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EVALUATION REPORT
COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT SERVICES
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR II PROGRAM
IN HONDURAS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The following report represents the findings, observations and recommendations of a two-person team that reviewed the development and progress of Agricultural Cooperative Development International's (ACDI) Cooperative Development Services project in Honduras during a three-week period in January/February 1983.

As a result of their review, the evaluators feel that the ACDI project is, without question, making significant and meaningful progress toward meeting its goal of improving the economic conditions of Honduran small farmers through the establishment of viable cooperatives.

It is yet too early to adequately measure the full extent of the benefits of ACDI's regional cooperative model. However, it is impossible to ignore the fact that virtually all of the farmers interviewed reported marked improvement in their harvests and incomes as a result of the credit services, technical inputs and the marketing procedures being utilized. The decisive steps being taken to capitalize the cooperative and the interest shown in the array of services being offered by the cooperatives were also heartening.

The project is based on an ACDI model that was successfully implemented in Guatemala and whose main characteristics are: 1) treating the cooperative primarily as a business entity; 2) utilizing professional cooperative management; 3) maintaining a policy of systematic and mandatory capitalization; 4) offering reliable membership services; and 5) working with informal groups of farmers within a regional structure.

The Honduran program, which began in May 1981, has adopted and modified these elements while creating two model cooperatives, "20 de Marzo" in Morazan and "Maya Occidental" in La Entrada.

At the time of the evaluation, these groups had been operating for approximately nine months and each had reached and/or surpassed most of its year-end goals. These had been set in such areas as membership (currently 728 for both cooperatives), number of loans

(736), amount of loans extended (U.S. \$331,023), and level of capitalization (U.S. \$54,041), among others. The repayment of loans has also been running at nearly 100% in those areas where the agricultural cycle has been completed.

Although they applaud these successful initial steps of the program and feel confident that continued progress will be made in the two model cooperatives, the evaluators noted a number of areas where attention could be given to further strengthen the program. They cautioned ACIDI about the projected methods for expanding the work with two additional cooperatives.

These comments form the major portion of the Findings, Observations, and Recommendations sections of this report. In reviewing these inputs, however, the reader should keep in mind that they are offered with the intention of helping management fine-tune the process, and not for the purpose of making a major overhaul in the operation.

I. PROJECT OVERVIEW**

The goal of the project is to improve the economic conditions of Honduran small farmers through the establishment of a set of at least two economically viable, autonomous, regional agricultural service cooperatives which are capable of generating the means of their growth through their own operations. The cooperatives are to provide timely and effective supply, credit, marketing and technical services to all the farmers in a valley or other market town area that wish to join.

This is to be accomplished over a period of four years. Beginning in July 1981, a team of two full-time senior technical advisers working with Honduran professionals for approximately six person-years, Honduran support personnel for four person-years and five person-months with short-term technical advisers began a two year assignment. It is expected that this team will continue, under a renewed contract agreement, for another two years. The project team will work with and receive support from DIFOCOOP and USAID/H. They will maintain separate offices, and will be provided with all the supplies and equipment necessary for maintaining their operations and organizing the autonomous regional cooperatives.

During the project period, the team is expected to conduct several preliminary investigations as well as full-scale feasibility studies leading to the organization of the regional service cooperatives. Once geographical target areas have been selected, the team is expected to recruit and organize farmers into new cooperatives and then work with the cooperatives' leadership to assure organizational effectiveness and viability. It is expected that by the end of the project (i.e., after four years), the cooperatives will be solidly established and have served as models for other regions in the country.

** Taken from the Regional Service Cooperative Evaluation Design produced by Development Associates, Inc.

II. EVALUATION ACTIVITIES

The team of evaluators was asked to perform a process (versus impact) evaluation of ACDI's Cooperative Development Services project in Honduras at a point approximately 20 months into a projected four-year process, and 9 months after the cooperatives had been formed. The content of the evaluation activities and the outline for the report were to be drawn from a design prepared by Development Associates, Inc., a Washington, D.C.-based consulting firm charged with the responsibility of assisting the major U.S. cooperative agencies in creating an evaluation model for their programs:

The terms of reference for this evaluation effort, as initially contracted, were as follows:

1) Analyze and evaluate project process and plans in collaboration with ACDI/H, USAID/H, relevant Government of Honduras officials, cooperative leaders and members, and review the operations of the regional cooperatives following the guidelines prepared by Development Associates, Inc.

2) In a collaborative fashion, assist on-site staff and cooperative leaders to reflect on their activities, and plan for the year ahead. (Note: the ACDI/H staff requested that the evaluators eliminate this step at the cooperative level.)

3) Prepare a report which will provide answers to the evaluation input and output questions A.1. - B.7., as well as the purpose questions C.1. - C.6. The report should generally follow the outline provided in the draft evaluation design. It should be prepared in draft and discussed with USAID/H and the project team prior to departure from Honduras.

4) Make such recommendations to the project advisers, to USAID/H and to ACDI concerning the project, as deemed appropriate.

The actual evaluation activities initiated with a two-day briefing session in ACDI/W, during which time:

- a) background materials were read and collected for later reference;
- b) the evaluation design was discussed with a representative of Development Associates and,
- c) computerized data covering the Honduran cooperatives' initial activities was reviewed with an ACDI consultant in this area.


Prior to traveling to Honduras, the evaluators spent additional time reading the background materials and preparing themselves for the tasks ahead.

The evaluation itself was implemented during the period January 16 through February 5, 1983, and the major activities (see Attachment A) included in-depth interviews with all of the principal participants (see Attachment B) involved in the project: ACDI/H; USAID/H; DIFOCOOP; BANADESA; IHMA; and the cooperatives' staff, leadership and membership.

After an initial stay in Tegucigalpa and visits with the appropriate officials there, the evaluation process proceeded to Morazan, where the cooperative "20 de Marzo" is located, and La Entrada, the site of the Cooperative "Maya Occidental" (see map on following page).

The concluding days of the time in Honduras were then spent in Tegucigalpa: a) drafting a report of the findings; b) discussing these issues with ACDI/H staff, as well as ACDI/W staff which was returning from a conference in Panama; and finally c) debriefing with USAID/H.

The detailed findings of these activities are found in the following section.



III. FINDINGS

The following commentary is a response to the evaluation questions put forth in the design.

A. Project Inputs

1. Was the number of project personnel adequate and were they well qualified?

The number of project personnel was adequate for the first year of the project, but because the number of groups, members and geographical areas covered will expand, it should follow that present personnel will not prove adequate in the future. In determining what the actual proportion of members/agents should be, ACIDI and the cooperative staffs will have to keep in mind such important factors as geographical dispersion, diversity of crops, development of the education committees at the GLA (Grupo Local de Asociados) level, etc. Furthermore, it may become very important to have a marketing specialist to assure that members can coordinate marketing their produce and obtain the maximum prices available.

In terms of adequacy a problem does exist. In the case of the cooperative "Maya Occidental" for example, a school teacher was hired during the promotional stage to provide on-the-job training so that he could function as an extension agent. Because retraining proved impossible and problems arose with the other extension agent, both were lost by the end of 1982. As a result, the cooperative is starting this year with new agents, one with considerable experience and the other directly out of school.

At the cooperative manager level the situation is mixed. Because of the heavy emphasis the model places on having economically viable cooperatives, it was surprising to find that in neither case did the managers have entrepreneurial experience nor had they been exposed to economic theory of business management. Both of the managers, however, have strong assets. In the case of "Maya Occidental," the manager's strong cooperative background should enhance the cooperative educational aspects of training programs. In the "20 de Marzo" cooperative, the extension agronomist background of the manager is a further backstop to the extension program.

Both cooperatives appear to have very capable accountants, secretary/cashiers, and janitor/warehouse men.

2. Were project funds and equipment provided at the level and schedule planned and were these adequate?

Yes, but in the case of the trucks for the cooperatives, there was a major central office (ACDI/W) error which resulted in shipping disbursements in an amount considerably beyond the budgeted costs. However, an arrangement has been made with the shipping company to give ACDI a credit toward future shipping costs in the amount of approximately \$12,000, thus reducing the financial burden of the error. It was later found, though, that the trucks were not adequate nor appropriate for the field conditions and motorcycles and jeeps had to be purchased to substitute for the trucks.

There was also one funding problem related to the provision of subsidies to the cooperatives, but this was quickly corrected and should probably be viewed as part of the start-up problems typical of a first year. The problem has not occurred again.

The radios for communication between the cooperatives and the Tegucigalpa office were not installed according to standard and manual-specified practice. Ground wires had not been installed in any of the offices, and, in the case of the central office, the power supply and the transceiver had not been grounded together. The antennas (inverted vees) were at too acute an angle at the apex and the height should be greater. In the case of the Tegucigalpa installation there is interference with another, similar type of antenna which is within inches. A vertical antenna would be more suitable in this case. The major problem is the poor antenna match for the frequencies used for transmitting. This is manifest by the SWR indicator lights when in the "tune" position, meaning that an inordinate amount of power is being "reflected" back from the antenna. This type of operation will eventually lead to final transistor failure in the transmitter.

The vehicles all seemed to be well maintained, but it was noted from the tire wear that they had been overinflated. Hard tires are also a problem for the bodies of the vehicles when driven on dirt or gravel roads because of increased vibration. It was noted that bodies had been rewelded on the jeeps and agronomists mentioned that they had rewelded some chassis parts. Tire gauges to check the tires were not available.

3. Was the organizational and technical support adequate from:

- a. DIFOCOOP? - Apparently so. DIFOCOOP has had a backstopping role to this point in the project development and as the program expands, it is expected that it will increase its input in the form of a training resource.
- b. USAID/H? Yes, USAID/H did provide excellent support in the form of pressure, linkages to key government agencies and timely, financial allocations. See C-3 for further information.

4. Was adequate capital and credit for the cooperatives available on a timely basis?

As mentioned in A-3, capital for the subsidies had an initial problem and, as will be explained in C-3, BANADESA had a similar delay with its credit for the initial agricultural inputs.

5. Were there any unanticipated events or conditions which had a major influence on project implementation or results?

The original plan of development for the project contemplated additional model cooperatives and the ACIDI/H team had begun feasibility studies for these when USAID/H made the decision to 1) extend ACIDI's contract, 2) add an additional technical person to work with DIFOCOOP, and 3) assign ACIDI/H to work with two cooperatives from the ANACH regional program. This caused the initial work to be put aside so that planning could begin on the feasibility of the ANACH regional cooperative.

Due to the economic conditions in IHMA and BANADESA, the arrangement by which members could sell their grains to IHMA and receive immediately negotiable documents was changed. The new policy decreed that payment would not be due until 45 days after delivery of the grain.

However, the members were able to use this "paper" to cancel their debts at the cooperatives. The cooperatives, in turn, were able to use the "paper" to cancel their debt with BANADESA before the 45-day period, permitting everyone to come out a winner. The exception is in the instance when the cooperatives need to cancel credit with the commercial supply houses who give them 30 days credit. This was not a problem this year, but it could be in the future.

An additional problem came to light during the evaluation process which resulted in a reduction of the amount of grain that each producer is allowed to market through the IHMA cooperative arrangement. The initial arrangement was that the cooperative could collectively sell grain to IHMA up to the amount of the loan from BANADESA, plus 20% for capitalization, plus interest on the inputs, and 40% overall. The new regulation only allowed for the sale of grain equal to the credit borrowed from BANADESA plus 40%. Because the cooperatives used member accumulated capital in addition to borrowed BANADESA capital, they were limited in the amount of grain they could deliver to IHMA at the support price and, thus, were in serious trouble because the bulk of their grain would then be sold on the free market at considerably lower prices.

This problem surfaced in La Entrada at year's end and was temporarily overcome by negotiations with BANADESA in Santa Rosa, Copan. It remains to be seen whether it will reappear during the next cycle. In the case of the "20 de Marzo" cooperative, the problem did not have an immediate impact because their cropping cycle is different and they had sold their crops. This may, however, have implications for their marketing strategy in the year to come.

B. Project Outputs

1. How were areas for cooperative development identified? What procedures were followed and by whom?

The ACIDI/H team conducted rapid field appraisals in the country using what have been termed "husmeos." The purpose of the field appraisals was to identify population centers, type of agriculture, services offered, etc. It is not clear, however, just what criteria were used to narrow down the areas to those in which the feasibility studies were finally done. Basically, the field team describes the process of decision making as "coming to a concensus."

Fortunately for the continuity of the program, the same people who were engaged in the field work for the appraisals and the feasibility studies went on to develop the program and implement it as managers and extensionists. This continuity is a very positive aspect of the process of the project's development.

Once the general area was identified, the feasibility studies were conducted. At this time, statistics from government agencies were used to establish the production and membership potential, as well as the types of agriculture and existing practices. The ACIDI/H team was expanded to include potential managers and extension agents for the proposed cooperative in order to implement these studies. Even more than feasibility, this set of data was used to project the goals for the cooperative in its development. The great majority of data in the studies is economic, leading to a situation whereby project sites were selected

using numerical considerations without taking into account social conditions such as the experience and existence of programs in the area. The evaluators found, for example, that in the case of "Maya Occidental," the manager noted that the area was difficult because so many other programs with poor payment records were already there, e.g. PRODERO, BANADESA and Foster Parents Plan.

2. How many areas for cooperative development were selected? What criteria were used? How many were formally organized?

Two sites were selected for cooperatives -- the same two where regional cooperatives are currently operating: Morazan and La Entrada.

The criteria utilized were discussed in B.1. above.

3. How were cooperative members identified and recruited? What criteria for membership were used?

The ACDI/H team, potential managers and extension agents visited villages and talked with farmers during the feasibility study. Based on this, they returned to these people suggesting that meetings be held to form GLAs. At these meetings, and beforehand, the possible services to be offered by such a cooperative were explained. In terms of credit, it was indicated that each GLA would be responsible for recommending new members and reviewing credit applications. The major criteria were that each member had to have land or access to land, as well as the support of fellow members of the GLA. Moreover, they could not be in debt to other institutions and, to participate, they would have to be able to pay an initial entry fee of Lps. 10. Actually, to participate in the credit and marketing

services, they had to be able to put forward 20% of the loan application. However, one could be a member without borrowing, although services would then be limited to extension and the purchase of inputs at member prices.

4. How were the needs for Training and Technical Assistance (T/TA) of cooperative members and staff assessed?
5. How much of what types of T/TA was provided to different categories of cooperative members and staff?
6. Was the T/TA provide relevant and timely?

The training needs of members and staff has been, with one exception, conducted in the "course of business." Only one formal training session was conducted in December 1982 at San Pedro Sula for the managers, extension agents and leaders of the GLA and ACIDI/H staff. It was unfortunate that the accountants and secretary/cashiers could not be present considering the interaction they have with the members. It was explained that they had to remain at the cooperative sites to maintain services to members. At the SPS meeting, from what members at that meeting related, the material covered was interesting and timely for the development of cooperativism and understanding of management of the GLAs and cooperatives. The only complaint voiced related to the quantity and quality of food served, but management of the training center responded at the end of the second day to suggestions by members.

While no such sessions were observed by the evaluators, it was reported that monthly meetings of 2-3 days each are held with the managers and extensionists in order to discuss common problems and deal with technical subjects. Accountants meet every three months for the same purpose.

Assessment of training needs appears to be based upon the experience of the ACDI/H staff with the other cooperatives. Other than the San Pedro Sula training session and the above mentioned sessions, the training is incipient and informal. Materials such as a list of members' responsibilities and services offered are only now being prepared. The only documentation a member receives upon showing interest is a legalistic booklet of the cooperative charter and bylaws. To date no promotional material has been prepared which would inform a potential member of services, rights and obligations, and the economic history of the cooperatives.

Education committees of three persons each have been named at the GLA level, but these have not yet begun to function.

In the area of technical assistance, assessment is made by the extension agents. This aspect of the T/TA has been carried out from the beginning, and on the basis of field observations, the agents have been doing a good job. The "20 de Marzo" agents took advantage of the formal meetings of the GLA to present brief discussions on topics such as deficiency signs in corn and types of herbicides to be used. While in the field and in daily contact with the members, the agents discussed aspects of crop production and marketing as the situation called for it. The technical assistance aspect is much more advanced than the training aspect. Part of the training aspect at the member level emerges in conversations with the extension agents on topics of member responsibility and the GLA organization and function.

In the case of the "20 de Marzo" cooperative, there are weekly and biweekly meetings with each GLA. These are formal, with minutes recorded and with discussion as well as the training mentioned above. But, in the case of the "Maya Occidental" cooperative, no evidence of such meetings was found. The turnover of the extension agents in the "Maya Occidental" cooperative may be part of the reason, but even last year there did not appear to be regularly scheduled meetings.

Although each cooperative has presented, in quarterly reports, the number of meetings with GLAs and members, the substance of these meetings in qualitative terms is not possible to assess. They have, however, met their goals and the members expressed satisfaction with the technical assistance.

7. What improved crops or technologies have been identified which are suitable for area farmers?

The technology identified relates to the amounts, timeliness, and proper allocation of fertilizers, insecticides, herbicides and fungicides as well as types of seed. As for crops per se, the technical assistance (TA) has not introduced new crops to the area. However, among individual farmers, TA has assisted the extension of crops to farmers who had not planted them before. This change is due more to the availability of credit than to the TA provided. Availability of credit for inputs and marketing have been the major services bringing about changes in cropping.

C. Project Purpose

1. How many members were there at each cooperative at the key points of development? What were their economic circumstances?

Table I, which is based on quarterly reports from each cooperative, shows the number of members, plus the number of loans taken out. The question of "key points of development" is not relevant because, aside from the yearly goals, there have not been intermediate points where the number of members was critical for the development of the cooperative.

The economic circumstances of cooperative members vary greatly, and the average condition of the cooperatives is different. Generally, those who are members of the cooperatives are not the poorest people in the population of their respective areas. Those without land and those with a manzana or less are much poorer. The housing of most members is typically poor, i.e., one or two small rooms with tile or sheet metal roofs for an average family of seven. Packed earth floors are most common, but some have cement and tile floors. The wealthier members have adobe houses with tile floors and roofs, several rooms, plus carpenter-made doors and window shutters. Poorer members have walls made of bamboo stakes. Inside partitions are constructed of cardboard or hanging cloth. Material possessions vary too. Some have chairs and tables, shelves and kitchens with adobe cooking stoves, but others do not have more than a stool and cooking stoves of primitive adobe. Many wear patched clothing, while a few others may have newer clothes and shoes. Depending on the area, some own horses and oxen. Others own tractors and trucks, and the poorest group must rent oxen at least for tilling. While the great majority are quite poor, there are a few members of some wealth who have larger expanses of land

(i.e., 30 Mzs. or more as compared to less than 12 Mzs. for most members.) A few of these wealthier members were not farmers but professionals who had someone managing the farm for them. The educational background of the members, on the average, was four years of primary school, and many were functionally illiterate. Only a very small number had agronomy or teaching degrees.

The comparison between average cooperative members in the "20 de Marzo" area and the "Maya Occidental" cooperative is nonconclusive. The latter have land with better soils under cultivation, and the cropping cycle in that area is favorable to two good crops per year. In the "Maya Occidental" area only one sure crop is possible. One would expect from a preliminary review of the statistics that the "Maya Occidental" members would be better off because they have an average 8.3 Mzs. under cultivation versus 5.8 Mzs. for "20 de Marzo," but the agricultural conditions are not as good. The "20 de Marzo" members appeared to have more oxen plus better tractor service.

It should be pointed out that most of the "20 de Marzo" members have been recipients of the 1970's agrarian reform, but in the case of "Maya Occidental," only some GLAs had received their land in the agrarian reform. The agrarian reform is the basis for their economic stability and quality of life and there are regions of Honduras where the reform has not taken place, making small farmer programs difficult because of isolation of fields and poor quality of soils.

2. Have the organizations been structured in accordance with national laws and cooperative principals?

Yes, on paper, but some committees have yet to truly function and to date only the administrative committees are active. From conversations and

observations in the case of the GLA's, the conclusion is that these committees are responding to the manager's or the extension agent's initiative and are not really at the stage of development when true collective analysis and decision-making takes place. As mentioned above under training, there has not been much formal effort in this regard, nor have documents been prepared. The philosophy of education expressed by the ACDI/H office and the extension people has been to learn by doing. It is only the first, partial year of work and perhaps too early to expect decision-making at these levels to become models of cooperative behavior.

What are cooperative members doing to support the cooperative?

This question was not included in the outline, but basic to cooperative development.

- a. Repayment - The "Maya Occidental" cooperative is behind in this area and may be a problem case. Data to answer this question will not be available until February when all credit extensions in that cooperative come due. At this point, only 75% of the loans have been repaid and there are indications that some individuals may be difficult to collect from.

One of the major causes of this situation is that the "Maya Occidental" cooperative has given some producers extensions on their credit obligations which has made the risk of non-recovery greater rather than smaller. At harvest time for the second cycle corn crop in 1982, members asked additional time to pay for two reasons: (i) the previous corn crop had been poor, and they needed their grain immediately for consumption; and ii) because they planted beans, which mature later,

it was necessary to leave the corn in the fields for awhile. They argued that the bean harvest would then be used to pay off the loans in the first case, and in the second case, that would come in at the end of the year or January, to pay off the loans. At the present time, some have further asked, and been given permission, to pay off with the coffee harvest which is even slightly later than the bean harvest.

The "20 de Marzo" cooperative, on the other hand, has a very good repayment record with only a few cases of late payments which total 1.23% of the portfolio.

- b. Attendance - Quorums were met at meetings of the GLA attended in the "20 de Marzo" area even though, in one case, the members had only a 24-hour notice. The other GLA meetings were scheduled. In the case of "Maya Occidental," scheduled meetings did not occur, and it is difficult to say how attendance has been at their meetings.
- c. Members assisting each other - In both cooperatives, there were many examples of members assisting each other. A member in an isolated community was making a storeroom available for inputs of all others to save a trip to town. Some members are agronomists who assist others with local questions. One chile producer heard of the cooperative and brought in neighbors to join him so that he could assist them with their production. Others bring inputs to members when they are in town or have trucks available.
- d. Member recruitment - In the "20 de Marzo" case, the drive for more members seem to be strong and active. In the "Maya Occidental," GLA directors have been placed in charge and very little enthusiasm was observed.

- e. Loan quotas - As has been described in other sections of this report, a member must deposit 20% of the credit desired in order to become eligible for a loan. In addition, he must pay in another 10% upon canceling the loan. These deposits become part of the cooperative's capital and in the first year of operations these deposits were used in the critical first planting when BANADESA did not release the credit on time. At the end of the calendar year 1982, "Mays Occidental" and "20 de Marzo" had, respectively, Lps. 64,858 and 43,223 in paid-in capital. Compared with the goals in the original plan (Lps. 64,465 and 35,648), the "20 de Marzo" cooperative did considerably better than anticipated (see table I).

- 3-4. Were the cooperatives able to access adequate and reliable sources of supplies, credit and markets? Have cooperative members had access to needed supplies, credit and marketing on a timely basis and how much have they received?

Yes, but how this has been accomplished must be described in detail for an understanding of the cooperatives and the socio-economic system in which they operate.

The cooperatives have been operating in a system built upon ACIDI/H, USAID, IHMA, BANADESA and commercial agricultural supply houses. These institutions interlock because of personal contacts, commercial interests and prestige. These relations and terms of agreement are continually changing and the success of the cooperatives depends upon them. At the moment the cooperatives enjoy a special place in the priorities of USAID because of USAID's project with IHMA and BANADESA for basic grains and agricultural credit.

The amount of credit received by members is shown in Table I. It should be noted that both cooperatives exceeded the amount of credit planned to be available in the initial

TABLE I: Progress Indicators for the Cooperatives *

	<u>Cooperative "Maya Occidental"</u>				<u>Cooperative "20 de Marzo"</u>			
	<u>JUN.</u>	<u>SEPT.</u>	<u>DEC.</u>	<u>GOAL</u>	<u>JUN.</u>	<u>SEPT.</u>	<u>DEC.</u>	<u>GOAL ***</u>
Members	252	347	423	450	185	245	305	311
Loans **	78	115	387	200	136	136	349	151
GLAs	12	15	15	12	9	10	13	11
Total Loans (Lps) ****			446,016	294,400			216,031	177,274
Ave. Loan (Lps.)			1,212	1,472			612	1,174
Vol. of Supplies (Lps.)			173,567	140,113			144,517	83,732
Paid-in Capital			64,858	64,465			43,223	35,648

* Source: Quarterly and Annual Reports

** Loans approved and disbursed in a given year may be multiple, thus these figures do not necessarily indicate the number of members who have taken out loans.

*** The goals were originally set for an agricultural year from May to April and not for a calendar year of January to December.

**** U.S. \$1.00 - Lps. 2.00

project feasibility study and the average loan was less than anticipated. These differences did not cause any difficulty for the program. They do show that the capacity to use agricultural credit in these areas is greater than anticipated and the capacity of the farmers to borrow as individuals is more limited than thought.

Considering the complicated procedures and unexpected obstacles for providing credit (described in the following paragraphs), the achievement of such a portfolio is a praiseworthy accomplishment by cooperative managers and extension agents who worked with the GLAs. It is also testimony to the utility of decentralizing the first line of credit application review to the group level. The very fine repayment rate of "20 de Marzo" shows that its credit review system worked well. It remains to be seen if the system worked well in the case of "Maya Occidental." This is not to say that there may be technical failures in the analysis of the farm investment plans in "Maya Occidental." However, if there are high default rates in the area, it will have been due to poor assessment of members' intentions and the previous experience of credit programs in the area.

In 1982, the following events took place which describe the institutional context of the program:

- a. USAID/H officials Barry Lennon and Steve Wingert were instrumental in setting up the mechanism providing capital for the production loans. This was made possible by a USAID/H loan of \$4.7 million to BANADESA for agricultural credit and this came about after restructuring of the Banco de Fomento. The BANADESA loan is to come under review in April of 1983 because it was not simply a case of a cooperative applying to the development bank. In spite of this connection, BANADESA did not immediately grant the loan and timeliness of purchase and delivery of agricultural inputs was threatened.

- b. In order to make supplies available to the members, the managers of the cooperatives and ACIDI/H arranged for 30 days credit (later extended to 40 days) with FERTICA, a fertilizer supplier, and with other commercial houses. Credit from the commercial houses was made available because the cooperatives were seen as USAID/H and ACIDI/H supported institutions. This line of credit, plus the 20% front money paid by every member for a loan was then used to provide on time the inputs for the first planting.
- c. When BANADESA funds finally became available, the cooperatives paid off the commercial credit as it became due. This event led to positive enterprise management as they were able to use commercial credit interest free, thus saving the members interest which would have been paid to BANADESA had the credit been available on time.
- d. Marketing was to have been the result of direct sales to the IHMA, which in turn, was to pay immediately to the farmer making delivery at a support price quite favorable to the producers of basic grains. The first shipments were given a rough time typified by practices known to exist for the last decade or so, i.e., high moisture counts, high counts of impurities, rejection at the gates, etc. The cooperative staff immediately mobilized its contacts at BANADESA (which is dependent upon IHMA's buying the grains to allow recovery of loans) and ACIDI/H to put pressure on IHMA. At first, the cooperative managers simply went to the buying station with the farmers and used their influence to intercede on the farmers' behalf. Eventually, a more formal arrangement was made to provide each cooperative with a quota for sales to the IHMA, based upon the amount of credit that had been granted to the cooperative for each crop. Each farmer was then given a card showing the amount he sold to IHMA.

With the second crop a new problem arose, as described in section 5.b., and which dealt with the amount of grains each cooperative would be allowed to sell to IHMA.

A partial aside is necessary to understand the factors behind the reluctance of IHMA to purchase beans, a situation that was at the root of the problem described in 5.b. Basically it is due to the fact that Hondurans produce a non-black bean and the world price for this is low. Hondurans prefer the non-black bean, and IHMA has supported the production of it for distribution in the BANASUPRO chain of basic necessity stores at popular prices. Last year, IHMA and BANADESA had the necessary resources to purchase the beans until the silos were full. However, since there was also a surplus production of beans, the domestic price dropped (that is, IHMA and BANADESA were not able to control the market and effectively support the price). Thus, there were less expensive beans for domestic consumption, and IHMA was caught with its silos full. Finally, IHMA began to sell beans at a loss to try to clear the silos. The world market price was even lower than the domestic price, and there are still beans in the silos. Thus, at the present time, IHMA does not have the necessary storage capacity nor the working capital to receive the potential harvest. Both the lack of working capital and of storage capacity make it impossible for IHMA to control the price. The "sharp" practices of the purchasing agents at the buying stations also limit the institution's ability to control the price. Furthermore, there appears to be (we do not have documentation to substantiate this) a lack of capital to make purchases at BANADESA and IHMA.

Previously IHMA paid directly or gave "paper" which could be presented for immediate cancellation of debts at BANADESA, but now the paper must be held for 45 days. It is probable that BANADESA cannot meet these obligations because of the excess of paper over the amount that is due in loans. IHMA, because of its problems of the past year, is not in a position to pay either and the 45-day grace period is probably to allow IHMA to sell some of the crop and for BANADESA to collect some of its outstanding debts.

BANADESA is in the middle of a campaign to collect overdue accounts in order to pass the USAID/H audit at the end of the first quarter of 1983.

In order to handle the 45-day grace period, the cooperatives decided to accept the paper from their members and cancel their debts, thus stopping their interest payments to the cooperative (BANADESA stops interest charges at the time of delivery of grains to IHMA). The plan is also to pay members in cash at the time they hand over the paper from IHMA.

5-6. How many cooperative members have made use of cooperative supplies and credit, and have some types of members made more use of it than others? What is the volume of activity?

The volume of cooperative activity is shown in Table I, and as mentioned above, the volume exceeded the amount planned. As described in the previous paragraphs, this accomplishment is admirable considering the credit/funding delays. The number of members who made use of credit and supplies is difficult to indicate precisely. One would have to take into account the number of members who took out more than one loan, and then account for those who did

not take out any, but who did buy from the cooperatives. This accounting is not within the scope of work on a quantitative level, but from conversations with the extension agents and members, one can conclude that more members took advantage of the supply service than the figures for loans would indicate.

The members who made greater use of the supply and credit services were those with greater savings. The 20% front money for a loan is an obstacle for a farmer without savings. Cases were identified where the complete technical package of inputs was not used because farmers did not have the necessary capital. However, they seem to judiciously select the inputs which were affordable, would increase their production, and prevent crop loss (herbicides and insecticides were usually purchased in these cases rather than fertilizer). Other types of farmers were those who were limited by climate to one good and one marginal season. These farmers did not normally borrow for the marginal season, limiting their potential losses to labor and seeds, and avoiding the risk of indebtedness.

To what degree have the cooperatives achieved self-sufficiency?

While this question did not form part of the terms of reference, ACIDI/W staff requested, informally, that the evaluators comment on some of the economic indicators of the project.

Because the agricultural cycle does not coincide with the calendar year accounting cycle, only certain observations concerning the financial progress of the cooperatives are possible. The closing of the books at the end of December means that yearly figures only reflect nine months of the original 12-month

period for which the goals were set. Keeping this in mind, plus the fact that the remaining three months of the agricultural cycle will be months in which loans are collected rather than months of supply sales and loan disbursements, it is nevertheless evident that the cooperatives have accomplished much more than the original plan, as shown in Table II on the following page. For example, since sales for both "Maya Occidental" and "20 de Marzo" were in excess of their respective goals, the gross income from sales was much greater - 3.18 and 5.68 times respectively - than expected. Gross income from sales was, respectively, 6.3% and 12.3% of sales. It should be noted that these margins are inadequate for the financial well-being of the cooperatives. However, the originally planned figures indicate that only a small margin of 2.5% and 3.7% would have been obtained. Thus, the cooperatives are also doing better than expected in this regard.

From the annual report (1982: page 3) the losses for both cooperatives are less than the subsidy given to them (losses were, respectively, 56% and 52% of the subsidies given to date) while in the original plan the losses were thought to be greater than the proposed subsidy.

Overall, the conclusion is that the cooperatives are closer to self-sufficiency than planned for this date, but that more attention should be paid to the reporting cycle of the accounting and to the margins of the sales.

TABLE II: FINANCIAL INDICATORS*

	"Maya Occidental"		"20 de Marzo"	
	DEC 82	Annual Goal **	DEC 82	Annual Goal
Gross Income from sales	10,959	3,450	17,731	3,120
Interest Income	13,179	35,994	13,850	20,226
Quotas	1,269	600	996	453
Total Income	25,407	44,499	32,959	27,814
Administrative Costs	58,959	158,312	59,002	130,640
Net Gain or (loss)	(33,552)	(113,813)	(26,043)	(102,826)
Subsidy Received	55,155	71,000	50,437	65,000

* Source: Sept/Dec. 1982 Quarterly Report

** The annual goal is established for the crop cycle of May-April, even though the books are closed on December 31.

*** All figures are reported in Lempiras which are converted at U.S.\$1 = 2 Lps.

IV. OBSERVATIONS AND IMPRESSIONS

As was indicated in the Executive Summary, the ACIDI Cooperative Development Services project is, without question, making significant and meaningful progress toward meeting its goal of improving the economic conditions of Honduran small farmers through the establishment of viable service cooperatives. Notwithstanding the comments and discussion of problem areas in the previous section, the evaluators believe that solid measures have been implemented which should result in a potentially important level of impact to be realized from this project.

There are, however, several danger signals that must be heeded in order to ensure the continued success of the project. A number of these issues were dealt with in the previous section and will appear again later in the form of concrete recommendations. Even more serious though are aspects of the project's future that are unrelated to the further development of the existing models.

Apparently it has already been decided that ACIDI will begin work with two additional cooperatives from among the existing ANACH (Asociacion Nacional de Campesinos de Honduras) regional cooperatives* being serviced by DIFOCOOP. This is being done in spite of the fact that almost all of these cooperatives have extremely serious problems with management, capitalization and repayment of loans. While any or all of these elements would be in and of themselves difficult to overcome, the most important factor seems to be that no firm, written commitment exists with any of these cooperatives signaling their willingness to submit to the characteristics of the ACIDI model that make it so successful: open membership (from the "reformed" as well as the "non-reformed" sectors); professional management; regular and systematic capitalization; and unfailing commitment to repayment of loan obligations.

Due to time and space considerations, no attempt will be made in this report to discuss the intricacies of the ANACH cooperatives. Furthermore, it is assumed that most readers will be familiar with the relevant factors.

An added dimension to this situation is the existing commitment (e.g., the recent amendment which provides for a Cooperative Management/Services Technician) to assist the remaining 15 ANACH groups to somehow turn their operations around and become viable economic enterprises over the next two years.

In both of these cases, the evaluators believe that ACDI is risking both its reputation and the viability of the existing model cooperatives by assuming these responsibilities.

An equally important observation relates to the institutional arena in which the cooperatives are operating. This includes ACDI/H itself, as well as USAID/H, DIFOCOOP, BANADESA, Recursos Naturales, and IHMA among others. As was shown in the "Findings" section, much of the success of the program to date is based on USAID/H's loan to BANADESA, allowing it to extend credit to the cooperatives. Likewise, relatively high prices for basic grain crops were obtained by the cooperative's membership through a permit arrangement involving BANADESA, Recursos Naturales and IHMA. In a number of other instances, i.e., dealings with commercial outlets of agricultural supplies, the support of ACDI/H, USAID/H and DIFOCOOP became an important factor.

While it was gratifying to observe all of these elements functioning properly for the benefit of the cooperatives, it should also be pointed out that these relationships could be viewed as a drawback. It could mean the elimination of any one of the important institutional "players," or the interruption of any of the credit/supply/marketing functions and could prove costly and disastrous to the program's future.

In another area, unrelated to the critical points made above, the evaluators noted the absence of any substantial written materials describing the project and its characteristics, the model of which was presumably developed in Guatemala, e.g., component parts of a "husmeo"; component parts of a feasibility study; criteria for site selection; professional

management; training/technical assistance; services; economic viability; regional cooperatives with local groups; systematic capitalization; on-the-job training; use of cosignees; credit mechanisms; marketing strategies, etc.

All of these factors, many of them critically important features, had to be pieced together by the evaluators in order to first understand the model before the review of the activities could realistically begin. While this was by no means an insurmountable task, a fairly detailed description would not only have assisted the evaluation, it would potentially, (1) help train new ACDI staff members; (2) provide a better understanding of the program for persons who can have an input, but who are only marginally knowledgeable about the program details; (3) create a checklist for program management; and (4) aid in the promotion of the model, both within and outside of Honduras.

Before concluding this section, the evaluators would also like to comment on two more minor issues related to this evaluation: the design itself and the computerized data.

Many positive things can be said about both, as their mere existence paved the way for the evaluators and made their job eminently easier. Both were very thoughtfully constructed tools of the trade.

However, in the interest of improving on these very positive initiatives, the following comments are offered.

In terms of the evaluation design, the evaluators felt that it was somewhat constrictive in its nature, providing the opportunity for comment only in those areas where questions were asked. There was no apparent place, for example, to discuss the ANACH cooperative situation discussed in this section. Although the cooperatives are obviously extending marketing and other services, no mention was made of these elements, but had to

be added by the evaluators, as did reference to an analysis of the cooperatives' financial situation. Likewise, in view of the fact that the designer had the same lack of knowledge about the step-by-step procedures of the ACIDI model, many key questions related to the process were missing and had to be accommodated in the existing outline. All of these, however, are easily correctable issues.

There were similar problems with the computerized data. First and foremost was the fact that the material gathered in January-March 1982 had not yet been shared with the field staff or cooperative managers in any form -- a lag of some 10 months. The data seems to indicate that loan amounts were reduced many times in the approval process -- something that happens only very rarely. There were also cases of double reporting of land amounts and use, and further apparent errors in calculation as well as blank spaces. Most of all, before meaningful use can be made of this data in the cooperatives, Spanish versions will have to be developed.

However, the time spent in making these and other changes should prove worthwhile, as the information was enthusiastically received by all who became aware of its existence.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Following is an attempt to synthesize the problem areas raised in the two previous sections, and to suggest concrete actions that can be taken to deal with them. However, some new issues may also appear that did not fit into the evaluation design format.

- A. The first of these areas deals with personnel, where the evaluators would recommend that consideration be given to hiring only extensionists with several years of proven experience in the field. Likewise, it is felt that regular, formalized technical training to update their expertise would be extremely helpful for their work, as well as for other members of the cooperative staff. For the cooperative managers, past and present, it would be helpful if they would

have a background in economic analysis and theory, and in general, exhibit business skills as their primary offering to the program.

As was pointed out in the "Findings" section, a number of problems began to surface as a result of the limited experience base of some of the individuals currently and previously working in the cooperatives. Additional training for those already on board, and more precise hiring practices for future employees would help correct these pitfalls.

Over and above the existing cooperative personnel, and possibly at the ACDI/Tegucigalpa level, the evaluators further believe that a marketing expert, on a consultative basis, would be a welcome addition to the existing expertise available to the program.

Much of the future success of the program, including the farmers' ability to repay their loans and therefore the ability to further capitalize the cooperative, will be highly dependent on the prices that members can receive for their crops, and the location of markets.

- B. A second area of interest would be for someone, not necessarily ACDI, to submit the regional service model approach to paper.

As was seen in the previous section, there are multiple uses that could be made of this document, by a variety of persons with interest in and with the ability to contribute to the program, but who need a better understanding of the characteristics of how it is run.

- C. As part of the process of producing a guide or manual, several components of the process might also come under scrutiny. For example, the evaluators firmly believe that the criteria for selecting a site to develop a new cooperative vis-a-vis the "feasibility" study, should be considerably broadened to include factors such as transportation, previous work in the area by other groups, infrastructure, marketing systems, etc., and not be so heavily based on purely economic projections as is now the case.

In La Entrada in particular, the evaluators felt that many potential problems in recovering loans might have been foreseen from the considerable amount of experience of other groups previously working in the area.

A systematic review of other factors might bring to light additional changes that could be suggested.

- D. In terms of the actual work being done in the cooperatives, the following details should also be considered:

1. The extensionists should begin to carry and keep a daily diary where they would note such things as meeting dates and subject matter, problems encountered and measures taken, technical aspects of a given visit, inputs made, etc.

This practice would help them reduce or eliminate any problem in scheduling and in keeping track of technical assistance inputs.

2. Each extensionist should also have a catalogue of labels of the chemicals they are using, so that they can more easily and reliably discuss names, uses and applications with members who many times cannot recall names but who do recognize the labels.

3. Steps should also be taken to provide the cooperative membership with information about their cooperative's status.

As it is right now they know very little, if anything, about their cooperative. A quarterly bulletin, information sheets, slide shows, diagrams and charts in the cooperative office and/or other didactic materials would provide them with technical information, news about what other members are doing, repayment rates, number of members, level of capitalization, etc.

4. A study should also be made to determine the optimum size for a GLA as well as the optimum ratio of members to extensionists.

GLAs as large as 50-60 members were observed as well as ones with as few as 3-5 members. In both cases, the evaluators felt that these extremes did not allow for maximum efficiency in the provision of services and that actions should be taken to come to a more workable number. Likewise, the existing extensionists cannot continue to increase indefinitely the number of persons they are servicing. At some point in the very near future, they will have reached the maximum in terms of the impact group they can efficiently attend.

5. Unless it is otherwise regulated by cooperative law, it is further suggested that the fiscal year of the cooperatives be changed to the May-April agricultural cycle instead of the calendar year accounting that is currently being utilized.

At present, the cooperatives are forced to make judgments about the goals on the basis of information gleaned from leftover results of the prior

year plus three-quarters of a year that has just been completed. Furthermore, although the cooperatives' books are closed on a calendar year basis, the goals are set on the agricultural year making analysis difficult.

6. Additionally, the evaluators believe that the cooperatives should discontinue the policy of allowing farmers to pay off loans for a given crop with the receipts of another.

The basic problem with this policy of paying off one crop with another is in the relative pricing and market security of the crops. Corn was a better crop to market because the price was higher at the time of marketing the second crop. The bean pricing problem was discussed in the "Findings" section. Worse yet, coffee prices are historically low because of an apparent error in the London negotiations this year. The loss of the quota, plus surplus production, means that the world price is low, but Honduras' domestic price is even lower. Thus, in the case of the cooperative "Maya Occidental," it has been staking its repayments on crops with a declining value and stability. The case of the coffee losses and the poor position of beans was known before, but not taken into consideration by the cooperative manager.

7. Finally, it is felt that the cooperatives should begin to collect data about the actual harvests of the members at the time they cancel their loans instead of only at the time of loan application.

Not only will this practice assist in obtaining the data needed for the "impact" evaluation that will be conducted at a later date, but it will also help assure that the information is accurate.

- E. With regard to the proposed work with the ANACH cooperatives, the evaluators would like to be able to recommend that ACDI not work with them at all, but rather choose two new areas where additional model cooperatives could be created. Realizing that the level of commitment has no doubt eliminated that possibility, it is felt that the next best alternative would be to allow ACDI to work with two new cooperatives (even if they are in ANACH geographical areas), and limit the direct work with ANACH to just one experimental run. This, it is believed, would considerably reduce the risk under the present plan of action.

Whatever the circumstances or the number of ANACH cooperatives to be assisted, the evaluators firmly recommend that no further work be done on time-consuming and costly feasibility studies until the cooperatives in question agree to, in writing, a series of factors such as open membership, professional management, systematic capitalization, etc. Furthermore, a time limit (e.g., 30 days) should be set for obtaining this agreement so as not to waste ACDI's time and resources, or jeopardize the promotion of other activities.

If it is determined that some amount of hard data is required to facilitate negotiations with the potential client cooperatives, then it would be preferable for ACDI to develop a shortened version of the feasibility, including "guesstimated" results, rather than invest resources in a full-blown effort.

Last, it is felt that the existing amendment to the ACDI agreement, and the work that has already begun with DIFOCOOP, be brought more into line with the characteristics of the model program, and be placed under the direct supervision of the existing staffing structure. Of all the recommendations made in this section, the evaluators feel most strongly about those related to the work with ANACH, and would urge that ACDI carefully consider its options in this matter at the earliest possible date.

- F. In view of the crucial and monopolistic reliance that is placed on institutional relationships among ACDI/H, USAID/H, BANADESA, DIFOCOOP, Recursos Naturales, and IHMA, as they relate to the credit/supply/marketing functions of the cooperatives, the evaluators would highly recommend that ACDI/H and the cooperatives begin to identify alternative methods and arrangements by which these elements can be obtained and satisfied. In that way, the continued success of the program can be further guaranteed, by hedging against the potential loss of any one or more of the "pieces" that are vital to the current program format.
- G. In the area of reporting, which has not been mentioned previously, it is felt that the current quarterly system is adequate in terms of timing, and that useful information is being presented in a systematic and logical order. However, unless ACDI/Washington is obtaining additional, more detailed information by alternative means, the evaluators believe that a good deal of useful data is not being transferred. For example, in the last quarterly report, there is no explanation as to why the "Maya Occidental" cooperative is slow to recover loans. Nor is there any explanation as to the content of training. Other examples could be cited, but the point is, if ACDI/W is not receiving this information in another form, it is suggested that the quarterly reports become more complete in reporting on activities and be more analytical in their style. This will allow for a more meaningful monitoring process and will facilitate future evaluations as well.
- H. As a final note, it is recommended that the evaluators be provided the opportunity to sit down with the persons who designed the evaluation guidelines and with the person processing the data, in order to discuss with them details of respective problems encountered in using these instruments as referred to in the previous section.

ATTACHMENT A

SCHEDULE OF EVALUATION ACTIVITIES

- | | |
|-----------------------|---|
| Sunday, January 16 | - Travel, New York (Miami) - Tegucigalpa |
| Monday, January 17 | - Briefing and interviews with ACDI staff in Tegucigalpa |
| | - Meeting with Steve Wingert, USAID/Honduras |
| Tuesday, January 18 | - Meeting with Mario Figueroa, Director of DIFOCOOP |
| | - Review of written materials, files in ACDI/H office |
| | - Additional sessions with staff |
| Wednesday, January 19 | - Meeting with Marco Aguero, Director and Carolina Mena, Director of Credit Operations, BANADESA |
| | - Further review of written materials, files |
| | - Additional sessions with staff |
| Thursday, January 20 | - Travel from Tegucigalpa to Morazan |
| | - Interviews with staff of the Cooperative "20 de Marzo" |
| | - Visits to GLAs in La Estancia, Morazan Independiente, Morazan ANACH and Guangolola |
| Friday, January 21 | - Additional interviews with cooperative staff |
| | - Visits to GLAs in El Negrito, Los Angeles, Nueva Esperanza, Morazan, El Vertiente and Congrejales |
| Saturday, January 22 | - Additional interviews with cooperative staff |
| | - Visit to GLA in Portillo Gonzales |
| Sunday, January 23 | - Travel from Morazan to La Entrada |
| Monday, January 24 | - Interviews with staff of the cooperative "Maya Occidental" |

ATTACHMENT A (cont.)

- Visits to GLAs in Los Tangos and San Antonio
- Visits with numerous members in the cooperative office
- Visit to Santa Rosa to negotiate a permit from "Recursos Naturales" and BANADESA in order to sell grains to IHMA.
- Visit with IHMA manager in La Entrada
- Additional interviews with cooperative staff
- Visits to GLAs in Chalmeca and San Juan Planes
- Visits with numerous members, in the cooperative office
- Visit to BANADESA in Santa Rosa to further negotiate permit
- Additional interviews with cooperative staff
- Visit to GLA in La Entrada
- Visits with numerous members in the cooperative office
- Travel from La Entrada to Lake Yojoa
- Travel from Lake Yojoa to Tegucigalpa
- Prepare report outline
- Initiate draft of report
- Continue drafting report
- Continue drafting report
- Complete first draft of report and debrief with ACDI/H and ACDI/W staff
- Obtain comments on first draft of report and begin preparation of final draft
- Continue preparation of final draft

ATTACHMENT A (cont.)

Thursday, February 3

Complete final draft

Friday, February 4

Debriefing with Steve Wingert and Barry Lennon,
USAID/H

Saturday, February 5

Travel, Tegucigalpa - (Miami) - New York

LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

TEGUCIGALPA

ACDI/H

Juan Alvarez, Cooperative Operations Adviser (Chief of Party)
Nery Chinchilla, Cooperative Administration Adviser
Julio Puente, Counterpart
Miguel Rodezno, Counterpart
Orlando Valle, Extensionist
Richard Clark, Cooperative Management/Service Technician
David Fledderjohn, Regional Representative (Guatemala-based)

USAID/H

Steve Wingert, Director of Rural Development Office
Barry Lenr.on, Project Officer

DIFOCOOP

Mario Figueroa, Director

BANADESA

Marco Agüero, Director
Carolina Mena, Director of Credit Operations

MORAZAN

Cooperative "20 de Marzo"

Carlos Barrera, Manager
Felix Flores, Extensionist
Roberto Guillen, Extensionist
Jorge Moreira, Accountant
President and Vice President of the "Consejo de Administracion"
President of the "Consejo de Vigilancia"
Numerous member of 10 of the 13 GLAs

LA ENTRADA:

Cooperative "Maya Occidental"

Guadalupe Zavala, Manager
Eduardo Melgar, Extensionist
Jose Antonio Posas, Extensionist
Hernana Chinchilla, Accountant
President of the "Consejo de Administracion"
Numerous members of 9 of the 15 GLAs

ATTACHMENT B (cont.)

Others

Recursos Naturales personnel in Santa Rosa
BANDAESA Personnel in Santa Rosa
IHMA manager in La Entrada

ACDI/W

Bartlett Harvey, Executive Vice President
Robert Flick, Project Officer
George Reagan, Director of Training and Evaluation

OTHERS/WASHINGTON, D.C.

Malcolm Young, Development Associates, Inc.
Russ Schuh, Computer Consultant

GUIDE TO ACRONYMS

ACDI/H:	Agricultural Cooperative Development International/Honduras office
ACDI/W:	Agricultural Cooperative Development International/Washington office
AID/W:	Agency for International Development/Washington office
ANACH:	Asociacion Nacional de Campesinos Hondurenos (The Honduran National Peasant Association)
BANADESA:	Banco Nacional de Desarrollo Agropecuario (The National Agricultural Development Bank of Honduras)
BANASUPRO:	A Honduran governmental agency operating a chain of "popular" grocery stores throughout the country
DIFOCCOOP:	Direccion de Fomento Cooperativa. A Government of Honduras Agency
IHMA:	Instituto Hondureno de Mercadeo Agropecuario (The Government of Honduras' Agricultural Marketing Institute)
USAID:	United States Agency for International Development
USAID/H:	USAID Mission to Honduras