14 localites de tailles variees s'echelonnant de 12 (Coquillot) a 227 foyers (Savane ronde). Ces localites ont ete delimitées en vue d'un travail de sondage efficace plutot que selon une definition anthropologique du village, lakou, abitation ou autres unites socialement pertinentes. On ne doit pas les prendre pour des petits villages et si les donnees en venaient a etre divisees par localite cela n'aiderait qu'a situer et identifier les foyers individuels et non a analyser la structure du village. Cependant, ces 14 localites constituent la seule identification geographique incluse systematiquement dans les questionnaires. Il convient donc d'en faire bon usage a l'analyse.

La definition de foyer semble avoir ete en grande partie laissee a l'interviewer qui devait juger selon la presence de maisons et cuisines. Un petit lakou a tres bien pu etre compte comme foyer malgre la presence de plusieurs maisons, alors que dans un endroit ayant la structure d'un village, tel que ODIGE, les maisons avoisinantes seraient probablement comptees comme foyers independants.

Le nombre de residents dans chaque foyer est distribue comme suit

personnes par foyer	nombre de foyers	nombre total de personnes
1 a 3	334	717
4 a 6	354	1742
7 a 9	173	1352
10 a 15	25	269
n.a.	2	n.a.

4080

Le nombre total de tous les membres de tous les foyers visites au cours du recensement est de 4080 (4028 seulement sont en fait listes individuellement) -soit moins de la moitie des 9000 prevus comme champ total de population pour le projet par le personnel du projet. L'ecart peut s'expliquer en partie par le fait que le recensement n'a pas couvert toute la region geographique qui a plus tard ete delimitée comme champ de projet. Une breve critique du projet par Charles MONDE a souligne ce probleme. Cependant, il ne fait pas de doute que la grande majorite des localites du champ de projet a ete visitee. La population evaluee par le personnel du projet est a peu pres le double de celle trouvee et denombree par le recensement. En ce moment il est impossible de determiner les causes de cet incroyable ecart entre la population estimee et la population denombree. Il est tout a fait possible que le recensement

ait été l'objet des problèmes habituellement rencontrés dans le travail de recensement de population dans le Tiers-Monde, c'est-à-dire, l'omission de foyers et de petites régions géographiques, le mauvais dénombrement des membres du foyer, surtout des enfants, et autres difficultés du genre. D'autres problèmes ayant trait aux données de base Bayonnais permettent de croire qu'en réalité l'équipe de recherche n'avait peut-être pas beaucoup d'expérience en travail de recensement rural avant le début du projet, ni même beaucoup d'aide professionnelle. Ceci expliquerait peut-être une marge d'erreur de 20%, soit 800 personnes environ. En incluant les localités non visitées lors du recensement, le champ du projet pourrait bien avoir une population totale de 5000 personnes.

Si cette évaluation est juste, nous devons toujours faire face au fait que le personnel du projet base présentement toutes ses activités sur une évaluation de la population qui excède la population 'réelle' de 80%. Un premier examen préliminaire des données de base a permis de découvrir un problème d'importance majeure. Il est évident que le personnel du projet ne peut être blâmé de travailler à partir de fausses hypothèses. Le manque de données sûres quant à la population n'est pas leur faute. Nous avons plutôt ici un exemple de l'utilité d'une étude de base sur la mesure exacte de l'impact potentiel du projet et sur la formulation des activités du projet. Il est grand temps de fournir des données de base au personnel du projet.

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3. ACTIVITES COMMERCIALES

Une partie du questionnaire a été utilisée pour la documentation sur les activités commerciales. Les réponses recues montrent que 39 pourcent des foyers ont au moins un de leurs membres implique dans le commerce. Il faut immédiatement prendre note du fait que les paysans Bayonnais établissent une distinction nette entre "vendre" et "faire commerce"; le premier comprend toute sorte de vente et fait souvent référence à la vente de produits de production domestique, alors que le dernier est strictement réservé à la revente de produits que le vendeur lui-même a acheté d'un producteur ou d'un autre intermédiaire. Le questionnaire limite toutes les questions à celle du commerce dans la dernière définition. L'activité commerciale peut devenir une considération importante dans l'avenir si et quand les groupements de paysans commenceront à investir soit dans la mise en marche de leur propre produits, soit dans l'emmagasinage de produits expressément pour des activités commerciales. Les groupements du Bayonnais n'ont pas encore atteint cette condition et leur orientation vers une production accrue rend incertain le fait qu'ils s'adonneraient au commerce dans les années à venir.

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4. MIGRATION

Les questions concernant la migration constituaient une grande partie du questionnaire. Cependant, elles couvrent seulement une petite partie de toute l'activite migratoire de la communaute, puisqu'elles ne font que poser des questions sur les membres du foyer presentement absents du Bayonnais et sur ceux qui sont revenus apres une periode d'absence. Les deux categories presentent des inconvenients. En premier lieu, elles n'offrent pas de definition claire. Un migrant saisonnier serait-il considere comme un membre de la maisonnee? Quelqu'un qui serait parti il y a un an serait-il exclu alors que son frere parti trois mois plus tot serait compte malgre tout? Des questions precises s'averent de la plus haute importance dans ce cas. Selon les donnees du recensement, seulement 7% des foyers incluent les membres absents de Bayonnais au moment de l'enquete. Ce chiffre semble faible si l'interet de quelqu'un est centre sur l'emigration d'une region rurale. Un total de 109 personnes a ete enregistre comme migrants. Pour les questions concernant le retour des migrants -faussement appeles "migrants saisonniers" dans le code-, le resultat est encore plus decevant. Seulement 6 des migrants qui reviennent ont pu etre retrouves parmi plus de 4000 personnes approchees lors du recensement. De meilleures questions auraient sans doute produit de meilleurs resultats.

Le second inconvenient des questions portant sur la migration est qu'elles soient toutes posees a propos de personnes autres que le repondant lui-meme. En d'autres mots, ces questions cumulent les difficultes de memoire exacte et celles du oui-dire. Des questions directes au repondant au sujet de sa propre histoire migratoire auraient sans doute produit des resultats plus interessants. Telles qu'elles sont maintenant, les questions du recensement sur la migration n'ont produit que de maigres resultats difficiles a interpreter.

5. DONNEES DEMOGRAPHIQUES

Les renseignements sur les naissances, les decès et les grossesses dans le champ du projet ont été recueillis pour la période des douze mois de 1980. 228 enfants sont nés alors que 77 sont morts. On n'a pas consigné les âges auxquels ces enfants sont morts mais on peut supposer qu'un grand nombre de ces morts s'est produit dans les mois qui suivirent la naissance. On fait état de 21 décès d'adultes pour la même période. Si ces données sont fiables - et on peut les accepter avec une généreuse marge d'erreur - ceci indiquerait que le Bayonnais traverse une période de croissance rapide de population. Un taux de naissance brut de 22.8 double d'un taux de décès brut de 9.8 voudrait dire que la population a augmenté naturellement de 130 personnes ou 3.2 pourcent au cours de l'année 80. Une étude plus détaillée des données démographiques de cette enquête est présentement en cours.

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6. RENSEIGNEMENTS SUR LE STATUT ECONOMIQUE

Une des series de questions les plus interessantes du questionnaire de recensement a trait au statut economique. Sa valeur est evidente des l'abord. Si le projet a un quelconque impact benefique pour la population qu'il vise, les membres de ces groupements devraient, dans quelques annees, jouir d'un statut economique remarquable ment plus haut que celui des non-membres. Ou encore si les benefices du projet etaient largement distribues parmi tous les residents de la region, ceux qui reussiraient a s'approprier la majorite de benefices, sans tenir compte de l'appartenance au groupement, devraient aller de l'avant. Alors qu'il etait trop tot en 1983 pour observer de tels courants, nous avons neanmoins evalue le statut economique de chaque maisonnee de facon assez detaillee et nous avons essaye d'etablir certaines correspondances quant au statut economique.

La mesure du statut economique est basee sur deux groupes de variables. Le premier groupe comprend les questions sur le type de maison. 87.7 pourcent de toutes les maisons ont des murs faits de "klisaj ak te", mais 7.6 pourcent ont utilise des pierres comme materiel de construction, et enfin 4.6 pourcent a meme utilise du ciment. Les toits sont surtout recouverts de paille, mais 15,9 pourcent des maisons ont des toits de zinc - un signe de plus grande prosperite et/ou de construction de date plus recente. La plupart des sols de maison sont les memes mais le recensement a decouvert 24

residences ou des matériaux plus chers - de la pierre et du ciment - avaient été utilisés. Pour la compilation d'une échelle pour la maison-type basée sur ces trois variables, nous avons utilisé des poids entre un et quatre pour les différents matériaux de construction, avec le plus grand nombre de points allant aux matériaux les plus chers. Il est clair qu'une telle échelle doit être utilisée avec précaution puisqu'elle inclut un nombre limité d'items dont l'interprétation n'est peut-être pas aussi simple qu'on pourrait le souhaiter.

Le deuxième groupe de variables du statut économique renferme huit items de consommation énumérés dans la question no. 65. 59.1 pourcent des foyers avaient un lit, alors que moins de 1 pourcent avait un fauteuil rembourré. Il serait idéal de pouvoir introduire dans une échelle sur le statut économique, des facteurs de mesure correspondant à la valeur monétaire représentée par les différents items. Dans le cas présent, ce n'était ni possible ni nécessaire. Quant à l'équipement domestique du foyer, le questionnaire couvrait un éventail suffisamment varié pour faire des comparaisons significatives.

Indice pour le type de maison		
Pointage	Etiquette	Pourcentage
1	le plus bas	82.5
2		1.1
3		4.7
4		6.2
6		3.4
7		0.7
9		0.8
10	le plus eleve	0.6
		Total: 100.0
		(885)

Indice pour les produits de consommation		
Pointage	Etiquette	Pourcentage
0	le plus bas	37.8
1		31.4
2		12.8
3		7.9
4		4.9
5		3.6
6		1.4
7		0.1
		Total: 100.0
		(885)

La comparaison de la distribution de frequence des deux echelles montre un difference significative. Alors que la grande majorite de toutes les maisons est faite des memes materiaux de construction, il y a une plus grande variation sur le plan de leur equipement. Presque deux tiers des foyers possedent au moins un des deux meubles et d'autres items donnees dans la meme question, et 17.9 pourcent, au moins trois. L'hypothese appuyant la mesure du statut economique par les articles de consommation veut que a mesure que leurs ressources augmentent, les habitants de ces foyers se portent acquereurs d'un meuble quel qu'il soit et d'appareillage. D'autre part, ils vont etre forces de s'en defaire des qu'ils se retrouvent en periode de famine.

Chacune des deux echelles mesure des elements relies au statut economique mais aucune n'est une mesure parfaite en

soi. Le tableau suivant montre la correspondance entre les deux.

Propriete d'articles de consommations par type de maison

Propriete d'articles de consommation					
Type de maison	tres bas	bas	moyen	eleve	
tres bas	42.3	43.7	10.5	3.6	100.0 (726)
bas	21.2	57.7	11.5	9.6	100.0 (52)
moyen	21.8	47.3	23.6	7.3	100.0 (55)
eleve	6.4	36.2	36.2	21.3	100.0 (47)

Gamma = .49

La correlation entre les deux echelles est claire. La majorite des repondants vivant dans de simples maisons au toit de paille possedent tres peu d'articles de consommation. Ceux vivant dans des maisons de construction relativement meilleure sont egalement ceux qui possedent plus de mobilier et autres appareils domestiques. La correlation est significative; toutefois, tout en etant loin d'etre parfaite, elle suggere que les deux echelles ne font pas que mesurer la meme chose. En combinant les deux echelles en une seule nous obtenons un indicateur beaucoup plus sur du statut economique. On le fait en additionnant les points obtenus pour chaque echelle de sorte que la nouvelle echelle pour le statut economique se developpe de 1 a 16. C'est cette echelle combinee qui va etre utilisee dans les tableaux suivants. Avant de l'utiliser, il nous faut faire un autre avertissement. Tous les observateurs de l'Haiti rurale sont d'accord pour dire que la meilleure mesure du statut economique est la propriete d'une terre et

d'animaux. Aucune n'est incluse ici et bien qu'on puisse formuler l'hypothèse d'une forte corrélation entre notre échelle et ces indicateurs à sûreté intégrée du statut économique, on ne peut tout de même pas être sûr d'une telle corrélation. Ce que notre échelle combinée mesure est en fait le statut de consommation. Une mesure idéale incluerait la propriété des moyens de production, soit la terre et les animaux.

Un des buts immédiats du PPG est de promouvoir les mouvements paysans de petite envergure (groupements). Ceux-ci constituent une nouvelle forme d'organisation rurale qui devra coexister et faire concurrence à d'autres formes d'organisation telles que les églises et le Conseil d'Action Communautaire (CAC). Avant qu'une évaluation puisse situer convenablement les groupements naissants dans le système local de stratification, nous devons chercher à en savoir plus long sur les gens qui participent aux activités des églises et du CAC.

Examinons d'abord la religion. Le questionnaire établit une distinction entre catholiques et protestants. Chacune de ces catégories comprend un éventail de pratiques religieuses. La plupart des catholiques vont "servir le loa" comme faisant partie de leurs obligations religieuses. Les protestants sont constitués de plusieurs petits groupes, parmi lesquels certains ont des liens nationaux et internationaux. 31 dénominations et mouvements ont été comptés à travers le Bayonnais.

2.61

Statut economique selon la religion

Religion	Statut economique				
	tres bas	bas	moyen	eleve	
catholique	38.4	28.5	28.3	4.8	100.0 (643)
protestant	24.7	23.8	41.3	10.2	100.0 (235)

Comme le tableau l'indique, en utilisant notre echelle pour le statut economique, les protestants vivent dans des conditions remarquablement meilleures que les catholiques. Deux fois plus de protestants tombent dans la categorie economique la plus elevee, et beaucoup moins dans la plus basse. Il n'y pas lieu ici de discuter a savoir si le protestantisme rend les gens economies, rationnels et verticalement plus mobiles, ou, si l'eglise protestante attire tout simplement les residents mieux nantis. Le resultat ne fait pas de doute. Devait-il y avoir un nombre disproportionne de protestants parmi les membres du groupement, ce serait alors une indication du fait que les groupements ne beneficent pas encore a la classe la plus pauvre de paysans autant qu'aux autres classes. Les traditionnels Conseils d'Action Communautaire ont souvent ete soupconnes de domination par l'elite locale, les magistrats, miliciens, speculateurs et autres. Les donnees du recensement nous permettent de comparer le statut economique des membres des CAC et celui des non membres.


Statut économique moyen par religion et appartenance au CAC
(seulement pour les foyers dont le chef est l'homme)

	Membres	Non-membres	N
Catholiques	3.3	2.6	519
Protestants	4.4	3.2	194

Pour les deux groupes religieux, nous pouvons observer une différence significative de statut économique entre les membres des CAC et les non-membres. L'appartenance aux CAC est clairement reliée au statut économique. Il serait intéressant de voir jusqu'à quel point cette tendance est confirmée ou même accentuée une fois qu'on peut mesurer le statut économique en incluant la possession de terre et de bétail.

(NOTE: LES ANALYSES PRESENTEES ICI DATENT DU MOIS DE MARS, 1983, ET LA REDACTION DE CE TEXTE DU MOIS DE MAI. DEPUIS LE MOIS DE JUILLET LES DONNEES DU RECENSEMENT ET DE L'ENQUETE DE BASE SONT DEVENUES DISPONIBLES, PERMETTANT AINSI UNE ANALYSE PLUS PUSSEE DE CES PROBLEMES).

FIGURE 1: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN THE GPP TARGET AREA



- 1: Carreaux of land worked
- 2: Ownership of consumption items
- 3: Value of animals owned

Source: GPP baseline data; n = 888 households (ownership of consumption items) and n = 142 individuals (carreaux of land worked and value of animals owned)

PART FOUR

An Evaluation of the Community
Development Project of Chambellan

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June 1983

Prepared for Creative Associates Inc., Washington D.C.,
as part of a comparative evaluation of three
Haitian rural development projects.

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1. Introduction

The Projet de Developpement Communautaire de Chambellan (PDCC) attempts to combine a variant of the traditional "bricks and mortar" approach to community development with elements of organizationally-centered approaches which emphasize the roles played by the formation, training and motivation of peasant groups in the development process. Founded on the assumption that "community development" is a long-term process which mobilizes both human and material resources in order to satisfy basic needs, the project seeks to alter existing infrastructure and technology by means of material inputs. PDCC further attempts to increase the capacity of individuals and community institutions to function as change agents through non-material inputs in the form of education and training. With respect to these material and non-material inputs, the theory and rhetoric of PDCC emphasize the importance of community initiative, self-help and self-determination.

PDCC has opted to work within the framework of community councils or community groups established according to the guidelines of the Government of Haiti's Office Nationale d'Alphabetization et d'Action Communautaire (ONAAC). Having done so, its program of infrastructural development, nonformal education and group formation is closely tied to, if not wholly limited by, the organizational structure of the councils. On the one hand, the project has divided Chambellan into territorial zones called "nuclei" in which teams of PDCC field personnel work with the community groups

of several neighbouring localities. On the other hand, it has encouraged the formation of smaller "strategic groups" within the councils of each nucleus. The organization of nuclei and strategic groups is designed to provide access to the peasant population as well as to ensure the success of PDCC activities by focusing on groups which have demonstrated an interest in community affairs.

However, it is important to note that community councils in Haiti have traditionally been highly political in character. They have tended to involve only the more well-to-do peasants of a locality, or to represent the interests of factions within it, rather than the concerns of an entire community (see, e.g. Smucker and Smucker 1980). Hence, while it appears that these problems have thus far been avoided in Chambellan, it remains to be seen whether the decision to channel funds and technical support through community councils will in fact allow PDCC to involve the majority of the peasant population in a long-term process of socio-economic change.

This evaluation is based primarily on interviews and discussions with PDCC field staff, field personnel, members of peasant groups, and on personal observations which took place in Chambellan during the weeks of 11 and 18 April 1983. These field data were supplemented by information contained in a recent evaluation of the PDCC (Bros 1983) and in documents provided by the project's sponsoring agencies. Additional interviews were conducted with the PDCC

co-ordinator in Port-au-Prince during the week of 25 April 1983.

In keeping with the evaluation team's common scope of work, the data-gathering process was oriented toward an understanding of forms and methods of peasant organization. Questions concerning PDCC's goals, the work of its field personnel and its accomplishments (especially in the crucial areas of peasant participation), were designed to document the impact of the project on local socio-economic conditions in qualitative and, to the extent possible, quantitative terms. A consistent attempt was made to go beyond the rhetoric of community development, which is now widely espoused by peasants as well as development technicians, in order to examine substantive structures and processes of change.

The reader should be aware of the limitations of this evaluation, however, due to the physical and temporal context in which field data were collected.

The PDCC project portfolio is extensive and its operations in Chambellan are dispersed. Therefore, it was impossible to visit more than a few sites of project activity during brief field trips. This restricted the possibility for in-depth investigation of the full range of PDCC activities either in terms of methods of peasant organization and training or the magnitude of the activities' socio-economic impact. For example, there was insufficient time to observe

the inner workings of community councils and strategic groups over time, a process which is essential for determining the depth of peasant participation and the precise distribution of benefits from PDCC activities. Similarly, it was difficult to establish rapport with residents of Chambellan's various localities in such a short period of time. This meant that dialogue with peasants (especially those not directly involved with PDCC) about project activities and benefits derived from them was constrained.

It must also be kept in mind that the peasant groups with which PDCC works are still in the early phases of development. Many of them remain in the formative stage while those of a more advanced nature have only undertaken specific projects recently. Furthermore, internal documentation of group formation and action in either qualitative or quantitative terms has not progressed very far. Thus, it is difficult to characterize most PDCC activities as outright successes or failures, or to determine their effectiveness unequivocally in terms of a simple cost/benefit analysis.

Despite these limitations, the data collected for this evaluation provided invaluable insight into PDCC's field operations and the character of contacts between the project and the peasants of Chambellan. The generalizations presented in this chapter will be most useful when they have been further substantiated by means of a more thorough,

long-term analysis of each sector of the PDCC community development program.

Unless indicated otherwise, terms which are italicized and enclosed within parentheses are written in Haitian Creole. With the exception of Chambellan itself, all place names in the Commune of Chambellan are also written in Creole (e.g. "Hainault" appears as "Eno"). In writing Haitian Creole, I have generally followed the orthographic conventions suggested in Albert Valdman's Basic Course in Haitian Creole (Bloomington: Research Center for Language Sciences, Indiana University, 1970).

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the assistance of PDCC co-directors, field staff and field personnel, as well as the help provided by residents of Chambellan's various localities in the preparation of this evaluation. I thank them for their hospitality and for the patience and candor with which they responded to my persistent questions.

2. Project History

2.1 Original Social, Economic and Political Context of PDCC

(PDCC) is a joint endeavor of the Alliance pour l'Enfance et le Developpment Communautaire (AEDC) and the Departement de l'Agriculture, des Ressources Naturelles et du Developpement Rural (DARNDR). The project was initiated in 1978 on the basis of a five-year agreement between the Canadian Save the Children Fund (CAN SAVE), the Save the Children Federation of the United States (SCF), and the Government of Haiti to undertake a program of integrated community development in the Department of the Grand' Anse. Under the terms of the agreement, both AEDC and DARNDR designated co-directors for PDCC, and each party committed itself to provide funds, technical support or equipment for the planning and implementation of the project (see Annex 1).

PDCC became operational in 1980. In 1981, it was granted three years of supplementary funding support by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) on the basis of a revised project paper (AEDC 1981). According to the funding agreement, USAID funds were to support a variety of PDCC activities, but the costs of construction projects were specifically excluded (see Annex 2).

2.2 The Project Site: Selection and Baseline Data

The Commune of Chambellan was selected as the project site because of its isolated position near the center of the Grand' Anse and the paucity of development activity in the

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area (AEDC 1981). AEDC and DARNDR officials considered Chambellan to be a potentially rich area for a variety of reasons. Among these were its favorable ecology, fertile land and the availability of water and other natural resources. The multiple cropping system employed by Chambellan's peasants and the important regional market in the town of Chambellan also offered possibilities for further agricultural and commercial development. Moreover, the existence of Community Action Councils (Konsej daksyon Komunote) or community groups (groupman Komunote) in the commune suggested that there were viable local institutions which could be strengthened and utilized as conduits for PDCC support.

Given these characteristics, it was felt that methods of community development emphasizing collective action, self-help and small-scale projects among peasants were most likely to have positive effects on social and economic life in Chambellan. Furthermore, it was assumed that any social and economic changes which occurred during the life of PDCC could be attributed to the efficacy of the project's approach to community development because no other agencies were active in the area.

During 1979, a baseline study was carried out on behalf of AEDC to document social and economic conditions in Chambellan (Fanfan et al. 1980). The study team was composed of five Haitian social scientists with development research experience and twenty-eight interviewers from

Chambellan and other parts of the Grand' Anse. The study, undertaken over a period of ten months, gathered information on population, education, health, housing and agriculture by means of a census and several surveys.

While presenting a picture of the general situation in each of these sectors, the study underscored the consequences of the absence and/or inadequacy of resources, technologies, institutions and particular forms of knowledge in the commune. Space limitations preclude an extensive discussion of the baseline study's theoretical assumptions, methodology or findings. However, we may cite three examples of the type of interrelationships among these variables which are stressed by the study.

Low levels of productivity for coffee, cocoa, corn and other crops were related to poor land tenure patterns, peasants' lack of access to tools, machinery, credit and other agricultural inputs, and their limited knowledge of more effective farming techniques such as terracing and use of fertilizers (Fanfan et al. 1980: Chap: 6, esp. pp. 177-80). A fifteen percent mortality rate among infants and the high morbidity rate in the general population were attributed to the unavailability of clean water, malnutrition, inadequate hygiene and sanitation practices, and limited access to the community's preventive and curative health care facilities which are poor to begin with (Fanfan et al. 1980: Chap. 5). Finally, the study pointed to Chambellan's low thirty percent literacy rate, inadequate educational facilities,

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inappropriate teaching techniques and materials, and the absence of opportunities for adult education and training as major problems in the field of education (Fanfan et al. 1980: Chap. 3, esp. pp. 72-76).

The results of the baseline study were used to determine priorities among Chambellan's sectoral needs in accordance with AEDC objectives and to formulate a "strategic group" approach to their fulfillment.

Two further points about the baseline study should be noted. First, the research team considered the baseline study to be a preliminary report which should be followed by more particularistic research on socio-economic organization (Fanfan et al. 1980: 7). The failure to undertake these more specialized studies created problems when PDCC implemented its program. Second, the work of the baseline study team itself had unanticipated consequences for project implementation.

Because the baseline study was the first PDCC activity in Chambellan, the local population became aware of its development philosophy and objectives through contact with the study team. Given that the members of the team had their own views on "integrated community development", or were not fully familiar with AEDC's intentions, certain false impressions about the project were fostered within the community. For example, the study team apparently made known to the community its conclusion that direct work with

the peasants on their own farms was likely to have a greater impact on agriculture than the training of "professional leaders" (Fanfan et al. 1980: 180). When the project eventually came to emphasize leaders and community groups, this move was perceived by many Chambellan residents as a departure from its original mission.

2.3 Project Goals and Implementation Strategy

PDCC is designed to address the basic human and material resource needs of poor peasants in Chambellan, a commune which occupies approximately 250 square kilometers and has a population of 16,523 persons (Fanfan et al. 1980: 3,9). The general goal of the project is "to set in motion a self-sustaining process whereby the poor peasant population in and around Chambellan can both improve and exercise more control over the social and economic aspects of their own lives" (AEDC 1981: 3, italics removed).

More specifically, the project aims to provide material and technical assistance to a minimum of thirty "strategic groups" (group stratejik); that is, groups of eight to fifteen peasants whose similar backgrounds and interests establish a basis for the identification, analysis and solution of shared problems. By aiding these groups to design and implement small-scale development projects, PDCC hoped to help bring about "significant economic and social improvement for the majority of the population residing within the Chambellan commune" (AEDC 1981: 24).

During the period 1981-84, PDCC planned to undertake some twenty-one activities which fell under the general headings of rural infrastructure development: agriculture; education and training; nutrition, health and sanitation; and small-scale enterprise development. These activities included construction of a road connecting the National Highway and the localities of Eno, Kadet and Boukan; construction of five social centers; organization of two tree nurseries to produce 80,000 seedlings annually; demonstration of soil conservation, contour planting and animal husbandry techniques to peasant farmers and youth groups; basic instruction in community development for ninety leaders and training of women in the organization of strategic groups; construction of latrines and instruction in nutrition and sanitation; and construction of a metal workshop and training of local artisans and apprentices. (See Annex 3 for a complete list of project activities.) Of these twenty-one activities, nine were new in 1981, eight were expansions of activities begun in 1980, and four were continuations of activities initiated during the project's first year of operation.

The PDCC project paper provided a detailed implementation plan for activities to be undertaken in each sector during 1981-82, and general implementation guidelines for 1982-83 and 1983-84 (AEDC 1981: 14-23). The implementation strategy was designed to allow PDCC to track the progress of each activity and, together with the baseline data, to establish a basis for mid-point and end-of-project evaluations.

During each quarter of the first year, project activities were expected to progress through various stages towards the fulfillment of a specific or general goal. These stages included the determination of community needs, preparation of a feasibility study, initiation of the activity with the assistance of community groups and appropriate agencies of the Government of Haiti, and completion of the activity or its continuation in a more advanced form. At each stage, the project field staff was to work closely with the community in order to define the peasants' needs, to determine the availability of local resources and types of necessary project inputs, and to enlist the assistance of community groups in monitoring, verifying and evaluating project activities.

Due to the nature of the strategic group approach, PDCC felt that it was impossible to develop implementation plans a year or two in advance (AEDC 1981: 22-3). Instead it provided implementation guidelines for years two and three which included the following points:

- 1) Emphasis on consolidation of activities in areas other than infrastructural development (on the assumption that need for construction would decrease);
- 2) Preference for expansion or continuation of activities initiated in year one as opposed to initiation of new ones;
- 3) Increasing delegation of responsibility to strategic groups for initiation of projects and development of implementation plans;
- 4) Treatment of implementation plans as projections in

order to maintain flexibility for adaptation to local realities;

- 5) Inclusion of a precise schedule for mid-point and end-of-project evaluations;
- 6) Provision of adequate time for inter-agency collaboration in order to encourage replication and, to the extent possible, institutionalization.

2.4 Budget

The total PDCC budget for the three year period amounts to U.S. \$1,000,455 and is financed by the Save the Children Alliance, USAID, the Government of Haiti and Chambellan's community groups (in the form of labor and local materials). The contributions of these agencies are distributed in the following manner:

SCF/Alliance	U.S.\$ 526,803	52.7%
USAID	362,000	36.1%
Government of Haiti	79,652	8.0%
Estimated Community Output	32,000	3.2%
	1,000,455	100.0%

Source: USAID/SCF Project Agreement for the PDCC
(See Annex 2, p. 7).

Note: A detailed summary budget is included in the USAID/SCF project agreement (Refer to Annex 2).

2.5 Expected Project Outputs

The success of the PDCC implementation strategy was to be measured in terms of the following project outputs:

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- 1) Increased accessibility to at least three localities as a result of road construction;
- 2) Increased accessibility of at least one new source of energy for commercial purposes;
- 3) Increased yields per hectare for coffee, cocoa, corn or rice on land of peasants participating in assorted agricultural activities;
- 4) Literacy training for five hundred people;
- 5) Ten percent increase in participation by local people in community groups and affairs;
- 6) Measurable decrease in mortality and morbidity rates;
- 7) Increased family income for fifty people participating in small-scale enterprise development activities;
- 8) Operation of thirty local self-help groups;
- 9) Training for fifty community leaders.

3. Implementation

3.1 Overview

In 1980, Hurricane Allen caused extensive damage in Chambellan and therefore retarded implementation of the PDCC program. Nevertheless, while making an important contribution to the recovery of the commune, PDCC was able to begin activities in community development training, agriculture, nutrition, potable water and sanitation, and building and road construction.

Most PDCC activities became fully operational during 1981 and 1982. In July and November of 1981, the original Canadian and Haitian project co-directors were replaced when their respective assignments with AEDC and DARNDR came to an end. Although these changes caused certain delays and transitional difficulties, the project's field staff and field personnel were recruited and the implementation of the PDCC program began in earnest.

The implementation phase was marked by shifts in PDCC's methods of operation and the status of particular sectors of project activity. These shifts included modification of the project's organizational focus, decentralization of some project operations and formalization of certain project activities. Three examples may be cited.

PDCC devoted considerable time to the formation of community groups (groupman Komunote) in order to gain access to the

peasant population prior to the formation of strategic groups. Chambellan was subdivided into four nuclei (nouayo), territorially-defined zones of operation which are anchored by an especially active community group and includes several neighboring groups. Twenty-three of the twenty-five community groups in the four nuclei were organized with the assistance of the project. Assistance took the form of training local peasants, based on ONAAC guidelines, in the purpose and organizational structure of the community groups (e.g. roles of officers and members, the importance of democratic elections and probity in financial matters, procedures for holding meetings, etc.). Other assistance included the provision of funds and materials for the construction of social centers.

PDCC also upgraded the status of its women's development and rural youth programs by hiring staff to be responsible specifically for them. These staff members trained field personnel, or worked directly with groups of women or young people in order to address the specific needs of these sectors of the local population and to involve them more fully in other areas of project activity.

Finally, it was also decided that PDCC activities in health, nutrition and household sanitation would be more effective if they were decentralized. Training and demonstrations in these areas would take place in peasants' homes rather than in centers associated with the project in order to counteract the perception that the centers were day-care

facilities or dispensaries. Thus, the two nutrition centers which had been established in Eno and Gran-Fon were closed.

3.2 Administrative Org., Field Staff and Field Personnel

PDCC is administered through the AEDC office in Port-au-Prince and the project field office in Chambellan, each of which is headed by a co-director. (A Chart showing PDCC's administrative organization appears in Annex 4.) With two exceptions, staff positions in both offices were filled during the administration of the current co-directors. In addition to the replacement of the original co-directors, several other changes in administrative personnel should be noted. The original secretary and nutritionist at the Chambellan office were dismissed in 1981 for failure to carry out their duties properly. A Canadian cultural animation specialist, who had been hired in February, 1982, was also released one week after his arrival in Chambellan because he experienced "violent culture shock" (AEDC 1982:2).

The PDCC staff in Port-au-Prince includes the Canadian project co-director, who is the chief AEDC administrator in Haiti, as well as an executive assistant and a secretary, both of whom are Haitian. The Port-au-Prince co-director coordinates relations between PDCC, its foreign sponsoring agencies and the Government of Haiti. He also shares responsibility with the Chambellan co-director for the definition, implementation and monitoring of PDCC field operations.

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In addition to the Haitian co-director, the PDCC field staff includes three Haitian men and two Canadian women. It consists of a Haitian co-ordinator/supervisor (koodinate/supevize), a Haitian administrator/accountant (administratè/Kontab), a Canadian nutritionist/women's development program specialist (nutrisyonis/responsab promosyn femininn), a Canadian cultural animation/rural youth program specialist (responsab animasyon Kulturel/jenes rural), and a Haitian pre-school program/community development specialist (responsab stimulasyon prekos/devlopman Komunote). Both offices also have full-time drivers in addition to a five-person house staff in Chambellan.

The following description summarizes the current responsibilities of each field staff member.

1) Co-director

- shares responsibility for definition, implementation and monitoring of PDCC field operations with his Canadian counterpart - directly responsible for day-to-day decisions concerning project operations, including direction of staff activities, training of field personnel and communication with local government officials and community councils or groups

2) Co-ordinator/Supervisor

- responsible for training and supervision of field personnel in agricultural and animation techniques
- co-ordination of project activities with community groups, strategic groups and co-operatives (including group formation process) - direct work with individual peasant farmers in technical assistance and animation - co-ordination of work of staff members in various sectors of project activity - assistance of co-director in day-to-day decisions and project communication with local community

3) Administrator/Accountant

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- responsible for office management and accounting (cash disbursements, requisitions, inventory and delivery of tools and supplies, etc.) - as of April 1983, was assigned additional responsibility of reorganizing literacy program
- 4) Nutritionist/Women's Development Specialist
 - responsible for nutrition, preventive health care and women's development programs - trains and supervises three (originally five) women's development animators - provides to women's committees (Komite de promosyon femininn) community groups, and women who became involved in nutrition centers information concerning diet, household sanitation, birth control, child-rearing, home economics, etc.
- 5) Cultural Animation/Rural Youth Development Specialist
 - responsible for organizing cultural activities (dance, song, games, etc.) for children and teenagers from age six to fifteen - provides children in this age range with information on farming, animal husbandry, nutrition and health - in addition, responsible for secretarial work at PDCC field office due to typing skills
- 6) Pre-School Program/Community Development Specialist
 - although technically an animator and leader of the field personnel assigned to one nucleus, responsible for animation and training of pre-school center monitors - works on the development of techniques for instruction and animation of pre-school children and community groups, including instruction materials.

In general, members of the field staff have sufficient educational background and work experience to function effectively in their positions. Each of the Haitians had worked as development technicians or teachers in the Grand' Anse or elsewhere in rural Haiti prior to joining the staff. The Canadians, both CECI volunteers who had contact with Haitians in Canada, came to the project with skills well-suited to the activities for which they are responsible, and soon became sufficiently fluent in Creole to communicate with peasants directly.

As a whole, the staff is also relatively free of outside commitments which would compete with project work. The only person with non-project-related responsibilities is the co-director. His position as chief agronomist of the agricultural district which includes Chambellan takes him to Dame Marie two to four times per month, and requires several hours of administrative work each week. On the other hand, some staff members have family obligations and commitments outside Chambellan. The contracts of the co-ordinator and the Canadians allow personal leave at regular intervals, and most staff members spend weekends in Jeremie.

Despite their general qualifications, certain staff members have experienced difficulty adjusting to either working conditions in Chambellan or to the specific requirements of their jobs. For example, the work of the nutritionist has been hampered somewhat by illness, and the administrator only became more efficient in inventory and accounting procedures during his second year with the project (AEDC 1982: 1). More important, there are doubts among staff members about the skill, work habits and commitment to project goals of their colleagues. In some instances, these doubts are based on specific actions staff members have taken; in others, they reflect complex issues of national and sexual identity, or differing perceptions of how development technicians should perform their roles. In both cases, the fact that doubts tend to be expressed indirectly rather than addressed openly by the staff as a whole tends to undermine the collegiality of staff relations.

The existence of the project residential center itself lends the impression of cordial and collegial staff relations. Completed in 1982, the center is located in Nore, just outside the town of Chambellan. It includes two concrete block dormitories with indoor plumbing and fibro-cement roofs, kitchen facilities, a tool depot and land used for agricultural and livestock demonstration. The center provides the entire staff with common living accommodations while affording a degree of privacy that promotes a certain esprit de corps. However, in certain regards the benefits of the center are more apparent than real.

The location of the center away from most sites of project activity, as well as the atypical design and construction materials of its buildings, create physical and social distances between the staff and the local community. Moreover, the high construction costs of these facilities - U.S. \$50,629 - and their numerous flaws indicate the limitations of inadequately planned and supervised experiments in "appropriate technology" (Bros 1983: 41,46). Aside from these shortcomings, the mere existence of common living accommodations does not in itself promote effective dialogue among staff members concerning day-to-day problems or long-term project goals.

PDCC's salaried field personnel consists of thirty-three literate Chambellan residents of peasant background who range in age from twenty-four to forty years. The core of the field personnel is the group of sixteen organizers

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(ankadre), animators (animate), soil technicians (teknisyen de sol), and women's development promoters (promotris daksyon femininn) who work in teams of four with the four nuclei of the project. In addition, the project employs twelve literacy training monitors (monite alfabetizasyon) and five pre-school center monitors (monite sont preskole). (See the administrative chart which appears as Annex 4.)

Of the personnel assigned to the nuclei, twelve are male and four (the women's development promoters) are female. The salary ranges for males and females are U.S. \$60-70 per month and U.S. \$40-60 per month respectively. Most of the literacy training monitors are male, but all of the pre-school monitors are female. They are payed U.S. \$20-25 per month.

Although the people occupying field personnel positions were all selected and trained during 1981-82, the quality of their training varies considerably. PDCC has placed much greater emphasis on the education and training of the personnel assigned to the nuclei than on the preparation of personnel in the pre-school and literacy programs. Both of these programs are poorly developed and poorly integrated with other project activities. The pre-school program was implemented recently and the literacy program, described by the administrator as a total failure, is currently being reorganized.

Initial training of the nuclei personnel involved a series

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of seminars which provided basic information on the role of change agents in a community, agricultural, soil and livestock improvement techniques, and animation methods. Several people have also made field trips to observe the operation of these techniques and methods elsewhere in Haiti. The women's development promoters were trained initially by the nutritionist in preventive health care, nutrition, household sanitation and other areas where the potential contribution of women to community development was considered to be greatest. They were later gradually introduced into the other training activities of the project.

The field personnel receive ongoing training through a combination of weekly meetings with the staff, field demonstrations at the project's demonstration farm or at the gardens of strategic groups, and participation in special seminars sponsored by the project. During the weekly meetings, the co-ordinator and, to a lesser extent, the co-director present more advanced technical information and animation techniques. The other staff members contribute to general discussion of progress made in various project activities, and the field personnel report on problems encountered in their work with community groups and strategic groups.

For the reasons indicated above, the organizers, animators, soil technicians and promoters are more advanced than the monitors. They are highly motivated and possess a keen

grasp of technical information, animation techniques, and the general objectives of the project. However, neither their current level of understanding nor the quality of their training permit them to work independently with existing strategic groups or, for that matter, to train new groups.

Finally, the high turnover rate of field staff members jeopardizes the continuity and integration of the PDCC program. The co-director in Port-au-Prince will leave his post in November of this year, the nutritionist is scheduled to depart within several weeks after organizing a seminar on women's development, and it is unclear how much longer the co-director in Chambellan intends to remain.

3.3 Previous Evaluations

An evaluation of PDCC activities up to January, 1983, based on one month of research, was prepared recently for AEDC by an outside evaluator (Bros 1983). The evaluation examined general socio-economic conditions in Chambellan, the status of PDCC activities in construction, agriculture and health, and the administration of the project. Data for the evaluation included responses of 154 peasants to a brief questionnaire, interviews with the PDCC staff in Chambellan and Port-au-Prince, observation of peasant group meetings, and a search of relevant documents.

In a candid appraisal of PDCC success and failures, the evaluation concluded that the project had created a positive

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climate for community development while producing short-term socio-economic benefits for the peasant population. However, certain departures from PDCC's original objectives of peasant self-motivation and self-sufficiency were noted, and the recent implementation of several project activities precluded precise determination of their impact.

In order of importance, the most successful PDCC activities were:

1) Construction of the potable water system.

Completion of this system has upgraded living conditions of peasants by providing sources of clean water and by training peasants in simple techniques for capping springs, installing pipes and constructing fountains.

2) Training of PDCC field personnel.

The sixteen organizers and animators were considered to be "pillars" of the project whose training and dedication transformed them into "agents of progress".

3) Agricultural extension.

By upgrading traditional farming techniques and introducing new techniques (e.g. use of draft animals), improved seed varieties, fish farming, rabbit breeding and vegetable cultivation, PDCC has contributed to better local resource utilization and improvement of the local diet.

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4) Consciousness-raising among peasants.

PDCC has stimulated greater awareness of problems of ecology, family size, health, etc. and provided education which will help peasants to solve these difficulties.

5) Building construction.

Peasants have participated extensively in the construction of four classrooms, a slaughterhouse, and five social centers, even though the technical quality of some buildings (e.g. the social centers) is unsatisfactory (Bros 1983: 79-83).

Those activities of the PDCC which were considered to be failures included:

1) Cash prizes for peasants.

Given the "realities of the area" and the "monetary system of the peasants", cash prizes for achievements in animal husbandry and agriculture undermine more fruitful long-term educational incentives and changes in peasant values.

2) Co-ordination of PDCC and DARNDR activities.

DARNDR has failed to fulfill its obligation to provide competent project co-ordinators and support services.

3) Construction of staff residential center.

High costs, technical difficulties and long delays in

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the completion of the center have made it a major problem.

4) Baseline study.

Heavily theoretical and statistical presentation of baseline data made practical information inaccessible to development technicians. Further, the research team encouraged unrealistic expectations about PDCC objectives among local residents (Bros 1983: 83-4).

Most of the evaluation's ten recommendations called on PDCC to reduce the portion of its budget devoted to infrastructural development (with the exception of latrine construction) in favor of activities in the areas of education, training and motivation (Bros 1983: 89-92). Special note was taken of the need for additional training of the project field personnel in order to achieve the goals of peasant self-determination and self-sufficiency.

More important, the evaluation recommended that the administration of PDCC be restructured in a way which would give AEDC complete control over project field operations. Although this change would require the complete revision of the AEDC-DARNDR agreement, it was deemed essential in order to achieve greater co-ordination in relations between Port-au-Prince and Chambellan offices. Specifically, it would permit AEDC to hire a field administrator who possessed the necessary experience in community development and the leadership qualities required to manage field

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operations effectively.

The final version of the evaluation has not been circulated. Although members of the PDCC field staff are familiar with its general content, only the Canadians are aware of the extent to which the AEDC-DARNDR relationship has been criticized. Thus while the PDCC co-director in Port-au-Prince and the Canadian members of the field staff are convinced that the project's administration must be changed, the co-director in Chambellan and the Haitian field staff members are not committed to this proposition. The evaluation was completed too recently to determine what action will be taken on this and other recommendations.

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4. Strengths and Weaknesses of Project Outputs

4.1 Organization of Peasant Groups

PDCC works with three types of peasant groups which are considered to represent increasingly advanced stages of peasant organization. These are community councils or groups (Konsej Komunote), (groupman Komunote), strategic groups (groupman stratejik), and co-operatives (Kooperatif). Twenty-five community groups, thirty strategic groups and one co-operative participate in PDCC activities. Although strategic groups are the basis of the PDCC approach to community development, the project has used community councils to establish contact with the peasant population, and members of strategic groups and co-operatives must be active council members.

The organizational structure of the councils generally follows the ONAAC model for quasi-governmental bodies which promote community development in rural Haiti. Each council has a steering committee (Komite direkte) composed of a president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer, alternates and counselors, and a general assembly (asanmble jeneral) composed of active and inactive members. Active members pay monthly dues of U.S. \$.20 - .40 and devote one day of labour each week to council projects.

In principle, there are two sub-councils in each rural section as well as community groups in each locality which are subordinate to the central council (gran Konsey) located

in the town of Chambellan. However, PDCC ignores this hierarchy. It treats all community groups as equals within its four nuclei (nouayo) in order to avoid conflicts which exist between the central council and the councils of the localities. In fact, the town council is not included in a PDCC nucleus in part because it showed little interest in becoming involved, and in part because it was disenchanted with the project's emphasis on self-help and work in the rural localities.

Inconsistent and incomplete PDCC records make it difficult to determine precisely how many peasants are involved in community groups. Although the project has information on twenty of the twenty-five community groups with which it works, the total population of localities, as well as active and inactive group members, are enumerated as family units in some instances and as individuals in others. Bros (1983: 21-22) estimates that 5,800 persons have had contact with PDCC personnel and that 4,000 peasants (approximately twenty-five percent<25%> of the population of Chambellan) benefit from project activities. However, both of these figures seem high. They must also be treated with caution because "contact" covers various types and degrees of peasant involvement, while "direct benefits" refers to greater awareness of the value of collective action for some peasants, short periods of training for others, and a few cases of economic improvement which can only be called marginal at this point.

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Community groups, especially those in the southern part of the commune, have participated most extensively in PDCC's construction activities. Some fifteen community groups have provided labor for construction of the Eno-Boukan road, and six of the planned eighteen kilometers have been completed without the benefit of machinery. Eleven community groups have furnished labor and materials for construction of social centers. Five social centers have been completed, three remain unfinished and an additional three are in the initial phases of construction.

Eleven of the twenty community groups for which information is available have formed strategic groups. The 365 peasants in the thirty PDCC strategic groups have participated most extensively in the project's agricultural activities, which often contribute to fulfillment of goals in other sectors of community need. They have begun to practice soil conservation techniques such as simple terracing, contour planting on small areas of hillside land, and maintained three nurseries: They have planted small family gardens of fresh vegetables, (previously imported from other parts of Haiti), and used a more careful selection of seed corn. Strategic groups have also reacted enthusiastically to the efforts of the project to improve the local breed of chickens, to breed rabbits and to establish fish ponds.

Nevertheless, in all cases the non-material benefits of these activities have been greater than their material benefits. For example, most peasants have harvested only

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one traditional or newly-introduced crop using PDCC agricultural techniques. Although people who had planted family vegetable gardens had begun to eat cabbage, carrots and egg plant more frequently, very few had sold any of these vegetables for profit. Moreover, others complained that visits by PDCC field personnel outside the context of formal meetings were infrequent, and doubted that the possibilities for commercial production of vegetables would be great once PDCC activities in this area were expanded.

Strategic group members, like other members of community groups, tend to be poor peasants. However, the category "poor peasant" (peyizan malere) is defined very loosely in contradistinction to "town residents" (mounn bouk) and "rich peasants" (gran abitan) by the PDCC staff and members of the peasant groups. The project's interest in group formation and economic improvement for poor peasants is not well served by so gross a conception of the nature of poor peasants. The composition of strategic groups in more precise socio-economic terms must be determined in order to document processes of group formation, to measure the results of strategic group actions, and to test PDCC's hypothesis that such groups will have a demonstration effect after project technical support is withdrawn. At present, strategic groups are very dependent on PDCC personnel and resources. Neither current levels of training nor the experience of strategic groups presently enable them to initiate and implement projects independently.

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4.2 Construction

a) The Eno-Boukan Road

Aside from involving the largest number of peasant community groups of any PDCC activity, the six kilometers of road which have been completed facilitate movement between peasants' houses and gardens in four localities, and between these localities and the town of Chambellan. Peasants also maintain that completion of the remaining twelve kilometers will give them greater access to an important local market in Boukan. However, unless canals are dug, this road is likely to become impassable during the rainy season. It also remains unclear whether poor peasants, as opposed to more well-to-do peasants and truck owners, will benefit most from increased accessibility to the southern part of the commune.

b) Social Centers

The five completed social centers provide localities with facilities for community group meetings as well as pre-school, literacy and rural youth programs. However, the fact that PDCC offers U.S. \$500 - 1,000 to community groups for the construction of such centers has canalized what appears to be community initiative in this direction. Construction of social centers may be supported by community groups more because they are means to secure project aid than because they reflect genuine need.

c) Latrines

Although approximately 100 latrines have been constructed in the town of Chambellan and six localities, this activity has been dropped temporarily pending inquiry into design problems and reasons for peasants' lack of motivation to use latrines.

d) potable water system

Four springs have been capped and eleven public fountains have been installed in the town of Chambellan and localities in its immediate vicinity. The system's construction involved several community groups and, although no information on its effects on health is available, it should decrease the incidence of illness caused by impure drinking water.

Still, it is by no means clear that the system can be maintained or replicated elsewhere in the commune without PDCC assistance. The project has not investigated the actual use of the fountains, but their location along Chambellan's main road reduces their accessibility to residents of outlying localities, especially those who must cross the river to reach them. Several peasants also pointed out that the absence of cisterns is very wasteful.

e) Slaughterhouse

This is the best example of PDCC construction. It has made an important, though limited, contribution to sanitary conditions in the marketplace.

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f) Residential construction

The delays, costliness and defects - both physical and social - of the center have been mentioned already. Given that its utility is not likely to outlive the project, it can only be deemed a very weak project output.

4.3 Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fish Farming

Agricultural activities have made slow but steady progress, and stand to make the most substantial contribution to improvement of economic conditions in Chambellan. The soil conservation techniques, seed and tool banks, seed selection program and family vegetable gardens have been successful in terms of initial training and demonstration, even though they have yet to produce extensive economic results.

Some 35,000 fast-growing trees (about half of those planted in tree nurseries) have been distributed to approximately sixty individuals and several groups in three different localities, and the success rate has been nearly sixty-five percent. Between May 1982 and March 1983, PDCC distributed rabbits to thirty-three families and, through the process of sharing the offspring, sixty-eight families are now raising rabbits. Chambellan residents, like other Haitians, are slow to accept rabbit meat as food, but these families do eat rabbits and some have been able to sell them for U.S. \$2 - 3 to supplement their incomes.

The major weakness of this sector is the inadequate training

of the field personnel and strategic groups. While the co-ordinator is highly skilled and motivated, he cannot be expected to provide all the initial and follow-up training required by field personnel, community groups, strategic groups and individual peasants. Another weakness is that, with the exception of corn and rice, relatively little extension work has been done for traditionally-grown crops such as yams, sweet potatoes and taro, all of which play important roles in the local diet and system of cultivation.

4.4 Health and Sanitation

The potable water system, the slaughterhouse and the latrine program, discussed under project construction, are important components of PDCC health and sanitation activities. Aside from these undertakings, project activities in this sector fall within its women's development program.

Decentralization of PDCC's education, training and demonstrations in women's development is the major strength of this sector. Small groups of women have begun to learn simple measures which can be applied towards the improvement of the health conditions which they and their families have long endured. They have also begun to examine the role of women in community development more generally through their involvement with the project.

This having been said, it must be admitted that much work remains to be done in the women's development program in terms of conceptualization, implementation and coordination.

While theoretically of equal status with other project activities, the number of field staff and field personnel involved in women's development is low and their work remains poorly integrated with other project activities, especially in agriculture. The integration of women's development into the PDCC program of community development requires great care because it raises thorny issues of sex-role definition and national identity which surface in subtle ways at project staff and peasant groups levels.

4.5 Other

The rural youth and pre-school programs have been implemented too recently to determine their strengths and weaknesses. The reorganization of the literacy program, a failure by admission of the project staff in terms of both personnel training and peasant participation, has already been noted. PDCC's hydro-electric project has been postponed indefinitely after a turbine was purchased due to unforeseen technical problems and after conflicts arose with the town of Chambellan over how the electrification system was to be installed. The project's small-scale enterprise development activities in women's craft production and metal work have both been dropped due to quality control problems and the lack of a commercial outlet for such products.

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

In general terms, PDCC may be considered successful in that it has mounted a partially effective campaign of infrastructural improvement and peasant group organization. While furnishing support for infrastructural development, it has made peasants more aware of the possibilities for collective action by providing many of them with their first experience with collectivities other than household and traditional work groups. It has further provided training for some peasants in the organization of activities of potentially great social and economic benefit.

However, despite PDCC's rhetoric of community initiative and self-sufficiency, peasants involved in the various project activities are thoroughly dependent on PDCC material and non-material resources. Further, in the case of project funding support for social centers, PDCC actually discourages peasant groups from undertaking non-construction related activities as their first project action. It seems unlikely to this observer that the work PDCC has accomplished could be sustained were the project staff and funding support withdrawn in 1984.

PDCC's resistance to the expectation that it is a substitute for inputs by the Government of Haiti and the residents of the localities is a laudable aspect of its development philosophy. This attitude is exemplified by the project's refusal to build schools and dispensaries, or to provide

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electricity for private homes in the town of Chambellan, thereby reinforcing the principle that the project assists the community to meet its own needs. Nevertheless, PDCC's emphasis on need satisfaction and the very slow progress of groups toward self-sufficiency conspire to undermine in fact what is attempted in theory.

Smucker (1982: 432) has noted that in rural Haiti "the (basic) needs are so vast that an agency which defines itself in terms of need is in a position to stay (in those communities) indefinitely." In other words, given the Haitian socio-economic and political context, community development projects like the PDCC run the risk of becoming institutionalized despite the best intentions of their sponsoring agencies and staff. The risk is especially great when projects yield to bureaucratic pressure to view community development merely in terms of "landscape changes" (roads, buildings, etc.) within territorially-defined "communities", rather than as a long-term and well-monitored process of ideational and organizational change rooted in socially-defined communities.

In this connection, PDCC has two major weaknesses. First, communication among staff members in Chambellan and Port-au-Prince lacks the candor which would permit open discussion of problems and divergent viewpoints on the substance of community development activities. Second, the limited internal documentation of the formation, composition and activities of groups of "poor peasants" on the one hand,

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and inadequate training of field personnel on the other hand, leaves PDCC unable to gauge one of its greatest potential contributions to community development in Chambellan. This involves the wedding of concrete material outputs with the mobilization of less concrete, but equally important, human beings.

These observations and the text of this chapter support the following observations:

- 1) Should the AEDC - DARNDR agreement be changed, it should be stipulated that the chief administrative position in the project field office be filled by an Haitian who is on equal footing with the Port-au-Prince co-director in terms of responsibilities for defining goals, implementation, etc.
- 2) Decrease staff time and project resources devoted to infrastructural projects and organization of community groups, in favor of:
 - a) increased attention to formation and monitoring of strategic groups, and
 - b) exploration of traditional associations (e.g. sori) as a means for recruiting strategic group members.
- 3) Develop the capacity of project field staff and personnel to conduct on-going applied research on social and economic conditions in Chambellan, and the

process of intervention by the project, including documentation of technical information and animation techniques, and feedback from peasants.

- 4) Devote more staff time to on-going training of of project field personnel using instruction techniques more suited to their capacity to understand and retain information.

- 5) Increase communication between field staff members as well as between project offices
 - a) formalized mechanism for exchange of ideas about goals, roles of Haitian and foreign staff, and differences in perspectives on development based on nationality, sex, previous experience, etc. - i.e. animation work with staff itself.
 - b) regular communication with community groups in order to counteract latent perception that development is a PDCC affair

- 6) Integrate various sectors of project activity more closely (e.g. women's development, pre-school program, etc.) and add more women to project field staff and field personnel.

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Annex 1

AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
THE SAVE THE CHILDREN ALLIANCE
AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, NATURAL RESOURCES
AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
FOR A
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
IN THE REGION OF THE GRAND ANSE

DAMIEN, HAITI

June 1978

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The Government of Haiti and the Save the Children Alliance agree to co-operate in an integrated rural community development program in the Grand'Anse Region. The principal objectives are:

1. To develop the confidence and skills in the rural population necessary to identify their own problems and to assure the responsibilities with respect to the planning, execution and evaluation of projects to resolve these problems.
2. To improve the quality of rural life through a truly integrated approach to rural development, working in the areas of education, health, nutrition, agriculture and small industries and transport and communication.
3. Assist the rural population to identify and utilize the resources which exist in their communities, to increase their production capacity, and to establish the ties necessary with the Government and private institutions so that they can ultimately attain relative self-sufficiency in the development process.

The Government of the Republic of Haiti, hereafter called the Haitian Government, represented by the Executive Secretary of CONADEP and the Secretary of State for Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (DARNDR) on the one hand,

and the Save the Children Alliance, a non-profit, non-religious, and non-political organization, represented by Mr. David L. Guyer, President of the American Save the Children Federation and Mrs. E. Patricia Mortimer, National Director of the Canadian Save the Children Fund, hereafter known as the "Alliance" on the other hand, agree to the following:

1. The Haitian Government permits the Alliance to appoint a Program Director and to implement an integrated community development program in the region of the Grand'Anse, in conjunction with the competent Haitian institutions.

A resume of the Program Director should be submitted to the Haitian Government for information.

2. The Alliance commits itself to:
 - a. co-operate with the Haitian Government to assist the communities and institutions of the Grand'Anse in the planning and the implementation of programs in the areas of agriculture, education and health by furnishing training, technical and financial co-operation and other necessary resources with the ultimate aim of self-management of the peasant institutions.

- b. establish its offices in Haiti to manage and

implement an integrated community development program in several agricultural villages of the Grand'Anse, in co-operation with the Haitian Government.

c. utilize to the maximum, services to the Haitian technicians in the fields in which they are available, and the foreign technicians, the number of which should not exceed the number of Haitian technicians involved in the project.

d. undertake training programs of rural leaders and members of the communes of the region, in conjunction with Haitian technicians.

e. furnish according to its means and the needs as expressed by the community, part of the equipment required to implement the program activities.

f. collaborate according to its means and program objectives with other programs and projects aimed at improving the economic, social and sanitary conditions of the region.

g. prepare and submit to DARNDR via the Unity of Programming in June of every year, a report on the completed project activities as well as the planned program objectives for the following year. An evaluation shall be done every year in conjunction with the Haitian Government and the community. The system of evaluation will subsequently be defined by the interested parties.

3. For its part, the Haitian Government commits itself to:

a. designate a Haitian co-director. A resume of the Co-Director will be submitted to the Alliance for information.

b. grant residence permits to foreign technicians called to collaborate in project implementation.

c. grant exemption of all duties, taxes and obligations which could be charged to the Alliance or its foreign staff participating in the program.

d. grant exemption on all taxes and customs duties on:

- all material, furniture and equipment destined for project use.

- all personal effects and household goods of foreign staff participating in the project.

e. grant exemption from excise taxes on the purchase of carburants necessary to the functioning of program vehicles and machinery.

f. guarantee that all material, equipment and provisions provided by the Alliance will not be subjected to requisition or re-allocation without the agreement of the Alliance.

4. The length of this agreement is five years and is renewable subject to mutual agreement. However, the party that would like to terminate this agreement must give written notice to the other of at least 120 days. In case of termination of this contract or its completion, and after mutual agreement, the programme will transfer in exclusive donation to the community all equipment and material necessary to the continuation of the project under the responsibility of DARNDR.

5. The agreement will become effective as soon as it is published in the official document of the Haitian Government, the Moniteur.

The undersigned, duly authorized to this effect, have signed this agreement in three copies in French and three copies in English. In the case of need for interpretation, only the French copy will be considered for reference.

Signed in Port-au-Prince on 26 October 1978 by the Secretary of State for Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development, and the Executive Secretary of CONADEP on behalf of the Haitian Government; and by David L. Guyer, President of Save the Children Federation (U.S. SCF), and E. Patricia Mortimer, National Director of Canadian Save the Children Fund (CANSAVE Children) on behalf of the Alliance.

Annex 2

CHAMBELLAN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

Project Agreement

Attachment I

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

A. Purpose of Grant

The purpose of this Grant is to provide partial support for a program of community development to be carried out by the Save the Children (SCF) Alliance and the Department of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (DARNDR).

The Chambellan Community Development Project (PDCC) is designed to enable the local community to take control of those social, economic and cultural aspects of life that most directly impinge on their existence. Specifically, the project's goal is to set in motion a self-sustaining process whereby the poor peasant population in the western end of the Haitian southern peninsula can both improve and exercise more control over the social and economic aspects of their own lives.

B. Specific Objective

The specific objective of the Grant is as follows:
Through the creation and support of local self-help groups, to design and implement a series of small-scale development projects that will result in significant economic and social improvement for the majority of the population residing

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within the Chambellan Commune.

To accomplish this objective a strategic group approach will be used. Strategic groups are composed of eight to fifteen individuals with similar backgrounds and interests. Relationships developed among group members become the basis for analyzing and resolving one or more shared problems. Groups also serve as a tool for consciousness raising and a growing awareness among members concerning the causes of their poverty and the ways in which they can better their lives. Group members are helped to develop the capacity to analyze in critical fashion a given situation, to determine priorities and to plan concrete actions. Many of these concrete actions are small-scale development projects in agriculture, education, health and nutrition. Members also develop skill in organizing themselves to utilize available resources, and to mobilize new resources. It is planned that a minimum of 30 local self-help groups will be formed and involved in activities designed to improve community social and economic conditions.

C. Implementation

1. The Chambellan Community Development Project began operating in 1980. During the first year of operation, the following activities were undertaken: training in community development; agricultural demonstration plots; agriculture education in primary schools; nutrition education; tree nursery establishment; tool bank establishment; small craft promotion; small project assistance; community center

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construction; potable water system; school construction and renovation; road construction; upgrading of Chambellan town square.

2. Grantee, through the Project Team, will implement the project during the next three years as follows:

A. During the first year Grantee will undertake to:

(Note: The construction costs of the following projects marked with an "*" will not be financed under the grant.)

- Construct a penetration road to connect three villages with the national highway.*
- Use the capping of the Ariche spring (completed last year) to install a turbine and generator to supply electricity to the village.
- Organize and offer courses in agriculture and animal husbandry to children at two Chambellan schools and to 4-C groups.
- Organize with community participation two tree nurseries that will produce 80,000 seedlings annually.
- Offer training to women in the organization of strategic groups to resolve selected shared problems.
- Permit teachers who possess less than a normal school diploma to receive an in-service normal school equivalency program.
- Construct five social centers to be used for meetings and instruction.*
- Offer basic instruction to 90 people in community development emphasizing the organization of strategic groups.
- Demonstrate on peasants' plots more productive agricultural techniques, both short- and long-term, including soil conservation, use of hybrid seeds, insecticides, and row cropping.
- Make tools and seeds available to peasants who have difficulty in obtaining these items. Monies received from seed sales will be used to capitalize a revolving fund.
- Offer a 6-month training program in animal husbandry to two "encadreurs" who will work with peasants.

- With community participation, construct a new building with four classrooms and renovate another building with three classrooms.*
- Train monitors to offer literacy classes to interested peasants.
- Construct, with community participation, a building for instruction in home economics to young women.*
- Contribute to the construction of a potable water system in Moron, a village near Chambellan.*
- Offer instruction in nutrition for parents of children suffering from malnutrition and provide nutritional recuperation programs.
- Participate, with the help of the community, in the completion of a public dispensary in Chambellan.*
- Construct, with community participation, a slaughterhouse for cows and pigs at the market place in Chambellan.*
- Construct, with community participation, public latrines and encourage interested individuals in the construction of private latrines.*
- Provide instruction in sewing and embroidery to women's groups interested in income-generating activity.
- Construct a metal workshop; provide training in this area to artisans and apprentice artisans.*

Of the foregoing activities, nine are new, eight are expansions and four are continuations of first year activities.

B. Given the nature of the strategic group approach, it is difficult to develop a detailed implementation plan for field activities a year or two in advance. However, implementation of activities for the remaining two years of the projects will be guided by the principles listed below.

1. Emphasis will be placed on consolidating activities, rather than on developing a very extensive project portfolio. In succeeding years,

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there will be less need for construction of schools and water systems, activities of great importance in year one.

2. Projects that represent expansion or continuation of year one activities will generally be preferred over those that are entirely new.

3. Increasing responsibility for development of implementation plans will be given to strategic groups.

4. Implementation plans will be treated as projections; flexibility to modify them will be maintained.

5. Implementation plans for years two and three will include a precise schedule for carrying out both a midpoint and end-of-project evaluation.

6. Implementation plans will provide adequate time for inter-agency collaborations to encourage replication and, to the extent possible, institutionalization.

Save the Children will submit, during the last quarter of each projected year, a detailed implementation plan for the following year to AID. The project management team will meet with AID personnel to discuss the plan in detail, and the relationship between the plan proposed and the concrete accomplishments of the preceeding year.

The implementation plan will serve as the basis for project monitoring activities. Field activities will be tracked

against projections to detect discrepancies between them. Where such discrepancies exist, project staff and local strategic group members will analyze them to determine their cause. The result will be a series of highly modifiable plans that are revised periodically to reflect the reality of Chambellan.

D. Reporting and Evaluation

1. Quarterly progress reports will be submitted to AID.
2. Evaluation activities will be carried out throughout the life of the project. Three kinds of evaluation can be discerned. The first, feasibility evaluation, is conducted prior to initiating a given project activity. It is concerned with determining whether the project meets specific criteria. A second type of evaluation is ongoing assessment. This kind of evaluation is concerned with the extent to which project activities are being implemented as they were planned. The third kind of evaluation to which the activities in this project will be subjected is impact evaluation. The purpose of this type of evaluation is to determine the extent to which project activities are having a measurable impact on the lives of those whom they are designed to help.

The Logical Framework Matrix (see OPG proposal page 24) contains a concise listing of the types of benchmarks that will become the bases for data collection. It is envisioned that data collection for impact assessment will occur two times over the life of this project, at the midpoint and

again at the project's conclusion. Baseline data has already been collected on Chambellan. Save the Children would welcome the participation of AID personnel or external evaluators in any impact assessment.

Given the nature of this project, PDCC considers that community participation in evaluation activities is of paramount importance. Therefore, project staff will work to train strategic groups in evaluation. Ultimately, the chief evaluators of project activities must be those whom the projects have been designed to serve, the peasants of Chambellan. Over the life of the project, PDCC staff will transfer increasing responsibility to peasants for determining project feasibility and monitoring activities.

Quarterly reports submitted to AID will present an analysis of all evaluation data for the period covered by the report.

E. Budget

A detailed project budget is provided in the OPG proposal. Attached are four Summaries: Summary by Source and three Yearly Budget summaries. The Grantee may not exceed the total amount of the budget. Reasonable adjustments of budget line items may be made without prior approval by USAID/Haiti. Proposed adjustments of more than 15% of any component subtotal should receive prior USAID/Haiti approval.

<u>Summary by Source</u>	<u>Dollars\$</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
AID	362,000	36.1% .

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SCF/Alliance	526,803	52.7%
Government of Haiti	79,652	8.0%
Estimated Community Input	32,000	3.2%
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	1,000,455	100.0%

F. Overhead Rate

Payment on account of indirect costs will be made based on a provisional overhead rate of 7.48% applied to total direct cost less commodities and equipment, in accordance with Standard Provision 5 of Attachment 2.

G. Source and Origin

The source and origin of all goods and services under this grant will be as set forth in Standard Provision 10 of Attachment 2, as amended by Standard Provision 28.

H. Special Provisions

Of the attached Standard Provisions (Attachment 2), delete the following: 7B, 7C, 12B, 12C.

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SUMMARY BUDGET

First Year

	<u>Aid</u>	<u>SCF Alliance</u>	<u>GOH</u>	<u>Community</u>	<u>Yearly Total</u>
A. Field Office Services	<u>\$12,550</u>	<u>\$90,693</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>\$103,243</u>
1) Salaries		48,498			48,498
2) Living Expenses/Benefits		17,925			17,925
3) Staff Training		1,000			1,000
4) Services	12,550	23,270			35,820
B. Capital Assets	<u>0</u>	<u>42,900</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>42,900</u>
1) Building		20,000			20,000
2) Transportation		18,400			18,400
3) Commodities		3,000			3,000
4) Land		1,500			1,500
C. Program	<u>79,400</u>	<u>21,250</u>	<u>9,200</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>109,850</u>
1) Salaries	31,400	7,440	9,200		48,040
2) Living Expenses/Benefits		13,310			13,310
3) Program Support	48,000	500			48,500
D. Direct Aid	<u>15,849</u>	<u>15,851</u>	<u>18,400</u>	<u>8,500</u>	<u>56,600</u>
1) Income Generation	8,499	8,501	8,500	4,500	30,000
2) Social Development	1,350	1,350	1,500	1,000	5,200
3) Nutrition/Education	2,250	2,250	4,400	500	9,400
4) Sanitation/Health	1,250	1,250	2,000	500	5,000
5) Rural Public Works	2,500	2,500		2,000	7,000
Sub-Total	107,799				
Overhead (7.48 %)	8,063				8,063
Contingency	961				961
TOTALS	<u>\$116,823</u>	<u>\$170,694</u>	<u>\$25,600</u>	<u>\$8,500</u>	<u>\$321,617</u>

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Second Year

	<u>Aid</u>	<u>SCF Alliance</u>	<u>GOH</u>	<u>Community</u>	<u>Yearly Total</u>
A. Field Office Services	\$12,550	\$96,755	0	0	\$103,243
1) Salaries		53,348			53,348
2) Living Expenses/Benefits		19,137			19,137
3) Staff Training		1,000			1,000
4) Services	12,550	23,270	0	0	27,000
B. Capital Assets	0	27,000	0	0	27,000
1) Building		20,000			20,000
2) Transportation		7,000			7,000
3) Commodities					
4) Land					
C. Program	82,540	27,965	10,120	0	120,625
1) Salaries	34,540	8,184	10,120		52,848
2) Living Expenses/Benefits		14,281			14,281
3) Program Support	48,000	500			48,500
4) Evaluation		5,000			5,000
D. Direct Aid	26,684	14,516	16,400	10,500	68,100
1) Income Generation	18,084	5,916	8,500	5,500	38,000
2) Social Development	1,350	1,350	1,500	1,500	5,700
3) Nutrition/Education	2,750	2,750	4,400	500	10,400
4) Sanitation/Health	1,500	1,500	2,000	500	5,500
5) Rural Public Works	3,000	3,000	0	2,500	8,500
Sub-Total	121,774				9,109
Overhead (7.48 %)					1,601
Contingency					
TOTALS	\$132,484	\$166,236	\$26,520	\$10,500	\$335,740

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	Third Year				Yearly Total	Summary	
	Aid	SCF Alliance	GOH	Community		Percent	Total
A. Field Office Services	<u>\$11,750</u>	<u>\$103,424</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>\$115,174</u>	<u>32.8%</u>	<u>\$327,722</u>
1) Salaries		58,683			58,683		
2) Living Expenses/ Benefits		20,471			20,471		
3) Staff Training		1,000			1,000		
4) Services	11,750	23,270			35,020		
B. Capital Assets	<u>0</u>	<u>10,000</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	10,000	<u>8.0</u>	<u>79,900</u>
1) Buildings		10,000			10,000		
2) Transportation					10,000		
3) Commodities							
4) Land							
C. Program	<u>75,994</u>	<u>42,851</u>	<u>11,132</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>129,977</u>	<u>36.0</u>	<u>360,452</u>
1) Salaries	37,994	9,002	11,132		58,128		
2) Living Expenses/ Benefits		15,349			15,349		
3) Program Support	18,000	10,500			48,500		
4) Evaluation		8,000			8,000		
D. Direct Aid	<u>16,202</u>	<u>33,598</u>	<u>16,400</u>	<u>13,000</u>	<u>79,200</u>	<u>20.4</u>	<u>203,900</u>
1) Income Generation	6,302	23,698	8,500	7,000	45,500		
2) Social Development	1,350	1,350	1,500	2,000	6,200		
3) Nutrition/Education	3,250	3,250	4,400	500	11,400		
4) Sanitation/Health	1,800	1,800	2,000	500	6,100		
5) Rural Public Works	3,500	3,500	0	3,000	10,000		
Sub-Total AID	103,946						
Overhead (7.48 %)	7,775				7,775	2.5	24,947
Contingency	972				972	0.3	3,534
TOTALS	<u>\$112,693</u>	<u>\$189,873</u>	<u>\$27,532</u>	<u>\$13,000</u>	<u>\$343,098</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>\$1,000,455</u>

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TABLE 1
 PDCC ACTIVITY SUMMARY BY SECTOR:
 NEW, CONTINUATION AND EXPANSION PROJECTS
 (1980-84)

SECTOR	PROJECT TITLE	DESCRIPTION	NEW FOR FY 1982-84	CONTINUATION OF FY 1980-81 ACTIVITIES	EXPANSION OF FY 1980-81 ACTIVITIES	CONCLUDED IN FY 1981
A. Rural Infra- structure	1. Penetration road construction between Cadette, Hainault, and Boucan	Pick and shovel construction of a penetration road connecting three villages with the national highway		X		
	2. Installation of a small hydroelectric turbine	Use the capping of the Ariche spring (completed last year) to install a turbine and generator to supply electricity to the village	X			
	3. Upgrading the town square of Chambellan	Construct, with community partici- pation, a public square in Chambellan to be used for meetings and entertain- ment purposes				X
B. Agriculture	1. Courses in agricul- ture and animal husbandry for groups of young people	Organize and offer courses in agricul- ture and animal husbandry to children at two Chambellan schools and to 4-C groups			X	
	2. tree nurseries	Organize, with community participation, two tree nurseries that will produce 80,000 seedlings annually			X	

PDCC ACTIVITY SUMMARY BY SECTOR
NEW, CONTINUATION AND EXPANSION PROJECTS
(1980-84)

SECTOR	PROJECT TITLE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY	NEW FOR FY 1982-84	CONTINUATION OF FY 1980-81 ACTIVITIES	EXPANSION OF FY 1980-81 ACTIVITIES	CONCLUDED IN FY 1981
	3. Demonstration of agricultural techniques	Demonstrate on peasants' plots more productive agricultural techniques, both short- and long-term, including soil conservation, use of hybrid seeds, insecticides, and row cropping			X	
	4. Tool and seed bank	Make tools and seeds available to peasants who have difficulty in obtaining these items. Monies received from seed sales will be used to capitalize a revolving fund			X	
	5. training of two husbandry agents	Offer a six-month training program in animal husbandry to two "encadreurs" who will work with peasants	X			
C. Education & training	1. Refurbishing the national school of Chambellan	With community participation, construct a new building with four classrooms and renovate another building with three additional classrooms		X		
	2. Literacy centers	Train monitors to offer literacy classes to interested peasants	X			

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PDCC ACTIVITY SUMMARY BY SECTOR:
NEW, CONTINUATION AND EXPANSION PROJECTS
(1980-84)

SECTOR	PROJECT TITLE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY	NEW FOR FY 1982-84	CONTINUATION OF FY 1980-81 ACTIVITIES	EXPANSION OF FY 1980-81 ACTIVITIES	CONCLUDED IN FY 1981
	3. Formation of women's groups	Offer training to women in the organization of strategic groups to resolve selected shared problems	X			
	4. In-service training for twenty primary school teachers	Permit teachers who possess less than a normal school diploma to receive an in-service normal school equivalency program	X			
	5. Construction of five social centers	Construction of five social centers to be used for meetings and instruction			X	
	6. Community development training	Offer basic instruction to ninety people in community development emphasizing the organization of strategic groups		X		
	7. Completion of the construction of the Bon Berger school	Participate in completing a four-room school building under the Baptist mission's sponsorship				X
	8. Renovation of the center for domestic education	Construct, with community participation, a building for instruction of home economics to young women		X		
D. Health, nutrition,	1. Potable water	Contribute to the construction of a potable water system in Moron, a village near Chambellan			X	
environ- mental sanitation	2. Center of nutrition education and recuperation	Offer instruction in nutrition education to parents of children suffering from malnutrition and provide nutritional recuperation programs	X			


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PDCC ACTIVITY SUMMARY BY SECTOR
NEW, CONTINUATION AND EXPANSION PROJECTS
(1980-84)

SECTOR	PROJECT TITLE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY	NEW FOR FY 1982-84	CONTINUATION OF FY 1980-81 ACTIVITIES	EXPANSION OF FY 1980-81 ACTIVITIES	CONCLUDED IN FY 1981
	3. Completion of the Chambellan dispensary	Participate, with the help of the community, in the completion of a public dispensary in Chambellan	X			
	4. Construction of a slaughterhouse in Chambellan	Construct, with community participation, a slaughterhouse for pigs and cows at the marketplace in Chambellan	X			
	5. Construction of low-cost latrines	Construct, with community participation, public latrines and encourage interested individuals in building private latrines	X			
E. Small enterprise development	1. Small enterprise development	Provide instruction in sewing and embroidery to women's groups interested in income-generating activity			X	
	2. Installation of a metal workshop	Construct a metal workshop; provide training in this area to artisans and apprentice artisans	X			

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Chart 1 - Administrative Organization at PDCC



ANNEX 4