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EVALUATION TEAM REPORT
AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT PROJECT

0209

Submitted to
United States Agency for International Development
DS/RAD, Washington, D.C.
and
USAID Mission, Cairo, Egypt

11 April 1980

by

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Secretary General
NIMD

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F O R E W O R D

A draft of the present report was prepared by the authors in Cairo in February/March and submitted to USAID/Cairo 19 March 1980. Upon receipt from USAID and the Ministry of Agriculture, Cairo, of their comments on that draft, the present final version was prepared; it differs from the draft in minor editorial changes but major reorganization in Chapters I, II and III, and fairly extensive change, particularly addition of detail regarding a follow-on project, in Chapter IV. This final text was prepared in the U.S. and Drs. Abdel Hamid and El-Kholei have not had an opportunity to review it prior to its submission to USAID. They should therefore not be held responsible for, or assumed to agree with any of the changes or additions that have been made, although I have no reason to think either of them would take issue with the present text in any major way.

Richard S. Roberts, Jr.
Denver, Colorado
11 April 1980

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Introduction

The activity under review in Egypt is part of a larger project, the
(1)
"Agricultural Sector Implementation Project" (ASIP). The prime objective
of this overall project is,

helping to bridge the gap between planners and farmers by
improving the planning, implementation and management capa-
bilities of those in the developing countries concerned
with agricultural and rural development.

(ASIP Summary Description)

Fundamental to the project is "the ASIP approach", the key aspects of
which are

- (a) identifying and communicating via "Reference Books" ways
agricultural sector managers have found to deal with their
major problems, and
- (b) developing in rural sector managers broadly applicable
management skills, through special training based on
"learning by doing".

During a first phase of the project (1972-1976) the contractor
(Governmental Affairs Institute, GAI), developed an extensive reference
book (Manual) of "successful practices" in dealing with rural sector
management problems in developing countries, practices likely to be
transferable. They then "designed a course of instruction for transferring
the information in the Manual, and to a lesser extent, other information

(1) Contract No. AID/ta-C-1350

as well, to managers concerned with agricultural and rural development in developing countries." (Review of the Pilot Training Course . . . , February 26, 1976, p. 1) This six-week pilot course (PTC) was delivered to relatively senior agricultural sector officials from several countries in July - August 1976 in the U.S.

Two months later, USAID and GAI signed a new contract under which "the ASIP approach" was to be implemented in two countries, yet to be chosen. That which was proposed was described in a "Summary Description" of the ASIP produced in November, 1976. In this document the operational model implemented in the PTC of summer, 1976, was scaled down to a three-week course plus follow-up consultancy. The content described was essentially that of the PTC, but there was half as much of it. This Summary Description introduced the concept and the program to prospective countries of application.

Egypt and Nepal were selected as implementation sites. In each country, the project was to have a field life of two years. At the end of this time there was to have been developed in each of the two participating countries "an 'in-country' capability in an indigenous organization capable of continuing the ASIP approach for training agricultural managers at appropriate levels in the identification and application of agricultural and rural development principles". (GAI/AID contract No. AID/ta-C-1350 of 9/30/76, Article I.F.)

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

I. ASIP in Egypt: Problems Addressed and Methodology

ASIP in Egypt has been organized as the Agricultural Sector Management Development Project (ASMDP) attached to, but not part of, the Training Department, Ministry of Agriculture; it is funded on an ad hoc basis.

The management problems addressed by the project were identified by the contractor (GAI) as common and basic in many countries; while they were not identified through a needs assessment in Egypt (which was to be done, but has not been), they are important, and fundamental here.

The "problems" addressed are, in fact, management weaknesses, the under-utilization by officials of their own power to reason out solutions to problems they encounter in doing their work, and relative lack of teamwork with consequent under-utilization of the capabilities represented by available manpower.

ASIP methodology is relevant and appropriate in Egypt, although unfortunately it has not been applied evenly, in its entirety or in a way calculated to produce meaningful organizational results.

The basic training course has been modified very little, even experimentally, since its introduction; it has produced useful results, but with refinement could be more effective.

There is a need to strengthen those elements of the ASIP methodology that complement training; follow-up consultancy and a collection of Egyptian "successful practices" have had less attention than planned, and than needed.

The Reference Book concept has strong support among program participants. The Egyptian version was to have been developed early in the project, but has progressed very little due to lack of staff and other reasons; a consultant and a full-time staff person have been working on it since early 1980 and expect to have an Egyptian supplement to the international Reference Book by July.

ASIP methodology calls for attention to forward and backward linkages; there has been good involvement of complementary organizations in the sector, but neglect of senior management.

II. ASIP in Egypt: Project Results

The project did not achieve the results expected of it by the end of its original two year life in October, 1979; for a variety of reasons, including the expectation that significant progress toward these objectives could be made, it was extended nine months, to 31 July 1980.

The project encountered a variety of technical, administrative and budgetary problems which were eventually solved with the help of MOA and USAID; their cumulative effect on operations was significant, but less so than more fundamental sources of obstacles, among them,

- The project design was made in USA; it was Egyptianized too late, and the process began at too low a level.
- Contract focus on institutionalization has resulted in contractor focus on it in narrowly defined terms.
- Directly related is lack of focus on the possibility that it cannot be institutionalized if key people are not convinced it is worth having for the long run; little attention has been given (until recently) to whether or why it is worth institutionalizing.
- A multi-faceted project was given to a small team that does not seem to have represented until recently all of the orientations appropriate to the project.
- The project lacked from the start a staff member who fully grasped the ASIP approach, techniques and strategy, and who had sufficient (considerable) grasp of Arabic to recognize and help minimize language-related obstacles.

Top level project supervision was ineffectual; although the contractor, USAID/Washington, USAID/Cairo and the MOA all had varying forms of authority over it, the project was allowed to wander far from its chartered course without timely, decisive action being taken.

The project has a professional staff of six Egyptians who will be moderately experienced by the end of July; six more people coming up are based in the field and not officially assigned to the project, even on a part-time basis.

The staff seem to be enthusiastic believers in, and practitioners of what they are teaching, but given their limited training and experience, it would be unrealistic (and unfair) to expect them to refine the program or to develop additional staff on their own.

Momentum has developed since the October extension; the basic course has now been taught by the Egyptian staff in Arabic for the first time, and plans are being made for a first intensive intervention in a limited geographic area and at different management levels.

Approximately 200 middle managers (broadly defined) and a handful of senior managers have attended ASMDP courses.

Unfortunately, there has been no systematic assessment of the results of the ASMDP effort; anecdotal testimony (see text) suggests that the results are significant at the level of the individual official, and even for localized operations, but it is not very meaningful in the overall scheme of the agricultural sector.

Thus far the project has missed its chance to demonstrate how significant the results of the ASIP approach can be for the agricultural sector in Egypt; concentration of effort, attention to management above and below the middle level and early establishment of an evaluation system were part of plans and would have made a big difference. We support the current, belated, attention they are getting.

When the project terminates at the end of July, anticipated outputs will have been only partially generated and end-of-project status will represent limited success. The capacity developed is not likely to be one that can sustain and build itself functioning on its own, as it is now; however, it could be a useful productive part of function-specific training programs and/or of a broader management development program.

III. Agricultural Management: Approaches to Meeting its Needs

The weaknesses addressed by ASIP/ASMDP are fundamental and there are no grounds (for which we have data) on which to prioritize them.

We have not clearly identified management problems of greater importance than those on which the project has focused, but are convinced that a more promising approach would be via a comprehensive, results-oriented management development program offering ASIP training, more focused behavioral training and courses to develop specialized management skills or techniques for those in need of them.

More information about management weaknesses is needed; some of this is coming (unsystematically) in feedback from ASMDP activity and some may be available in studies done by ODM and ILO but which were not available to the evaluation team.

Some management problems in the sector are related to structural characteristics; structure does set limits to potential performance, but management is a major determinant of performance within the structurally created limits and much can be done within these limits.

For a comprehensive management development program to bring about change in organizational performance it will have to be so programmed that it creates in each organization a critical mass of like-minded managers and reaches top as well as middle and lower level managers.

IV. Implications for the Future: A Follow-on Project

We recommend that USAID and MOA undertake a systematic, results-oriented management development program for the agricultural sector.¹

The purpose of such a project would be to use management development to improve the performance of public sector organizations serving the agricultural sector in limited target areas or systems, and to develop and institutionalize the capability of the GOE to continue the program after termination of USAID involvement.

Project strategy would involve (a) aim at developing a "critical mass" of trained managers in the target areas/systems, (b) attention to all levels of management, to interrelationships among agencies in the target areas/systems, and to participant selection and mix in all training, (c) focus on operational needs rather than theoretical educational profiles, (d) a three phase cycle of information gathering/analysis, training and consultancy/follow-up, and (e) being flexible and responsive, thus offering a comprehensive training approach as described in Chapter III.

Outputs would be a functioning, result-oriented management development system in place, a critical mass of managers at all levels of all relevant agencies in the target areas/systems having received effective, appropriate training and consultancy/follow-up, and such other outputs as are needed to produce these.

Operationally, the project would have an initial period during which staff development and planning would coincide with phase one information gathering/analysis; phase two would begin with ASIP-type training and continue with other training responsive to needs, and phase three would be follow-up and consultancy, leading into a new cycle in the target area/system in question. Different areas/systems would be

¹In the draft report reviewed by USAID and MOA, this chapter was essentially a collection of points the evaluation team felt should be taken into account in developing the recommended project. The preparation of this final report, following receipt of USAID and MOA feedback, has been done in the U.S. where it has not been possible to consult Drs. Abdel Hamid and El-Kholei. Attention is drawn to this fact, because Chapter IV has been extensively rewritten in the final report. While the collaborative relationship that resulted in the earlier draft has certainly influenced the present recommendations, and I have no reason to think they would take issue with them in any major way, Dr. Abdel Hamid and Dr. El-Kholei should not be held responsible for most of the detailed recommendations in this chapter until they have had an opportunity to review them. (R. Roberts)

targeted sequentially, a first cycle starting in one as a second begins in another.

Development of training materials and new courses would be an on-going activity, as would be dissemination of field information and successful practices.

Conduct of training in Arabic should be an aim of the program, though it may not be possible in all subject areas and with all levels of management from the start.

The evaluation team has no strongly held view as to the optimal organizational location of the project; it should be where it is most likely to succeed.

Project staff should include the present ASMDP staff (assuming positive results of ASMDP work the first half of 1980) and, at the start, four to six other professionals, including a project manager; the professionals recruited should have good management and/or training qualifications, leaving the project to develop one set of skills or the other, not both; project design should assume that only basic and/or commonly needed skills needs will be met by project staff, other needs to be met by local (or expatriate) consultants.

USAID level of effort would be roughly similar to that of the overall ASIP project (\$0.5 million/year), plus adjustment for inflation, but would be over four to five years rather than ASIP's three; key elements would be two resident specialists, short-term consultants and participant training, with some materials, equipment, language training and locale refurbishing requirements.

MOA inputs would include staff, administrative support and budget; care should be taken to allow for items (such as participant per diem) normally charged to organization or governorate budgets but likely to be unusually large due to project efforts.

A management committee representing concerned agencies should be established.

USAID should arrange for semi-annual external technical review of the project to assess progress against plans and objectives with a long-term perspective, in addition to regular review within the Mission.

I. ASIP in Egypt: Problems Addressed and Methodology

USAID and the Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) signed an agreement concerning the ASIP project 9 September 1977. As established in the letter of agreement of that date,

"The objective of the ASIP in Egypt is to assist the A.R.E. to attain the institutional capacity to develop and carry out a continuing program to train middle level agricultural and rural development personnel in the ASIP approach to management.

. . .
"The capability of the (MOA agency) to continue the training will constitute the institutionalization of the ASIP approach in Egypt. This will be the major criterion for the success of the project."

In October, 1977, the two-man GAI team assigned to the project in Egypt arrived in Cairo. They brought with them a course model that differed from the three-week version in the "Summary Description" in being only two weeks and in having dropped management practice and theory and much of the agricultural content of the other models. This new model is what has been applied in Egypt with only minor changes.

The project has been attached to the Training Department of the MOA since late 1978, after an initial association with the Agricultural Training Board (ATB). It is organized as the Agricultural Sector Management Development Project (ASMDP) and is not formally a part of the Training Department. ASMDP has not yet been institutionalized in terms of the MOA budget, but is financed with funds culled from anticipated under-spending of other parts of MOA, and from extra-budgetary sources controlled by MOA. This creates a degree of uncertainty as to the limit on funds available to the project, which in turn creates handicaps in terms of planning and operating, and of its effect on staff morale. Fortunately,

the project has had strong support from the First Under-Secretary of the MOA from the beginning. This has been very important in resolving problems that have arisen.

The problems addressed by ASIP in Egypt have really been those of very broad character identified by GAI as being common in many countries. While ASIP in Egypt was to identify the major agricultural/rural development management training needs in the country (as per the USAID/GOA Letter of Agreement), this has never been done. Thus, in practice, ASIP--through ASMDP--has focused on what might be described as under-utilization by officials of their own power to reason out solutions to problems they encounter in doing their work (and a tendency to wait for instructions from above, or for someone else to solve the problems), and relative lack of teamwork and consequent under-utilization of the capabilities represented by available manpower. These are not always thought of as problems, and are often not what comes to mind when one asks about management problems in the agricultural sector. However, as work habits, they are closely tied to any management task, problem, or bottleneck that arises.

Effectively taught, the skills and related attitudes ASMDP seeks to inculcate make it possible to mitigate the effect of many kinds of problems, for example by helping identify and implement ways to optimize progress with limited resources (shortage of resources is frequently identified as a big problem). They also enable officials to develop conditions conducive to solution of other problems, for example as changes in an official's performance give his boss increased confidence

in him, that confidence results in greater willingness to delegate (lack of delegation has been cited as a major problem).

In principle, the ASIP methodology relies on task-based learning and group work in the classroom, makes formal training part of a system with follow-up and experience sharing, and takes into account forward and backward linkages that are vital to implementation of plans in the agricultural sector. The methodology is both relevant and appropriate here. There is nothing to indicate that it does not fit or work in Egypt (which is not to say it cannot be improved in practice). However, the methodology has not been applied in its entirety, evenly, or in a way strategically calculated to produce measurable organizational results (at whatever level of organization). Moreover, on-going evaluation has not been such as to provide a solid base for pedagogical adjustments to try to improve effectiveness.

The basic training course can be refined to make it more effective. The training procedures have been tried numerous times with only very ~~minor~~ adjustment for Egypt. They have produced useful results with at least some participants, but the procedures have not been adjusted or tested to try to improve on these results. We would suggest, for example, that the course include a brief early explanation of how its aims relate to the overall management process; doing this in relatively conventional terms would help participants place it in a broader context and better explain it to others. We would also like to see a way found to relate it more closely to agriculture as in its original form (see the "Summary Description" of November, 1976) to facilitate the transfer of skills back

to the work situation; this could be done through additional agricultural "tasks" (the course may speed up in Arabic, creating time that could be so used, or a longer course may be desirable), or through the linking of the course to other, more "agricultural" training (e.g. for extension agents). More could also be done to produce "tasks" that clearly relate to Egypt, and to develop and produce training materials based on Egyptian experience to supplement the Arabic translations of imported materials.

The course is part of a system: the ASIP methodology. The activities in that system that complement the training need strengthening. The methodology calls for follow-up and consultancy work, for example; there has been less of this than planned, and less than is needed.

Another example is the Reference Book. With the training course, this was a second way ASIP was to address the broad spectrum of problems facing agricultural sector managers. Its contribution is to make available to Egyptian agricultural sector officials information about practices that have been successfully applied to overcome agricultural development problems and bottlenecks in Egypt and elsewhere in the world. The International Reference Book is available in English and was, until recently, distributed to all course participants. The two chapters considered of greatest priority/applicability have been translated into Arabic and are distributed to participants. However, the Egyptian Reference Book, which was to be prepared early in the project according to the USAID/GOA Letter of Agreement, has not been prepared and will not be completed when the project terminates. "Successful practices" are being identified, recorded, reported, filtered, clarified and classified, but slowly and far behind

the original schedule. The concept is one that is not grasped easily, and the identification and reporting process calls for many people who have grasped it to function as a widespread net. Pressure to recruit and develop training staff to meet contract requirements ("institutionalization"), difficulties in doing so, and the absence from the GAI team of anyone with strong orientation and capability for field investigation and reporting of the type needed, have all contributed to the slow progress in this area. In recent months a GAI consultant has been working on this in Egypt with a local staff person who has been available to work full time on it since early 1980. As a result, a modest Egyptian supplement to the Reference Book should be completed by July 1980. This is a key aspect of the ASIP methodology and one that meets a real need. (Of the 39 former ASIP participants responding to an evaluation team questionnaire, 31 felt there is a need for the Reference Book, 20 said they have used it, 30 wanted it translated to Arabic, and 38 felt an Egyptian version was needed.)

Finally, the ASIP methodology at a strategic level calls for attention to forward and backward linkages. In this context, this means cross-organizational linkages within the sector (suppliers of inputs, producers, processors, etc.), and vertical linkages within systems. ASIP in Egypt has involved numerous organizations in its activities, in keeping with this aspect of its strategy. However, it has made very little effort to involve senior management and none to bring in lower level management (e.g. cooperative managers). This is one more aspect of the ASIP methodology that fits Egypt, but has not really been applied here.

II. ASIP in Egypt: Project Results

The project did not achieve the results expected of it by the end of its original two-year life in October, 1979. For a variety of reasons, including the expectation that significant progress toward those objectives could be made, it has been given a nine-month extension which will terminate 31 July 1980. In the present chapter we shall very briefly identify a number of factors we believe have been fundamental sources of obstacles to project progress. We shall then turn to project outputs (which are still more fully described in Annex I) and, finally, look at "results" in terms of what the project means to the effectiveness of agricultural sector operations.

The project encountered a variety of technical, administrative and budgetary problems, as is normal with such activities. Among these were the unanticipated need to provide English language training for participants (USAID/Cairo made funding available), to supplement conventional sources of per diem for participants (the Management Committee found funding on an ad hoc basis), to have more vehicles and equipment than the budget allowed (USAID/Cairo found a solution). USAID and MOA did a good job of meeting needs, anticipated and unanticipated, sometimes rather more slowly than would have been liked, but they did meet them. (1)

The cumulative effect of coping with administrative obstacles and uncertainty can be quite significant, particularly with a small staff, and we suspect that such was the case with this project. However, even

(1) See also Annex I, Questions 4 and 5 re USAID and MOA inputs.

without this, there are a number of fundamental sources of obstacles to project progress that would have held the project back. In particular,

- The project design was made in USA; it was Egyptianized too late, and the process began at too low a level.
- Contract focus on institutionalization has resulted in contractor focus on it in narrowly defined terms.
- Directly related is lack of focus on the possibility that it cannot be institutionalized if key people are not convinced it is worth having for the long run; little attention has been given (until recently) to whether or why it is worth institutionalizing.
- A multi-faceted project was given to a small team that does not seem to have represented until recently all of the orientations appropriate to the project.
- The project lacked from the start a staff member who fully grasped the ASIP approach, techniques and strategy, and who had sufficient (considerable) grasp of Arabic to recognize and help minimize language-related obstacles.

To these we would add the observation that overall top management supervision does not seem to have been often exercised by anyone. Although the contractor's headquarters and project director, USAID/Washington, USAID/Cairo and the MOA directly or through the Management Committee of the project all had varying forms of individual or collective authority over the project in part or in toto, it was allowed to wander far from its chartered course without decisive action being taken.

Institutionalization of the project was to be the criterion of success of the project in Egypt. This has kept project team attention very much focused on directly related matters. First among these has been recruitment and development of Egyptian staff. Current staff is small: six people. Only four of them are formally assigned to the Training Department of MOA, to which ASMDP is attached (the others being seconded from other departments). None of the present staff has any training/education in management as a general subject. Two have had some training abroad as trainers, but the others have had only what they have received on this project. And their experience in both training and agricultural management is quite limited. Thus, two of the current staff members have experience as course directors (each having directed one course); one or two more are to get such experience by 31 July. The same four have been trained and have functioned as coaches. They have also done some participant selection and follow-up work, but very little consultancy (though they will participate in some during the coming months). The two other present staff members are developing research and evaluation skills through guided practice on the job. In addition, six former participants in the Governorates have, or are now getting experience as assistant coaches; some of these should be coaching by July. In short, there are six now on the staff who will be moderately experienced by the end of July, and six more coming up, the latter based in the field and not officially assigned to the project, even on a part-time basis.

The staff seem to be enthusiastic believers in, and practitioners of what they are teaching. But the program is still very much evolving.

Because of this, adaptation, design evaluation, and development are vital functions of the program team. Given their very limited opportunity to develop knowledge and skills in training, consultancy and management, it would be unrealistic (and unfair) to expect this staff alone to cope with development of what is lacking as well as delivery of what they are now working at mastering. For essentially the same reason - their own positions on the learning curve - it is not realistic to count on this staff to effectively train additional colleagues in the near future.

However, the project has picked up momentum since its extension in October. When it ends in July, it will have made progress toward institutionalizing capability to apply at least part of the ASIP approach. True, staff capability will be limited, as will be training materials and the ability to develop them. There will have been only moderate progress in developing an Egyptian Reference Book, a vital part of the ASIP approach for which there is locally perceived need. And, the data base for assessing project impact will be weak, although indications are that it will be much better than a few months ago. But in March, the basic course was being taught by the Egyptian staff in Arabic for the first time, and the possibility of the first intensive intervention in a single geographic area and at different management levels was under serious consideration at the project. In this and other ways, increasing consideration is now being given identification and assessment of the organizational and operational significance of the training.

The capacity developed by 31 July 1980 is not likely to be one

that can sustain and build itself functioning alone as a specialized operation within the training department. However, it should be a capacity that can be a very useful, productive part of function-specific training programs (e.g. for extension workers, inspectors, etc.) and/or of a broader management development program.

Approximately two hundred officials from the MOA and related agencies have been through ASMDP training. Most of these people have been middle level managers (broadly defined); a single group of senior managers attended a course especially organized for them. The usefulness of this type of training is most meaningfully estimated by a review of the impact it has had on the work of these managers back on the job. Unfortunately, there has been no systematic assessment of the results of the ASMDP effort, and relatively little unsystematic appreciation of it. The type of results attained in individual cases is indicated by the following anecdotal examples:

- Before the course "I tried to carry everything in my head; now, I have organized telephone indexes and cards for insect control, potato production, complaints, letters for other sections - this way when I am absent from my work my general director and colleagues have access to the information - I learned from the course it is advisable to write things down."
- Before the course we often failed to get information we needed and/or got information we did not need, and often two people would collect the same information from the same place, thus duplicating the work and wasting time - now we make a plan and

clearly define our aim so that we collect only the needed information and divide up the work among ourselves so that we do not duplicate what each other is doing, thus cutting down considerably on wasted time and ensuring that we get what information we need.

- The director general who had the training recognized that most (he estimated 80%) of his time was spent signing permits (and on the related interruptions of people coming, waiting and going in and out of the office); considering his aims and his activities, he sought a way to have more time for planning and policy making - a secretary was trained to collect and classify permits requiring signatures, with the result that the time they took was cut to 15 minutes per day, freeing the Director for other managerial activities.
- A former participant obtains subordinates' participation by discussing jobs and problems with them, listening to their ideas and suggestions and allowing them to implement their own solutions. Result - subordinates are motivated and producing more work.
- After the course, the participant set aims with assistants and then allowed assistants to help obtain information, determine what has to be done and formulate a plan of action. Results - more work accomplished with positive attitudes.
- The participant used the systematic approach and successful practices from the Reference Book to develop a plan to introduce

a new crop to farmers. Result - enough farmers have planted the new crop to make an impact.

- A veterinarian reports that before the training he distributed his limited (and inadequate) supply of poultry vaccine on a first come, first served basis; after the course, he reflected on the aim of vaccine distribution and, on the basis of his technical knowledge, conceived a scheme to set priorities for vaccine distribution so as to maximize the impact in terms of disease prevention.

When supervisors of former ASMDP training participants were asked by the evaluation team (by questionnaire) what the results of the training were, eleven of thirteen questioned gave one or more examples. Most examples were very general (e.g. he makes decisions faster, makes good decisions . . .). However, some were more specific. Examples included:

- improved the administration of the secretariat and the paper flow;
- found ways to use broken equipment, and started budgeting the fertilizers for the cotton;
- reduced the inactive season so as to increase the planting season for vegetables;
- the work for which he was responsible started succeeding, and he did courses for his subordinates.

The results of the training are significant for many of the participants, and in some cases for their colleagues and their superiors. For other participants, and for those working with them, the training appears

to have had little impact. Unfortunately, the coverage, the nature and the quantity of data available from past participants is not such as to tell us even approximately what proportion of them fall in each of the above groups. We cannot prove it, but we suspect that a majority of the participants may now be applying at least some of what they learned in the ASMDP training and that this is contributing to improved performance of the organizations of which they are a part. We would expect that improved performance to be a result of increased local initiative and teamwork such that, for example, officials are coping with problems locally to attain objectives, where in the past the problems were allowed to remain as obstacles until higher authority provided instructions as to how to solve them, or until they were solved by external action.

This is significant at the level of the individual official, and even more so when he communicates his own changed attitude and approach to his immediate colleagues. It is even significant for local operations. However, it is not very meaningful in the overall scheme of the agricultural sector.

To the present time, the project has missed its chance to demonstrate just how significant the results of the ASIP approach can be for the agricultural sector in Egypt. It could have demonstrated this by much greater geographic and organizational unit concentration, by bringing into its activities officials at all levels of the selected operational areas, and by establishing evaluation data and systems from the start. Much of this was to be done, according to early project plans (see the

first six month work plan, and the "decisions" of the first meeting of the Management Committee); for reasons that remain unclear, or disputed, it was not done. However, the research and evaluation effort is now being pushed harder. In addition, there are indications that during the last four months of the project there may be a concentrated effort in one geographic region, with careful attention to all levels of management and to people who can make, or break, mutual support links both up and down individual organizations and across organizations within the sector in the chosen region. This would provide a far better test than anything to date, of the kind and significance of results the ASIP approach can produce in terms of organizational operations.

III. Agricultural Management: Approaches to Meeting its Needs

As noted earlier, ASIP has focused on under-utilisation by officials of their own power to reason out solutions to problems they encounter in their work, and relative lack of teamwork, with consequent underutilisation of the capabilities represented by available manpower. There are no grounds (for which data are available) on which to prioritize the work habits (or problems) selected for ASMDP attention. (N.B. these were chosen by ASIP from broad-based observation, not from Egypt-specific analysis.) They are fundamental, in any case. All officials can benefit from them, even without knowledge of specialized techniques of management. Those who can make use of the latter techniques (which is not everyone), and do learn them, will find appropriate work habits no less useful for effective management. Other USAID evaluators are currently interviewing Egyptian middle managers from industry who have recently had management

training in a U.S. university; they report feedback suggesting the program in question would have been more effective if it had included attention to work habits such as those addressed by ASMDP.

The evaluation team has not clearly identified management problems of greater importance than those on which the project has focused. There are other problems of considerable importance and equally broad relevance, but which can be influenced relatively little by training (e.g. the relationship between salary levels, cost of living and motivation, or problems caused by an obligation to maintain more personnel than needed). And there are problems which might be more important, but only for particular, limited, groups of people (e.g. spare parts inventory management in an equipment maintenance department). The special value of the ASIP training is due in large part to the fact that it develops skills and habits that are very much needed and are basic to all management work.

This said, we would not call the ASIP project the "key" to better performance in the agricultural sector. There is no "key"; what is needed is a combination. The optimal approach will involve training, field study and consultancy, as in the ASIP design, but will also require being prepared to offer/develop/obtain responses that fit the considerable range of needs that will be identified as one looks more closely at sector management, and as the solution of one problem uncovers another.

This broad approach to improve organizational (and sectoral) performance should ensure that basic management skills are developed. This is most effectively done through process training which aims broadly at

work habits applicable in many or most kinds of activities. This is the aim of ASIP. It is a very effective "opening wedge", a good opener and base builder for a comprehensive program, but more is needed.

There is also a need for training that is more focused but still has broad applicability. This will tend to be more oriented to developing managers' attitudes and skills than to communicating knowledge to them, and it will tend to be more behavioral than technical or quantitative. Such training could usefully focus on such areas as leadership, delegation, motivation, coordination and communication.

This comprehensive approach should also anticipate meeting needs for relatively specialized training and consultancy. In some instances it will focus on learning to understand and use somewhat specialized tools, e.g. particular planning and/or analytical techniques. In others, needs will be more job-specific, for example, dealing with practices and procedures for purchasing agents.

Determination of what specialized training can best be used, by whom and with what impact on organizational performance remains to be made. There are indicators: feedback from the ASIP project suggests that planning techniques could usefully be taught, but has not yet produced the systematic information as to who could most usefully benefit from what training in planning. We also understand that studies of management training needs in the sector have been done by the British ODM and the ILO. While the evaluation team has not had access to these studies, they (and others) are referenced in the individual report submitted to USAID by team member, Dr. Osman A. El-Kholei.

As the focus of training should vary to meet differing needs, so the training methodology and tools should fit varying training tasks; they fit if they lead effectively to the desired results. Lectures and readings are good ways to communicate information. Case studies are good for developing analytical skills in varied situations. They are also useful for developing decision-making skills, but less so than simulations in which one must live with the results of his decision (which is not normally so with case study analysis). Group work and inter-active tasks are effective for changing attitudes. Application exercises help one learn to use special tools. The mix of these techniques (and the choice of trainers skilled in their use), the combination of training with on-the-job assistance (consultancy), the mix of theory and practice, and the choice of participants, all should depend on what results are sought.

This approach is far more comprehensive than that of ASIP and offers considerable promise, but it is important to recognize the limits of any management development program. One should not expect too much, or too little. There are numerous obstacles to improved planning, implementation and management in Egypt's agricultural sector, and thus to improved performance. In many ways these obstacles are a result of the structure of the economy, the government and individual organization. Nevertheless, the knowledge, attitudes and skills of the people who staff the organizations of the agricultural sector also have a direct influence on performance. Thus, while it is true that structure to some degree sets limits to potential performance, management is a major

determinant of performance within the structurally created limits. Some ministries in Egypt are said to function more effectively and efficiently than others; if some parts of the system are more effective than others and all work within the same overall rules, then improvements must be possible within those parts working less well.

The evaluation team believes that agricultural sector performance can be improved by the sectors' managers, and that their ability and will to do so can be increased through a comprehensive management development program. However, if such a program is to avoid creating more frustration than change it will have to be carefully planned and implemented. For example, it will recognize that the knowledge, attitudes and skills of modern management must be widely shared if they are to result in a change in organizational performance. The manager who returns from training with new ideas and tools only to find himself surrounded by colleagues who are unfamiliar with the new ideas will quickly skip into old habits. It is important that enough managers be reached that they form a critical mass within the organization, a mutually supportive group big enough to initiate and sustain change. (1) It is also essential that one take into account the relative roles of different levels of involved organizations. Unless superiors are already thoroughly familiar with the management concepts to be taught to middle management, it is

(1) CRITICAL MASS, in nuclear physics, the minimum amount of a given fissionable material necessary to achieve a self-sustaining fission chain reaction under stated conditions. Its size depends on several factors, including the kind of fissionable material used, its concentration and purity, and the composition and geometry of the surrounding system. Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th edition, Micropaedia, vol. III.

important that a vertical approach be adopted to avoid having trained middle managers be frustrated by superiors who do not understand or share the new ideas. Developing organizational performance through management training requires far more than opening occasional workshops and seminars to any who are interested, or are sent. Done systematically and well, it can make a big difference in the people who can improve performance within the system now, and who are most likely to produce needed changes of the system sooner or later.

IV. Implications for the Future: A Follow-on Project

We believe that much better performance can be obtained from the agricultural sector in Egypt by improving the planning, implementation and management capabilities of officials in the many organizations serving that sector. We are also convinced that a systematic, results-oriented management development program can make a major, and necessary contribution to that improvement.

This being the case, we sincerely hope that USAID and the Government of Egypt will decide to undertake such a program. Should they do so, program design should be the result of joint efforts on the part of Egyptian and foreign specialists. Both have useful inputs to make. The earlier collaboration begins, the more likely they are to be working from a common base, and common understanding.

Purpose

We recommend a program whose purpose is to use management development to improve the performance of public sector organizations serving the agricultural sector. Among the possible indicators of success would be increases in degree of attainment of plan objectives, increases

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Such collaboration began with the preparation of the draft of the present report in Cairo. Unfortunately, revision of that draft to take into account feedback from USAID and MOA has had to be done in Colorado without benefit of inputs from my colleagues, Dr. Abdel Hamid and Dr. El-Kholai. Changes have been very minor, or organizational, with the exception of the present chapter, which has undergone extensive modification. I have no reason to think either of my colleagues would take issue with the new text in any major way, but since they have not had a chance to review it, they should not be held responsible for any of the changes made. Their inputs and those of others likely to be involved should be sought as and when USAID and MOA decide to develop a new project. (R. Roberts)

in plant and animal production yields, decreases in losses from plant and animal disease, successful adoption of new practices (by managers and by farmers), introduction and effective acceptance of new crops and/or animals. A program aim of the GOE could be to accomplish this throughout the country in a specified period, perhaps ten years. Given the limitations on USAID commitment options, the GOE/USAID project that would be the first phase of such a program should limit its aims to specified regions (e.g. governorates) and/or activities (e.g. input distribution, a specific development project or projects, truck farming). A parallel purpose of the project (and first phase of such a program) should be the development and institutionalization of the capability to continue the program in second and subsequent phases.¹

Strategy

Accepting changes in organizational performance as an aim implies a strategy with characteristics that would be different from those of a program seeking only to improve the knowledge or skills of individuals working in the sector. The strategy is results-oriented; what is learned is less important than the use made of it, and the impact of that use. The need for a "critical mass" of managers with a common management language, approach and tools to mutually reinforce each other in bringing about changes was described in Chapter III; it means that the strategy will require organizational and/or geographic

¹ Among the considerations to be taken into account when target regions or systems are selected are projects currently in the pipeline that may serve similar aims. The team has conflicting reports on this subject and urges that current information be sought from MOA, UNDP, ILO, IBRD and the European Development Fund.

concentration and attention to development of "critical masses" over relatively short time periods. Similarly, the results-oriented strategy will recognize that results depend on vertical linkages within an organization and horizontal linkages between organizations; this requires attention to training at different levels, to the interrelationships among agencies and to participant selection and mix in each training course. A results-oriented program must be based on current knowledge of needs--the difference between the way the system is supposed to work and the way it does work, must provide training to meet those needs, and must be prepared to assist managers in the application of new skills where such help is needed to obtain desired results. Program strategy would involve a three phase cycle:

Information gathering/analysis

Training

Consultancy/Follow-up

And finally, the program strategy would envisage a comprehensive training program, as described in Chapter III, offering very broad, basic training (of the ASIP variety), more focused behavioral training (e.g. on communications, leadership, motivation) and training in specific management techniques or tools; it would be responsive, and flexible.

Outputs

Given purpose and strategy essentially as outlined above, the project should produce the following key outputs,

- a) a functioning, results-oriented management development system

- in place;
- b) a critical mass of managers at all levels of all relevant agencies in the target population having received effective, appropriate training and consultancy/follow-up;
 - c) an information gathering/analysis system focused on management practices and problems in place and used for management development planning and evaluation;
 - d) a means of communicating individual accomplishments and successful practices to sector managers established;
 - e) trainers/consultants trained;
 - f) local trainer/consultant roster developed with operational system for up-dating same; and
 - g) syllabus and materials developed for basic set of general and specialized courses.

Operations

In operational terms, staff development, the gathering and analysis of information regarding the management systems to be addressed and the development and/or gathering of training materials would be principal tasks of the first few months. This would involve Egyptian and expatriate staff developing plans, internal management procedures and field study methodology, then working closely together in the field to acquire a thorough understanding of the target systems (theory and practice), to identify points at which training/consultancy interventions appear to offer particular promise, and to plan with local senior management the training program ahead. They would also gather baseline

information against which to measure progress and from which to prepare problem-oriented teaching cases for future use. This first period should also include some short-term training for Egyptian staff in areas in which this seems desirable (e.g. training methodology, particular management subjects).

Assuming positive results from ASMDP efforts during the first half of 1980, when Egyptian staff are conducting most activities and operating in Arabic, and when a concentrated, localized effort is to be undertaken, a series of ASMDP basic courses could constitute the start of the training phase of the cycle, overlapping somewhat with the first phase to lay the foundation for subsequent training of a more specialized character.¹

The second phase would also include more focused training for which a need was identified and plans made in phase one. It is reasonable to assume that this would include short workshops for senior management and longer ones for middle management, and that they would treat such topics as motivation, organization, communication, and leadership for most managers, and the development of technical skills in planning and other tools for managers found to be in positions in which these can be especially useful.

1 If ASMDP efforts in the first half of 1980 do produce encouraging results, both the training and the staff should become a part of the new effort, though we would not expect it to take a lead role. With this in mind, USAID and MOA should consider ways to provide interim backstopping to the ASMDP and to ensure that its information-gathering activities and its training continue until the new project is operational. This might be done through a consultant or consultants on a personal services basis, someone acceptable to both AID and the MOA and preferably having intimate knowledge of the project and experience with it.

As phase three of the cycle, follow-up visits to participants after training, and consultancy where indicated, would be an integral part of the program. (This would be equally true of the ASMDP training done earlier in the cycle.) One aspect of this follow-up would be identification of new problems encountered and new needs uncovered which suggest training for other managers, or in other subject matter. Another would be gathering of information on successful applications of lessons and techniques learned in training. Information collected during follow-up would be the basis on which to begin a new, and probably less intensive cycle in that target system. At the same time, a first cycle would be initiated in a new part of the organization or system, a new region or a new activity system.

On a continuing basis, once the cycles are underway, development of new training materials and of new courses to meet arising needs would be on-going. So, too, would dissemination of information from the field to spread successful practices and to give recognition to those who develop them. As the project matures, new initiatives may become possible, for example introduction of management concepts at "entry-level" training for new professionals.

In their many characteristics, the training programs should be designed to produce results. Thus, training materials should fit aims, as mentioned earlier. Sub-aims will be diverse, and similar variety in methods is to be expected. Where necessary, staff should develop skills in the various training techniques found to be desirable in view of project aims.

The possibility of some residential training should be envisaged. Particularly for a first introduction to management concepts, and also for senior management training (to get them away from persistent interruptions). For economic reasons it is not likely to be possible all the time. When it is, it ensures more intensity of training and learning, as well as more effective development of personal links among participants.

Whether residential or not, training on a decentralized basis is desirable. It not only has economic advantages, it also takes the trainers into the environment in which the participants must function. This is useful to keep trainers close to reality while in the classroom.

The conduct of training in Arabic should be an aim of the program, although it may not be possible in all subject areas and with all levels of management from the start.

Inputs and Organization

The project should be organizationally located within the agricultural sector wherever it is most likely to have the resources, support and latitude to succeed. The evaluation team has no strongly-held view as to the optimal location of such a program.

Project staff will have to possess a mix of training, consulting and field investigation ("research") capabilities, as well as the ability to organize and administer their own activities. Given that training and consultancy needs are likely to be varied and that project resources will be limited, it should be accepted from the start that basic and commonly needed skills will be represented on the staff, but

that outsiders (Egyptian or expatriates) will be used on a sub-contract or consultant basis whenever staff skills do not meet needs. (Potential local sources include NIMD and the universities.) Staff should be recruited with either the skills mentioned above or good knowledge of management principles and tools, or of agricultural management; the project can expect to have to develop training skills or management skills/knowledge, but should not have its staff start from zero in both areas. The present ASMDP staff of four with training experience (with their particular methodology) and two with research and evaluation experience can provide part of an initial staff. The ASMDP trainers should meet the training needs for their type of training in the program and its research and evaluation people should become part of the staff of the new project concerned with these functions. An additional four to six professionals should probably be envisaged, including a project manager (one of whose primary traits should be concern with operational results).

The USAID level of effort for the recommended project would be--in annual financial terms--roughly similar to that of the (overall) ASIP project, plus the impact of inflation. (The ASIP budget was \$1.5 million over three years.) Two resident specialists should be programmed for the life of the project; they should bring a mix of behavioral and technical specialization in management, of training, field research and consultancy experience, and preferably of some experience related to agriculture or rural sector management. Knowledge of Arabic would be a major asset. Several person-months of consultants should also be

envisaged each year, including some locally recruited; as early as possible the project should try to meet consultant needs from local sources.

Training materials are likely to be a relatively minor cost item; a modest library/documentation center should be established, training materials that exist and are relevant should be acquired (there is not a lot focused on agricultural management, but there is some) and funds should be available (probably in the consultant line) to develop Egyptian materials.¹ Equipment should also not be a major item. It is assumed that ASMDP vehicles and training equipment would be used by a new project. During the life of the latter, vehicles will have to be replaced in all likelihood (some were acquired used) and this should be programmed, since field work is vital to the new project. ASMDP uses little training equipment (it seems to have more than it uses), and a budget to supplement what it has should be included. Participant training will be important. It should be possible to meet most or all needs by sending staff members to short-term training programs, most of them during the off-season in Egypt. The budget should allow for each professional staff person to participate in such training more or less annually, both to develop multiple capabilities and to build in motivation.

1 In the earlier draft of this chapter, it was suggested that consideration be given development of a simulation of the agricultural sector for training purposes. Both for what would be learned in the research on which to base it, and for the effectiveness of the "game" in training it is worth serious consideration. However, we suggest that it be put aside and brought out as a separate proposal once a new project is well under way.

It is likely that the same language problem encountered by ASIP/ASMDP will be encountered in a new project. Funding for refresher English language training should be provided for the first year and a half of training activity, but after that Egyptian staff should be taking over in Arabic, at least at the middle management level (since it is assumed that they will have a grounding in either training or management before being recruited). If a new project is to be housed in the Barrage Training Center, as has been suggested, the budget should include some refurbishing funding.

Ministry of Agriculture inputs would include staff, administrative support and budget. In the case of personnel, allocation of support staff should take into account the fact that the productivity of professional staff depends in part of the availability of adequate support personnel. Budget should take into account the importance of field activity, which will require ample funding for fuel, drivers and staff per diem, should cover allowable staff incentive payments and overtime, and should recognize that concentrated training is likely to strain governorate per diem budgets and to require project funds for such costs. It is also important that arrangements be made to ensure adequate budget commitments for entire budget years to permit realistic planning by project management.

The project management committee involving representatives of concerned agencies is a useful concept, and should be used in a new project. However, it is important that the role and limitations of such a committee be understood by all concerned.

USAID/Cairo is encouraged to provide for periodic (semi-annual, at least the first two or three years) technical reviews of the project by someone from outside the circle of the contractor/local USAID project officer/MOA-Management Committee. The purpose of this is to bring in management expertise not involved in day-to-day activities and able to concentrate on the project for a brief period each time (say, a week) to assess progress against plans in technical terms with a long-term perspective. If possible, the same person should be used throughout the project (assuming satisfactory performance). This could be arranged via a private agency, a personal services contract with the Mission or the Bureau in AID/Washington, or an arrangement with a central services bureau in AID/W (e.g. DS/RAD).

The aim of this final chapter has been to provide the basic, or general, outline of the follow-on project which we believe should be undertaken by MOA and USAID. We are convinced that with such a project it will be possible to make public sector organizations more effective in serving the agricultural sector by developing the management knowledge, attitudes and skills of those who can improve performance within the system, and who can eventually bring about needed changes of the system.

ANNEX I

Evaluation Questions Related to
Project Inputs and Outputs

(n.b. Questions from Evaluation Team
Scope of Work)

ANNEX I

Responses to

Scope of Work Evaluation Questions

Related to Project Inputs and Outputs

1. TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE PROJECT DEVELOPED AN INDIGENOUS CAPACITY TO TRAIN AND SUPPORT AGRICULTURAL MANAGERS USING THE ASIP APPROACH?

This capacity has been developed to a limited extent. It is limited in terms of numbers and of breadth and depth of experience (and training).

As indicated in Chapter II, the staff there now plus any who can be added (from six candidates) and can obtain experience in staff roles in at least one course in the four months left to the project. Even those currently on the staff have relatively little experience, and any new personnel will have still less.

The capacity developed by 31 July 1980 is not likely to be one that can sustain and build itself functioning alone as a specialized operation within the training department. However, it should be a capacity that can be a very useful, productive part of function-specific training programs (e.g. for extension workers, inspectors, etc.) and/or of a broader management development program.

2. GIVEN THE PRESENT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF MOA, IS THE PROJECT LOCATED IN AN APPROPRIATE ORGANIZATIONAL NICHE?

We are not aware of any significant problems encountered by the Project that are due to the relationship between its organizational location and the structure of MOA; the same could be said for its previous location.

3. HAS THE CONTRACTOR MET THE CONTRACT'S REQUIREMENTS, SUCH AS,

a) The In-country Reference Book. It will not be completed when the project terminates. "Successful Practices" are being identified, recorded, reported, filtered, clarified and classified, but slowly and not according to the original program. The concept is one that is not grasped easily, and the identification and reporting process calls for many people who have grasped it to function as a widespread net. A modest collection of successful practices should have been assembled for dissemination by the end of July, and a modest capability for expanding upon it.

b) The Planned Project Tracking Network Chart. It was produced and periodically updated during much of project life, but is not current. Project staff now use their own version of such a planning/control system on the wall of part of their offices; there is no indication that others who might (should) use the former(formal) tracking chart to exercise management control have missed it.

- c) Training materials in English and Arabic. The project uses very little in the way of printed training materials other than the Reference Book. The few items they do use have been translated as have two chapters of the Reference Book. An English/Arabic newsletter is being produced (irregularly so far) and distributed to former participants. To the best of our knowledge, there have been no training materials developed from Egyptian experience.
- d) Agricultural managers trained in the field. Approximately 200 officials have been through project training. Most of them are managers in that they manage material resources and people (of 39 surveyed by the evaluation team, 35 reported supervising five or more people, 25 direct ten or more). Many of those trained are not, strictly speaking, in the field; roughly 30% are in Cairo and another 5% in adjacent, only slightly agricultural Giza Governorate.
- e) An indigenous team thoroughly qualified in ASIP training, research and consultancy methods capable of continuing after Project completion. See the response to question No.1, above.

- f) An organization capable of continuing ASIP training after the Project's completion. The Project as such has no formal organizational existence (as conveyed by budget lines and staff posts); it is attached to the Training Department of the MOA, with staff from that department and others. It is funded on an ad hoc basis. There is no reason to think this will change in the near future. The Project staff will represent a team with some technical capability (see question No.1, above, re its limitations); whether the department can and will make effective use of the team's capacities to continue ASIP is uncertain.
- g) A country work plan. These have been prepared periodically: six-month and three-month plans. The earlier comments regarding the tracking chart apply here.
- h) Consultancy services. There has been very little done, although more is envisaged during the final four months of the Project.

As we have tried to indicate in the body of our report, we believe that these inputs relate very directly to the Ministry's management problems (other than those inputs that are purely for Project management). The resultant outputs have been described in the body of our report and in response to questions No. 1 and 2 above, and No. 6, below.

4. WERE USAID INPUT LEVELS APPROPRIATE?

Budget

The original budget did not provide funds for numerous needs that arose during the life of the project (e.g. English language training for participants, more than one vehicle, miscellaneous supplies). These needs were eventually met by the Cairo Mission of USAID. Had they been anticipated in the original budget, funds would have been available earlier in the project life than they were and with less expenditure of project team, MOA and USAID time and energy. At the same time, other items provided by USAID/Cairo had, in fact been foreseen in the original budget. Thus one is left to assume that the funds so allocated in the basic contract (\$38,520 for Egypt and Nepal) were inadequate even for anticipated equipment and material needs (or that the release of these funds from this use, by provision of Mission funds, made it possible to cover inadequacies elsewhere in the budget).

Considering that the basic budget was for two different operations and the contractor had full freedom to use funds in either of the two countries involved, there is little one can say about the appropriateness of that budget from the vantage point of one of the countries. We can, and do, note that additional funds were needed in Egypt (and were provided by USAID locally), but we have not found reason to conclude that

any lack of USAID funds for expenditures normally financed by USAID or promised in the project agreement has been a significant deterrent to attainment of project objectives. This said, it should be noted that the evaluators have not had the time, the information or the mandate to analyze the budget or the utilization of funds.

Contractor Team Size and Composition

Composition of the contractor team should be based on the aims and tasks that are key to the project and require continuing attention, leadership, and technical guidance (where these are needed only intermittently, consultants are likely to be preferred). In this case, in our view, team orientations and capabilities did not match the scope of "ASIP approach" demands.

This project was an experimental, pilot application, making continuing evaluation particularly important. Moreover, its research aspects (needs assessment, identification of successful practices and development of a local reference book) are an integral part of it. This being the case, the team should have included someone with an orientation to, and at least basic skills in evaluation and research to ensure that these aspects would not be slighted, as in practice they have been. Such a person could have been a second team member with almost exclusively this role, or part-trainer, part-evaluator/researcher with timely inputs from a short-term consultant. (Or, it could have been a relatively junior third person with good solid training, good Arabic

and good back-stopping from a short-term consultant on a periodic basis.)

A good working knowledge of Arabic should have been a requirement for at least one of the team members.

A case could be made for a three-person team, as outlined above. However, given suitable team cooperation and consultant support, a two-person team is an appropriate size, provided they have a good administrative assistant and good administrative support from the local organization with which they work. In the absence of either, the team must spend too much of its time on administrative matters at the expense of project substance; to some extent, this appears to have been the case with this project.

Materials and Supplies

We have found no reason to consider inappropriate the level of USAID inputs in terms of materials and supplies. As discussed under the budget heading above, supplemental funds were apparently needed and were provided by the local USAID Mission; their nonavailability in the original budget resulted in delays and expenditure of time and effort, but they were provided.

AID Backstopping

The team has not delved into micro-administrative aspects of the AID/W - AID/Cairo - project relationship. Nonetheless, we gather that there have been cases in which AID/Washington has been felt by those in Cairo (AID Project or MOA) to have let them down in one way or another; e.g. contractor personnel have not been cleared prior to assignment, the contract extension document effective in October, 1979, did not reach Cairo until February, 1980, creating some hesitancy on the part of people there to make firm decisions. There is little question in our minds but the fact of this being a "Washington" contract has created some confusion, communications problems (in terms of understanding) and resultant expenditure of time and effort. We have also been told that personnel changes (3 project managers in AID/W, plus changes in AID/Cairo) have made it hard to convert oral agreements to durable bases for action.

As we commented early in the report, it is our view that inadequate management supervision (oversight) was exercised by AID (among others) in the case of this project. It was allowed to meander much farther from the original model than should have been the case; we do not try to assess who had how much responsibility for bringing about course corrections, but we would think that AID had some, and does seem to have exercised it more actively in 1979 than previously.

5. HAS GOE/MOA MET ITS INPUT REQUIREMENTS?

The question is addressed in general terms in the following three paragraphs, then on an itemized basis in relationship to commitments in the USAID/MOA Letter of Agreement.

Budget

The Project has not been institutionalized in terms of the MOA budget. It continues to subsist on funds culled from anticipated under-spending of other parts of MOA, and from extra-budgetary sources controlled by MOA. This leaves Project management with a high degree of uncertainty as to the limit on the funds it will have available even a few weeks or months in the future. It puts the Project under a serious handicap, both in terms of planning and operating and in terms of its effect on staff morale.

Staff

Staffing the Project has been a major preoccupation of the GAI team, with its eye on the need to institutionalize and the fact that this is inconceivable without staff. Limits on Project credibility (Egyptian perception of the likelihood of its being a safe, promising (lasting) place to which to transfer) has been probably a major cause of difficulty encountered in staff recruitment. Project staff appear to feel that lack of adequate incentive payments is another cause of the problem, but acknowledge that MOA rules seem to pose some difficulties in this regard. The Ministry has provided

staff when the Project has identified appropriate people, they have been willing to come, and their superiors have agreed to the move. The question is, how can more of the appropriate people be stimulated to join the staff, which is still too small for the work expected of it? And, can ways be found to attract, motivate and involve in the Project part-time governorate staff?

Trainees

Suitable trainees have been provided, in the sense that the Project has had a major say (control, we are told) in selecting them. If they have not been suitable, Project staff are to blame, not the MOA, if our understanding of the process is correct. On the other hand, there have been problems in having trainees in suitable numbers and from some locations, reportedly because of inadequacy of per diem funds; this is dealt with in the detailed items below.

Following is a brief review of MOA commitments in the Letter of Agreement with USAID of 9 September 1977.

1. An Egyptian Project Co-Director. Provided, (3 different ones).
2. Support Staff. This was provided as outlined in the agreement, after some delay in one or two cases, we are told. However, more is now needed.
3. Office space, furniture and supplies. This has been provided, but the space allocation has always been very tight from the Project's viewpoint (but a problem for many in Cairo), some action has been very late (telephone installation in particular, though this is not unusual in Cairo), and some has not met needs (ASMDP is criticized

for not making its library accessible, but has only one bookcase).

4. Training facilities in Cairo and Barrage to train staff.

These have been provided

5. Training facilities for courses for middle management.

These have been made available. Difficulty is being encountered locating what ASIP staff consider adequate facilities in the Governorates, but this is a matter of their existence, not of MOA making them available.

6. Lodging, food and/or per diem for Egyptian trainers

and participants. Lodging and food have never been mentioned as a problem. Per diem, however, is frequently cited as a cause of difficulties of one kind and another. We understand that normal procedure is for a participant's per diem to come from the budget of his Governorate, and that in many cases funds have not been made available (whether because there were none, or for other reasons we do not know), or a high degree of uncertainty as to whether they will be available has resulted in people not attending courses. We are pleased to learn that the Management Committee has found ways to provide the per diem on most occasions; unfortunately, this is done on an ad hoc basis from one activity to the next, resulting in a high degree of uncertainty which makes planning very difficult.

7. Spare parts, fuel and maintenance for the Project vehicle.
This has been provided.
8. & 9. Access to relevant records. Provided on request.
10. Customs clearance and related help for Project material.
Provided as needed.
6. TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE PROJECT MET THE OUTPUT PREDICTED IN USAID'S LETTER OF 9 SEPTEMBER, 1977, TO THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE?
- a) A group of trained trainers and managers. Such a group (or groups) have been trained, but to a very limited depth. See the responses to Questions No. 1, & 3. above.
- b) The capability to continue to train trainers, managers and other personnel on an expended basis. In our view the Egyptian staff should be able to continue to offer the present course to agricultural officials, but will lack the training, experience and depth to train other trainers or to expand the program.
- c) Tested, practical training procedures which have been adjusted to Egypt's needs. The training procedures have been tried numerous times with only very minor adjustment for Egypt. They have produced useful results with at least some participants, but the procedures have not been adjusted or tested to try to improve on these results. As noted earlier the ASIP methodology

has not really been fully implemented in Egypt, and is thus not fully tested. This output has been satisfied to some extent, but less than should have been the case.

- d) A country oriented Reference Book which identifies agricultural management practices relevant to Egypt's needs. Very little progress has been made in this direction. Something will be produced before the Project terminates, but it will be much less than an Egyptian Reference Book. (See also question 3.)
- e) Capability to conduct consultancy with participants who have returned to work to ensure that the lessons and skills learned are able to be applied on the job. The Egyptian staff has had some training in consultancy given them by the GAI team of ASIP, and they have had some experience in the past year or so. During the remaining four months of the contract, they are to have more such experience with the ASIP team. If they do, they should be able to do some useful consultancy work with participants back on the job, but there will be very real limitations on this capability in the absence of an experienced team member to whom to turn in time of need for backup or assistance.
- f) An Egyptian/Contractor team of selected trainers to identify the major agricultural management training needs in Egypt. This has not been done.

g) Training tasks prepared that use a "learning by doing" approach. Local versions of the first week simple tasks have been prepared to make use of (for example) aspects of the Barrage Training Center. The local farmer survey task has also been "developed". However, little more has been done, much less than background information on the program would lead one to expect. This may change some in the remaining four months, as a result of activities we understand are currently under consideration.

ANNEX II

Results of Questionnaire
Completed by 39 Participants
for
The Evaluation Team

Questionnaire Distributed to
the Trainees*

1st Question

Major functions of your current job.

	Governorates	Central Ag.	Sub Total
Administrative	2	3	5
Technical	27	7	34
TOTAL	29	10	39

2nd Question

Knowledge required for carrying out your job.

	Governorates		Central Ag.		Sub Total		Total
	Res	Non-Res	Res	Non-Res	Res	Non-Res	
Knowledge of Management Principles	1	28	4	6	5	34	39
Experience in Management	17	12	4	6	21	18	39
Other	24	5	10	-	34	5	39

* All questions were open-ended. Coding for this document required subjective classification by technicians unfamiliar with the area, but working to instructions of one of the evaluators.

3rd Question

Skills required for your job.

	Governorates		Central Ag.		Sub Total		Total
	Res	Non-Res	Res	Non-Res	Res	Non-Res	
Ability to identify problems	4	25	4	6	8	31	39
Ability to solve problems	1	28	-	10	1	38	39
Working in a group	13	16	3	7	16	23	39
Decision making	19	20	2	8	11	28	39
Other	29	-	10	-	39	-	39

4th Question

Main attitudes for carrying out the job.

	Governorates		Central Ag.		All Sample		Total
	Res	Non-Res	Res	Non-Res	Res	Non-Res	
Desire for problem solving	6	23	2	8	8	31	39
Ability to hold responsibility	1	28	-	10	1	38	39
Feeling and evaluation of other ideas	7	22	1	9	8	31	39
Other	21	8	8	2	29	10	39

5th Question

Number of employees supervised by you.

	Governorates	Central Ag.	All Sample
None	1	2	3
Less than 5	-	1	1
5 - 10	8	2	10
More than 10	20	5	25
TOTAL	29	10	39

6th Question

Qualifications of the trainees.

	Governorates	Central Ag.	Total
B.Sc. Ag.	23	5	28
B.Sc. Bus. Ad.	-	1	1
B.Sc. Vet. Sc.	1	1	2
Higher than B.Sc. (Ag.)	5	2	7*
Other	-	1	1
TOTAL	29	10	39

* All Ag. Grad.

7th Question

Other training courses you have attended.

	Gov.	Central Ag.	Total
None	-	3	3
One Tech	-	-	-
Two Tech	1	1	2
More than three Tech	4	1	4
One Administrative or Managerial	3	1	4
Two Ad or Mang	-	1	1
More than three Ad or Mang	2	2	4
One Tech & one Ad or Mang	5	-	5
One Tech & two Ad or Mang	2	1	3
One Tech & more than three Ad or Mang	-	-	-
Two Tech & one Ad or Mang	2	-	2
Two Tech & two Ad or Mang	4	-	4
Two Tech & more than three Ad or Mang	-	-	-
More than three Tech & one Ad or Mang	4	-	4
More than three Tech & two Ad or Mang	2	-	2
More than three Tech & more than three Ad or Mang	-	1	1
TOTAL	29	10	39

What are the skills that you feel you are lacking that reflect directly on your job?

	Governorates	Central Ag.	Total
None or no reply	12	5	17
Administrative	7	1	8
Technical	10	4	14
TOTAL	29	10	39

9th Question

What are the major functions of management?

	Governorates		Central Ag.		Sub Total		Total
	Res	Non-Res	Res	Non-Res	Res	Non-Res	
Planning	11	18	6	4	17	22	39
Organization	20	9	7	3	27	12	39
Monitoring & Follow-up	11	18	4	6	15	24	39
Leadership	5	24	4	6	9	30	39
Decision making	4	25	1	9	5	34	39
Other	13	16	-	10	13	26	39
TOTAL	64	110	22	38	86	148	234

10th Question

What are the skills you acquired in this training course?

	Governorates	Central Ag.	Total
Communicate more effectively	4	3	7
Delegate more effectively	-	-	-
Use time more effectively	5	2	7
Improve decision making	1	-	1
Improve problem solving	6	2	8
Develop subordinates' abilities	3	3	6
Handle grievances more effectively	2	3	5
Treat co-workers firmly	-	-	-
Increase self motivation	1	-	1
Motivate others more effectively	1	-	1
Improve self confidence	-	-	-
Become more goal directed	4	3	7
Plan and organize more effectively	13	2	15
Improve personal relationships with others	1	-	1
Arrange ideas	1	-	1
Use experiences of others in research	3	-	3
Continuous revision of the plan of work	2	-	2
Ability to hear other view points	5	-	5
Working in a group	5	-	5
Discussion and deducing results	1	-	1
Observation and deducing results	2	-	2
Standard performance	1	-	1
Take momentum action	1	-	1
No response	4	2	6
TOTAL	66	20	86

Note: Categories above the line are those used by ASMDP in some of its questionnaires. Replies that did not fit one or another of them are reproduced below the line.

11th Question

What are your ideas about those who trained you?

Name	Governorates				Central Ag.				Sub Total				Total
	Ex.	V.Good	Good	None	Ex.	V.Good	Good	None	Ex.	V.Good	Good	None	
John	7	2	-	20	5	-	-	5	12	2	-	25	39
Bruce	15	3	-	11	7	1	-	2	22	4	-	13	39
Norman	7	3	-	19	2	1	-	7	9	4	-	26	39
Ahmed Abdel Mohsen	8	1	-	20	3	-	-	7	11	1	-	27	39
Hassan El Leithy	7	1	1	20	3	-	1	6	10	1	2	26	39
Ragab Mohamed M. El Gheriany	1	2	-	26	2	-	1	7	3	2	1	33	39
Salah el Din Mohamed	-	1	-	28	1	1	-	8	1	2	-	36	39
Housam	-	-	-	29	1	1	-	8	1	1	-	37	39

12th Question

What are your ideas about the administrative personnel who assisted in carrying out the course?

	Governorates	Central Ag.	Total
Excellent	12	7	19
Very Good	8	2	10
Good	5	1	6
Average	1	-	1
None	3	-	3
TOTAL	29	10	39

13th Question

What is your general evaluation of the course?

	Governorates	Central Ag.	Total
Excellent	13	3	16
Very Good	7	1	8
Good	4	-	4
Average	3	5	8
Short	2	1	3
TOTAL	29	10	39

14th Question

Do you agree that the training course should be reorganized according to the following plan?

- a. The first week for introductory orientation and general ideas related to the method of training i.e. task method and systematic approach.
- b. The second week for measures of modern management its principles, scientific methods for solving, problems, decision making, operations research, managing by objectives and other of modern scientific management techniques.
- c. A third week for intensive use of compound and complex tasks, to be solved by techniques of modern scientific management which were discussed in the second week.

14.a.

	Governorates	Central Ag.	Total
Yes	25	8	33
No	1	1	2
None	3	1	4
TOTAL	29	10	39

14.b.

Reasons for agreeing to above	Governorates	Central Ag.	Total
Lack of knowing scientific techniques of modern management	2	-	2
Poor English	6	2	8
More training on completed tasks	16	3	19
None	5	5	10
TOTAL	29	10	39

15th Question

Do you think it is beneficial for your supervisors to attend management training courses, and why?

A

	Governorates	Central Ag.	Total
Yes	27	9	36
No	1	-	1
No response	1	1	2
TOTAL	29	10	39

B

Reasons	Governorates	Central Ag.	Total
To learn techniques of modern Management	18	5	23
To improve English language	5	3	8
None	6	2	8
TOTAL	29	10	39

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16th Question

What do you feel about the Reference Book?

	Governorates		Central Ag.		Sub Total		Total
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	
Is there a need for it?	24	5	7	3	31	8	39
Have you used it?	16	13	4	6	20	19	39
Should it be translated?	25	4	5	5	30	9	39
Is it necessary to use a different book related to Egyptian conditions?	29	-	9	1	38	1	39

17th Question

Does the English represent a problem for the training course?

	Governorates	Central Ag.	Total
Yes	24	6	30
No	5	2	7
None	-	2	2
TOTAL	29	10	39

Was the two week training period in the English language preceding the course sufficient?

	Governorates	Central Ag.	Total
Yes	24	6	30
No	5	2	7
None	-	2	2
TOTAL	29	10	39

19th Question

Define the concept of ASIP

Items	Governorates	Central Ag.	Total
Wrong Definition	18	4	22
Right Definition	6	3	9
No Definition	5	3	8
TOTAL	29	10	39

20th Question

How do you feel about the hand-outs given to you during the training course?

	Governorates	Central Ag.	Total
Sufficient	8	2	10
Insufficient	4	4	8
Interesting	1	1	2
Sufficient & interesting	12	1	13
Interesting but insufficient	2	1	3
Not interesting & insufficient	1	1	2
No response	1	-	1
TOTAL	29	10	39

ANNEX III

Results of Questionnaire
Completed by 13 Supervisors of
ASID Participants
for
The Evaluation Team

Questionnaire Distributed to
Supervisors of Trainees*

1st Question

Did the training course have an effect on knowledge, skills, relationships with others, ability to identify problems and ability to solve problems?

	Yes	No	Total
Knowledge	11	2	13
Skills	10	3	13
Relationships with others	12	1	13
Ability to identify problems	12	1	13
Ability to solve problems	12	1	13
TOTAL	57	8	65

2nd Question

Give examples of successful practices achieved following the training course.

Item	No.
None	3
One example	2
Two examples	3
Three examples	5
TOTAL	13

* All questions were open-ended. Coding for this document required subjective classification by technicians unfamiliar with the area, but working to instructions of one of the evaluators.

3rd Question

Have you discussed the course with the trainee since he returned to his job?

Item	No.
Yes	10
No	3
TOTAL	13

4th Question

Have you encouraged the trainees to use the skills acquired from the training course? Explain and give examples.

Item	No.
No	4
Yes without example	2
Yes one example	2
Yes two examples	2
Yes three examples	3
TOTAL	13

5th Question

Have you followed up on the trainee's activities after returning from the training course?

	Number
Yes	12
No	1
TOTAL	13

6th Question

How have the colleagues of the trainee responded to his use of his new skills?

	Number
No response	1
Excellent response	5
Average response	7
TOTAL	13

7th Question

Has the training course affected the amount of problems met on the job?

	Number
Yes	9
No	4
TOTAL	13

8th Question

Do you wish to train other employees in the ASIP approach?

	Number
Yes	13
No	-
TOTAL	13

9th Question

Do you wish to attend such a course?

	Number
Yes	11
No	2
TOTAL	13

10th Question

Are there new ideas to be added?

	Number
Yes	4
No	9
TOTAL	13