

THE
SAHEL MANPOWER
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
- AN EVALUATION -

4 June 1982

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Sahel Manpower Development Project was authorized at a level of \$8.5 million in FY 79 to provide training for 400-500 Sahelians in an effort to remove some of the critical manpower constraints to development in the Sahel. By FY 1982, the \$8.5 million was entirely obligated, and an additional \$1,225,000 was added to the project to enable some 135 participants currently in training to complete their studies. The total of approximately 315 Sahelians who will have completed training under SMDP is less than the 400-500 forecast in the project paper. From April 21 - May 21, 1982, a six person evaluation team gathered baseline data in Washington and in the field to assess project impact, achievements, cost and constraints. Preparation of this report continued from May 21 through mid-June.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS:

1. Program:

- SMDP is a versatile development tool that USAID Missions find useful in providing training outside the bilateral project context.
- SMDP was projected over a five-year life of project (LOP), but the planned \$8.5 million plus an additional \$1.2 million was obligated/committed in less than three years.
- Country Training Plans are generally consistent with Country Development Strategy Statements and Host Country objectives; some worthwhile programs have alleviated development constraints in areas outside of, but important to, implementation of project activity in priority sectors.
- The Project Review Committee mechanism was ineffective in AID/W and the field missions with the result that Country Training Plans (CTP) were not fully analyzed as a basis for LOP program decisions and funding consequences.
- Several Missions funded undergraduate academic programs contrary to PP guidelines. Neither AID/W's Africa Bureau nor ST/IT acted to correct such deviations.
- SMDP's actual impact has not been assessed fully because so few participants, particularly academics, have returned. Few Missions are

prepared to implement worthwhile follow-up programs.

- "Equivalency" remains a problem; U.S. training does not always result in upward mobility to responsible positions and full utilization of skills acquired in U.S. academic or non-academic institutions.

2. Management

- Just three of the francophone/lusophone countries offer some in-country English language training (ELT). Only Mali requires proficiency levels established in Handbook 10 as a condition of departure for U.S. training. In general, Missions have programmed ELT at ALIGU in Washington and the geographic (AFR) and technical (IT) managers have acquiesced.
- Training in the English language in the U.S. has increased the costs of long-term training - usually academic - by as much as 20%.
- Very few women have received opportunities for training under SMDP. The same observation applies to representatives of the private sector.
- Predeparture and follow-up guidelines are honored mainly in the breach. Few participants depart for the U.S. with more than a smattering of orientation to U.S. academic or social life. Returned participants receive Mission personnel attention mainly when operating in a U.S. funded project.
- Field Missions are generally understaffed and inappropriately organized to address basic human resource development and training issues, e.g., quality candidate selection; documentation; orientation; ELT testing and instruction; follow-up, including alumni associations and participant recognition.
- SMDP funded very little in-country training; the same applies for third country training. Most Africans prefer training in the U.S. over other African countries. No effective mechanisms were found for the placement and maintenance of participants in the third country mode.
- AID's Participant Training Information System and the associated financial tracking system require some integration and modification to qualify as Mission support functions.

3. Financial:

- AID/W allocated SMDP funds on the basis of annual Country Training Plans rather than an integrated LOP program plan.
- Annual planning offers field Missions little basis for a dialogue on the longer range aspects of an essentially pre- and post-project training program.
- Partial - rather than full - funding of participant programs by most Missions produced "mortgages" in excess projected resources; these remained undetected in the course of the annual fund allocation process.

- ~~— Some Missions used SMDP improperly as a surrogate for bilateral project funding. Missions funding undergraduate training increased average costs per participant.~~
- U.S. academic training under SMDP - currently estimated by ST/IT \$23,000/annum - compares to AFGRAD cost of approximately \$12,000. Assuming an SMDP Master's program requires 30 months plus six months ELT (as is now the rule), then \$69,000 must be allocated without allowance for inflation.

PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Because this evaluation is seen as formative, leading to a prospective second phase participant training project, and because the findings pertain to bilateral project as well as SMDP funded participant training, the following recommendations are made:

- The respective program/implementation responsibilities of AID/W and Field Missions must be clearly delineated in accordance with established AID policies and procedures; e.g., Project Review Committees must be established.
- A CTP - projected for five years - should constitute the basic planning/implementation guide. The aggregate of all CTP - once approved - should be the basis for fund apportionment. Missions should assume full implementation responsibility; any LOP short-falls should be subsumed in regular bilateral CYB.
- Measurable criteria should determine the equitable apportionment of SMDP funds among Sahelian countries.
- The CTP should contain a rational mix of U.S., third country and in-country training, all justified in terms of the CDSS, but not slavishly harnessed to CDSS priority sectors, which should be the focus of the regular bilateral project programs.
- SMDP trainings should remove or alleviate critical development constraints in institutions or sectors that impede bilateral project progress and success. Under no circumstances should SMDP substitute for bilateral project funding of training. ✓
- AID Missions should assume more active roles in:
 - general candidate selection
 - assuring increased participation by women
 - offering training opportunities to the private sector.
- AID Missions should form training committees with broad program and technical membership to assure full coordination of the participant training component of technical assistance. Increased U.S. and

local national direct hire effort should be concentrated on participant training:

- Effective pre-departure orientation, English training and follow-up programs should be implemented in collaboration with USICA, Peace Corps or alumni associations of returned participants.
- Personnel associated with training should be encouraged to upgrade their skills and knowledge of the training component.
- AID/W and AID Missions must resolve issues impeding the development of in-country ELT programs. If African officials value U.S. training, they should also value the language proficiency on which absorption of that training depends. The Africa Bureau and ST/IT should agree that TOEFL proficiency levels of 425-450 are mandatory prior to departure for U.S. training.
- In those instances where in-country ELT potential is problematic, AID/W and Missions concerned should combine efforts to arrange ELT in other Sahel countries or in a regional facility, e.g., in The Gambia.
- AID/W should investigate whether implementation (placement and maintenance) of third country training can be contracted out effectively and economically. The cost benefit questions should be addressed and answered definitively as an alternative to the conventional wisdom that "third country costs less."
- AID/W Africa Bureau and ST/IT should actively identify U.S. training resources capable of offering in-country courses in local language on topics of current import, e.g., management; financial controls; energy; environment. Returned participants should be encouraged to participate in such in-country activities both as resource personnel and trainers.
- AID personnel at all levels should focus on reducing the costs of U.S. training: more efficient ELT; better preparation of academic credentials; lower contract overhead; tuition waivers; increased host country contributions (international travel); fewer extensions of individual programs.
- U.S. academic training should be limited to graduate level degrees. Non-academic U.S. training should be decided on the basis of relevance and absence of qualified third country facilities. The possibilities of using non-academic training as a lead-in to in-country training should be considered and written into PIO/P, where feasible.
- All training should be funded for the duration of the program (when regulations allow) to reduce extensions and other cost overruns.
- Mission dialogues with host countries should stress the inequity of civil service systems that deny equal opportunity, recognition and mobility to trained participants, especially those returning from non-francophone countries.

PREFACE

The Evaluation Team organized to review the first three years of activity under the Sahel Manpower Development Project brought together a variety of talents from both inside and outside the Agency for International Development:

- A senior retired AID executive (contractor)
- A development economist/evaluator (contractor)
- Two education specialists (direct-hire)
- A training specialist (direct-hire)
- An English language expert (contractor)

The former AID executive functioned as overall Team Leader and headed a sub-team - with an education and the training specialist - that visited the Sahelian coastal countries of Mauritania, Senegal and The Gambia plus Cape Verde. The development economist led the inland team, comprised of the other education specialist and the ELT expert, covering Mali, Upper Volta and Niger. The ELT expert joined the "coastal" group for the Senegal and The Gambia visits, while the Sahel Development Planning Team's social anthropologist accompanied the "inland" team to Upper Volta and Niger.

The Team's itinerary called for Washington meetings beginning April 12, departure for the field evaluations on April 21, return to Washington on May 21 and completion of the report by June 4. After a late start, the whole schedule slipped by several days with consequent effects throughout the entire calendar. Unfortunately, the Team never met as a full unit prior to departing for the field nor could all members be assembled for all meetings during the crucial report preparation period. The practical effect was that the bulk of the analysis, writing, critique and editing fell on the shoulders of that hard core of Team members who participated in all sessions, including the various briefings of responsible AID/W decision makers, and pooled their combined verbal and written experience in the interest of a comprehensive report.

The reader will detect some variation in literary style in the report narrative because it is the product of several Team members. In the interest of completing the report on a timely basis, the Team made a conscious decision to allow such variety to stand. Most Team members read and commented on the entire narrative; the Team Leader incorporated those comments into the final version and edited the total narrative to eliminate duplication and simplify the format. Some of the typed material was left in its double-spaced draft form in the interest of economy of money and time.

Mission and AID/W personnel alike broke into busy schedules to work with Team members all along the way. Most host country officials cooperated through candid observations on local working relationships growing out of SMDP and other project activity. The Team's single complaint concerned the limited time planned for work in the individual countries; the tight schedules eliminated almost entirely the possibility of visiting project sites and interviewing enough returned participants, whether SMDP or other projects, in their work environments. Thus, an important dimension of the evaluation received less than its just due; future Teams should take note along with project managers. In closing, a note of appreciation is accorded to all those personnel, not only administrative employees, who saw to the logistics of the Team's travels. They did their jobs well.

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SUBJECT: SMDP Evaluation

I. Foreword

Following is the synthesis of the SMDP Evaluation Team findings and corresponding recommendations for constraint removal and program development. The final results emerge as a comprehensive product of the combined Team effort; all Team members reviewed and annotated the narrative to include their views and the outcome of their respective investigations.

The attention of all concerned is invited to the fact that many recommendations in this report are Agency-wide in their impact, particularly where participant training procedures are involved. In the specific realm of English language training, recommendations encompass all of francophone Africa involved in training participants in the U.S. In essence, these two factors require wider review and consideration, if the entire Africa Bureau is to benefit from the results of this evaluation.

II. Introduction

The SMDP Evaluation Team operated in two sub-teams: an HRD specialist, a development economist/evaluation specialist and an ELT specialist traveled to Mali, Upper Volta and Niger; an HRD specialist, a training officer and a program evaluation specialist covered Mauritania, Cape Verde, Senegal and The Gambia. The ELT expert joined the "coastal" sub-team during the visits to Senegal and The Gambia. The SDPT regional anthropologist joined the "inland" team in Mali.

During the period April 21 - May 21, 1982, the team gathered baseline data on participants and project costs, examined program compatibility with host country and USAID strategies and priorities and explored program impact, achievements and constraints. Data was gleaned from HC/USAID records, interviews with returned participants (including some from other projects), formal discussions with HC/USAID officials responsible for SMDP management and operation and meetings with HC representatives involved with selecting SMDP participants and supervising returnees from training. Among other agencies contacted were Peace Corps, USICA, UNDP/FAO, UNESCO and USAID Project managers. These contacts varied from country to country depending upon availability and association with human resource development. Five research instruments/questionnaires were developed and served as research guides on the following topics:

- a. Program and participant baseline data and financial statistics.
- b. USAID Mission project management
- c. Participant evaluation and performance
- d. English language training
- e. Pre-departure and follow-up programs

III. General

~~The SMDP project purpose as specified in the PP log frame is both general and vague. The anticipated end of project status (400-500 Sahelians trained in priority fields and effectively employed using those skills)~~ was only partially achieved as the result of a series of program, management, and implementation considerations. Some of these issues were inherent in the initial SMDP design and others have developed during the life of the project. These considerations and issues are outlined below along with a series of recommendations which in the evaluation team's view will mitigate or resolve them.

IV. Principal Findings/Recommendations

A. Program

1. A general consensus exists among USAID missions and host country representatives that SMDP is a versatile development tool which they have found useful and need to have available to them in the future for training outside of the project context.

Recommendation: that any prospective SMDP II PP log frame be modified to more precisely state project goal and purpose, including the specific purposes of providing:

- a. pre-project training;
- b. post-project training; and
- c. training to remove critical development constraints that impact on the success of AID's projects.

2. In general, country training plans (CTP) are consistent with USAID country development strategies (CDSS) and host country needs although a number of departures have been made to remove constraints in special situations of emerging host country needs. 1/

Recommendation: that guidelines be developed (and adhered to by USAIDs) concerning the utilization of SMDP funds for non-CDSS related purposes.

3. Private sector candidates have had little or no access to SMDP training due to a variety of factors, including:

- a. paucity (or complete absence) of academically qualified candidates;
- b. host government exigencies in matters of maintaining family maintenance allowances, increased compensation while in training, and post-training promotions;

1/ Examples range from the training of a mining engineer and a refrigerator specialist (Niger) through upgrading a public health physician's skills (Mali) to training for village livestock project prior to project start-up (Upper Volta).

- c. failure of host country governments/USAIDs to see ~~private sector candidates' selection and recruitment being limited to civil servants;~~
- d. ~~limiting candidate identification and recruitment exclusively to designated host government Ministries (at their behest), and~~
- e. absence of highly developed private sectors.

Recommendation: that new guidelines and criteria for candidate participation/selection submitted to host country agencies include:

- a. USAID CDSS parameters;
- b. a specified (and feasible) portion of candidates to be taken from private sector;
- c. a USAID review provision; and
- d. an outline of possibilities of conducting informal, adult education training for private sector participants (not qualified for formal academic training).

4. There are some indications that SMDP funds have been used as a source of surrogate training funding.

Recommendation: that guidelines to USAIDs specifically interdict such usage of SMDP funds.

5. The average time required for the completion of most graduate academic programs leading to the master's degree is two years, not including language training or other adjuncts. The fact that most SMDP participants are expected to complete their studies in a 24-month period is a serious miscalculation which impacts negatively upon project budget projections and calculations. Most participants who enter the program without prior proficiency in English require six months' language training while some require even more. In this sense SMDP budget cost factors do not reflect reality in terms of per participant costs which are generally some 20 per cent higher than those projected for a 24-month period; this applies equally to undergraduate programs.

Recommendation: For planning purposes a 30-month cost projection should be made for participants entering most masters' programs. It would also be prudent to factor in minimal provisions for contingencies and inflation (say, 5 per cent for each).

B. Management

1. The AID/W participant data base and tracking system leaves much to be desired in terms of baseline participant program data retrievability. Participant data is maintained in two separate systems (FM and S+T/IT). Moreover, since storage in the FM data base is by PIO/P sequential numbers, on a worldwide basis, it is necessary to prepare a special program to retrieve information pertinent to a limited region such as the Sahel. In addition, certain critical information is not

recorded at all, and participants are "lost" to USAID and host country view during and after the training period.

Recommendation: The question of proposing an improved reporting and data management system is a moot one for this evaluation since an RFP has just been issued for an overall global AID participant training contractor who will not only design a professional Management Information System (MIS) but implement it as well. However, it should be noted that in addition to consolidating the two existing data bases, the new MIS should include:

- a. marital status;
- b. whether participant is accompanied by family member(s) or not;
- c. if participant has relevant/critical home country assignment awaiting completion of training;
- d. periodic academic and social progress reports to USAIDs;
- e. early projection/forecast of any scholarship extension(s) requirements;
- f. CTP objectives and degree of CTP achievement including UST, ICT, and TCT "mix;"
- g. number of participants (by country and discipline) who complete or prematurely terminate programs including timeliness, mode (LT, St, or technical), and locus;

None of the above should be construed as substituting for adequate mission records, particularly for follow-up of returnees.

2. USAID mission staffing patterns relative to participant training differ widely. The range varies from satisfactory (one instance with a U.S. direct-hire human resources officer and two local-hire training officers) through just adequate (a U.S. direct-hire SMDP project manager and a FSN training officer) to barely adequate (an FSN training officer supported as required by the program officer). In only the first instance, Mali, is a USAID mission adequately staffed to provide quality candidate recruitment, documentation, ELT (supervision), and follow-up and authoritatively negotiate with responsible HC officials. With respect to the coastal countries, only one (Gambia) has a well run SMDP program with an unusually competent local-hire training officer.

Recommendation: that USAID Mission be asked to strengthen staff responsible for participant training, provide training for the training officers if required, and give greater emphasis/support to the human resources/training staff.

3. Many activities connected with participant training can be and are contracted out (e.g., ELT, participant orientation/briefing, participant maintenance, counseling, scheduling, et.). Other activities, such as TCT placement and maintenance (as mentioned elsewhere in this report), progress monitoring and post-training follow-up, and tracking can and should be assigned to a competent and experienced contractor(s). In only one country, The Gambia, did the Team find a nascent participant alumni association, which can be an effective coordinating agency for follow-up

and possibly function in a contract relationship providing pre-departure, ELT and follow-up services. However, USAID missions should retain oversight and control in certain critical policy areas.

Recommendation: that efficient and competent contractors be identified and utilized to supplement USAID mission capabilities in implementing U.S., in-country and Third country training. However, USAID missions should retain oversight and control of: (a) planning; (b) selective recruitment; (c) monitoring; and (d) follow-up of individual participants and trainees generally.

Finding

Consultations and research at almost all USAIDs visited in the course of the evaluation established that SMDP PP guidelines as well as the general provisions of Handbook 10 were not being properly observed.

(1) For example, in several instances no in-country training committees have been established to deal with the setting of training priorities or the identification and selection of candidates;

(2) In other instances no serious or sustained efforts have been made to include in-country or TCT in the program;

(3) Predeparture orientation/briefing monitoring and follow-up of participants as called for both by the PP and Handbook 10 was largely minimal with few exceptions;

(4) With the exception of Mali, ELT minimal score guidelines as recommended by Handbook 10 were largely ignored; and

(5) Adherence to the credentials analysis and call-forward policies outlined in Handbook 10 was almost entirely lacking.

Recommendation

In view of the critical importance of insuring that training plans are coherent with CDSS objectives and AID policies, it is recommended that:

(1) CTPs which do not include establishment of an in-country training committee (or its equivalent) be held unacceptable;

(2) Greater attention be given to the training "mix" or modes proposed by each country both at the USAID and AID/W levels and that proposals for ICT and TCT be given preferential consideration over UST;

(3) That no participant be allowed entry into the program without the recommended ELT score; and

(4) That USAIDs be held strictly accountable by AID/W ST/IT, etc. for adherence to the degree possible to the guidelines, requirements, and regulations set out in Handbook 10 regarding participant training, particularly as it relates to call forward, credential analyses policies, participant predeparture orientation/briefing monitoring and follow-up.

C. Finances

General

The initial FY 1979 funding of \$8.5 million for participant training (PT) over a five-year period (FY 1979-FY 1983) has been increased in FY 1982 by \$1,225,000 for a total of \$9,725,000. The entire sum will be obligated in FY 1982 to enable some 135 PTs currently in academic/technical training to complete their studies. The total of approximately 315 Sahelians who will have completed training under SMDP 1/ is less than the 400-500 forecast in the project paper (PP).

The reasons for this cost overrun, training and time deficits are several and include:

- a. SMDP funds allocation policies which tended to respond to USAID training proposals on an ad hoc or unprogrammed basis and thus allowed the LOP funding to be obligated in three rather than five years.
- b. the partial funding of some participants by USAIDs in nearly every country causing cost overruns and "mortgages" on future funds;
- c. higher than anticipated demand for long-term academic and technical training by Sahelian countries;
- d. the indiscriminate acceptance into the program of some candidates with English language and/or academic shortcomings necessitating additional expenditures for the extension of their time in training;
- e. the unanticipated concentration of both long- and short-term training in the U.S. 2/ as opposed to a larger proportion of Ps in Africa; and
- f. substantial increases in the cost of participant training during the past three years.

1/ Includes approximately 40 participants who will participate in the Joint Pan-African Institute for Development (PAID)/University of Pittsburgh Francophone Regional Management Development Seminar in Ouagadougou November 1-19, 1982.

2/ 74.8 per cent of LT in U.S. vs. 25.1 per cent in Africa (two thirds of whom come from Chad, a politically disturbed country); 71.7 per cent ST in U.S. vs. 28.2 per cent in Africa.

Training Costs Analysis

a. Projected Costs

These projections were contained in the original SMDP PP.

1. U.S. training

(a) Academic (LT)

Tuition, books, domestic travel, maintenance etc. were estimated at \$1,250 a month, excluding international travel.

(b) Special (ST)

ST/IT costs were estimated at \$1,800 a month, excluding international travel.

(c) International travel

Round-trip travel was estimated at \$1,900.

2. Africa training

(a) Academic (LT)

Tuition, books, maintenance, etc. were estimated at \$400 a month, excluding travel.

(b) Special (ST)

Tuition, books, maintenance, etc. were estimated at \$600 a month, excluding travel.

(c) Special (ad hoc)

Based on a two-week international seminar (with total costs of \$40,000 for 25 participants), per capita cost was estimated at \$1,600, excluding travel.

3. Scholarship management

This project component was estimated at \$50,000 per country

LOP.

4. Miscellaneous

(a) Contingency costs were estimated at \$25,000 per country
LOP.

(b) Anticipated inflation was factored into the budget at 10 per cent.

Obligated Costs

The following costs are as obligated by P10/P. 1/

1. U.S. training

(a) Academic (LT)

Ranges from \$1,251 (absolute low) to a high of \$2,400 a month. 2/ Median costs are in the \$2,200 range.

(b) Special (ST)

Median cost is \$5,000 a month. 3/

(c) International travel

Round-trip travel is currently (1980-82) factored in the range of \$2,000 to \$2,200.

2. Africa training

(a) Academic (LT)

Ranges from \$534 a month to \$644. 4/ The median cost is \$590.

(b) Special ICT (ST)

The representative monthly cost based on actual ELT experience 5/ ranges from \$396 to \$2,248 for a median cost of \$1,124. 6/

1/ Although PT costs inevitably vary because of differing tuition costs at various academic and technical training institutions, length of time in training and other similar considerations the range of costs shown here are representative of those used at the most frequently utilized U.S. institutions.

2/ Includes 90 hours in-country ELT (factored at \$1,850).

3/ Illustrative examples: seminars at University of Connecticut (six weeks, \$5,250); U.S. Dept. of Labor (four weeks, \$5,000); University of Pittsburgh (nine weeks, \$9,065); USDA (six weeks, \$4,975).

4/ Includes undergraduate and graduate and technical training of all SMDP Ps (excepting Chad) in TC Africa training (11) as follows: 5 Gambia Ps (3 in Ghana, 2 in Nigeria, with a further 2 scheduled for training in Kenya/Tanzania); and 6 Mauritania Ps (2 each in Senegal and Tunis).

5/ Based on BEVI (Bamako) 30 hours/week cost of \$3.33 per hour and USICA (Bamako) cost of \$15.41 per hour for same duration.

6/ Highly dubious calculation based on only ELT information available.

~~(c) Special (ad hoc)~~

Based on prorated costs (40 participants for three weeks) for two weeks, \$2,600. 1/

3. Scholarship management

The only country which has used funds under this project component appears to be Niger which has obligated \$26,000 to USICA for ELT for an indeterminate number of participants.

4. Miscellaneous

(a) Contingencies: The following two tables indicate the extent of contingency costs which have occurred.

Table I. Extent of Mortgage 2/

	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>Total</u>
Mali	\$110,779	\$ 69,340	0	\$180,119
Upper Volta	0	9,294	9,460	18,754
Niger	0	0	0	0
Senegal	0	291,000	264,000	555,000
Mauritania	0	105,700	364,000	469,700
Cape Verde	0	495,000	-408,500	903,500
Gambia	<u>6,000</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>114,000</u>	<u>120,000</u>
Grand Total	\$116,000	\$970,334	\$1,159,960	\$2,247,073

Table II. Extensions 3/

	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>Total</u>
Mali	\$ 27,929	\$ 3,500	\$ 45,200		\$ 76,627
Upper Volta	0	0	1,248		1,248
Niger	0	0	0		0
Senegal	57,600	16,744	85,860		160,204
Mauritania	0	45,574	18,691		64,265
Cape Verde	0	0	158,800		158,800
Gambia	<u>97,190</u>	<u>106,332</u>	<u>138,022</u>	<u>\$70,700</u>	<u>412,244</u>
Grand Total	\$182,717	\$172,150	\$447,821	\$70,700	\$873,388

(b) Inflation LOP has ranged from 7.5 percent to 14 per cent.

1/ Based on University of Pittsburgh Francophone Management Development Seminar (Ouagadougou, November 1-19, 1982).

2/ Estimated funds required to complete training of partially funded participants.

3/ Funds obligated for "fully funded" participants.

Comparative Costs Analysis

1. Costs deficit

The cost overrun or deficit of obligated costs as compared with projected costs can be noted in nearly every project component as indicated in the following chart.

	<u>Projected Cost</u>	<u>Obligated Cost</u>	<u>Deficit</u>
1. <u>U.S. training</u>			
(a) Academic (LT)	\$1,250 P/M	\$2,200	\$ 950 P/M
(b) Special (ST)	1,800 P/M	5,000	3,200 P/M
(c) International travel	1,900	2,100	200
2. <u>Africa training</u>			
(a) Academic (LT)	\$ 400 P/M	590	190 P/M
(b) Special ICT (ST)	600 P/M	1,124 ^{1/}	524 P/M ^{1/}
(c) Special (ad hoc)	1,600 PC	2,600	1,000 PC
3. <u>Scholarship management</u>	\$50,000 per country		Negative
4. <u>Miscellaneous</u>			
(a) Contingency	\$25,000 per country		Negative
(b) Inflation	10 per cent		2.5 per cent

2. Average Obligated Cost per SMDP Participant

The bases and indications of this analysis are not as firm as the Evaluation Team would like. It has proven extremely difficult to arrive at completely reliable figures/conclusions for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the record keeping at the USAIDs vary from excellent to very poor with the result that there is no uniformity in available data to allow for even a gross global SMDP average cost per participant. ^{2/}

Proceeding on a country-by-country basis has also proven to be unreliable because (1) some Ps in 1979 were carry-overs from AMDP and (2) subsequent year funding for some Ps are entered on separate PIO/Ps causing them to appear more than once on the FM computer print-out roster which lists Ps by PIO/P number (worldwide) rather than by name. A further complication is the partial funding of Ps in certain instances. For example, some participant training costs including ELT and transportation are provided by USICA. In other instances SMDP funds have been used to pay the transportation costs of participants in USICA-sponsored observation seminars while the remaining costs are borne by USICA. Are such participants USICA or SMDP participants? In any case the results are unreliably skewed statistics.

^{1/} Highly dubious calculation based on only ELT information available.

^{2/} Dividing the total funds obligated by the number of participants.

Nevertheless, the Evaluation Team compiled the data available in the seven countries it visited and, with the above reservations in mind, presents the following tabulations as being illustrative of the trends in SMDP average costs per participant.

(a) Mali

Average Cost Per SMDP Participant

	1979		1980		1981	
	LT	ST	LT	ST	LT	ST
UST	\$26,665	1/ \$10,237	\$51,600	\$8,500	\$33,666	\$10,375
ICT	0	0	0	0		6,750
TCT		2,300		3,500		5,500

(b) Upper Volta

Average Cost Per SMDP Participant

	1979		1980		1981	
	LT	ST	LT	ST	LT	ST
UST	\$26,579	\$7,527	\$25,304	\$8,104	\$29,980	\$10,126
ICT	0	0	0	0	0	0
TCT	0	3,900	1/ 0	3,050		0

(c) Niger

Average Cost Per SMDP Participant

	1979		1980		1981	
	LT	ST	LT	ST	LT	ST
UST	42,240		\$49,124	\$6,975	\$36,707	\$14,137
ICT	0	\$4,000	0	0		2,500
TCT		2,470		1,579		5,500

(d) Senegal

Average Cost Per SMDP Participant 1/

UST	\$26,787	\$6,225	\$21,370	\$7,267	\$28,781	\$6,247
TCT		926				4,843

(e) Mauritania

Average Cost Per SMDP Participant

UST	\$30,000	\$9,280	\$21,894	\$11,576	\$48,904	\$3,117
TCT	—	—	11,475	1,473	15,843	—

1/ Some participants only partially funded.

(f) ~~Cape Verde~~

Average Cost Per SMDP Participant 1/

UST	\$17,728	--	\$18,920	--
ICT	--	--	--	\$5,294

(g) The Gambia

Average Cost Per SMDP Participant 1/

	1979		1980		1981		1982
	LT	ST	LT	LT	ST	LT	
UST	\$11,743	\$8,203	\$9,667	\$17,193	\$6,855	\$8,838	
TCT	\$10,000	--	--	10,000	--	--	

1/ Some only partially funded.

The variations from year to year reflect total obligations divided by numbers of PIO/P, thus, account needs to be taken of the differing mix each year. For example, the wide difference shown for Mali LT participants may result from a combination in 1980 that presents a skewed picture when compared to 1979 and 1981. Until more definitive expenditure data is available, these gross comparisons are all the Team could make. Even then, the variety of policies followed from Mission to Mission concerning partial or full funding will continue to produce aberrations.

V. EXTENDED EVALUATION NARRATIVE

A. Program/Management Aspects

Finding No. 1:

Irrespective of the absolute number of Sahelians targeted to be trained under SMDP, the project paper (PP) specifies that roughly a third are to be trained in host or third-country institutions. In fact, 73 of 315 participants were trained in Africa, 33 of whom, for a period of over six months. The evaluation team encourages the use of quality third-country training (TCT) institutions, where feasible, since TCT is less expensive, generally more relevant, and alleviates the need for English Language Training in most cases. However, there are a number of constraints to the use of long-term TCT which explain and partially justify the limited use of such institution during SMDP Phase I.

- Most statistical institutions for higher learning in Sahelian West Africa are already overcrowded with priority given to the satisfaction of national needs. Some institutions (University of Dakar) allow for a quota of foreign students, but these slots are quickly filled under national budget sponsorship.

- Graduate training (M.S. and above) is, by and large, unavailable in West Africa. Mauritania, The Gambia and Cape Verde cannot yet meet their own undergraduate training needs in academic and technical fields; the remaining countries have effective national education institutions.

- The "quality" of West African higher level training institutions has not achieved standards found in developed countries in terms of availability of institutional materials, laboratory equipment, pedagogical techniques, and library facilities. The strengthening of these institutions is another issue.

- AID lacks an effective mechanism for the placement and maintenance of participants in third countries, depending upon the cooperation of already understaffed USAID missions, U. S. Embassies or government-to-government arrangements. There is general resistance on the part of African countries to third country training. Most candidates prefer to attend institutions outside Africa.

RECOMMENDATION:

AID should encourage and finance regional short-term training seminars in certain technical disciplines, previously available in the U.S. only. Considerable cost savings could be effected by contracting with USDA, University of Pittsburgh, Michigan State University, and University of Michigan (CRED) to implement their successful short-term training courses, in French, on African soil, and if possible, in cooperation with African training institutions which would thereby

become strengthened. USDA has already successfully conducted a required project management seminar in Dakar, and the University of Pittsburgh plans to conduct a management training course in Ouagadougou, ~~in cooperation with the Pan-African Institute for Development.~~ Additionally, such ventures should be encouraged. Short-term training in the U. S. should only be conducted when training objectives require significant practical or technical field visitations, or where laboratory or other essential technical equipment is unavailable in Africa.

HC/USAID dialogues should stress short-term in-country training, employing returned participants and using course material made available by the U. S. institutions and, in some instances, supported by U. S. experts brought in for limited participation. Cape Verde and The Gambia have the approach under study.

Finding No. 2:

The process of apportionment and allocation of SMDP funding was based upon submission and review of country training plans, annually, usually during the month of November. The process has several shortcomings:

- In all countries, coordinating authorities require notification of scholarship availability, usually in October, in order to proceed with candidate selection. This dis-synchronization of timing forces USAID missions to either go out on a limb and promise scholarships based upon anticipated authorization, or forego long-term candidate nomination in any given year. The first alternative caused considerable USAID mission embarrassment when FY 82 funds were unavailable, and the second alternative prevented several USAIDs from sending several promising candidates for long-term training to the U.S.

- In Senegal, the AID Mission found that because of delays in the program process for SMDP, it was losing out on the best candidates who were taken by other donors. The past year, however, it speeded up the process and presented its scholarship list at the same time as other donors.

- The annual funding process effectively prevents missions from engaging in long-term planning with HC officials.

- Due to less than adequate financial reporting (from AID/W to field posts), Missions are only aware of their own SMDP expenses. They were, therefore, surprised to learn that no funds were available in FY 82, having no knowledge of total regional expenditure.

- In some Missions, the controller's records are not systematized and, in the case of Cape Verde, such records are in Guinea-Bissau, making it very difficult to analyze funding.

- The allocation process was effectively made on an ad hoc basis, with Senegal receiving 20 per cent of the total authorization; Niger and Mali, 13 per cent each; Cape Verde and The Gambia, 11 per cent each; Mauritania, 10 per cent; Chad and Upper Volta, 9 per cent each; and regional training, 5 per cent. See Table 1.

SAHEL MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

FY 1979 -- FY 1982

(\$ Thousands)

<u>Country</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>%</u>
Cape Verde	-	200	650	100	950	11
Chad	186	194	298	-	678	8
The Gambia	192	117	527	85	921	11
Mali	300	295	375	23	993	12
Mauritania	105	199	439	31	774	9
Niger	255	319	405	50	1029	12
Senegal	276	663	628	150	1717	20
Upper Volta	150	237	323	140	850	10
Regional	-	84	329	93	560	7
					8472	100

- N.B. 1. Regional funds were used primarily for CRED and USDA seminars. The total - \$560 - includes \$45 for the upcoming CRED seminar - travel only - and an unallocated balance.
2. Variations between the percentages in the text and this table are due to shifts resulting from 1982 allocations.

Recommendation No. -2:

It is recommended that each USAID and principal post submit a five-year general country training plan to be updated annually, upon which basis a multi-year authorization be made. The five-year plan should indicate the mix of short-term in-country, short-term U.S., long-term TCT, and long-term U.S. training projected. Approximately 15 per cent of the total should be reserved and centrally managed to provide for financing of regional seminars. The five-year CTP should also specify sectoral distribution of training assistance in the categories outlined above and the requested level of annual effort. The five-year CTP should be consistent with agency policy, CDSS, host country planning, mission project training and cognizant of non U.S. funded participant training opportunities. This revised process would:

- enable USAID missions to synchronize the availability of funding with national requirements;
- give USAIDs and the HC governments advance knowledge of future year funding availability, enabling better long-term planning;
- reduce AID/Washington allocation role, shifting it instead to the USAID missions;
- eliminate possibility of cost overrun and reduce financial reporting procedures (from AID/W to field posts); and
- enable rational allocation process after PP approval.

The allocation process should be based upon:

- size of population and level of overall AID effort;
- coherency of CTP with CDSS and agency policy;
- status of indigenous higher educational development; -
- availability of participant training funding through non-SMDP as well as other resources; and
- demonstrated HC desire for training under the SMDP and need to alleviate manpower constraints.

Finding No. 3:

SMDP was projected to fund participant training over a five-year period at an authorized level of \$8.5 million. After 2.5 years, the project had fully obligated all of the \$8.5 million with an unfunded mortgage commitment of an additional \$1.2 million necessary to maintain unfunded participants presently in training through 1984. The rapid drawdown of funds was caused by:

- inflation;

- mission unawareness of total project expenditure;

- the fact that most participants remained in training longer than anticipated due to lengthy English Language Training, the need to pursue undergraduate prerequisite courses prior to graduate school matriculation, personal reasons, poor scholarship.

- a tendency on the part of AID/W management to satisfy mission requests for higher levels of participant training than had been anticipated.

The unfunded mortgage commitment is due to the fact that many participants were annually funded rather than fully funded at the outset of their training. This, combined with the general unawareness of total project expenditure, placed project management in an embarrassing position.

Recommendation No. 3:

The rapid utilization of authorized project funding suggests that SMDP is a popular, well utilized project. However, the projected level of effort was inadequate. If the five-year CTP and authorization recommendation is adopted for SMDP II, it would eliminate the possibility of cost overruns by keeping missions totally aware of project expenditure and eliminating annual competition for funding. We recommend, however, on the basis of previous performance, that project funding be increased to accommodate the demand. SMDP I expended at an average annual rate of \$3 million, and there is no indication that this level of effort should be reduced.

Finding No. 4:

Implementation of the Sahel manpower development project U. S. training has been managed by AID/S+T/IT through contracts with USDA, Roy Littlejohn Assoc., and the Southeast Consortium for International Development (SECID). An evaluation of these three contractors has recently been carried out by Jephaly Johnson (SIC) Associates and is available through AID/S+T/IT. AID has decided to consolidate and amend its contracting policy with regard to participant training and has issued a request for proposals from interested organizations. The RFP covers U.S. training only, but no effective mechanism for the placement of third-country participants has yet been developed.

Recommendation No. 4:

That AID encourage the utilization of appropriate third-country institutions by entering into a contract to place and maintain Sahelian participants in African training institutions. The contractor should be a well-established, U.S.-based organization with a network of representatives in key African countries, including all of the Sahel states. To the extent that economy of scale can be achieved by lowering direct overhead costs of African-based representatives, the contract should include all third-country financing African-wide, including AMDP, SMDP, and project-related training.

Finding No. 5:

The cost of SMDP participant training in the U. S. estimated at \$23,000-\$24,000 per annum for FY 82 is considerably higher than the cost of graduate training under the AFGRAD program (estimated at \$12,000 per annum). Even conceding that AFGRAD is a tuition waiver program, the cost of SMDP is still far higher.

Recommendation No. 5:

That per annum U.S. participant costs be lowered by:

- requiring that the general contractor selected by AID seek maximum tuition concessions from receiving universities. It is reasonable to expect tuition waivers for at least 10 per cent of long-term academic and agricultural U.S. participants;

- contracting in-country for English language training, possibly with participant associations;

- seeking collaboration with Peace Corps for in-country English Language Training;

- reducing overhead costs connected with management of participant training; and

- seeking increased host-country contributions for participants in the form of international air travel.

Finding No. 6:

There is a great deal of controversy over equivalency of U.S. degrees and diplomas with those of francophone educational systems. This is an historical problem which will continue to linger as long as one system or the other dominates in any given country. U.S. universities do not always recognize the three-year license or Diplome d'ingenieur agricole as B.A. equivalent, and Sahelian African universities of higher education tend to downgrade the U.S. master's and Ph.D. with respect to civil service placement.

~~Some ministries have agreed to consider each program on a case-by-case basis, evaluating course content, course load, and duration of training, prior to according equivalency.~~

In Mauritania, this matter has been resolved by merely adding years of training overseas to the level attained prior to departure. The rationale for this approach was to finesse the degree question and to avoid any implied discrimination against any donor's education system.

Recommendation No. 6:

While continuing to press for increased civil service recognition of U.S. degrees, through conditions precedent to project agreements, USAID training staff should at least assure that all participants, prior to beginning English Language Training, clearly understand how their Governments will recognize their degree upon successful completion of training.

Senegal has recently established a Committee on Equivalency in the Ministry of Higher Education. The Committee is expected to complete a report before the end of 1982 which will help to resolve the question of equivalency.

B. Program Impact

The Evaluation Team interviewed all available returned short- and long-term participants to assess upward career ability subsequent to training, participant perceptions of relevance of training, utilization of training, adjustment to American institutions, health and logistic support during training, prior preparation for training, and open-ended recommendations for improvement of training. Although it is not possible to cite all responses to all questions, the following concerns were fairly consistently registered by those interviewed:

- very little orientation to life and studies in the U.S. were given prior to departure;

- participants, by and large, returned to the same, or similar posts to which they were assigned prior to training;

- most were well satisfied with the selection of institution to which they were sent;

- most short-term participants would have preferred additional information on universities and courses available prior to departure;

- most University of Pittsburgh management participants were well satisfied with program which is a popular one. Some would have preferred fewer modules of instruction with greater depth in those taught;

- most University of Michigan CRED participants felt that the course was too general--below their level;

~~- most felt that training was relevant. Short-term participants~~
felt that training could have been offered in Africa;

- most felt that health support and maintenance was satisfactory but those with accompanying dependents felt strapped;

- most were unconcerned with "equivalency" question though USAID missions were preoccupied with subject;

- most participants had little formal contact with AID upon return, except for those working in AID-financed projects. These latter felt much more able to deal with AID staff and the feeling was mutual.

C. Socio-Cultural Constraints

1. Issues

a. Introductory Remarks. A major socio-cultural constraint in the successful completion of a long-term training program in the United States is inadequate information and understanding of the American academic system and American life, customs, and behavior. A corollary constraint is inadequate command of and confidence in the English language. Both constraints can be mitigated against by effective predeparture preparation and training.

The AID Participant Training Handbook (#10) states that all AID-sponsored participants should receive predeparture orientation because (a) there is a high correlation between effective predeparture preparation and successful training and (b) predeparture orientation is important not only for its informational content, but for its removal of anxiety, and building of understanding and confidence. The Project Paper points out that a small portion of funding is being set aside for orientation processing, follow-up, and evaluation of the program. To date, only Niger has used any of these funds for predeparture orientation. The Gambia is in the process of expanding predeparture activities, but has not expended any SMDP funds.

b. Findings.

(1) Interviews with long-term participants indicate a need for more effective predeparture orientation, concerning the American academic system and departmental programs. Due to the structural, philosophical, and pedagogical differences between the British, the Portuguese and the French and the American educational systems, potential benefits to both

~~the individual participant and the mutual AID/host government development goals warrant a detailed introduction to the American system in the following areas:~~

- synthesis and problem solving as opposed to memorization;
- heavy workloads and assignments;
- examinations and grading;
- academic calendar;
- role of advisors (academic and foreign student); and
- initiative and responsibility for meeting course requirements, e.g., 200-400 pages of reading per week, research papers, class attendance.

(2) Inadequate communication of general information on American life, customs, and behaviors. The following were highlighted during interviews as areas of predeparture anxiety and concern:

- race relations;
- public violence;
- fast pace of life;
- anonymity and impersonal communications; and
- cost of maintenance re: monthly stipend.

(3) Predeparture orientation ranged from no exchange or transmission of information to ad hoc and informal personal exchanges between departing participants and one or more U.S. mission persons to a formal two-hour session under the auspices of USICA. 1/

c. Recommendation. A minimum two-week in-country orientation program to be contracted out to USICA or the Peace Corps. The contents of the program should be uniform and standardized for Sahel. A funding precedent has been established by USAID/Niger using SMDP funds as allowed in PP. In those countries with an English Language Training program this orientation should be incorporated into course units. In the absence of an ELT program, the orientation could be presented as a separate unit. Predeparture orientation by no means precludes the possibility of an orientation in the U.S.; it should, rather, strengthen the latter.

A presentation of precise contents of an orientation package would be premature at this point, but a broad brush of possible tools and approaches may be useful:

- discussion sessions with returned participants;
- role playing (simulated academic and social situations);
- short films on American life highlighting regional/cultural differences; and
- prepared handouts.

1/ In this instance the cost of the USICA orientation activity was paid for by SMDP funds.

~~We wish to make the point here that a cross-cultural orientation should be neither a list of "dos" and "don'ts" nor a series of lectures transmitting information about a culture. The strategy should be a variety of communications tools aimed at identifying some underlying cultural principles and adequate information to cope with these principles. We are not suggesting that the SMDP assume a responsibility for the highly complex task of the development of cross-cultural skills in its participants; rather, that it assume responsibility for designating an appropriate institution for the design and implementation of an orientation package which can ease entry into a new cultural and academic milieu.~~

d. Recommendation. Another possibility is a standardized academic orientation component done in tandem with predeparture English Language Training programs where they exist or in conjunction with ICA cultural centers, whose libraries usually contain college catalogs and other materials relevant to college-bound students. The orientation could consist of the following:

(1) Films or video-tapes on life on an American university campus.

(2) Advance preparation or lectures outlining the organization of U.S. academic institutions which would address themselves specifically to:

- selecting a college;
- reviewing catalogs to understand program requirements of U.S. academic institutions; and
- assisting participants in formulating their questions and knowing what questions to ask.

(3) Interactive Activities:

- discussions
- case studies
- role playing/simulations

Returned participants could be an invaluable source in interactive activities, provide a vehicle for follow-up, and insure greater involvement in AID activities. As an incentive, AID missions might offer "free" specialized courses in their fields and provide opportunities to use English more. Many returned participants indicated that they did not presently use English very much with a consequent diminution of proficiency. Most welcomed the idea of having "refresher" English courses to keep abreast of developments in their fields through professional and trade journals, books, and international contacts.

2. Spouse/Dependent(s) Accompanying Participants During Long-Term Training

a. According to the Participant Training Handbook, AID does not encourage dependents to accompany or join participants, unless

~~the host government and mission approve such action. If approved, dependents may accompany or join participants while they are in training in the United States provided:~~

(1) the participant is scheduled to remain in one place for at least six months, and

(2) the participant furnishes proof of adequate financial resources over and above the AID maintenance allowance and cost of a round-trip ticket.

B. Findings.

(1) Married returned participants express that spouses (and where possible, children) should accompany or join their mates during long-term training in the U.S. Advantages include spiritual and emotional support in a new environment. Disadvantages include cost of maintenance, especially health care, and lack of adjustment to American life by wives. Each of these interviewees suggested an increase in stipends to cover maintenance of a participant's family.

(2) Two returned participants interviewed were joined by their families. One of the two expressed a problem with the cost of medical and health care for his family.

(3) All of Niger's SMDP long-term participants are currently in the U.S., seven of whom are married and three of these seven have been joined by their families (wife and son in each instance). The Niger case is interesting because the Government has legal statutes covering this social issue. The SMDP office does not yet have copy of this statute but was able to verbally communicate it to us as follows:

- Any civil servant or recipient of a government grant or scholarship to pursue studies outside Niger is eligible to request:

(a) At the end of one year that wife and no more than two children join him. The appropriate Ministry pays for one set of round-trip tickets;

(b) If wife and children do not join the participant, he is eligible at the end of the second year to return for a visit to his family;

(c) If participant is studying in France or another third-world country and scholarship is from the Nigerian Government, he is entitled to a supplementary maintenance allowance covering housing, health care, etc.

Mauritania also makes proviso for return home visits at the end of the second year.

In Cape Verde, four spouses have been selected as SMDP trainees; in three cases, the male member is a trainee under project funding; in the fourth, the husband is a COCV diplomat in Washington. As a matter of policy, sending both spouses under AID auspices has advantages and disadvantages and case-by-case decisions are best. In the Cape Verde case, however, the Team found sponsorship of the diplomat's wife an abuse of the program. In one other case the wife departed prior to acceptance at a U.S. training institution with confirmation/arrangement of international travel by AID after acceptance. If husband and wife should both be sponsored, some compromise should be reached on maintenance because both normally receive their regular salaries.

c. Recommendation.

(1) AID should not pay for spouses and dependents; however, in those cases where the host government feels that long-term absence presents a hardship on family life, it may, as in the case of Niger, provide monies for air travel (and a maintenance allowance).

(2) In instances where wives will accompany or join husbands, predeparture orientation should be extended to them.

(3) Decisions on maintenance should be made by AID/W on a case-by-case basis where both spouses are participants or where the participant requests special consideration.

D. Increased Participation of Women in Training Programs

1. The Project Paper points out the need for the various training programs to emphasize the availability of opportunities for women.

2. Findings. Project records and interviews indicate extremely low participation of women in both short-term and long-term training programs. Some general reasons given for this situation are as follows (although they do not all apply to all countries):

- very small pool of professionally trained women in the Government;
- family constraints of a wife and mother concerning travel; and
- skewing of selection process in favor of candidates principally from Rural Development Ministries due to emphasis on national priority of food self-sufficiency.

Suggestions from a female short-term participant and the Secretaire Generale of the Association des Femmes du Niger included the following:

- mounting of short-term training programs in French;
- shortening the short-term programs even more to a maximum of six weeks; and
- providing detailed and timely information on the particular program, i.e., course content, expectations, etc.

3. Recommendations.

(1) Missions assume as active a role as possible in the selection process to ensure increased participation of women, e.g., in instances where host government does send names of female candidates for consideration, these should receive priority attention even when male applicants are also under consideration.

(2) Active dialogue with host government officials to stimulate favorable environment for increased identification of female candidates.

(3) In-country and third-country short-term training in French (USDA, University of Pittsburgh, Pan-African Institute) for 4-6 week courses.

(4) SDPT coordinate short-term program information network to SMDP project managers. This would include provision of timely and appropriately detailed information on available course.

VI. English Language Training

A. General:

1. ~~Most participants received no English Language Training (ELT)~~ immediately prior to departure for the United States. Their knowledge of English language, generally acquired in high school, consisted of grammar rules with little or no practice listening, speaking and writing. To the maximum degree possible English language training should be provided in-country. Participants should meet minimum proficiency levels to ascertain aptitude, increase motivation to learn English and as an incentive to attend classes regularly. Proficiency levels could be established in a number of ways: 1) TOEFL minimum scores, 2) ALIGU minimum scores correlated with TOEFL, 3) close monitoring to ascertain "normal" progress, using ALIGU estimated.

2. Pre-departure orientation need not always be viewed as a total substitute for U.S. language training. On a selective basis, a participant might begin ELT in-country and possibly spend two/three months at ALIGU (or similar institution) to focus on specialized English relevant to field of study, individual study skills, library resources, or preparation of research papers.

3. Chapter 12, Handbook 10 states that "participants proposed for training in countries where training is conducted in English, must demonstrate English language proficiency (based on an ALIGU test) adequate to meet program requirements." Actual guidelines are contained in Appendix "A" which is excerpted from Handbook 10. As a practical matter, Sahel Missions - with some exceptions noted below - have been solving their SMDP problems by programming PIO/P resources for training at ALIGU - usually for a six-month period. AID/Washington, i.e., SER/IT, has generally responded by calling such participants forward without firm acceptance at a training institution,

assigning them to ALIGU and pursuing ultimate placement as progress in English evolves. In the final analysis, this practice - which is not limited to SMDP - measurably increases the costs of U.S. academic and long-term, non-academic training by something on the order of 20-25%.

B. AID-Peace Corps-ICA Collaboration:

In the five countries surveyed, Peace Corps and ICA generally endorsed the idea of working closely with AID in support of or to develop ELT programs. ICA, currently suffering budget constraints, indicated willingness to supply teaching materials and library resources. Peace Corps Directors, on the other hand, indicated that with sufficient notification such undertakings could be easily implemented because:

- a. A recent Peace Corps directive calls for increasing numbers of volunteers and working more closely with AID;
- b. The largest resource pool of volunteers already has ESL talent;
- c. Peace Corps has a long-standing record in ELT excellence;
- d. Peace Corps volunteers are trained in cross-cultural awareness and might supply models for orienting participants;
- e. Many HC officials expressed interest in having more Peace Corps English teachers.

C. In-Country Programs:

1. The Team found no systematic use of SMDP or other project funds for development of ELT facilities (except Niger) or programs. In Senegal, a very nominal allocation of PIO/P funds have occasionally paid for a few hours of intensive ELT by USICA for short-term trainees. In Mali, the Mission supports OMBEVI. Yet each Mission has routinely programmed funds - on the order of \$7,200 - for six months ELT in the U.S. Using the current Mali pattern and looking at the cost comparison worked out below it is easy to conclude that considerable savings can be realized and more widespread use of funds accomplished.

For those that suggested to the Team - and they were encountered in most countries - that too many distractions in-country divert a participant's ~~attention from English, the Team can now respond:~~ attention from English, the Team can now respond: If the opportunity to learn English in country is seriously offered and this does not constitute sufficient motivation, then perhaps the HC could propose other nominees. Knowledge that one will not depart until a qualifying English proficiency is achieved can and should be a powerful motivator - or possibly weed out non-performers in advance.

2. Two of the seven countries visited by the Team - Mauritania and Cape Verde - face near insurmountable problems in any effort to provide in-country ELT. Neither country has a fully-staffed USICA program with ELT resources nor is the British Council active in either country. The absence of an undergraduate university further limits potential resources. The AID Missions have yet to undertake any efforts at mobilizing returned participants, whose numbers in any case are too small to form an organizational entity - an alumni association - to address the ELT and the associated pre-departure and follow-up issues. (Except for The Gambia, this shortcoming applies to all Missions).

3. The Gambia encounters no ELT problems because of its Anglophone heritage. The country might offer some regional ELT possibilities, as discussed below.

4. Senegal and Upper Volta have activities underway that bear further exploration. The AID Mission in Ouagadougou has begun a program that may result in an ELT facility with ultimate capability of offering acceptable levels of English instruction. In Senegal, several opportunities are available, but are not being actively pursued. For example, the USICA program has been used to provide intensive language courses for short-term, non-academic participants. The Team was unable to piece together any clear rationale for AID and USICA lack of collaboration on a full-scale program for all participants, SMDP and other projects alike. The Ministry of Higher Education operates a training center, while the

University of Dakar has resources that might be drawn upon for teachers or orientation personnel. Senegal has a sizable pool of returned participants (from U.S. training) whose talents might be mobilized in support of ELT and general orientation and follow-up of participants. Within this vast reservoir of potential must lie a solution to the in-country ELT requirements of this country which received over 20% of the programmed SMDP resources (plus sizable project allocations), the bulk of which went into U.S. training. (Note: If the estimated figure of a 20% increase in costs proves accurate, then Senegal alone allocated over \$340,000 to ELT in the U.S.).

5. OMBEVI in Bamako was set up in 1976 with USICA help to provide ELT for the Mali Livestock Project participants scheduled for U.S. academic training. Since July 1981, Mali participants must achieve a TCEFL score of 500 or better prior to departure. Increasingly, the school prepares other AID project participants and employees on an intensive (25-30 hours) or part-time (16 hours) basis. As of March 1982, a total of 33 AID participants were enrolled (see Appendix "B"). The present staff includes a director, several part-time Malian and two part-time American teachers of English with varying abilities and credentials. French and Bambara courses are also offered. The school holds classes in a large rented house with four classrooms, one storeroom, one six- . booth language laboratory, an administrative office and secretarial and library facilities. The laboratory has monitoring capabilities and uses LADO books and audio-cassettes. Students - usually six to a class - are placed on the basis of the Michigan Placement Test and generally pay for their own books. AID provides yearly support at \$25,000.00 plus instructional costs.

6. USICA Niamey's program includes four regular eight-week, semi-intensive (32 hours) sessions annually plus specialized programs for particular functional fields and classes for AID employees. AID participant trainees or

grantees are included under a formal reimbursable arrangement. Intensive classes of twenty (20) hours per week have been offered to participants on a limited basis. The average length of stay has been one month. Since October, 1981 eight AID participants have been enrolled of whom two received ELT training for one month prior to departure for the U.S. (See Appendix "C"). AID, USICA and the Embassy Joint Admin Office (JAO) share the costs of the director's services and other overhead costs; the current director has little knowledge of the details of these arrangements. The Center has several administrative and operational weaknesses. Files are inadequate to monitor participant progress and attendant costs. USICA has no established pay scale for administrative or teaching personnel, which motivates many trained personnel to seek employment elsewhere. AID has enunciated no clear goals nor projected needs for ELT from which the center could formulate plans and establish training and equipment requirements, e.g., a language lab facility; texts; curricula; orientation and cultural materials. AID's planning should include scheduling groups of participants with similar ELT goals rather than following the present system of individual tutorials which tend to be more costly than group instruction.

AID's contribution to the Center's operation in FY 1981 was \$10,278 of which \$6,300 went toward the Director's salary and the remainder toward overhead costs. In the same year, the AID/Agrhymet program used some 54.5% of the classroom time, USICA's evening program about 28% and the JAO employee program about 17.5%; these figures served as the basis for apportioning overhead. The Director allocated 50% of total time to USICA's programs, 30% to AID's and 20% to JAO's.

D. A Regional ELT Center?

Meetings were held in Banjul with several people (including the Principal and Vice-Principal of Gambia College, the Director of Curriculum Development, Ministry of Education Officers, ICA personnel, Peace Corps and AID mission officials) who enthusiastically and unanimously endorsed the idea of establishing a regional

center in Gambia. The old campus of the College is totally unsuited for an

~~ELT site, however, the new campus, scheduled to open this fall, has modern~~
~~classrooms, a library, and dormitory facilities. The College president~~

suggested that AID would need to construct a building and probably dormitories to accommodate an English language facility. (Gambia College has been closed for a year because of student strikes and its reopening in the fall is still somewhat problematic).

AID Mission personnel suggested the possibility of contracting locally for ELT services, although no immediate suggestions were forthcoming to identify any prospective agencies or entities. A number of hotel properties are available and could probably be leased to provide both housing and classrooms. Presumably, after some start-up costs, the on-going expenses could be paid from PIO/P costs allocated by sending Missions as an integral part of individual training program costs (more information follows below on comparative costs).

RECOMMENDATION:

That AID/W consider a more detailed review of ELT prospects in The Gambia as a possible regional alternative for those countries which lack the potential for in-country resolution of this vital issue.

E. COST ANALYSIS

1. The issue of ELT cost is an especially elusive one. The present record-keeping systems, both in the field and in AID/Washington, do not systematically or adequately record the cost nor the length of time spent in English language training. Quite often, English language training costs at U.S. institutions are concealed in overall tuition fees. Some U.S. institutions provisionally accept students in "special" status with a reduced course load pending achievement of a "successful" score on specialized exams, e.g. tests of speed and comprehension or test-taking strategies - skills that foreign students seldom learn in ESL programs.

In spite of the complexities, some general statements that can be made regarding costs:

2. In-Country versus . . .

In-country ELT is cheaper than in the U.S., if only through elimination of the \$850.00 per month U.S. maintenance cost (payable to participants taking ELT at ALIGU in Washington). Of the two in-country facilities visited OMBEVI's records provided more information to determine real costs. Only four participants have left since the requirement for a 500 TOEFL score prior to departure (July 1981). These participants received an average TOEFL score of 538 after completing an average of 900 hours of instruction at the cost of \$6,000 during a 30-week period. This cost could be immediately cut to \$3,000 by increasing class size from the present six (6) to twelve (12) students per class. The quality of instruction could not be seriously affected. (Average U.S. ESL classes have 12-18 students from a wide variety of backgrounds, goals and languages).

3. United States Costs

For in-country versus U.S. comparisons, OMBEVI provides thirty (30) instructional hours per week whereas ALIGU provides twenty-five (25). OMBEVI's records also indicated that at least some participants had obtained more than 500 on the TOEFL, or scores comparable to participants completing ALIGU in preparation for undertaking academic studies elsewhere. The following cost breakdown is based on 900 hours of instruction and assumes doubling of class size at OMBEVI:

OMBEVI:

30 hrs./wk X 30 weeks - 7.5 months (4 wks/month)

Instructional fees - \$3.33/hr

900 hours X \$3.33 - - \$2,997

Maintenance: Participants reside at home or are paid in-country per diem at HC rates.

ALIGU:

~~25 hrs/wk X 36 weeks - 9 months~~

Instructional fees: \$90 wk X 36 - \$3,240
(\$3.60/hour)

Maintenance: 9 mo. X \$850 . 7,650

Total: \$10,890

Note: Cost comparisons do not assume Peace Corps specialists working in the program, which could reduce costs further. The Team recommends a program using a combination of local HC and available U.S. talent as a more effective long-range solution.

F. The ALIGU Option

1. Before turning to a summary of various options and combinations of options which decision makers may wish to examine before resolving the ELT issue in their respective countries, a better understanding of the ALIGU function may be useful. As noted in the beginning of this discussion of ELT, AID recommends ALIGU tests of English proficiency as a preliminary to U.S. training. Results of these tests govern the placement of a participant at ALIGU if such training is programmed; for example, the following Usage and Listening Scores will decide placement levels as indicated.

0 - 30	- Beginning Level
31 - 40	- Low - Intermediate Level
41 - 50	- Intermediate Level
51 - 70	- High Intermediate Level
71 - 90	- Advanced Level

Generally, students require 12 consecutive months of training to proceed from the Beginning through the Advanced Levels. In other words, a maximum of 48 weeks of ELT instruction can be required, assuming an individual starts at the "0" level or in the Beginning Level bracket. That same 48 weeks in the average case, however, should culminate in a TOEFL score of 500 or better, sufficient to qualify for academic training at most U.S. institutions. It is necessary to add that if the entire 48 weeks is required, the current costs would be \$14,520 (48 weeks X \$90 = \$4,320 plus \$10,200; \$350 X 12). Although such calculations can ultimately prove

meaningless, nevertheless, this breaks down to \$1,210/month. This compares to just under \$400 for a course such as that now held in Bamako (see above).

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That Mission personnel, SMDP Project Managers in particular, stress to HC representatives that henceforth the established English proficiency requirements will be achieved prior to departure of an SMDP funded participant. Should Missions wish to propose special approaches, e.g., achievement of a 450 TOEFL, confirmation of "provisional" placement and "topping off" at ALIGU, such should be entertained by SMDP Washington and reviewed thoroughly prior to a final decision.

Note: In light of the above recommendation, the cost analysis that appears above for U.S. ELT includes only ALIGU. In those cases where special English is offered, e.g., Boulder Institute, the Team recommends that participants should score at the minimum level, e.g., 70, required for non-academic programs prior to pursuing such special English.

2. That each Mission now supporting an in-country ELT program take necessary action to up-grade facilities, operations and personnel toward the goal of a fully-qualified effort to train participants to English proficiency levels recommended in Handbook 10. In this context, the following check list illustrates some of the major concerns:

- a. Management oversight - possibly through a contractor - of ELT program administration and operations: faculty qualification; curricula; personnel regulations; classroom monitoring; upgrading of teacher skills, including in-service training; effective participant records of progress.
- b. Full utilization of all available USICA and Peace Corps resources, talents and capabilities.
- c. Annual program meetings between U.S. agencies and ELT directors with HC participation to schedule future programs, prepare budgets and review procedures and operations. Regional meetings among various centers might be scheduled periodically for exchange of experience and review of common problems/solutions.
- d. Rigorous local evaluation to chart effectiveness and efficiency.

~~e. Adapt standard materials - e.g., ALIGU - for classroom use and for monitoring and testing student programs.~~

3. In countries lacking ELT potential, the Missions enter into ELT arrangements with other Sahel Missions or consider supporting a regional center, as discussed above.

4. That Missions take maximum advantage of returned participants, grouped if feasible into alumni associations, and their potential as possible contracting parties in the organization of ELT programs.

5. That AID/W enlist USICA support in assigning an ELT specialist to visit all Sahel countries and offer advice and guidance in the development of on-going or nascent ELT programs. Such a specialist should also check progress on a periodic basis.

G. Summary Analysis

The following section summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of the various options available for training. Detailed explanations are included in the preceding section.

U.S. Training: Option A

ADVANTAGES

1. Better instructional quality at ALIGU.
2. Language taught in an English-speaking environment.
3. Direct access to U.S. culture and academic institutions.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Mandatory costs (tuition and maintenance fees).

In-country Only: Option B

ADVANTAGES

1. Less costly; no maintenance fees.
2. Quicker adaptation to new U.S. environment when provided with cultural and academic orientation.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Longer time to learn English since they are not reinforced by an English-speaking environment.
2. Quality inferior to English language training at present.

NOTE: Differences have been noted in quality between Bamako and Niamey; two in-country facilities.

Regional Centers in English-speaking Country: Option C GAMBIA

1. English-speaking environment provides more incentive to learn English.
2. Less costly than U.S. English language training, but more

2. costly than in-country because of maintenance costs.
3. Quality of instruction may be better because there is a larger ~~pool of native speakers of English. Teaching experience would~~ also have to be taken into account.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Initial outlay of capital to start program might prove costly.
2. Potential difficulty with maintaining participants unless adequate administration arrangements are carefully monitored.
3. Lack of direct contact with American culture and U.S. institutions. (Existing English language training facility. e.g. Bamako).

ADVANTAGES

1. Instructional and maintenance costs are less than English language training institutions (e.g. ALIGU).

Possible Combinations: In-country and U.S. Training Option D

1. Establish minimal levels of English language proficiency obtained prior to English language training in the U.S. (Minimal scores of 400-500 on TOEFL).
2. Three to four months English language training in the U.S. (ALIGU).

ADVANTAGES

1. Reduction in cost of U.S. training attributed to a three or four month period of English language training.
2. Better instructional quality at ALIGU.
3. Obtaining cultural information and familiarity with U.S. academic institutions.
4. Potential focus on academic/study skills and English for Special Purposes at ALIGU or other English language training institutions

DISADVANTAGES

1. More costly than in-country/regional English language training.
2. Requirements need to be closely coordinated between in-country and U.S. facilities. (Time line), with the exception of ALIGU.

~~Possible Combination of Regional Centers: Anglophone Countries and U.S. institutions: Option E~~

1. Establish minimum level of English proficiency (400-500 on TOEFL).
2. Require two months English language training in the U.S.

ADVANTAGES

1. Reduction in time and maintenance costs for U.S. English language training (two months).
2. Better instructional quality at ALIGU.
3. Obtaining cultural information and familiarity with U.S. academic institutions.
4. Potential focus on academic/study skills and English for Special Purposes at ALIGU or other English language training institutions.

DISADVANTAGES

1. More costly than in-country/regional English language training.
2. Requirements need to be closely coordinated between in-country and U.S. facilities.

Possible Combination: Regional Center/U.S. English Language Training and Francophone Country - Option F

1. Establish minimum score on TOEFL (400-500).
2. Provide three months of English language training in the U.S.

ADVANTAGES

1. Reduction in maintenance costs for U.S. English language training. (three months)
2. Better instructional quality at ALIGU.
3. Obtaining cultural information and familiarity with U.S. academic institutions.
4. Potential focus on academic/study skills and English for Special Purposes at ALIGU or other English language training institutions.

Possible Combination: In-Country/U.S./Regional Centers
Option G

1. Minimal level of English language proficiency obtained in-country during a 3-month period.
2. Recommended 350-450 TOEFL scores.
3. Minimal level of English language proficiency at regional center in anglophone country. (350-550 - three month period).

ADVANTAGES

1. Reduction in maintenance costs for U.S. English language training (three months).
2. Better instructional quality at ALIGU.
3. Obtaining cultural information and familiarity with U.S. academic institutions.
4. Potential focus on academic/study skills and English for Special Purposes at ALIGU or other English language training institutions.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Potential difficulty with the coordination of three English language training institutions.

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A

II. Relating Test Scores to Program Planning

~~In general, Participants whose English proficiency is below~~ the acceptable minimums described above should be deferred from immediate Call-Forward and should continue intensive English-language training until appropriate retesting indicates English proficiency readiness for commencement of U.S. technical training. A general guide for Participant program planners is provided subsequently in A12 in abbreviated chart form. There has been no attempt to include interpretations for "mixed" or uneven scoring patterns for those instances where Participants qualify on only a portion of the ALI/GU Test Battery.

a. The minimum acceptable score for U.S. academic training (i.e., programs of formal study at academic institutions where Participants will be required to meet the English communication skills standards set for native English-speaking students) should be 80 for Usage, 75 for Oral Interview, 75 for Listening, and 65 for the Vocabulary and Reading tests. Academic Participants are required to take the ALI/GU Vocabulary and Reading Test and should ordinarily not be Called Forward whenever this score is below 55.

b. Minimum acceptable scores for other types of technical training (on-the-job training, observation, and special classes) should generally fall within the 60-80 range on the Usage and Oral Interview tests. Nonacademic Participants are not required to take the Vocabulary and Reading Test but must take the Listening Test and score not less than 55 for Call-Forward.

c. Because of the complex linguistic and programmatic factors involved, it has so far proved extremely difficult to set specific norms for each type of training. However, it has been determined that observation and on-the-job training rank

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Allc

next to academic training in level of difficulty. Special classes make less demand on English proficiency than other types of training.

d. Participants whose present scores are above the minimums required for Call-Forward but not yet at desired levels can be considered for placement but should continue intensive home-country training until Called Forward.

12. Interpretation of ALI/GU Proficiency Test Scores

a. For Academic Programs

<u>Scores</u>	<u>Test</u>	<u>Interpretation</u>
80-100	Usage Oral Listening Voc-Reading	Qualified for Call-Forward and immediate placement.
65-79	Usage Oral Listening Voc-Reading	Participant should receive training; if program necessitates, can be Called Forward for ALI/GU training. Questionable. Additional English training would be beneficial, but Participant can be Called Forward if other score requirements are met. Satisfactory for Call-Forward, though Participant may experience some initial difficulty with academic reading assignments.

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A12a

<u>Scores</u>	<u>Test</u>	<u>Interpretation</u>
60-69	Usage	Continued language training would be beneficial; ALI/GU training may be considered.
	Oral	
	Listening	
50-59	Usage	More language training required before Call-Forward. Two to 3 months of intensive training would probably be minimal to bring Participant to 70's or above.
	Oral	More language training required before Call-Forward.
	Listening	Questionable. Participant needs additional development of listening skills.
0-49	Usage	Unsatisfactory. Candidate should begin or continue intensive-language study, and training program should be deferred.
	Oral	
	Listening	

13. Testing and Language Training Placement Procedures in the United States

a. The American Language Institute of Georgetown (ALI/GU), upon request, furnishes English language training to AID Participants. The administrative offices of ALI/GU are located in two adjoining buildings, 3605 and 3607 "O" Street, N.W., on the Georgetown University campus. Classes are held

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1.2a

Scores	Test	Interpretation
55-64	Usage	More language training required before Call-Forward. Two to 3 months of intensive training would probably be minimal to bring Participant to 80-100 range.
	Oral	More language training required before Call-Forward.
	Listening	More language training required before Call-Forward.
	Voc-Reading	Questionable. Participant needs additional development of reading skills. Performance on other sections of test battery should be outstanding in order to compensate.
0-54	Usage Oral Listening Voc-Reading	Unsatisfactory. Candidate should begin or continue intensive-language study, and academic program should be deferred.
b. <u>For Nonacademic Programs</u>		
70-100	Usage Oral Listening	Qualified for Call-Forward and immediate placement.

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C

must achieve ALI/GU scores considerably above the minimums set by AID. The following equivalency table illustrates the above:

<u>ALI/GU</u> <u>Total Score</u> ^{1/}	<u>Best Prediction</u> <u>of TOEFL Total Score</u>
290	565
280	552
270	538
260	525
250	511
240	498
230	484
220 ^{2/}	470

Since ALI/GU is designed to measure a wider (particularly lower-level) range of English language ability than TOEFL, caution is to be exercised in utilizing the above correlation table.

^{1/} Scores on English Usage, Listening, and Vocabulary & Reading Tests.

^{2/} The total of 220 represents the AID minimums for English Usage (80), Listening (75), and Vocabulary & Reading (65). Missions may wish to consider raising the requirements for the three tests by approximately 10 points each (total 250) in anticipation of the Participants being required to score 500 on the TOEFL test.

APPENDIX B

PROJECT MALI LIVESTOCK II/USAID LANGUAGE TRAINING PROGRAM
March, 1982 Report

NAME	SERVICE	RESPONSIBLE FOR PAYMENT	DATE BEGUN	* RESULTS OF TESTING	ACTUAL TOEFL and DATE
1. Amadou Frantao CISSE	Mali II	USAID	1/20/81	P TOEFL = 459.5	390 3/13/82
2. Norbert DEMBELE	Mali II	USAID	1/26/81	Michigan P = 82% P TOEFL = 596	467 3/26/81
3. Ousmane N'DIAYE	Mali II	USAID	1/26/81	Michigan P = 66% P TOEFL = 432.9	457 3/13/82
4. Ibrahima SANGARE	Mali II	USAID	1/16/81	Michigan P = 82% P TOEFL = 546	520 3/13/82
5. Becaye SANKHARE	Mali II	USAID	1/16/81	Michigan P = 61% P TOEFL = 482	517 3/13/82
6. Issa BARADJI	C.V.L.	USAID	1/81	P TOEFL = 482	427 3/15/82
7. Sekouba BENGALY	C.V.L.	USAID	1/81	P TOEFL = 477	-----
8. Allassane M. AG	D.L.T.	USAID	11/23/82	P TOEFL = 459	-----
9. Mamadou DIAKITE	D.L.T.	USAID	11/23/82	P TOEFL = 459	-----

*P = Practice TOEFL Score

5

Centre Culturel Américain

B.P. 11201
Niamey, Niger



~~73-29-20~~
73.31.69

TO: Jim Dias
FROM: Lea Donald :)
RE: ALIGU scores received by participants
since October, 1981.

	Usage	Listening	Reading	Oral Interview
Daddy Gaoh Nouhou	24	30	23	36
Moussa Soussou	No English background			
Salissou Aboubacar	43	12	17	—
Djibo Mounouni	25	07	27	20
Moussa Souleymane	41	30	30	28
Mahamane Hassane Sidde	No English background			
Amadou Moundio	28	57	(48)	(15)
Abdurahmane Tilly Gaoh	43	57	(60)	(22)

Of these participants, only Abdurahaman Tilly Gaoh and Amadou Moundio received ELT training (of one month's duration) in Niamey. Their ALIGU scores are those they received prior to departure, except for those in brackets, which were received before their training.

Mahamane Hassane Sidde categorically refused to consider learning any English prior to his departure to the States.

APPENDIX "C"
Centre Culturel Américain

B.P. 11201
Niamey, Niger



Tel: 73.29.20

~~73.31.69~~

TO: Jim Dias
FROM: Lea Donald
RE: ELT training for AID participants in Niamey

TAHIROU Adamou Issa 2/4/80-21/8/80

ADAMOUI Guiso (Human Resources Dev. Project)

DODO Adamou (HRDP)

SALIME Toure (AGRHYMET) - Sahel Water Date

Barry Hamidou (AGRYMET)

Alferi Issifou (AGRHYMET)

OUMAROU Daouda (AGRHYMET)

MAI Mousssa (Niger Cereals) 12/6/78 - 2/2/79

KORI Malam Ari (Niger Cereals) 18/6/79 - 14/9/79

Wright Albert (tested only)

KANDA Siptey (Niger cereals) length of training? (began 8/10/79 -)

ABBA Moussa (Niger cereals) 8/10/79 - 12/12/79

SEYDOU Yacouba 8/10/79 - ?

CISSE Abdoulaye 27/11/78 - 2/2/79

KANE Mohamed Salissou 26/3/79 - 27/4/79

DENDA Issa (tested only)

TRAORE Oumar Sekou 30/8/78 - 2/10/78 (?)

GARBA Ibrahim 2/11/78 - 29/4/79

ABDOULAYE Idrissa 18/6/79 - 14/9/79

N'GRADE Goumeye 12/6/78 - 2/2/79

MOUSSA Abba

ABDOULAYE Nomaou

due to billing procedures, it's impossible to tell when training took place for each participant. Perhaps the projects would have this information.

} (tested only)

VII. INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY REVIEWS

Mali

A. Program

1. Training under SMDP appears to Mission HRDO to be directly related to the CDSS in so far as its primary focus has been on the agricultural sector (some emphasis in the CDSS is now being placed on the private enterprise sector as well). However, examination of participants' (Ps') fields of study shows the following:

	<u>Agricultural Sectors</u>		<u>Nonagricultural</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>LT</u>	<u>ST</u>	<u>LT</u>	<u>ST</u>	
Returned Ps	6 <u>1/</u>	6	6 <u>1/</u>	12	30
Ps in training	3 <u>2/</u>		12 <u>3/</u>		15
Total	<u>9</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>45</u>

1/ Includes three AMDF carry-overs.

2/ Includes one in nutrition.

3/ Includes six in business administration and three in health.

The above figures indicate a shift to the private sector (business/public administration and academic participants) but are not reflective of the CDSS' emphasis on agriculture or host country (HC) manpower requirements in so far as its priority goals and objective are declared to be food self-sufficiency. In fact, nonagricultural returned participants predominate two to one for ST training and are even for LT training; while participants currently in training are concentrated in nonagricultural fields by four to one.

2. Fields of study and mix between ST and LT training appear to be arrived at on a fairly ad hoc basis. Scholarships are awarded in response to host country requests as well as upon the initiative of USAID project officers and other staff. In general SMDP has been employed in Mali for the removal of critical manpower constraints not related to projects. Some examples:

a. A medical surgeon at the Ministry of Health was sent to Harvard where he earned (in one year) an M.P.H. and has since become the Director of Public Health (service d'hygiene)

b. An official of the Excise Tax Office was sent to Harvard for a ST program to increase his skills. He has returned to his former position.

c. An official of the Mali Development Bank visited several U.S. banking institutions to study financial systems.

d. Currently, six participants are studying for M.B.A. degrees at Michigan State University.

e. Four other participants are presently in English Language Training at the OMBEVI Language School in Bamako prior to seeking M.P.H. degrees (two in public health, one each in nutrition and epidemiology).

3. With the exception of English Language Training such as indicated under 2.e. above and a seminar, there has been no in-country training (ICT). The only third country SMDP training of record appears to be one participant in 1979 and 1980 and two in 1981. With these exceptions all LT and ST training has been in the U.S.

Conversely, four Togolese and one Chadian participant is currently in LT TCT in Mali (two Togolese and one Chadian have completed training), where they are fully adequately supported by the HRDO.

4. SMDP candidates are obtained from HC solicitations (these efforts are coordinated Government-wide by project officers and other USAID staff recommendations).

5. Returned SMDP (LT and ST) participants 1/ working in:

- a. agriculture: 8
- b. scientific/technical: 0
- c. academic: 2
- d. other fields: 11 (e.g., health, finance, literacy, etc.)

6. Returned SMDP participants working in former/anticipated disciplines/ ministries/sectors: 22. 1/

7. NonSMDP project-related participants:

<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>
52	47	69

1/ Includes one returned participant now working in his field in Ivory Coast.

~~8. Locus and type of nonSMDP training:~~

	<u>Academic</u>	<u>Technical</u>
UST	42	42
ICT	21	12 (English, later academic)
TCT	0	82

9. Life of project (LOP) private sector Ps: 0.

10. LOP female Ps: ??.

B. Management

1. In Mali SMDP and other training activities are managed/coordinated by a Human Resources Development Officer (HRDO) assisted by two training officers. SMDP and project-related training is coordinated at the mission level with the program and other relevant offices.

2. The Country Training Plan (CTP) over the three-year life of SMDP has been prepared by three different individuals varying from the program office to the HRDO when that post was filled. Typically, the CTP is prepared after consultations with HC officials and in agreement with the MOP. HC recommendations and other needs are reviewed by USAID and after that input the CTP is finalized and submitted to Washington.

3. Funding

a. SMDP funds utilization

	1979		1980		1981	
	LT	ST	LT	ST	LT	ST
UST	\$266,989	\$30,771	\$258,000	\$34,000	\$202,000	\$83,000
ICT	0	0	0	0	0	\$54,000
TCT	0	\$2,300	0	\$3,000		\$11,000

b. Average cost per SMDP participant

	1979		1980		1981	
	LT	ST	LT	ST	LT	ST
UST	\$26,665 <u>1/</u>	\$10,237	\$51,600	\$8,500	\$33,666	\$10,375
ICT	0	0	0	0		\$6,750
TCT		\$2,300		\$3,500		\$5,500

1/ Some participants only partially funded.

~~c.~~ Extent of mortgage (less than fully funded participants)

<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>
\$110,779	\$69,340	0

d. Funds obligated for extensions (of fully funded participants)

<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>
\$27,927	\$3,500	\$45,200

4. There is virtually no formal predeparture or follow-up program or monitoring system for participants in training. HRDO gives periodic briefings at language school. U.S. staffers there also provide some "cultural input." Contacts with returned participants is casual and on an individual, personal basis.

5. HC/USAID views on SMDP and a possible SMDP Phase II include the following:

a. SMDP should be available for pre- and post-project training needs, especially pre-project;

b. Criteria for selection into program for LT training should include:

- (1) studies be in participants' background area;
- (2) participant be at license (B.A.) level;
- (3) participant have actual or potential "key role" in development assignment;
- (4) participant have demonstrated experience/capabilities academically and professionally; and
- (5) proposed studies be related to CDSS.

c. 30-60 days' delay are often not enough lead time for planning and preparing the CTP (i.e., HC contacts, research, consultations, etc.).

d. Criteria for allocation of funds by country should include:

- (1) development of HC social infrastructure;
- (2) country (USAID) access to project training funds; and
- (3) defined country needs.

e. SMDP funds should be made available in timely manner (FY 1981 was half over before funds were available).

f. USAID missions should have more flexibility in training, planning, and implementation.

g. Do not limit SMDP training to project-related activities when some sectoral needs (such as housing, management, research, etc.) are not being addressed by project.

h. SMDP allocations based on a five-year CTP would allow USAIDs greater flexibility in forward planning.

i. Reserving an SMDP fund for regional seminars would allow for:

- (1) holding seminars in different countries of region and
- (2) participation by candidates in seminars in other countries.

j. Private sector (PS) involvement could be assured by:

- (1) recruiting PS candidates for business administration, M.B.A.'s;
- (2) ICT seminars in business/agricultural management for commercants, herders, merchants, etc. and
- (3) conducting nonformal training for candidates not qualified for academic training.

Upper Volta

A. Program

1. USAID program and training officers find that SMDP training and CTP are directly related to the CDSS' prioritizing of agricultural development and HC goal of food self-sufficiency. Examination of SMDP participants' fields of study shows the following:

	<u>Agricultural Sector 1/</u>		<u>Nonagricultural sector 2/</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>LT</u>	<u>ST</u>	<u>LT</u>	<u>ST</u>	
Returned Ps	3 <u>3/</u>	12 <u>1/</u>	0	17 <u>2/</u>	32
Ps in training	5		1 <u>4/</u>		6
Total	<u>8</u>	12	<u>1</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>38</u>

1/ Includes fishery (5), grain storage/marketing (5), seed improvement (1), poultry production.

2/ Includes public administration (13), demography (2), labor (1), and economics (1).

3/ One returned P, degree not completed.

4/ Enrolled for M.A. in computer data processing, ISPC, Bureau of Census, Washington, D.C.

~~The above figures affirm emphasis on the key CDSS priority of agricultural development and HC priority of food self-sufficiency (8 rural sector LTPs to 1 nonrural and 12 rural sector STPs to 17 nonrural) to a marked degree.~~

2. Fields of study and mix between ST and LT training appear to be both consistent in achieving LT goals and meeting only some current needs for removal of constraints as they develop or are conceived. Scholarships are awarded in response to HC requests after USAID review for conformance with its CDSS and HC priority goals. In general, SMDP in Upper Volta has been used by both USAID and HC primarily for LT training in support of HC and USAID LT goals. It has been used to a lesser degree for constraint removal (see table above). Pertinent examples include:

a. USAID has declined to provide direct financial support to:

- (1) development of the University of Upper Volta, or
- (2) training of UV physicians.

b. GOUV was unable to provide a suitable candidate for a USAID project calling for the training of an M.P.H.

c. Nonagricultural LT training has been limited to one computer data processing specialist.

d. Nonagricultural ST training has been limited to public administration (13), demography (2), and economics (1).

3. There has been zero use of any ICT, zero use of LT TCT, and only minimal use of ST TCT (6 participants in three years). With the exception of the latter all LT and ST training has taken place in the U.S.

Conversely, there are two Chadians in LT TCT training in Upper Volta at the Centre Muraz (OCGE) as Bio-Lab Technicians. They are fully and adequately supported by the USAID mission.

4. SMDP participants are selected from candidates proposed by HC, coordinated by the Ministry of Higher Education (MHE) after being informed of the number of available scholarships by USAID. Several proposals have been nullified because of area of study or, conversely, by unavailability of candidates due to protracted delay of USAID/SMDP procedures. USAID does make input in selection process and has retained oversight/review proviso (somewhat to the distress of MHE).

5. Returned SMDP Ps (LT and ST) working in:

- a. agriculture: 15
- b. scientific/technical: 1
- c. academic: 1
- d. other: 16 (public administration (12), demography (2), labor (1), economics (1)).

6. Returned LT SMDP participants working in former/anticipated disciplines/ministries/sectors: 1 (out of 3). 1/

7. NonSMDP project-related participants:

<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>
6 <u>2/</u>	20	18

8. Locus and type of nonSMDP training:

	<u>Academic</u>	<u>Technical</u>
UST	22	2
ICT		15
TCT	0	1

9. Life of project (LOP) private sector Ps: 0.

10. LOP female Ps: 1 (currently in computer training in U.S.).

B. Management

1. In Upper Volta SMDP and other training activities are managed/coordinated by a local hire training Officer assisted by the program and deputy program officers. SMDP and project-related training is coordinated at the mission level with the program and other relevant offices (HRDO, agriculture, etc.).

2. The Country Training Plan (CTP) is typically prepared after consultations with HC officials and in agreement with the coordinating MHE. HC recommendations and needs 3/ are reviewed by USAID and after that input the CTP is finalized and submitted to Washington.

3. Funding

a. SMDP funds utilization

1/ Includes one participant now working for FAO in Rome and one participant who did not obtain his degree because of health problems; participant is currently in training in-country at the ENA. All LTPs to date have been senior university degreed civil servants involved in upgrading skills (Ps have been choosing own schools for UST). MHE feels more mid-level training is needed.

2/ Records for 1979 are incomplete making this figure subject to modification.

3/ HC manpower needs are outlined in GOUV five-year plan first prepared in 1970 and updated annually with FAO assistance. A new five-year plan is currently in preparation.

	<u>1979*</u>		<u>1980*</u>		<u>1981*</u>	
	LT	ST	LT	ST	LT	ST
UST	\$53,158	\$67,750	\$101,219	\$32,438	\$149,902	\$91,136
ICT	0	0	0	0	0	0
TCT	0	\$19,500	0	\$6,100		0

b. Average cost per SMDP participant

	<u>1979</u>		<u>1980</u>		<u>1981</u>	
	LT	ST	LT	ST	LT	ST
UST	\$26,579	\$7,527	\$25,304	\$8,104	\$29,980	\$10,126
ICT	0	0	0	0		0
TCT	0	\$3,900 <u>1/</u>	0	\$3,050 <u>2/</u>		0

c. Extent of mortgage (less than fully funded participants)

<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>
0	\$9,294	\$9,460

d. Funds obligated for extensions (of fully funded participants)

<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>
0	0	\$1,248

4. There is no formal predeparture or follow-up program or monitoring system for participants in training. Contacts with returned participants is casual and on an individual, personal basis.

5. HC/USAID views on SMDP and a possible SMDP Phase II include the following:

a. SMDP should be available for pre- and post-project training needs, especially pre-project; equally important is availability of funds for nonproject training in areas such as energy and environment.

b. Criteria for selection into program for LT training should include:

- (1) 1-3 years' service in sponsoring ministry (MHE);
- (2) no participant be recruited or selected without MHE knowledge/approval; and

1/ 5 participants in Ivory Coast.

2/ 2 participants in Camerouns.

* Team could not reconcile discrepancies between totals by year and those in Table 1, p.15

~~(3) participant be adaptable, good student with good English.~~

c. 30-60 days' delay are often not enough lead time for planning and preparing the CTP (i.e., HC contacts, research, consultations, etc.).

d. MHE needs six weeks' notice prior to October school startup for candidate selection for following year.

e. USAID would like to see an English language training facility established in Upper Volta.

f. Criteria for allocation of funds by country should include:

- (1) development of HC;
- (2) population of country; and
- (3) level of bilateral programs.

g. HC would like support in building institutional infrastructure (e.g., medical school) in addition to P training.

h. USAID would like maximum flexibility in training planning and implementation.

i. ICT should be given greater emphasis (such as the three-week management seminar planned for fall jointly by University of Pittsburgh/IPD/AID).

j. Returned participants should complete questionnaire, be interviewed immediately upon return.

Niger

A. Program

1. In Niger SMDP training is coordinated by a project officer aided by a local hire training officer. Both find that SMDP training and the CTP are directly related to the CDSS' prioritizing of agricultural development and HC goal of food self-sufficiency. Examination of SMDP participants' fields of study shows the following:

	<u>Agricultural Sector</u>		<u>Nonagricultural sector</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>LT</u>	<u>ST</u>	<u>LT</u>	<u>ST</u>	
Returned Ps	0		0	25	25
Ps in training	9	<u>1/</u>	3	<u>2/</u>	12
Total	<u>9</u>		<u>3</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>37</u>

1/ Includes agricultural economics (2), forest management (4), agronomy (1).

2/ Includes bacteriology (1), mass communications (1), geology (1).

~~The above figures show a 3 to 1 margin in LT training in the key CDSS~~ priority area of agricultural development and HC priority of food self-sufficiency. However, there is a marked absence of ST training in the agricultural/rural development sectors. 1/

2. Fields of study and mix between ST and LT training appear to be incongruous in achieving LT goals. Meeting current needs for removal of constraints appears more developed. Participant training in response to HC requests (after USAID review) is the rule rather than the exception in seeking to achieve CDSS and HC priority goals. In general, SMDP in Niger has been used by HC primarily for LT training in support of HC agricultural goals. ST has been used almost exclusively for constraint removal (see table above). Pertinent examples include:

- a. LT participant trained in elevage (now coordinator of project)
- b. LT training of two agricultural pilots at aircraft manufacturer's plant in Georgia.
- c. LT training of two mining and communications specialists in the U.S.
- d. Nonagricultural ST of accountants in Morocco, observer tours in Ivory Coast/Upper Volta, population and mapping seminars in Gabon and wood stoves in Upper Volta.

3. There has been zero use ICT, zero use of LT TCT, and rather extensive use of ST TCT (17 participants in two years). With the exception of the latter all LT and ST training has taken place in the U.S.

There are no Ps in LT TCT training in Niger,

4. SMDP participants are selected from successful candidates competing in annual academic competitions and proposed by MHE, coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after being informed of the number of available scholarships by USAID. Several proposals have been nullified because of area of study or by unavailability of suitable candidates due to timing of USAID/SMDP procedures. USAID does not make much input in selection process and has not retained oversight/review proviso. Greater USAID involvement in candidate selection is currently being explored with GON. USAID project staff sometimes assists in identification of candidates for project training.

1/ U.S. ST training was in public administration (3), women in DEV (1), CREED (1), management/leadership (1), and trade unions (2); TCT training was in accounting (6), observation tours (5) wood stoves (4), population (1), and census mapping (1).

~~5. Returned LT SMDP Ps (LT and ST) working in:~~

- a. agriculture:
- b. scientific/technical: N/A (no returned Ps)
- c. academic:
- d. other:

6. Returned SMDP participants working in former/anticipated disciplines/ministries/sectors: 21.

7. NonSMDP project-related participants:

<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>
125	5	22

8. Locus and type of nonSMDP training:

	<u>Academic</u>	<u>Technical</u>
UST	34	
ICT	20	
TCT	98	

9. Life of project (LOP) private sector Ps: 0.

10. LOP female Ps: 5.

B. Management

1. In Niger SMDP training activities are managed/coordinated by a local hire training officer (HRDO) assisted by a project manager. SMDP and project-related training is coordinated at the mission level with the program and other relevant offices.

2. The Country Training Plan (CTP) over the three-year life of SMDP has been prepared based on HC requests. Typically, the CTP is prepared after consultations with HC officials and in agreement with the Foreign Affairs Office. HC recommendations and needs are reviewed by USAID and after that input the CTP is finalized and submitted to Washington.

3. Funding

a. SMDP funds utilization

	<u>1979*</u>		<u>1980*</u>		<u>1981*</u>	
	<u>LT</u>	<u>ST</u>	<u>LT</u>	<u>ST</u>	<u>LT</u>	<u>ST</u>
UST	\$168,962	\$13,475	\$245,621	\$6,975	\$256,955	\$70,685
ICT	0	\$16,000 <u>1/</u>	0	0	0	\$10,000 <u>1/</u>
TCT	0	\$41,993	0	\$3,477		\$11,000 <u>1/</u>

1/ Represents fund paid to USICA for ELT.

* Team could not reconcile discrepancies between totals by year and those in Table 1. p.15

b. Average cost per SMDP participant

	1979		1980		1981	
	LT	ST	LT	ST	LT	ST
UST	\$42,240		\$49,124	\$6,975	\$36,707	\$14,137
ICT	0	\$4,000	0	0		\$2,500
TCT		\$2,470		\$1,579		\$5,500

c. Extent of mortgage (less than fully funded participants)

1979 1980 1981

Mission reports: "mortgage has been eliminated through fully funding all LT PIO/Ps."

d. Funds obligated for extensions (of fully funded participants)

1979 1980 1981

0 0 0

4. USICA operates an ELT facility in Niamey which has trained a number of SMDP Ps. (Details on this training and its course content are given elsewhere in this report.) The USICA ELT is the only formal predeparture training and orientation directly supported by SMDP funds-(\$26,000 over a two-year period). In addition the training project manager, on his own initiative, has obtained and distributes to departing Ps a booklet (in English and French) on life in the U.S., what to expect, etc.

However, there is no formal follow-up or monitoring system for participants in training. Contacts with returned Ps is casual and on an individual, personal basis.

5. HC/USAID views on SMDP and a possible SMDP Phase II include the following:

a. has been a considerable resource and is highly appreciated by the GON;

b. AID/GON particularly like flexibility of SMDP as a tool for nonproject-related training in the absence of other resources (for example, financial training);

c. Criteria for selection into program for LT training should include:


- (1) P's target job, and
- (2) P's academic and professional qualifications.

d. Insofar as numbers of women in school system and GON employment is increasing the number of women Fs will also increase;

e. TCT is a hassle even with adequate information on TCT possibilities communications with TCT institutions, HCs, USAIDs are cumbersome and difficult. A contractor should be hired for handling TCT arrangements;

f. Working relations with AID/W/IT have been satisfactory but some of their contractors such as Littlejohn and Company seem unaware of some Handbook 10 provisions (such as those relating to M.A. and Ph.D. programs, for example).

g. USAID staff for handing training is barely adequate. Training officer only recently hired and the responsible training project manager has or has had several other major programmatic/administrative responsibilities.



SENEGAL

General

The SMDP Evaluation Team visited USAID Senegal during the week of May 1. Meetings were held with Mamadou Jallow, Evaluation Officer, Ousmane N'Da^o, Training Officer, and Sam Rea, Program Officer, as well as with the Mission Director, David Shear. Members of the Team also consulted with individual project managers and conducted several interviews with participants. The Team in addition met with Government officials including Amadou Thiala^o Diop, Directeur Adjoint de la Cooperation, in the Ministry of Plan and Cooperation, and Amadou Guye, Directeur, Bureau des Bourses, in the Ministry for Higher Education.

The meetings with Government officials were not as productive as the Team would have liked. A certain lack of openness and failure to respond to specific questions left the Team with a less than adequate picture of the Government's real attitude concerning training for participants from Senegal under the SMDP program.

Selection of Candidates

Candidates for training are selected initially by the GOS on the basis of high academic marks. None are interviewed and, if there is a tie, the younger person is selected. The list of candidates is reviewed by a joint GOS/USAID Training Committee composed of representatives from the Ministry of Higher Education, the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation, other interested Ministries and AID representatives. The Committee reviews training requirements and sets priorities for the SMDP, after which the AID mission draws up its Country Training Plan. The Committee meets again, after AID/W has established the budget, at which time it decides how many candidates are to be funded.

It was pointed out by the AID Evaluation Officer, who is a host country national, that the AID scholarship program is more cumbersome than that of other donors, that it takes longer to place students and that for this reason until recently, the best students were taken by other donors. Last year, however, USAID speeded up its system and forwarded its list of scholarships to the GOS at the same time as other donors. The students were selected in September, documents were processed in November and the first contingent left for the United States in March.

For the academic year 1981-82, eleven students,
including three women, were selected for long term study
from a list of seventy. Distribution by discipline was
as follows:

Agricultural engineering-irrigation	2
Public health -- paramedical	2
Cooperatives	1
Environment/energy	2
Education administration and finance	1
Agricultural economics	2
Forestry/ecology	1

Relation of SMDP Training to CDSS and HC Manpower
Requirements

The Ministry of Planning and Cooperation coordinates manpower training requirements and establishes priorities among the various sectors in accordance with Senegal's Four Year Plan. Priorities include health, agricultural economics, forestry and all aspects of rural development.

The AID Mission in turn sets its priorities in accordance with the CDSS strategy which places major emphasis on rural development. Both sets of priorities must be reconciled at the joint meeting of AID and HC representatives.

The supplement to the 1983 CDSS states that USAID will continue to use SMLP for public management training, environment/energy, public health, cooperatives and other professions related to the AID program, as well as for training related to the private sector. It also stipulates that SMDP may be used for training faculties at the National Institute for Rural Development and the Graduate School for Business Management.

~~The selection of disciplines for the SMDP, as shown at the end of this section, cuts across a reasonably broad spectrum for both long and short term participants. However, as yet there are no trainees drawn from the private sector.~~

Pre-departure Orientation

USAID Senegal provides little or no pre-departure orientation for SMDP participants. Normally, participants meet with the Training Officer for a brief fifteen minutes or half an hour before leaving for the U.S. Participants are therefore inadequately prepared for the transition to academic life in the United States.

Equivalency

This has been a persistent problem with returning participants whose American degrees are not fully recognized by the Government of Senegal, particularly with respect to promotions in the Civil Service. All donors, except France, have had difficulties with equivalency ratings for students from Senegal. A committee on Equivalency has been recently established in the Ministry of Higher Education. Formation of the Committee is said to be the direct outcome of an observation tour to the U.S. which was undertaken by the Minister of Education under the auspices of the SMDP. Cheikh Tidiane Sy, now Director of ENEA, and a former consultant to AID, is serving on the Committee which is expected to complete its report before the end of 1982.

Pre-Project and Post-Project Training

The CDSS supplement provides that the SMDP will continue to fulfill two important needs. One is for training "to supplement that provided in actual, or planned, bilateral projects." The other is for training "for key positions or disciplines not provided under USAID projects." The SMDP was designed to provide among other things pre-project and post-project training. It is not to be used to supplement training in on-going projects. The Team found no evidence that the Mission in Senegal has used the SMDP for project related training.*

Third Country Training

Third country training is not generally desired by officials in Senegal. They prefer U.S. training because they believe that climatic conditions and the technical training available in the United States are well suited to the needs of the Sahel countries.

Such third country training as is provided is arranged on a Government to Government basis.

There is a need to encourage a better mix of in-country, third country and U.S. training for SMDP participants from Senegal.

* In its request for FY 82 SMDP funding, however, (Dakar 10299), the Mission asked for \$27,000 for short-term training in connection with the YMCA Youth Job Development Project (0222)

Management in the AID Mission

The SMDP is managed by the Training Officer who is a host country national. In addition to the SMDP, he also has responsibility for documentation of participants in project-related training - a heavy workload in view of the size of the country program. The Training Officer's workload is far too great for him to manage the SMDP adequately. Not only does he have little or no time to devote to pre-depart-ure orientation for participants, after carrying out the basic paperwork required for participants in training, he has little time for additional follow-up or developing potential resources available through returned participants. As a host country national, the present incumbent appears to maintain effective relationships with key Government officials but this requires continuing demands upon his time as does his participation in Committee meetings for the selection of candidates. Furthermore, he does not have the steady guidance and support he deserves from higher echelons in the Mission. There should also be closer coordination between the Human Resources Officer and the Training Officer on training matters.

USAID Senegal with assistance from REDSO Abidjan recently completed a survey of returned SMDP participants. Seventeen were interviewed and responded to a questionnaire. The Evaluation Team also interviewed several participants.

Participant Reactions

Returnees were generally enthusiastic about the training they had received in the U.S., both long-term and short-term. Most deplored the lack of pre-departure orientation and urged the use of films, U.S. travel booklets and information on U.S. universities. Many were concerned about insufficient stipends and complained generally about inadequacies with respect to logistical support. They recommended better coordination between AID/W and the universities and advocated continuing contact with universities after their return (documents, publications, etc.) They suggested organizing a follow-up system for returned participants urging their utilization as a resource for in-country activities.* One participant hoped to organize an association of CPED graduates. A similar group might well be organized for graduates of the University of Pittsburgh Management Development Seminar which is particularly popular in Senegal.

*In this connection, the Mission Program Officer told the team that an effort was made a year ago to organize an alumni of returned participants.

association

Brief Profile of Participants

As of April 1982, a total of 54 participants have been financed under the SMDP program in Senegal. Of the 12 currently in training, all are employed in the public sector and all are candidates for the MS degree. The spread of disciplines is as follows:

Agricultural Economics	6
Agricultural Engineering	1
Forest Genetics	1
Agronomy	1
Rural Cooperatives	1
Hydrology	1
Forest Research	1

Forty-two participants have returned among whom ten were in long-term training. Nine of the latter are employed in the public sector and one is unemployed. Seven received MS degrees, one received an MBA and two were non-degree students. Disciplines for the ten long-term returned participants are as follows:

Nutrition	1
Financial Management	1
Public Administration	1
Agricultural Extension	1
Agricultural Economics	4
Research Administration	1
Salinity Laboratory	1

All of the 32 short-term returnees are employed in the public sector. Subjects studied or institutions attended are as follows:

Management Development	10
Management of Agricultural Resources	1
World Bank	2
Economics	6
Energy Management	1
Community Health	2
Soy Bean Processing	1
Observation Tour (Health)	1
" " (Higher Edu)	1
Rural Community Development	1

National Technical Information	1
Systems	1
NOAA	1
Food and Drug Administration	3
Estuary Studies	1

Mortgage Issue

According to the controller's records in the Dakar Mission, new starts for FY 1981 include three participants already in the U.S., ^{seven} ~~two~~ who are awaiting call forward and one scheduled for call forward in July, 1982. All PIO/P's for these participants provide for 18 p/m of training including six months for English Training. All are MS candidates programmed for a second year which, estimated at 11 x \$2,000 x 12, would come to \$264,000.

In addition to the above eleven participants, the Dakar Mission list of on-going long-term participants ~~is~~ includes several more whose training period in the U.S. will extend into 1983 or even 1984. These will also require further funding.

USAID Dakar (Dakar 10299, 16 Dec. 81) requested a minimum of \$291,000 for FY 82 to cover

1. ¹None continuing long-term participants 216,000
 2. New short-term training
(YMCA Youth Job Development Project) 27,000
 3. Special short-term computer training
for six at MIT 48,000
- \$291,000

~~Since that time another \$150,000 ^{has been} was alloted to~~
Dakar to "partially fund on-going programs" (State 000002,
1 Jan. 82). The same cable stated^s that an additional
\$141,000ⁿ will be sent["] as soon as the project amendment is
signed, making a total of \$291,000.

It is impossible to estimate on the basis of records
made available to the Evaluation Team the exact amount of
mortgages involved. It is, however, greatly in excess of
the \$216,000 requested by the Mission for nine continuing
long-term participants in FY 82.

MAURITANIA

A. GENERAL

Mauritania has no university; an ambitious "Project Universite" has been launched but will not constitute a full-fledged institution for several years. The government depends largely on donor assistance for upper level academic training, degree and non-degree. Mauritaniens are studying in some 30 countries; the GIRM itself allocates roughly \$3.5 million annually to international training; e.g., travel, co-participation with donors, full funding of some scholars.

B. PROGRAM

1. SMDP training supports the Mission strategy with the primary focus on rural development activities; e.g., "Sahel Master's" (at MSU), agricultural economics, agronomy, electrical and mechanical engineering. Supplemental priorities are spread among developmental planning (degree training), poultry farming, general statistics (both in third countries) and in-country training of local administrators and normal school teachers in general administrative and management procedures and principles. The GIRM has no well-defined manpower development goals at this stage in its evolution; however, conversations with the principal planners and civil service policy makers revealed profound dedication to a systematic expansion of the trained manpower base through a combination of academic degree and non-academic, short-term upgrading of skills either in-country or overseas.

SMDP is looked upon by GIRM officials as the ideal vehicle for their immediate U.S. training needs, although they would expect expansion of the program in the future.

2. The training mix over the three years of SMDP has focused heavily on U.S. degree training -- mainly at the bachelor's level -- with selected short term programs in established programs for Africans. The degree side of the program is divided as follows:

<u>Sector</u>	<u>MA/MS</u>	<u>BA/BS</u>
Ag Economics	3	3
Agronomy		1
Plant Pathology	1	
Electrical Engr.		2
Animal Husbandry		1 (TCT)
Pub Ad/Econ Planning	1	5 (TCT)

Four of the five TCT programs in planning are actually diploma/certificate courses which were selected for relevance and location (Francophone countries). Among short-term U.S. programs were two Chicago and two Pittsburgh courses plus one at USDA (in 1979); one Pittsburgh course (in 1980) and two CRED courses (1980).

3. Mauritania follows a general policy of providing university training for every high school graduate who successfully completes the annual competition. For the most part, the GIRM has succeeded in getting donor support; over 4,000 Mauritians are pursuing overseas training, the largest numbers in France, Tunisia, Senegal, Morocco, Algeria and Iraq. All

secondary level training in-country is financed by the GIRM, the principal locations being the Normal School for teachers and the Public Administration School, both of which also offer annual in-service training for civil servants. All applicants list three preferred areas of specialization and three countries of choice; best scorers usually get their first choice, especially seekers of scientific, technical and medical degrees, all of whom are assured GIRM support. The resources allocated by the government plus donor cooperation have sufficed to make the general policy work thus far; however, GIRM planners told the team that the crossover point is approaching where government resources may begin to lag behind requirements. This development will probably stiffen the competition.

4. SMDP has yet to be used in a pre- or post-project mode because of the slow evolution of project activity. The Pittsburgh and GRED programs have been used because -- in the French versions -- they offer prospects for quick experience for use against economic and management constraints. In 1979 a USDA program was organized for the senior civil servant in the Rural Development Ministry. The USAID and HC representatives are discussing the possibility of more in-country training organized around U.S. experts rather than experiencing the growing expense of sending single individuals to U.S. institutions. The intention is to accelerate the multiplier effect.

C. MANAGEMENT

1. The training function in Nouakchott is assigned to the Projects Office which means general coordination of SMDP with regular project activity. A senior U.S. direct hire employee supervises overall activities and an FSN handles most contacts and administration on SMDP. This individual has limited English language skills, but the Team was impressed by the high degree of confidence and cooperation that HC officials manifested for this AID employee. Unfortunately, the Mission allowed the opportunity of a training seminar in Dakar to pass last year without this employee being able to profit from a highly useful learning experience.

2. The CTP is largely a U.S. document keyed to the CDSS; however, the selection of specific skills to be considered for training emerges from a continuing dialogue. The principal party on the HC side is the Directorate for Employment and Training of Civil Servants, which not only deals with the civil service function throughout the government, but backstops all Mauritians studying overseas. This office also receives the annual projections of manpower and manpower training needs from GIRM ministries and agencies; these projections are then matched with available resources. In this process the dialogue with USAID begins to broaden from skills required to identification of the individual or individuals for nomination for U.S. training. This refinement process continues through the course of the year and generally follows the forecast contained in the CTP.

2. Funding

a. SMDP funds utilization:

(1) The cumulative allotment of funds to USAID Mauritania amounts to \$743,000: \$105,000 (1979); \$199,000 (1980); and \$439,000 (1981). In 1979, two academic programs were funded at \$30,000 each (for 30 person/months, according to the P10/P; however, this appears more likely to ^{be} 18 or 24 months at most). Two programs of six weeks each were financed for a total of \$10,440 (\$6440 disbursed) at the University of Chicago. Two participants attended the Pittsburgh program for three months at a combined cost of \$20,078 and a specialized five week course at USDA was programmed at \$15,876 (but required only \$4,200 in disbursements).

(2) The 1980 program amounted to allotments and obligations of \$199,000. Analysis of the allocations by P10/P produces no basic rationale. Two academic programs (U.S.) were continued at \$16,014 each (for 12 months). Two masters programs were initiated, one for 21 months at \$13,546 and the other for \$42,000 and 30 months! Third country programs were funded in Tunisia, one at \$8,460, the other at \$9,260, presumably for 12 months; in Senegal, two year programs in economics and public administration cost \$13,615 and \$14,560 respectively. Short-term training in the U.S. cost some \$4,650/month for nine months (\$41,793); a third country program added up to \$4800 for five months (\$535/month). Observation programs (four) cost \$5,600 for six weeks.

~~(3) Ten of thirteen trainees funded from~~
~~\$439,000 in FY1981 obligations pursued academic programs, one~~
a carryover, seven new starts in the U.S., and two in third
countries. The U.S. carryover program cost \$3160/month
(\$18,961-six months), while new starts involved 213 months of
training at an average of \$1,750; third countries' programs
amounting to 61 months cost only \$525. Short-term training
(CRED-2 months for 2 persons) averaged \$2200/month; a four month
energy management program cost SMDP only \$550 for international
travel.

b. The USAID/MC country representatives view AMDP
(and AFGRAD) in a more favorable light than SMDP, mainly
because of the clouded funding picture, but also because AMDP
monitoring provides better and more effective reporting on
student progress. The USAID suggested that a field contractor
might be engaged to maintain in-country oversight of the
program, provide pre-departure and follow-up and advise on
the allocation and distribution of resources.

c. USAID Mauritania conducts precious little advance
orientation of trainees; in fact, more than a one hour session
per participant is a rarity. Nquakchott has no ELT facilities
nor are there any plans for such; ICA currently has a very
modest cultural program. The few returned participants do not
yet constitute a large enough community for follow-up activities;
in fact, the short-termers offer little language potential,
although they could assist in some acculturation of prospective
trainees and introduction to U.S. ways. One major impediment -- in

~~Mauritania as in other countries -- to more systematic~~
~~pre-departure orientation is HC departure procedures which post-~~
pone until the last moment such formalities as passport and
exit visa issuance and clearance from employers (in the case
of civil servants). This telescopes so many details into a
short time ^{and limits} ~~that~~ the possibility of any comprehensive orienta-
tion. Also prevalent among the SMDP countries, including
Mauritania, was the late identification of the selected
trainee; early dialogue and mutual processing concentrates on
field of training or skill requirements without reference to
any individual (or, in some cases, to several from whom one
will be chosen).

SMDP Funds Utilization (Mauritania):

~~Note: No records of In-Country Training~~

	1979		1980		1981	
	LT	ST	LT	ST	LT	ST
UST	\$60,000	46,394	87,574	46,303	391,230	9,350
TCT	--	--	45,895	5,890	31,685	--

Average Cost/SMDP Participant:

UST	\$30,000	9,280	21,894	11,576	48,904	3,117
TCT	--	--	11,475	1,473	15,843	--

Mortgage:

UST	\$70,700	\$364,000
TCT	\$35,000	

Funds obligated for extensions

\$45,574	\$18,691
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CAPE VERDE

A. GENERAL

Cape Verde may be compared to mainland Sahelian countries on the basis of drought effects. Volcanic soil composition and mountainous topography are differentiating factors. Like The Gambia and Mauritania, Cape Verde lacks university institutions and depends on overseas facilities for all upper level training and education. Cape Verde's insular situation tends to accentuate some development problems, for example, less than adequate transportation, mandatory duplication of some education and health facilities. The generally-expressed goal of self-sufficiency in food supplies through improvements in the agricultural sector probably should be trimmed back for Cape Verde because of climatic, topographic and geographic limitations. The route to food self-sufficiency may well lie via other development sectors, e.g., services. Because current bilateral AID project activity focuses principally on agriculture, SMDP resources might better be dedicated to attacking development constraints identifiable in non-agricultural areas. Such an approach would be fully consistent with the current SMDP Project Paper.

B. PROGRAM

1. Training supported via SMDP is limited very narrowly to the agriculture sector which is even more restrictive than

the CDSS. This limitation was criticized by Cape Verde spokespersons who refer to the fact that nearly all donors focus on rural development and agriculture-associated activities. The U.S., argues the chairman of the national scholarship committee, offers many opportunities in management, administration, health and education, all fields where Cape Verde needs assistance. The chairman pulled SMDP files and pointed out ProAg language limiting training to "agricultural development activities." The training to date, all conducted in the U.S., is focused as follows:

<u>Sector</u>	<u>MS/MA</u>	<u>BS/BA</u>
Agriculture	2	6 (1 woman)
Econ Pol/Planning	1	1
Water Resources		4
Bus. Admin.		2 (both women)
Ecology		1 (woman)

Note: One female in Bus. Ad. and the one in ecology are wives of male participants (one wife, a Bus. Ad. major, proceeded to the U.S. prior to acceptance by a U.S. institution with assurance in the PIO/P that international travel costs would be reimbursed. The other female Bus. Ad. major is the now divorced wife of a Cape Verde diplomat for whom AID tuition financing was arranged. Since the divorce, the young lady now wants a full stipend; the matter is under advisement.)

~~Nine participants nominated by the GOCV and approved in principle pending availability of FY1982 funding are all candidates for bachelor degrees: seven in agriculture; one in hydrogeology; and one in engineering hydraulics. No SMDP trainees have resumed their employment as of the evaluation date.~~

2. All training under SMDP is decided by the GOCV national scholarship committee based on review of applications from graduating high schoolers. Decisions on fields of study flow from requests from government ministries and agencies; only applicants with scores of 16 or above (on a scale of 20) are considered with waivers only when the number of awards exceeds the supply of high achievers. Some donors, in particular the USSR, are usually willing to increase their annual awards (the Soviet offer stands annually at 30) at the request of the GOCV scholarship committee. One effect produced by this system is that one major directorate of the Rural Development Ministry has more degree-holding functionaries than trained middle level managers.

3. The sole in-country ^{training} under SMDP has been a program for planning assistants, proposed on the initiative of the GOCV. Scheduled to cover a six month span -- the 17 trainees will combine work and classroom work or practical experience -- the program will be half theory and half practice. The faculty is part Cape Verdian and part Portuguese and the curriculum was a product of faculty deliberations. Some \$90,000 was obligated for the project; the expectation is that

some of the better students may in turn become trainers for their peers. Depending on later evaluation, SMDP may be used for such programs in other across-the-board skills.

C. MANAGEMENT

1. During the two years of SMDP operation in Cape Verde, the AID office operated with a minimum U.S. and Cape Verdian staff. Even now, no formal Training Officer or HRDO position exists nor is the Team persuaded such positions are currently justified. The generally truncated nature of what is nominally a combined Guinea-Bissau / Cape Verde AID operation complicates many aspects of a training activity. Mission approvals are G-Bissau responsibility, although programming is done in Praia. Controller records are split between Bissau and Dakar. In spite of all this, staffing currently on board -- since early 1982 -- promises a more coordinated approach.

2. The CTP for 1980 and 1981 were prepared after consultation with the GOCV and -- as stated above -- foresaw a concentration of nearly all resources in agriculture. For the future, now that several projects in agriculture and water management have been approved and are underway, the Mission should consider focusing SMDP resources on relieving constraints to the general development process^r in sectors or agencies, such as planning, finance, health, where U.S. technical training offers solutions that may make immediate differences.

~~3. Funding~~

a. SMDP funds utilization:

(1) Some \$195,000 constituted the initial SMDP increment for Cape Verde: \$135,000 partially funded one master's and six bachelor's programs, two in agriculture, two in water resource management, and one each in ecology, economic development and business administration. The remaining \$60,000 was allocated to funding four programs begun under the Utah State-Tarrafal contract. The total effect of this decision was ultimately to charge SMDP over two years with some \$220,000 (including this \$60,000) that was a legitimate charge against water management project funding. The "savings" in the training component of the Utah State contract (\$109,000) was reprogrammed to extend the operating budget of the contract for an additional 12 months. This reprogramming was contrary to SMDP PP guidelines which specify that SMDP shall not be a surrogate for project funding. When the "MORTGAGE" against SMDP is considered -- see below -- this \$220,000 becomes very important.

(2) The FY1981 allotment -- \$650,000 provided \$149,800 for continuation of nine (of eleven) programs for a second year and \$125,000 for five new starts -- one master's in economic policy/planning, three bachelor's in water management and one in business administration -- plus \$9,000 to finish out the last months of a master's program in civil engineering begun under the now terminated Tarrafal project. This latter is an example of effective

~~SMDP use to finance post-project training. Finally, \$90,000~~

for the in-country planners' project came from FY1981 funds. The Team could find no documentation liquidating \$276,200.

(3) Average cost per participant has no meaning as yet in the Cape Verde program. Only one participant -- a master's candidate -- is "fully funded" at an obligation of \$31,000.

(4) Extent of mortgage: The USAID estimates the future requirements at \$572,000 for participants currently in training. This obviously omits reference to the above \$276,200 and \$100,000 in FY 1982 funds. Three participants, provided first year funding from FY1981 allotments, but not yet departed, would require by the Mission's estimate an additional \$330,000. The \$572,000 amounts to \$1800/month; three of the programs will require FY1985 funds as the last year of obligation. For the three participants awaiting call forward the monthly cost figures at \$2,600 (each participant has already been funded at \$30,000 for twelve months from FY1981 resources; \$110,000 is programmed for each for the remaining 42 months).

(5) Cape Verde's SMDP records offer an interesting comparison between direct participant placement and university contract placement. The four undergraduates at Utah State were projected to cost \$41,000 for a four year program (\$9,320 x 4 + \$3,700 for international travel and contingencies). Obligated plus projected costs for the four after the shift to SMDP amount to \$55,000 each. Overhead and other contract costs would increase the \$41,000 by some unknown factor, but certainly not to the tune of \$14,000.

4. The USAID and GOCV operate no pre-departure or follow-up programs (there are no SMDP returnees). There is no English language training program in Cape Verde. As in other countries, the government is habitually late in completing exit formalities, thus little time can be devoted to important briefing and orientation.

5. HC/USAID views on SMDP include the following:

a. AMDP as operated ^{by} AAI was much better because of advance assurances on numbers of trainees per year and closer monitoring, reporting on participants in training. SMDP should be modified accordingly.

b. The narrow limitation of training fields to agriculture should be lifted. A CTP should identify constraints with specificity and describe how training will resolve problems and remove obstacles.

THE GAMBIA

The Gambia is one of the Sahelian countries depending entirely on foreign institutions for university level education and training for its civil service. The GOTG has estimated manpower requirements in the Five Year Plan (July 1981.- July 1986) albeit based on macro planning base lines. As a practical matter, the government seeks to provide employment for as many qualified school leavers as apply. The Plan lays the groundwork for staff development and organization principles and regulations for gradual application among the agencies of the Establishment. In the interim, staffing patterns and personnel requirements are developed annually.

PROGRAM:

Representatives of the Establishment Office (i.e., the Civil Service) and the USAID meet annually to formulate a training outline. This meeting precedes drafting of the Country Training Plan (CTP) required by the SMDP. Priorities are drawn from a combination of the Project Paper, the CDSS and/or ABS and GOTG policy; flexibility in the decision-making process is assured through the absence of a Project Agreement (PIO/P are obligating documents, although in FY1979 four training programs were covered in a Pro Ag). After numbers, fields and types of training are decided, the GOTG distributes letters of announcement that encourage applications from

~~civil servants who in turn must apply through their regular~~
~~agency channels.~~ As a rule, only applications from civil servants are accepted, although The Gambian Cooperative Union -- a parastatal organization -- has recently been included. When the deadline passes, all applications are reviewed by a joint GOTG-USAID committee, decisions reached and processing begun.

In the three years of SMDP history, The Gambia's program has evolved into an admixture of long and short term academic, short-term non-academic and observation training opportunities. As might be expected, some 14 of 18 programs in the first year provided for academic experiences, half at the graduate (master's), six at the undergraduate, and one at the diploma level. Three of the participants studied in third country African institutions. Four functionaries pursued practical, short-term courses in U.S. institutions. Nine of this first SMDP "class" had begun their programs under AMDP. Year two funds, ^{i.e., FY 1980,} were allocated entirely to con-
^{long-term}tinuation of programs begun in 1979.

Of the 26 new starts in 1981 (in addition to 12 carry-overs), sixteen began academic studies, six in African (anglo-phone) countries, the remainder in the U.S. It is noteworthy that eight of these academic programs are destined for reward with a diploma or certificate after 12 months of study, thereby stressing relevance as contrasted to straight education. The ten short-term programs, all scheduled for the U.S., range in duration from four weeks to four months; one involves four weeks of observation training for the

~~Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Health, Labor and
Social Welfare.~~

As in most developing countries, priorities in The Gambia begin with the agriculture sector, followed by planning, health and community development. SMDP priorities have been set accordingly; this is reflected in the training programs selected mutually by the GOTG and the USAID. Of 18 programs in 1979, 12 concentrated on agricultural specialties, two on water resources and management, two on cooperatives and two on development administration. By 1981, only three of 26 programs featured agriculture (which actually was dropped from SMDP because of bilateral projects focused on the sector). Major emphasis is found in health and nutrition (including education), while financial management and statistics, the environment and energy resources receive modest attention. One degree program focuses on a training institution in Africa, while five others seek only technical skills in anglophone institutions in Central and East Africa. In conversations with GOTG and USAID officials, relevance dominated much of the discussion. First attention is given to third country resources and decisions on U.S. training -- whether short- or long-term -- result mainly from mutual agreement that content, duration and relevance are all better met in U.S. public or private institutions or agencies. For Gambians, the language factor plays a role only to the extent that study in francophone African countries receives little consideration.

A comparison of two programs assumed from AMDP funding
demonstrates good and poor training site selection. One student with an undergraduate U.S. degree selected his own U.S. university, was accepted by AMDP and received complete satisfaction. The other, an undergraduate from Sierra Leone, had little knowledge of U.S. institutions, but elected to specialize in irrigated and rain-fed rice culture. Unfortunately, USDA placed her at Washington State University and she received no practical training (and precious little relevant classroom instruction) in her chosen field.

MANAGEMENT:

Human resource development receives considerable stress and attention within the USAID, beginning in the front office. The Training Officer, a Gambian lady educated in the U.S., enjoys the respect and cooperation of the combined GOTG/USAID communities involved in economic and social development. SMDP management as well as planning and implementing of all training is centered in the Program Office and is adequately staffed. The three CTP prepared in Banjul exhibit complete appreciation of the necessity for synchronizing host country and U.S. priorities. Moreover, the CTP demonstrated a conscious shift in emphasis as project activity began. Agriculture has been dropped almost entirely from latest plans because the bulk of other bilateral resources flows into such activities as Mixed Farming, Forestry, Soil and

~~Water Management, Gambia River Development; regional funding~~
~~operates in the Crop Protection and Pest Management fields.~~
Had one program begun under AMDP been ^{properly} shifted to Crop Protection funds rather than SMDP nearly two person years of training (\$40-45,000) could have been applied to additional non-project training. In an otherwise well-managed and well-conceived project, this oversight had no adverse effects because the GOTG benefits from an effectively trained technician.

The first CTP, prepared in late 1978 for FY1979, set a pattern that remains a challenge. In theory and practice, the Plan reflected GOTG priorities: agriculture; water resource planning and management; animal health and production; forestry; cooperatives and community development (originally in the Planning Ministry, but now in Local Government). At this early stage, the U.S. was only developing individual project activity, focus of which would be agriculture. In year Two, the first rank priorities remained the same, but maternal and child health, public health, livestock and produce marketing (both parastatal functions) were added to the mutually agreed fields of training endeavor. The latest Plan dropped agriculture -- except for cooperatives -- and weighed in heavily on programs related to primary health care, including nutrition. Community development remained on the list, however, central statistics gained recognition, reflecting U.S. concern with strengthened financial management systems and improved project justifications.

~~SMDP~~ finances, in ~~The~~ Gambia as elsewhere, suffer from a lack of early AID/W guidelines on funding practices and rather vague PP language on the respective roles of AID/W and the USAID in managing SMDP resources. One AID/W cable observed that Missions should decide either to fund participants annually or for the life of their program. Quick consideration of this ambiguous guidance produces a whole host of downstream problems, all of which have arisen. The Gambia has provided full funding for all observation and short-term academic or non-academic training. Long-term academic training, however, has been programmed fully in some cases, partially in others. No clear rationale for the choices emerged from conversations in the Mission or from analysis of the financial data. Training site seemed to make no difference; programs in third countries and the U.S. are funded in both manners. First year funding for long-term trainees seemed to follow PP or SER/IT guidelines, but subsequent years' allocations are based on first year experience by institution of training.

Assuming no additional new starts and considering the \$85,000 in FY 1982 allotted (STATE 037073) to cover participants in training, the "mortgage" amounts to about \$120,000. This amount, required partly in FY 1983 (\$56,000) and in FY 1984 (\$64,000), will complete funding of four LT academic programs in the U.S. and four in third countries (three in Ghana and one in Nigeria). Although only illustrative because

of the scarce data available. the monthly cost for graduate training for three returned participants amounted to \$1990, \$2270 and \$1400, respectively (straight calculation of PIO/P funding and subtracting \$1900 for international travel; PP estimates such training at \$1,250). For short-term participants, the costs for five programs (all less international travel) per month varied from \$2340, \$1517, \$3570, \$2661, \$2321 (versus \$1800 in the PP). Combining the five programs and dividing the sum by the person/months involved produced an average of \$2472/month; the utility of this figure for planning purposes is problematical given the differences in training which ranged from cooperative management through surface and ground water exploration to primary health care and vegetable production/marketing.

The USAID Training Officer recently visited Nigeria to review programs for Gambian participants; a similar visit to Sierra Leone is planned. AAI has a representative in Lagos and maintains contact with all major institutions. A problem arises in attempting to support participants where no AID Mission operates; embassy personnel are not apt to visit participants, counsel them or provide emergency assistance. In Lagos, the embassy receives and distributes checks to participants. The Gambian ambassador to Nigeria was contacted and expressed interest in assisting not only in monitoring participants in training, but also in expediting placement. This proposal bears further examination. It

should be noted, in any event, that most AID Missions are
not usually staffed to support third country training in
their host countries; where no AID Mission operates, prospects
for effective use of local institutions are reduced measurably,
if in fact prospects even exist.

USAID Gambia has proceeded methodically to develop an
effective pre-departure program. Nevertheless, the USAID
in Banjul -- and in all other countries -- is hampered by
the deliberate processes followed by the host government.
Candidates are named late in many instances, which obviates
the possibilities of orientation. In some cases, departure
proceeds so rapidly because exit visas are withheld that
cash advances are not even possible. This matter is part of
a continuing dialogue with the GOTG aimed at better preparing
the participants for a smooth transition into an overseas
environment whether in a third country or the U.S.

Returnees under SMDP are few, however, an alumni
association has been launched, certificates of achievement
distributed by the Ambassador and a newsletter and social
events are planned. It is also intended to use the associa-
tion as an organic component of the pre-departure and follow-up
processes; consideration may be given to inviting Gambians
who studied in the U.S. under private auspices to join the
association as associate members. Returned participants
are also to be enlisted to participate alone or with U.S.
experts in the conduct of in-country training under SMDP.

~~The USAID and the GOCG have launched an ambitious program~~
~~for cementing relations among returned participants. As~~
more participants return, the Training Officer also plans
to monitor contact between participant and training institution
and professional society. So far, the latter link has not
functioned well and the USAID will provide details to AID/W.

~~SMDP Funds Utilization (The Gambia):~~

~~N.B. - No records of In-Country Training~~

	1979		1980		1981	1982
	LT	ST	LT	LT	ST	LT
UST	\$129,172	32,810	106,332	395,448	68,552	70,700
TCT	\$ 30,000	--	--	60,000	--	--

Average Cpt/SMDP Participant:^{1/}

	1979		1980		1981	1982
	LT	ST	LT	LT	ST	LT
UST	\$ 11,743	8,203	9,667	17,193	6,855	8,838
TCT	\$ 10,000	--	--	10,000	--	--

1/ Some only partially funded.

Mortgage:

	<u>1979</u>	<u>1981</u>
	\$6,000	\$114,000

Fund obligated for extensions:

	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>
	\$97,190	\$106,332	\$138,022	\$70,700

List of Official Contacts

The Gambia

Larry Piper, Ambassador

Thomas Moser, AID Representative

Anthony Funicello, Program Officer

Ms. Binta I. Sidibe, Training Officer

Michael Bradley, Controller

Quincy Benbow, Agricultural Officer

Mark Madland, Asst. Ag. Officer

Ms. Mary Langley, Establishment Sec'y, Off. of the President

Ms. Bakary Sanneh, Deputy

Mr. K. Ruud, Manpower Planner (UNDP)

Min. of Econ. Planning

Mr. E.S. Jobarteh, Planning Assistant

Sulayman Ceesay, Under Secretary, Min. of Agriculture

Ms. Ralpherina de Almeida, Exec. Sec. Women's Bureau

Office of the President

Mr. S. Johnson, Dep. Director, Dept. of Water Resources

Ms. Fatouh Jasseh, Returned SMDP Participant

Mr. Lamin Jobe, " " "

Mr. Sulayman M'Boob, Dir., Dept. of Crop Protection

Mr. James Grey-Johnson, CILSS Executive Secretariat

~~Cape Verde~~

Edward Torrey, Charge d'Affaires

James Anderson, AID Affairs Officer

Frank Dimond, Program Officer

Alda Texiera, Executive Assistant

Quivino Spencer, Secy Gen'l., Min. of Education

Horacio Soares, Director of Nat'l. Resources,
Min. of Rural Development

Adao Rocha, Director of Cooperation,
Min. of Planning/Cooperation

Esther Sequeira, Min. of Education

Senegal

David Shear, AID Director

Sam Rea, Acting Deputy

Barbara Howard, Acting Program Officer

Ousmane N'Dao, Training Officer

Lance Jepsen, Agricultural Officer

Wayne Butler, Controller's Office

Janet Gillis, Controller's Office

Mamadon Jallow, Evaluation Officer

Diop Amadon Ti, Deputy Director for Cooperation,
Min. of Planning and Cooperation

N'Diaye Serigne, Deputy Director of Scholarships,
Min. of Higher Education

Mauritania

Stanley Schragar, Charge d'Affaires

Kane Mame Diack, Secy Gen'l., Min. of Employment and
Training for the Civil Service

Baber Salah O/M.A., Director of Senior Training

Hacen M., Deputy

Haiba Mohamed H O/S, Chancellor (designate) of the University
BA (Ms.), Director, Mauritanian Normal School

Rabat O/Lam, Deputy Director, Mauritanian Admin. School

Ly Amadou Tidiane, Director of Research/Programming,
Min. of Economics and Finance

Peter Benedict, AID Director

Abraham Hirsch, Chief, AID Projects Office

The following people were interviewed (ELT only):

MALI

Jean DuKette, Human Resources Officer
Barbara Wills, Language Advisor, OMBEVI
Mr. Fofata, Director
Mr. Chuck Cecil, ICA
Ms. Christina Lauren, Teacher, OMBEVI
Mr. Babakar, Assistant to Jean DuRette
Mr. Burt Lauren, U.S. Peace Corps

UPPER VOLTA

Mr. Tom Hull, ICA Director
Mr. W. Garberson, Acting Director, Peace Corps
Mr. Tony Wollbrecht, Program Officer
Mr. Mike Rue, Director, Program Office
Ms. Fati Ouedraogo, Training Officer, FNS -

NIGER

Ms. Lea Donald, Director, ICA/Niamey Language Center
Ms. Vita Wilson, Public Affairs Officer, ICA
Peace Corps Director
Ms. Barbara Belding, Education Director
Ms. Pat McDuffy, Program Officer, USAID

GAMBIA

Mrs. Isatou J. Ndure, Acting Director of Curriculum Development
Mr. Inkster, Teaching Training College
Mr. Heamey, Head of Education Dpartment
Mr. Sam Kinter, Education Department
Mrs. Ndaw, Librarian, Gambia College
Mr. Ndondy N'Jie, Vice-Principal, Gambia College
ICA
Peace Corps
Mr. Joe Wolof, Literacy/Materials Development Section

NOTE: The above list does not include general meetings which were held for the purpose of briefing and debriefing the mission director and other USAID personnel.

SENEGAL

Ousmane Idaiye, Human Resources Program Officer/AID
Barbara Howard, AID Program Officer
Julie Owen, Human Resources Development Officer/AID
Will Petty, Public Affairs Officer/ USICA
Lorraine Issacs, U.S. Peace Corps
Lillian Bear, YMCA Program
Gary Ingelberg, Independent Consultant
John Frankus, Director of Resources/USICA

NOTE: I am unable to evaluate, in qualitative or quantitative terms, the English language training situation in Senegal. I was unable to hold substantive meetings with key people in Dakar because of scheduling problems and other logistical problems attributed to their not being notified sufficiently in advance as to the purpose of my visit and the nature of my inquiry. The information I did receive was insufficient to make any concrete evaluative statements. — James Dias