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ANNUAL EVALUATION  
BASIC VILLAGE SERVICES  
VILLAGE CASE STUDIES

Report Submitted to  
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CASE No. 1.

VILLAGE: Manshiat El Kubra  
MARKAZ : Kafr Shukr

QALIUBIYA

E.V.S. Evaluation  
QALIUBIYA

Summary.

The BVS program in the village of Manshiat El Kubra is roughly on schedule in terms of completion of the technical components of its water and sewerage projects, and it is largely successful in stimulating village-level planning, decision making, and implementation in partnership with governorate offices.

Village

The village of Manshiat El Kubra is several Km. north of the markaz town of Kafr El Shukr in the governorate of Qaliubiya. It is approximately 25 km. from the governorate capital of Benha. The village population is 12,887 and it has agricultural fields totaling 2279 feddans. There are two medical stations and the nearest hospital is 3 km. in Kafr El Shukra. Six primary schools contain 52 classes and one preparatory school has 18 classes. The number of girls enrolled in school is roughly equal to the number of boys. There is one government post office and two private ones, but no public telephone station. The village contains three mosques.

The central village is composed of two large sections: Manshiat El Kubra and Manshiat El Sughra. There are two much smaller satellite villages named El Safiin and Met El Darady.

Forty percent of the village households own no agricultural land and another thirty percent have less than 1 feddan. Twenty-five

percent have holdings of about two or three feddans, roughly the amount needed for subsisting on an agricultural income. Five percent have been five and seven feddans and two individuals own over ten feddans each. Approximately 500 educated men from the village are currently employed overseas, and an additional 400 laborers from the village are overseas. Villagers own a total of six tractors and forty-one diesel irrigation pumps.

### The Project

The emphasis of the project is the extension of in-house water taps to a large number of villagers. This involves improving the village water pumping and storage station and laying down an expanded network of pipes to enable increased household connections. There is additionally a small sewerage disposal project and money from this year's budget has been set aside for a future road paving project.

At the pumping station, they have installed a new electric pump (not with BVS funds) and they are replacing the unreliable 1948 diesel pump with a new model. They are building a major brick and cement wall around the pumping compounds, which includes the two pumps and the water tower.

In the village they have laid 800 meters of pipe enabling potentially 1500 families to make connections into their houses.

The original proposal from the village to BVS included the cost of the electric pump (LE.10,000), but they found that they could procure one free from the governorate and they re-allocated those funds

to purchase extra piping to serve a larger number of villagers. Later in the year the price of the piping rose almost fifty percent and they had to cut back the planned number of meters of pipe installation. Because of their good fortune with the electric pump the price rise for the pipes did not cause them a major problem, governorate officials stressed that the issue is quite serious for most of the villages within their jurisdiction. They stressed that Chemonics was helping them to overcome this problem of pipe shortage and price rise by arranging for foreign imports. Additionally, funding delays have slowed the work somewhat.

As the first year's program nears completion, they have spent:

Spent of total			
LE. 7084	12000	pipes	(installed)
6410	4000	new diesel pump	(not yet arrived)
3967	8000	sewerage	(half completed)
6010	7000	wall	(almost complete)
<u>LE.23471</u>	<u>31000</u>		
=====	=====		

For the new diesel and the wall, the completion costs will take them over the original proposal allocations. In the area of pipes they have a surplus of about LE.5000 due to the savings from the electric pump deal. The village leaders say they plan to transfer any surplus to other parts of their BVS package or to next year's budget. But these arrangements are not yet finalized.

The BVS water project in Manshiat El Kubra provides pipes in the streets to which householders can, at their own expense, connect for inhouse water taps. To date only 25 houses have made these new

connections, but officials in the village expect that most or many of the houses along the new line will make hook ups. One line also provides tap water to a mosque, thus providing an additional public service.

### Decentralization

In Qaliubiya governorate the choice of projects is worked out at the village level and the contracting and implementation activities are largely carried out by the governorate. However, this theoretical arrangement is modified in several ways which make the partnership between governorate and village a closer and more complex arrangement. First of all the choice by the villages is strongly circumscribed by the governorate. The village councils in Qaliubiya were told to choose projects only in the areas of water, sewerage, or roads, and it seems that most villages chose a combination of the three, with water as the lead component. On the other hand, "choosing" the project for the village goes far beyond merely submitting a list or voting among alternatives. The village level officials have been closely involved in aspects of budgeting and readjusting priorities in light of changing financial constraints, contracting procedures, overseeing the work done locally, etc. The relationship between the village, as represented by the executive (Rais Majlis Al Karia) and the elected council (especially the president, Rais Majlis Al Sha'ab) and the governorate (especially the Ministry of Housing) is one of partnership and cooperation. The appointed executive stressed that he looked upon the governorate as his "lawyer", helping him to put

together the program for his village. Both in public and in private he stressed his complete satisfaction with this arrangement and he contrasted this relationship with the more adversarial relationship they have with the representatives of the central ministry of in Cairo.

The strongest evidence of the degree of real decision making in the hands of local village officials is their ability to discuss the detailed aspects of the project arrangements. The elected officials and the appointed officials have the kind of detailed knowledge about budgets, and planning trade-offs, and causes of delays that only comes from close association with an activity.

Not only have these local officials not been left out, but it is difficult to imagine similar activities being successfully carried out in Manshiat El Kubra without this type of close attention from the village leaders.

One often observes tension in villages between the elected president of the people's council and the appointed village executive, with the elected head being overshadowed by the appointed official. In Manshiat El Kubra, the older elected official and the appointed executive seemed to work in an equal partnership, and both are clearly interested in the welfare of their village and sensitive to the desires and demands of villagers, or at least to the demands of many of them. Moreover they are proud of the water project in their village and pleased with the part they have been able to play.

There had clearly been considerable earlier discussions among the elected and appointed officials of various possible alternative projects other than the one being implemented. These issues would come up in the conversations in ways that showed that this was not the first or even the tenth time they had been discussed. One man argued that some of the funds should be used to pave "the most important street in the village", the one leading to the cemetery. He stressed that just that day an important village person was being buried and the procession would have to walk this undignified and unpaved road. Others disputed his insistence that this was the most important road and suggested that the main access road out to the asphalt road was far more important for paving.

The original plans for sewerage had been to provide disposal at each of the three mosques, but budget constraints had forced them to restrict this program to only the largest mosque, although one of the other mosques received the tap water for the first time. The appointed executive defended any such necessary decision on the principle of which among the alternatives would provide service for the greatest number of people.

The village officials objected to the allocation of funds to villages according to population size, stressing that many larger villages already have services while smaller ones (such as Manshiat El Kubra, they said) often have greater needs. However, when choosing among alternative sites for project activities within the village and among sub-villages, they themselves used roughly the same rule-relative population to be served.

Following this, they provided sewerage disposal for the public toilets of the largest mosque, and put in proportionately more water pipe in the more densely populated central village. However, they made efforts to maintain a reasonable balance with 300 m. of pipe going to each of the two central parts and 100 m. going to each satellite village.

The village officials demonstrated an awareness of some of the possible problems that may result from their chosen project. This shows up in their discussion of the water tower which they fear will be unable to supply enough volume and pressure to serve adequately the expanded system. A new tower would cost about five times their annual BVS budget however, and they have no solution to the problem, save to hope for a great deal more money.

In the same way they expressed worry, but no solution, to maintenance issues. The appointed executive figures that next year the pump will need to function 20 hours a day and still there will be problems of water pressure and availability in certain parts of the village. Twenty hours a day on one engine, he fears, is more than it can stand.

The village leaders have prepared their program for next year's BVS request, but the budgeting is only in preliminary stage. Next year's budget is LE.43,000 plus LE.12,000 held back last year by the governorate to use for road paving. About LE.30,000 is earmarked for the water program - 1500 m. of pipe plus a new well and diesel pump. Two other items on their agenda are a post office (LE.8,000) and some market

stalls (LE.8,000). We asked which part of the program they would postpone if it turned out that the budget was not enough to cover all. The unanimous response was "the market stalls".

#### Beneficiaries

The village plan will provide the possibility of in-house water hook-up to all of the houses in the two satellite villages and to 80 percent of the two parts of the central village over a three year period. The better off households already have in-house water as a result of privately installed hand pumps (estimated cost, installed, LE.125). Additionally, about 350 households have interior tap water from hook ups with the previous extensions of the 1948 water system. We saw a number of houses which had received these taps about two years ago. The extent to which the poorer members of the village will pay to have in-house water is not yet clear. By next year an evaluation will be able to measure exactly the extent to which people find the cost worthwhile.

However, for the great majority of the village families, the BVS program provides them with the chance to have a treasured commodity that used to be restricted to the "rich" - tap water in the house. From conversations with people at public taps near the new piping, we got the clear message that they are anxiously awaiting the imminent luxury of in-house water. One house with a new interior tap is located only some yards from the public tap. The owner explained that his two wives had been arguing for years every time one had to cart the water in. Now he hopes to have peace.

CASE No. 2.

VILLAGE: El Borombol  
MARKAZ : El Saf

GIZA

CASE STUDY OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BVS  
(AID) Project in the Village of Borombal,  
El Saf Markaz, Giza Governorate, A.R.E.

INTRODUCTION

The village of Borombal is situated on the eastern bank of the Nile about one hundred kilometers from central Cairo. We met Mr. Ahmed Aziz of the office of ORDEV headquarters together with Mr. Salah El-Hariri of the Giza office of ORDEV. They took us to the office of Mr. Ahmed Gamal El-Din, Secretary General of the Giza Governorate who supervises all ORDEV activities within his Governorate. With respect to the choice of village projects he noted that the decision was made at the level of the village council and they do not want to interfere. To facilitate our study he transferred us to the office of Dr. Nazik Saleh, the head of ORDEV for Giza. There we met with Mr. Abdel Hamid Nassar (Head of Social Services), and with Mr. Mourad Abdel Malik Mansour an agronomist and chemist in charge of follow-up of the project and was trained at the Blue Grass program in the United States (as did Mr. Ahmed Aziz).

THE PERSPECTIVE AT THE HIGHER ADMINISTRATIVE LEVEL

At this office Mr. Salah El-Hariri provided us with the file of "The Follow-Up of the Execution of the BVS". In these pages we had the records of the Borombal water project until December 1981. Also included were other financial and statistical data. The funds allotted for this project were LE.65,000, the amount already spent was LE.31,554.

The work has resulted in 2,370 meters of pipe laid of both 4" and 6" pipe in Borombal, and 1,140 meters in Kharman. At the end of December 1981 the project was continuing in Karimat village with the installation of 1,340 meters of piping. These pipes are for the main feeder lines in the streets and do not represent the connections to individual households.

Concerning the roads, the file notes the allotment of LE.16,000 for Borombal but this has not yet begun at the time of the report, nor at the present. The file also includes the estimated prices for the pipes and excavation.

Asbestos Piping (Price per meter)

6 inch	LE.11.000
4 inch	LE. 7.500

Excavation Costs (per meter)

LE.2	Sandy or silty soil
LE.4	Stony or rocky soil

The file notes that the amount of LE.65,000 for water projects was sent to the bank of Saf Markaz on March 25, 1981 with instructions to open an account for the village bank, however, we discovered that this was actually opened in Bank Misr in Saf Markaz which does not draw interest. On 29 September 1981, the amount of LE.16,000 was sent to the same account to initiate the financing of the road projects which have still to begin.

The estimated costs for road construction and grading were LE.8,000/km. assuming that the average width was about 6 meters.

The financing provides that Markaz receives and distributes such funds. Mr. Hariri noted that for 1982 a new system will be introduced in which funds first go to the Giza Governorate Village Bank with instructions that the bank should transfer the funds directly to the village to eliminate the Markaz level.

Mr. Mansour spoke very highly of the Blue Grass program and thought that it provided excellent training. He was a bit frustrated upon his return because he felt that he was not able to apply all that he had learned. He believed that senior officials were restricting his initiative and that junior administrators felt that he was taking too much initiative.

Mr. Mansour was also somewhat critical of some infrastructural problems, specifically he found difficulties in communication with the village by telephone, and that transportation was not always reliable, insofar as there were insufficient vehicles and fuel which accounted for some delays. Mr. Hariri agreed with these shortcomings and suggested that this was at the heart of the problem in data collection and follow-up which he had wanted to do.

Dr. Nazik said that she has only one pick-up truck but must visit some 39 local units. For this reason village level visits must be irregular. Although officially she had five vehicles for her 60 employees assigned to Giza, gradually four of the vehicles were lost to other departments of the Governorate during the past year. The situation has become so difficult that her workers have had to had recourse to public transportation to do their follow-up. Such measures have

consumed very large amounts of time. In addition she has no budget line for fuel for her own work and must get her fuel from the Governorate headquarters. She recommends that vehicles and their fuel allotment be permanently assigned to her so that she could perform her work properly and according to schedule. She would like to have each village visited twice a week and to drive an average of 100 km per day. To overcome this problem to some degree the appointed village head (Rais meglis al karia) is invited to the Governorate ORDEV headquarters for weekly briefings.

Periodically Dr. Nazik receives proposals from the villages. These are discussed with the appropriate engineers and technical staff.

Request for bids for projects come from the Markaz level since lower levels of administration would lack the technical staff to receive and evaluate proposals. Such meetings are chaired by the Secretary General of the entire Governorate. To activate funding, signatures are required from the head of the village and the financial controller of the Markaz. Since this controller must follow governmental procedures he may represent some bottleneck in the procurement of funds because he seeks higher authorization. For example, while our team was in the ORDEV office the financial controller of Oseem Markaz was nagging the ORDEV office for their authorization or that of AID's so that he would feel secure to sign the checks.

Dr. Nazik pointed out that the criterion for determining whether a project would fall under the BVS program was mainly to see if there was another existing program which was organized to deal with the

proposals submitted by the villages. Dr. Hariri had been told that the money was to be spent mainly on water projects and roads but he would consider other projects as well, as long as they were for the general good of the inhabitants of specific village rather than for individual benefit.

#### PERSPECTIVES FROM THE VILLAGE LEVEL

The host for the village-level research was Hussein Abdel Hamid who was the elected head of Borombal where his father's family resides (at the same time he is the appointed head of the village council of Atfih of Saf. Markaz). We did not meet with the appointed head of Borombal who is away on a leave of absence. He did meet with the secretary of the appointed council who is Muhammad Mahros.

The water pump which serves Borombal is actually located near the Nile at the village of Kharman about three kilometers to the west. This was first established in about 1955 but is no longer able to meet the expanding needs for water consumption. It is run by a diesel pump which is started manually, with considerable difficulty. The amount of fuel is also limited by the Markaz budget and does not permit more than four hours of operation per day. When the large storage tank above the pump is fully empty the limited operation is not sufficient for completely recharging the supply. This problem is continually being aggravated. For such reasons the villagers want an electrically-started pump and one which is driven by electric motor to overcome the persistent problem of fuel shortage.

The former pipe network serviced 128 household connections. Since the new BVS project this has expanded to 381 new applicants of which most are now in service making the total of 509 households which is far beyond the capacity of the former system. Thus, while the villagers are extremely pleased with their new water access there is a basic requirement for a holistic plan in water supply which includes not only the in-ground supply network but also an adequate pump system as well. Furthermore, bringing water to the neighborhoods and households has also introduced a new problem of drainage. Public standpipes were originally provided before the BVS project, but the inhabitants themselves took these out since the taps were frequently left open and seepage in the adjacent streets weakened the foundation of buildings, and created health problems from standing water and made some streets impassable because of mud. Because of this problem the village council issued a public resolution to close all of the public taps. Even with this measure, and with the household connections of the BVS project the problem has not been fully resolved. The new connections are usually supplied with a cement catchment basin inside the entrance way but there is sometimes spillover which goes back into the street. Water used for domestic purposes is also discharged into the street. Thus, a holistic approach must also include provisions for more satisfactory water drainage. The more easily accessible the water supply the more liberal is the discharge from the households so the solution to one problem has aggravated another.

The bid for the Borombal project was put out in July 1981 and the contract was actually begun in October. The financial award allowed

for 500 meters of six inch pipe and 4.5 kilometers of one four inch pipe. The plan also included fire plugs and public water taps even though this had already been informally and formally rejected by the villages. This suggests that initial planning was made at a level higher than at the village. The contractor Hag Essam El Seramaki does not live in Borombal. For the contract the G.O.E. is represented by the appointed village head. Mr. Abdel Hamid considers that the problem of water supply is about half solved and now he is giving his attention to water pressure from the pump and to changing the main line from six inches to eight or ten inch pipes. The BVS project has been well received and is considered valuable especially because of the recent and rapid expansion of the housing in the village.

Aside from the above strengths and weaknesses, Mr. Abdel Hamid felt that more attention should be placed on questions of maintenance. At present the maintenance is centralized in the Markaz and sometimes several days go by for the lack of spareparts. Mr. Hariri noted that a program of maintenance training is about to begin in the Ministry of Agriculture, but the villagers would prefer such training to be held at the Markaz level. Mr. Hariri could provide better, university-trained teachers at the Ministry level, but would not have such well-trained people if he had to supply them for each Markaz.

A critical issue of project efficiency was brought to our attention when Mr. Abdel Hamid said that in his own village he was able to install about 8 kilometers of pipe instead of 5 for about the same amount of

money. In Borombal, the supply of pipes was only through the contractor who charged more; in the other case the self-help approach was used and so more could be spent on pipes and less on labor and overhead costs.

The village territory includes some 1,900 feddans and of this some 700 feddans have saline soils which may be related to drainage problems. These lands are generally not cultivated. The overall population is 25,502 people. Given this population density on soil of limited arability, the village of Borombal is known as a source of agricultural migrant labor, tarahil. The villagers have expressed keen interest in knowing whether the BVS program could cover a program of evaluation and reclamation of this land to curb the necessary out-migration and to generate significant new income for the village economy.

#### PERSPECTIVES FROM THE HOUSEHOLD

Although the new pipe network offers main water trunk lines in the main streets, the individual households must pay for their own domestic connection whatever the distance from the main street line. These secondary household branches vary considerably in cost depending primarily upon the length of pipe required. In our study, we saw and interviewed household members with functioning domestic taps, some with new taps which were connected but were not yet functioning, some which were actively being assembled during the days of our visits, and some households still without taps or connections. The project was very much still in process.

Mr. Kamel Kamel Abdel Latif, a farmer, told us that he paid LE.9.710 for his deposit tameen, plus he bought his own pipes and the taps, and he built his own water catchment basin. His house is on the main line and his connection has been in operation for about a month. Before, he had to walk about 3 km, or else he would get water from the canal which had the danger of Bilharzia. There are no meters in Borombal but each user is charged PT25/month as the basic water user's rate.

A small boy, Sayed Musa said that his family did not make a water connection because his father was a tarahela and they did not have enough money for the costs of the connection. Mr. Abdel Salam Ali el Sol, a farmer, has a branch connection with his cousin Mr. Mamdoh Abdel Khaliq; together they share the water but the connection cost them LE.200. They bought 39 meters of one-inch pipe plus 24 meters of 3/4 inch pipe and they paid LE.30 for the local plumber. They did all of their own excavations. The basin cost LE.10 and they paid the deposit of LE.9.710. Their water supply has been in operation for about 3 weeks and they expect to pay about LE.3.000/year for water consumption. Formerly his wife had to carry the water from the Nile which is far away.

Sayed Ahmed Sayed, a farmer, claimed costs of pipes, work and deposit was LE.51. His water has been in operation for one month. At that house, the research team found two young girls filling containers from the tap. We asked how much they were charged but they replied that they took the water without charge since they were neighbors.

Abdel Fadil Abdel Latif, a farmer has had his water since January 28 at a total cost of LE.55. There we found a hose coming out of the house so that his neighbors could fill their containers at no charge. At this point Mr. Abdel Hamid said that this would soon stop since they must avoid spillage and drainage in the street.

Ahmed Abdel Mawgoud, a migrant farmer, has installed his connection last week but has not yet built his basin. The total cost so far is LE.45. Before, his wife used to get water from the canal or from neighbors who had been connected to the old system.

Nadi Mohammad Hussein, a former butcher, has put in his connection but he is still awaiting his water supply for the past month. His house is far from the main water line and is located on a slope away from the village toward the desert. Mr. Abdel Hamid said that this gave a good example of the need for a pump with greater pressure.

Mr. Muhammad Hamid Ahmed, farmer, has had his connection for a month without any water for the same reasons as Nadi Mohammad above. Ahmed Hanafi Hassan, a peasant farmer, has had his water supply for 12 years.

We met three girls in the streets carrying large water containers. They said that they do not have water connections for the lack of money. Their water comes from the houses of friends for drinking, and from the canal for doing their washing.

Sayed Mohammad Yousif, ex-guard, had hired a local plumber who we met at work in house. The plumber, Nasir Ahmed Abdel Gawad, is

from Borombal himself, but was trained as an apprentice plumber in Cairo. Within the last month he has completed seven connections. He buys all of the pipes and plumbing supplies from the local shop. If he has four houses together he would use a one inch connection with  $\frac{1}{2}$  inch supply pipes to the households. He buys the supplies at the local prices which would be as follows:

The main connector for a 4 inch pipe. (bareeza)	LE.10.000
$\frac{1}{2}$ inch pipe/meter	LE. 1.000
$\frac{3}{4}$ inch pipe	LE. 1.300
1 inch pipe	LE. 1.600
$\frac{1}{2}$ inch tap	LE. 1.200
$\frac{1}{2}$ inch valve	LE. 1.200

Note: Typical connections would include both tap and valve set-ups.

CASE No. 3.

VILLAGE: Fidameen  
MARKAZ : Sinores

FAYOUM

## B.V.S. Evaluation

### INTRODUCTION

Fayoum is located about 110 kilometers to the southwest of Cairo across a desert road. The Fayoum Depression is an ancient region of agricultural importance as it is close to the Nile Valley and is served by a major canal system. The village Fidimin is 15 km. from Fayoum town, growing a wide variety of crops, and is rather densely inhabited for an agricultural region.

### Perspectives at the Higher Administrative Level

We went to the ORDEV office in Fayoum Governorate to meet the Deputy Director of ORDEV. The normal procedure is for ORDEV to solicit proposals from these local units for needed projects. Each village council would determine what would be most suitable such as potable water, roads, retaining wall and so forth. Once they have made their decisions the proposals are sent to the markaz level where technical people make certain revisions, specifications, and budget recommendations. From each of the five marakez in Fayoum the proposals then go the planning department of the Governorate where they are "prioritized". For example, for the year 1981-82, the financial needs totaled LE.11 million while the available funding was only about LE.5 million. For this reason the departmental directors all sit together for discussing and determining which projects will be given how much support. At this point the recommendations are returned to the village councils to seek their reactions. Finally it

it is presented to the elected council of the governorate for ultimate approval. In Fayoum the funds are distributed according to needs of the villages rather than because of village size per se.

When ORDEV initiates a project the funds are sent to the village bank which is actually located in the village. Checks are signed by the head of the village and by the secretary of the village council. However, before any checks are issued, the finance director of ORDEV would make any necessary revisions or refinements in the accounts. To protect the village administrations from any fiscal errors a special one and a half months course on accounting procedures is offered to an employee of the council who must have a Bachelor's degree in commerce. Although this is the ideal, such individuals are only provided, at present, for about half of the villages. But this training program continues. Once this person would be trained he would handle all ORDEV accounts, even those beyond those in the BVS program.

We met Mr. Hussein Dawoud, Deputy Secretary General of Fayoum Governorate who is in charge of the BVS programs. He was critical of the low profile of Chemonics and felt that they did rather little from his perspective.

For example, the last month's program of Chemonics was for pumps and engines but these are not used at all in Fayoum since there are no artesian wells. He also would like to have the training in the Governorate rather than in Cairo. Perhaps the training could now be done by Egyptians instead of Chemonics organization, he said.

Mr. Dawoud thought the role of Chemonics only added overall cost which was often unnecessary and wasted a lot of time which could be used for other purposes. Once trained, it is appropriate that ORDEV is, and should be, the propagator of the kinds of training that is still done unnecessarily by Chemonics. He also noted that the BVS projects seemed to be "over-evaluated" i.e., evaluative teams appeared almost weekly for some type or another of evaluation of BVS programs. Both Mr. Dawoud and Mr. Mansour thought that evaluations could take place for 10-15 days every six months to satisfactorily survey a full array of project developments and programs. As it is now, the continual evaluations have actually become something of a distraction in the work efforts.

Mr. Mansour was among the first to attend the Blue Grass Programs in the United States. He was critical of the stress on classroom work rather than on field studies. Furthermore much of the training was on accounting which used American terms and techniques which did not apply whatsoever in his work. Although his own command of the English language was quite good he also recalled that some of the other students had considerable difficulty in following the curriculum.

#### Perspectives From the Village Level

At the office of the village of Fidimin we met Mohamed Younis, the appointed head of the village council, Mr. Ishaq the Secretary of the council who is supervising the BVS projects there, Mr. Ahmed Shoeb, the Head of Administrative Affairs, and Mr. Mohamed Abdel Kader, The Secretary of the Elected Council. There are six projects in the village. For 1979-1980:

- + the retaining wall/embankment which created a new accessway to the village at the place known as Bahr Sanhor.  
Cost: LE.92,000.
- + underground drainage and a simplified sewerage system which allowed for the disposal of used water in public grated "man-holes".  
Cost: LE.50,750.
- + small arable land reclamation project through improved drainage.  
Cost: LE.2,000

For 1980-1981:

- + A continuation of the wall/embankment project above  
Cost: LE.30,000 (virtually complete, through self-help)
- + Continuation of above drainage/sewerage project above.  
Cost: LE.30,000 (90% finished, by contractor)
- + Road, between Fidimin and Senro Cost: LE.15,000 for leveling and gravel, but not for asphalt.  
Cost: LE.15,000.(by road contractor)
- + Walls for water canal for Bahr El Elow el Sageer at Salein village. Cost: LE.5,4000 (accomplished through self-help)
- + Walls for Khor Sharaf at village of Tawfikia.  
Cost: LE.15,000 (to be accomplished through the irrigation Dept.)

Whenever possible, the villagers preferred self-help projects because they were more economical. More walls or roads, or whatever could be built for the same money that would have been paid to a private contractor. Of course, there were certain projects which were outside of the technical expertise or logistical ability of the villagers. Among the employees of the village council there are three technicians, and the markaz engineers are available for consultation

to expand the possible projects which could be done by self-help. According to BVS regulations, self help projects can not have "incentives" to local labor, so in this case some additional incentives are found in other budgets to compensate the technical workers who would be working beyond their regular job assignments and descriptions.

For the bigger projects the council was able to mobilize about 1,000 villagers who worked with their own tractors and equipment. These were paid, but much less than would have been the case for private contractors. Because of this, the people felt that it was their own project and they took more pride in its execution. In this way the council gained much experience; for example, the Head of the Council said that he can now buy stone and make contracts with builders and can make the excavations himself. The experience was very beneficial. Now the Fidimin Council can get into bids as if they were the contracting agency, under the new name of the Local Services Department Fund. The workers, technicians and the accountants from the village are all involved; in this way the Governorate and the village both gain. It should be clear that this involves both BVS bids, and for bids outside of the village too. Already three such contracts have been stimulated by the original BVS work. It is worth noting that the contractor for the sewerage project was inclined to keep his prices for this year the same as last year because he knew that if he raised prices too much the Council would take over the project; this happened in spite of generally rising prices for contractors.

There is a history of strengthening local autonomy dating back to 1976 when Mr. Dabbous, then Governor, gave the local units-villages more initiative. This policy was continued by the current Governor, Dr. Hakim who sent a circular to all of the villages urging them to get further involved in the execution of projects, not just the planning as before. This trend has been encouraged by ORDEV.

Illustrations of the impact of this policy trend may be seen in the project for six kilometers of retaining walls, but with local involvement they were able to make seven kilometers with the same amount of money. The team was very much impressed with the scale and general effectiveness of the large wall system which had been constructed. At the same time the use of local workers without proper experience may be the cause of the abuse of the wall structure, i.e., when stone was delivered to the lower tiers of the stepped walls it was dumped or thrown down with such impact that sections of the wall were seriously fractured and some brand new sections were completely smashed away. If the water were to rise or repairs were not made this could presumably affect the integrity of the whole wall system and ultimately the road at the top of the embankment.

#### Perspectives From the Households

The team viewed the small land reclamation project and we were satisfied that it made an improvement to those immediately concerned. In particular it made improved access for motor vehicles to a four story government housing apartment complex and related buildings.

The team also went to the project for water canal walls at Bahr El Elow. We walked from the beginning to the end of the canal and interviewed a number of local residents. We spoke with Mohamed El-Sayed Yousif, grocer, who said that the project helped to keep the village clean and enlarged the street so vehicles could enter more easily. The water would now run out more quickly rather than collect as before. However we noticed that the canal was collecting all sorts of rubbish. We pointed this out but were told that periodically a large canal gate may be opened to flush the system. We spoke with many women in houses along the canal who repeated what the grocer had said but added that the water canal helped to protect foundations and reduced unpleasant odours which were common before the canal was put into operation.

We also visited the large, integrated projects of the retaining walls, embankment and underground drainage/sewerage. We spoke with El Sayed Awadallah Megawi, peasant, who said that the walls made it possible to create a road at the top so that cars, tractors, and ambulances could pass into the village which was not at all possible before. We conversed with a group of young men, Sayed Yousif (Dip. in Commerce), Tolba Mohamed Hussein ("Assistant Driver"), Salah Omar, butcher, and Omar Mursi, butcher. They all repeated enthusiastically what had been said before and they were especially pleased with the village clean and was very heavily used. He demonstrated how the system was used when a young woman came to pour dirty water in the grated opening rather than on the street as had been done before the project was installed,

Basic Service?

Almost every household in all parts of the villages seemed to be reasonably close to a public water tap which had been there for some years. Many other houses have their own pumps or have arrangements with close neighbors who have such pumps. Clean, safe water has long been available to the people of Manshiat El Kubra, and an outside observer is tempted to question whether the added convenience of interior taps is the most pressing basic village need. It seems that the interior water tap has become an important symbol of modernity for these village people. And so they have chosen to invest their share of BVS funds in the extended water system.

Experts from Cairo or Washington probably would have designed a different package of basic services for this village in the 1980s. But under "decentralization" these villagers seem to be obtaining something they value: one's own water tap inside the house.

CASE No. 4.

VILLAGE: Dairoot  
MARKAZ : Mahmoudiya

BEHEIRA

B.V.S..

BEHEIRA

Summary

The BVS program in the village of Dairut is one of the most active and successful programs we visited during this evaluation tour. Extensive use of local contributions of both labor and money enabled them to install many more kilometers of water pipes and sewerage pipes than would have otherwise been possible under their budget allocations. This pattern of local initiative extends throughout Beheira governorate. There are several reasons for this successful village participation. Based on our interviews in one village, one key reason seems to be the high level of previous experience in organizing activities of similar size and complexity. Another important factor is the close cooperation between markaz officials and village leaders.

The Governorate

Damanhour, the capital of Beheira Governorate in Lower Egypt, is approximately 150 kilometers from Cairo. Accompanied by Mr. Ibrahim Ghoneim, ORDEV evaluation officer, we made our first visit to the Governorate headquarters in Damanhour. We tried to meet the Governor, Mr. Labib Azaam, who was former director of ORDEV in Cairo, but he was very busy as he had visitors from the Arab Faisal Bank.

We met with Mr. Abdel Moneim Badawi, the ORDEV Development Officer in Damanhour. After a very short interview, he too excused himself as he had to be with the Governor to meet with the representatives of the Faisal Bank. We were left in the hands of Mr. Youssry Abdel Allim, the development overseer who offered us all the needed information Dairut BVS projects and accompanied us to visit the village and its six satellite villages.

Mr. Youssry had some complaints to make concerning the work load and working facilities. Besides overseeing and supervising BVS projects, he was also responsible for the follow-up and evaluation of all development projects in the whole Beheira Governorate. He was responsible for 67 units (i.e. village compounds such as Dairut) consisting of 440 villages. ORDEV, the Beheira Governorate, CARE, and UNICEF are also carrying out village development projects simultaneously with the AID, BVS projects in these villages. Only himself and another two governorate officials were responsible for the implementation of all these development projects. They did not have enough space to work in the governorate offices. The more pressing problem, he felt, was transportation:

"Here we have this three million and a half pound project and we don't even get one vehicle to carry us to the villages. The roads are muddy and the weather is bad and we have to depend on taxis, motor-cycles or just any governorate cars going in our direction."

On the other hand, he said that the BVS projects in Dairut was going according to schedule and that in fact the people had been very enthusiastic and had contributed to the 60,000 pound budget allotted to them in terms of manpower and also in money. He repeatedly stressed that all decision-making was made on the village council level, especially the elected council. His job as the representative of the governorate was simply to help the village people solve their problems and convey their demands and messages either to the governorate or to ORDEV people.

In the Governorate, one gets the impression that relations between the development officers in the governorate are smooth with elected and appointed village council members but <sup>not</sup> as smooth with Cairo ORDEV representatives. Mr. Youssry and Mr. Ghoneim entered into an argument over the problems of transportation and Mr. Ghoneim insisted that ORDEV in Cairo had in fact provided the governorate with cars for the BVS, but Mr. Youssry said that was not true. He, Mr. Youssry, further pointed out that for the coming budget year he plans to make specific demands and was going to make sure that he, and the governorate people get their rights. He had prepared a two-page petition including twelve demands "to ensure serious cooperation between the governorate and ORDEV in the AID BVS projects." The petition stresses that the BVS budget money be deposited in a local

Again decision-making was said to be made on the level of the elected and appointed village councils. The Director of the Markaz, Mr. Bastawissi said that his job was to help villagers get the needed materials for their BVS projects. For instance, he received the estimate of the needed amount of water piping for all the four units under his control early last year and ordered the pipes at once. He even made a loan to the BVS as the AID money had not yet been deposited in the village banks.

He strongly felt that water was a pressing need for the villagers in the Dairut and other village complexes in the Manmoudiya Markaz. He said that the doctors in the governorate hospital have become experts in the performance of spleen operations as they perform so many of them and so regularly. "A healthy farmer," he said, "is the basis of all development projects." Some women had been known to walk four or five kilometers a day to reach the nearest canal to get the needed water. The problem is so pressing that in one village (not included in the Dairut compound) Kom Nasr, BVS money for water pipes was enough for only 14 kilometers of pipes but the village through contributing their labour and cash installed 34 kilometers of pipes.

at the same time and in the same places.

The major problem in Dairut remains the roads. The major objection of the village councils that they are not allowed enough flexibility in how best to use the money. They believe that they should be allowed to decide how to spend the money. They are not aware that AID is willing to finance any projects besides roads, water pipes and sewerage systems.

One member of the elected village council was in fact responsible for studying how the villagers can contribute to the pavement of the roads. He had counted the number of lorries in the Dairut complex (30 lorries) and the number of private cars (50 in number). The lorries were needed to carry the needed material from the governorate or factories and the owners of private cars would be asked to contribute cash to help cover the cost of pavement of at least a main road or some such project.

#### The Markaz

In the Markaz office of Mahmoudiya we met with Mr. Fawzi El Bastawissi, the Markaz director. He oversees four complexes in the governorate including the Dairut complex of capitol or main village and smaller satellite villages. He said there were BVS projects in all the four units. The number of villages that came under his jurisdiction were so high he could not even give a rough estimate of their number. He met every two weeks with the appointed council heads of the four units under his control. The heads of the village councils were expected to hand in monthly reports on the progress of the projects.

village bank and that the village elected and appointed council members be allowed more freedom in deciding how best the money should be spent.

Mr. Youssry is expected to make an evaluation every month. His role, he says, is simply to offer technical advice as to how best to complete the EVS projects in time. He takes into consideration the availability of materials (asbestos pipe lines) and technical advisors, i.e., engineers etc.

#### Dairut

Dairut and its satellite villages are about 20 kilometers from Damanhour. The total population of the Dairut complex is 36,879 divided as follows:

Al Atef	3089
Kafr Felet	2173
Dairut	7803
Miniat El Said	2250
Fazaza	3872
Sidi Okba	11,134
El Kasr	6,468

The above are 1978 CAPMAS estimates of the population based on the 1976 census data.

Dairut complex has 7 Omdas, 13 agricultural co-operatives, 1 started in 1952 with the Land Reclamation Laws and the other 12 are semi-private semi-government co-operatives designed to help small farmers receive loans, etc., 4 clinics, 11 primary schools, 1 preparatory school, 1 school for adult education, 3 public mosques, 40 private mosques, 400 tractors, and 2 village banks.

The agricultural land of the seven villages is 36,988 feddans, 18,000 are privately owned and 18,000 are government owned. The privately owned land is owned by 3914 villagers as follows:

Less than 1 feddan	811
1 - 3 feddans	1103
3 feddans	1370
10 feddans	630

In Dairut we were met by Mr. Abdel Shafy, head of the appointed council and Mr. Abdel Meguid Qamara, head of the elected council. Both are from the villages of Dairut and seem to have a very good working relationship together. They are both experienced in leadership and in dealing with villagers. Particularly, Mr. Qamara, had been the youth representative before being elected head of the elected council. In this capacity he had initiated a volunteer program among the youth of the villages to lower the surfacing of underground water in the village of Sidi Oqba. He had also introduced sewerage systems in this village by voluntary work.

#### BVS PROJECTS

The budget allotted to the Dairut complex was 60,000 pounds. The village representatives were told that they had only a choice between three types of projects: Roads, water pipes and sewerage. Through governorate technicians and through a public tender they discovered that it would cost 68,000 pounds to have 1 kilometer of roads. Although this is their most pressing need, the money available was not enough to cover the expenses. The budget was therefore divided between the second two most pressing needs, water pipes and sewerage.

The village allotted 40,000 pounds for the installment of water pipes to the roads of the seven villages of Dairut complex. To date, i.e., February, 1982, 35,000 pounds have been spent and twelve kilometers of pipe have been installed (8.5 km. 4" pipe, 2.5 km. 6" pipe, 1 km. 2" pipe) 35,000 pounds of BVS money has been used for the purchase of the asbestos pipes. The digging and the installment of the pipes was done by the villagers themselves, some actually helped in the digging, i.e., they contributed their labor and others paid 10 pounds to have the village council hire people to do the digging. The technical and engineering advice and assistance was offerered for free by governorate people.

Efefore BVS, 50% of the villagers of Dairut had access to potable water either through private taps at home or through public taps. The remaining 50% used water from the canals for washing and used water for drinking from the houses that had taps. Dairut does not have a private water tower but receives its water from two nearby towns and has authorization for this from the water supply officials. After BVS, 35% of the villagers who lived without water will now have water at home. The pipes have been installed, and the water is expected to start running by the end of March. From 10% to 15% of the villagers will still depend on canal water and on "borrowing" water.

20,000 pounds of the BVS money was allotted to sewerage pipes. To date 1,623 meters of sewerage pipes have been installed. Again the money was used for buying the pipes and the villagers contributed the equivalent of 1,648 pounds in terms of labour and cash for the installation of these pipes. Water pipes and sewerage pipes were installed

CASE No. 5.

VILLAGE: Beni Mohamed Sultan  
MARKAZ : Minia

MINIA

Evaluation of BVS Projects in Beni Mohammed Sultan and Satellite Villages in Minia

Mr. Abdel Kader Amin, ORDEV headquarters representative, met us in Minia Governorate. The Governorate had been notified of our visit in advance and we were expected and met by Mr. Mohamed Marwan, Director of Development in the Governorate. When interviewed and asked about his opinion of the progress of BVS projects in Minia he said the projects were going very well, except for the supply of pipes which he said was not sufficient and was delaying the completion of water projects in some of the villages. SIGWART does not have enough pipes to supply the needs of BVS projects all over Egypt.

He felt that the BVS project was a really welcome project because the building of a solid infrastructure is very important as a basis for starting any development plans. The Governorate had not received funding for roads or water pipes for the past 20 years or so.

When we asked about the process of decision-making he said that he enthusiastically supports that all decision-making concerning the use of BVS money he made at the village level, both the elected and appointed councils. During the first years of BVS, when only Fayoum, Giza and Sohag were included in the program, he had paid a visit to Fayoum Governorate to attend a conference on Rural Development and had a chance to meet with the officials there and learn about their experience with BVS. Later, when Minia was included in the project, he made a two-week tour of the villages in his governorate where BVS projects were expected to be carried out and had encouraged village council heads to take over the responsibility of choosing and prioritizing their needs.

The choice of projects was done entirely on the village level. "We", meaning the Governorate and Markaz people, "are only consultants" The Governorate offers technical assistance and functions as a liaison officer between the villages, ORDEV and the AID. They also attempt to give village the needed equipment if it is available.

When asked about the village of Beni Mohamed Sultan in particular, he was able to give us the following figures:

Total budget for water: LE. 53,860  
Part of water budget spent: LE.40,894  
Rating of the completion of work: 75.9%

Total budget for roads: LE.25,790  
Part of roads budget spent: LE.17,765  
Rating of the completion of work: 68.8%

When asked for further details concerning the number of meters of pipes or the length of roads paved etc. there was not enough information. This, however, was in fact a good sign because all data was kept at the village level and copies are sent to the markaz and then the governorate. In this case the data on Beni Mohamed Sultan had not yet been received by the Governorate, at least the most up-to-date data.

Mr. Marwan said that the budget for the whole of Minia for the BVS projects was distributed to the villages by size of population. A rough estimate revealed that each individual received about one pound in terms of services from BVS money. All decisions concerning the allocation of the money of each village was then made by the village people. The budget of each village was transferred to the village Bank. The head of the appointed village council signed the cheques and needed only the signature of the Markaz controller to withdraw money from the bank.

Mr. Marwan understood infrastructure to mean: roads, water, sewage and improving the environment. Under "improving the environment" he listed fire extinguishing units, covering up of lakes or swamps, and public toilets. Though he fully endorsed the idea that village people make their own decisions he felt it his responsibility and that of village council members to help villagers realise both what is really needed and really possible. A villager may suggest that the BVS build a university in a village, but by discussion and convincing he may come to realize that may be a primary school, preparatory school or possibly potable water was better and more feasible to have first.

We next moved to the office of Mr. Safwat, Secretary General of the Governorate. Mr. Safwat informed us that the bids for the carrying out of the BVS projects were made by each village separately with the assistance of the technicians and legal consultants of the markaz and governorate people: The Contracts Office of the Markaz. The supervision of the actual execution of the projects was left entirely to the village councils. Sometimes they would call on markaz expertise. He cited one village, Nazlet Hussein, where the village council took over the whole process of carrying out the BVS projects. They hired their own contractor and used their own equipment and village participation.

Concerning Beni Mohamed Sultan he said that the village was doing very well. There were other projects being carried out in it, e.g., a health unit built by the World Bank, the reclamation of 150 feddans, and a family planning unit.

(AN ASIDE: Back to Mr. Marwan)

Mr. Marwan felt that the BVS by not allowing incentives or the buying of equipment was in fact harming the efficient use of BVS money, much needed by most of the villages of Minia governorate. Giving BVS projects to contractors is good in that it improves and expands the potential and capabilities of local contractors who could later be employed or hired to carry out other projects. On the other hand, contractors make a 30% profit for example. If the BVS allowed for incentives and for the buying of even intermediate technology, the villages with the help of markaz and governorate equipment and expertise could undertake these projects with less expenses and also increase the governorate's capital in terms of equipment etc. As the situation stands now, governorate and markaz technicians, i.e., engineers, maintenance officers etc. are doing overwork for which they are not paid and for which they have no incentive save their desire to improve the conditions of their villages and their governorate as a whole.

Concerning maintenance, Mr. Marwan said that according to the terms of the BVS agreement, the Governorate was expected to provide 10% of BVS budget money for maintenance. The maintenance money for each village was already deposited in the village bank of each village where BVS projects were underway. In addition, the governorate had trained at least three of the personnel of the village to take care of maintenance. However, maintenance money has of course not been used yet and the maintenance on the village level would still need guidance and more training from Governorate and Markaz people.

Some of the villages needed electricity but BVS does not provide that. New water towers are needed and it would be preferable if electric pumps are installed instead of diesel pumps. However, this is impossible if the villages do not originally have electricity. Some of the diesels in the villages may be out of order for two or three months. AID prefers that the most purchases of equipment come from the Western Bloc, if not from the U.S.A.

Engineer Ghattas (Roads Dept.) joined the meeting. The governorate tries to balance between financial resources for roads allocated by the governorate and those provided by the BVS, BVS will take care of road bedding and the governorate takes care of the Asphalt covering. Road bedding sometimes involves raising the level of the roads. Roads are chosen to join central village with hamlets or with main roads. No roads are built inside the villages.

For the coming year, all village council heads were sent a letter in which a number of suggestions were made for the 1982-83 BVS budget year. The suggestions included covering up swamps, public toilets, and slaughter units. The final decisions were left to the village council heads. The Governorate was receiving the forms listing the choices of the villages for the coming year..

#### THE VILLAGE

The village of Beni Mohamed Sultan is 18 kilometers south of the town of Minia. It has eight satellite villages whose population is as follows:

	Population
Beni Mohamed Sultan	4,200
Beni Ahmed	12,202
Reeda	6,858
Beni Mahdi	3,024
Beni Hammad	1,265
El Matahra El Bahariya	4,170
Manshiat El Howasliya	1,842
El Hawasliya	2,142
Magousia	<u>6,977</u>
Total:	42,680 =====

The above estimates are the 1976 census data.

Mr. Ali Hassan Gad is the appointed village council head.

Mr. Fath El Bab head of the elected village council. We met with both at the village council headquarters in Beni Mohamed Sultan. They confirmed most of the information that we had already received at the governorate and added that all decisions concerning the priority needs of the villagers are decided by the elected village council members in co-operation with the appointed council members.

The first priority for Beni Mohamed Sultan was the bedding of a road linking the different settlements of the village. The 2 km. road has already been partially bedded. The bedded part has not yet received the asphalt cover but is being used. The contractor is aware of the possibilities of misusing the road before the asphalt covering is made, and he has left one layer of the bedding incomplete to be made immediately before doing the asphalt layer.

The second priority according to the village council head was the introduction of water pipes in Beni Mohamed Sultan and its satellite villages. Priority in the first BVS year was given to the most deprived villages and the budget was allotted on the basis of needs rather than on the basis of population size.

The following is the planned and completed installation of water pipes in Beni Mohamed Sulatan to date:

	<u>Planned(M)</u>	<u>Completed(%)</u>	<u>Subscribers</u>	
			Old	New
Beni Mohamed Sultan	155	0	8	
Beni Ahmed	148	100	97	10
Reeda	600	100	12	6
Beni Mahdi	1,700	100	8	8
Beni Hammad			3	
El Matahera El Bahariya	1460	0	4	3
Manshiat El Hawasliya			1	
El Hawasliya			3	
Magoussa			111	

The villages that were not included in the 1981-82 plan will be included in the 1982-83 plan.

The above table also includes the number of subscribers for water taps at home and the numbers on the waiting list for each of the satellite villages. The procedure for installing water inside the homes is that the subscriber would buy a meter. He also buys the necessary amount of length of pipes. The council then takes care of the installation of both pipes and meters.

The village of Beni Mohamed Sultan had received all its share of Spanish pipes through SIEGWART pipes for the past year, i.e., 1981-82, a total of 4 kilometers, 1 km. 6 pipes and 3 km. 4" pipes. The 6" pipes were needed because the pipes already installed were this size and it was necessary to make the connections or extensions using the 6" pipes and then shifting to the 4" pipes. All the pipes were Spanish made with "Gibalt" connections.

When asked about villagers participation in the digging and installation of water pipes, Mr. Gad replied that it would infact cost less if the whole process was done by the villagers rather than through a contractor. His estimate is that it costs about 9 pounds per meter to have the contractor do it while it would probably cost around 5 pounds if the villagers did it themselves. However, he said, that very frankly the contractor, who was really one person for the whole of Minia had paid a 10,000 pound bribe to SIEGWART to receive the needed pipes. Of course, Beni Mohamed Sultan does not have this kind of money. He cited the village of Nazlet Hussein, already mentioned to us by Mr. Safwat, The Secretary General of Minia Governorate, where the village wanted to undertake the process of the installation of piping without using the contractor. They had not received their share of pipes. They had to give it to the Contractor !!!

He mentioned that if he had a loader and a grader he can even take care of the roading, but unfortunately BVS money does not provide for the buying of equipment. His plans for the whole BVS project is to complete the water network pave the necessary roads, and dig irrigation canals.

A major problem in his village is that there is a canal that has not been cleaned for the past 20 years. This canal is preventing the proper irrigation of almost 1,000 feddans of sugar cane. He was not aware that cleaning canals ia a project that is acceptable by BVS terms. He said that he may try to introduce it in the 1982-83 plan; if not then in the following year.

He said that he has the necessary expertise in terms of legal council and accounting to do his bidding with the contractor independently, but that the governorate does not allow this.

The BVS program in Beni Mohamed Sultan is moving forward with impressive success. Villagers with whom we spoke are quite pleased with the water program and with the paving of their main access road. The village in general gives an impression of an active and prosperous rural community which is becoming accustomed to a gradual improvement in their local facilities. The young village head has only been in office for several months. Most of the projects (BVS and others) were arranged under the former village head who has now been promoted to the post of markaz head. In spite of being new on the job, the present village head is completely knowledgeable of all the details and plans, and he impressed us by his competence and commitment. BVS seems to make the village headship an attractive position, a means of proving one's capabilities through local service.

CASE No. 6.

VILLAGE: Awlad Amr  
MARKAZ : Qena

QENA

B.V.S. Evaluation  
QENA

### Summary

The village of Awlad Amr has received BVS services from the governorate in the form of having two of its irrigation canals cleaned. An extension of its drinking water system is planned but not yet executed. Almost all planning and implementation activities are retained at the governorate level.

### Village

Awlad Amr is located about 25 km. from the town of Qena, along the main road leading to Sohag to the north. The village unit is relatively large with a total population of 33,400 (1976) divided among five villages (each with an omda). These satellite villages are spread out over a relatively broad area and they are further divided into a total of about 24 hamlets. Awlad Amr has 9 primary schools and 2 secondary schools. Only about 5% of the students are female, however, which suggests the extent to which the village is tradition oriented in its cultural values.

The agricultural land of the village measures just over 6000 feddans. Forty percent of the families have holdings of less than half a feddan. These holdings are recorded and reported in carets (24 carets equals 1 feddan). Thirty percent of the families are reported to hold between 6 carets and 3 feddans, and the remaining 30% have over 3 feddans. There are 30 tractors privately owned and one owned by the government.

<u>Village</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Agricultural Land</u>
Awlad Amr	10,320	1571
El Ghowasa	5,430	1180
El Hogayrat	10,277	1205
El Tawaybia	3,593	885
Geziret Tawaybia	4,969	1200
	<u>33,400</u>	<u>6000</u>
	=====	=====

An important fact about Awlad Amr is that it is famous in the region for its traditional feuds between the families of its different satellite villages. Although the feuds are "traditional" stories have it that caches of rather sophisticated weaponry are sometimes discovered and confiscated by government authorities. It appears that this local feuding has implications for the BVS program in the village and we shall return to this topic in later sections of this report.

### Project

Two BVS activities have been planned for Awlad Amr: canal cleaning and drinking-water pipes. The canal projects have been successfully completed. Nothing has been done at the village toward completing the water project.

Two irrigation canals have been cleared and lined at a cost of about LE.6,000. These are large canals leading directly from the Ibrahimiya canal, and it is the first time in about 20 years that any improvements or maintenance has been done on them. The work was done by the irrigation department of Qena governorate.

The water program planned for the villages of Awlad Amr consists of 3.5 km. of asbestos piping and the installation of two electric pumping units to replace the antiquated diesel pumps. In the four

hamlets that make up Awlad Amr proper, 2 km. of pipe and one pump installation are planned. In the hamlets that make up the satellite village of El Hogayrat 1 km. of piping is combined with a new pumping unit to make up the program. In the additional villages of El Tawaybia, half a kilometer of piping is supposed to be added to the existing system. The budget prepared by the governorate planning department allocates LE.6,000 per km. of piping (installed) and LE.6,000 for each electric pump unit (partially installed, it seems).

	<u>Pipe</u>	<u>Pump</u>	<u>Total</u>
Awlad Amr	12,000	6,000	18,000
El Hogayrat	6,000	6,000	12,000
El Tawaybia and Geziret Tawaybia	3,000	--	3,000
			<u>LE.33,000</u> =====

Exactly when one could expect completion of the water project is difficult to predict. The governorate has received about 88% of the necessary pipe for the whole governorate, and they have received their electric pumps. But the governorate faces a number of problems of implementation.

Next year's BVS plan, however, is already being planned and costed out. It consists of more water pipes and more canal cleaning in Awlad Amr.

Both the canal project and the water project are important to the village people. According to women we interviewed at public water taps there is a problem in the area of salty water from the hand pumps.

Women will walk quite far (several k.m.) once every four days or so to get clean tap water for making tea and for drinking. They use the saltier water for washing and for certain cooking. The canals also, as we mentioned, are perceived as an important improvement. Farmers have had considerable problems in recent years in getting adequate water on to their fields in a timely fashion, and yet the task of cleaning such a large canal was really beyond any local endeavor.

#### Decentralization

The process of decentralization - the devolution of decision making and responsibility on to lower levels of government - is severely arrested at the governorate level in Qena. It is not our intention to criticize the authorities responsible for BVS in Qena nor to question the policies of BVS. However, there seems to be a misfit between the Qena situation and the BVS goals, and the reasons for this need to be explored here. ORDEV, AID, and Qena officials are certainly aware of the situation, and whether our comments here add anything to their awareness, we cannot say.

First of all, the formal arrangement for BVS village activities in Qena is in many ways similar to that of some other governorates. One can make a comparison with Qaliubiya, for instance. In both cases governorate authorities request village leaders to choose projects from a restricted list of suggestions: water, roads, canal cleaning, sewerage. In both cases the main implementation is carried out by departments at the governorate (housing department for water projects),

usually through private contractors.

It is in the informal relations between village and governorate where the difference between these two governorates' programs can be seen. The mood in Qena is one of intense hierarchy. Every level of government seems to resent the level above it and deprecate the abilities of the level below. Governorate officials are quite articulate in their expression about the inability of village level units to accomplish modern tasks. They proudly claim to make all the decisions and plans for BVS and insist that mere village people cannot, for instance, dig trenches level enough for water pipes. When we said that we intended to talk with the head of the elected village council, the response from governorate officials said, "Why? He is just a gallabiya man." Qena officials view BVS as an extremely complex technical project which only modern trained personnel can carry out.

At the village, the appointed village head had rather little involvement in the project compared to his counterparts in other governorates. He could not reallocate the money assigned to his village from one sub-project to another. He has requested a certain number of meters of pipe and he will receive that percentage of the pipe analagous to the percentage received in Qena of their total request for pipes. Qena got 88% of what it was originally allotted and so Awlad Amr will get 88% of its allotment. The village officials have nothing to do but wait for Qena to deliver the pipes, for Qena to figure out solutions to its logistical and bureaucratic log jams, for Qena to decide on a policy for installation.

The village head does not think creatively about the project nor does he try very hard to involve others in the village in thinking about BVS potential activities. And he would be foolish if he were to stick his neck out and get people all involved because he cannot be sure that Qena governorate will provide him with the necessary promised material support. He might get all the people to dig trenches and then the pipes would not arrive, or the pump will not be strong enough, or the electric authorities will not allow it to be hooked up, or whatever. And with local feuds and factions, such failures or delays would be even more awkward than usual.

However, BVS has bestowed unprecedented power on the village head in Awlad Amr in spite of his lack of participation in project planning, budgeting, etc. It is he (with whatever local consultation he finds appropriate) who decides the precise location of BVS projects in the village. He decides which canal gets cleaned for the first time in a generation, and therefore which people's fields prosper as a result of proper irrigation. He decides which hamlets get clear tap water and which ones continue to have only brackish water. In a poor area like this, decisions about the placement of projects is much more important than in Qaliubiyah or Beheira. In the village we visited in Qaliubiya, everyone had clean tap water or clean pump water nearby. The margin of improvement under BVS project activities was less than in this village of Upper Egypt. The village head in Awlad Amr receives from BVS more power within the local village arena than does his more active and more sophisticated counterpart in Qaliubiya.

How does he use this power? He uses two criteria to decide on the location of new BVS services. One is the relative need of the hamlet. The other is the effect of the project activity on the local faction situation. He explicitly plans to have a water tap in a certain hamlet to avoid having those people passing close to an opposition hamlet on their way to the river for water. In this way he hopes to reduce the level of village tension. He expressed similar thinking regarding the canal cleaning project. On one hand he is concerned to avoid aggravating local disputes through unequal distribution of project activities. On the other hand, he sees BVS project activities as a means of actually ameliorating the factious situation of village politics. The weight of evidence on the issue of development projects and local factionalism from most parts of the world suggests that his situation is not likely to become easier very quickly.

The feuding situation seems to be especially tense in Awlad Amr, and one cannot consider the case representative. However, the situation is far from unique in the Said. Officials in Upper Egypt who are reluctant to turn over decision-making largely to local government units may base their caution on a real awareness of such problems.

#### Qena Governorate Program

The Qena BVS program is largely centralized within the governorate department of planning, and therefore, we must focus more on this level than at the village in order to understand the state of the program.

First of all, it is the stated policy of the officials of the planning department to keep the BVS program centralized at the governorate level. These reasons for this are (a) the inexperience of local units, (b) the technical complexity of the projects, (c) the shortage of supervisory personnel. They maintain that things such as water projects need considerable expertise and thorough follow-through in order to be successfully implemented. Their statements of the inability of village units to provide the necessary supervision are not without justification. In the village of Awlad Amr the village council does not even have a proper office (in comparison with all other villages we visited). The village is widely spread out but the village head has no means of transport, not even the usual motorbike. Furthermore, officials explained, there are only 7 engineers in the governorate to supervise water programs in 200 village units including 1000 villages. They claim they would need 30 engineers plus vehicles plus fuel to supervise properly any sort of village level participation. Additionally, they state that the imported Spanish pipes they have received have a particularly complicated joining mechanism which makes the exact levelling of the trenches very important. It is the sort of work that needs close and experienced supervision.

If a contractor does the job and there is any problem within the next year, they can call him back to repair it. But if any of the work is done by the villagers, it will be impossible to have them repair it. AID and ORDEV do not understand these complexities, officials said.

In the Qena Department of planning they insist that BVS is so important that it must be kept under their close professional control. Yet, the professionals are facing many difficulties in making their BVS plan work. Centralization of the work has produced a large and complex operation, the many pieces of which do not as yet fit together. This is especially true (literally true) regarding the water pipes and pumps. They have finally received their huge shipment of 185 km. of asbestos pipes. They managed to get them unloaded and piled up at the housing department by working around the clock with the one forklift they had just managed to purchase from other funds the week before. If the pipes had arrived before the forklift, they said, they do not know what they would have done. They have the pipes and the joining pieces, but they do not seem to have any curved pieces and they are wondering how they are going to install these pipes in the crooked streets of the villages.

The other part of the water program, the pumps, is even more problematical than the pipes. They ordered and received 106 electric pumping units through the GEMICO company. As part of the purchases, GEMICO undertook to send 7 Qena engineers to Hastings , Nebraska, for a 10 day training program on pump assembly and maintenance. Since their return, these engineers have faced many frustrations and they express great dissatisfaction with their working situation and compensation. There are a number of unresolved problems with the installation of the pumps. The housing department would like to install the pumps itself rather than let a contractor do it. This would make use of the

training the engineers received in Nebraska. However, to do the job within the housing department would need funds to pay incentives to the engineers and others for all the extra work.

The BVS does not allow its funds to be used for such incentives. The alternative is to let the job go to a contractor who will then hire some of the same engineers to work on the project on their "days off". This would work and at least some of the engineers would receive compensation, but it would be much more expensive than just paying small incentives and keeping the task within the department. Costs are a strong concern of the deputy director of planning because he has very little money left in his budget to cover the cost of installation of the water system in over 100 villages.

Another serious problem they have run into is that the electricity authority has surprised them with an estimated cost of over one million pounds to connect the pumps to the electricity grid. In some of the villages slated to receive the pumps they now realize that there is no electricity at all. The Qena BVS budget cannot come close to paying this connection fee or making distant connections for villages without electricity. Unless some elaborate bureaucratic compromise is reached, these pumps will remain as powerless as the villages they are supposed to serve.

Of all the governorates we visited, we found our work in Qena to be the most difficult in spite of the frank and friendly response of all of the officials we met there. The information so frankly and enthusiastically provided was often contradictory from one person to

another, or even from the same person at different times. What did emerge, however, was the dedication and hard work of many of the officials and engineers in Qena, under often difficult situations. They are still searching for the right balance between central planning and local participation, between government implementation and private contracting. So far they seem to lurch from crisis to crisis, but one way or another they will most likely get a fair number of roads built, canals cleaned, and water systems installed. So far the BVS program seems to have reinforced the hierarchical structure of government in Qena rather than have its intended effect of spreading the responsibility, the risks of failure, and the pride of accomplishment out to other levels and locales.