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Interim Evaluation
of
DS/RAD Project 936-5300, Organization
and Administration of Integrated Rural Development

by

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Gene Miller LAC/DR
David Hess AFR/DR
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We would like to thank the new Rural Development Officer at USAID/Kingston Don Yeaman for briefing us on the Jamaican integrated rural development project and the secretaries in his office for being so kind and helpful. Mr. Dudley Reid, Mr. Henry Webber and all others we met at the Jamaican project were hospitable and frank. They allowed, even encouraged, us to look and ask freely. We greatly appreciated Mr. Reid's help with our unexpected transport problem. Our visit to the project will always be a pleasant memory.

During the design and execution of the evaluation, RAD assisted us in every way. It proposed the evaluation and wanted to learn from it. DAI was equally helpful and open. We thank RAD and DAI for their comments on the December 1980 draft of the evaluation some of which have been incorporated in this final version. Finally, thanks to Diana Washington in ASIA/TR for deciphering the penciled drafts and typing the final copy.

Terms Used in Report

1. Contract DSAN-C-0065 DAI's contract under Project 936-5300
2. DA Development Administration; emphasis on goals, structure, roles and functions
3. DAI Development Alternatives Inc; a Washington based consulting firm and contractor under Project 936-5300
4. DSB or DS Development Support Bureau
5. IRDP or IRD Integrated Rural Development Project
6. II - IRDP Second Integrated Rural Development Project - Jamaica
7. OD Organizational Development; emphasis on behavior, process, indigenous groups, the "whole person"
8. Project 936-5300 the project being evaluated
9. RAD Office of Rural Development and Development Administration, DSB
10. TA Technical Assistance

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SUMMARY

This is a mid-term evaluation of DSB/RAD Project 936-5300, Organization and Administration of Integrated Rural Development, a \$2.8 million, four year project for technical assistance and research. The project is carried out by a contractor, Development Alternatives Inc. of Washington, D.C., and its purpose is to improve AID's integrated rural development projects.

The evaluation was requested and in part paid for by RAD, guided by an inter-bureau steering committee and conducted by a team of three direct hires and one PASA member representing three regional bureaus. The normal mid-term evaluation identifies weaknesses and strengths in a project and makes recommendations for the balance of the term. At the request of RAD and the steering committee, this evaluation was broader and more ambitious. As well as evaluating the performance of the contractor and the project, it investigated how the structure of AID and the operation of RAD affected this performance. In other words we assumed that the performance of the project was strongly influenced by its environment over which it had little control.

Findings

This project was motivated by the valid assumption that AID inadequately understands integrated rural development and that its activities in this field need help. Despite its excellent intention to supply the needed understanding and help, RAD lacks sufficient control over research, technical assistance and dissemination. Because Missions have veto power over who visits "their" projects, RAD can not plan the agendas for research and technical assistance. Thus RAD cannot effectively apply the resources of this project for research and technical assistance. In applying these resources RAD is forced to act more like a trouble shooting indefinite quantity contractor than as AID's agent for learning and quality control. RAD has to either wait to be called or market its services to the Missions in an ad hoc and non-cumulative manner. It can not choose the integrated rural development projects in AID's portfolio most interesting for research or most needing assistance and plan for a cumulative effort. Even if it could control the agenda, because half of RAD's staff are not AID employees and all the personnel operating project 5300 are temporary non-AID employees, much of the learning and skill developed for the \$2.8 million investment will not be carried into AID's future operations. Thus our major finding is that RAD's operational scope is too narrow to achieve the valid purpose of this project. Consequently the performance of research and TA are well below intended levels and are likely to remain so.

Given this mis-match between authority and purpose, RAD and DAI performed well in several areas. RAD took the initiative on work important to the Agency. By iteratively combining project work, disciplinary integration and technical oversight, RAD created an excellent training framework. This kind of training framework should be used throughout AID. Under

unfavorable conditions RAD and DAI made effective efforts to market the project and consolidate the agendas for research and technical assistance. Once invited into a country and hampered by the lack of a reasonable long term agenda for research or assistance, DAI performed professionally. The reports and research papers written by DAI contain many insights and useful recommendations.

Most of the weaknesses of this project came together in Jamaica, the only field work country visited by the evaluation team. Technical assistance in Jamaica failed to follow up a relevant and well timed AID evaluation of the Jamaican project, missed the important issues, provided no actionable recommendations for the Mission, and was not part of a series of interventions to improve management.

During the remainder of Project 5300, the consultants' field visits should be more concentrated and cumulative. At least 75 percent of the field visit budget should be allocated for repeat visits to four or five projects. The concept of a core of disciplines relevant to IRD projects is a good one and should be put into use more deliberately for technical assistance and research.

As a result of the excellent although expensive learning process constructed by RAD and using AID's unique learning assets, much has been learned by the consultants. Both in practice and due to the design of the project, dissemination of this learning to those who need it has been and is likely to continue to be extremely weak. During the final two years of the project, RAD and DAI should go back to zero and try to radically improve dissemination within AID.

This project illustrates the mistake of learning by proxy in a "soft" subject. The study of the organization and administration of integrated rural development will not lead to a major discovery or breakthrough which can be put into practice by others. The learners and doers should not be separated by several layers of intermediaries. Field staff should be run through each knowledge building project as part of a career development program including more formal training and planning for the next job assignment. Finally, if RAD is important enough to exist and control a budget, it is important enough to be staffed with direct hires and share control with the Missions over technical assistance and research.

List of Recommendations

1. The core team approach is an excellent feature of project 5300. Its application in TA should be improved by more dependable scheduling of field visits, better scopes of work and the selection and disciplining of team members according to the skill mix required by the intervention rather than by who is available for the team or can impose his intellectual speciality.
2. The networking output of the project has not contributed to the enhancement of DAI's performance or to betterment of management of IRD projects. Therefore, the DAI project manager should transfer all information on experts to AID, possibly to the DS/RAD project manager. The lists should be made available to AID missions and regional bureau technical and project offices. Once these actions are taken, funding of this output should be terminated.
3. In comparison to the SOAP, the design manual should pay less attention to context and problem identification and more to solutions in design and implementation with AID projects as cases.
4. DAI's research officer should instruct all TA staff to look for problems identified in the SOAP that have been solved in the field.
5. Continue the occasional papers, let DAI control the topics and the pace and write them in anticipation of the desk manual.
6. For the remainder of the project, DAI should isolate 4 or 5 clients from its current portfolio and devote at least 75% of its field work to these clients for IRD project improvement and research.
7. At a minimum the May 1980 intervention introduced DAI and the management of the Jamaican project and laid the groundwork for future contacts. The Jamaican project should be one of DAI's four or five key field targets during the remainder of its contract. USAID/Kingston, RAD, DAI and project management should plan a series of DAI visits which will identify and follow up actions to improve the organization, management and impact of the project.
8. RAD should give DAI deadlines and objectives for creative thinking and action to improve dissemination during the remainder of the project.

9. DSB should allocate at least 2 percent of the budget of knowledge building projects to cover expenses of regional bureau personnel trained by the knowledge builders.
10. PM/TD should investigate linking training and career development to DSB knowledge building projects.
11. All DSB knowledge building projects should include OE funds for evaluation by regional bureaus.
12. DSB as AID's central bureau for research and management information should consider using DAI to analyze the organization and management of AID.
13. From our evaluation, we conclude this project should not be extended beyond its scheduled termination date. By the end of the contract the various research papers will be used if practitioners find them useful and we will have trained DAI staff for future TA work if needed. That is, the knowledge and the experts will be available and little will be gained by additional expenditure.

I. DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT 936-5300: Organization and Integration of Integrated Rural Development

The purpose of the project is to improve AIDs understanding and operation of integrated rural development (IRD) projects.

The project purpose will be attained through research and technical assistance (TA) to USAID's responseable for designing, planning, administering and evaluating IRD activities. The research and TA are provided by Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI) of Washington, D.C.

The project is designed for 48 months with a total cost of \$2.764 million.

The outputs planned under this project are as follows:

- (1) State-of-the-Art-Paper (SOAP)
- (2) Networking of Consultants
- (3) Review of IRD Management Issues in ten developing countries
- (4) Formal analysis of and assistance to IRD projects; and
- (5) Manual for designing IRD activities.

II. SCOPE AND ISSUES OF EVALUATION

RAD asked the regional bureau steering committee to conduct an interim evaluation of Project 5300. RAD wanted outside, consumer oriented feedback on the project both to learn about its performance and that of the project, and to make improvements during the final two years of the DAI contract.

After great difficulty obtaining money and staff, the regional bureaus agreed to evaluate the project but they wanted more than an interim evaluation. Normally an interim evaluation focuses on the strengths and weaknesses of the project and recommends mid-course corrections. It takes the project as given. It does not investigate its underlying rationale, the value of the program out of which the project developed or the role and capability of the AID office responsible for the program and project.

For three reasons the regional bureaus wanted this evaluation to be much more ambitious.

First, and most important, they emphasized the connection between the performance of the contractor, the contribution of this performance to AID's developmental objectives and the way the powers and purpose of AID's sponsoring office circumscribe the performance of the contractor. They considered a focus on the contractor or the project, of which the contract constitutes the main element, too narrow. Weaknesses or strengths in the project, they felt, might be more attributable to the project's programmatic and managerial environment than to the project itself. For example, the contractor's options for TA and research are reduced by the design of the obligated IRD project, AID's operating procedures, and country conditions. The consultant is dependent on access to Missions and projects and cannot dictate its country assignment or the assumptions linking its contracted outputs with RAD's project purposes and goals. Thus, the logical boundaries for an interim evaluation include examination of field impact, and the programmatic and managerial environment created for the contractor.

Second, the regional bureaus use all of RAD's (and DSB's) projects. Their main interest is how RAD employs resources to meet their needs. They did not want to exhaust the rare opportunity of an inter-bureau evaluation team on only one of RAD's projects. They wanted the team to focus on project 5300, but also to bring in the larger issues.

Third, PPC/E intends a comprehensive evaluation of RAD and its projects for which our evaluation should serve as an experiment. PPC/E hopes that it will be able to expand our methodology and extend or confirm our general observations.*

Thus in comparison to the normal mid-term evaluation, our assignment is broader and the means for carrying it out less than normal. Our team consists of only one experienced AID direct hire, one member on secondment from USDA

*PPC/E evaluation of RAD has been indefinitely deferred.

and two inexperienced International Development Interns (IDI's) all of whom remain accountable for their regular jobs. We have travel funds for only one five day field trip for a project operating in ten countries on three continents. Our starting point for comments on RAD's program and management is a view of the mid-point of one project. We are forced to generalize from a small and unscientific sample and must hope to offset this weakness by drawing on our experience and using common sense. In what follows the reader, and particularly those readers being evaluated, should understand the imperfections in our approach and bear in mind that the alternative is not a better equipped evaluation. The alternative is no evaluation.

The questions covered by the evaluation can be divided into two categories: the performance of the project and the programmatic, organizational and managerial environment that influenced performance.

Project Performance

The first level of inquiry should be the performance of the contractor. This means more than assessing whether DAI has provided the physical outputs on time. Project 5300 aims to develop innovative approaches to the management of IRD projects. This requires flexibility in defining and producing end products under the contract. Therefore, we evaluate the relevance and applicability of the knowledge and technical assistance as well as the quantity of publications and field visits.

In addition, the means by which DAI has generated these outputs and facilitated learning are evaluated. The contractor was responsible for organizing its resources to achieve an effective blend of TA and research. The approach taken was to form a "core" team representing four disciplines which would work in an interdisciplinary manner to analyze management problems from several perspectives. The effectiveness of DAI's management of this "core" team to achieve interdisciplinary analysis, useful technical assistance, and relevant research is evaluated.

DAI's primary approach to technical assistance is to utilize process consultation techniques for diagnosing organizational problems, generating solutions, and building human capability. The advantages and disadvantages of this approach are covered.

In evaluating the research activities, assessing the quantity and quality of research is not enough. The immediate next step is to make the knowledge gained available in appropriate form and content for others to use. The consultant shares the responsibility for effective dissemination with DS/RAD and the evaluation looks at DAI's performance in this area.

In summary, questions about project performance will include: how well DAI has managed its resources to produce results; the makeup, use and effectiveness of the "core" team; the usefulness of the process consultation approach in providing technical assistance; the quality of the technical assistance and learning; and the dissemination of the learning.

Project Environment

The second level of inquiry will focus on factors outside the contractor's control: project design, development hypothesis, and DS/RAD performance. These factors can have decisive impact on the operation and usefulness of the project.

A central issue at this level is whether the project design reflects the most efficient and effective means of achieving either of the two principal objectives--research and technical assistance.

The project is structured to establish a centrally based group of generalists proficient in management and rural development. These people are to provide TA and centralize experience and knowledge for analysis. Are the goals of TA and analysis well served by such a structure? Can short term TA significantly improve organization and behavior in IRD projects? Is long term TA or an accumulative sequence of short visits possible? Does the structure of project 5300 promote both learning and its dissemination to the appropriate users? Is the project designed to encourage and facilitate learning in AID as well as in the contractor? The project has the effect of "institution building" for a consulting firm since most of the learning is taking place among the DAI employees. The anticipated result is that this learning will eventually make its way to AID project managers and host country project staff in AID countries. The evaluation is concerned with: whether the dissemination mechanisms are adequate to encourage this type of learning; whether we are "teaching" the wrong people; and whether there are more effective ways to design the project to allow learning to take place in AID.

A more limited design issue is one of assessing the validity of the outputs, their relevance to the project objectives, and the interrelationships among them. Most of the outputs are standard in DS/RAD projects--the SOAP, networking, and the TA component. The degree to which these outputs are useful on the operational level and contribute to the work of rural development is an area of interest for the evaluation.

The relationship of each output to the others is also a part of the design issue. Does each of the outputs complement the others or do the different agendas of TA and research compete with each other for project resources? This is particularly germane in considering tradeoffs between the ability of the project to respond to mission requests for TA and the need to tailor activities to subjects or projects important for research. The relative importance of each agenda has implications for the ability of DAI to program its resources for long term relationships.

At a level above DAI's performance and the design parameters which control this performance is the question of RAD's performance. We evaluate its management of the contractor including finance, support in dealing with Missions,

identifying research priorities and identifying and planning country visits. On a broader level we ask the following questions: Why did RAD choose this project and write this kind of a contract? Is AID getting its money's worth? In sponsoring this project what role was RAD filling for DSB and AID? Is this role needed and can it be performed by RAD?

In general our approach is to integrate the perspectives of performance and structure starting with the contractor's performance and moving to the structural limits on the performance of DSB and AID. In evaluating performance we have tried to remember that each actor in the system -- DAI, the IRD projects, the Missions, RAD and DSB-- is partly free to succeed or fail and partly constrained in either direction by structural circumstances. Thus in evaluating performance we must also evaluate structure and try to see where its mandate ends and individual or organizational responsibility begins. In what follows we cannot exhaustively pursue the metaphor of environment vs. freedom but we believe it is essential to a fair evaluation of this project.

III. PROJECT PERFORMANCE

The Core Team

The Project Paper, DAI proposal and contract all require a core team to conduct TA and research. This rests on the sound assumption that understanding IRD projects requires a mix of knowledge and analytical techniques. Expertise is needed in management, organization, planning, rural development, community development, finance and procurement. It was hoped that the integration of this expertise in a consultant experienced with IRD projects would greatly enhance the quality of TA and research.

In application this approach has been more successful for research than TA. Because it unites insights from several fields, the SOAP is able to be comprehensive ie encompass an unwieldy subject, and focus on key problems. The working papers and research roles also arrive at viewpoints dependant on a variety of disciplines.

In its technical assistance DAI has been too one sided. We will discuss TA separately in a later section but here we can cite the examples of Jamaica and Cameroon. We visited Jamaica and read DAI's report of its work in Cameroon.

The Jamaican intervention emphasized problems of behavior, interpersonal relationships, communication and information flow. These matters were addressed superficially, they were not the most important aspects of the organization and administration of the project at that time and DAI had little impact on them. Structural issues were not addressed. These included the structure of management, the connection between research and extention, the monitoring of project performance, and the mis-match between the project's activities and goals. This case illustrates an excess of the OD approach over DA, planning and rural development. As a result the usefulness of the intervention was greatly diminished.

In Cameroon the DAI team helped design an IRD project. The team comprehensively assessed organizational structure in relation to social realities at the local, provincial and national levels. It carefully considered options for eliciting and organizing participation by the project's beneficiaries. However, the team did not identify how managerial behavior would be improved through the use of OD to suit the structural requirements. General references were made to training, but no specific analysis was made of which elements of behavior would require modification through training and how that training might be incorporated in the design of the project.

Recommendation: The core team approach is an excellent feature of project 5300. Its application in TA should be improved by more dependable scheduling of field visits, better scopes of work and the selection and disciplining of team members according to the skill mix required by the intervention rather than by who is available for the team or can impose his intellectual speciality.

Networking

According to the project paper, DAI's proposal, and the contract, DAI was required to establish procedures for listing experts in fields relevant to the organization and administration of IRD. To date, DAI has developed a form for experts to fill out which classifies their training and experience according to a number of different categories. These forms have been sent to approximately seventy people some of whom have replied. At present no information has been supplied to AID nor has AID made any requests. Helping DAI locate staff to list in its contract proposals seems to be the only benefit of networking.

Recommendation: The Networking output of the project has not contributed to the enhancement of DAI's performance or to the betterment of management of IRD projects. Therefore, the DAI project manager should transfer all information on experts to AID, possibly to the DS/RAD project manager. The lists should be made available to AID missions and regional bureau technical and project offices. Once these actions are taken, funding of this output should be terminated.

State of the Art Paper (SOAP)

The term integrated rural development can be applied to a variety of activities; resettlement, irrigation, subsistence farming, rural electrification, fishing, community development etc. For some people the term has no definable subject and consequently they believe there can be no relevant art or state of the art. In asking DAI to write a state of the art paper RAD did not define the subject or offer guidelines. This was consistent with the intention to "let DAI think for us". To its credit DAI has succeeded on taking a comprehensive and orderly approach in the paper. The need to encompass this unwieldy subject has not prevented DAI

from making many useful and specific observations and recommendations. The document rambles in places and there are patches of unclear writing i.e.

"For literature and experience to provide guidance to managers, they must be presented in a way that suggests what factors affect what results and what can be done to improve those results. Such suggestions may be viewed as propositions regarding the relationships between organizational characteristics and management practices on the one hand, and project processes and impact on the other. (p.5)

The framework in Chapter 2 of resources-goods-response-welfare is simple, clear and useful. The discussion of organization and information in Chapter 3 is well done except that it may be too confident about the applicability of modern management practices to all institutional and cultural settings. As anthropologist Allen Hoben has observed "bureaucrats are as rational as peasants". If these modern practices would improve management, then how do we get them into our IRD projects? This key issue of application is largely ignored. The treatment of local response and welfare in Chapters 4 and 5 repeats conventional views and misses an opportunity to provide analysis and cases on incentives as is done with organization and information in chapter 3. Incentives are recognized as important but there is no discussion of how to build incentives into traditional civil service bureaucracies. This is a problem AID missions face in every IRD project; how to get counterparts to work hard, learn, promote the purposes of the project rather than immediate personal interests, serve rather than dictate to or ignore beneficiaries, take risks, and adapt central procedures to field conditions. DAI's approach of isolating a key operational problem and then analyzing its organizational and managerial causes and showing cases would have been highly appropriate in chapters 4 or 5 on this issue.

If the strength of the SOAP lies in bringing coherence and perspective to a slippery subject its weakness lies in an overemphasis on typologies, contexts and problems. It is supposed to present the state of the art of making these projects "work". We understand conditions and problems better than solutions. We need to know the "art" of solving problems of organization, information, response, incentives etc. What solutions have been found, what strategies have worked and what are the cases? Hopefully, the final output of the project, the desk manual, will be more practice.

An AID officer immersed in a frustrating IRD project might use the SOAP as follows. Have some of the choices described in the paper been made in my project and what are the consequences? Does my project have some of the problems listed in the SOAP and can I use one of the approaches mentioned? Thus the SOAP can serve as check list and refresher. But this purpose could also be served by many of the publications listed in the

SOAP's bibliography. The DS Bureau has established the Development Information Unit to quickly and selectively send such publication to project officers. The USDA offers a similar service. An LDC or AID project officer seeking a review of cases or problems or a presentation of recent thinking need only forward his request to one of these services. Reference librarians will tailor the response to his needs. Under Project 5300, DAI's SOAP is mailed to missions whether or not the project officers want it. Thus for the people who are trying to make IRD projects work the cost effectiveness of this document is doubtful. If on the other hand the main purpose of the SOAP is to train DAI then we must ask, does DAI need training, has it been trained and if so how does a trained DAI benefit AID. These questions are taken up in the last section of this evaluation report. As a product standing apart from its cost-effective contribution to AID's development objectives and given the difficulty of a SOAP on this subject, DAI has done a good job.

Recommendation: In comparison to the SOAP, the design manual should pay less attention to context and problem identification and more to solutions in design and implementation with AID projects as cases.

Recommendation: DAI's research officer should instruct all TA staff to look for problems identified on the SOAP that have been solved in the field.

Working Papers and Research Notes

These occasional papers are not required in the contract but are well done and should be continued. They deal with rapid reconnaissance, managing TA, the role of OD and other subjects. In comparison to the SOAP, their subject matter is better defined and they attempt to provide solutions rather than descriptions of problems. They could be used as building blocks for the desk manual. These papers are a credit to the flexibility of the contract and the expertise of DAI. However, like the SOAP, there is a distinction between the learning reflected in the document and the questionable impact of this learning on AID's field operations.

Given that over the years DAI has worked almost exclusively for AID, we wonder if AID could have simply commissioned DAI to write the SOAP and other papers without laying on the field visits. These papers arise from an experience broader than that provided to DAI under project 5300. For a new contractor it might be necessary to combine field exposure with research but DAI has the exposure through many past and present AID contracts. In the last section of this report we will consider how AID might better use a consultant that over the year's has functioned more like an AID office than an independent contractor.

Recommendation: Continue the occasional papers, let DAI control the topics and the pace and write them in anticipation of the desk manual.

Technical Assistance - Ten Country Review and Interventions

In the first year of its contract DAI was required to review integrated rural development in ten AID assisted countries. RAD did not specify the method to be used or the issues to be covered in this review. The ostensible purpose of the review was to provide material for the SOAP. Marketing the project to the missions was a second purpose of the review. This could not be openly stated in the contract. It is awkward to state in a public contract the purpose of hiring an outsider to market the services of one AID office to other AID offices. Nevertheless both RAD and DAI saw the ten country review partly as a means to get DAI personnel into the Missions to drum up demand for the project. For RAD the review had a third purpose: visits to ten countries, reports on these visits and the SOAP, all to take place during the first year, would show RAD if DAI was qualified to provide technical assistance as RAD's agent. Thus the review would train DAI and indicate its readiness to assist Missions during the final three years of the contract. This method of handling a contractor has good and bad features that will be evaluated in discussing RAD's performance in the last section of this paper. Here we will confine our comments to the difficulties DAI faced in serving this three part purpose.

During the first year of the contract, work was initiated in eight countries; Honduras, Liberia, Tanzania, Nepal, Botswana, Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia. In the second year of the contract, two more countries became sites of work under the contract, Jamaica and Cameroon. However, agreement between DS/RAD and DAI, as found in Administrative Report #6, January, 1980, declared the ten country review output was completed. Field visits after this date are considered part of the routine TA offered to Missions under the project.

Our comments are based on DAI's reports of its TA visits, a questionnaire which elicited replies from all Missions visited by DAI (cover letter and questionnaire are attached as Annex II), our visit to Jamaica and our personal knowledge of some of the projects and missions visited by DAI. It should be noted that in some cases due to the turnover of Mission personnel, the questionnaire was answered by people not present at the time of DAI's assistance.

The Missions considered DAI's work useful, its people well qualified and effective and its reports prompt and accurate. The DAI teams were able to smoothly enter very diverse cultural/developmental settings and quickly get to work. They did not burden Missions with needs for orientation or logistical support. In general they did not cause trouble, took care of themselves, related well with counterparts and performed their assignments well and promptly. Given that AID missions are usually understaffed, rushed and distracted by conflicting demands, DAI's experience and professionalism, as reflected in its ability to begin working almost immediately upon emerging from the airport are important qualities.

However, these are qualities one should expect from any good indefinite quantity contractor (IQC) on a specific trouble shooting assignment. The DAI field work both during the ten country review and after was supposed to be much more than this. Under its contract DAI was supposed to conduct research and TA aimed at making IRD projects work. Trouble shooting for a particular problem in design or implementation is too ad hoc and short term.

Making projects work requires a more fundamental and sustained involvement. Due to their total dependence on Mission requests for assistance, RAD and DAI could not target those projects most needing assistance and plan a series of visits that would produce cumulative improvement. Rather they had to be ready to meet any request regardless of whether the project could make the best use of TA resources, could provide the best case for research or could provide the best training for DAI. Thus it is not surprising that the field visit reports lack a common framework. The reports do not show a common approach to making the projects work, nor a common set of problems, for example, those identified in the SOAP, addressed in each project nor a set of recommendations with the projects as test cases. In other words the TA seems not to have applied or obtained any of the advantages of a unified approach to the problem of IRD projects: each project was treated as an isolated case. At the time of our evaluation it was too early to see if this kind of nominalism would characterize repeat visits to the same project. But given that there is no guarantee of a repeat visit to a project or of the subject of such a visit, such eclecticism is likely. At this writing (early 1981) apparently Botswana and Ecuador are the only cases where there is some guarantee of repeat visits and the possibility for cumulative improvement in the project and/or in the research. In both cases this constancy resulted not from planning by RAD or DAI but from a fishing exercise which apparently permanently landed these two fish.

Apart from diminishing the value of both TA and research, the need to use TA for project marketing can distort the composition of TA. The OD approach, where the consultants interact with project personnel in a non-authoritative, non prescriptive and non-critical manner, may cause less antagonism than the more audit like DA approach. DAI has used both approaches in its TA and, with the possible exception of its May 1980 work in Jamaica, we have no evidence that marketing needs skewed its mix of techniques. We mention this connection between marketing and TA because it is a danger and reveals weaknesses in project 5300. DAI's marketing should stop after it signs its contract. From that point on it should concentrate on unalloyed TA, research and dissemination. At the worst, the services of RAD should be marketed within AID by RAD. At best, the market should exist before RAD spends resources to serve it.

In fact the mix of disciplines and skills on the teams seems to have been distorted on occasion by who was available to travel and who could impose his speciality on the team. These factors always influence the character of TA teams. However project 5300 is based on an orchestration

of skills in both TA and research. DAI should be held to a standard above the norm in fielding teams suited to the IRD project and its stage of development. This is an area for improvement during the remainder of the project. Improvement will require a guarantee to DAI of scheduled visits to the same project. This will give DAI time to assemble a team and make possible a precise assignment. It is the duty of RAD and AID generally to provide DAI a stable environment in which to work.

The Missions have not viewed the TA as part of an overall DAI/RAD effort to study IRD management. Nor have they seen it as a long term effort to generally improve their IRD projects. In other words the TA was not seen as a central bureau TA and research effort with its own objectives and agenda. This is positive in that they saw the TA as meeting their immediate needs. It is negative in that they neither contributed to nor benefited from the larger effort. DAI did not present each mission's project as a case illustrating certain stages, problems and solutions. The Missions did not comment on DAI's research strategy worldwide or suggest how their projects might serve AID's research needs. Instead of complementarity and synergism there was fragmentation and dissipation. Again this is partly because RAD as AID's agent for research and management information could not make any demands on the operating units.

In the last section of this paper we will deal more fully with environmental constraints affecting the performance of RAD and DAI. Given these constraints much of the value expected from the DAI contract - high impact TA and project life cycle research - have not arisen from DAI's field work. In summary, and partially excluding the case of Jamaica, DAI has performed its TA well by the standards of a trouble shooting IQC.

Recommendation: For the remainder of the project, DAI should isolate 4 or 5 clients from its current portfolio and devote at least 75% of its field work to these clients for IRD project improvement and research.

Jamaica - A Case Study of TA by DAI

Project 5300 operates on three continents in at least 10 countries. Time and money were inadequate to properly investigate field operations and ultimate impact. In fact, we were lucky to be able to visit one country. Therefore our comments on DAI's Jamaican work, which contain some criticisms of the Jamaican project, DAI, USAID/Kingston and RAD, do not provide a basis for generalizations about the latter three parties. Regarding the Jamaican project where we call attention to weaknesses identified by others and where we were treated most hospitably, we must confess that it was our unenviable task to make large judgments about someone else's business quite hurriedly. Thus we present our findings with respect to our Jamaican colleagues who also have their unenviable burdens and who know much more about their project than we do.

In May 1980, DAI conducted three management workshops for the Second Integrated Rural Development Project (II-IRDP) at Two Meetings and Pindars River watersheds in central Jamaica. In its only opportunity to see field work under the RAD project, the evaluation team visited Jamaica for five work days in November 1980 to evaluate DAI's impact on the Jamaican project. For working papers on our methodology, field assignments and findings see Annex I.

In its range of development activities, the Jamaican IRDP is similar to AID assisted IRD projects in Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines and other countries. It serves families cultivating three acre plots on hillsides so steep a man can fall off his farm. The objectives include increased farm productivity and income, improved marketing, soil conservation, reforestation, roads, nutrition, housing, potable water, electrification, agricultural demonstration and extension, agricultural credit, training of government servants and community organization. When DAI arrived in May 1980, the five year \$26 million project had been underway for two years.

DAI used the internal feed back approach. Both privately and in subsequent group sessions DAI asked project officials about their problems. Their responses included the views that assignments given them were not clear, they did not know how far they could go, how much control they had over subordinates and the grounds on which they were evaluated by their superiors. During the workshops these vague disgruntlements were clarified as "role definition problems" and participants were encouraged to state their expectations of each other. Letting off steam in this way undoubtedly made some people feel easier and clearer about their responsibilities. But, as reported for the Philippines intervention, this "glow" or "workshop hype" evaporates in a month or two.

Bringing out feelings can be useful. The feedback process can uncover inconsistencies, blocked communications and personnel problems. It can generate good ideas and enthusiasm. However, this technique is not very useful by itself when there are serious managerial and structural problems. Making the participants feel better about themselves and well disposed to the consultants are not ends in themselves. Staff feedback, even when it is quite frank which appears to have been the case in the DAI workshops, should not be expected to define or propose solutions for basic problems. If the staff can do this in a two or three day workshop, one wonders why the problems have become so intractable? On the other hand, the consultants, if they are serious about managerial improvements, should not serve as passive facilitators for an interchange among those who have the problems and to some extent are the problem. If the consultants have no ideas of their own, one wonders why they are considered experts. At the beginning of a series of scheduled visits, feedback consultation can be used to introduce and inform the consultants. Or, after top management has made some hard choices, it can be used to collectively retrace the logic behind a decision and thus build understanding and commitment. Because neither of these conditions applied in the Jamaican case, the use of the technique resulted in little benefit to the project.

An expert is needed to define feelings, relate them to structure and make them actionable. As noted elsewhere in this report (see attachment on Development Committee Strategy, annex I.2), role definition problems in II-IRDP stem from structural defects in incentives, technology, delegation and targeting. Concerning the problem of incentives, the consultant could have helped define the problems and facilitated the generation of ideas on how to provide incentives given civil service rigidities and the existence of the project outside the normal bureaucratic career development system. We have no doubt that those who might benefit from creative ideas on incentives would have come up with some creative ideas. The consultants could have helped make these ideas actionable. Then they could have visited the project after three months to review the actions taken.

Another management priority the consultants might have raised is the vacant deputy director position. Senior staff could have discussed the following: is it needed, how should it function, should it be filled, what is our next step? This approach in several structural areas would have had more chance of benefitting the project.

We are recommending here that when attempting to improve the management of a project the consultant alternately play an authoritative (DA) and facilitative (OD) role as the situation requires. Integration of the technology being applied is the responsibility of DAI and to a lesser extent of DAI's manager, RAD. The point is made elsewhere in this report that team composition, often determined by who is available rather than the needs of the assignment, influences the choice of technique. With longer and more predictable assignments, it would be much easier for DAI to plan its teams, balance its techniques and make a useful impact on the implementation of IRD projects. But this requires strong mission involvement in programming the consultants and reinforcing their contributions.

Role Of Mission

In the Jamaican case, the Mission commissioned an evaluation of the II-IRDP in February 1980. The DS/RAD manager of the DAI contract was a member of the team. The hard-hitting evaluation pinpointed several structural and managerial weaknesses which were also noticed by this evaluation team; isolation of demonstration farms, need for a deputy director, inadequacy of economic monitoring, doubts about the agricultural package, slow delivery of services to farmers, and a general subordination of development to construction. In a sense, this Mission evaluation served as the OD phase in a planned series of interventions. In a manner more vigorous than that of process consultation, it had exposed the key management issues and introduced the consultant, via their RAD contract manager, to the project. Project people had already begun thinking and talking about these issues. They were ready for a focused, serious interchange. Unfortunately this excellent launching pad for a management workshop was largely ignored. The consultants started from zero by collecting

and feeding back unrefined personal reactions. Given that the DAI intervention was in part prompted by the February evaluation, the Mission and RAD let slip an opportunity to follow evaluation with remediation.

The turnover of the relevant Mission officers since the workshop makes it difficult to reconstruct this failure and assign responsibility to structural circumstances and individuals. Before the workshop, the RAD project officer and a DAI representative went to Jamaica to prepare a scope of work with Mission and project officials. There were three objectives; (a) to determine needs for project coordination, (b) to discuss a managerial model for the identification, collection and utilization of information, (c) to develop a strategy for strengthening small farmer organizations.* These objectives were to be achieved by;

The workshop will emphasize an experiential approach to learning. That is, the knowledge of the behavioral sciences will be used to support a participative, action-oriented process. Small-group exercises, full-group reporting, structured feed-back, and integration among participants and the specialist team will be emphasized. The content of the workshop will be based on rural development management concepts which will focus on the documents, procedures, objectives and processes of the Integrated Rural Development Project. The Phase One data collection will provide some of this content, with additional materials introduced by the specialist team.*

In the general character of its objectives and standard OD format, the scope was not tailored to the evaluation and could have been used with equal relevance for many IRDPs. The Mission, RAD, DAI and the project should have written a scope aimed at guiding interchange among project officials to define the weaknesses seen in the February evaluation, assess why action had not been taken and plan action to strengthen the project. The scope should have envisioned repeat visits by DAI "to make the project work".

The RAD project officer and DAI certainly could have prepared a better scope of work despite the many inhibiting circumstances: the relevant Mission officers apparently did not push for a more useful scope either because they were too busy on more important matters, a consequence of short staffing, or they felt a workshop should not or could not raise sensitive issues; the resident consultant, Pacific Consultants International, may have felt threatened by scrutiny from another consultant; and finally, project senior staff may not have wanted basic shortcomings aired before junior staff and farmers.

*Source: Scope of work for DAI workshop

Because the intervention dealt with volunteered concerns below the structural level, i.e. mail boxes in watershed offices, report forms, clarifying job descriptions, etc. and did not include any Mission officers, it left no recommendations which the Mission could follow up at the project or ministerial level. In this case, the strengths of a resident field mission (one of AID's unique advantages in the development business) were not even called upon. The II-IRDP is not so close to perfection nor is AID so unencumbered in the pursuit of its objectives that readily available sources of help can be ignored.

If the workshop had focused even for an hour on the vacant deputy position, the participants, without risking embarrassing an incumbent, may have suggested many good ideas on recruitment and function. It is likely the open minded and frank project director would have encouraged such a discussion and may have allowed the consultants to steer it toward the dual technical and political management requirements in this and most IRD projects. Such projects are always accountable to several ministers and administrative jurisdictions and subject to short range political pressures. But there are also certain imperatives of technology and hard internal management. A project can succeed initially by offending no one, but in the end if it does not succeed technically, socially and economically, it will fail politically. An IRD project director is always politically responsible for his project. He has a natural fear that technical and managerial delegation may result in actions which are sound from the viewpoint of project implementation but cause political difficulties for which he is held accountable. Examples are hiring the "wrong" people or not spending money fast enough in politically important areas. Thus, a project director may be reluctant to allow the delegation and strict management needed for project success. The political, technical managerial imperatives can be met by one or more people. In the Jamaican case, a sensitive persuasive overall leader should be able to delegate daily operational control to a technically competent deputy. A discussion of these more substantive issues may have done more to relieve the role anxieties expressed by the participants than the internal feed-back exercises used. Also, such a discussion would have pointed to actions more directly related to ultimate project performance and perhaps have allowed USAID to play a constructive role at the ministerial level.

The issue of the vacant deputy director's position and other managerial issues raised in the February 1980 evaluation of the II-IRDP are sensitive and those involved might not want to have them raised in open session by short term consultants. As argued above, it is possible they could have been raised at the Jamaican project but most IRDP projects are not as open or led by such a frank and adaptable director. This gives rise to questions about RAD's approach. Should AID generally or any mission in particular, expect RAD's consultants to come into a project for two weeks or even quarterly for two years and raise serious managerial problems? On the other hand, if raising serious issues is inappropriate and the consultant only helps participants to blow off steam, is it worth doing? If the consultant enters projects only to work the temporary magic of the "workshop hype", then his intervention must be justified not by improving the project but as an opportunity to learn about projects. If that is

the case, research becomes the justification. Does research and the prospect for putting it into use justify the money spent, the disruption of project activities, and the use of valuable access privileges? In the Jamaican case, the answer is no.

Real managerial problems are best handled privately. Because IRDPs are managerially difficult, AID normally requires a resident consultant team to help manage. If the consultants are effective, they should be able to improve management by unobtrusive daily advice to their counterparts. USAID should take up problems beyond the influence of the consultant. USAID has more responsibility, power and access points, ranging from the farmer all the way to the ministers. Problems found intractable by the consultant and USAID are not likely to be solved by a public management workshop.

DAI cannot substitute for weaknesses in the project consultant or USAID. Thus, the logic behind DAI's technical assistance for managerial improvement and RAD's support of such assistance are dubious.

Based on our analysis of the Jamaican case, we conclude there are several pre-conditions which must be met to expect an outside consultant to improve the working of an IRDP.

- There must be a planned series of interventions occurring over a significant period of the life of the project. This will allow one or two visits for mutual introduction and trust building. Subsequent visits can refine analysis and establish an accountability framework for the project, USAID and the consultants. Planned visits allow the consultant to plan personnel, technique mix, research and publications. There has never been a schedule of visits to Jamaica.
- Project staff must be frank with the consultants and among themselves. These qualities existed in the Jamaican case but are rare.
- The resident consultant must not feel threatened. This is a Catch-22 condition. If the resident consultant is doing its job well it will not feel threatened and an outside consultant will probably not be needed. If it is failing it will feel threatened and try to block the outsider.
- The outside consultant must not only be able to accurately analyze the project but be perceived as having this ability otherwise USAID, the resident consultant and the project will either accept false advice or reject good advice. In the Jamaican case, DAI did not offer its own advice to any of the three parties.
- USAID staff must have the interest and will to act on the consultants advice. This was not the case in Jamaica.

Because these conditions are not likely to exist, an outside consultant is not likely to be useful. More important given the planning, openness, confidence, intelligence, trust, interest and will, inherent in these preconditions an outside consultant is not likely to be needed.

Recommendation: At a minimum the May 1980 intervention introduced DAI and the management of the Jamaican project and laid the groundwork for future contacts. The Jamaican project should be one of DAI's four or five key field targets during the remainder of its contract. USAID/Kingston, RAD, DAI and project management should plan a series of DAI visits which will identify and follow up actions to improve the organization, management and impact of the project.

IV. PROJECT ENVIRONMENT

This section evaluates RAD's performance in conceiving and implementing Project 5300. It tries to answer the following questions. In spending \$2.8 million on this project, what task is RAD performing for AID? Is this task needed and is RAD able to perform it? Will AID receive at least \$2.8 million in value from this project? Could the task and project be performed better?

Project History And Perspective

The ideas behind Project 498-5300 germinated during 1976-77. The new mandate for rural development and a basic human needs approach was enacted in 1973. By 1977 money had been committed to several integrated rural development projects (IRDPs) around the world. AID had neither intellectual nor operational experience with these controversial projects which would lead the reorientation of its program over the next decade. Did it make sense to see these collections of ministries, disciplines and activities as a single project? Were the problems coming up in design and implementation unique or common to all such projects? What kind of technical assistance was required and who would provide it? Should AID change its procedures? How is success measured?

Any organization impelled by outside forces to attain new objectives in a new environment must not only learn but invent a learning process. This is true of a firm entering new markets or an army facing new adversaries and new weapons. Repeatedly new challenges have been thrown at AID, for example, wartime development in Vietnam, the new mandate, Cambodian relief, and massive transfers to Egypt. AID has attempted to structure and accelerate learning processes. Project 5300 should be seen in this perspective.

The Learning Process

It is a characteristic weakness of AID that the formal learning function occurs mainly in the large central bureaus--DS and PPC-- apart from the field operations conducted by the regional bureaus.

This is because the regional bureaus labor under severe short-run pressures to spend money and react to a host of constituencies within and outside AID. The missions, chronically understaffed and layered with competing objectives, have inadequate time to understand and manage their own projects and none to learn about new program areas spanning several years and countries. On the other hand, learning in the central bureaus is remote from operations and often farmed out to consultants. This remoteness is partly caused by the missions which are so pressed by daily exigencies that they view initiatives by the central bureaus as annoying and unproductive diversions.

DS/RAD recognized and accepted its responsibility to learn for the agency about IRDPs. It would have preferred to form an interdisciplinary team of its own people and let them study projects and theory for a year to develop both understanding and a technical assistance (TA) capability. But in order to justify its existence, RAD's people had to be on call to the Missions. RAD could not allocate people and money to a year long R&D effort. Therefore, the only alternative was to hire consultants to learn for RAD. The contract with DAI provided for a first year of unalloyed learning with two quality control check points followed by three years of learning combined with TA. The first year would be devoted to general reviews in ten countries and writing a state of the art paper (SOAP). The ten review papers and the SOAP would show if the consultants had learned enough, i.e. had attained sufficient quality, to be allowed to provide TA. Using the first year to train and test the consultant was the intention although due to the antagonism in the agency to hiring consultants to "do research" it was not explicitly stated in the PP or contract. This antagonism to consultants coming out to projects to pursue their research interests also made it necessary to assign a marketing role to the consultants and may have prejudiced selection in favor of consultants able to perform this role. That is, upon receiving the contract, members of the firm called and wrote their friends in various missions explaining the project and angling for an invitation. To the extent that a consultant must market its services within AID after it receives its contract, there will be a tendency for AID to select contractors with previous AID experience. Throughout its history DAI has received over 90% of its business from AID.

DS/RAD in not using its own people and in working into the contract components for learning, quality control and marketing, was accepting its responsibilities to AID in spite of AID's procedures. A less innovative and serious office may have been content with the easier course of not taking on the responsibility and allowing AID procedures their natural ascendancy over substance.

One of the major conclusions of our evaluation is that this kind of learning cannot be farmed out. This is not the kind of learning where a team of chemists can be asked to develop a new catalyst which can be used by production workers. This kind of learning requires exposure to the tortuous operational problems of IRDPs, and a planned interchange with experts in several disciplines and knowledge of leading ideas in development administration, industrial psychology, cultural anthropology, and economic development. This creative interaction between projects, experts and theory must be planned and disciplined. To learn one must go through the process rather than read a report by someone who has done so. A strength of this project is that the consultants have gone through the process and learned a great deal. A major weakness is dissemination. Creating a smarter consultant does not necessarily create a smarter AID. How can AID learn what the consultants learn?

Dissemination Of Learning

When learning is removed from those who act, host country and mission project personnel, and from those assigned to learn, DS/RAD, and entrusted to outsiders, DAI, the prospect for the useful absorption of learning is very poor. As noted in the section on project performance above, little thought has gone into dissemination. The PP and contract make the standard and inadequate references to document distribution and seminars. There are no specifics on the kind of distribution or seminars or deadlines for the consultant to supply specifics. There are no requirements for research on how to improve dissemination, a chronic and often criticized weakness in RAD and DSB, or performance indicators or quality control check points on the consultant's growth in thinking about dissemination. Apart from transference during the TA visits, dissemination is assumed to occur mainly at the end of the project. Except for the laudable and explicit combination of TA and research, the project is not guided by the assumption that learning and dissemination are part of the same process. Dissemination should be continual and intrinsic not discrete, periodic or a summary activity. During the final two years of the project, RAD should give DAI deadlines and objectives for creative thinking and action to improve dissemination.

While RAD could have handled dissemination better in this project, it must operate in an Agency where the separation of learning and doing, which is the heart of the dissemination problem, is structurally determined. Mission people are burdened with detail, hard deadlines and competing objectives of development and disbursement. Central bureau people have more time for visiting experts, attending seminars, reading and analysis. It is typical that those most burdened with program implementation, the mission agricultural and rural development officers* are the last to be released by Mission directors for work with consultants or long term training. Field isolation is abetted by long tours, frequently 10 to 15 years without a Washington rotation. The learners in DSB and PPC, those who do the studies

*Backstops 9 and 10, have the leanest ratio of officers to work load as measured by number, complexity or value of projects.

and manage the research contracts, and the doers, those who design and manage projects in LDCs, do not report to the same bosses. Each is encased in the budget, agenda and vertical communications of his own bureaucracy within the bureaucracy. Creating a number of functional assistant administrators in agriculture, health, rural development etc. with control over both research and project approval might solve this problem but create an agency too technical for its political environment. The result of the present system is out of date field officers combined with a continual flurry of policy changes, format revisions, new fashions and cosmetic requirements emanating from Washington. Antagonism between the field and Washington, cynicism, and lowered agency performance naturally follow. Thus the RAD contract with DAI, despite the laudable intention behind it, typifies some major weaknesses in the Agency.

Dissemination, Training And Career Development

In a situation where learning is important but made difficult by the agency's structure and procedures, what can be done? In thinking about this dilemma we are struck by our own experience as an evaluation team. RAD, realizing that the regional bureaus must guide and consume its knowledge building projects, asked the regional bureaus to conduct this interim evaluation. The regional bureaus repeatedly refused. They have little incentive to evaluate another bureau's project. RAD had money to pay consultants to evaluate its consultants, the perfect isolation of the learning process, but none for AID employees. After considerable horse trading, four people from three regional bureaus agreed to add the evaluation to their other jobs, with acquiescence if not encouragement from their supervisors, and travel money was crabbled together from RAD and a convenient PASA budget. Inadequate though it may be, the five week effort of the team in reading the documents, visiting an intervention site, talking to DAI and rigorously exploring all the related issues, will probably represent most of the genuine dissemination within the regional bureaus of this \$2.8 million knowledge building project. This unlikely team, plus the RAD project manager, if he becomes an AID employee, plus DAI, if AID gives it another contract for IRDP work, will probably transmit to AID's future operations most of the value generated by the expenditure of \$2.8 million. Those who read the SOAP and other papers and meet the consultants on a field trip will absorb the remaining value.

Two members of the evaluation team are international development interns, IDIs: new hires at the entry level. For them the team provided responsible work, excellent training at the beginning of their AID careers and did not significantly disrupt their flexible schedules. For the other two team members who have managed IRD projects, this was an exposure to new ideas and an opportunity to reflect on operations and theory. Due to this intense learning experience, we will be more effective in AID. Our travel and per diem expenses did not reach \$4,000. If AID can spend \$2.8 million on a learning process for consultants it should be able to spend at least 5 per cent, \$135,000, for its own people to learn from the consultants. DSB could be required to allocate 5 per cent or even 2 per cent of the budgets of its knowledge building projects to AID's training division or to

a new DSB training division. The fund could be used for evaluation teams such as ours or for pure training teams. This could be an operating expense (OE) fund or a program fund. An OE fund would raise DSB's overall OE account but not necessarily raise overall spending by DSB or AID. DSB contracts have (program) funds for dissemination and training. With these funds, DSB's consultants can travel around the world for workshops, pay the expenses of experts invited to the workshops and pay for professors to spend months writing and producing stacks of documents. Not one penny can be spent on these activities if they are performed by AID's personnel. These funds could be switched to the OE account for the learning and training of AID people. Congress might accept this if it understood that the money was not being used for internal boondoggles but to serve an existing and sanctioned objective more efficiently. The new Foreign Service Act specifically mandates training and career development. If the money were kept in the program account, DSB contract funds currently used for dissemination and training could be switched to AID's training program or funds in that program could cover training modules attached to DSB's knowledge building projects. For example, each DSB contract could specify an interface with the Development Studies Program.

As part of a knowledge building project, a consultant could be required to supervise the training of an AID team for a month each quarter during the contract. The consultant could guide the team around the world to investigate an issue or type of project. It could require readings, written exercises and visits to experts all associated with its learning for AID. IDI's could be mixed with professionals more advanced in their careers. In this way DSB's investment in learning would draw closer to the missions both as precipitators and consumers of its knowledge. Also the training function would be brought closer to learning and operations. The consultants would appreciate a closer relationship with field personnel, who are a source of real world experience. The training division could combine learning under consultants with academic training and advice on job assignments in a career development program, a vital ingredient the Agency has always lacked.

Undoubtedly Mission directors would oppose releasing their productive people for even a month. This is an area of Mission sovereignty which is understandable but not consistent with the Agency's need to learn, adapt and develop people. Given changing but intense obligational pressures and the power of the various AID lobby groups, directors are forced to continually reinvent long term programs, adapt to Washington fashions and spend money as well as transform society. Small wonder they want to guard what little staff control they possess. Unfortunately one system defect breeds another. The improper use of Missions results in an improper use of staff. If Mission responsibilities were more limited to the implementation of more stable, more concentrated and longer term programs, which were not the play things of various political, economic and ideological lobbies, then there would be more opportunity for personnel planning and career development. The existence of these systemic defects should not blind us to the possibility of adding training and

career development components to DSB's knowledge building projects. This would break the isolation of the learning process, improve dissemination and help integrate operations, training, learning, career development and agency adaptability.

In summary, we envision the following role for DSB knowledge building/TA projects. First, DSB in cooperation with the Missions identifies a technical problem and selects a competent contractor. By creating access to field operations, requiring a multidisciplinary focus and establishing quality control check points, it creates a learning process for the contractor. Second, after the contractor has passed the quality threshold, DSB markets its services to the missions. The market test is the missions' willingness to pay in-country per diem and travel of the contractor's people and, after one or two visits, agree on a cumulative sequence of visits lasting at least two years. Third, DSB and/or AID/Training fund field people to participate with the contractor during the learning, TA and evaluation stages of the contract. Work with the contractor would be integrated with assignments at the mission, more formal training given by AID or other organizations and the employee's career path. All of this could be done without spending more money or changing AIDs objectives.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. RAD should give DAI deadlines and objectives for creative thinking and action to improve dissemination during the remainder of the project.
2. DSB should allocate at least 2 percent of the budget of knowledge building projects to cover expenses of regional bureau personnel trained by the knowledge builders.
3. PM/TD should investigate linking training and career development to DSB knowledge building projects.
4. All DSB knowledge building projects should include OE funds for evaluation by regional bureaus.

RAD PERSONNEL ISSUES

Currently RAD has 18 professionals. Nine are AID direct hire employees of which four are foreign service officers. The remaining nine, half the staff, are IPA's, PASAs and RSSAs whose turnover exceeds the AID norm and whose backgrounds are largely in teaching and research as opposed to development implementation, which is AID's main business. As noted elsewhere, one weakness of the dissemination process is that the RAD contract managers take their learning out of the Agency. For example, the RAD manager of the DAI contract is not an AID employee. This personnel system results in a learning process where outside consultants learn, are managed by short term in-house consultants who are on call world-wide, and are evaluated, if at all, by other consultants. It is almost like

an elaborate fencing system where the intent is to hide the stolen goods, in this case the insights acquired, by passing them through a series of increasingly removed brokers.

This situation suggests several questions about AID policies and operations. "Doing more with less" may have gone too far. The core of AID's business, broad and equitable development in foreign countries, is extremely ambitious by itself. When it is combined with the need to reflect shifting political preferences in shifting country funding levels and serve a host of domestic lobbies, the imbalance between means and objectives may have become unrealistically ambitious. RAD may have accommodated to these pressures to the point that the marginal utility of an extra budget dollar is very low or even negative. In project 5300 we have seen that the TA was of little benefit to the Jamaican IRDP and the learning is not likely to be usefully absorbed.

If AID is going to have central technical offices like RAD, they should be staffed by FSRs on three year rotations between field assignments. If they are not expert enough to work with consultants and build knowledge they can be given long term training as part of their career development and assignment planning before going to RAD. What the Agency might lose in technical expertise it would more than gain in dissemination and a more field oriented control over contractor work plans. Also, it should be noted that RAD experts spend about half their time managing contracts. Field staff, with their experience in project management, can be expected to do this part of the job at least as well. When academics manage academics there is a risk of personal research interests displacing contract objectives. And on the subject matter side, an infusion of field veterans would provide a healthy grounding to the graduate school mentality of many of RAD's consultants.

Staffing RAD with direct hires as well as passing direct hire trainee teams through RAD would increase RAD's allocation of direct hires. We have argued that RAD's difficulties result in part from an impractical ratio of direct hire staff to objectives. This imbalance is not entirely imposed from the outside. RAD has probably accepted and prompted requests for its services too indiscriminately, although a "ready to serve" stance is needed to charm the regional bureaus and provide access and freedom for research. A less expansive RAD would still face the personnel ceiling problem. It seems to us that if RAD is important enough to have a payroll and program budget and learn for the agency in critical areas, then it is important enough to have direct hire staff. If the purpose is legitimate, so are the means. If the means cannot be spared, is the purpose worthwhile and, in any event, can it be achieved with inappropriate means, in this case contract personnel, who cost the taxpayer as much as the appropriate means, direct hires.

A more fundamental remedy for the imbalances reflected by RAD is to concentrate and stretch out our field programs. If there are too few people for AID's many projects, rather than adding people through increasingly

tenuous webs of consultancies, which often create more work for others than product for AID, why not simplify the program: fewer, bigger and more loosely designed projects; missions more confined to implementation; more design work done during implementation, especially for rural development projects; less AID/W change in country levels and program mix; more stability in personnel planning, etc. If a country program were largely fixed for the next five or ten years, a short period in terms of developmental change, missions would spend less time on documentation, ie CDSS, PP, ABS, CP, CN, etc, and with more stable subject areas we would need fewer but longer term consultants. This of course assumes that Mission Directors would not be encouraged to drum up every possible project either to get more money or to be ready for the next AID/W program revolution. It also assumes some AID/W technical guidance for long term programming and top management ability to defend the implied powers of the agency.

These changes in turn assume certain political and organizational reforms in AID which complete the connection between defects in RADs personnel and projects and overall agency problems. Both the scope of this report and our sense of realism dissuade us from making recommendations on the larger political and organizational issues such as AID's autonomy within the government, micro level commands from Congressional staffers, career people in top management, multiyear authorizations, risk taking with government money, internal delegation, and the unification of technical and executive authority.

Site Selection

As discussed above RAD identified and, within the limitations posed by AID's structure, tried to meet a genuine need: to understand and assist IRD projects. The research and TA required project sites. The consultants needed to learn from field operations and improve those operations. Thus sites had to be selected for the opportunities they provided to learn and to assist. A likely approach to programming the consultants is as follows:

- RAD is familiar with AID IRD projects worldwide.
- RAD ranks the projects according to suitability for learning and TA.
- RAD markets its ranking to the Missions using higher DS or AID authority to settle disputes.
- RAD programs a series of DAI visits based on its ranking and Mission agreement, as modified by the views of top management.

The key ingredients here are that RAD understands the Agency's IRD projects and that the Missions are not completely free to ignore RAD's work. Without understanding, how can RAD presume to program money on behalf of the Agency's needs for learning and technical assistance? Without some authority over the Missions, how can its understanding and money be of any use and, more generally, why have a central technical office if the field operatives have the power to totally shut it out?

In other words the existence of a central technical office with staff and money implies some authority: consumers are not sovereign. It is a general weakness in AID, very much exemplified by the contract under review, that the Missions operate on the basis of consumer sovereignty and DSB, although it often tries to or says it does, cannot operate wholly on this basis.

In selecting sites, RAD used what might be called the subterranean or back channel model of consumer sovereignty. Missions decided whether, when, and what type of service they receive from RAD, but, in making this decision, they were informally prompted by RAD and DAI. Below are sketches of the way site visits came about:

1. Honduras - DS/RAD project officer Ron Curtis was in country for the evaluation of another project and was able to sell project 5300 to an acquaintance for the PROTECPA project.
2. Liberia - Mission Director Garufi responded to the airgram announcement of the project and wrote directly to DAI Project Director Peter Weisel whom he had known from previous Liberian work.
3. Tanzania - Mission deputy director, Jerry French, responded to the airgram with a request for help on the Masai Project.
4. Botswana - In 1978, before the signing of DAI's contract, Mission rural development officer, John Pielemeier, asked for Peter Weisel at DAI to lead a rural sector study to be paid under DAI's IQC with AID. Weisel was busy with the IRD contract proposal and DAI sent Tony Barclay under the IQC. After the IRD contract was awarded to DAI Weisel went to Botswana in December 1978 to work on the study under the contract. Thus Weisel, a well known expert in the field, probably would have done the job in Botswana whether or not employed at DAI and whether or not DAI had the IRD contract.
5. Cameroon - DAI president Mickelwait knew the Mission Director and personally sent him the proposal for IRD. The Mission Director knew of David Gow, DAI anthropologist, and asked DS/RAD project officer Curtis to visit Cameroon during an African trip to discuss the project and draw up a scope of work.
6. Nepal - Project Officer Bill Douglass needed a management information system expert. He had seen Peter Weisel's writings in this field, found he was currently working for DAI and asked for his services under the RAD project. Weisel was unavailable so Nepal took David Gow instead.
7. Philippines - DAI DA specialist George Honadle had worked on a team in the Bicol prior to IRD contract and the Mission Director responded to the airgram with a request to Tom Carey, one of the members of the original core team for assistance. Carey, Tom Armor, and Honadle all eventually worked in the Philippines under project 5300 funds.

8. Indonesia - The Mission's answer to airgram was "don't call us, we'll call you" which evoked a spirited reply from the Director of DS/RAD, Harlan Hobgood. Hobgood's eloquent reply, combined with the mission's previous positive experience with Honadle and Jerry Van Sant, led to the Mission giving IRD a try.

9. Thailand - The Mission responded to the airgram with a specific request for Mickelwait, Murray, and Roth. Mickelwait and Roth were members of DAI, Murray was a sub-contractor. All were chosen for their Thailand experience. The work involved assessment of several representative Rural Development projects, recommendations for ways to improve their implementation, and an over-all appraisal and recommendations for future Mission rural development strategies. Work was not really related to the IRD project focus on organization and administration of IRD. DAI admits it was a case of doing what Mission wanted to get a foot in the door.

10. Jamaica - DS/RAD officer Curtis was RDO in USAID/Kingston and helped design II-IRDP. DAI had been contracted for the information system for the project. Curtis led the January, 1980 evaluation and selected RAD management expert Lowenthal for the team because management was major issue in project. Lowenthal then sold IRD after the evaluation.

11. Yemen - DAI anthropologist David Gow, under another DAI contract, had done a study for the design of a local organization project. The Mission responded to the airgram with a request for IRD help specifically on a local organization project.

Apparently in only one case, Tanzania, was a site selected by a Mission response to RAD's airgram announcement of services available. In no case was there even a hint of an order that a Mission must accept a visit either to serve the Agency's management information system or to improve a project. Rather than being designed to achieve research and TA objectives, site selection was marketed or even lobbied. It depended largely on personal connections, coincidences in travel schedules and, as noted elsewhere in this report, an informal but clear instruction to the consultants to sell Project - 936-5300 within the Agency.

A major weakness of this site selection process is its one shot character. That is, when the sites were initially selected, they were not programmed for a series of research and TA interventions during the four years of the contract. If this were done, some of the defects of the initial arbitrary selection, i.e. selecting some poor sites, could be compensated by cumulative and increasingly well targeted visits. Rather, the personalistic, arbitrary process is repeated during the contract. Initial visits do not guarantee repeat visits. There is no program of visits. For both research and TA, it is vastly more cost effective to visit several typical projects quarterly in a planned manner as they change over four years, which is a large portion of the normal five year project life, than to visit many projects, almost at random, once or twice

not knowing six months hence which project will be available.

To their credit, by energetically playing the site selection game, RAD and DAI apparently have come up with two projects where repeat visits for TA and research are highly likely during the remainder of DAI's contract: the Rural Sector Grant Project in Botswana and the Integrated Rural Development Project in Ecuador. These victories, playing by rules which favor the short run, narrow horizons of the missions, are the result of constant hard work and good field conduct. However, these sites are not necessarily the best ones for RADs research and TA objectives. Nor is it likely that DAI will be able to deal with them in a way that maximizes their usefulness for research or TA.

AID's Use of DAI

DAI receives over 90 percent of its corporate revenues from AID. It has been intimately involved in AID's operations for 10 years. A network of friendships links the two organizations. The staff of each has been employed in the other. DAI testifies in Congress on AID matters. This might be considered an incestuous situation and a risky marketing strategy for DAI but the close relationship is likely to continue. As a result, DAI understands AID very well;

"I think it is fair to say we know more about how AID works, its strengths and weaknesses, than most of AID's own staff".
(February 10, 1981, Memo from DAI commenting on section in draft evaluation which criticizes learning by proxy.)

The tone of the above statement indicates that the relationship may have become a bit too familiar but it suggests using DAI in a new way. DAI is in a good position to analyze AID's programs and operating procedures. Normally it functions at the level of field operations where the developmental objectives are concrete and urgent but where layers of bureaucratic complications stretching back to AID/W, Congress and the lobbies hamstring practice action. At the same time DAI as a quasi-outsider is able to think and write undistractedly. In this rushed evaluation we have tried to analyze and make recommendations on the programmatic and managerial impediments to the success of Project 5300. DAI with its greater disciplinary range and broader perspective should be able to do it better. It could be given a general assignment to review delegation, career development, the flow of paper work, the coordination of technical and executive functions, long term programing, how to maintain quality with reduced staff, etc. AID's investment in DAI has built up a capacity for management information and general feedback that we have never used.

Recommendation: DSB as AID's central bureau for research and management information should consider using DAI to analyze the organization and management of AID.

Financial Management

As part of our assignment to evaluate RADs management of Project 5300 we explored several questions about financial management. These included the following. Considerably more money was requested in the Project Paper and authorized by DSB than was needed to fund DAIs contract or the PASA for the contract officer. Why was this extra money authorized and what happened to it? Was it a kind of slush fund conveniently hidden in the instercies where a contract, PASA and project loosely fit together? Were categories in the contract, like the TDY account, so loosely specified that they could be used as blank checks by RAD or DAI for purposes unrelated to the contract? Was it possible or likely that after two years of investment in exposure and research the contract would have to be terminated for lack of funds before it entered the pay-off stage?

We do not fully understand the initial purpose and subsequent use of the funds authorized above the requirements of the contract and PASA. We know of one minor case of what might be called raiding the contract to get money for a purpose whose contribution to the contract was far from obvious. The shelf problem was an understandable consequence of budget fluctuations RAD could not predict. Overall we find the financial management of the contract satisfactory. To its credit RAD used the financial flexibility of the contract effectively to guide it and shape the output mix. Also RAD has been able to elicit matching contributions from the Missions for certain contract costs (field travel and per diem). These contributions are likely to increase as a portion of total project expenditures which signifies mission interest and leverages RAD's efforts.

CONCLUSION

To conclude this section on project environment, it is appropriate to return to the questions posed at the beginning of the section.

In this project what task is RAD performing for AID? RAD has created a learning process to increase knowledge about IRDPs, develop IRDP experts and use the experts to improve IRDPs.

Is RAD able to perform this task? Not very well, although better than any other unit in AID. RAD's isolation from, but dependence on the Missions, which control the IRDPs, has the following consequences:

- RAD people cannot do the learning and become the experts. They must be on call for short-term assignments and be part time managers of learning done by outsiders. The project manager in this case and one-half of RAD's staff are not direct hires and thus are not likely to carry what they have learned into future agency operations.
- Visits to projects by the outside learner-experts are of an ad hoc, non-cumulative character which greatly dilutes both learning and impact.

- The separation of learning and doing forces dissemination to rely on the standard and inadequate means of circulation of publications, one or two brief seminars and any transference occurring during project visits.

Will AID receive value at least equivalent to the money spent? This question is as difficult to answer as it is important. It is our opinion that although much has been learned, a learning process weakened by consumer, i.e. mission, sovereignty as opposed to some learner sovereignty, an unsystematic association with projects and severe weaknesses in the dissemination or the knowledge gained undermine much of the value of this project. The TA visits being ad hoc, short term and concentrating on one often non-fundamental piece of an IRD project cannot be expected to significantly improve the implementation of such projects. Improvement in this area during the final two years could greatly increase the cost effectiveness of the project.

Could the task be performed better? Probably not. Given the structural obstacles, RAD had no choice but to hire outsiders to learn and submit to a site selection process over which it had little influence. RAD deserves compliments for taking seriously its responsibilities and trying to carry them out.

Could the project be performed better? During the final two years of the contract it should be possible to achieve a more systematic link with IRDPs. On TA visits, DAI's technique mix can be more tailored to the project and less dependent on the disciplines of team members. More planning should be done to maximize the value of the standard dissemination measures.

Recommendation: From our evaluation, we conclude this project should not be extended beyond its scheduled termination date. By the end of the contract the various research papers will be used if practitioners find them useful and we will have trained DAI staff for future TA work if needed. That is, the knowledge and the experts will be available and little will be gained by additional expenditure.

Jamaican Case Work

This annex includes the evaluation team's internal working papers for its field investigation in Jamaica. Before going to Jamaica the team organized its investigation according to a logical sequence: the outputs following the actions agreed at the management workshop and the stages preliminary to these actions. Each team member was given one type of action and assigned to follow the forward and backward linkages as well as identify the methodology and information sources to be used. Thus there are four papers on work assignments and four on findings.

These are rough, brief working papers used mainly as thinking aids. They are annexed to the report for two reasons. First, the regional bureau committee which liases with DS/RAD asked us to record some of our methods for use by other regional bureau evaluations of RAD projects. Second, PPC/E wanted to consider our work as a model for its broader evaluation of RAD.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Evaluation Team

FROM : Gerrit Argento, ASIA/TR/RD

SUBJECT: Description of Field Assignment

DATE: November 13, 1980

Partial field assignments were made and at our meeting on November 12, it was agreed we would complete the description of our assignments according to six categories. The categories cover forward and backward linkages from actions resulting from DAIs May 1980 intervention. We also agreed to indicate the information sources we would use to evaluate the categories and comment on our evaluation methodology.

LINKAGE CATEGORIES

1. Project Impact Project committees become implementors of projects. They enlighten project staff on local needs and adapt project resources to local needs. They mobilize local resources. They make dependable commitments which allow others to make commitments which leads to an increased intensity, integration and speed of project implementation thereby achieving project purposes.
2. Result The strategy is implemented.
3. Actions To prepare a strategy for the future of the development committees.
4. Skills Analysis; priority setting; ability to compromise, ability to communicate and induce participation and consensus.
5. Attitudes A commitment to do what is necessary to make the project attain its objectives. A trust that others share this commitment and conducting personal relations on this basis. An open minded, flexible attitude willing to try new approaches and discard them if they do not contribute to objectives.
6. Technique What is needed is a technique that improves understanding of the proper role of the development committees within the project and of the practical steps to develop the committees into this role: a cognitive technique. Also needed is a technique which motivates the official to act on this new understanding. Exercises in PERT, means-end analysis, decision tree and system diagraming might serve as cognitive techniques. Concerning motivation, an intervention technique alone, without changes in incentives or



responsibilities, is unlikely to improve motivation. Conceivably cognitive techniques and consensus building sessions among staff could improve an official's understanding of the boundaries of his responsibility and his feeling of security in exercising it both of which might make him more willing to exercise it.

Information Sources

People - Individuals to be specified in Jamaica after discussions with USAID Nov. 17 and George Honadle and Dudley Ried Nov. 18 but farmers, development committee members and project staff should be included.

Documents - Has a strategy statement been written? Have the development committees (DCs) seen it and responded (in writing)? Have the DCs been asked (in writing) for strategy proposals?

METHODOLOGY Are DC leaders and project staff (PS) on a first name basis? Do they know each others names? Do PS know where and when the DCs meet? Have improvements in these areas occurred since May? Are PS city reared? When discussing implementation problems do PS volunteer any ways in which DCs are vital to project success? Do DC members expect to continue membership after project activities? Has PS made more initiatives to the DCs since May 1980? Are contacts with DCs itemized in PS work plans or program reports? Are any elements of the strategy observable? Who is working on the strategy and what are his performance criteria? Have any changes at all occurred with respect to the DCs since May and to what extent are these attributable to the May intervention?

memorandum

DATE: 11-25-80

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: ASIA/TR/RD:Gerrit ArgentoSUBJECT: Field Assignment Findings on Development Committee
Strategy

TO: Evaluation Team

At the DAI conducted management workshop in May 1980, II-IRDP project officials agreed on several actions. The commitment to these actions, their relevance to the project, their implementation and the creation of the attitudes and skills upon which they depend comprise much of the benefit, if any, which can be expected to result from the DAI intervention. These actions were grouped into four categories and parceled out to the four members of the evaluation team for investigation. The action discussed here is the preparation of a strategy to strengthen the development committees (DCs).

During the period between the intervention in May 1980 and the visit of the evaluation team in November 1980, the following steps were taken:

- Creation of a council for the development committees and approval of its constitution. Two quarterly meetings held.
- Guidelines for development committees (a two-page check list of functions DCs should perform).
- One-page standard format for monthly reporting to project of results of DC meetings.
- Strategy document showing problem, remedial action, planned results and deadline for results.

Some of these steps may have been in train before the workshop, but it is clear that since the workshop, efforts have been made to formulate and carry out a strategy for strengthening the DCs. Also it is clear that the DC or some equivalent group of farmers able to interact with the project is needed. Thus it seems that the workshop helped in identifying and carrying out an important action. However, despite the number of meetings held by the DCs and council, the excellent reporting form and the documents



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on strategy and guidelines, we have the impression that the vital signs of the DCs have not significantly quickened since May and that the approaches identified may not be sufficient to energize the patient.

This presents a paradox: success in the identification of problem and action - strong groups of farmers are necessary and a strategy to strengthen them is needed - combined with likely overall failure in actually creating the appropriate kind of farmers' groups. A discussion of this paradox requires an understanding of the project difficult to achieve by a reading of the documents and a five day visit. Nevertheless, it is the unenviable task of evaluation teams to make large judgements hurriedly. What follows is an explanation of our judgement that the DAI intervention was probably not a good way to identify or attempt to solve the problems of the development committees.

DAI used an internal feed back approach. Workshop participants are encouraged to identify problems and propose solutions. This has the advantages of immediacy and project specificity. The potential problem solvers identify and "own" the problem. There is the possibility that the participants were encouraged to see this problem as AID sees it. To the three groups of consultants receiving AID money - DAI, PCI and the Cornell sociologist - AID has communicated its convictions on the creation of active beneficiary groups. Interest in the DCs may be stronger at AID than among the project officials. In any event, the emphasis was on problem identification and solution within the existing project context. For example, writing and implementing the DC strategy were assigned to the project's training and coordinating officer. The actions taken - calling for more regular DC meetings, encouraging the establishment of new DCs, improving the reporting of meetings, establishing a committee of committees, etc. - were the most he could do in his official capacity. But in our opinion the DCs must be viewed systematically: the need for them and the means of creating them arise from the structure of the project. There must be a strong mutual dependency between the DCs and the project similar to that between a politician and his constituency. In Jamaica, the politician provides solely needed benefits to his constituency and the constituency keeps the politician in office. This mutual dependency has created political constituency groups which, as the recent election has shown, are perhaps too cohesive and entrepreneurial. Unfortunately inter-dependency in the II-IRDP has been too weak to generate farmer groups which can articulate demands, identify opportunities, commit members, mobilize their own resources or adapt project resources. It has also been too weak to generate "successful" project officials. For example, the extension agent does not have a productive new technology to offer the farmer and for the old technology he cannot deliver coffee or citrus seedlings. Nor can he deliver rapidly - farm plan approval, farm plan implementation, livestock, roads, electricity, potable water, fertilizer or credit. Concerning other important needs of the farmer - transportation to market, stable and remunerative prices, tenurial security - the agent and the project are largely powerless. Thus the farmer has little

incentive to depend on or support the project despite its \$26 million budget and high ratio of officials to beneficiaries. Even if the agent could help the mini farm to rapidly become more profitable, due to civil service rigidities and the temporary character of the project the agent is not likely to be rewarded in pay or career advancement. Thus the agent and his colleagues throughout the project staff have little incentive to depend on or support the farmer. Without interdependency there is little urgency to develop work targets and personnel performance indicators. Interdependency in the project has not risen to this creative threshold due to systemic weaknesses in research, technology, commodity availability, response time, personnel incentives, delegation, work targeting and overall objectives.

A detailed discussion of how and why these weaknesses are likely to cause this project to fall far short of its expectations is not appropriate here but some indications can be given. There is no agronomic package likely to have an impact on productivity remotely approaching the new rice and wheat seeds or even equivalent to bringing irrigation to rainfed areas. Agronomic testing on the demonstration plots functions independantly of extension agents and farmers. Land in bush and cane will be put into coffee, citrus and banana with land in vegetable crops largely unchanged. The quantity of inputs will increase as will the average value of the farm's output. But labor and management requirements are likely to go up when farms add 50% to 70% to cultivated land and use all cultivated land more intensively. Generally the heads of farm households are elderly or female and family members depend on temporary off-farm jobs to supplement income. In this situation can a larger and steadier flow of higher quality from labor be expected? Economic research has provided virtually no knowledge of the net economic effect of this increase in inputs, outputs and quality control. Farmers are clamoring for coffee and citrus seedlings which are not allowed to be grown on the project's testing stations. There are long delays between the approval of farm plans and their implementation although response intervals have declined recently. There are no yearly targets for the approval or implementation of farm plans. It is difficult to know if any official succeeds or fails in tasks directly related to ultimate objectives. Those who do succeed cannot be significantly rewarded by money or promotion. Delegation is made difficult by the political sensitivity of the project and the need to prevent subordinates from taking technical initiatives which might cause political problems. Top managements' time is constantly diverted by a stream of ceremonial and procedural duties. Due to the impracticable policy of "doing more with less" USAID/Kingston has always been woefully understaffed to fulfill its project management responsibilities. This has resulted in design weaknesses, unrealistic costs, poor procurement, superficial and mainly financial monitoring, late recognition of problems and even later responses. In a natural but unfair response to USAID's over-commitment, some of its responsibilities have

shifted to the project consultant whose advisory role prohibits taking decisions and executing actions. Finally, while the real and highly ambitious objective of the project is a sustained social and economic transformation of a society based on hillside mini-farms, the operational objectives are dominated by engineering considerations - acres of terraces, miles of road etc. - political tight-rope walking and the pressure to spend money.

To cite these structural weaknesses is not to criticise this project which in several respects is better than most. All integrated rural development projects are difficult because they combine ambitious long term objectives with weaknesses in personnel, planning, technology and management; the displacement of goals and resources; the tyranny of the immediate; and a host of factors which make for underdevelopment in the country and consequently in the project. The point being made here is that given these systemic defects and the importance of the interface between beneficiaries-implementors and project officials, a two week management workshop conducted by outside consultants, no matter how clever, is likely to misperceive the strategic problem, initiate actions in the wrong direction and leave a false sense of accomplishment.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Evaluation Team

DATE: December 8, 1980

FROM : Gene F. Miller, LAC/DR

SUBJECT: Description of Field Assignment

The evaluation of senior staff skill development focuses on the staffs ability to define roles and make appropriate assignments of duties and responsibilities.

The proposed methodology is that developed by the evaluation work group, i.e., investigating forward and backward linkages from actions resulting from the May 1980 DAI intervention.

The linkage categories are shown below:

LINKAGE CATEGORIES

1. Project Impact: Improved formulation and execution of project plans and policies. The senior staff directs the activities of the project. Successful project implementation is contingent upon senior staff capacity.
2. Results: Staff members have a better understanding how their particular action steps contribute to the overall implementation plan. The critical interdependencies and action activities are identified and addressed.
3. Actions: Staff skill development. Raising the ability of project personnel to deal with new situations. Attention by senior staff to role definitions and appropriate duty and responsibility assignments. Effective planning and executing project activities.
4. Skills: Ability to apply the range of management techniques necessary to implement the project. To plan, to communicate, to define roles, to make decisions, to delegate authority, to motivate, to recognize capabilities of subordinates, to negotiate, etc.
5. Attitudes: Openmindedness; subordinates can carry out their roles; need to account for own actions; a sense of fair play. A commitment to do what is necessary to make the project successful.
6. Techniques: There are many recognized techniques used by management to carry out the management function. Needed is a better understanding of these techniques and ways to apply them. The techniques employed



by BAI in its workshops are just some of the tools management has at its disposal. Those important to the evaluation and used by DAI are: Listing of action steps, hollow squares, decision tree, time management exercise, and network planning.

7. Information Sources: Senior staff, Peace Corps Volunteers, Technical Assistance Contractor and In-house documents.

8. Methodology: Interviews and document search. Does senior staff understand the relationship between their actions and others? Do job descriptions reflect actual duties? Have any changes occurred since the May intervention and to what extent are they attributable to the intervention.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Evaluation Team

DATE: December 8, 1980

FROM : Gene F. Miller, LAC/DR

SUBJECT: Field Assignment Findings on Senior Staff Role Definition

My field assignment was to evaluate the impact the DAI intervention had on the senior staff of the IRD Project. Specifically, my task was to determine if the intervention produced positive results in the senior staffs ability to define roles of project personnel and make appropriate assignments of duties and responsibilities.

Preparatory Activities for Field Assignment

The DAI workshop was an effort to address the need for improving management skills in the IRD Project. The DAI Jamaican Field Report states on page 10 that "the objective of the management skills workshops was to develop the ability of staff to solve their own problems, rather than to provide solutions to present situation." Thus, the workshops involved project staff in an effort to focus on generation of plans and improved staff capacities, (staff skill development).

Four categories of issues were generated in pre-workshop activities, they are: 1) subwatershed team, 2) planning, 3) communications, and 4) relationship between Development Committee and project. These four "problem categories" stress middle-level management involvement and do not specifically focus on senior staff skill development.

The workshop participants identified a series of management needs relevant to the existing situations, they are as follows:

- need for communication between planners and implementors,
- need to improve time management,
- need to develop greater self-reliance by development committees,
- need to develop better planning,
- need to incorporate group problem-solving in management function,
- need to conduct better meetings,
- need to improve data use.



Note: The role of the senior management team impinges upon all the above management "needs."

Finally, the workshops produced a list of 19 action steps, that point toward implementation responsibility, see pages 25, 26, and 27 of the report. These action steps provide the focus for the senior staff evaluation examines two of the immediate action recommendations of the DAI workshop, they are:

1. Role relations - explain different roles within the project, and
2. Staffing - fill existing staff vacancies with capable people.

Basically, the above two areas to be evaluated stem from the communication "problem category" identified in the pre-workshop activity. Three staff generated remedies, listed under the topic, Rapid Means of Improving Communications, are relevant to the evaluation, they are: 1) understanding roles, 2) filling existing staff vacancies, and 3) delegation of authority.

A recognized technique for explaining management roles is to provide individual project personnel with detailed job descriptions. Supplementary to job descriptions are explanations of payments and incentives, and promotions requisites.

The senior staff evaluation is based on an examination of staff roles and status of staff vacancies.

FINDINGS

Initial: Approximately 30 percent of the present senior staff were not employed under the project when the DAI workshop was held in May 1980. Senior staff officers were required to attend only one, one-day workshop activity, that being Friday, the last day. A number of the senior officers did not attend this session, due to the press of duties, or from being absent from the job on that day. This finding raises questions about the effectiveness of the intervention. Without the senior staff in attendance some impact must necessarily be lost.

Status of Staff Vacancies: At least one important senior staff position has not been filled to date, i.e., the position of Deputy Project Director. At least three other senior staff positions went unfilled until August 1980 or later, namely the Administrative, Livestock and Communication Officer positions. Numerous mid-level management positions are still vacant.

Role Relations: To date, job descriptions do not accurately describe the duties and responsibilities of individual officers. The management role of many officers remains unclear. Mr. Holmes, the Acting Project Manager for PCI, stated that this was still a problem that had not been solved. Examination revealed that most were vague, rambling and nondescriptive of desired function.

Delegation of Authority: Appropriate delegation of authority has not been effected at any level of the project. Project officers, particularly senior staff officers, are reluctant to delegate authority. There are indications that this stems from actions of the Project Director. The vacancy at the Deputy Project Director level is probably attributable to reluctance to delegate authority, which may be due to the political risks of lessened control or the difficulty of finding or compensating an appropriate person.

Linkage Appraisal: Some improvement in senior staffs ability to formulate and execute project plans and policies is in evidence. However, weaknesses still exist and overall project impact resulting from DAI intervention is probably negligible. The critical interdependencies and action activities are still not commensurate to that expected. This and the other sections of the evaluation points out many weaknesses.

The skills, attitudes and techniques possessed by the project senior staff appear better than those of many counterpart staff in USAID projects in other LDC's...Yet, upgrading of staff is still needed.

The DAI Approach: The internal feedback approach used by DAI to identify management deficiencies has at least one serious drawback of its own. A primary weakness in this approach is that workshop participants do not generally have sufficient knowledge and experience to identify many of the problems constraining the project. Additionally, structural constraints are always present — many may be insurmountable. Trite as it may seem, project personnel are motivated by such factors as face-saving, favor expectance, faction pressures and fear of loss of job. Many times, these external pressures are the paramount motivating factors. It is therefore unlikely that the internal feedback mechanism will surface many of the problems confronting implementation.

Additional Comments - not intervention related: The cumbersome bureaucracy imposed on the project by the present structure gives the project little control over employee career path and remuneration. Upward mobility is restricted by a rigid classification system and monetary incentives are totally lacking. This situation is exacerbated by the expected short life of the project. These factors contribute to project difficulties.

Summary: The primary focus of the DAI workshops was on those specific problems that were identified as a result of the pre-workshop activities. It appears that DAI acted more as a facilitating agent, offering solutions rather than "selling" the elements for needed change.

memorandum

DATE: November 13, 1980

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: AFRICA/DR, David Hess

SUBJECT: Description of Field Assignment

TO: IRD Evaluation Team

My assignment in Jamaica is to collect information, through examination of written materials and conducting interviews, to determine the effect of the DAI intervention in May, 1980 on communication within the IRDP II project. One of the primary emphases found in the DAI Field Report on the Jamaican work and in other documents on the workshop they conducted is communications improvement. I want to see what this has meant for communication processes within the project.

Results

The DAI workshop has led to increased and improved verbal and written communication within the project, according to workshop reports. This has supposedly meant: 1) increased and regularized visits of senior staff to sub-project staff; 2) an improved and expanded newsletter; 3) the beginning of reporting between senior and junior staff of various meetings; 4) placement of mail boxes; 5) better distribution of internal written communication including memos and letters; and 6) greater communication with farmers on the part of project staff, both through more frequent visits and dissemination of minutes of meetings and reports.

Attitudes and Skills

The intervention by DAI was intended to foster attitudes and teach skills which will help the staff improve communication. Attitudes to be developed included responsibility for one's own actions, acceptance of the need to keep others informed, and belief in the importance of knowing the status of particular project activities and of the project in general. Skills include the ability to produce effective verbal and written communication, to identify the kinds of information important for measuring project performance, and to recognize kinds of information which are not important.

Techniques

DAI used various OD techniques during the workshops in order to develop



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the above skills and attitudes. I want to find out which, if any, were remembered as contributing to the learning process during the intervention. Reports indicate that DAI used the Hollow Square, Goldfish Bowl, and other techniques to facilitate communication improvement.

Indicators

Indicators will include all the specific results mentioned above and any others which might be obvious or are mentioned during the investigation.

Methodology

In the field, I will be looking for the way communication occurs at as many levels of project organization as possible. Documents including minutes, memos, letters, and other written items will be important, especially those unavailable in Washington. I also want to interview project staff and farmers to gain insight on communication flow in the project and surrounding population.

memorandum

DATE: 12/8/80

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: AFRICA/DR, David Hess

SUBJECT: Field Assignment Findings on Verbal and
Written Communication

TO: Evaluation Team

Improvement in Verbal and Written Communication

Improvement of verbal and written communication was considered to be generally the most clearly effected area of project management through the intervention of DAI in May, 1980. It was so recognized because of the obvious physical proof available for assessment by our team. Project staff pointed to increased and regularized visits of senior staff to watershed and subwatershed meetings, the improvement and expansion of the staff newsletter, the construction of mail boxes at all project offices, the flow of written information in the form of letters, memos and reprints of meetings to various new recipients in the project, and other specific accomplishments which will be listed below. Various of the exercises used in the DAI workshop were cited as the takeoff points for the improvements made in communication within the project.

However, major deficiencies in materials and activities remain and offer significant hindrance to the flow of necessary and effective information to all those who need it within the project and between the project and outside entities. Principal deficiencies are: 1) the total lack of adequate facilities to produce needed quantities of professional publications; 2) lack of a technical advisor for design and dissemination of information for farmers in the area (a newsletter for farmers was attempted and abandoned); 3) lack of structured communication between the two crucial components essential for discovering and promoting the means of increasing farmer productivity, the agricultural research and extension groups; and 4) the lack of regularized reporting of farm visits by extensionists and soil/con officers which, if done in a comparable or standarized way, could help provide monitoring of project performance and results.

Specific Accomplishments

1. Standardized senior staff meeting format - Robert's Rules of Order -



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also rotation of subject matter on monthly basis to cover all necessary project areas.

2. Increased visiting by senior staff to watersheds and subwatersheds.
3. Visits to farmers by watershed, subwatershed, and assistant sub-watershed staff became more regularized.
4. Teaching/training - from two examples appeared well-organized and effective.
5. 2-way radio communication between project offices is regularized.
6. Abstracts of DC meeting minutes now go to Mr. Webber's office - Examples of requests through these abstracts were reported to have elicited rapid response from project in areas of construction and maintenance of infrastructure - no mention made in them of need for planning materials, but could be source of information flow.
7. Mail boxes constructed and put up at all offices, sub-watershed, watershed and project.
8. Drivers regularly required to carry project mail to the boxes.
9. Notice boards not installed - but at all offices observed some surface served as notice board - notices ranged from social to project related - seemed to serve needs of those who read them.
10. Senior Staff Meeting Minutes have been expanded and altered - now have: a) summary of meetings, b) notifications of place and time of DC meetings in both watersheds, c) rotating participation from senior staff in writing, d) discussion of subject matter relevant to staff and farmers, e) entertainment page, f) requests for suggestions for improvement. June issue featured a tear-off survey of readers to solicit views on ways to improve the newsletter. Major bottleneck is poorly functioning mimeo machine and inability to get access to typing machines.
11. Letters and memos now more widely copied to relevant staff.
12. Webber reported widespread involvement in planning of training but Major Bottleneck is lack of materials, facilities, and technical advice at present limited to use of actual materials and film strips.
13. Notifications of meetings more systematically circulated - director and sub-director more aware - Staff attending some DC meetings.
14. DC's request staff to speak at meetings.

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15. Libraries established at sub-watersheds - one sub-watershed visited reported farmers reading materials - again Major Bottleneck is lack of graphic production facilities and technical advice to make effective and relevant materials for farmers. Filmstrips are available and used but not as result of DAI intervention.

16. Farm plans are now copied to sub-watersheds.

Specific Deficiencies of Communication Remaining in the Project

1. Lack of adequate facilities for production of professionally acceptable publications. This deficiency is supposed to be met by the project amendment which is being written at present.

2. Lack of technical advisor for design and dissemination of information to farmers involved and not involved with the project. This deficiency is supposed to be met by the addition of an extension education and graphics design expert to the Pacific Consultants Team in January.

3. Lack of structured communication between the two crucial components essential for discovering and promoting the means of increasing farmer productivity, the agricultural research and agricultural extension groups. Major flaw in project due to: 1) Omission of PP designated team member of FSR expert to facilitate link between the two components, 2) Non-recognition by research component of need to move more closely involve extensionists and farmers in research process. This is a specific example of DAI not using what they know to promote modifications in structural relationship of project components. It would seem to be an example of over-emphasis on OD or process as opposed to DA or structure of intervention for improving management of IRD. DAI recognized the inherent problem in the structure of these project components, but judged its task to lie more in the realm of group dynamics approach of organizational development.

4. Lack of regularized reporting of farm visits by extensionists and soil/con officers. This deficiency is actually only one facet of the overall project deficiency of not having a reliable means to track project performance by regular monitoring. No system of reporting on farm visits was evident. While accompanying an obviously knowledgeable and effective senior soil/con officer, it was surprising that no notes and observations, whether standardized or not, were taken. While this officer appeared to know how to recognize problems and solutions for construction and maintenance of terraces, ditches, and waterways, neither he nor his assistant recorded their assessment of these constructions on the four farms we visited. The officer did record the complaints of one farmer who was having difficulty obtaining his approved credit and planting material, but nothing else.

Conclusion

The DAI intervention produced a number of specific accomplishments

through modification of communication activities by the staff. These changes were related to instilling or reinforcing attitudes of accountability for one's actions, desire to know what others are doing, and recognition of need to coordinate through communications. In particular, senior staff, developed an attitude of valuing contact with various lower level organizational levels in the project. The attitudes were translated into the development, by some staff, of an interest in eliciting information from others and providing that information for a larger audience.

However, the communication skill related to teaching performance in service delivery and project performance and to anticipate the appearance of need for changes in project activities was not evident. Resulting from improvement of verbal and written communication, there has developed a greater level of understanding of project activities by staff and farmers, but this has not led to the anticipated improvement in reliability of policy and project decisions because of remaining barriers in the structure of information flow and failure to standardize the monitoring of project performance.

Evaluation of the area of communication reveals the poor use by DAI of their expertise in DA and Information Systems. The intervention focused on OD and eliciting feedback from staff to identify problems and ways to solve them. DAI needs to utilize all the disciplinary expertise available on the project core team and establish a schedule of repeated involvements with the project. Specifically, they should help facilitate communication between agricultural research and extension, and design a system of reporting of project performance.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Evaluation Team

DATE: December 9, 1980

FROM : John Gillies, LAC/DR/RD

SUBJECT: Description of Field Assignment

This is the description of the field tasks assigned to me on our meeting on November 12. This reflects the framework I will use for evaluating the impact on the DAI intervention on mutual support activities among management groups. I will concentrate on mutual support issues within the project staff and Gerrit will include the support of UCs in his investigation.

1. Project Impact:

- project activities will work more smoothly,
- farmer requests will be processed more quickly and efficiently,
- farmers will be more satisfied with project leading to more farmers participating in the program.

2. Results:

- more initiatives and decisions at lower administrative levels,
- more efficient processing of project work,
- better morale and problem resolution.

3. Actions: Mutual Support Between Management Groups

Senior staff will provide to:

Watershed Offices

- needed equipment
- identify sources for supplies
- give needed technical assistance
- provide schedules for resources and personnel
- assist in identification of inputs and markets
- assist in feasibility investigations

Subwatershed Offices (SWS)

- support SWS decisions
- investigate and advise about crop and animal health problems
- promptly process work, including farmers cheques
- project senior staff will attend meetings and conferences
- perform the same support as mentioned above for the WS offices



Watershed Offices will provide

- timely and accurate reports
- adequate notice for planting materials
- identify training and technical needs
- make more decisions
- collect information on input requirements and markets
- identify project opportunities
- submit correct vouchers and farm plans

Subwatershed offices will provide

- make more decisions
- submit correct reports
- work more closely with DCs and JASs
- identify and report crop and animal health problems
- hold meaningful meetings

4. Skills:

- need identification problem solving orientation
- organizing meetings
- information handling and identification (research orientation)

5. Attitudes:

- self reliance
- sense of management responsibilities on all levels
- sense of contributing to the same effort
- sensitivity to problems and needs of other management units

6. Techniques:

- mutual support sharing exercise
- goldfish bowl discussion

7. Information Sources:

People:

- project staff in all divisions on senior staff, watershed, and subwatershed levels
- TA advisors
- Peace Corps volunteers

Documents;

- minutes of meetings
- quarterly reports
- monthly reports
- trip reports
- vouchers

8. Methodology:

- interviews and document search

memorandum

DATE:

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: AFRICA/DR, John Gilles

SUBJECT: Field Assignment Findings on Mutual Support
Among Management Groups

TO: Evaluation Team

This output of DAI's workshop focuses on the need to perceive "management" as a process and function on all levels of project administration-- senior staff, watershed offices, sub-watershed offices, research/ demonstration farms, and Development Committees. This perception would then lead to greater support and understanding of roles, responsibilities, and needs of the other management levels, and eventually to more effective coordination of management groups and better management of the project.

In order to develop the attitudes and skills needed to accomplish these goals, the DAI team conducted a number of workshops, including exercises in identification of needs at different levels (mutual support sharing and goldfish bowl discussions) and development of skills such as organizing meetings, time management, problem solving, and need assessment.

Many of the specific actions expected to result from these workshops came out of the mutual support sharing exercises. These actions would be expected to result in better overall project management as reflected in more timely delivery of benefits and services to the farmers, more effective use of existing project resources, greater degree of complementarity in the work of the various functional areas in the project, and more effective problem identification and solution at lower management levels. These improvements in the management of project resources would eventually lead to greater acceptance of the project among farmers, reduction of soil erosion-, increased farmer welfare, and establishment of the changes as self-sustaining activities.

In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the workshops in addressing the problems and reaching the goals, interviews were conducted with project staff on all levels, members of the Development Committees, members of the technical assistance team from Pacific Consultants, and some Peace Corps Volunteers working with the project. Minutes from the monthly meetings and monthly reports were also used as source material.



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Findings

In general, the participants felt that the workshops had been useful in developing mutual support and specific management skills. Real enthusiasm was expressed for the methods used, particularly the consultant team's practice of addressing problems identified by the project staff. The time period required to process farm plans and extend credit had been reduced. Meetings were more carefully structured and were perceived as being more productive. Project staff in all levels had felt that the communications and coordination among management groups had improved and that the watershed and subwatershed officers perceived their roles and functions as managers much more clearly than before.

In the criteria and actions developed from the workshops, therefore, the DAI intervention was fairly successful in inducing actions and attitudes related to the internal management of the project.

The link from actions to results and project impact is, as we anticipated, considerably more tenuous and difficult to measure. The link from internal management to project impact is hypothetical to begin with, many other factors of project design and general economic and political environment can impede progress, and the time period since the workshops is very short to expect changes in project impact.

Nonetheless, the effectiveness of DAI in terms of their overall mandate to improve the management and administration of IRD projects was not as great as it could have been. Certain critical problems in project implementation which are under the managerial control of the project staff were not effectively addressed. This is due both to what DAI did and what they did not do.

First, the focus of the workshops seemed to be much more on the internal workings of the project staff as an end in itself rather than as a mechanism for advancing project goals. It sometimes appeared that two separate processes existed--internal management functions on one hand and the creation of goods and services for the farmers on the other. The question arose whether DAI had been tuning the engine and greasing the wheels without considering where it was going and what the purpose was of having the vehicle in the first place. While the development of human capability within the project staff is a necessary element of improving management of the project, it may not be sufficient. Without a clear link to project performance, the danger exists that changes in procedures and attitudes might be either cosmetic or even irrelevant to the critical problems of the project.

The DAI team relied entirely on the preception of project staff for diagnosis and indentification of management problems rather than utilizing

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their skills as professional observers and interpreters of administrative and organizational behavior. This technique is the essence of the "process consultation" approach used by the consultant. While this approach certainly has a number of advantages and uses, its major drawback is that it does not allow the consultants their knowledge of administration in identifying and prioritizing the critical problems of the project.

This is what happened in Jamaica. The emphasis on problems perceived by the project staff eclipsed not only the perceptions of the DAI team, but even the findings of the midterm evaluation of the IRD project which was completed in January. This report identified a number of problems with the project which were also noticed by our team, for example: serious difficulties in procuring adequate amounts of seedlings in time for seasonal planting; a lack of coordination between the extension staff and the demonstration farms; and a lack of an information system for evaluating progress, forward planning, and identifying bottlenecks. These problems were considered by our team members to be of the highest priority.

Because these problems were outside the focus of the "process consultation" seminars, they were not addressed by the DAI team in their intervention. As a result of the lack of attention given to these problems, at the time of this evaluation no mechanism yet exist to allow for coordination between the demonstration farm component and the extension staff. Each was following a separate agenda and they did not manage in the intervening six months since the workshops, (or in the months since the DS/RAD evaluation which had identified this problem) to plan for any field days on the demonstration farms. The problem for getting supplies of planting materials, particularly for citrus and coffee, is similar in that it has been recognized as an important, if not critical, problem for over a year and yet no effective method, apart from a risky dependence on government nurseries, has been proposed to deal with it. The inability of the project to deliver on its promises could have a detrimental effect on the trust and willingness of the farmers to participate. With the sole, and very notable exceptions of the forestry and home economics units, none of the managers on any level had developed schedules of planned activities, targets, other systems of monitoring progress and identifying problems. The lack of such systems affects not only the agricultural activities but also such efforts as the rural roads component.

These types of problems could and should be addressed under a contract for improving the administration and organization of such projects. It would require a broader focus of activities to include the links from management to outputs to impact. In addition, to be more effective, the workshops should have included more participation of the senior staff, and somewhat greater representation of project workers at the workshops, (for instance, only one of the demonstration/research staff attended the workshops).

SUMMARY

The DAI intervention had a generally favorable impact in improving the relations among and strengthening the mutual support of the different management groups. However, their failure to recognize and give suitable priority to crucial areas of mutual support in project implementation may result in minimal effect on project effectiveness. High among these areas would be senior staff support of field units in assuring a steady supply of planting and livestock materials to provide some base for farmer and extension agent expectations. In addition, increased cooperation and mutual support among functional units, particularly between extension and research staff, is a critical element in effectively utilizing the demonstration farm concept.

The DAI team did a fine job of drawing out problems from the staff and creating a more productive work environment. However, they failed to complete their job by fulfilling the role of detached observer, expert administration analyst, articulator of priorities and link to project outputs.

Field Questionnaire

November 13, 1980

Mr. Louis Cohen
Director
USAID/Gaborone

Dear Mr. Cohen:

I am writing you to inform you of the status of the DSB/RAD project, Organization and Administration of Integrated Rural Development, and to ask your help in filling out and returning to me the appended questionnaire. A DAI field team visited your mission in April 1979, to work with the Village Area Development program, as part of sector study.

In September, 1978, DSB/RAD, signed a four year contract with Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI), and its sub-contractor Research Triangle Institute (RTI) to assist USAID's and host governments design and administer Integrated Rural Development Projects. Briefly, the objective of this project are the following:

- (A) State-of-the-Art-Paper (SOAP);
- (B) Networking of Consultants;
- (C) Review of ten developing countries;
- (D) Manual for designing IRD activities; and
- (E) Formal analysis of and assistance to local IRD Projects

The DS/RAD/DAI Project has now reached the midpoint of its four year life. The regional bureaus are conducting an interim evaluation of this project and are soliciting your views regarding perceived impact and judgment of DAI's performance. Therefore, I encourage you or your project people to take twenty minutes to answer the questions appended to this letter. To save time, please write your answers directly on the questionnaire. Your responses will be confidential if you wish. By responding to these questions, you will enable us to more effectively evaluate past performance and make this assistance more useful to the regional bureaus.

Sincerely,

Lawrence C. Heilman
Deputy Director for
Technical Operations
Office of Development Resources
Bureau for Africa

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EVALUATION OF DS/RAD PROJECT 936-5300

The Organization and Administration of Integrated Rural Development Project, being implemented under contract to Development Alternatives, Inc., is being evaluated by a team of representatives of the regional bureaus. As part of this evaluation, the team would like to know how USAID Missions with which DAI has worked under this project have viewed the assistance. We would be grateful if you would take the time to answer the following questions and return the questionnaire, as soon as possible to: IRD Evaluation Team, Gerrit Argento, Asia/TR, Room 606, SA-18, AID, Washington, D.C.

Feel free to give copies of this questionnaire to other interested individuals in the Mission or in the host country institutions involved. If you wish your response to be treated as confidential, please indicate this on the questionnaire.

Write all answers directly on the questionnaire.

Project Data

1. Country _____
2. Project Name and Number _____

- B. On a scale of 1 to 5, rate the DAI team on the following criteria. Please circle your answers. If you wish to expand on any of the answers, use the space provided under "Comments."

1. One of the worst contractors/consultants with whom I have worked.
2. Worse than most of the contractors/consultants with whom I've worked.
3. About average for the contractors.
4. Better than most contractors with whom I've worked.
5. One of the best contractors/consultants I have ever worked with.

- | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. How would you judge the qualifications of the DAI team? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 2. How would you judge the team's working relationships with mission personnel? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 3. How would you judge the team's working relationships with host country personnel? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 4. How would you judge the scheduling of the DAI work in your country in terms of timeliness of arrival and delivery of results? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 5. Was the DAI team too theoretical in their approach? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 6. Was the DAI team able to adapt to the specific requirements of the situation in the country and the project? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 7. Were they able to communicate well with the local people? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 8. Did DAI provide usable and practical advice and/or training for the project personnel with whom they worked? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 9. Were the recommendations for structural and institutional changes practical and attainable under present conditions? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 10. Were the results made available to mission and host country personnel? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 11. How would you judge the <u>approach</u> of the DAI consultants in comparison with other consulting firms? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 12. Comments. | | | | | |

4. Did you anticipate any changes in project management, mission administration, or host country institutions which did not occur? Why do you think they did not occur?

5. Were there any negative impacts from the DAI visit?

6. Would this experience have any influence on how you would design or implement integrated rural or area development project in the future? In what way?