

PD-AAN-277

ISN 31561

4920302/08

FINAL EVALUATION OF THE INTEGRATED AGRICULTURAL  
PRODUCTION AND MARKETING PROJECT

June 3, 1983

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Submitted to the Government of the Philippines  
and the United States Agency for International Development/Manila

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Members of the evaluation team would like to express their gratitude and appreciation for the excellent cooperation and assistance provided by officials and staff of all government agencies and universities visited in the performance of this evaluation.

We especially appreciate the gracious hospitality extended by President Amado Campos and Dr. Filomena Campos during our visit to Central Luzon State University. The comprehensive briefing by them and the CLSU staff was very useful.

We are also grateful to the Thrust and Sub-Thrust Coordinators and KSU Team Leader and Consultants for their excellent briefing and for giving very generously of their own time in providing the team with most useful information.

The team is especially grateful for the assistance provided by the Ministry of Agriculture; Dr. Edgerdo Quisumbing, Overall Project Coordinator, and the IAFM project staff. We especially thank Mrs. Ciosena Ungson, Ms. Lydia Martinez and Ms. Fe Flores for their patient and diligent assistance in arranging interviews, providing documents and tending to other needs of the team.

We would also wish to express our sincere appreciation for the assistance by Messrs. Ralph J. Edwards, Douglas J. Clark, Edward J. Rice, and Thomas D. Hoggood of the USAID/Manila in arranging logistic support, locating documents and providing very useful information. Finally, we express our sincere thanks to the USAID secretaries Ms. Nena Caro, Ms. Annie Arnesto, Ms. Helen Gatpandan, Ms. Norma Tayan and Ms. Fely Sunga. Without their cheerful and competent assistance we would not have completed this report.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### I. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The Integrated Agricultural Production and Marketing Project (IAPMP) was designed to institutionalize an approach to improving small farmer income, an approach characterized by (1) improving the capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture to develop appropriate management, technology, and economic policies; (2) upgrading the capabilities of Central Luzon State University (CLSU) and the University of the Philippines at Los Baños (UPLB) to support the growth of the Nation's manpower for agribusiness and agricultural marketing management; (3) developing, verifying and implementing new strategies for technology diffusion; and (4) institutionalizing better linkages between agricultural producers and the agricultural marketing system.

The project sought to achieve these purposes through a variety of activities grouped into four thrusts: National Policy, Academic, Tech Pack and Extension/Outreach-Complementation. The National Policy and Academic Thrusts are essentially institution-building efforts. Consequently, evaluation of these thrusts will concentrate on indications of institutional capacity rather than on demonstrations of direct impacts on small farmers. For the Tech Pack and Outreach Thrusts, however, we did look for impacts on small farmers and small farmer incomes. By and large, professional capacities have been improved by the National Policy and Academic Thrusts. Tech Pack's impacts on small farmer incomes in the Central Luzon State University area have been negligible. Complementation efforts are new and have not included any baseline studies so we are not able to measure small farmer impacts.

Overall, IAPMP is best understood as a learning process in the management and coordination of complex activities in which the implementing institutions are the primary beneficiaries. From that perspective, the project was moderately successful, suffering from faulty assumptions about the time needed for learning and inadequate attention to "ownership" of the project. If the project is understood as a strategy for directly improving small farmer income during the life of the project, IAPMP was not successful.

There were major changes in the IAPMP environment which influenced the project: (1) reorganization and regionalization of the Ministry of Agriculture altered linkages within the Ministry and between the Ministry and other units of government; (2) the creation of the National Food Authority and the continuing reduction in the role of the Ministry of Agriculture in agricultural policy; (3) the expanding role of the state in directly managing and regulating private activities in agricultural marketing; (4) the impacts of global economic problems on Philippine agricultural exports and rural incomes; (5) the assumption of responsibility by the MA for several large and complex foreign-assisted projects; and (6) changing understandings of Title XII as a strategy for American development assistance.

IAPMP was effectively managed by the Office of the Overall Project Coordinator, given several limitations: (1) the project was implemented by agencies not adequately involved in project design; (2) a loose pattern of inter-agency coordination was practiced which constrained the managed convergence or even review of activities; (3) the Executive Committee of the Project did not take final responsibility for project evolution and final accountability for project implementation, and (4) the host country contracting mechanism created some problems in role definitions among AID, Kansas State University, and the Government of the Philippines.

Major accomplishments of the National Policy Thrust have been (1) an increased appreciation by the Ministry's leadership and executives for the value of timely and accurate economic information; (2) significant improvement in the capabilities of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAEcon) to generate reliable statistical estimates of crop production and program performance; and (3) progress within the Ministry in understanding and addressing production-marketing linkages.

The Central Luzon State University (CLSU) and the College of Development Economics and Management (CDEM) at the University of the Philippines at Los Banos (UPLB) attained two major objectives under the Academic Thrust: (1) staff received graduate training in the United States and have returned and (2) new academic programs focused on agribusiness and agricultural marketing have been established. Non-degree as well as degree training offered by CLSU and CDEM and focusing on agribusiness development and management have graduated students.

CLSU has demonstrated that a technology packaging process can be implemented which produces packages of technological components potentially capable of increasing small farmer income. The Food and Feed Grain Processing Centers will be completed later in 1983 and equipment will be installed.

The Extension/Outreach Thrust successfully demonstrated that the training and visit (T and V) system could be used to improve the capacity of local level MA workers to implement national agricultural development programs. The T and V system has been institutionalized through a separate project, the National Extension Project. A new Thrust, the Complementation Thrust, was initiated in 1981 to test the integrated management of market assistance, cooperative development, and tech pack activities in the same small area settings. These are all activities developed and supported under IAPMP. The Complementation Thrust shows promise as a small area agricultural development strategy.

## II. RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

### Overall Project Management and Design

- In interagency projects characterized by coordination rather than central control of activities and budgets by project management, the Executive Committee needs to be credible as a source of overall responsibility for project evolution and overall accountability for project implementation. If it does not or cannot accept this role, there tends to be no clear, consistent and credible location for the performance of essential management and accountability functions. We recommend that the GOP and USAID consider this point in structuring interagency projects.
- Inadequate involvement by agencies expected to implement a project in the design of that project will usually lead to a variety of implementation difficulties, not the least of which is hesitancy by some agencies to implement the project and to accept some common overall management structure. We recommend that the GOP and USAID consider this point as they prepare projects.
- Excessive ambition and complexity in project design often will be associated with delays in accomplishing project objectives, especially those related to institutional change. Such problems can be reduced if projects involving institutional change are recognized as learning experiences rather than the simple execution of blueprints for project evolution and impacts. We recommend that the GOP and USAID consider this point as they prepare and monitor projects, especially those involving institutional change.

### National Policy Thrust

- The Ministry of Agriculture should set down a deliberate Manpower Development Plan, which will visualize some targetted staff profile to be attained after five years, and will work out ways and means to try to minimize the attrition, as well as rationalize further staff recruitment and development both on-the-job as well as through formal training.
- The various agencies involved in agricultural policy should explore new vehicles to foster inter-agency linkages in policy analysis.
- More data collection and publication by the BAEcon are needed which provide information on small farmers, farm income, and landless workers.
- The Director of the BAEcon should be a full member of the Statistical Advisory Board.
- The concept of agribusiness should be clarified and incorporated into the MA data system.

- The desirability of committing resources to macro-modelling should be carefully reassessed by the MA.
- A no-cost extension until December 31, 1983 should be made to ensure participants on training can complete their programs and computer equipment is received and installed.

#### Academic Thrust

- The academic programs initiated and strengthened by the thrust cannot be effectively or relevantly guided without a more detailed vision of agribusiness and agricultural marketing in the Philippines. Steps need to be taken by CLSU and UPLB, in association with several public and private agencies, to develop such a vision and correlate it with the research, educational, and training functions of the two universities.
- A no-cost extension should be made until December 31, 1983 to permit participants on training to complete their programs and return to their institutions.

#### Technology Packaging

- CLSU should immediately conduct a well planned and adequately funded study aimed at assessing the reasons farmers are not adopting the technology packages.
- CLSU and the MA should redesign the technology packaging process to reduce its resource and time requirements.
- A rigorous Management and Implementation Study for the Food and Feed Grains Processing Centers is needed before any commitments are made to fund or otherwise initiate operation. The study should be conducted under the auspices of Central Luzon State University, the Ministry of Agriculture, the National Economic and Development Authority, and the Office of Budget and Management.
- A no-cost extension should be made until December 31, 1983 to ensure that equipment for the Food and Feed Grains Processing Centers is received and installed in working condition.

#### Extension/Outreach - Complementation

- The MA should continue the Complementation program but should avoid the inclusion of additional pilot areas. It is probably more prudent to pursue the initial program areas for a few years more, learn the lessons more clearly, and then decide on whether to expand or not.
- The MA should develop clear and measurable criteria for evaluating success or failure of the complementation approach.

BASIC PROGRAM IDENTIFICATION DATA

1. Country : Philippines
2. Bilateral project title: Integrated Agricultural Production and Marketing
3. Bilateral project numbers: Project No. 492-0302  
Loan No. 492-T-044
4. Program implementation :
  - a. First project agreement: FY 77
  - b. Final obligation : FY 82
  - c. Final input delivery : FY 83
5. Program funding :
  - a. A.I.D. bilateral funding: \$ 8,230,000 Grant  
\$ 3,000,000 Loan
  - b. Host country counterpart: P 81,134,000 (budgetary support)  
P103,800,000 (in-kind support)
  - c. Other donors : NA
6. Mode of implementation :
  - a. Project Agreements between USAID/Philippines and GOP with implementation carried out by Ministry of Agriculture, University of the Philippines at Los Banos and Central Luzon State University.
  - b. Host Country Contract between Ministry of Agriculture and Kansas State University.
  - c. Agreement with Ministry of Agriculture and USAID/Philippines using PIOs.
7. Previous evaluation and reviews:
  - a. Project Evaluation covering 1977-March 1979
  - b. Project Evaluation covering April, 1979-April, 1981
8. Responsible Mission Officials:
  - a. Mission Directors: Garnett A. Zimmerly, 1976; Peter Cody, 1977-79;  
Anthony M. Schwarzwald, 1979-83
  - b. Responsible project officers: Kenneth Eubanks, 1976-79  
John A. Foti, 1979-81  
Ronald H. Pollock, 1981-82  
Thomas D. Hobgood, 1982-83
9. Host country exchange rates:
  - a. Name of currency : Peso
  - b. Average exchange rate during time of project: P8.0 = \$1

## INTRODUCTION

The Integrated Agricultural Production and Marketing Project (IAPMP) was designed to institutionalize an approach to improving small farmer income, an approach characterized by (1) improving the capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture to develop appropriate management, technology and economic policies; (2) upgrading the capabilities of Central Luzon State University and the University of the Philippines at Los Banos to support the growth of the Nation's manpower for agribusiness and agricultural marketing management; (3) developing, verifying and implementing new strategies for technology diffusion; and (4) institutionalizing better linkages between agricultural producers and the agricultural marketing system. The project sought to achieve these purposes through a variety of activities grouped into four thrusts: National Policy, Academic, Technology Packaging, Extension/Outreach-Complementation.

The National Policy and Academic Thrusts are evaluated in this report essentially as efforts to improve institutional capacities. Direct impacts on small farmers lie in the future. The Tech Pack and Complementation Thrusts are examined with an expectation of discernable impacts on small farmers in the geographical areas covered by those thrusts.

### CHANGES IN THE IAPMP ENVIRONMENT

An evaluation should be set clearly in the context of a project's environment, especially if changes in that environment influence the project's relationships of ends and means. There are six significant changes in the functioning environment of the IAPMP project that we wish to identify.

1. Linkages within the Ministry and between the Ministry and other units of government were altered and fluid. PD 1579 (1978) mandated the regionalization and reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture (MA). Line Bureaus are to be converted to staff Bureaus while essentially all Ministry staff (the major exception being the Bureau of Agricultural Economics) in the 12 Regions are integrated and placed under the leadership of a single regional director. A regional integrated agricultural research station (RIARS) is to be created in each region providing a clearer institutional basis for a farming systems and more location-specific agricultural support system. An Agricultural Research Office is created within the central Ministry Office to coordinate the research activities conducted within this framework. Implementation of PD 1579 has been uneven, but the initiation of the process altered relationships between most parts of the Ministry and complicated the basic management challenges within the Ministry as well as between the Ministry and other agencies. For example, regionalization alters, in a positive direction, the opportunities for cooperation between regional Universities and the Ministry of Agriculture. However, as long as most other National agencies are not similarly regionalized, PD 1579 substantially complicates the prospects and character of inter-agency coordination including the MA. IAPMP was designed on the assumption of a centralized Ministry with more or less independent line Bureaus, an assumption that was fundamentally correct when the project was being designed. PD 1579 initiated a process, however, in which relationships need to be sorted out on a region-central office basis as well.

EO 589 (1980) implements the Regional Development Investment Program as the mechanism for translating the nation's regional plans into regional programs and projects. By itself, EO 589 could be viewed as just a refinement of the planning process led by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), and therefore of only marginal interest for the day-to-day operations of the MA. However, two related changes make EO 589 important to IAPMP. First, as already noted, there is PD 1579 and the regionalization of the Ministry. Second, there is the continuing evolution of regional budgeting and the expanding role of the Regional Development Council (RDC) chairpersons (for example, LOI's 844 and 895; NEC's 348, 1-81, and 2-82). Taken together, they mean that planning and programming of the Ministry of Agriculture evolve away from essentially central office functions to processes in which the Ministry must negotiate with other Ministries, agencies, and government units at both central and regional levels. IAPMP did not assume that strengthening the Ministry's capacities in policy analysis and programming required attention to regional offices as points of initiation. Regional and provincial offices were seen only as points of implementation.

EO 803 (1982) implements an integrated area management system for agricultural services; provides mechanisms for linking agricultural programming at regional, provincial and municipal levels to land use assessments; and increases the role of the Provincial Government in the delivery of agricultural services through supervision of agricultural extension activities. While EO 803 is only just beginning to be implemented, it is important to this evaluation for at least two reasons. First, it illustrates the scope and rate of change in administrative and management relationships within the Ministry and between the Ministry and other units of government. Change in these relationships impacted the feasibility of establishing linkages required for IAPMP as well as influencing the probabilities of maintaining IAPMP relationships after project termination. For example, how will EO 803 impact the feasibility and character of collaboration between university outreach and MA extension? Second, incompleteness in implementing these various changes has been associated with bureaucratic in-fighting and management transitions within the Ministry that would not leave IAPMP unscathed.

Some of these changes are facilitative for IAPMP, some clearly are not. What matters is that linkages, particularly with regard to management and administrative relationships, became more fluid and complex. This was not without significance for the evolution of IAPMP and its own management structure.

2. The creation of the National Food Authority and the mandates given to it were the most visible points of a process in which the formal functional roles of the Ministry of Agriculture continued to be reduced. At least since the creation of the Rice and Corn Authority in the 1960's, it has not been accurate to say that the Ministry of Agriculture is the major actor in agricultural policy, considering that agricultural policy includes institutional, managerial, and technological instruments as well as economic and financial strategies. The creation of the National Food and Agriculture Council (NFAC) and the implementation of Masagana 99 provides strong evidence in the 1970's of the multi-agency nature of agriculture production policy in the Philippines. The IAPMP design took account of all this, but it assumed that the multi-agency context was only a significant characteristic of the Government's strategies for increasing agricultural production. A project that sought to improve production-marketing linkages by focusing on the Ministry of Agriculture was assumed to be both feasible and appropriate. The latter assumption proved problematic with the creation of the National Food Authority (NFA) from the former National Grains Authority. NFA was given a very broad mandate in food marketing, processing, regulation, and even production coordination. Recent amendments to PD 1770 indicate an intention to "rationalize" the food processing, storage, and transport industry through the NFA. In this context, IAPMP's orientation to constructing a coherent and innovative administrative response essentially within the MA to production-marketing linkages became less appropriate. NFA was brought into IAPMP activities connected to vegetable marketing, but we need to

recognize that the sustainability and generalizability of these efforts cannot be assessed independently of the broader reality of NFA's roles and their relationships to those of the MA.

3. The expanding role of the state in directly managing and regulating private activities in agricultural marketing significantly influences the areas where the MA can initiate activities and how far they can go in those activities. This point is closely related to the immediately preceding point. The continuing reorganization of how export agriculture in the Philippines is managed illustrates the more general point that the MA's abilities to program outside of rice and corn production are sometimes quite limited. This development is significant for a project that seeks to address production-marketing linkages and improved small farmer income. The environment for private investment in agriculture has changed during the life of the IAPMP project. There is strong evidence that change substantially complicated the feasibility of expecting the MA or the Universities to stimulate, on a sustainable basis, private investment in small-scale agriculture.
4. The impacts of global economic problems on the Philippine economy included significant declines in demand for Philippine agricultural exports and, in some cases, significant declines in agricultural prices. IAPMP assumes that Philippine agriculture is surplus producing. The project did not anticipate a set of economic circumstances that would shift concern away from reducing post harvest losses and increasing a marketable surplus to a concern for the very ability of small-scale agricultural enterprises.
5. The Ministry accepted responsibility for designing and implementing several large foreign assisted projects in addition to IAPMP. The emergence of several large and often complex foreign assisted projects in addition to IAPMP both improved the capacity of the Ministry to implement and institutionalize IAPMP initiatives and stretched the capacity of the Ministry to manage and administer IAPMP.
6. While still fluid, much clearer understanding has emerged about Title XII programs, their goals, how they operate, and in particular, the expected relationships between AID, the involved American universities, and the host countries. This understanding has often been at variance with the arrangements characteristic of IAPMP, a variance which changed expectations of some parties about IAPMP and its implementation. IAPMP was developed, in part, as a prototype Title XII project and host-country contract. As Title XII and the host-country contracting mechanism were specified, however, IAPMP looked less like a positive prototype. In effect, expectations may have changed, helping to contribute to an environment for the project at AID/Washington that was not always fully supportive. We make this point primarily to suggest that some of the internal "operating rules" of IAPMP became contentious in part because of problems in project implementation and in part because the parties in the project developed altered views about the utility and sufficiency of those rules.

### OVERALL PROJECT DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT

The IAPMP went through two previous evaluations, in 1979 and 1981. By the time of this final evaluation, the IAPMP has already learned from its past experiences and the management lessons learned are already being transferred to other projects. Many of the early obstacles were part of the learning experience needed to understand the complications of the host country arrangement and the coordination of the project's activities. The individuals who were part of the IAPMP and are still associated with their respective institutions, carry these lessons of the IAPMP with them.

The IAPMP benefits should be recognized. Individuals were trained abroad and from a management viewpoint, the loss of a few individuals due to dropouts or failures to return do not detract from the success of the training component of the project. Consultants were active in all the thrusts. While criticisms can be made concerning the selection of consultants and definition of their roles, there were both exceptional long and short term contributory consultants as well as the standard stable of "tourist" consultants. On the whole and under the circumstances, the IAPMP is an example of a reasonably well managed project.

The project's major overall impacts can be briefly summarized as follows:

- (1) The project has contributed to the establishment of some, though not all, important parts of the infrastructure necessary for continued agricultural production and marketing development
- (2) The project structure (Thrust Coordinator Meetings) promoted informal dialogue (which should continue) between academicians, policy makers, extension workers and farmers - all attempting to solve some of the problems confronting small farmers.
- (3) The Ministry of Agriculture has an improved capacity to implement complex foreign-assisted projects.

### OVERALL MANAGEMENT PROCESS

#### Design and Planning

The process of designing and planning the IAPMP developed in three overlapping stages. The first-stage consisted of meetings between key individuals at AID and KSU for the initial concept of the project. The second stage consisted of consultative meetings involving host country institutions such as NEDA, MA and CLSU, by which time the project concept was already firmly established, and

the different components had to decide how to make the best use of the resources being offered. The third stage of planning took place between 1977-1979 when implementation was supposed to have begun in earnest, but actually ended up as a pre-implementation, organizing stage.

The basic issue is the "ownership" of the project. AID and KSU apparently were the original designers and planners of the project (in the first stage) but could not "own" the IAPMP because implementation rested with the MA (plus UPLB and CLSU). The MA could not "own" the project in its entirety partly because the UPLB/CLSU thrusts could operate more or less independent of the MA structure.

There is a distinction being made between "ownership" of the IAPMP as a whole and the involvement and commitment demonstrated by the different thrust coordinators and institutions. Each of the different thrust coordinators was actively involved with his particular segment of the IAPMP. This notion should have been written into the basic objectives of the project paper from the start. Instead, the project paper made the IAPMP into a seemingly cut and dried activity.

The project plan and design did not directly address the issue of how the objectives of the individual components would be "integrated" into an overall management objective. It is also quite possible that this project could not have been integrated. There were too many components-policy analysis, extension services, academic programs, feed and food processing, etc. Each component was integrated within the implementing bureau or institution, but overall integration may not have been feasible since there was no single overall authority for the project.

Institutionalization was another overall project management objective. However, there was no clear agreement as to how institutionalization would be carried out. For example, in the case of CLSU, the project had an institution doing something entirely new to its experience (the FFGPC) on the assumption that would result in the emergence of appropriate staff and programmatic capacities. The critical task in objective setting was to specify what institutionalization was expected to achieve. One definition of institutionalization is making certain that the system (organization and physical facilities) will operate regardless of changes of individuals in key positions (below a prescribed critical mass where the organization and facilities are paralyzed). For example, it is not clear whether the achievements of the policy analysis staff can be sustained after the departure of its consultant. It is also not clear whether the FFGPC has been "institutionalized" within CLSU: we are still uncertain who will run it or how it will be used. On the other hand "institutionalization" of the IAPMP activities in extension and data gathering, for example, was successful largely because an existing system was already in place.

The minutes of meetings following the 1981 evaluation attest to the efforts of the Project Coordinator to "integrate" and possibly institutionalize the IAPMP. However, this effort may have come too late, because organizations were already committed to existing activities, and any new activities would run against an impending termination date.

### Structure

The IAPMP became a rather open ended exploratory management model with no clear organizational objective or structure. Given that several institutions were involved in both planning and implementing of the IAPMP, a one-man management style at the top would not have worked even with the necessary personality and power. A project like the IAPMP apparently needed a coordinator, but with somewhat more authority, and more important, with a body above him who represented the legitimate source of his authority for his role as a manager.

The IAPMP Executive Committee could have been the body with the responsibility for overall management of the project. In theory, this would just be an extension of the policy-making roles which members of the Executive Committee had. In practice, since they were not involved in the initial overall planning of the IAPMP, the members did not feel that it was their role to redirect or control the project as a whole once it had begun. The Executive Committee became a middle up to the top policy making body, reacting to specific pressures emanating from specific thrust activities (the FFGPC, runaway graduate students, etc.) The Executive Committee did not feel compelled to ask the question: "Is this or that policy and activity in keeping with the overall project plan and design?"

On the other hand, the IAPMP operating organizations functioned quite well. The organizational structure at the middle levels successfully carried out their tasks. The implementing bodies were in place but the legitimizing body above the Project Coordinator was unable to play its part in the management process. The Executive Committee's function should have included planning, and a major objective should have been to support the project director in integrating the different thrusts. However, in practice, the Executive Committee was confined essentially to the role of responding to various thrust problems. In effect, the basic structure placed the project coordinator as the man in the middle.

The basic issue again lies with the "ownership" of the project. The Project Coordinator did not feel that he could impose his own priorities on the Executive Committee, while the latter did not feel that they as individuals knew enough about the different components to take a more active role. The Executive Committee did not take an overview of the project's direction. The Executive Committee should have been set up and involved at the very start of the project to get the different agencies committed (even if individuals changed later on) and to allow the Executive Committee an opportunity to plan and develop an overview. Where no single agency chooses to "own" a project,

then the Executive Committee as a body must take on responsibility for systems planning. It's role becomes more important and active and its membership must be both committed and available.

### Operations

The overall operations of the project may be divided into three two year stages. The first phase took place approximately from 1977-1979 during which time roles were being defined, both the leaders and their respective organizations were gearing up to the implementation task, and the complexity of coordination was realized. It may be convenient to end this phase with the completion of the first evaluation report, which in effect documented this pre-operating process.

The second stage lasted for two years and consisted of two major operating components. First of all, the major activities of training and hiring began and continued in earnest, broken down into the thrust and sub-thrust activities of which the FFGPC became the most noticeable. Secondly, implementation developed along (vertical) institutional lines and this became a cause for concern at least at the higher levels of management. The 1981 evaluation report marks the end of this stage.

The need to define management objectives at the coordinating level became apparent in the third stage and the last two years of the IAPMP were devoted to attempts at horizontal activities such as complementation. Several approaches such as the Marketing Assistance Program (MAP) and the agribusiness sub-thrust were developed partly to work out the meaning of integration as an objective as well as to actually learn how to set up marketing systems. However, activities prepared by mid-1981 were already running against the project deadline and dwindling financial resources.

### ACTIVITY AND INSTITUTIONS

#### Major Activity

One way to evaluate the overall management of the IAPMP is to study it from the point of view of the major activity that is, in terms of the financial resources used. This activity is clear: the bulk of dollar and peso resources went either to send individuals abroad for academic degree and non-degree training, or to bring consultants into the country for the different thrusts.

Training abroad is a traditional activity of academic institutions. The management process involved matching individuals to institutions. This was neither unique nor complex. The hiring of consultants is also a standard activity and the key management task lies in defining the consultant's job specifications as closely as possible.

### Key Institutions

Another way to approach the management of the IAPMP is by looking at the participating institutions and the roles that key individuals and units played. The key agencies are the MA, USAID and KSU. NEDA was involved in the planning of the project, and UPLB and CLSU took part in the academic and technology package thrusts. Within the MA, BAEcon and BAEx are the two bureaus which made substantial investments in time to the IAPMP. There is lastly a policy and planning task which cuts across several organizational units.

### AID

The view of one senior manager of the USAID (Manila) staff is that AID's primary role in a host country contract is focused on the planning and design of a project; the task of managing (here defined as the responsibility for carrying out the project) falls to an institution of the country government, in this case, the MA. The concept behind this view is that a country eventually reaches a stage when its government managers must begin to manage (implement) as many of the components of a project as possible. The host country contract theoretically stands in contrast to bilateral direct agreements between AID and GOP where both are active and possibly unequal partners and managers in a particular project. This position does not ignore very real management problems in planning and implementation that took place in the first half of the project life. But these experiences have already been reported in previous evaluations and the lessons have already been learned, documented and even exercised in other AID-GOP projects since 1977.

AID had three functions or roles in the IAPMP. The agency was heavily involved in the project design and in the selection of KSU as the academic partner. AID also clearly was the major source of funds for the IAPMP. The GOP counterpart financing to the MA in effect came as a result of AID's willingness to fund the IAPMP. Finally, AID had a role in controlling certain specific activities according to its own operating financial procedures. It was with regard to this third function that AID was perceived to have taken a more active role in the IAPMP in the early years. However, the arrival and exit of four project officers and two office chiefs intuitively suggests that continuity in coordination might suffer.

The spirit of the host country contract agreement theoretically should have relegated AID strictly to the planning and financing roles. However, the difficulties and delays of the early years required, at least in AID's view, more direct action and assistance. There were numerous occasions over the six years that AID took a direct role in the IAPMP. The Thrust Coordinators, with one exception, were non-committal about AID's management participation in the IAPMP, and seemed to take AID in stride, possibly because they had relatively low levels of interaction

with AID. It should be noted however that AID had no real control in the totality of the project. Once the project paper was approved, funds realistically could not be denied, and delays in releasing funds simply created delays in implementation.

### Kansas State University

KSU was unable to take a more active role in the IAPMP. The consultants in effect became "employees" of the MA and other institutions. KSU therefore played no substantive overall management role in the IAPMP. The KSU office essentially provided support service to the incoming consultants, became a liaison office for the outgoing trainees and acted as a recruiting agency for both consultants and occasionally for non-KSU bound trainees. The difficulties encountered by the KSU staff in accomplishing these tasks already have been covered in previous evaluations. Many of the difficulties had been sorted out one way or the other by the last two years of the IAPMP. And enough was said about the ability of any single American university to field necessary qualified personnel from in-house, given the schedule of needs expressed in the IAPM project paper. It has also become obvious that managerial and technical expertise in one area, such as feedgrains, does not automatically ensure competence in other areas such as food processing.

The KSU role in the IAPMP is one of the more interesting answers to the puzzle of the overall management of the IAPMP. Apparently, one of the basic unwritten assumptions of the IAPMP at the early stage of the conceptualization of the project was that KSU would manage and run the IAPMP as a whole, possibly along lines similar to KSU's experience in Nigeria. The concept, "host-country contract" was understood as a commitment, in this case by the GOP, to fund various in-country project costs. Unfortunately for KSU, the understanding which evolved of what a host-country contract involved strengthened the notion that management belonged to the GOP. At the same time, internal communication problems between KSU home office and the Manila office during the first year of the project weakened KSU's position that it should and could have run the IAPMP.

The net result was that no blueprint for managing the IAPMP was developed in the project design. There is no way to determine how well KSU would have performed as the overall manager of the IAPMP. The point is that the MA apparently fought for and obtained the position of manager for the IAPMP. After designing the project, KSU's role became one of providing advice, placing individuals for training in academic institutions abroad, and recruiting consultants.

The consultants had a two-fold role: as trainers and problem solvers. However, KSU did not have responsibility for delineating the two roles of both the KSU and non-KSU consultants. There was a definition of the two roles to some extent within the different thrusts, so that the training

(or transfer of skills and learning) function was partly successful. The problem solving role was probably the more successful function, particularly in the case of some exceptional consultants. However, it probably was not adequately realized that there is a trade off between training a replacement to solve problems and having the consultant solving the problem. In the IAPMP, the tendency was present for the trade off to be made by using the consultants to do the work themselves for the sake of efficiency.

#### NEDA

NEDA performed as it was expected to. It participated to some extent in the planning of the project and left implementation responsibility to the MA. However, NEDA's original concept and objective for the project was apparently more focused, though not necessarily defined, of involving only post harvest marketing and feed grain processing. The concept grew and the objectives multiplied. The two managers of NEDA interviewed concluded from their experience with IAPMP that they were not enthusiastic about having the GOP implement USAID financial procedures. Under such circumstances, they prefer to have real initiative or, alternately, to review execution of financial procedures by AID.

#### UPLB and CLSU

The academic thrust for UPLB and CLSU represents the traditional university tasks of curriculum design and program development. The topic of agribusiness marketing is new, but the process of design and development is the same. UPLB may have had more resources and expertise in curriculum design and program development than CLSU.

#### The Ministry of Agriculture (MA)

This leaves the MA as the key institution with major implementing responsibility. There are two organizational units whose views have to be considered - the IAPMP Coordinator and the directors of the major bureaus involved in the different thrusts.

The Project Coordinator tried to become the overall manager of the project with responsibility for the project's success but in practice he had little authority to set directions or move resources for the implementation of activities, and he had little control over the disbursement and use of funds for the diverse activities of the thrusts. He could ultimately have refused to fund an item or turn down a request, but this refusal would not likely have resulted in effective long run coordination, and was essentially an act of last resort. The Project Coordinator therefore had no real tools of authority necessary for the overall management of the project.

One major contribution the Project Coordinator made to the IAPMP (and the MA) was to take on himself the task of dealing with USAID. Many of the procedural differences between AID and the MA primarily fell on his shoulders and much less so on the implementing Thrust Coordinators.

The Thrust Coordinators who are themselves bureau directors profess satisfaction with the IAPMP. Both the Project and Thrust Coordinators made use of the funds for consultants to service specific bureau needs, and to provide needed "retooling" and training for the staff. For example, IAPMP opened up training opportunities for particular staff units and created the occasion for an evaluation of bureau tasks, since there now were funds to hire consultants to train staff and to solve problems. The existence of the IAPMP also allowed the MA to secure GOP funds which otherwise would not have been available to the MA, because of the counterpart nature of the funding of the contract, although the scheduling of these GOP funds sometimes created difficulties.

The planning and policy component was housed in several sub-units of the MA and each sub-unit attempted to get its piece of the IAPMP. The participants in this component demonstrated the greatest variability in satisfaction, with one unit indicating that they received only a few consultants and even less slots and another unit indicating complete satisfaction with the management of the consulting and training resources made available to it through the IAPMP.

The MA through the Project Coordinator's office also had a monitoring role or function. However, this activity was not related to the function of controlling, since the project head was a coordinator and not a director. The monitoring activity, like consulting, does not include an implementing responsibility. Individuals, on certain occasions, felt compelled to make more forceful recommendations and to take action, but these are exceptions which represented a risk on the part of the individuals and not an institutionalized role. However, the voluminous documents attest to the effectiveness of the monitoring task.

#### THE PROJECT AS A LEARNING EXPERIENCE

Over the 6 year life of the IAPMP, the underlying management thread is one of experimenting with a host of activities to see which ones would be useful. A breakdown of the major thrusts offers evidence of the multitude of tasks - curriculum development, training, tech packs, research on specific crops, market assistance, complementation and extension work, planning and policy making, statistical analysis and projections, the FFGPC, trading in vegetables, etc. The list of projects is extensive and covers a variety of experiments over a wide range which were subsumed into the major thrusts.

Unfortunately, the project paper was prepared as though a blueprint for management already existed. One key assumption implied in the project paper is that the implementation stage would proceed immediately after the initial planning stage. The assumption, then, was that no learning was required. In fact, the first two years of the project, from 1977-1979, represented the "breaking-in" process for the IAPMP, with the different thrust managers, the Project Coordinator and AID and KSU trying to work out their roles. The IAPMP was complex, several agencies were involved, diverse activities had to be coordinated and carried, and there was no blueprint for implementation.

The consensus among the interviewees seems to be that the host country contract agreement as applied in the IAPMP was more of a learning experience than a model for effective project management. Lessons learned have already been incorporated into other projects. For example, given the rather independent activities of the various thrusts, it is possible that separate direct contracts between AID and the MA, CLSU, and UPLB might have been more effective. On the other hand, there had to be a first project for a host country contract agreement. It is probably not realistic to have expected a new agreement to be effective from the start and to have assumed that the new attitudes implied by the host country agreement would automatically be accepted by all the participating institutions.

#### Some Specific Lessons

- A. The basic management lesson in sending individuals abroad and in hiring consultants remains the same: spend as much time as needed in the planning and preparation stage and do not suffer from any illusion that corresponding with students and debriefings with consultants will remedy all problems. This activity is one process where intermediate corrective action probably does not work; once started, the only real management decision is made after the fact, when to stop the studies or the consulting, when the performance has been judged unsatisfactory.
- B. There are three basic management lessons pertinent to AID's handling of projects. One of them is the realization that while it is administratively convenient to assign only one contracting university or institution, in practice, it may be necessary to have a consortium with one participant singled out with the lead role. This is particularly true where the technical assistance is diverse, and in the context of the current environment of budget cuts and "lean" faculty that existing academic institutions in the U.S. face. This is what has happened in the implementation of Title XII. The second lesson is a matter of exercising institutional will-power in taking a passive role, if that is indeed the intent. In practice, AID management switched from one mode to the other, depending on the individual and the situation. Institutional will is required in

realizing that the active mode is temporary and that the passive mode is the long run permanent position to take (at least for host country type contracts). Finally, the AID managers probably have to err on the side of flexibility in enforcing procedures.

- C. The Project Coordinator and his staff will remain more or less intact, and they are already managing much larger projects. A core of expertise has therefore already been developed for the development of other complex projects. Part of his role, or burden, is to take on the responsibility of coordinating with AID and other major non-MA partners and to give as much flexibility as possible to the complementing organizational units.
- D. Projects with a complex multi-bureau, multi-activity design must have a three stage process. Instead of just planning and implementing, there is also an intermediate stage, a pre-operating, organizing, establishing relationship, and ways of getting things done, scheduling and sequencing stage. This in effect is what took place between 1977-1979, when the first 1979 evaluation took place. "Getting things sorted out" was a major operating objective in those two years, after the project plan had been approved and implementation was supposed to start in earnest. In effect, the intermediate stage allows the top management. The time and opportunity to more specifically define what integration means and how it is to be achieved.
- E. The real world often does not operate on a systematic and logical basis. Objectives evolve over time, especially for a complex project with an extended life. Key individuals learn and change both attitudes and actions. Organizations are affected by external events. The far sighted individual or institution with objectives clearly defined from the start may be the exception rather than the rule. It is therefore not surprising that the IAPMP objectives only surfaced seemingly after the fact and after a gestation period, or that objectives meant to provide performance targets ended up as long run visions or expectations (e.g., the 10% increase in farmer incomes).
- F. The various planning institutions and implementing units developed objectives and agenda relevant to their needs, such that no individual or institution at the top level "owned" the project. If more multiple institutional participation is expected in the future, equality in involvement and commitment is an unrealistic assumption, and the individual agency with the major burden ought to have the necessary authority which it can transfer to its implementing manager.
- G. Multi-activity, multi-agency projects require a committed and involved Executive Committee (or Steering Committee) not only to set policy but also to support the Project Coordinator in his managing function.

- H. The controlling function is critical for multi-component projects like the IAPMP. Neither AID/KSU nor the MA (through the IAPMP) exercised a controlling function, particularly with respect to funds use. Some middle ground must be defined between control at the coordinator's level and the efficient use of resources at the implementing level. One alternative is for the Executive Committee to control the timing and amount of funds to be released to the different thrusts based on periodic reviews; that is, if one major component requires a total amount of money for a period a several years, availability of funds is not automatic but depends on a regular evaluation of accomplishments. The FFGPC is probably one example of scheduled activities which could have been controlled more efficiently.

#### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the final analysis, the overall management of the IAPMP could have been improved if fairly basic rules had been observed:

1. Actively involve the implementing agency in the planning process in order to generate commitment either to "own" the project or to take the lead in the policy making role of the executive committee;
2. Design into the planning both the objectives and the management structure for implementation from the start while keeping in mind that objectives evolve and organizations change; and
3. Provide the Project Coordinator with both authority as well as responsibility to manage effectively.

#### NATIONAL POLICY THRUST

#### OBJECTIVES AND OUTCOMES

The National Policy Thrust had as its objectives:

- (1) The improvement of the agricultural data system and the expansion of computer capacity to achieve that objective.
- (2) Improved linkages between analysts and decision makers.
- (3) The development and utilization of sub-sector models consonant with the NEDA macro models and capable of forming the base for intermediate and long-term structural analysis of agriculture and its inter-relationships with the rest of the economy.
- (4) The enhancement of the technical skills of Philippine analysts to identify and evaluate alternative sets of national policies affecting production, processing, storage, distribution and

marketing (including exportation) of priority food crops, livestock and fisheries.

- (5) The strengthening of GOP capacity to collect and analyze agricultural data with greater accuracy.
- (6) The refinement of a conceptual framework to guide the formulation of food and agricultural policies.

At project's end, the IAPMP can count a number of significant achievements: computer hardware will be enhanced; statistical techniques, crop estimates, and program monitoring data have all been upgraded; upper level decision makers have had good interaction with analysts attached to the MA; and a large number of Ministry participants have been involved in degree and non-degree training programs.

From the above, it is clear that the Policy Thrust is a Ministry-wide effort. The data collection capability of the Ministry is not limited to BAEcon, however; the Special Studies Division has also made notable contributions. Neither is policy analysis limited to the Policy Analysis Staff (PAS); BAEcon also has its Economic Research Division and its Agricultural Marketing Services Division. Thus the comments in this report regarding data should not be construed as pertaining only to BAEcon, and neither should comments regarding analysis be construed as pertaining only to PAS.

## FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

### 1. National Policy Analysis Capability

Within the IAPMP framework, analytical capabilities were provided by (a) training of Filipino staff, both in formal courses and through on-the-job interaction with project consultants and by (b) the direct application of the consultants' skills to certain problems of analysis assigned to them. The ultimate impacts of the former are expected to become visible in the long run. However, the impact of consultant analytical inputs (as distinguished from training inputs) were immediate. The impacts emerged within the IAPM Project period and can be seen mainly in the output of the Policy Analysis Staff. There is no doubt that the volume of research output of the PAS is impressive and it has contributed significantly to the clarification of knowledge about agricultural output. Nevertheless, two issues can be raised with regard to the PAS: the scope of its analysis and the post-project sustainability of its functions.

#### The Scope of National Policy Analysis

The project's objective of enhancing the policy analysis capability of the GOP is not categorical in defining precisely what it regards as "better" national policy analysis. At its most ambitious, one

might read into this objective an intention to go beyond analytical studies which are crop specific. This would imply a broadened focus on the entire agricultural sector -- evaluating the overall sector policy strategy and considering the impact of policies across agricultural commodities and between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. Such an enlarged focus would also include the effects of technology, institutional, price, credit, exchange rate, fiscal and monetary policies on the allocation of resources and the distribution of income within agriculture and between agriculture and the rest of the economy. The outcomes of such analyses would not only be to infer government priorities and cater to them but also to examine these priorities and to suggest and evaluate alternative directions.

The PAS has done some longer term and more broadly scoped perspective studies - it played an important role, for example, in the preparation of the Food and Nutrition Plan; it has estimated prospects in food consumption trends; and it has played a major role in broadening awareness of linkages between the corn and livestock economies in the Philippines. Most of its efforts, however, have been directed to appraisals and assessments required for shorter term management decisions. This is not to say that a broader focus for national policy analysis in any way precludes a flow of near-term outlook studies on different crops, the monitoring of prices, the estimation of derived producer and consumer response functions for specific commodities and rough forecasting of demand and supply scenarios. These activities are especially important in keeping the Ministry of Agriculture informed on developments for major agricultural products (principally rice and corn) and their near-term prospects. In the course of the IAPMP, the Minister's requirements for this type of analysis, often on short notice, have been both encouraged and successfully met by the Policy Analysis Staff, both through formal papers and memoranda and through informal, undocumented interaction with Ministry Officials.

In the course of their analysis, the PAS has encountered a number of problems in the data; these includes both data generated within the MA and data from outside agencies. As data are subjected to more intense analysis, it is but normal that certain problems, inconsistencies etc., which were not noticed before will come to light. This would, in turn, help to guide data generators towards the needed improvements. In this way an analytical staff also plays a role in improving the data base.

#### The Sustainability of National Policy Analysis Capability

Notwithstanding the progress made by the project in the area of research support, it is clear that several factors call into question the prospects for sustained maintenance and growth of professional capability for policy analysis within the Ministry. In the case of

the PAS, leadership has been completely in the hands of the senior project consultant. The close rapport which has been developed between the Minister and his PAS is actually a personalized rapport with its director - there is no evidence that any local staff member can pick up this relationship after the departure of Mr. Daly. Of the nearly 180 PAS papers and memoranda produced during the IAPMP, less than 10 were written without the participation of a foreign consultant. Even the program of work activities for the six months after the termination of IAPMP has been drafted by Rex Daly.

Another problem that poses an obstacle to the recruitment, development and retention of qualified personnel, not only for the PAS, but also for the broader requirements of national policy analysis, is the need for competitive rates of compensation. In the case of the PAS, staff members currently receive 20% more in terms of pay and benefits than regular compensation. This differential has been supported by IAPMP. Alternative sources exist to keep it going for an additional six month period at the end of which administrators may have to start hunting around again. This situation is not peculiar to the MA. In general, government salary scales (far from competitive), are often augmented in this manner -- on a project to project basis. However, this hand to mouth existence, involving a perennial struggle to maintain regular, reasonable compensation, is not good for staff morale. At professional levels, turnover rates are high even with salary augmentation, not only because higher income work opportunities exist, but also because these opportunities offer greater stability in compensation. Many professionals are willing to work for less than their market rates (money is not the only reward for a job) as long as sources of income are acceptably steady. This is especially true of young professionals who have to make long term career decisions.

## 2. The Limited Focus on the Small Farmer in Particular

The project paper identifies the small farmer as the key beneficiary of IAPMP. It is interesting however, that the implication of the cost-benefit analysis included in the project paper is that expected outcomes might be somewhat divergent of this target.

Firstly, the estimated effects on small farmer incomes of sustained efforts in all four thrusts (with additional GOP funding up to the year 2000) were largest for the Outreach/Complementation component (about eight to ten times those for National Policy and Tech Pack), while National Policy and Tech Pack effects were estimated to be about four of five times those of the Academic Thrust.

Secondly, is the fact that the estimated net benefits for small farmers from the national policy thrust "from 1981 onward were based on .005 (one half of one percent) of the projected net earnings in agriculture attributable to more effective national and regional food

policies made possible by the project." (Project Document, p. 69). In other words, of the total impact of the National Policy Thrust on agricultural income, only 1/200 was expected to accrue to small farmers.

Thirdly, prior to the establishment of the PAS, the Minister's economic intelligence unit (other than BAEcon) was the Special Studies Division (SSD). Basic sources of information for the SSD reports were the food consumption surveys that it periodically conducted. Included among these were data that supported studies of the socioeconomics of certain crops as well as of farm households in some regions. In addition, on the basis of the surveys, SSD generated production, costs of production and price estimates. The ascension of the PAS saw more sophisticated analysis and estimation of the situational outlook for various commodities. This improvement was achieved, however, while reducing attention to the farm household itself. The SSD looked at suppliers and supply while PAS has looked principally at supply. The common denominator was supply not the supplying sector. While SSD's program continued, resources and visibility were increasingly with the PAS. Of the nearly 180 PAS papers and memoranda, not more than three have any clear focus on the intended beneficiaries of IAPMP - the small farmer. It can be argued that policy based on better analysis of the supply situation benefitted the small farmer through a trickle down process. But a different case can also be made: namely that research output, in terms of the focus on small farmers, took a step or two backwards in IAPMP.

### 3. The Limited Focus on Low Income Groups in General

The project's intended emphasis is towards "the 2.8 million small farm production units which constitute the backbone of the agricultural sector and the related agricultural service industry that supports them in the processing, storage and marketing chain" (Project Document p. 11). It is important to recognize that these nearly three million production units include two special groups: (1) agricultural workers (those with virtually no access to land) whose income sources are agricultural wage labor (approximately ₱10 per day in the Nueva Ecija area) and marginal non-farm employment, and (2) the growing class of small farmers who have mortgaged their Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT's). These "mortgage" arrangements involve the surrender of rights to CLT-acquired land for periods up to five years for a loan that averages around ₱10,000 (the average going rate around Munoz). Conversations with some farmers in Nueva Ecija yielded estimates that the landless group constitutes about 15% of rural communities while the mortgagee rate could be as high as 10%. Without good statistical knowledge of these groups, the implication is that national policy will be flying blind as far as planning for them is concerned and, what is more disturbing, may even ignore, implicitly if not explicitly, as much as one fourth of the lower income strata of the rural population.

#### 4. Agribusiness

The activities of the Agribusiness unit can perhaps best be described as information brokerage and, at rare times, process feasibility testing. In the former area, the unit has been engaged in locating prospective (primarily Metro Manila) buyers of agricultural commodities produced in the regions. Often the scenario takes the form of a phone call from a regional director to the Agribusiness Unit announcing surpluses in the production of some commodity; the unit, in turn, enters into verbal communications with identified contact buyers in the hope of arranging a sale. There has been no documentation of this aspect of their activities: There are no lists of identified contact buyers, number of transactions or negotiations initiated, the number of successes, settlement prices, case studies or records of procedures used. Obviously the successful conduct of operations such as these require a good knowledge of the commodity environment and broad commercial contacts. Without full documentation of activities, it is quite conceivable that whenever any staff member with such personal contacts leaves, remaining staff members or replacements will be virtually ineffective.

One of the reasons for the lack of a clear cut role for the Agribusiness sub-Thrust is the nebulous notion of what agribusiness is in the first place. There is no problem in identifying many of the large corporate concerns as agribusiness but within the context of the rural Philippines, there is a large informal group of small food merchants and processors. To this date, no clear definition of this huge sector has been made, regardless of how arbitrary such a definition might be. The latest proposal to strengthen the IAPMP Agribusiness Sub-Thrust, prepared in early 1983 (as the project was winding down) formalizes the information brokerage function, but it does not offer a clear, operational definition of agribusiness. In fact, it concedes that agribusiness, as the paper defines it, could constitute 70% of GNP, implying that practically everyone in rural areas can be regarded as an agribusiness unit. In relation to this, the proposal draws attention to the need for capitalizing on particular skills required for the conduct of agribusiness. It is unclear, however, where the agribusiness role of the MA should be directed. Is it towards providing these skills to the larger agribusiness firms (page 1 of the proposal carries this tone)? and if so, how does the MA foresee the payoffs to its activities accruing to the larger rural sector? If the MA role is more in the direction of skill supplementation for smaller agribusiness units, it seems that the first thing to do is to define these units and their production and marketing linkages.

The whole question of the MA capability to provide such skills leads us to the issue of what IAPMP has left behind as an operational definition of agribusiness, what documented knowledge there is of the actors involved and the personnel required to fulfill the task. From the estimated personnel specifications of the proposal (at least 11 specialists for the central Agribusiness office alone) it is doubtful that specialists needs can be met.

5. Market Assistance Centers (MAC) and Cooperative Development

The objectives of activities in this area, originally placed in the extension/outreach thrust of IAPMP, were to encourage and implement improved linkages between production and marketing through (a) making available and using more timely and appropriate market information, (b) influencing production decisions regarding crop choice and timing, and (c) strengthening the role of cooperative marketing schemes in agricultural marketing, especially for vegetables. The MAC activities included some notable accomplishments, such as: price information dissemination activities, development of good working relationships between the involved agencies and groups of farmers, and pilot efforts to directly negotiate and implement sales and distribution.

Several issues are raised by the MAC experience. The provision of reliable and timely price information to facilitate better production and marketing decisions is a worthwhile goal. However, it is important to be continually aware of the distinction between information which makes better decisions possible and a variety of other factors which influences the likelihood such decisions will actually be made. IAPMP was on target in linking MAC's to cooperative development, but the experience of MAC efforts suggests that eliciting year-to-year responses from farmers is something that still has to be established.

IAPMP project design called for outputs from the policy analysis sub-thrust which would be supportive of programming in other parts of the project. The MAC experience suggests such linkages might have been quite desirable had they been forthcoming. The MAC strategy proceeds in large part from an assumption that farmers need to be protected against the price effects of excess or high supplies. This problem is certainly susceptible to local actions, but other features of the MAC's, notably price dissemination, suggest the problem is also a macro problem, influenced by national policies and economic relationships. In the absence of attention to the macro side of the high supply problem, we need to ask which farmers can withstand best (and tend to benefit most from) supply and price fluctuations and which farmers, at least on a local basis, can actually influence that fluctuation. The answer is larger farmers who are not committed to rice production alone. The question therefore may still remain: how to improve production-marketing linkages for small farmers?

LESSONS LEARNED

1. The MA Policy Perspective

The policy analysis objectives of the Project Paper are set forth on the basis of one perspective on the agricultural policy concerns of the MA. Presumably, the MA would like to have as much analysis as possible on the small farm sector, inter-sectoral linkages and so on. However, it must be recognized that high on the list of the MA's perceived

responsibilities is the commitment to foster a steady supply of agricultural output at politically acceptable price levels. The pressure to do this is reflected in the type of data, research and analysis that the MA wants. On the basis of timely, regular commodity outlook reports and production estimates, analysis can lead to quick, continuous identification of critical spots in supply and price situations. Where scarce research resources prevail, broader analysis has to be sacrificed.

Despite the observation that too many of the PAS Staff Papers are commodity outlooks, rather than deliberate and detailed comparisons between specific policy options, we feel that there is no doubt about their significant contribution to policy understanding. Moreover, we recognize that many discussions of policy options based upon PAS output were too sensitive to disseminate in a non-confidential published manner.

## 2. Salaries, Funds and Staff Requirements

By and large, we view outlook analysis, not as a final product in terms of policy analysis, but as one input along with data improvement and computer enhancement. However, to bring these inputs together, there is a demonstrable need for high-level, highly professional staff. These needs are not limited to those who are part of the present Policy Analysis Staff but includes other professionals in the BAEcon, Planning Service, etc., whose work is highly relevant to policy. The fact that IAPMP consultants -- particularly those who have been most appreciated and who have been rated as highly successful in their jobs -- have been active as professional "work horses" and have not limited their roles only to the training of "counterparts" is a clear indication of the MA's need for highly experienced, Ph.D. level staff members. The Project Consultants were not "consultants" in the ordinary sense of specialists who were only temporarily needed. The experience of the American consultants could have been matched by Filipinos from the private sector or from academic institutions; but the fact was that the Philippine government did not have the budgetary means and the institutional flexibility to hire such experts directly. Thus, the IAPMP project in effect served as a budgetary supplement for the MA, a convenient means for the acquisition of highly trained staff members. The only drawback, of course, is that such a supplementation, based on foreign funding and staffing, cannot be a permanent one.

At this point, the important need is to be able to retain those trained under IAPMP, such that, with a few more years of experience, they will reach the level of expertise that was provided under the project mainly through the help of supplementary manpower in the form of the consultants. What must be avoided is a perennial state of under-professionalization within the MA such that, in five or ten years, it is again observed that staff can be characterized as too young, too inexperienced, lacking in farm background, lacking in graduate training and so on.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

- (1) The Evaluation Team recommends that the MA should set down a deliberate Manpower Development Plan, which will visualize some targetted staff profile to be attained after say five years, and will work out ways and means to try to minimize the attrition, as well as rationalize further staff recruitment and development both on-the-job as well as through formal training. A first implication of such a plan will be the need to upgrade professional compensation. This is recognized as a government-wide problem, felt by all agencies. Some agencies have managed to improve their situations and offer a more attractive professional career path by organizing new institutions, which could be foundation type or corporate entities, and which could house such professionals. An example is the Philippine Institute for Development Studies, attached to the NEDA. This is not to suggest that an exact model for such a new institution already exists. It will be necessary for the Ministry to design an appropriate institution and to work out the necessary arrangements within government in order to make it viable. The main point is that (a) a government-wide reform is badly needed, and (b) certain individual agencies appear to have coped relatively successfully with the problem through the creation of such attached institutions. The MA would do well to study carefully the type of new institution which would be needed in order to solve the pervasive problem of maintaining a highly professional group for policy research.

It should be observed, however, that in the short run very little leeway may be possible given local resources. Given the current recession and the shortness of the government budget, the MA is very insecure with respect to its funds even for the current year, let alone for the next five years. At the same time, the job market is relatively weak and there may be fewer job alternatives for the professional staff. This would not be the case under normal economic times, however, and the problem of competition for professional staff can be expected to be a very significant factor as soon as the economic recovery takes place. In the meantime, one senior MA official feels that the MA will be lucky if it retains 10% of the staff who have been trained, one way or another, under IAPMP. This is a prospect which would significantly negate the pay-offs from the human investments which have been made under IAPMP.

- (2) Explore new vehicles to foster inter-agency linkages. The dilution of the powers and responsibilities of the MA has not affected the importance of the IAPMP as a mechanism for creating professional capability in economic analysis and providing reliable economic information to decision-makers. As long as the MA staff are on good professional terms with their counterparts in other agencies who are concerned with agricultural issues, their training under IAPMP is not wasted. What the Evaluation Team suggests is the adoption of a more deliberate program for promoting professional interchange between the MA and the other agri-related agencies, such as the National Food Authority. This could come about through greater dissemination of papers and materials between

agencies, the undertaking of joint projects, a greater volume of publications, etc. Such activities would best not be left to chance but should be the subject of a deliberate interagency Professional Linkages Program.

- (3) Generate information that is more directly related to the objectives of the IAPMP. The IAPMP investments in data collection, within the BAEcon frame, seem to have been fairly successful. It may be observed that many of these improvements were already in the pipeline and IAPMP acted as a very welcome supplement to the MA's regular resources, in order to bring this about. It could also be noted that the short term expatriates involved in the data collection effort functioned more as "consultants" in the ordinary sense of temporary staff members. They helped to improve the data system and their departure did not cause any dislocations.

There are, however, some substantive areas in which more data collection efforts seem to be warranted, and these are discussed more fully below. It should be clarified that the term "data collection" as used here refers to the entire process from primary observation on to data processing and down to release of summarized information for the use of analysts. This comes about through an interaction between "data generators" and "data users", and both groups share in the responsibility. Those who supply data should take more initiative in preparing tables which could be easily assessed as useful for analysis, even though analysts may not have specifically asked for them.

- (a) Small Farmers. Given the IAPMP stress on the small farmers, or a group relative to other groups which are not small, it could be suggested that the BAEcon generate more information directly related to the small farmers. For example, it could generate data on crop yields disaggregated by farm size. It seems that the farm size variable has not been given much emphasis in publication formats.

There seems to be a tendency to: identify crops (e.g., vegetables) first, and rationalize later that the "majority" of these are small farmers, as contrasted to a system of identifying those who are small first, and afterward checking on their production attributes. Until the data on specific crops are provided with clear disaggregations between "small", "medium" and "large" -- for which proper definitions must be constructed-- the analysis of policy implications for the "small" farmers can only be expected to be of the "trickle-down" type.

- (b) Farm Income. Given the IAPMP's objective of increasing the income of farmers, the measurement of income would seem to be mandatory. At present BAEcon feels that income measurement is not under its jurisdiction but under that of the National Census Statistics Office. However, the NCSO is not generating data which enables an analysis of the trend in farm income over time. The BAEcon also has some data on farm income, through not "official" and not sufficiently broad in geographical coverage and frequent in collection in order to constitute a series for trend analysis.

In addition, the measurement of income is by no means an easy or routine task. The Team feels that more research is needed specifically in order to determine the most effective survey techniques in order to measure income accurately and inexpensively. In this regard, the Special Studies Division of the Planning Service provides a potential unit to pioneer such work. It should be noted, however, that survey technique development will require, in many instances, an above-average professional staff with a good grasp of survey research.

- (c) Landless Workers. This is another group whose conditions cannot be identified in the BAEcon data. Again, it is recommended that the data collection system be more attuned to monitoring the conditions of landless workers.
  - (d) Agribusiness. The concept of agribusiness should be incorporated into the data collection system as a means of clarifying what seems to be as yet a nebulous entity. Is a farm always an agribusiness? What are the agribusinesses which are not farms? How many people (as owners, operators, workers) are directly involved in agribusiness? An attempt to quantify the presence of agribusinesses will help to clarify many issues.
- (4) In connection with statistical coordination with the NCSO, it is desirable that upper echelon discussions be initiated to ensure that the director of BAEcon participates on the Statistical Advisory Board, given BAEcon's mandate to collect data on the agricultural sector. Presently there is a dispute as to whether BAEcon participation in the SAB is already provided by law.
  - (5) Carefully re-think the desirability of committing resources to MacroModelling. The Evaluation Team points out that "modelling" is a means of analysis that is extremely dependent on staff members having high level graduate training. While very useful, it again calls attention to the greater need for a well planned professional retention scheme. It is observed that Project ADAM, the linear programming scheme, is still regarded as too complex and too unrealistic for application, particularly if the coverage is at the macro level. It has been described by one administrative official as still being in the tooling-up stage even after several years of work. There are hopes that, with the devolution of agricultural planning tasks to the provincial level, programming models of optimal cropping patterns could be more reliable. This only means, however, that there will be an even greater demand for highly trained persons at the provincial level, one which was not anticipated by IAPMP
  - (6) A no-cost extension of the IAPM Project until December 31, 1983 is recommended to ensure that (a) participants on training can complete their programs and (b) computer enhancement activities can be completed through the receipt and installation of computer equipment.

## ACADEMIC THRUST

### OBJECTIVES AND OUTCOMES

The basic purpose of the academic thrust is to develop a continuing supply of professionally trained people in Philippine agriculture and food systems management. Such people would assume management roles in government agencies, agricultural cooperatives, and agribusiness enterprises. The thrust was to achieve its purpose through academic training at the undergraduate and masters level and non-degree professional training. Appropriate academic capabilities to conduct this training were to be strengthened at two institutions: The Central Luzon State University (CLSU) and the University of the Philippines at Los Banos (UPLB) College of Development Economics and Management (CDEM).

At CLSU, the project was to develop and implement a Bachelor of Science in Agriculture (B.S.A.) with major in Food Systems Management curriculum. The overall capacities of the Department of Agri-Management in the College of Agriculture were to be enriched through staff development, curriculum revision and upgrade. A B.S.A. with a major in Agricultural Marketing was implemented in 1981. Since then, 25 students have completed the new B.S.A. Courses were strengthened and added in cognate major areas of Agribusiness Management, Agricultural Economics and Farm Management. A B.S. in Business Administration was implemented in 1983. Two faculty members have completed Ph.D. training in the U.S. and have returned to CLSU. Two faculty members have completed Masters training in the U.S. and have returned to CLSU. An additional five are expected to return from the United States and one is expected to return from UPLB with Masters degrees in agricultural economics or a related field in 1983. Seventy six (76) farmer-leaders and cooperative workers completed non-degree professional training programs. 22.3 person-months of long term U.S. consultancy were supported by the Academic Thrust of the Project. Five CLSU faculty members participated in study tours in the U.S. and thirteen CLSU faculty completed summer training programs in Agricultural Marketing and the Management and Analysis of Agribusiness projects at the College of Development Economics and Management (CDEM).

At UPLB, the project was to develop and implement a Masters program in Food Systems Management. The Masters program in Agricultural Economics and the professional training programs in Cooperatives Management were to be strengthened through staff development, curriculum revision and upgrade. Non-degree training programs in Food Systems Management for employees and managers of various agricultural agencies were to be implemented. Two Masters programs were implemented in 1980: a Master of Professional Studies (MPS) in Agricultural Marketing and a Master of Management (MM) in Agribusiness Management. A third MM program in Rural Development was implemented in 1982. Two faculty members supported by the Academic thrust have completed Ph.D. programs in the U.S. and have returned to UPLB. Five have not yet finished. Nine faculty members have completed Masters training in the U.S. and have returned to UPLB. Sixty-five (65) students have received support under the project to pursue Masters training at CDEM of which approximately 40 will successfully graduate by project termination. Two hundred fifty one (251)

professionals from government agencies were trained in non-degree programs on agricultural marketing and agribusiness management. An additional 19 persons were trained in Cooperative Management under project funding. Summer workshops were implemented in economics, agricultural management, and agricultural marketing. The workshops are prerequisites to the MM and MPS programs. Twenty-two (22) person-months of long-term consultancy and 16.8 person-months of short term consultancy were provided by the Academic Thrust of the project. Eight CDEM faculty used non-degree professional improvement funds from the Project to complete graduate studies initiated from other financial sources or for study tours in the U.S.

According to the Project Paper,

"UPLB and CLSU will be providing trained marketing experts to strengthen university and college faculties in agricultural marketing to fill critical government positions at appropriate levels, to staff all elements of this integrated project and to make available trained marketing experts to cooperative and other agribusinesses.

Both institutions will be able to continue their agricultural marketing programs without further direct support and will be able to assist other college faculties train manpower in food marketing technology."

By the amended project completion date in June, 1983, both UPLB and CLSU are training students in agricultural marketing in programs established and enriched by the IAPMP Academic Thrust.

#### FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

By itself, staff development is not equivalent to upgrading the quality and professional relevance of an academic program. Staff development usually is associated more directly with raising expectations that quality and relevance will improve. Whether and how expectations can be transformed into performance is the basic position from which to evaluate an investment in academic development. In what forms will the programs exist and evolve in the post-IAPMP environment? The more important reason for asking the question is that the real accomplishments from the thrust's investments are revealed in the programs that develop, not simply in the number of staff trained. The 1981 evaluation concluded that this thrust had already achieved its objectives of getting staff into a training pipeline. However, the purposes which motivated the thrust and against which accomplishments must ultimately be measured relate to the capability of the academic programs to contribute manpower to improved food systems management.

In what forms will the programs initiated and strengthened under IAPMP's academic thrust exist and evolve in the post-IAPMP environment? A place to begin is with the thrust design and management plan. How will the manner in which the thrust was implemented influence the ultimate results?

1. Variance from original project plans. The numbers of people trained and their actual training periods have not been entirely as intended. This was recognized and discussed in the two earlier evaluations. The variance can be attributed to difficulties in getting the project organized and delays encountered in defining and detailing the new academic programs being developed. The same points can be made about the identification and utilization of long and short-term American consultants. It is our judgement that the original project design was vague, simplistic and over-ambitious in assuming that new curricula were required and could be identified, developed, institutionalized and legitimated relying almost entirely on foreign training of staff and a moderate amount of U.S. consultancy. Inadequate consideration was given to careful appraisal of what was needed in terms of "a continuing supply of professionally trained people" to be turned out by strengthened academic programs.

Actually, there really was no single academic thrust, but rather three academic thrusts under IAPMP and another academic thrust outside IAPMP. Under IAPMP support, there was a thrust at CLSU, one at UPLB, and staff development at both institutions supported by other components of the project. These three thrusts were not always managed together. This means that CLSU and UPLB have had more staff trained than the Academic Thrust alone provided, but it is not entirely clear to us whether those additional trained staff strengthen or dilute capacity to address the objectives of the academic thrust in the medium and long-term at each institution. This issue really turns on (1) the context of programmatic focus and evolution and (2) the resources available to support the needed continuing professional development of all faculty. Similarly, the development of programs at UPLB and CLSU under the academic thrust, while not inconsistent with each other, was not an illustration of deliberate coordination. In fact, coordination was neither called for in the project design nor forthcoming in project implementation. Nationally, enrollments in agricultural colleges and universities are declining and there is a strong possibility that several undergraduate agricultural programs may be closed. In that light, it is appropriate to ask whether the pattern of coordination between CLSU and UPLB will prove to have been inefficient or whether this example of essentially parallel program development will prove to have been a foundation for independent innovativeness?

In addition, staff development supported by non-IAPMP sources proceeded at both CLSU and CDEM, but especially at CDEM. How does the impact of all staff training relate to the specific program directions supported by the IAPMP academic thrust? Will CDEM be even better positioned to support its new MM and MPS degrees, or will the strength and emphases be in other areas? How, for example, will the relationships between applied and academic interests be influenced?

2. Curriculum Scope. How do the scope of the current curricula compare with what is needed? Attempts at both UPLB and CLSU to develop "Food Systems" curricula proved unworkable and efforts focused on marketing and management. As those programs have evolved, can we say that they demonstrate scope compatible with real world problems of agricultural and agribusiness development in the Philippines? While that question cannot be answered categorically, we would note the following:
- No substantial effort has yet been made to determine what specific manpower needs exist and where. In the absence of such an effort, the two programs tend to gravitate to public sector, cooperative, and large agribusiness audiences. Is that where a need resides that justifies the commitment of energies at two major publically supported educational institutions?
  - The programs at both universities remain to be Filipinized. By this we mean that the programs pay too much attention to principles of agribusiness and agricultural marketing based on American experience and theory. The programs give inadequate attention to important elements of the context and content of agribusiness development in the Philippines. We know that Philippine materials are being incorporated into core economic and marketing courses, but these courses draw their frameworks from theoretical and empirical materials that are not clearly Philippine based. More to the point, we believe that the programs at this time give inadequate attention to the agrarian context of agribusiness development (e.g., intermediation processes in rural capital markets, processes through which entrepreneurial orientations and experience are transferred); the structure and role of the "non-formal" food marketing system, particularly in linking rural producers and consumers; the policy environment in specific agricultural commodity systems and how that environment impacts private enterprise formation and expansion in assembling, processing, and marketing those commodities; the special and presumably important issue of local entrepreneurship and small-scale agribusiness development; and collective resource management activities outside the scope of the essentially rice-oriented cooperatives system.
  - Can a practical and application oriented agribusiness and marketing training program function effectively with faculty largely lacking appropriate and significant applied experience themselves? Has the project's staff development strategy been too knowledge rather than skill-oriented? If so, what avenues are being explored on can be explored which would correct that imbalance?

3. Staff Development. Have faculty skills been improved in required areas? We are prepared to offer a positive answer. Training in various aspects of agricultural economics was appropriate for at least two reasons: (1) CDEM has suffered some crucial staff losses in agricultural economics and the faculty there needed replenishment, especially since that faculty has to be the core of any agribusiness and marketing program. (2) More generally, we recognize that agribusiness traditionally is seen as an aspect of the agricultural economy, closely related to farm management. The same two reasons, however, lead us to offer a more mixed response to a second question, namely: Have the most important areas needing faculty skills been adequately addressed by IAFMP academic training?

- Is it appropriate to consider the typical Filipino farmer as commanding sufficient resources to be an agribusiness agent in the sense conveyed in American agricultural economics?
- Considering that agribusiness in the Philippines (and many other places) is increasingly not a purely or even primarily agricultural activity, and is an activity subject to incentives and distortions characteristic of several non-agricultural industries, should not strong attention be given to the macroeconomic environment and the intersectoral impacts of macroeconomic policies?
- Experience with programs like KKK, and other efforts to stimulate private agribusiness enterprise formation and growth suggest much remains to be learned about how to administer and monitor such programs -- however elegant their guiding economic frameworks.
- If agribusiness development is going to be linked to the uplift of small farmers and poorer rural households, it will probably have to assume various forms of collective economic action. In many instances, this will mean formal cooperatives, a strategy with which CDEM and CLSU are familiar. However, in many instances other forms of voluntary and private collective action might be more viable. Understanding options for collective economic action other than cooperatives, especially in non-urban settings, is inadequate. Much needs to be learned and incorporated into academic programs.

We are concerned that at CLSU and especially at CDEM, too much emphasis was placed in IAFMP on staff training in agricultural economics. If the programs that are to emerge from an investment in staff training are to be problem and mission-oriented, it would not appear entirely optimal to pursue a strategy of disciplinary strengthening alone. Staff improvement through training should have been considered in other areas required to effectively address agribusiness and agricultural marketing. In addition, if the degrees being granted are viewed more as professional than academic awards, staff improvement through options other than academic training, could have been developed. Examples include encouraging staff experience in the risk-taking associated with enterprise formation and management.

4. Program Evolution. What can we say about where the programs at the two Universities are going? It may well be too soon to tell, but certain signposts should be noted, if only for where they point.

- UPLB devoted considerable effort to non-degree training for the public sector. What kind of training is actually needed in the public sector and where does the UPLB non-degree training effort stand in relationship to that need? Is the private sector going to be an appropriate clientele for UPLB? If so, what parts of the private sector?
- In our discussions at CLSU and UPLB, we detected a tendency to embrace a process of degree differentiation and proliferation. This concerns us because it assumes that variations in curricula drawing on a common pool of courses justify different degree names. We would like to have seen (1) more attention to the quality and relevance of individual courses and (2) more careful consideration of the core knowledge and skill foundation required to be an effective agricultural manager.

Very important decisions about the future of the Academic Thrust of IAPMP at CLSU and UPLB will be made in the next few years. The legacy left by IAPMP for that decision process is essentially positive. The basic programs formally exist. Staff have been trained. The Universities have acquired some experience in degree and non-degree knowledge transfer. But ends and means have not yet been associated in as deliberate or purposeful manner as would appear desirable. Some of that can be attributed to problems in project design and implementation. What is important now, however, is to recognize that the academic programs at the termination of IAPMP are still formative. Some of the most important decisions remain to be made.

#### LESSONS LEARNED

Several constructive lessons can be learned from the experience of the Academic Thrust. While some will be stated in positive and some in negative terms, we want to be clear in noting that the lessons learned from this component of the project should not be assessed independently of lessons learned from the overall experience of the Integrated Agricultural Production and Marketing Project.

1. The effort made by the project to upgrade the quality and relevance of the academic program at CLSU supports the proposition that such investment in regional universities is appropriate, feasible and, indeed, necessary. While that much is a matter of policy in the Philippines, the IAPM project confirms the policy is appropriate in specific and more specialized terms as well as general and more institutional terms. The Thrust was not as clear as it might have been in identifying who the beneficiaries of the Academic Thrust at CLSU were or how they related to the University's service area. Hopefully that condition can be corrected as the agri-management program continues to be linked with other parts of the CLSU program. Vagueness about beneficiaries raises a somewhat different question at CDEM: Can national needs for manpower in agribusiness and marketing best be met by upgrading and expanding the

capabilities of the Nation's premier agricultural University or should more serious attention have been given to upgrading and expanding the capabilities of the Nation's premier management and business schools? The choice has not been or is it now either/or -- a combination built on linking the best of both has been and remains available. Unfortunately, the project and the component were not nearly explicit enough about the audience and ultimate beneficiaries of the new academic programs to have made pursuing the question of linkages pressing.

2. Academic programs that are professionally oriented to agribusiness strongly require at least two components beyond highly trained staff and supportive facilities: (a) an environment that supports independent and critical perspectives on what agribusiness is and can be and (b) a systematic and continual linkage to the "real world" the program strives to understand and aims to serve. The first is needed to nurture a more comprehensive and open view of agribusiness and its roles. It is crucial if faculty research and student education are to achieve understanding as well as transmit received wisdom. The second ensures that continually relevant and useful skills are being transferred. The academic programs supported by the thrust have some distance to travel before either of these two components are adequately present. Here again, had the thrust been clearer about what aspects of agribusiness development and agricultural marketing it would contribute to, those elements of academic programming that needed strengthening would have been easier to identify.
3. A basic question arises about the of lack of clarity within the Thrust about what agribusiness development in the Philippines means; what obstacles and difficulties hinder that development; and how, where, and what manpower needs exist that relate to overcoming those obstacles. Nationally, such information has not been and is not now absent. Yet that information has not adequately influenced the design and implementation of the Academic Thrust at CDEM. Similarly, at a regional level, we do not find evidence of systematic assessment of agribusiness manpower needs in the Central Luzon region. In making this point, we are not suggesting a lack of need for the programs. Quite to the contrary, the ongoing regionalization of the Ministry of Agriculture, the continuation of the KKK program, and the possible improvement of incentives for private investment in agriculture all illustrate there are a range of roles that will require skilled practitioners. At this moment, can we say that the UPLB and CLSU programs are located on the front edge of that wave? We think not, but in part that is because the Thrust has not yet really made the effort to determine where the waves are. Given the distribution of management, business administration, and agricultural economic faculties in the Philippines, we suspect that the Academic Thrust would have achieved more had it been asking specific questions about manpower needs all along. There is an independent evolution of capacities at institutions other than CLSU and UPLB. In this larger picture, there are different strengths and weaknesses. That means different niches and comparative advantages for institutions to recognize and fill. We note here that responsibility for providing the

academic programs at UPLB and CLSU an appropriate axis along which they could evolve and develop did not belong to CLSU and UPLB alone. IAPMP management, AID, and KSU all seemed to have accepted the rather luxuriant assumption that there were general needs in marketing and management, and that a generalized staff development strategy focused on CLSU and UPLB was adequate. Considerable and notable effort was made to design food systems management curricula, but how was that process and its ultimate resolution influenced by interaction with the very institutions and groups it was supposed to serve? Fortunately, as already indicated, the programs are formative and such relationships can still be explored and utilized.

4. The original project paper states clearly that the manpower developed by this Thrust "will provide the basic source of skills for the other three elements of the project." That objective was heroic in concept and something less than useful as a guideline for overall project management. Logically, the other Thrusts would have had to wait for a flow of degree and non-degree trainees from programs that were not going to be able to function at adequate strength until staff development had proceeded. Certainly, a lesson to be learned from this is that the project design may have been too ambitious. That conclusion stands even if we consider all training in IAPMP. But that is not the most important lesson in this regard. More important, we believe, is having or developing a reasonably clear strategy of post-project capacity and program development. The benefits of the Academic Thrust are not coterminous with the staff and program development supported by the Thrust. The benefits of the Academic Thrust really begin when the Thrust ends, when trained staff return and are re-integrated into their respective faculties and programs. Rather than expect the Academic Thrust to staff the other IAPMP components, it has always been and remains considerably more realistic to expect that the experience of the other IAPMP Thrusts would be major contributors to the future evolution of the programs initiated under IAPMP Academic Thrust support at CLSU and UPLB. Budgetary support will certainly be important for the future of the Academic Thrust efforts at CLSU and UPLB, but the programs now (or soon) will have more of something than they had earlier--highly trained faculty. In what programmatic context will those faculty function? More than a budget question, this is a management question.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

- (1) The academic programs initiated and strengthened by the thrust cannot be effectively or relevantly guided without a vision of agribusiness and agricultural marketing in the Philippines. Steps need to be taken to develop such a vision and correlate it with the research, educational, and training functions of the two universities. That means:
  - (a). Program development plans should be constructed by both CLSU and UPLB in close cooperation with diverse portions of the public and private agribusiness sectors; other agricultural, business administration, and management faculties; NEDA, and the Office of

Budget and Management. The plans should include as a minimum specific sections on: faculty development; degree program objectives, scope, and audience; non-degree program objectives, and linkage to faculty development; and the roles of public and private sector practitioners in program implementation, evaluation, and redesign. Non-degree training conducted by CLSU and CDEM under the thrust should be evaluated as part of this exercise. The plans should give special attention to agribusiness development in the context of countryside development. That means the program plans should be clear about who the specific beneficiaries of agribusiness development are -- for different enterprise scales and sources of investment.

- (b). CLSU should assess the economic structure and opportunities in Central Luzon with special reference to agribusiness development in order to determine a realistic and appropriate regional service area. This assessment should be conducted in close cooperation with the regional offices of NEDA, the NFA, the Ministry of Agriculture, and appropriate representatives of small, medium, and large private agribusinesses. The assessment should provide a basis for planning linkages between the agri-management undergraduate program and (1) other CLSU programs, (2) other educational institutions in the region, (3) the programs and activities of the public sector in the region as they relate to opportunities for agribusiness formation and expansion, and (4) existing private sector agribusiness enterprises and projects, paying special attention to a range of scale and capitalization levels.
- (c). Since UPLB CDEM has several staff completing foreign advanced degree training under other support programs, CDEM has a special responsibility to re-assess its overall capabilities and responsibilities in order to effectively answer the questions: In the marketing and management areas, what can CDEM do well? Of special importance are substantive issues such as expanding understanding of specific commodity systems and their policy environments, so-called "non-formal" food marketing systems in the Philippines, rural agribusiness enterprise formation and expansion, and institutional issues such as developing strategies for enhancing the capabilities of various regional educational institutions.
- (d). A conference should be organized, possibly by PIDS AND CDEM, on the theme: "The Future of Agribusiness." The conference should address the issue of agribusiness development as both a public sector and private sector issue. Leading sector and commodity-specific policy, investment, and manpower issues should be discussed drawing on a variety of available data and analyses. The conference should identify priority issues and regional and commodity specific aspects of agribusiness development needs, giving special attention to medium-term requirements in policy research, degree and non-degree training.

- (e). Special efforts should be made to develop commodity specific understandings of the public management of agribusiness development. While the team recognizes this is in some respects, sensitive, we cannot see how academic programs in agribusiness can proceed with real credibility unless and even until they are informed by an understanding of the economics of public management of agribusiness. By public management we mean direct management or support of agribusiness functions by national agencies, essentially public sector corporations, cooperatives, and any other public bodies.
  - (f). Efforts are needed to improve understandings of modes of collective economic activity outside the framework of the essentially state-sponsored cooperative movement. Building such understanding will be a crucial part of orienting research, education, training and applied activities at the two universities to private agribusiness development. As part of such efforts, improved understanding would be needed also of the roles and functions of rural labor and capital markets, rural-urban linkages in specific agricultural commodity systems, the impacts of state and parastatal operations, and the distribution of firm size (employment, capitalization, and sales).
  - (g). Since several institutions in addition to CLSU and UPLB have developed research, education, and training capacities directed at agricultural marketing and management, consideration should be given to organizing an informal working group on agricultural marketing and management education. The working group should meet periodically for purposes of joint and mutual professional growth. One vehicle for such an initiative would be the Association of Colleges of Agriculture of the Philippines (ACAP). However, since several non-agricultural institutions have strength in business and management education, we recommend that the working group initiative be taken under the joint auspices of ACAP and the Management Association of the Philippines.
- (2) A No-Cost Extension of the IAPMP Project until December 31, 1983 should be made to permit participants on training to complete their programs and return to their institutions.

#### EXTENSION/OUTREACH - COMPLEMENTATION THRUST

##### OBJECTIVES AND OUTCOMES

As described in the original project paper, this thrust was expected "to achieve coordinated and profitable production, processing and marketing of priority commodities produced by small farm operators." In 1979, this objective was redefined when the Agribusiness and Cooperative Marketing activities were transferred from this thrust to the National Policy Thrust. That meant that extension/outreach consisted of the extension delivery system

(EDS) activity only. EDS addressed a desire by the Ministry of Agriculture and the National Food and Agriculture Council to improve the abilities and increase the efficiency of local MA staff in implementing national programs. The objective of EDS was specified in conjunction with planning for the National Extension Project (NEP), a World Bank-assisted effort. EDS became a pilot program for NEP, determining the feasibility of the training and visit or T&V system in the Philippines. By 1981, it was clear that EDS had demonstrated the T&V process was workable. The issue of content was identified as a potential problem, but the focus of EDS was, in fact, on process. With the implementation of the NEP, the EDS activity was essentially phased out in 1981 and a new activity organized. The new activity developed from discussions following the 1981 evaluation. That evaluation suggested more could be done to integrate some of the IAPMP activities.

The complementation program attempts to integrate four major activities of IAPMP (EDS, MAC, Tech Pack and Coops) by implementing them simultaneously in a single setting. The following has been accomplished:

- (1) Eight towns previously used as a pilot area for either EDS, MAC or Coops were designated as complementation areas.
- (2) An operational plan that has been agreed upon by all project workers has been developed for each pilot area. The plan identifies administrative mechanisms, the activities to be implemented and the corresponding agency with primary responsibility for each activity.
- (3) Several workshops and training programs designed to familiarize participants and intended farmer clientele with the rationale and implementing plans of the complementation program were completed.

#### FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

The complementation program can be looked upon as a model for integrating under a single management the many government programs that are being implemented in various communities.

- (1) Integration As a Desirable Goal. The program treats integration not only as a means of improving the efficiency of governmental programs in promoting rural development but as a desirable goal in itself. Thus, no attempt was made to compare the potential efficiency of an integrated approach relative to the usual single activity approach. Is the assumption of integration as a desirable goal in itself logical? Should not integration be treated as only one of among several approaches that should be evaluated?
- (2) The desirable level of integration. Assuming that some integration is needed, how broad of an integration is desired? Should all programs be put together into a single integrated package or should they be categorized into several sub-packages? What are the important considerations in making such a judgment?

- (3) The capacity of government technicians to simultaneously handle many competing activities. An important consequence of integration is the need for each government technician to be familiar with several existing projects. Clearly, it is more difficult to cope with many activities where before the technician was concerned with only one. Can the technician cope with such a difficulty? At the existing level of our field technicians might not the single activity focus be more efficient?

#### LESSONS LEARNED

While the complimentation program is less than two years old and is probably too young to produce significant impact, the following lessons may be evident.

- (1) Integration is difficult. It is evident that many difficulties inherent to integration have been met and will continue to be met by the program. Administrative authority, competing priorities, diverging perceptions among workers are some of the problems that seemed to exist in the project areas visited.
- (2) Evaluation of progress. With many activities simultaneously being implemented, the impact of the program becomes more difficult to evaluate. Many changes, usually small, are expected to occur, and it is not clear as to which is the more important and should be given more weight. Clearly, it will not be easy to judge the success or failure of this program.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

- (1) Continue the program but avoid the inclusion of additional pilot areas. The program is young and it is too early to expect significant accomplishments. The individual components are themselves in the process of development and the integration process is expected to even take longer. With such an expectation, it is not wise to expand the program so early. It is probably more prudent to pursue the initial program areas for a few years more, learn the lessons more clearly and then decide on whether to expand or not.
- (2) Develop clear and measurable criteria for evaluating success or failure. As previously mentioned, the measure of success or failure becomes more difficult with the integration of many activities. Such a difficulty, however, must be confronted and solved. While the program plan itself places major importance on the task of monitoring and evaluation, much of the evaluation has so far focused on opinions of project workers and farmers about the new set-up. Some measurement has yet to be attempted on actual benefits derived by the small farmer clientele. Such parameters as the rate of adoption of newly developed packages and improvement in income and productivity among farmer adoptors should form an important part of the criteria for success or failure.

## TECHNOLOGY PACKAGING THRUST

### OBJECTIVES AND OUTCOMES

The primary goal of this thrust was to develop technological packages that can increase farm income among the small rice farmers within a 15 kilometer radius of the CLSU campus. The technological packages were to integrate crop and livestock enterprises, product processing and marketing. At the end of the project the following was to have been accomplished:

- (1) Development at CLSU of the capability to implement the process of technology packaging.
- (2) Technological packages are developed that can substantially increase farm income among the small farmers of Central Luzon.
- (3) Adoption by the small farmers around CLSU of the newly developed technological packages and an increase in their average farm income in the area.
- (4) Validation of a process of technology packaging that can be replicated in by other Philippine institutions.

Substantial progress was made in items (1), (2) and (4) but very little progress was made in item (3). More specifically, the important outcomes of the project can be described as follows:

- (1) The process of technological packaging. On the premise that the technology required by farmers is one that integrates production with processing and marketing, the project developed a simple process of combining existing technology components into one package that can directly satisfy farmer's requirements. The initial intent was to combine a broad range of components, consisting of crop and animal enterprises and the corresponding post-harvest techniques for processing and marketing, into single integrated packages. In practice, the packaging process focused primarily on adding a crop or animal enterprise to the traditional rice crop. The process of packaging consisted of the following steps.
  - Step (a). Inventory of existing technology components by (1) reviewing results of previous experiments and (2) surveying existing farmer practices.
  - Step (b). Conduct research on those components that are not yet available but are considered crucial to the package being developed. This step was generally done through experiments conducted at the CLSU research station, often within the framework of PCARRD's regional research priorities.

- Step (c). Combining of information from step (a) and (b) into integrated packages that are designed to suit the bio-physical and socio-economic environment of the farmers within a 15 km radius of CLSU.
  - Step (d). On-farm verification of the packages developed in (c). The primary index for assessment used in this step is profitability per unit area of land.
  - Step (e). Dissemination to target farmers of the technology packages shown to be superior to existing cropping systems in step (d).
- (2) The newly developed production packages. Of the 28 commodity packages tested and generated at CLSU, 10 are now ready for dissemination. These packages are: peanut, mungbean, soybean, sunflower, goat, broiler, swine fattening, brickmaking, rice-fish-gabi and cotton. Note that the packages are primarily designed to increase farm production by adding new production activities to the existing rice crop. Hardly any attempts were made to integrate processing and marketing components.
- (3) Improvement of institutional capability at CLSU There are three major contributors to the improvement of CLSU's capability. These are: (a) returning faculty with advance degrees, (b) the work of foreign consultants, and (c) experience in actually doing the work by concerned CLSU staff. Of these three, on-the-job experience seems to have contributed the most to improving CLSU's capacity to implement the technology packaging processes. The CLSU staff who participated in the Tech Pack activity radiate with confidence that the job can be done and that they can do it. Working with farmers and extension technicians, activities that were avoided by less experienced CLSU staff in the early years of the project are now considered a necessary and welcome activities.
- (4) Increasing farm income - The ultimate indicator of the suitability of a technology package is its adoption by a large number of farmers in the target area. Clearly, this has not been achieved by the project. To this date, less than 5% of the farmers in the target area have adopted the technology packages developed by CLSU. In fact, the latest survey shows that farmer adoption may even be on the downtrend. We are not prepared to give this any final significance since dissemination activities are less than two years old. Nevertheless, there certainly are indications that the technology packages are not readily and widely accepted by farmers. Why this may be the case and what modification may be required in the packages or the packaging process have yet to be identified.

## ISSUES AND ANALYSIS

The concept of developing integrated technology packages linking production with processing and marketing and designed specifically to increase the income of small farmers is fairly new. The traditional approach to improving small farmer productivity and income is to develop specific production technology components which the farmers themselves (or with the help of production technicians) incorporate into their existing practices to suit their own farm environments and resource endowments. The technology packaging approach has many issues that are yet to be answered. Some of the more important ones are:

- (a) Efficiency of the technology packaging approach. What evidence do we have that the technology packaging approach is more efficient than the technology component approach? To this day the CLSU effort has not substantially impacted existing farmers' practices and farm productivity. Is this mainly due to the very limited time devoted to disseminating packages, i.e. substantial improvements can be expected soon? Or is it inherent in the process itself that progress is in fact slow and fragile?
- (b) Strategic place of Technology Packaging. The traditional approach of developing component technology is natural for research and educational institutions such as CLSU. Is this also true for the new approach of technology packaging? Might not this activity be more suited to institutions directly involved in extension instead of research? After the process has been developed and validated at CLSU would not the Ministry of Agriculture be the more strategic institution to replicate the process in other locations?
- (c) Level of Integration. How much integration is needed in a technology package? In this project the original intent was to develop a very broad package encompassing production, processing and marketing. At this time, however, the developed packages are primarily production oriented. Hardly any component on marketing or processing is incorporated. Is this an indication of some limit to the range of integration? Or is it more a case of not having the time, experience, and resources to develop the complete package?
- (d) Specificity of a technology package. One justification for the technology packaging process is that individual packages can be developed to serve specific environments. This implies that the process has to be repeated for many environments. However, how robust can a package be in environmental terms? How often should the process of technology packaging be repeated for purposes of environmental adaptability? Due to the low level of adoption of the packages by farmers around CLSU, it is not possible to evaluate the range of adaptability of these packages from that experience.

- (e) Focus on Small and Marginal Farmers As stated in the project objectives, the technology packaging process was to give priority to small farmers. Much of the technology represented in the packages being disseminated by CLSU are for irrigated farms. Farmer cooperators for off-campus testing have been selected from among farmers with larger landholdings. Does this indicate a distortion of goals or a preference to begin where adoption and experimentation may be more feasible? Either way, it is not clear that the technology packages are appropriate for small farmers who do not command relatively significant resources.
- (f) Integrating the new packages with the existing rice crop. Many of the newly developed packages are intended to supplement the existing rice crop. Such technologies as sesame, gabi, sorghum, and mungbean are intended for planting after the rice crop is harvested. For irrigated areas, these crops may even be planted after two rice crops have been harvested. We observed, however, that the new packages do not clearly show the dependence and inter-relationship of the new crop to the traditional rice crop. How difficult, for example, is it to plow a dried rice paddy? Can this be done by animal power? How late can the rice harvest be before there may be too little water for the new crops? It seems clear that these questions have to be addressed thoroughly since farmer adoption can be expected to depend a lot upon favorable relationships of the new crop with the traditional rice crop.

#### LESSONS LEARNED

Several important lessons can be learned from the substantial effort made by CLSU to package technologies. Some of the more important ones are:

- (1) On the adoption of new technologies. Farmers are very careful about changing their traditional practices in favor of a fairly new and unfamiliar technology. For a new technology to be adopted widely, it must show substantial possibility of profit. The superiority of the new technology must be shown not only by trials in the research stations of a University, but more importantly, in actual farmers' fields. In the present project many new technologies have been shown to have a high profit potential both at the research stations and in a few selected farms. And yet adoption by farmers is at best, spotty. Clearly, farmers' perceptions of the new technology and their actual reasons for non-adoption must feed back into the technology packaging process in order to modify and further improve the new packages.
- (2) On-farm surveys to evaluate existing farm and household status. In designing farm surveys, one can easily be over ambitious about the volume of information to be gathered only to find out that the processing of voluminous survey data is a major bottleneck. Such was the case in this project where the benchmark survey conducted at the start of the project has yet to be fully processed and summarized. It seems clear that farm surveys have to be planned carefully not only on the basis of information to be gathered but more importantly on how that information will be analyzed to answer specific question.

- (3) On the resource requirement for technology packaging. Considering that technology packages are expected to be very environment-specific and that the process of environmental testing must be repeated in many locations, it is necessary that technology packaging be fairly inexpensive. Some CLSU staff have suggested that the processing and marketing components of the process have been weakened by delays in operationalizing the Food and Feed Grains Processing Center. That may be the case for CLSU, but if it is true, what does this say about the infrastructure requirements of the Tech Pack process? For the present project, a substantial amount of money and personnel were expended for packaging. Considerable research primarily for technology generation on the University farm and on-farm surveys in the target areas have been conducted. A substantial portion of these activities ultimately may not be necessary. Perhaps the package can be designed based mainly on secondary research data such that the primary task can be shifted from research station trials to verification among actual farmers.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

1. CLSU should immediately conduct a well planned and adequately funded study aimed at assessing farmers' reasons for not adopting the new technology packages. The priority farmers to be interviewed are:
  - (a) Farmer cooperators including those that have stopped using the new technology.
  - (b) Farmers immediately adjacent to existing and former cooperators.
  - (c) Randomly selected farms in the target area.

Different instruments may have to be developed for each group, but the purpose is to determine the reason for adoption or non-adoption of the new technology. Because of such a clear focus, the instrument should be short and data analysis should be simple. A very similar type of survey has been conducted by IRRI and their experiences should be utilized in designing this study.

2. CLSU and the MA should redesign the technology packaging process to reduce its resource and time requirements. As previously suggested, the packaging process initially used at CLSU may be too expensive both in time and resources to be easily replicated at other locations. We believe several of the initial activities at CLSU may be reduced or eliminated in future applications. Some modifications which can be considered are:
  - (a) Reduce the effort devoted to technology generation on the research station and give more emphasis to the use of existing component technologies.

- (b) Shorten the survey of existing farm practices. No more than two months should be needed to get familiar with the prevailing farmer's practices in a given area.
- (c) Give primary emphasis to verification on farmer's fields. Using the information in (a) and (b) above, several new packages can be quickly developed (in less than six months). These packages, however, have to be accurately evaluated for their superiority over existing farm practices. This verification process should evaluate jointly all crops and livestock raised on the farm rather than separate testing for individual crops. Experience on this process is available in the Philippines and in several countries in Asia.

### THE FOOD AND FEED GRAIN PROCESSING CENTERS

#### OBJECTIVES AND OUTCOMES

The Food and Feed Grain Processing Centers (FFGPC) are to accomplish or facilitate the following: (1) provide a venue at the Central Luzon State University for applied faculty research and student learning on various aspects of food processing, ultimately graduating students prepared to assume roles in the Philippine food processing industry and developing faculty expertise capable of providing consulting services to that industry; (2) provide a facility at CLSU for processing and marketing the output from campus agricultural production; and (3) provide a marketing and processing outlet for small farmers within a 15-kilometer radius of the CLSU campus, particularly those involved with the technology packaging program.

The construction and operationalization of the Food and Feed Grain Processing Centers (FFGPC) has been the most controversial part of the IAPM project. That much was indicated by two prior evaluations (in 1979 and 1981), and in several boxes of memoranda, reports and correspondence. The context in which problems arose has been referenced in our earlier chapter on Overall Project Design and Management. We will not repeat what we have said there except to conclude that from design through construction, staffing, funding and plans for operation, a process has been unveiled that reveals management problems on the part of CLSU, KSU, IAPMP overall management, and USAID. We will only list some of the problems in order to convey a sense of what has happened:

- Adequate engineering design drawings were never developed or reviewed.
- Construction contracts and construction supervision were not performed well, and, in some instances, were performed either poorly or not at all.
- While considerable consultant expertise was brought to bear and generally used well for the feed center, the food center was not as effectively serviced. This reflected both KSU's strength and weakness as well as the limited authorities and responsibilities which IAPMP management had in relationship to agencies implementing specific IAPMP thrusts.

## ISSUES

The facilities are now expected to be completed before the end of 1983. That means buildings that are acceptably functional and equipment installed and working. The major difficulty that remains is the operation of the FFGPC. Specifically unsettled and still subject to discussion are: responsibility for operations and management; funding and financial control; relationship to other public and private institutions in the food and feed grain area; the relationship of the facilities to teaching, research, and student enterprise functions at CLSU; raw material sourcing and product marketing. The 1981 evaluation team recommended that a rigorous feasibility study directed at operations and management issues be conducted before additional dollar and peso funds were committed. A satisfactory feasibility study was not implemented. Instead, eventually, an operational plan was prepared. We judge the plan to be too conservative with regard to costs and funding, and too ambiguous with regard to management and linkages to other parts of CLSU, producers in the region, and related public and private agencies.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

- (1) This team strongly recommends that a rigorous Management and Implementation Study should be implemented before any commitments are made to fund or otherwise initiate operation. The study should be conducted under the auspices of Central Luzon State University, the Ministry of Agriculture, the National Economic and Development Authority, and the Office of Budget and Management. By "auspices", we mean that this interagency group should take responsibility for (1) defining and finalizing the scope of work and terms of reference for the study; (2) identifying participants for the study and arranging needed funding; (3) receiving the study report to ensure satisfaction of terms of reference; (4) determining of final recommendations and (5) bringing those recommendations to the attention of whatever parties needed to implement the recommendations.

Terms of reference and scope of work for the management and implementation study should be directed at establishing a study that takes an open and flexible view of options, assessing the feasibility and impacts of each, with regard to responsibility for operations and management (including an assessment of full and partial commercial options), funding and financial control, raw material sourcing and product marketing, and relationship to teaching and research functions at CLSU. The Management and Implementation Study should adopt two time frames. The first should be a longer-term time frame which asks: what is the most viable operations and management structure that should be implemented? It is within the context of the answer to this question that most other questions relating to operational matters will be addressed. The second time-frame should be shorter-term, we estimate two years, and it asks: how do we get the FFGPC running and determine actual product throughput, operating costs, etc? One of the options the study may recommend with regard to the second time-frame is to seek further

external financial assistance. However, we want to emphasize that the major and guiding questions of this study must be management, funding, raw material sourcing, marketing, relationship to teaching and research at CLSU, and the role of commercial operations. The study should be primarily directed at management and organization. It should consider technical issues only insofar as such issues are related to getting and keeping the centers running.

The Management and Implementation Study should take two to three months and should be completed before October, 1983 (the estimated time at which the physical facilities and equipment will be ready). The study should present to the Government of the Philippines a few well-evaluated strategies for the centers. The Study should indicate its own recommendations based on the evaluation of alternatives.

- (2) There should be a no-cost extension of IAPMP until December 31, 1983 to ensure that equipment procurement can be completed and equipment actually installed.

APPENDIX A

SCOPE OF WORK FOR END-OF-PROJECT EVALUATION

I. THE PROJECT

Title : Integrated Agricultural Production  
and Marketing Project

II. PURPOSE AND TIMING OF THE EVALUATION

The four to six-week evaluation will be conducted beginning around mid-April 1983 (approximately two months before Project Assistance Completion Date) following almost six years of project implementation to allow GRP, KSU and USAID to assess the effects of the project on intended beneficiaries and to derive lessons from the project's experience for purposes of future project design, planning and implementation.

III. AREAS TO BE ADDRESSED

The report of the evaluation should be able to answer the following major questions:

1. What are the Project's effects, as determined to the degree feasible, on its intended beneficiaries? How do these compare to what has been planned? Did the Project serve as an appropriate vehicle for addressing production and marketing constraints in the Philippines?
2. Have the institutional capabilities and linkages been strengthened by the Project? If so, can the activities initiated by the Project within the institutions retain momentum once the Project ends?
3. What lessons are to be derived from the Project's experience and how can similar projects be improved in the future in terms of design, planning, management and implementation?

In addressing the above major questions, the evaluation should look into the following aspects:

1. Academic Thrust
  - a. To what degree and how has the U.P. Los Banos (UPLB) and the Central Luzon State University (CLSU) facilitated the provision of a continuing supply of professionally-trained people (with skills in agricultural marketing, development planning and management, cooperative management, resource economics, finance and credit,

international trade, regional development economics and processing of agricultural products) in Philippine agriculture and food systems development for government agencies, agricultural education institutions, small farmers' cooperatives and agribusiness enterprises?

- b. How much has the library materials provided by the Project to CLSU contributed to its academic programs? Is there evidence that library enhancement will be a sustained activity at CLSU?

## 2. National Policy Thrust

- a. To what extent has an enhanced policy-making capability been institutionalized within the Ministry of Agriculture through improved linkages and interfacing between analysts and decision-makers; improved agricultural data system; enhancement of computer capability and enhancement of policy analysts' technical skills?
- b. How relevant/appropriate have the types of undertaken policy analysis been in meeting the needs of the M.A.?
- c. What future directions should policy and planning analysis take with the MA? How should the existing policy analysis staff under the IAPM Project institutionalized within the M.A.?
- d. What has been accomplished in improving the management capabilities of farmer cooperatives?
- e. To what extent have agribusiness activities under the Project contributed to a more vigorous agribusiness sector? What steps should the M.A. take to improve this private sector activity?
- f. To what extent has the Market Assistance Centers Program (MACP) a been viable approach for improving the marketing of farm products?
- g. To what degree has coordinated and profitable production, processing and marketing of small farmers' priority commodities been achieved through effective market assistance and agribusiness and cooperatives development programs?

## 3. Technological Packages Thrust

- a. To what degree has a capacity to develop modern alternative, integrated packages of production, processing and marketing technology been institutionalized at the CLSU?

- b. If continued, how could the process of technology packaging be improved?
  - c. What changes in productivity levels and types among target groups (or farmer-cooperators) have been brought about by the adoption of the tech packs introduced? What adoption problems/constraints have been encountered and how could these be remedied?
  - d. Since the FFGPC has not been made operational at the end of six years, what lessons could be learned from this experience?
  - e. When completed and operational will the FFGPC be useful in integrating production, processing and marketing of farmers' products?
4. Extension-Outreach Thrust/Complementation Program
- a. How effective have the Extension Delivery Systems Sub-Thrust and the Complementation Program been in systematically extending to small farmers the technological packages developed by research agencies and institutions and the necessary marketing assistance services ?
  - b. How useful have the training and visit method and the contact leader approach been as strategies in the provision of more efficient and effective extension services?
  - c. To what extent is the Complementation Program approach understood, working and appreciated?
  - d. To what extent has the Extension Delivery Systems Sub-Thrust influenced the Ministry of Agriculture's strategies for the delivery of extension services?
5. Participant Training
- a. To what extent are the M.S. degree and Ph.D. degree participants who have returned home effectively using the knowledge they have acquired in attaining the Project's objectives?
  - b. How effective have the non-degree training programs been in accomplishing project objectives?
  - c. How effective have the faculty fellowships been in contributing to the attainment of project objectives?

6. Technical Assistance

- a. To what extent has there been an effective transfer of knowledge from KSU consultants to GRP counterparts/agencies? To what extent have these transfers of knowledge and enhancement of skills been institutionalized within recipient GRP agencies?
- b. To what extent have the KSU Consultants' contributions/services been effectively used for the attainment of the Project's purposes?

7. Overall Management and Operations

- a. To what extent has there been effective planning and implementation within the four thrusts?
- b. To what extent has there been effective coordination among the thrusts and agencies?
- c. To what extent has the Executive Committee provided policy directions effectively?
- d. To what extent has there been an integration of project activities toward the overall goal of the project?
- e. To what extent has there been effective monitoring of project activities and has it functioned as intended?
- f. To what extent have adequate resources/inputs been made available on a timely basis by GRP, KSU and USAID?
- g. What effect has the regionalization of the Ministry had on the progress of activities toward the Project's objectives?
- h. To what degree has the host country contract arrangement proven to be an effective vehicle for attaining the project's objectives?
- i. To what extent has there been effective coordination among GRP, KSU and USAID in the implementation of project activities geared towards the attainment of project objectives?
- j. To what degree have the provisions in the Project Loan and Grant Agreement and the GRP-KSU Contract facilitated an efficient and effective implementation of project activities?

- k. To what extent has the GRP been effective in providing leadership, local staff and budgetary support in the implementation of project activities?
- l. To what extent has the Kansas State University (home Office and KSU Team Leader's Office) been effective as a source of technical assistance and implementation support?
- m. How effective has USAID been as a source of development resources, technical assistance and implementation support?
- n. What lessons can be learned from the organization of the Project within the M.A. in terms of institutionalizing the effects of foreign-assisted projects within a host-government agency?

#### IV REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

##### 1. Format of the Report

The report will contain the following sections:

- a. Executive Summary (two pages, single spaced, including statement of purpose of the AID project(s) reviewed and of the evaluation);
- b. Basic Project Identification Data Facesheet (see attached);
- c. Statement of conclusions (short and succinct with topic identified by subheading) and recommendations (corresponding to conclusions and worded, whenever possible, to specify who, or which agency, should take the recommended action);
- d. Body of report (which includes a description of the country context in which the project was developed and which provides the information on which the conclusions and recommendations were based); and

##### 2. Submission of Preliminary Draft Report

A preliminary draft of the report should be submitted for review by GRP, KSU and USAID ten days prior to completion of the evaluation period.

3. Debriefing

A debriefing session will be conducted by the evaluation team together with appropriate GRP, KSU and USAID officials and project implementors and personnel seven days before the end of the evaluation period to discuss the team's findings and to allow those involved in the Project to respond to the points raised by the evaluation team.

4. Submission of Final Report

Following finalization of team findings and recommendations based on results of the debriefing discussions, a final report will be submitted for review not later than three days following the end of the evaluation period. The team leader will be responsible for seeing the report through to timely, professional-level completion.

V. UTILIZATION OF THE EVALUATION REPORT

The evaluation team's report will be one of the subjects for discussion during an end-of-project workshop planned to be held not later than the first week of June 1983. The team's feasible recommendations may be considered for adoption by appropriate agencies in the continued implementation of activities initiated under the Project. The USAID may also use the report as a basis for future project design and planning.

Appendix B

EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The methodology used to conduct this evaluation included reading all relevant project documents and reports; interviewing thrust coordinators, selected consultants and participants, and appropriate individuals in the project environment; and site visits to Central Luzon State University and the University of the Philippines at Los Banos. A list of the principal persons interviewed follows:

1. Dr. Ulyses Acasio  
Consultant  
CLSU
2. Dr. Elpidio Agbisit  
CDEM-UPLB
3. Dr. Manuel S. Alba  
Minister of the Budget
4. Dr. Juliano Alunan  
Director, Planning Service  
Ministry of Agriculture
5. Mr. Diogenes Antonio  
Department of Agri-Management
6. Dr. Corazon Aragon  
CDEM-UPLB
7. Mr. Alberto Arevalo  
CDEM-UPLB
8. Ms. Teresita Austria  
Economic Planning and Research Staff
9. Ms. Jocelyn Aveno  
Socio-Economic Research Staff  
CLSU
10. Mr. Hilario Bera  
Barangay Captain  
Talavera, Nueva Ecija
11. Ms. Thelma Bernardo  
Socio-Economic Research Staff  
CLSU
12. Mr. David Besa  
Bureau of Agricultural
13. Dr. Manuel Bonifacio  
University of the Philippines
14. Ms. Bedelia Bool  
Bureau of Agricultural  
Economics
15. Dr. William Briggs  
Consultant  
CLSU
16. Mr. Constanacia Caballero  
CDEM-UPLB
17. Mr. Pacifico Cachero  
Municipal Action Officer  
Lupao, Nueva Ecija
18. Dr. Amado Campos  
President  
CLSU
19. Dr. Filomena Campos  
CLSU
20. Dr. Gelia Castillo  
Department of Agricultural  
Extension UPLB
21. Mr. Pastor Coloma  
Socio-Economic Research Staff
22. Dr. Emilio Cruz  
Research and Development Center

23. Dr. Thelma Cruz  
Research and Development Center  
CLSU
24. Dr. Rex Daly  
Consultant  
Ministry of Agriculture
25. Dr. Christina David  
Philippine Institute for  
Development Studies
26. Dr. Bart Duff  
International Rice Research  
Institute
27. Dean John Dunbar  
Kansas State University
28. Mr. Louie Divinagracia  
CDEM-UPLB
29. Dr. Ralph J. Edwards  
Chief, Office of Rural and  
Agricultural Development/USAID
30. Ms. Lolita Gonzales  
CDEM-UPLB
31. Mr. Mario Hiwatig  
CDEM-UPLB
32. Mr. Tom Hobgood  
ORAD/USAID
33. Mr. Domingo Idogo  
Farmer-Cooperator  
Lupao, Nueva Ecija
34. Mr. Wilfred Jamandre  
Department of Agri-Mangement  
CLSU
35. Mr. Fresciliano Jose  
Municipal Action Officer  
Talavera, Nueva Ecija
36. Dr. Jose Lawas  
Assistant Director-General  
NEDA
37. Honorable Manuel Q. Lim  
Deputy Minister  
Ministry of Agriculture
38. Dr. Eduardo Marzan  
Department of Agri-Management  
CLSU
39. Ms. Helene Mendoza  
Department of Agri-Management  
CLSU
40. Mr. Ricardo Mercado  
Farmer Cooperator  
Talavera, Nueva Ecija
41. Mr. Mervyn Misajon  
CDEM-UPLB
42. Ms. Celeste Molina  
Bureau of Agricultural  
Economics
43. Mr. Orlando Munoz  
Ministry of Agriculture
44. Dr. Wilfredo Nuqui  
Director, Economic Planning  
and Research Staff, NEDA
45. Dr. Celestino Olalo  
Policy Analysis Staff  
Ministry of Agriculture
46. Ms. Isabelita Pabuayon  
Bureau of Agricultural  
Economics
47. Dr. Filologo Pante  
Philippine Institute for  
Development Studies
48. Mr. Mario Perilla  
CDEM-UPLB

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|--|---|
| 49. Dr. Edgardo Quisumbing<br>IAPMP Overall Project<br>Coordinator         | 60. Mr. Jaime Sevilla<br>Assistant Director, Regional<br>Development Staff, NEDA          |
| 50. Mr. Roberto Ranola<br>CDEM-UPLB  | 61. Mr. Eduardo Sison<br>Farmer Cooperator<br>Lupao, Nueva Ecija                          |
| 51. Mr. Francisco Rentutar<br>Director<br>Bureau of Agricultural Extension | 62. Dr. Ray Steele<br>Consultant<br>CLSU  |
| 52. Ms. Anna Reyes<br>Socio-Economic Research<br>Staff, NEDA               | 63. Dr. Rodolfo Undan<br>CLSU   |
| 53. Mr. Romemo Reyes<br>Director, External Assistance<br>Staff, NEDA       | 64. Mr. Abraham Valino<br>Socio-Economic Research<br>CLSU                                 |
| 54. Dr. Fermina Rivera<br>Socio-Economic Research Staff<br>CLSU            | 65. Mr. Moises Vergara<br>Provincial Agricultural<br>Officer, Nueva Ecija                 |
| 55. Dean Marcelo Roque<br>CLSU   | 66. Mr. Louie Villa-Real<br>Ministry of Agriculture                                       |
| 56. Dr. Orlando Sacay<br>Deputy Minister<br>Ministry of Agriculture        | 67. Col. Bienvenido Villavicencio<br>Former Director, External<br>Assistance Office, NEDA |
| 57. Mr. Joseph Salvacruz<br>CDEM-UPLB                                      | 68. Mr. Ambrosio Villorente<br>Bureau of Agricultural<br>Extension                        |
| 58. Dean Pablo Sandoval<br>CDEM-UPLB                                       | 69. Dr. C. Peairs Wilson<br>Kansas State University                                       |
| 59. Mr. Emmanuel Santiago<br>CDEM-UPLB                                     |   |

In addition, a number of persons from the private food processing sector were interviewed.

APPENDIX C

GLOSSARY

ADAM	-	Agricultural Diversification and Marketing Project
BAEcon	-	Bureau of Agricultural Economics
BAEx	-	Bureau of Agricultural Extension
B.S.A	-	Bachelor of Science in Agriculture
CDEM	-	College of Development Economics and Management
CLSU	-	Central Luzon State University
CLT	-	Certificate of Land Transfer
EDS	-	Extension Delivery System
EXCOM	-	Executive Committee
FFGPC	-	Food and Feed Grain Processing Centers
GOP	-	Government of the Philippines
IAPMP	-	Integrated Agricultural Production and Marketing Project
KKK	-	Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran
MA	-	Ministry of Agriculture
MAC	-	Market Assistance Center
MAP	-	Marketing Assistance Program
MM	-	Master of Management
MPS	-	Master of Professional Studies
NEDA	-	National Economic and Development Authority
NEP	-	National Extension Program
NFA	-	National Food Authority
NFAC	-	National Food and Agriculture Council
PAS	-	Policy Analysis Staff
PCARRD	-	Philippine Council for Agriculture and Resources Research and Development
RDC	-	Regional Development Council
T and V	-	Training and Visit
UPLB	-	University of the Philippines at Los Banos
USAID	-	United States Agency for International Development