

CLASSIFICATION PD-AAA-344/15  
**PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY (PES) - PART I**

Report Control  
 Symbol U-447

1. PROJECT TITLE  <b>AFR/CA 2637</b>  Urban Functions in Rural Development	2. PROJECT NUMBER  931-1228	3. MISSION/AID/W OFFICE  USAID/Cameroon
	4. EVALUATION NUMBER (Enter the number maintained by the reporting unit e.g., Country or AID/W Administrative Code, Fiscal Year, Serial No. beginning with No. 1 each FY) <b>631-82-3</b>	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> REGULAR EVALUATION <input type="checkbox"/> SPECIAL EVALUATION		

5. KEY PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DATES			6. ESTIMATED PROJECT FUNDING	7. PERIOD COVERED BY EVALUATION	
A. First PRO-AG or Equivalent FY <b>9/82</b>	B. Final Obligation Expected FY <b>7/82</b>	C. Final Input Delivery FY <b>7/82</b>		A. Total \$ <b>576,000</b>	From (month/yr.) <b>September 1980</b>
			B. U.S. \$ <b>476,000</b>	To (month/yr.) <b>April, 1982</b>	
			Date of Evaluation Review <b>May 7, 1982</b>		

**B. ACTION DECISIONS APPROVED BY MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE DIRECTOR**

A. List decisions and/or unresolved issues; cite those items needing further study. (NOTE: Mission decisions which anticipate AID/W or regional office action should specify type of document, e.g., airgram, SPAR, PIO, which will present detailed request.)	B. NAME OF OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION	C. DATE ACTION TO BE COMPLETED
<p>Since this is a summative, end-of-project evaluation, there are no action decisions to be taken. However, "Lessons Learned" Section of P.E.S. will be circulated to all Mission project officers.</p>		

<p>9. INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS TO BE REVISED PER ABOVE DECISIONS</p> <table> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Project Paper</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Implementation Plan e.g., CPI Network</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Financial Plan</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> PIO/T</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Logical Framework</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> PIO/C</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Project Agreement</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> PIO/P</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	<input type="checkbox"/> Project Paper	<input type="checkbox"/> Implementation Plan e.g., CPI Network	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Financial Plan	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/T	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Logical Framework	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/C		<input type="checkbox"/> Project Agreement	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/P		<p>10. ALTERNATIVE DECISIONS ON FUTURE OF PROJECT</p> <p>A. <input type="checkbox"/> Continue Project Without Change</p> <p>B. <input type="checkbox"/> Change Project Design and/or <input type="checkbox"/> Change Implementation Plan</p> <p>C. <input type="checkbox"/> Discontinue Project</p>
<input type="checkbox"/> Project Paper	<input type="checkbox"/> Implementation Plan e.g., CPI Network	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____											
<input type="checkbox"/> Financial Plan	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/T	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____											
<input type="checkbox"/> Logical Framework	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/C												
<input type="checkbox"/> Project Agreement	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/P												

<p>11. PROJECT OFFICER AND HOST COUNTRY OR OTHER BANKING PARTICIPANTS AS APPROPRIATE (Names and Titles)</p> <p>Leroy Jackson, USAID Project Officer              Claude Mathieu, Ministry of Housing and Town Planning              Lambert Tam, Ministry of Housing and Town Planning</p>	<p>12. Mission/AID/W Office Director Approval</p> <p>Signature <i>Ronald D. Levin</i></p> <p>Typed Name <b>Ronald D. Levin</b></p> <p>Date <b>July 10, 1982</b></p>
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AID 1330-15 (3-78)

Edward Perry, Team Leader  
 John Horton, Economist  
 Bayie Kamunda, Sociologist  
 Randal Thompson, USAID Project Design/Evaluation Officer

### 13. SUMMARY

The Urban Functions in Rural Development Project in Cameroon evolved out of the efforts of the Office of Urban Development of the Development Support Bureau (now the Bureau of Science and Technology) to develop a new approach for achieving rural development through improved planning for the provision of urban based services at key settlements sites. These settlements sites are to be selected by virtue of their potential for servicing a hinterland consisting of a number of villages; these settlements, or investment points, are generally secondary cities chosen so that productive resources will be more equitably distributed within a country and hence not poured only into major cities. The major problem in the UFIRD approach is how to identify those functions which are lacking at specific locations which are both technically required to stimulate rural development and are perceived as crucial needs by the local population. In order to coordinate these "tops down" and "bottoms up" perspectives, the approach must apply methodologies for eliciting felt needs for urban services.

These latter methodologies are still rather experimental, and the integration of the methodologies into the project selection process has only rarely been done. The approach proceeds by gathering a great deal of data on regional characteristics, urban hierarchy, and urban-rural linkages; the data is then used to construct a profile of the region which identifies important urban functions. After a lengthy process of analysis, and an assessment of felt needs, gaps between existing and needed urban services for rural development are located, and projects proposed to fill these gaps.

In Cameroon, the project purpose was to assess and analyze prospects for strengthening the essentially rural/agriculture oriented strategy currently underway in North Cameroon by integrating urban development components into it. The "core" project region selected was the area circumscribed by the Arrondissements of Mokolo and Bourrah in the Department of Margui-Wandala and the Arrondissements of Mayo Oulo and Guider in the Department of the Benoue. In order to include viable secondary cities, Garoua and Maroua were also included in the project region. The project was divided into three phases of six months each. Phase I involved the assessment of rural and urban systems and had as its output a profile of the region and its institutions. Phase II identified and analyzed rural-urban linkages. Phase III identified existing gaps in urban services and facilities and linkages which should be created between urban and rural areas, and planned programs and projects.

The project was implemented by three personal services contractors, a regional planner (team leader), an economist, and a sociologist. The period of the project was eighteen months; the contract of the team leader was extended three months after that period to make revisions to the final report. In addition, the project was backstopped by a consultant with expertise in planning and labor economics, who spent three TDY's in Cameroon guiding the technical assistance team and giving direction to the project. The Ministry of Housing and Town Planning served as project counterpart.

This project is a classic example of a project beset with the whole spectrum

of possible implementation problems. The technical assistance team was inexperienced and sometimes underqualified for the task. The USAID project backstopping was mutable and inconsistent. Administrative difficulties plagued the project and often technical direction was confused or lacking. There was a dearth of positive communication between the technical assistance team, USAID, and the counterparts in the Ministry of Housing and Town Planning, such that misunderstandings and confusion arose. There was sometimes a lack of definition of the role of the counterparts and, as a consequence, the counterparts played a passive, reactive role, rather than a guiding one. In addition, implementation was complicated because the project was a research project utilizing a methodology still in the experimental stage.

Because of administrative problems, Phase I was delayed and was not completed until May 11, 1981, eight months after it began. Phase II required ten months to complete and ended on March 26, 1982. Phase III will be accomplished in about three months, from March 26 - June 16, 1982.

Results of the Phase I seminar conducted on May 11, 1981 were disappointing and as a consequence the team worked closely with the TDY labor economist to better focus the project and to produce a written account of Phase I activities. The Phase II seminar on March 26, 1982 was more successful and the constructive criticisms provided the team during the seminar will serve as the basis for revisions to the project final report and for Phase III activities completed by the team leader.

In spite of all the problems encountered by the project, the project has, according to the Ministry of Housing and Town Planning, produced its expected outputs. These include a viable UFIRD methodology which can be applied to other regions of Cameroon and a plan for the development of the project area containing a list of future investments in services, facilities, and infrastructure. There has been some criticism that the list of investment represents a "shopping list" of projects, rather than an integrated, cross sectoral plan, but according to the counterparts, it is useable as is.

Moreover, according to the Ministry of Housing and Town Planning, both purpose level and goal level objectives were achieved. These are elaborated herein in the appropriate sections.

#### 14. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

This evaluation was conducted as a summative evaluation nineteen months after Phase I of the project started and two months before the Team Leader was scheduled to submit his final report. The purpose of the evaluation was to review the project implementation process and project reports and to determine whether the project had accomplished what it set out to, and whether purpose and goal-level objectives were achieved.

Interviews were held with GURC and USAID/Cameroon representatives involved in the project as well as with the technical assistance team. In addition the project files were read and criticized. The information gathered by the above methods was then compared with the statements of project objectives as contained in the Project Grant Agreement. Discrepancies between plans and reality were diagnosed and conclusions drawn as to the accomplishments of the project.

The following individuals participated in this evaluation:

Claude Mathieu, Ministry of Housing and Town Planning  
Lambert Tam, Ministry of Housing and Town Planning  
Edward Perry, Team Leader  
John Horton, Economist  
Bayie Kamanda, Sociologist  
Leroy Jackson, USAID Project Officer  
Randal Thompson, USAID Project Design/Evaluation Officer

#### 15. EXTERNAL FACTORS

Northern Cameroon is about 90% agriculturally oriented. The primary activity is the production of food and cash crops. The UFIRD project, designed to be a regional one, strongly favors the establishment of urban infrastructure without focusing on the issues of barriers to increased agricultural production such as the lack of ethnic homogeneity among farmers, diversity in the quality of land, water available, social organizations of various groups, etc. It appears that while the project paper description has a clear "Urban Functions" bias, both AID and the GURC were divided internally regarding the appropriateness of such an emphasis. Because of the extreme poverty and subsistence type peasant existence of the typical North Cameroonian farmer, another region such as the Northwest, might have been a better site since it is a very dynamic area where the potential for important production-related industries in cities, towns and villages is already clear.

#### 16. INPUTS

##### 1. Technical Assistance:

The project was implemented by three personal services contractors: a spatial planner, an economist, and a sociologist. Person months of technical assistance included:

spatial planner:	20 PM
economist:	18 PM
sociologist:	20 PM

### Quality of Technical Assistance

The evaluation revealed that certain individuals in the Government of Cameroon, USAID/Cameroon, AID/W, and the technical assistance team itself questioned the capability of the technical assistance team to perform several of the tasks required of them. Specific criticisms included:

- i) The "economist" was not really a trained economist and did not have the skills required to perform economic analysis.
- ii) The "sociologist" was described as too inexperienced for the demands of his job.
- iii) The team leader was inexperienced as a leader and hence did not know how to best make use of the skills of his team members. He also failed to adequately utilize consultants to assist with specific technical tasks.

Various individuals interviewed expanded the above observations as follows:

According to the team leader, the ability to successfully implement the project has been limited by the skills and inexperience of the technical assistance team. The team leader had to utilize the team according to their abilities and then had to perform more than his share of the project functions in order to compensate for the lack of abilities of the others. The team leader asserted that the "sociologist" was used mainly to compile a bibliography, for data collection, and for administrative functions. The "economist" contributed to the project by participating in the surveys, by extensive writing, and limited economic analyses of the productive sector. The team leader also asserted that the position of sociologist was not even required in the project, provided that a sensitive planner was hired.

The counterparts within the Ministry of Housing and Town Planning also expressed dismay at the qualifications of the team, and asserted that they had no input into the hiring of the individuals. They felt that the economist and sociologist were underqualified for their expected functions.

According to DS/UD, consultants would be "parachuted" in to backstop the technical assistance team in order to make up for their inexperience. Consequently, a labor economist was sent on three TDY's to Cameroon. He assisted the team to re-write work plans, to focus more on industry and the productive sector, and to help guide the direction of the project and review the work. The team leader asserted that the TDY's of this consultant were very helpful in formulating the project and focusing its direction, since the consultant had knowledge of similar projects in other countries. However, following the consultant's last TDY, the consultant expressed dismay that he was made "titular head" of a project which he wanted little to do with, and he sorely criticized the project economist after consoling him in person that he was unfairly expected to perform out of his professional milieu. As a consequence, this strategy for backstopping an inexperienced technical assistance team was not flawless.

In addition, two consultants were hired to investigate the feasibility of three interventions proposed by the labor economist in consultation with the technical assistance team. These interventions included: (1) a private fund for the promotion of small enterprise; (2) support to local small and medium enterprise promotion institutions; and (3) promotion of medium-scale agro-industry which uses actual and potential agricultural production of the region. These consultants were obtained at record speed and reportedly performed effectively and efficiently.

According to the Mission, there were funds in the project to make more use of consultants (both U.S. and local) in order to assist the team to conduct analyses which required particular expertise. In addition to the above-mentioned consultants, the team did have assistance from a government "seconded" agricultural economist and cartographer. However, the team could still have employed additional consultants in order to perform specific technical analyses which the team had inadequate experience to perform.

Some of the reasons why the technical assistance team was under-qualified for the job can be explained by the recruitment process. When a representative from DS/UD initially came to the Mission to discuss the project, an agreement was made between the Mission and DS/UD that the Mission would hire the sociologist locally and DS/UD would recruit the planner and economist in the U.S. The Mission proceeded to hire the sociologist, who they felt was the most qualified candidate available for the job, even though the representative from DS/UD, who interviewed the candidate when at the Mission, felt that the candidate, though bright and promising, was inexperienced.

Evidently, through some misunderstanding, DS/UD went ahead with the recruitment of the sociologist and identified a candidate for this position. When reminded that the Mission had the responsibility to hire the sociologist and had in fact already done so, DS/UD then offered the job of economist to the individual they had identified for the sociologist slot, in spite of the fact that he had taken only one economics course. Their reasoning was that referred to previously, namely, that they would provide backstopping by sending out qualified consultants. Clearly, the strategy of selecting an entire technical assistance team of inexperienced, though bright, individuals is not a workable one. At least the team leader should have adequate experience to maximize the performance of the team members and make optimal usage of the consultants provided to him.

## 2. Counterparts

The initial project counterpart was the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Planning/Urban Planning. However, in late 1980, the project was moved to the Ministry of Housing and Town Planning, Division of Town Planning. This latter Ministry expressed a real interest in the UFIRD project, indicating that it could duplicate the UFIRD methodology in other regions of Cameroon if found to be successful. In addition, the Ministry asserted that it could pursue implementation of individual projects identified by a planning exercise such as UFIRD through the "Fonds Spéciaux de l'Action Rural".

There were two project counterparts in the Ministry of Housing and Town Planning in Yaounde who reportedly sustained interest and support for the project throughout

its implementation. According to the technical assistance team, the style of these counterparts was largely "reactive" rather than guiding. However, they did provide technical advice to the contractors, aided in seconding GURC officials to perform various consulting assignments over the course of the project, coordinated seminars I and II, translated seminar materials from English language drafts into French, and made frequent trips and telephone calls to the USAID project officer on their own initiative.

There were problems obtaining a full-time counterpart to work with the team. One was finally assigned on May 10, 1981. In addition, short-term counterparts were obtained for specific project studies, including a cartographer, a hydrologist, and an agro-economist.

Issues:

The evaluation of this project brought to the fore an issue vis-à-vis counterparts which arises in many development projects. It is not clear just how much technical input and guidance into the project a counterpart should provide. The technical assistance team expressed frustration that the counterparts were not more forthcoming in making technical demands on the team and more aggressive in defining what the team should accomplish. The counterparts, on the other hand, repeat that the technical assistance team are the "experts", and that they should take the initiative in defining their task.

17. OUTPUTS: The UFIRD project was to develop and apply a methodology for the identification of urban-based facilities and services that would contribute to the increased income of rural families in the surrounding rural hinterlands. As such, the project had two outputs: (1) the planning methodology; and (2) a plan for the development of the project area containing a list of future investments in services, facilities, and infrastructure. This section of the evaluation will first summarize these two outputs as developed by the technical assistance team, and then will discuss problems encountered in their development, as well as comments on their quality and their usefulness.

According to the Project Agreement, the project outputs were to be completed during three phases of six months each. Phase I was to consist of a survey and analysis of the region and a specification of the hierarchy of centers. Phase II was to consist of the identification and analysis of the major linkages within the urban hierarchy and between rural and urban areas; and Phase III was to consist of the identification of gaps and the formulation of a plan to fill them. The "core" project region selected was the area circumscribed by the Arrondissements of Mokolo and Bourrah in the Department of Margui Wandala and Arrondissements of Mayo Oulo and Guider in the Department of the Benoue. In order to include viable secondary cities, Garoua and Maroua were included in the project region, although this resulted in a non-contiguous region, which is not a typical characteristic of the UFIRD approach.

During Phase I of the project, the team conducted a preliminary survey in the seventy-two most important centers of the project region, not including Maroua and Garoua, in order to determine the socio-economic conditions and felt needs of the population. Then, the team conducted an inventory of seventy-five services and goods for the seventy-two major centers of the region. This information was combined with information gathered on the movements of people seeking functions of different orders, resulting in the identification of a hierarchy of functions and of central places and hinterlands. Sociological data and secondary data on the characteristics of the project zone were then surveyed to define what currently exists in the area and what the constraints to interventions would be.

The Phase I interim report presents a thorough over view of the project region and includes sections on (1) physical characteristics; (2) animal life; (3) water availability; (4) population and settlement patterns, (5) ethnic groups; (6) agriculture and livestock; (7) productive sector (8) trade and services sector; (9) communication infrastructure; (10) administrative organization; (11) social infrastructure, and (12) energy.

(1) Planning Methodology:

The information gathered by the above described methods was then manipulated by the UFIRD methodology to provide a basis for program and project selection. The project methodology is based on the theory of central places associated with the work of Christaller. Settlements are selected as sites for investment which are well distributed and service or have the potential of servicing a hinterland consisting of a number of villages. These settlements provide optimal locations based on technical, economic, and social criteria for selecting investments in various sectors. Centers are arrayed in a hierarchy

according to the functions (goods and services) they possess. The higher level of the hierarchy of centers supply a greater number of goods and services than are available in lower levels. In addition, higher level places have functions which are supported by a larger area of influence and greater population. The area of influence and the population utilizing functions are determined by mapping out the movement of people toward the various functions; people are in general willing to travel longer distances for functions in higher level places. Moreover, higher level places offer lower level functions in larger numbers and volume than do lower level places. Finally, higher order places have greater economies of scale than lower level places due to the fact that they have more specialized functions and a larger number of institutions providing lower level functions than do lower level places.

Connecting the various levels of the city-town-village (CTV) hierarchy are a number of functional linkages including physical, economic, population movement, technological, social, service delivery, and administrative factors.

The technical assistance team developed a ranking and grouping of functions by using a scalogram analysis. Different weights were assigned to different functions on the basis of ubiquity of functions, (see the horizontal axis of Chart 1 for the rank list of functions).

A three level hierarchy of central places was identified. A fourth level consisting only of Garoua was also identified. These 4 levels include: level I/village centers; level II/service centers; level III/secondary towns; and level IV/regional city (Garoua). (See Chart 2 for a listing of centers).

The identification of hierarchic levels, then affords information on what types of investments should be located where. The lowest level center, the village center, is best suited for the location of small scale facilities and agricultural infrastructure, since the region's cultivators will travel only relatively short distances for purchase of agricultural inputs and the commercialization or processing of crop production. For longer scale interventions higher level centers of the third or fourth order are more appropriate, since they have larger economies of scale, population, and areas of influence.

## (2) Plan for the Development of the Project Area.

Phase II of the project, then, took the number of prospective sites across the city, town, and village hierarchy (CTV) which appeared appropriate for the program and project interventions, and further defined specific locations and specific program and project interventions. More detailed sectoral analyses were conducted in order to develop economic justification for interventions based on the performance and potential of the sector. These analyses coupled with the data on the hierarchy of centers would clarify the optimum investments in type and location.

In addition, the technical assistance team evaluated the scope, direction, and impact of migration in the project area. It is migration which changes the spatial pattern of an area, and once the spatial pattern is changed, the hierarchy of centers and functions changes. Thus, for planning purposes, it is crucial to understand migratory patterns and to delineate a strategy for accommodating and directing future migratory streams.

Also, Phase II activities included an analysis of the agricultural sector. Such an analysis was required since the framework of UFIRD highlights the relationship between rural development and the city-town-village (CTV) hierarchy of a region; hence it is necessary to understand the constraints and opportunities for ag/livestock development in the region. Once an understanding of land use, soil characteristics, soil management requirements, appropriate cropping patterns, etc, are made, then one can determine which supporting services are required to promote the potential ag/livestock production increase.

Special attention was given to the productive sector since a key element which supports agricultural development is the dynamism of the productive sector. In addition, an analysis of road, communication and electricity system needs was made since an infrastructure which links a region forms an essential framework for dynamic development. Moreover, access to health, education, and water was assessed (sectoral analyses are presented in the project's final report.)

Summary results and recommendations of the sectoral analyses are presented on the following pages.

### 1. Administrative Services

There are eight administrative units in the project region, two of which were created in December, 1981. There is an administrative unit for each 64,000 inhabitants in the project region, as compared to a national average of 41,000 inhabitants. Administrative units are important to assure the access of people to necessary infrastructure and services. The technical assistance team recommended three new central offices for the administrative units, six new homes for administrative authorities, five new vehicles, and more administrative agents for a cost of 1.1 billion CFA from 1982-87.

### 2. Livestock

Livestock is a primary activity of very few people in the project zone, but the ratio of goats and sheep to people is two times greater than the national average. However, in terms of the ratio of livestock to technical agents, the divisions of Mokolo and Guider are the least served of all the Northern Province. Consequently, the team recommended two new veterinary centers, fifty-eight vaccination corrals, six new de-licing baths, three new slaughter houses, one research center for the raising of livestock such as goats and sheep.

### 3. Productive Sector

The industry in the project region is, by-and-large, dominated by small-scale business using basic, traditional technology. There are a few exceptions to this. The region depends in large measure on industries concentrated at Douala and abroad for industrial products. Constraints in the region include the lack of capital, the investment policy which favors large industry, and the difficulty of obtaining inputs and services locally. Toward the end of creating an environment more favorable for the growth of the productive zone in the project region, the technical assistance team recommended three interventions: (1) a private fund (approximately 300,000,000 CFA) for credit to small enterprise; (2) technical assistance for an organization such as CAPME which will benefit small and medium sized enterprise; (3) measures to promote the agro-industry of medium scale-collaborations between the Government and the para-public organizations on the one hand and investors from other regions, on the other hand.

### 4. Tourism

The project region is endowed with several tourist attractions. The project team recommended the improvement of roads, the creation of a cooperative for handicrafts, and the construction of 264 hotel rooms from 1982-1987.

### 5. Transport

Vast parts of the mountainous zone of the project region are isolated due to lack of secondary roads accessible year round. The project recommends the construction of nine new road sections with a total length of 162 kilometers between 1982-1987. The principles of selecting the roads included: (1) all village centers should be linked to provincial or national roads or to all-weather roads and (2) no area in the project zone should be at a distance of more than fifteen kilometers from a provincial or national road or from an all-weather road.

## 6. Communications

There are currently four post offices and four telephone centers in the project zone. The project team recommend to rebuild two existing post offices and to build one new one. They also recommend to hire 32 supplementary agents for the Post and Telecommunications service in the area and to purchase two mail trucks to better serve the area.

## 7. Electricity

The rate of electrification in the project zone is inadequate when compared with national standards. The project recommends the electrification of eight centers during 1982-1987.

## 8. Provision of Water

Lack of water is one of the greatest problems in the project zone. The project recommends the provision of water in 31 villages.

## 9. Health

The project team recommends that the number of doctors in the project zone increase from 29 to 41 by 1986 and 47 by 1991. The number of nurses and aides should be greater than 587 by 1986.

## 10. Education

The level of education of the project zone is one of the lowest in the country. The project recommends the construction of new classrooms (437 primary classrooms, 77 secondary classrooms) between 1982 to 1987.

On March 26, 1982, the second project seminar was held in Garoua, marking the end of Phase II of the project. GURC representatives from interested ministries attended to comment on the above presented sector analyses and project recommendations. It was the general consensus of the GURC that the project team did an excellent job in data collection and analysis of the project region. There was some concern, however, that the recommendations for the sectoral interventions were not adequately integrated and did not represent a coherent, global, regional plan. There was also some concern that the projects suggested were more-or-less "brainstormed", rather than generated with a conceptual framework. That is to say, there was no explicit theory which was used to determine which interventions to pursue first, or which order of interventions to follow, to best encourage development given the current status of the sector and the stages which the sector must traverse to develop. Currently, the team leader is revising the sector analyses to better address the issues raised by the seminar.

18. PURPOSE

The project purpose as stated in the Project Agreement was to help the Government of Cameroon assess and analyze the prospects for strengthening the essential rural/agricultural oriented strategy currently underway for the Mandara Mountains and surrounding sub-regions in North Cameroon by integrating urban development components into it.

To date no significant technical and economically viable development plan has been realized for the Mandara Mountains region despite considerable efforts by the GURC and many donors (including AID) to identify development projects for the largely subsistence level agriculturalists who inhabit the area. Hence the UFIRD project purpose cannot be judged by its contribution to a viable development plan for the Mandara Mountains region. The Ministry of Housing and Town Planning asserts that the project purpose was realized from their point of view when one considers the UFIRD plan in isolation, as an attempt to analyze what could be accomplished on a regional basis in the area. The Ministry did assert, however, that the plan would have been a better one had there been an experienced agricultural economist on the project team who could have conducted more in depth macro-economic analyses of the area.

19. GOAL

The goal of the project was, according to the Project Agreement, to help the GURC develop its institutional capacity to conduct regional planning activities. According to the Ministry of Housing and Town Planning, the goal of the project was achieved by virtue of the fact that the Ministry now has a methodology which it can apply in other regions of Cameroon. The project team leader is currently working with the Ministry to apply the methodology.

## 20. BENEFICIARIES

The direct beneficiaries will be those Ministry of Urbanism officials closely associated with the implementation and review of the UFIRD project. Less direct beneficiaries will be those Ministry of Urbanism representatives to be trained in the procedures required to undertake correct regional planning activities. Indirect beneficiaries will be the thousands of farmers who will find their living conditions improved by virtue of public services provided and value created through GURC sponsored improved access to such typically urban facilities as financial institutions, schools, medical centers, stores and the like. It is likely that the present UFIRD project will be used by the Ministry of Urbanism and Town Planning as model for similar studies in other regions of the country.

## 21. UNPLANNED EFFECTS

Due to the limited scope of the project and its uniqueness (i.e. designed to produce a series of recommendations in areas where future projects might be undertaken) no immediate changes in social structures, the environment, the technical or economic situation occurred.

## 22. LESSONS LEARNED

(1) Project officers should better understand their projects conceptually, so that they can explain and defend the projects to the Mission. They should be in a sense "promoters" of the project within the Mission and attempt to integrate the project with other projects and the Mission program.

(2) Too many changes in a project officer can be disruptive to a project, unless there is clear, written, and easily transmitted monitoring information and unless counterparts are "eased" into the change.

(3) There should be a project administrator for most projects; the Chief of Party should have responsibility to direct technical aspects of the project and only oversee administrative aspects.

(4) Technical assistance teams should be recruited carefully to assure that they are qualified and experienced to perform as required by the project.

(5) Input of GURC counterparts should be solicited early on in the design stage. GURC counterparts in this project felt that a better project description and scope of work might have been obtained if they had been involved early on in the project.

(6) Host governments have a very difficult time understanding the division of labors and responsibilities within the AID system. To the government, every American be it a consultant or representative of an AID/W Regional Office looks alike. In the future, USAID Cameroon should be more sensitive to needs of the host government to understand the AID system. This can be especially important when there is a divergence of opinion on the part of any of the AID actors. The GURC needs clearer information regarding whose position carries the most weight: Is it the short-term consultants, the Regional Office or the USAID Director or his representative?

23. SPECIAL COMMENTS OR REMARKS:

Project Management

This project has suffered a full gamut of management problems on the USAID, GURC, and the technical assistance team sides.

1. Role of USAID/Yaounde

It is the consensus of the technical assistance team that the role played by USAID in implementing the project was far from ideal. Specific criticisms included:

- (a) USAID changed project officers too often and some of the project officers were poorly informed about the objectives of the project. The technical assistance team asserted that seven USAID officers served as official or stop-gap project officers. This created a lack of continuity which the technical assistance team cited as disruptive to the implementation process. In addition, some of the project officers failed to understand the project and failed to perform certain duties expected of a competent project officer. For example:
  - (1) Some project officers failed to keep the Mission properly informed of problems in the project. This resulted from lack of understanding of the project and lack of understanding of their role in involving the Mission in project implementation.
  - (2) Some project officers failed to keep open the communication channels between USAID, the Ministry of Housing and Town Planning, and the technical assistance team, leading to misunderstandings between the three units, and lack of coordination in project implementation efforts. The current project officer, however, was complimented in his ability to maintain a positive communication relationship.
  - (3) The technical assistance team felt that they were inadequately oriented and briefed upon their arrival in Cameroon. They claimed that no USAID officer attempted to orient them to the GURC system, nor even to introduce them to their counterparts. They also claimed that the USAID project officer did not brief them on AID accounting and procurement rules and procedures and that throughout the project they had difficulties following these rules correctly.
  - (4) There were severe administrative problems surrounding the housing and furnishings of the technical assistance team which delayed project progress.
  - (5) Sometimes, there was some lack of discipline in the project backstepping, which meant that project schedules were not maintained. The most recent project officer attempted to impose some discipline on the team by refusing to extend indefinitely the project and by aiding the team obtain additional assistance from consultants. This effort served to encourage the technical assistance team to complete their work as scheduled.

## 2. Role of GURC

Though the project counterparts expressed an interest in the project, there were several instances when prudent project management was lacking.

First of all, there was a long delay in obtaining the GURC local cost contribution to the project, during which time the GURC requested AID to pay for things which the GURC had the responsibility to pay for.

Moreover, there was an inefficient system for the monitoring of local currency expenditures. MINUH failed to satisfactorily carry out their accounting or administrative roles.

In addition, during the initial months of the project, there is evidence that high ranking individuals from several Ministries were interested in the Project. At the meeting of November 21, 1980, representatives from various Ministries suggested that collaboration with existing administrative structures be initiated, as well as planning with other projects in the same area. These suggestions were never really acted upon, and as a consequence, the project was not linked into the existing government/planning system, nor was the interest of these various Ministries sustained. The initiative of the project counterparts could have been stronger here.

## 3. Role of Technical Assistance Team

The team leader experienced great difficulty balancing administrative and technical assistance responsibilities. He attempted to hire administrators, but had problems employing them in a helpful way. His lack of knowledge of AID procedures and regulations hindered his efficient management of and accounting for funds.

According to the team leader, he should have had primary technical rather than administrative duties and should have had responsibility only for organizing overall project structure, including the design of the work plan and supervision of the technicians work.

There is some feeling among the other members of the technical assistance team that the team leader did not adequately communicate with them regarding the project concept or specific project objectives. As a consequence, there sometimes occurred a breakdown in a positive communication process.

Some of the reasons why the project was so difficult to manage include:

### (1) The theoretical nature of the project:

Since the project involved the development and application of a still undeveloped methodology and since the theoretical underpinnings required knowledge not possessed by many of the project responsables, the project was full of the potential to generate management problems. Many of the individuals who had implementation responsibilities did not understand the project and hence could not "represent" the project or guide it if necessary. As a consequence, the technical assistance team was on the

one hand, left to its own devices, and on the other, given little technical guidance from USAID or GURC. USAID could have sought out individuals, such as other contractors or the Mission economist, who had useful experience to bear, to offer constructive criticism to the technical aspects of the project. Moreover, the various project officers could have enhanced their own knowledge and that of the Mission by viewing the video in the HRD library which presents in common sense language the theory behind the project and offers relevant reading. The team leader also could have given a brief presentation to the Mission to better orient concerned individuals.

- (2) The fact that the project was centrally funded and was not designed in Cameroon. The project was in a sense "imposed" on Cameroon in that DS/UD was looking for virgin lands to test its theory and methodology. This meant that the project idea and its evolution into a design did not emerge within Cameroon and hence USAID and GURC did not traverse all the stages of project development which would have built up at least an awareness and perhaps an understanding of the project and a commitment of it. As a consequence, it took longer for USAID and GURC to understand the project and see its usefulness; this again showed up in the USAID and GURC "hands-off," reactive rather than guiding management style.

The fact that the project was centrally-funded also created problems vis-à-vis lines of authority. According to MINUH counterparts, the technical assistance team had a "bias toward Washington and a certain reluctance to follow instructions from Yaounde". This made it difficult for the MINUH to exert an influence over the project.



CHART II

Level IV: Regional City

Garoua

Level III: Secondary Towns

Maroua

Guider

Mokolo

Mubi (Nigeria)

Level II: Service Centers

Mayo Oulo

Hina Marbak

Bourrah

Figuil

Mogode

Level I: Village Centers

Tchontchi

Babouri

Bidzar

Zibe

Dourbeye

Doumes

Guirviza

Zam

Matafal

Douroum

Mousgoy

Guili

Gambourra

Mofow

Gawar

Mokong

Zarray

Soulede

Tourou

Wanarau

Boukoula

Gazawa

## ANNEX I

### Key Events in Project Implementation

1. July 1, 1980 - September 23, 1980  
Sociologist met with research institutions located in Yaounde, compiling a bibliography of documents related to the project zone and reviewed USAID project papers for North Cameroon
2. September 23, 1980: arrival of Project Director/Regional Planner and Economist
3. September 23, 1980 - October 31, 1980: time spent in Yaounde dealing with administrative details such as determining project technical counterpart, defining relationship between the project and the technical counterparts, and identifying the project area and base. Six month work plan, revised budget and project description completed.
4. October 31, 1980: Project Director and economist moved to project site; sociologist followed one week later.
5. November 1 - 11: Project team made official contacts, obtained office space, and settled in homes.  
  
Project area selected: Arrondissements of Mokolo, Bourrha, Mayo Oulo, and Guider
6. November 11 - 15, 1980: Project team conducted a wind shield survey. Discussions held with the sous-prefets of Guider, Mokolo, and Bourrha, the Adjoint to the prefect of Margui Wandala, two members of the Michigan State University team, Delege of Agriculture in Mokolo. Informal discussions held with villagers concerning conditions found in their communities.
7. November 21, 1980: meeting was held in the conference room of the province to discuss project; meeting resulted in understanding of project as one concerned with rural development and agricultural production opposed to urban development. Participants suggested that collaboration with existing administrative structures be initiated, as well as planning with other projects in the same area.
8. November 21 - 31, 1980: Preparation of questionnaire for the identification of a settlement hierarchy and areas of influence and for the for nation of village profiles.
9. November 25, 1980: Sociologist went to Yaounde to begin library research in Yaounde.
10. December 1980 - March 1981: Team Leader and economist organized preliminary survey to determine the socio-economic conditions and felt needs of the population in the project zone.
11. December 1980: TDY's of Simon Fass, consultant (labor-economist)

William Minor, Director of the office of Urban Development, AID/W

12. March - April, 1981: Coding, tabulation, analysis and report writing, of survey results. Economist began investigation of small scale enterprises and the sociologist began writing sociological over view of project zone.
13. May 10, 1981: Project received full time counterpart. Cartographer also assigned to project until July, 1981
14. May 11, 1981: First Project Seminar reviewing state of the project, preliminary results of investigations, and applied methodology. Participants included provincial delegates of interested ministries as well as representatives from USAID/Yaounde SODOCOTON, INADES, the Ministry of Agriculture/Department of Community Development the Ministry of Housing and Town Planning and CAPME
15. May 12 - July 31, 1981: Project refined material presented at time of seminar and individual phase II work plans. Agreement signed with Agronomic Research Institute (IRA) for the study of the agricultural sector and establishment of a plan for its development.
16. Technical Progress to July 1, 1981:
  - a) review of existing documentation
  - b) contact with institutions and individuals involved in development activities.
  - c) establishment of regional and village profiles
  - d) identification of central places and hinterlands
  - e) sociological overview
  - f) small scale enterprise profile
  - g) preliminary study on crop and livestock destruction by baboons in project area.
17. July 22 - August 4, 1981: TDY of Michael Farbman and Simon Fass. Decided that project should re-emphasize "urban" aspects. Worked on plan for Phase I interim report and detailed Phase II work plan which had sectoral, rather than disciplinary focus.
18. August - December, 1981: Economist worked on analysis of productive sector. Team leader wrote Phase I interim report and began sector analyses per Phase II work plan.
19. December, 1981: TDY of Simon Fass to work on the economic analysis of productive sector and to make recommendations for direction of project
20. February - March, 1982: Two TDY consultants arrived to investigate feasibility of three interventions (1) private fund for promotion of small enterprise; (2) support to small and medium enterprise promotion institutions; (3) promotion of medium scale agro-industry which uses actual and potential agricultural production of region.
21. March 26, 1982: Final Project Seminar. Sector analyses reviewed by GURC responsables.
22. March 26 - June 16, 1982: Team Leader worked on revision of sector analyses and project recommendations.