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PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY (PES) - PART I

Report Symbol U-447

1. PROJECT TITLE African Labor Development	2. PROJECT NUMBER 698-0363	3. MISSION/AID/W OFFICE Africa Regional
	4. EVALUATION NUMBER (Enter the number maintained by the reporting unit e.g., Country or AID/W Administrative Code, Fiscal Year, Serial No. beginning with No. 1 each FY): <u>698-83-02</u>	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> REGULAR EVALUATION <input type="checkbox"/> SPECIAL EVALUATION		

5. KEY PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DATES			6. ESTIMATED PROJECT FUNDING		7. PERIOD COVERED BY EVALUATION	
A. First PRO-AG or Equivalent FY <u>71</u>	B. Final Obligation Expected FY <u>83</u>	C. Final Input Delivery FY <u>84</u>	A. Total	\$ <u>30.3 M</u>	From (month/yr.)	<u>N/A</u>
			B. U.S.	\$ <u>30.3 M</u>	To (month/yr.)	
					Date of Evaluation Review	<u>Sept. 1, 1982</u>

8. ACTION DECISIONS APPROVED BY MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE DIRECTOR			
A. List decisions and/or unresolved issues; cite those items needing further study. (NOTE: Mission decisions which anticipate AID/W or regional office action should specify type of document, e.g., airmgram, SPAR, PIQ, which will present detailed request.)		B. NAME OF OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION	C. DATE ACTION TO BE COMPLETED
<p>The attached evaluation documents consist of (1) country-specific evaluations of African-American Labor Center operations in Zaire, Liberia and Senegal, (2) comments on the evaluation by the AALC, and (3) responses to the evaluation by the concerned missions. Because many of the mission-specific findings of the evaluation will be dealt with by USAID and Embassy staffs, AFR/RA will not propose any action.</p> <p>Readers of the attachments should be aware that the AALC and mission's comments refer to an early version of the evaluation; some of the comments have lead to changes in the final version attached.</p> <p>Many of the general recommendations, proposing possible action by AID/W, are subsumed by a planned Agency-wide evaluation sponsored by PPC/E which will address issues raised in the attached evaluation and result in revised project activities and organization. The present project is receiving final funding this FY and a new project start in FY 1984 will have its design impetus from the Agency-wide evaluation. A draft approach to the Agency-wide evaluation is attached.</p>			

9. INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS TO BE REVISED PER ABOVE DECISIONS			10. ALTERNATIVE DECISIONS ON FUTURE OF PROJECT	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Project Paper	<input type="checkbox"/> Implementation Plan e.g., CPI Network	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) <u>new project</u>	<input type="checkbox"/> Continue Project Without Change	
<input type="checkbox"/> Financial Plan	<input type="checkbox"/> PIQ/T	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)	<input type="checkbox"/> Change Project Design and/or	
<input type="checkbox"/> Logical Framework	<input type="checkbox"/> PIQ/C		<input type="checkbox"/> Change Implementation Plan	
<input type="checkbox"/> Project Agreement	<input type="checkbox"/> PIQ/P		<input type="checkbox"/> Discontinue Project	

11. PROJECT OFFICER AND HOST COUNTRY OR OTHER BANKING PARTICIPANTS AS APPROPRIATE (Name and Title)		12. MISSION/AID/W OFFICE Director Approval	
AFR/RA: MDM/had	<i>[Signature]</i>	Signature	<i>[Signature]</i>
AFR/RA: CHU/ste	<i>[Signature]</i>	Typed Name	William H. Taylor,
AFR/RA: Asher/vn	<i>[Signature]</i>	Title	Director, AFR/RA
		Date	<u>10/14/82</u>

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AND DISBURSEMENTS WILL BE PERSONALLY HANDLED AND CLOSELY MONITORED BY THE AALC REP. WE WOULD HOPE THIS CONDITION WOULD BE SUFFICIENT.

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AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

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AID FOR AFR/RA

THIS IS A JOINT AID/STATE CABLE

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: ELAB, LI
SUBJECT: EVALUATION OF AALC PROGRAM IN LIBERIA

REF: (A) STATE 142348, (B) STATE 159222

1. POST REGRETS DELAY IN RESPONSE TO REF A. WE HAVE STUDIED DRAFT EVALUATION OF AALC, CONSIDERED THE EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE INTERAGENCY LABOR COORDINATING COMMITTEE, AND COME UP WITH THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS:
2. RE RECOMMENDATION THAT AALC URGE LIBERIAN FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS (LFLU) TO REDUCE ITS PROFESSIONAL AND CLERICAL STAFF IMMEDIATELY. WE CONCUR WITH THIS RECOMMENDATION. LFLU'S INABILITY TO MEET ITS MONTHLY PAYROLL'S SOME DISSENSION IN THE ORGANIZATION, DEMORALIZES MEMBER UNIONS, FINANCES INTERMEDIATE STRUGGLES OVER MONEY AND INFLUENCE AND DISCREDITS LFLU IN THE EYES OF MEMBER UNIONS. THE STAFF IS NOT ONLY UNREASONABLY LARGE; THE METHOD OF PAYING STAFF IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. OFFICIALS OF MEMBER UNIONS ARE CONSIDERED STAFF AND PAID FROM A COMMON FUND TO WHICH MEMBER UNIONS CONTRIBUTE 50 PER CENT OF DUES. THIS MEANS VIABLE UNIONS ARE SUBSIDIZING BANKRUPT ONES. RESENTMENT OF THIS FACT HAS BEEN A FACTOR IN THE DECISION OF SOME MEMBER UNIONS TO REDUCE OR CEASE ENTIRELY PAYING DUES TO LFLU.

3. RE RECOMMENDATION THAT AALC URGE THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF LFLU TO HAVE AN INDEPENDENT AUDIT. WE CONCUR. LFLU'S BOOKS ARE REPORTEDLY POORLY KEPT, ACCOUNTABILITY IS NOT CLEARLY DEFINED, AND ALLEGATIONS OF FINANCIAL IMPROPRIETY BOTH FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE ORGANIZATION CREATE DIVISIVENESS AND GAP LFLU'S EFFECTIVENESS. WE WOULD HOPE AN AUDIT WOULD BE THE DEPARTURE POINT FOR A REFORM OF LFLU'S FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND PRACTICES.

4. RE RECOMMENDATION THAT AALC AND AID IN CONSULTATION WITH THE POST'S LABOR COMMITTEE DETERMINE WHAT IF ANY ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE IMMEDIATELY GIVEN TO LFLU; WE DO NOT FEEL FURTHER TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IS WARRANTED AT THIS TIME, OR UNTIL LFLU GETS ITS OWN HOUSE IN ORDER.

5. RE RECOMMENDATION THAT AALC AND AID IN CONSULTATION WITH THE POST'S LABOR COMMITTEE DETERMINE UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS PROGRAM FUNDS WILL BE RELEASED TO LFLU TO AVOID FUTURE DIVERSION TO OPERATING EXPENSES. WE AGREE WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING FUTURE DIVERSION AND WE NOTE AALC REP DON JONES HAS STATED THAT INDIVIDUAL BUDGETS WILL BE PREPARED FOR AALC ACTIVITIES SUCH AS SEMINARS --

6. RE RECOMMENDATION THAT AALC AND AID IN CONSULTATION WITH THE POST'S LABOR COMMITTEE BEGIN TO STUDY PROGRAM AND CLIENT ALTERNATIVES IN LIBERIA. WE CONCUR. LFLU'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND EXTERNAL CHALLENGES LEAD US TO QUESTION ITS FUTURE VIABILITY WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT REFORM. U.S. MISSION POLICY AT THIS POST IS TO MAINTAIN CONTACTS WITH THE FULL SPECTRUM OF RESPONSIBLE LABOR LEADERS REGARDLESS OF LFLU MEMBERSHIP OR NONAFFILIATION. WE WOULD HOPE AALC COULD HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO IDENTIFY AND WORK WITH THE MOST PROMISING ACTORS IN THE LABOR SCENE. WE NOTE AALC'S TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT WITH GOL AND LFLU SPECIFICALLY TIES IT TO LFLU. WE ARE MAKING THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT A SUBJECT OF OUR NEXT LABOR COMMITTEE MEETING. (IR: AALC REP JONES DOES NOT CONCUR WITH THIS RECOMMENDATION.

7. WE LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING THE FINAL EVALUATION REPORT AND WISH TO EXPRESS OUR APPRECIATION FOR THE THOUGHTFUL AND DEDICATED MANNER IN WHICH THE EVALUATION FIELD WORK AND REPORT WAS AND IS BEING ACCOMPLISHED. SWING

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FOR AFR/RA JEANNETTE B. CARSON

E. O. 12865
SUBJ: AALC EVALUATION 1982: SENEGAL
REF: CARSON MEMO OF APRIL 22, 1982

MISSION HAS REVIEWED DRAFT EVALUATION REPORT OF AALC ACTIVITIES IN SENEGAL. WHILE WE HAVE NO OBJECTIONS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SENEGAL, WE BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IN PREPARING THE FINAL REPORT:

-- IT SHOULD BE CLEARLY STATED AT THE OUTSET THAT THE AALC REPRESENTATIVE IS REGIONAL AND THAT HE DIVIDES HIS TIME AMONG APPROXIMATELY EIGHT COUNTRIES. WHILE IT IS TECHNICALLY CORRECT TO SAY THAT THERE IS NO BILATERAL PROGRAM, 'ACTIVE' OR OTHERWISE, EARMARKED FOR SENEGAL, IT SHOULD BE ADDED THAT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF ITS OPERATIONS THE AALC OFFICE IN DAKAR CONTINUES TO SPONSOR WORKER EDUCATION SEMINARS IN SENEGAL AS IT HAS IN THE PAST.

-- THE REPORT'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE SENEGALESE NATIONAL TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION CNTS AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST IN IT IS DATED. AT THE TIME OF THE EVALUATION TEAM'S VISIT IN LATE FEBRUARY THE CNTS WAS LARGELY DEADLOCKED BY AN INTERNAL STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNION MOVEMENT WHICH TENDED TO PREEMPT THE TIME AND ENERGIES OF ITS LEADERS. WITH THE CONCLUSION OF ITS QUADRENNIAL CONGRESS IN APRIL THIS STRUGGLE WITHIN THE CNTS IS LARGELY RESOLVED. THE NEW HEAD OF THE CNTS, QUICK TO PROCLAIM HIS MEMBERSHIP IN THE RULING SOCIALIST PARTY, WAS NONETHELESS ELECTED BY THE MEMBERSHIP ON THE EXPECTATION THAT HE WOULD DEFEND THE RIGHTS OF WORKERS MORE VIGOROUSLY THAN HIS PREDECESSOR. THE EFFECTS OF THIS CHANGE CAN ALREADY BE SEEN IN RECENT STRIKES BY BUS DRIVERS AND ELECTRICAL WORKERS. TRADE UNION ACTIVITY HAS NEVER BEEN OF 'MINIMAL' INTEREST TO THE EMBASSY, AND ASSUMES EVEN GREATER IMPORTANCE TODAY. ON THE SENEGALESE SIDE THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THE STATEMENT THAT THE CNTS HAS 'LITTLE INTEREST' IN WORKER EDUCATION AND GROWTH. CNTS LEADERS PAST AND PRESENT HAVE ALWAYS BEEN VERY INTERESTED IN U.S. GOVERNMENT AND AALC TRAINING PROGRAMS AND ASSISTANCE.

-- THE REPORT MISREPRESENTS THE AALC REPRESENTATIVE'S RELATIONS WITH THE EMBASSY AND USAID. THE AALC REPRESENTATIVE HAS ESTABLISHED CONTACTS BEYOND THE 'HODDING' STAGE WITH A LARGE NUMBER OF EMBASSY AND USAID MISSION OFFICERS INCLUDING ALL THE EMBASSY PROGRAM OFFICERS AND USAID'S TOP LEADERSHIP. HE MAINTAINS FREQUENT CONTACTS WITH THE EMBASSY'S LABOR OFFICER. THE REPORT OVERDRAMATIZES AN EVENT WHICH OCCURED DURING ONE OF THE BRIEFINGS AND CONTRIBUTES TO THIS MISLEADING IMPRESSION.

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FOR AFR/RA

E.O. 12958: N/A
SUBJECT: AALC EVALUATION (ZAIRE), 698-0363

REF: STATE 148348

1. MISSION COMMENTS ON SUBJECT DRAFT REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS FOLLOWS:

- A. QUOTE THAT AID/W ENCOURAGE USAID DIRECTOR TO DEVELOP HIS PLAN FOR JOINT PROGRAMMING OF USAID UNTZA AND AALC. THAT AID DISCUSS THIS VENTURE WITH AALC/WASHINGTON UNQUOTE. COMMENT: USAID FORMALLY REVIEWS THE AALC'S ANNUAL PROJECT PROPOSAL DOCUMENT. THE MISSION NOTES THAT THE AALC PROGRAM PRIMARILY SERVES POLITICAL ENDS AND DOES NOT MEET USAID PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT CRITERIA. HOWEVER, USAID BELIEVES THAT TO THE EXTENT AALC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ARE FUNDED BY AID, WE SHOULD, AT A MINIMUM, MAINTAIN REVIEW, APPROVAL AND MONITORING RESPONSIBILITIES. (IN THIS REGARD, AALC DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES SHOULD FIT WITH IN THE COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY). THE EMBASSY MONITORS THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF AALC'S PROGRAM.

- B. QUOTE THAT AID RECONSIDER ITS (AALC) PROGRAM SUPPORT FOR ZAIRE IN CONSULTATION WITH USAID AND EMBASSY KINSHASA UNQUOTE. COMMENT: THIS RECOMMENDATION IS LINKED TO (A) ABOVE. TO THE EXTENT THAT AALC PROJECTS AND ACTIVITIES SERVE AS AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT VEHICLE, AID SHOULD MAINTAIN ITS SUPPORT TO SUCH PROJECTS AND ACTIVITIES. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT SUCH DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES MUST CONFORM, AT LEAST MINIMALLY, TO AID PROGRAMMING CRITERIA.

- C. QUOTE EMBASSY, USAID AND AALC EXAMINE THE PROS AND CONS OF ESTABLISHMENT OF A LABOR COORDINATING COMMITTEE AT POST AFTER THE LIBERIA MODEL UNQUOTE. COMMENT: MISSION IS GIVING DUE CONSIDERATION TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH A COMMITTEE.

- D. QUOTE THAT USAID KINSHASA DESIGNATE AN OFFICER AS LIAISON TO UNTZA AND AALC UNQUOTE. COMMENT: THE USAID PROGRAM OFFICER IS THE DE FACTO LIAISON OFFICER FOR LABOR PROGRAM RELATED MATTERS. THE USAID HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT ADVISOR COORDINATES WITH THE EMBASSY, AALC, AND UNTZA ON LABOR-RELATED TRAINING PROGRAMS. BOTH INDIVIDUALS COULD REPRESENT USAID ON THE LABOR COORDINATING COMMITTEE MENTIONED IN (C) ABOVE.

- E. QUOTE THAT IN THE EVENT UNTZA DOES NOT LAUNCH ITS NEW COOPERATIVE PROGRAM WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR, THAT AALC IN COORDINATION WITH AID DISCONTINUE THE MAINTENANCE OF

A FULL-TIME REPRESENTATIVE IN KINSHASA UNQUOTE. COMMENT: THE PRESENCE OF THE FULL-TIME AALC REPRESENTATIVE IN ZAIRE SHOULD NOT BE CONTINGENT UPON ANY SINGLE FACTOR. GIVEN THAT PAST EXPERIENCE WITH COOPERATIVES IN ZAIRE HAS BEEN TROUBLESOME AT BEST, MISSION DOUBTS THAT A SUCCESSFUL COOPERATIVE PROGRAM WILL BE IN PLACE WITHIN FY 1983. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT AALC PRESENCE SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN LIGHT OF ITS CURRENT AND FUTURE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. A MAJOR REVIEW WILL BE UNDERTAKEN WHEN THE FY 83 PROGRAM PROPOSAL IS PRESENTED FOR USAID REVIEW IN THE FALL.

2. AS A FOOTNOTE RE PAGE 13 OF THE DRAFT REPORT, PLEASE NOTE THAT CASOP IS NOT REPEAT NOT THE MOST EFFECTIVE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM AVAILABLE TO WORKERS AND PEASANTS IN ZAIRE. THE RELIGIOUS MISSIONARY NETWORK PROVIDES THE BEST HEALTH CARE SYSTEM IN ZAIRE. SUGGEST EDITORIAL CHANGE TO READ QUOTE... UNTZA IS AN EFFECTIVE... UNQUOTE. MCHAMARA

Carson

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EVALUATION

AFRICAN AMERICAN LABOR CENTER

FIELD PROGRAMS

• • • ZAIRE • LIBERIA • SENEGAL • • •

FEBRUARY, 1982

Prepared for the Agency for International Development
by CHARLES A. JAMES

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EVALUATION OF AFRICAN AMERICAN LABOR CENTER PROGRAMS

PREFACE

The Agency for International Development (AID) initiated its support of African American Labor Center (AALC) African programs in 1966. In 1971, AID and AALC agreed that there should be annual evaluations of the programs with the objective of an evaluation for each country program every three years. The first evaluation occurred in 1972. This report is the product of the latest evaluation undertaken in February and March, 1982.

In accordance with the agreement between AID and AALC the team consisted of an outside consultant provided by AID and a senior staff member of AALC. The agreement provided that the third member of the team should be an independent labor expert, however, in this instance, the AID or Embassy officer responsible for liaison with AALC in Zaire, Liberia and Senegal respectively, became the third man. The AID consultant and chief of party was Charles A. James. AALC provided Dr. George Martens, Chief of AALC African programs and a scholar of the African labor movement. In all three countries visited, the Embassy supplied the third member of the team.

The team acknowledges with grateful appreciation, the extraordinary cooperation and support that was provided by AID, Embassy and AALC personnel in the three countries visited.

SUMMARY

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The African American Labor Center (AALC), as an arm of AFL/CIO is dedicated to the building of free, democratic, strong and self-reliant trade unions in Africa. AALC considers its independence from U.S. Government policies and control essential to the maintenance of its "union to union" relationship and the achievement of its ultimate goals.

The Agency for International Development (AID) is charged with the installation of the development process. In order to determine whether or not it has successfully grafted the development process onto a political, social and economic corpus, AID must constantly monitor, measure and sometimes magnify its efforts.

AID and AALC have different priorities although the ultimate goals are not incompatible. The measure of success for AALC in a country program may be totally unrelated to AID's development objectives. Economic Development is not the first priority of AALC. "Presence and relationships" are its immediate objectives.

AID must measure success in terms of development. Current philosophy requires all projects to bear upon or support economic development processes or objectives more or less

directly. AID is motivated to initiate a process which will continue no matter what political changes or interventions may occur.

AALC is uncomfortable with AID's insistence on measurements of project success and feels that AID does not understand the mission of AALC.

Embassies tend to have closer rapport with AALC than USAID in the field. Political trends and personalities dominate Embassy interests and such trends and personalities have an impact on AALC activities and interests.

Each of the Ambassadors in the countries reviewed would recommend the continuance of AALC programs. Senegal could be less interested inasmuch as there are no bilateral programs in existence there.

Each of the USAID directors supports the continuance of AALC programs and in one instance, the director felt that the freedom of the AALC representative from bureaucratic constraints of a USAID mission, had very special value and could be useful to all parties.

The AALC activities with the national union of Zaire are development related. In addition, these activities demonstrated a potential for the national union as an instrument of development in Zaire which USAID may utilize more directly.

On the other hand, there were no activities of significant economic development consequence in Liberia or Senegal.

The disparity of "activities" among the three countries examined suggests that a more intense examination of a greater number of the AID/AALC activities should be undertaken in at least one third to one half of the countries in Africa.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

1. AID and AALC commission an independent evaluation of AID-supported AALC activities in at least one half of the African countries ;
2. AID and AALC re-examine support of the Liberian program in consultation with the Labor Coordinating Committee of the Embassy/AID/AALC;
3. Africa Bureau of AID and AALC of AFL/CIO recommend that the principals undertake a critical assessment of the relationship between AID and AFL/CIO in the joint implementation of programs and activities in the Third World;
4. AID and AALC carefully examine the possibility of decentralization of the activities funded by AID.

5. AID and AALC endorse the Labor Coordinating Committee concept in Liberia and monitor its effectiveness in coordination with the U.S. Department of State.

6. AID, AALC and the U.S. Department of State establish closer working relationship in Washington dealing with labor affairs in Africa and the backstopping of field activities.

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

The African American Labor Center (AALC) is the AFL/CIO extension in Africa. There are counterpart organizations in Asia and Latin America (AFELD and AFLI). These organizations were established to strengthen the fraternal ties with the international trade union movement, specifically between AFL/CIO and unions in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In addition, AALC provides technical assistance to the unions with which it works in approximately fourteen countries in Africa. The Agency for International Development provides approximately 90 percent of the funds for the assistance programs that are implemented by AALC. The rationale for AID support is derived from the development nature of AALC programs. Actually, these programs place a heavy emphasis on trade union education and leadership but are often oriented to the physical and social welfare of the members and their families.

These programs are not a part of AID's country strategy and are not programmed or budgeted by its country missions, but are funded through its regional offices in Washington. The mission director for AID is required to concur in

AALC's Country budget prior to final approval and funding by AID/Washington.

AID and AALC have agreed to the regular evaluation of these programs to determine if they assist AALC to move towards its goals and objectives. In addition, AID wants to know if the programs that have been funded fit within the overall development strategy for the country and the AID mission.

Originally, five programs in Zaire, Togo, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Senegal were selected for evaluation. Three countries were eliminated. Two, Sierra Leone and Ghana were abandoned because of serious internal political problems involving the trade unions. The third, Togo, which is the site of AALC's Crede publications program was eliminated at the request of AALC. Finally, Zaire, Liberia and Senegal were selected for evaluation. Each country presented a distinct pattern of trade union activity and the AALC relationship to that pattern. In addition, each of the three countries provided a unique perspective of the relationship among the Embassy, AID and AALC.

THREE MISSIONS

A significant factor in AALC operations in the countries visited (and it is suspected in all countries where there is AALC presence), is the nature and style of the relationship which exists among the Embassy, AID and AALC. Of equal significance is the difference of perception by each entity of that relationship and the role and mission of AALC. Analysis of these perceptions and the extent to which they differ from each other reveals some variations on a theme. The single theme in all three of the countries visited was the clear distinction and the unique separateness of these missions.

EMBASSY

The principal mission of the Embassy is to maintain an appropriate diplomatic relationship and to analyze and report the political, economic, social events and trends which may have an impact on that relationship, or U.S. international or domestic affairs. The Ambassador will recommend policy direction or changes as appropriate to the situation. In addition, the President charges each Ambassador in the most explicit terms with supervisory responsibility for every program of United States origin that exists in the country to which the Ambassador is accredited.

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AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AID)

"Development" is AID's chief reason for existence. AID is the steward of United States' foreign assistance and administers the development funds which the Congress carefully appropriates.

AID is dedicated to the conceptualization and implementation of development programs within the context of a country's development objectives as well as its political, economic and social environment. AID has been known to argue for the maintenance of its programs and projects in a country even though political and diplomatic relationships with the United States were severely strained. AID will not easily concede to termination of development programs unless a "development climate" which will support and nourish the development process no longer exists.

AFRICAN AMERICAN LABOR CENTER (AALC)

AALC's GENERAL POLICY GUIDELINES describes its "goal" as follows:

"THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN LABOR CENTER SEEKS THE DEVELOPMENT OF FREE, DEMOCRATIC, SELF-SUFFICIENT, RESPONSIBLE, AND EFFECTIVE

TRADE UNIONS IN AFRICA, ENABLING THEM TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROCESSES AND BENEFITS OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT." (AALC Management Manual, section 1-01.01, 1978)

"Free:

In the context of our goals and operations, 'free' indicates unions which are relatively autonomous, and whose policies are not decided by government or any other outside organization or person (such as a political party or an employer)."

Few, if any, African trade unions are entirely devoid of such outside influence or control (even if one does not count the limitations imposed by legislation). 'Free' must therefore be assessed in each situation in the light of past traditions and the prevailing political and economic climate. What is relatively 'free' in one country may be relatively 'controlled' in another though, objectively, the situations may be comparable." (AALC Management Manual section 1-02.01)

"Democratic:

In this context we are referring to the procedural systems of the unions, and not to those of the country as a whole.

'Democratic' indicates those unions where the members have a voice in the adoption of union policy and in the election of their leaders."

"There are degrees of membership participation (which can be steps toward a practical working democracy) for a developing trade union which might be considered 'non-democratic' in a situation where membership participation is a long honored tradition."

"It is necessary to assess each union the(sic) the light of its own past and its current political and economic realities before deciding that it is, or is not, 'democratic'. Perhaps it is moving in the direction of democracy."

AALC believes that the goal of free and democratic trade

unions which are strong, self-reliant and self-supporting, can best be accomplished through the maintenance of a constant "presence". The programs funded by AID are helpful as a medium for the maintenance of that "presence".

The State Department, through its embassies abroad, focusses on the sweep of United States interests abroad and tends to perceive United States' relations and activities in other countries in political terms. AALC activities are perceived as a valuable political resource serving the interests of the United States.

AID's focus is developmental and to the extent that AALC activities abroad fit AID's concept of development, its posts abroad (USAIDs) are likely to be actively interested. Conversely, to the extent that these activities do not fit within the AID's development mold, its missions tend to have little interest or involvement. However, AID missions are not likely to include AALC programs and budgets in country planning since these budgets and programs are not subject to Mission control.

AALC preserves a sharp focus on its mission of union to union fraternal alliances and its activities are carefully described as "activities" as opposed to "projects". These "activities" are AALC's means to pursue its objectives. Economic development is not the primary mission

of AALC. Its mission is the promotion of trade unionism in Africa which it describes as "institutional development". AALC's implementation of its "institutional development" objectives is not usually in direct conflict with AID's country programs but often the two programs are not mutually supportive.

With respect to the Embassy's political focus, AALC maintains a weather eye not only on the political trends within the Third World trade unionism but also in the U.S. Government as represented by the Department of State and the Embassies. It reserves to itself the right to adopt policy positions at variance with those of the U.S. Government. In its overt stance in the international trade union movement, AALC makes a sincere effort to establish a separate identity in order to convince the unions with which it works that AALC and AFL/CIO are independent of United States policy direction and control. Section 4.04 et seq. of the Management Manual and Policy Guidelines published in 1978, describes the relationship between AALC and the United States Government as follows:

4.04 "The United States Government and its Agencies:

4.04.01 The AALC is an independent voluntary organization and as such is independent of the U.S. Government's policy. It will continue to

maintain that autonomy in the future.

The AFL-CIO has historically maintained a 'foreign policy' which has sometimes been at variance with that of the U.S. Government. As an instrument of AFL-CIO the AALC may sometimes find itself supporting views which are quite different from the U.S. Government position.

4.04.02 The basic enabling legislation of the AID program specifically calls for the encouragement of viable industrial relations as an integral part of any program of economic assistance to a Developing Country. In this area the AFL-CIO and the U.S. Government policies clearly concur. This concurrence forms the basis of annual AID grants which are given to the AALC to carry out, on AALC terms and under independent AALC management, programs of assistance to the African trade unions.

4.04.03 In carrying out its program, the AALC keeps the U.S. Government informed of the broad outlines of its actions. It neither asks for nor receives field support, and jealously guards its position as an independent organization."

ZAIRE

BACKGROUND

The trade union movement has existed in Zaire more or less in its present form since World War II. However, in 1967, as the MPR Party formed, the NSELE MANIFESTO, which gave life to the Party, gave birth to Union Nationale Des Travailleurs Du Zaire (UNTZA), unequivocally emphasizing the subordinate relationship of the trade union to the Party. The Chief of UNTZA, the Executive Secretary, occupies a seat on the Executive Board of the Party by virtue of his position with the Union. In Zaire, the Party and therefore the Government, creates the Union and permits it to live. Except for individual lapses into illicit or illegal activity for private gain, union officials faithfully refrain from any action that would appear hostile to the Party or the Government.

Strikes are not approved by the Government. Strikes do occur, but they are never led or instigated by the Union officially. To all appearances they are always "wildcat" strikes which the unions then try to settle through mediation.

Collective bargaining does not have the same character in Zaire as it does in the United States, but there is

bargaining and an acceptance of the worker's right to complain about certain working conditions. These complaints are voiced through the shop steward to the personnel officer of the company and perhaps to higher authorities.

Checkoff of union dues is prescribed by law.

To all appearances, the national union is strong and capable of self-sufficiency although its political origins and subservience make it more of a political institution than is envisaged by the goals of AFL/CIO and its subsidiary, African American Labor Center.

On the other hand, the national union is democratically run complete with all the accusations of election chicanery that is so often found in "democratically run" bodies.

UNTZA PRACTICE and AALC GOALS

UNTZA is the largest, and appears to be the best organized and run of the unions that the team observed. However, when UNTZA is examined within the definition of the AALC goal, it falls somewhat short. The question arises whether or not the goal is realistic for Zaire and possibly for other African countries, considering the nature of the politics, economics and social ferment as well as the traditions of Zaire or other African nations. Should AALC redefine its goal which by its own realistic assessment is unattainable, or is there a reasonable standard against which AALC's

"relativity test" can be applied?

The policies of Zaire limit the freedom and the self-sufficiency of LNTZa. The Party has defined LNTZa's mission and expressly prohibited any activity which the Party deems contradictory.

The ultimate expression of independence and self-sufficiency in a trade union is its capacity to engage in serious collective bargaining, with the option to lead its members on strike, in the event the negotiations break down. The Government does not like strikes. The unions do not strike.

There is no evidence that either the union leadership or the members question that policy or have any expectation that the unions should question the policy.

In February, 1982, the teachers of Zaire went on strike and every school was closed including the University. LNTZa officials told the evaluation team that they did not know what the teachers were demanding nor could they identify the leaders or spokespersons for the teachers. The teachers were still on strike at the time the evaluation team left the country.

The role that the union has reserved for itself is that of mediator. When a strike occurs, the union determines the demands that are being made by the strikers and then

attempts to bring about an amicable settlement of the disagreement. No one admits to the existence of an organized and identifiable body providing the leadership for the strike action and the medium for identification and negotiation of demands.

Secretary-General Kombo the recently elected chief of UNTZA states the situation succinctly:

"Trade Unions are different here
than they are in the United States"

Despite the practice and the policy, the charter of UNTZA contains a statement that its strength is based upon the rights of liberty, movement and strike as guaranteed by the constitution of the Republic of Zaire. Article 20 of the charter provides that the executive committee of the UNTZA would have the authority to settle either general or partial strikes.

UNTZA GOALS, AALC ACTIVITIES, and AID SUPPORT

The charter of the UNTZA emphasizes the need to accelerate progress toward achievement of economic and social gains for its members and the protection of the rights of workers. In contrast, AFL/CIO does not focus solely on economic and social gains but has a broader perspective.

AALC in its policy guidelines quotes Samuel Gompers in this respect:

"I do not value the labor movement only for its ability to give higher wages, better clothes and better homes. Its ultimate goal is to be found in the progressively evolving life possibilities for those who work and in its devotion to advancing the basic idea of freedom for all people everywhere."

LNTZa has instituted activities designed to advance the social and economic well-being of its workers and their families. The activities have been designed, and/or implemented with the support of AALC using AID funds. The pattern of AID contributions to AALC designed programs arose out of a Congressional requirement that economic assistance programs to developing countries should be accompanied by the promotion of viable industrial

relations. The focal point of mutuality among the two union organizations and AID is often blurred by their separate and distinct missions and the jealously guarded identities.

As mentioned above, AALC is more protective of its identity and less secure in its autonomy than AID, an embassy or in certain respects, even UNTZA, or other African Trade unions encountered during the evaluation. This sensitivity is understandable, simply because AALC does not enjoy the autonomy that it desires, in fact has decreed, for itself, and more importantly, the veil of independence does not conceal the facts from African trade unionists. It is important to AALC that it function on a "union to union" basis with its African counterparts and that it function

"independent of the U.S. Government's policy." The provision of funds by AID for the programs that are basic to the goals of UNTZA renders the veil somewhat transparent, particularly to African eyes. When added to the shadow of the omnipresent Embassy discharging its responsibilities, the image of the U.S. Government is inescapable. Furthermore, every Agency functioning at Post with U.S. funds, is or should be under the scrutiny of the Ambassador if he is to faithfully discharge the responsibility which has been expressly detailed to him by the President of the United States.

AALC AND UNTZa ACTIVITIES

ORGANIZATION FOR THE UNITY OF WORKERS AND FARMERS

CAISSE DE SOLIDARITE OUVRIERE ET PAYSANNE (CASCP)

This is the showpiece of AALC supported activities in the countries visited. CASCP, which is the primary health care service of UNTZa, is one of the most effective health care systems available to workers and peasants in Zaire. The support of the government not only lends credibility to the program but has, no doubt, facilitated the expansion of CASCP services to almost every region of the country.

Most of the equipment at the clinic in Kinshasha appeared to be in working order and modern enough to deal with the health problems confronting the dispensary. There were adequate medicines and supplies on hand, not only to support the outpatient service at the clinic, but also to be dispatched to rural areas. The director told the team that the bulging warehouse contained the largest supply of medicine in one location in the whole of Zaire. Most of stock was contraceptive or designed for preventive health care. CASCP Director, Kila, explained that the health care of CASCP focuses upon the eight most common illnesses or diseases in Zaire, with an emphasis on prevention. The pharmaceuticals are procured for that purpose.

Extensive training of workers and clientele has been conducted by the director and his assistants, in each of

the regions where the 20 clinics are located.

CASOP appears to be an unique institution in Zaire. First of all, there does not seem to be a comparable institution with as extensive a network of health delivery clinics as CASOP. The director stated that there was no stock of medicines or medical supplies in Zaire equal to that held by CASOP. The Government's support of CASOP suggests a realistic assessment, not only of the potential political strength of the union, but also of the political and economic value of both the human and institutional resources offered by UNTZa and especially CASOP.

AALC will discontinue assistance to CASOP this year. The system is well-established. The technicians appear competent and the professional service, skilled and dedicated.

ZAIRE INSTITUTE FOR LABOR STUDIES L'INSTITUT
SUPERIEUR D'ETUDES SYNDICALES (IDES))

IDES was established to provide a four year evening program of higher level studies for top cadre trade unionists who do not have an opportunity to attend a traditional university. Although the curriculum focusses upon labor law, rights of workers, and other subjects of trade union interest, it does embrace more academic material of broader appeal.

The program is currently in its third year of operation, with a faculty consisting of University professors, as well as trade unionists, designed for an optimum mix of theory and practice. IDES is attempting to obtain official accreditation of the Institute as a "university-equivalent educational institution", or a "People's University".

In addition, IDES leaders hope to expand the usefulness of the Institute by establishing short-term intensive courses of three to four months duration. It is contemplated that the installation of such courses would make IDES an attractive international institution of higher trade union education. Neighboring African countries, have already demonstrated interest in sending their trade unionist students to such courses.

The principal problems are finance and transport for the students. AALC provides money for professors' salaries and for books. UNTZA supplements AALC financial support. The financial and technical assistance provided by AALC, and made possible through AID support, were essential to the creation of IDES. IDES could not continue to exist without the payment of salaries and costs of books by AALC. While AALC is attempting to induce UNTZA to assume this financial responsibility as soon as possible, there is still considerable uncertainty about it and when UNTZA will pick up IDES' operating costs.

OFFICE OF WOMEN'S AFFAIRS (BUREAU POUR LES PROBLEMES
FEMININ(BUPROF))

BUPROF and women's programs appeared to have been relegated to second-class status until recently. Citoyen Korbo, the Secretary-General of UNTZA elevated BUPROF to the level of a federation and its able leader, Citoyenne Maudi, to new status as a member of the Executive Committee of UNTZA, immediately after his election as Secretary-General, November, 1981.

BUPROF's maternal child-health program was inaugurated in January, 1982. Although it is too early to assess the results of the program and its ultimate effect, there seems to be little question about the benefits and limitations. During the team's visit to the newly opened facility, approximately 25 mothers and babies were present. Children were weighed and examined, and mothers were instructed in the basics of nutrition, food preparation and healthful practices.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

STATE OF THE UNION

The trade union movement in Zaire as represented by Union Nationale Des Travailleurs Du Zaire is strong and healthy within the special limitations determined by its political environment.

UNTZA is well organized and appears to be well managed and its officers are elected through a democratic process.

UNTZA was created and shaped by the official political party of Zaire. Its functions and limitations are prescribed by either Party policies or by decree.

It is not likely to function as a free institution within ALC's definition of "free".

The strongest feature of UNTZA is its capacity to administer strong social service programs such as the health program under CASCP, the maternal/child health program of BUPROF which is fairly new and the ambitious but serious four year program of higher education by IDES.

The most important value of UNTZA may be its strong institutional foundation and the utilization of the union network and experience as a base for expanding social

services throughout Zaire.

The trade union movement is much less impressive as an agent for effective collective bargaining, than it is as a source of social services.

UNTZA's effectiveness as a national union is not likely to increase substantially in the context of the traditions and policies of Zaire.

The programs that are supported by AALC and AID appear to be self-sufficient with effective UNTZA leadership and are not now in need of continuous technical assistance.

UNTZA will need technical assistance for the cooperative program that it plans to renew. The current AALC Representative is well qualified to provide that assistance. His recent transfer to Kinshasha anticipated UNTZA's need for his credit union/cooperative expertise.

EMBASSY, USAID AND AALC

An Embassy labor reporting officer from the political section is assigned as liaison with the African American Labor Center Office. He monitors the program closely. In addition, the Ambassador and other elements within the Embassy are most effective in utilizing all resources to establish close working relations with the new leadership

of UNTZA.

Although USAID has no officer formally assigned as AALC liaison, there is considerable contact between AID officers and the AALC Representative. These contacts are usually at the instigation of the AALC Rep. who visits offices in USAID (usually the Director of Human Resources) and the Embassy. The Director of Human Resources is not only very knowledgeable about AALC programs, he has an active interest in the programs because of their similarity or identity to those projects and programs in his area of responsibility.

The USAID Director believes that USAID has not been sufficiently attentive to AALC. He envisions USAID programming opportunities utilizing the resources of UNTZA and its diverse social service components.

Creative programming which maximizes use of indigenous resources or institutions could well become a model for the establishment of meaningful relationships between USAIDs and AALC missions around the world. However, the greater intimacy implicit in a more "meaningful relationship" with USAID risks compromise of AALC's dedicated struggle to maintain purity of its "union to union" relationship and the sanctity of its independence.

This risk must be weighed against the advantages presented by the potential for revitalization of programs and the

possible preservation of AALC's "presence" beyond the legitimate requirements of present day programs.

USAID and Embassy officers are divided on the necessity to maintain a full time AALC Representative in Kinshasha. There was no one who felt that the program should be discontinued.

Some officers felt that programs (or "activities") such as those administered by AALC should be in the name of AFL/CIO and that AALC should rid itself of its dichotomous existence as an independent entity while so dependent upon AID resources. Many agreed that there is value in the autonomy of AALC but there were others who felt that AALC could not insist on autonomy while receiving money from AID for its programs and activities. There were some who could not see the relevance of AALC programs to AID's development strategies in Zaire. Others felt that the activities were insignificant in the total development environment of Zaire.

The administration of the CASCOP, BURPROF and IDES is in very capable hands and are among some of the most impressive activities witnessed.

LNTZa has a sound organizational and administrative base which could well serve to expand development activities in Zaire.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

1. Embassy, USAID and AALC examine the pros and cons of establishment of a Labor Coordinating Committee at field posts after the Liberia model;
2. AID/Washington encourage the USAID Director to develop his plan for joint programming of USAID, UNTZA and AALC, and that AID/Washington explore this with AALC;
3. In the event UNTZA does not launch its new cooperative program within the next year, that AALC, in coordination with AID, discontinue the maintenance of a full time representative in Kinshasha;
4. AID reconsider the nature and extent of its support for the Zaire program in consultation with USAID and Embassy, Kinshasha;
5. USAID, Kinshasha designate an officer as liaison to UNTZA and AALC.

LIBERIA

BACKGROUND

The labor movement in Liberia has been described as having been disorganized and weakened by dissension and rivalry, which inhibited the development of effective trade unionism. In early 1980, the two rival national unions, the United Workers Congress and the Liberian Federation of Trade Unions, (LFLU), merged. This occurred as a result of significant effort on the part of AALC to overcome the conflict which has seriously inhibited the growth of strong unions. The new organization became the Liberian Federation of Labour Unions. At best, this merger has been shaky.

In 1980, an agreement was signed by the Government of Liberia, LFLU and AALC for the provision of bilateral support by AALC and the "secondment of technical advisors to the L.F.L.U." The agreement, among other things, specifically provided for the establishment of literacy training programs, assistance in the development of an administrative cadre and trade union education for the officers and members. LFLU was limited by its structure, lack of money, and a deficient operational base. AALC set about to correct those deficiencies. In addition, in 1980, AALC established an "Impact Activity" to fund an organization of agricultural workers after Government policy was modified to permit the unionization of the

plantations.

In anticipation of the arrival of the evaluation team, the Post's U.S. MISSION APPRAISAL/POLICY REVIEW Committee reviewed the AALC program in Liberia. The Committee was led by the Deputy Chief of Mission and consisted of the AID Program Officer, AID's AALC Liaison Officer, and the Embassy Labor Reporting Officer. The Committee, whose report was limited to the year 1981, took special note of the "valuable input" of the AALC Representative.

AALC ACTIVITIES

The activities of AALC in support of LFLU are quite different in Liberia from those in Zaire. There are few, if any, of the social service programs in existence in the Liberia movement. There is little basis for comparison of the two programs because each has a different genesis, history, financial support and political and social environment. The U.S. Mission Committee noted three major goals of the AALC program for 1981:

- (A) Consolidation of 1980 merger between two previously rival labor union federations;
- (B) Assisting in organizing of agricultural workers;
- (C) Improving internal administration in member unions and in the Liberian Federation of Labor Unions (LFLU)."

The Committee found that there had been limited progress toward achievement of these goals, noting the rising unemployment and degenerating economic conditions as the limiting conditions. In addition, the former Minister of Labor agitated labor unrest and friction between labor and management. Declining union membership, dwindling dues, and poor physical facilities compounded the difficulties.

The evaluation team conferred with all elements in the U.S. Mission including the Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, the USAID Mission Director and the economic and political officers from the Embassy, as well as the program officer from USAID. On the Liberian side, the team met and travelled with the principal officers of LFLU. The team visited a plantation with which an LFLU union was negotiating, and a bank that had been the elusive target of organization efforts. The team's observations and interviews tended to confirm the findings of the Mission Policy/Appraisal Review Committee. However, there are additional considerations that require examination.

EMBASSY, AID AND AALC RELATIONSHIP

The tripartite nature of this relationship is as evident in Liberia as it is in Zaire. The pattern of association is roughly the same. The Ambassador and Embassy maintain an active interest in AALC's union clients and program. This interest is motivated by the Embassy's view of the

importance of labor in the Liberian political and economic environment.

The USAID Director feels that when AID funds are expended within the geographic area of his responsibility, he has an obligation to monitor the programs and the expenditures. Nevertheless, AID's involvement was more in the nature of detached observer rather than responsible overseer.

AALC pursues its program with restraint and discretion. The AALC Representative maintains close contact with the trade union movement, as represented by the LFLU, and keeps its distance from ideological and/or political opposites in the movement. So far, AALC has resisted Embassy suggestions that its trade union contacts in Liberia should be broadened. As in Zaire, AALC controls and nurtures the relationship. The Representative calls on the Embassy and USAID frequently to explain those aspects of the program that he feels can be explained without compromising the special "union to union" relationship that AALC emphasizes in its dealings with the African unions. As in Zaire, the AALC Representative is well known and highly regarded by both Embassy and AID officers, as well as by his African colleagues.

The Ambassador felt that the interests of the United States would be best served if Embassy, AID and AALC would be more collaborative in the sharing of information and policy direction about a sector of vital importance to Liberia and

to United States' interests. As a consequence, he inaugurated a Labor Coordinating Committee consisting of relevant Embassy, AID officers and the AALC representative. The group will meet periodically to review the programs and issues related to labor in Liberia. AALC and AID fully supported the Ambassador's approach. The evaluation team was debriefed at the first meeting of the group.

LIBERIAN FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS (LFLU)

This national union came into being in 1980, with the merger of the two rival national federations through the efforts of AALC. There are eight member unions, but the officials claim that some may be expelled because they "are not financial." LFLU has 22 staff members and eleven "non-staff". There is an \$8700.00 per month payroll but the receipts from dues collection amount to between \$3,000.00 and \$4,000.00 per month. The President of LFLU volunteered that the inadequacy of operating funds necessitated the union's diversion of approximately \$11,000.00 from the AALC donated program money. AALC admits that it reluctantly agreed to the diversion of the funds to the payment of operating expenses including salaries. This agreement is confirmed by a letter over the signature of AALC President, Patrick O'Farrell.

The President of the Federation concedes that the organization is over-staffed, but alleges that he cannot unilaterally reduce the staff. He has recommended staff

reduction to the Executive Board, which is reluctant to take action.

There does not appear to be a Mission-wide consensus about continued support for the Liberian Federation of Labor Unions. AALC is committed to continued support for LFLU despite its obvious problems. This commitment seems to stem from AALC fears that the alternative is support for organizations with close affiliation with eastern bloc countries or institutions. Embassy political officers do not feel sanguine about the capacity of LFLU leadership to overcome its limitations and are urging AALC to broaden its contacts in the trade union world. AID leadership seems to agree with the Embassy position.

Embassy and AID express sensitivity to the need for AALC to preserve its "union to union" stance and desire to avoid compromising AALC's relationship. In addition, both rejected suggestions that AALC programs be discontinued, despite the absence of viable programs in Liberia.

AID's PROGRAM AND AALC's PLAN

The programming planned for Liberia consists of literacy training and worker education. AID's development program targets the urban poor and increase of the productive base of the economy. In addition, AID is attempting to improve crop variety in its agricultural program as well as deal with basic health needs and non-formal education. AALC's planning and programming appear to be consistent with AID's broad sweep but do not threaten a significant development impact. AT this time, AALC refuses to give LFLU program funds until it is more comfortable with LFLU's accountability and there is general improvement of the confederation's financial and organizational status. The AALC Representative says:

"I refuse to request any more money until there has been an accounting."

This position is supported by the President of the confederation, who remarked that he fears there may be some corruption among some of the unions. However, he has been unsuccessful in his efforts to persuade the Executive Board to hire independent auditors.

PRIVATE SECTOR

The team's visit to a rubber plantation and subsequently to a bank provided some insights into union style. When the new government assumed power in 1980, the policy prohibiting agricultural unions was reversed. LFLU perceived a future in the organization of the rubber plantations. Consequently, most current union activity appears focussed on plantations. Negotiations had not yet produced an agreement but had inspired significant effort on part of management of the plantation to improve the living conditions of the workers. The team observed that the tin roofs on workers houses were still shiny new. Management admitted to having recently installed deep wells in the camps to bring in potable water. Union officers allege that workers are pleased and relate these management responses to the existence of the union.

The plantation management expressed grave concern that the union might not understand the seriousness of the financial crisis that could drive the plantation out of business. However, even though the union is currently negotiating additional benefits for the workers, the officers privately revealed that the difficult economic situation practically eliminates the possibility of negotiation for higher wages. The significant points of negotiation concern working or living conditions, and the fringe benefits related to

worker health, safety, or comfort which the union feels are within the company's financial capability.

On the other hand, experience at the bank has not been so favorable. The officers at the bank described Labor as one of Liberia's serious problems. Although they have no desire to have union activity at the bank, there has never been any overt effort on the part of the bank to discourage organization. The bank manager felt that the lack of trade union sophistication and professionalism was damaging to the union effort. In addition, the former Minister of Labor did not comply with the law. The Ministry failed to develop an orderly procedure for the resolution of industrial disputes and the Minister entertained labor grievances, which oftentimes became tools for employer harassment. It was felt that if the Ministry of Labor could be straightened out, problems such as those experienced by the bank could be avoided. Since the advent of the union, the bank has experienced dropping production and increased disgruntlement among the employees. The bank's executive officer feels that employees are dissatisfied with the union.

The team paid a call on the Minister of Labor prior to the discussion with the bank officials. The Minister has recently assumed his position but expressed desire to institute some changes in the Labor law. He specifically referred to the need for an Industrial Court and a more

orderly pattern for dealing with labor complaints.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

STATE OF THE UNION

At the present time there does not appear to be any significant government constraint on the development of free and democratic trade unions. If anything, there is potential for proliferation.

The Liberian Federation of Labor Unions could be threatened by internal destruction due to suspicion and bickering. Suspicion and mistrust are likely to continue until there is an external audit which satisfies all participants including AALC and AID.

LFLU is financially dependent upon external support. It cannot now implement programs that AID would support through AALC due to serious organizational and operating deficiencies. As long as expenditures exceed revenues by 50 percent, the necessity or at least a strong temptation will remain to divert program funds to operating budget.

The political uncertainties and economic setbacks in Liberia have had a strong impact on the trade union movement but they are not the sole cause of the poor health of LFLU.

LFLU is seriously overstuffed and its current overload of professional and clerical staff will defeat any effort to

establish it as a sound and functioning institution.

Although there is a need for worker education and leadership training in the federations' unions, there are knowledgeable and experienced leaders in LFLU. It appears that the trade union movement is not getting the full benefit of that knowledge and experience at this time.

There needs to be a closer analysis of the LFLU situation to determine what, if any, additional technical assistance would strengthen it. It is suggested that LFLU is in dire need of institutional reinforcement. In the event such assistance is not forthcoming, or if LFLU is not cooperative, then AID and AALC should begin to look for other clients because neither Agency can realize its goals in Liberia with the status quo.

EMBASSY, AID AND AALC

This trinity fits the pattern found at other posts. The Embassy maintains the most overt interest in AALC activities whereas the USAID mission is uncertain about the interest it should maintain and is reluctant to be assertive. As in other posts, AALC country programs are not included in the Mission's development strategy. Recently, the USAID has designated one of its more senior

multi-sector officers as liaison to AALC.

The Embassy and USAID strongly support the continuance of AALC activity in country. In addition, Embassy and USAID believe that the sanctity of AALC's union-to-union relationship should be respected and preserved.

The AALC's representative in Liberia has been effective in maintaining such relationship as exists among the three entities. The existing relationship serves the purposes of AALC, but not necessarily those of the Embassy and AID.

The Embassy perceives "labor" as one of the key elements in the stability (or instability) in Liberia. Consequently, the status of the trade union movement and the source and nature of support for diverse elements in that movement have great significance for United States interests in Liberia.

The Ambassador has established the best possible working relationship for the trinity in the Liberian context by organizing the Labor Coordinating Committee or Group which includes, the Embassy, USAID and AALC.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

1. AALC urge LFLU to reduce its professional and clerical staff immediately;
2. AALC urge the Executive Board of LFLU to have an independent audit;
3. AALC and AID in consultation with the Post's Labor Coordinating Committee determine what, if any additional technical assistance should be immediately given to LFLU;
4. AALC and AID in consultation with the Post's Labor Coordinating Committee determine under what conditions program funds will be released to LFLU to avoid future diversion to operating expenses;
5. AALC and AID in consultation with the Post's Labor Coordinating Committee begin to study program and client alternatives in Liberia.

SENEGAL

BACKGROUND

There is no active bilateral program in Senegal. However, the Regional Institute for Higher Trade Union Studies was created by a protocol signed in New York in 1979. The parties to the protocol included the Secretary General of the Organization for African Trade Union Unity (OATUU), Dennis Okumu; the Secretary General of the Confederation Nationale des Travailleurs du Senegal (CNTS), and Patrick O'Farrell, Executive Director of the African American Labor Center (AALC)

In recent years the political climate of Senegal has not been hospitable to the healthy growth of strong, independent trade unions. Consequently, there has been little enthusiasm or encouragement to develop bilateral programs in support of the trade union movement in Senegal. AALC established a tailoring institute which remains in existence, operated by Senegalese.

Despite the existence of deep trade union roots in Senegal, little interest seems to remain in worker education and growth in the CNTS. The leadership seems to have become inextricably linked with the Government and the Party which casts a pall on the potential for bilateral programs. Nevertheless, an agreement was signed in November, 1981, by

the Secretary General of the CNTS and the Executive Secretary of the AALC which purported to provide for the renewal of bilateral activities by AALC. No programs have been initiated pursuant to this agreement.

PURPOSE

The Regional Institute for Higher Trade Union Education was established to upgrade and standardize the quality of worker education and to provide leadership training for twelve West and Central African Francophone countries. Specifically, AALC documentation proclaims:

"Purpose of Activity:

To create a trade union educational institution in Francophone Africa capable of providing either on a permanent or a four-year basis:

- a) leadership training in specific technical subjects required by trade union cadres;
- b) training and review sessions for union education specialists and instructors; and
- c) developing standardized curricula and model educational programs with related course materials which can be adapted to local country programs.

The original plan to phase over support for the Institute in 1982 to the Organization of African Trade Union Unity had to be modified to a later phase-over date. The

alternative is a termination of the Institute. However, termination is not considered a total loss, inasmuch as many trade unionists will have been exposed to worker education, and leadership training.

AALC and AID decided to support the Institute despite the serious reservations about OATLU's promise to assume responsibility for this, a Francophone Institute. The anticipated benefit to be derived from four years of education and leadership training persuaded the parties to proceed with the project. The rationale was that even if OATLU failed to adopt the Institute at the end of four years, there will have been hundreds of African unionists and leaders trained directly by the Institute and thousands more will profit indirectly. In addition, an effective program of worker education will have been developed. The Institute is underway, but it is too early to make firm predictions about the its future or the intentions of OATLU.

EMBASSY, AALC AND AID

The absence of a bilateral program contributes to the relative remoteness of AALC from both the Embassy and AID in Dakar when compared to Liberia and Zaire. However, a relationship does exist. The Embassy Labor Attache acts as the Embassy liaison with the AALC representative. There is fairly frequent contact which seems to be inspired more by the fact that both have regional labor responsibilities

in the same geographic area in West Africa than by the Senegal focus. The relationship between the Embassy and AALC does not extend beyond the sharing of information between the Labor Attache and the AALC Representative.

Labor does not appear to be central to the interests of the Embassy. This may be accounted for by the Embassy's perception that Labor does not appear to be central to the concerns of the Government of Senegal. Historically, labor has played an important role in Senegal's political evolution, consequently, the appearances may be deceptive. The author of this report has the impression that in today's Senegal, trade unionism is perceived as neither promise nor threat, therefore of no vital interest.

Gaps in communication among Embassy, AID and AALC were illustrated by the fact that the labor attache was the only officer in Embassy or AID who knew of the existence of a bilateral agreement which had been executed between AALC and CNT, the Senegalese labor federation, a few months before. AALC indicated that the agreement was of no great consequence and did not constitute a formal agreement with the government. Normally, agreements for bilateral programs involving AALC will be executed both with the government and the trade union with which AALC will work. AALC represented that the agreement was executed for bureaucratic reasons.

USAID has no special relationship with AALC. However, USAID is including AALC in its future planning which contemplates the possible utilization of AALC as a contractor for the implementation of some of its programs. USAID has not discussed this with the AALC representative.

Since most of the seminars and workshops that are sponsored by the Regional Institute are conducted in surrounding countries, there is little opportunity for the involvement USAID/Senegal with AALC. In addition the programs that are promulgated through the Institute do not have a clear relationship to the development programs being implemented by USAID, Senegal. In the final analysis, there is no serious need for USAID to concern itself with the AALC program in Senegal, since the relationship is so tenuous, unless USAID assumes a monitoring function.

During the visit of the evaluation team, the Director of the Institute was in the process of preparing for the next workshop to held in Ouagadougou in March, 1982. Materials had been prepared and the mailings were about to be posted. There were no measurable results available except for the many shelves of materials and papers that had been prepared previously.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

There is minimal significant contact between USAID and AALC, and there is no commonality of interests.

The Embassy Labor Attache and AALC representative have frequent contact to share information on a regional basis.

AID should encourage the Mission to continue to explore the possibility of collaborative effort with AALC. Such effort could well serve as a future model for AID and AALC.

Trade Union activity in Senegal appears to be of lesser interest to Embassy, AALC and AID in Senegal than in the other countries visited.

The involvement of the CNTS with the Government structure may be limiting its effectiveness as a free, democratic and strong, self reliant union and that goal may be unattainable.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

1. That AID and AALC immediately arrange to brief the Ambassador on its range of activities in Dakar, current and proposed;
2. That AID and AALC confer on the prospects for OATLU assumption of total responsibility for the Regional Institute for Higher Trade Union Education.



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Executive Director

September 29, 1982

Mrs. Jeannette B. Carson
Project Officer
AFR/RA 3327A
Agency for International Development
320 21st Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20523

Dear Jeannette:

Enclosed please find my comments concerning the report prepared by Charles James following the February 1982 evaluation of AALC field programs in Zaire, Liberia and Senegal. Although I accompanied Ambassador James on this mission, he drafted the report.

These comments attempt to clarify some philosophical, organizational, and technical questions where we are not in full agreement. As we discussed during our meeting of September 21, 1982, at your office, this material should be attached to the final version of the report as an addendum.

If there are any further questions concerning the evaluation please let me know as soon as possible so that we can finish this exercise.

Very truly yours,

George R. Martens
Project Director

cc: Mr. Sean Holly
Enclosure
ms

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COMMENTS
ON THE
FEBRUARY 1982 EVALUATION OF
AFRICAN-AMERICAN LABOR CENTER FIELD PROGRAMS
IN ZAIRE, LIBERIA, AND SENEGAL

*

A. "BACKGROUND" (pp. 1-6)

- 1) On Page 2 there is an inaccurate statement which should be either corrected or omitted:

The first paragraph says "The Country Director for AID is required to concur with AALC's country budget prior to its submission to the Washington offices of AALC for approval and presentation to AID/Washington for funding."

The actual procedure is that proposed budgets are submitted to AALC/Washington. After its review and approval they are submitted to AID/Washington. It is at this point that they are sent to the Country Directors of AID for their comment.

- 2) On Pages 5 and 6 is one of the several statements of the evaluator that "Development is not a primary mission of the AALC." He goes on to say "AALC will not allow the 'development' process or objectives to inhibit its mission of promoting trade unionism."

This and other similar statements in the draft report indicate a considerable difference between the evaluator and the AALC on the meaning of 'development'.

It is difficult to determine the evaluator's exact definition of development, but certainly it appears to be much narrower than that of the AALC, or, in fact, of the Foreign Assistance Legislation. To the AALC, the development of institutions such as trade unions, which can play a significant role in determining the distribution of the national product, is of major importance in the general process of national development. This has been recognized in all previous evaluations of AALC programs and the evaluator's position in this report is, to say the least, disturbing.

- 3) In the last sentence on Page 6 we would ask that the word "show" be substituted for the word "convince".

Continued

B. "ZAIRE" (pp. 7-21)

- 1) In the judgement of the evaluator the UNTZA "is strong and capable of self-sufficiency." It is democratically-run," and "is the largest and appears to be the best organized and best run of the unions that the team observed." He goes on, however, to suggest that its "political origins" and (political?) "subservience" might remove the organization from the category of "free and democratic trade unions" which the AALC is charged with promoting. He suggest, further, that the AALC's overall goal might need to be redefined.

This last suggestion probably derives from the evaluator's own view of trade unionism which appears to be simplistic and focused on the U.S. model. On page 9 there is the statement: "The ultimate expression of independence and self-sufficiency in a trade union is its capacity to engage in collective bargaining with the option to lead its members on strike in the event the negotiations break down."

The plain facts are that a significant number of undeniably free and democratic trade union movements in the world do not engage in collective bargaining. There are even some in developed nations who have foresworn strikes.

The AALC has not insisted that a trade union movement must collectively bargain as we do in the U.S. or be as free to strike as are our own trade unions in order for that trade union to be judged by us as "free" or to be eligible to receive our assistance. In fact we have often advised our African counterparts that too much dependence on the strike weapon in societies with extensive unemployment is a sure road to disaster.

Regardless of the evaluator's opinion, we are completely satisfied with our own goals and we are completely convinced that assistance to the UNTZA is within our mandate. We reject, therefore, the fourth paragraph on page 17.

- 2) There is the suggestion in the evaluator's discussion of the UNTZA that its viability as an institution might make it a vehicle for the accomplishment of other and more general objectives of AID/Zaire.- Presumably after the AALC representative has been withdrawn. We object strongly to this.

A succession of leaders of the UNTZA have openly acknowledged that AALC programs and assistance has been of fundamental importance in the development of the UNTZA to its present strength. Our projects and programs have been successful for a number of reasons, but one of the most important has been the careful nurturing of relationships between succeeding AALC representatives and the succession of UNTZA officials. And, contrary to prevailing foreign AID practices, the AALC has used small amounts of funding judiciously allocated and overseen by its representative to foster self-help and motivation.

The alternative approach which would seem to be suggested by the evaluator was tried once before by AID/Zaire and led to unhappy results. We would refer those not familiar with the history to the Inspection Report of the Inspector General of Foreign Assistance dated May 27, 1977. We feel it is of utmost importance to maintain a resident representative in Zaire as long as we have a program there.

- 3) At the bottom of page 11, on page 12 and at several other places in his report the evaluator discusses the question of AALC's independent identity vis-a-vis the U.S. Government. We do not agree with his statements or conclusions.

The AALC is an organization of the AFL-CIO. It takes direction only from its President, who is also the President of the AFL-CIO and from its Board of Directors composed of members of the AFL-CIO Executive Council. We are not "less secure in (our) autonomy than AID, Embassy on in certain respects, even UNTZA, or other African trade unions encountered during the evaluation." Neither do we try to conceal true facts from African trade unionists under the veil of independence.

AALC's programs are bi-lateral, union to union activities. They are developed on the basis of requests made to the AALC from the national trade union centers of Africa. We make no apology for the fact that we seek and accept funding from USAID for programs which we have developed in consultation with the African trade union movements. Through their taxes American workers contribute substantially to the funds which are available for use as foreign assistance. The U.S. trade union movement has been consistent and effective in its support of foreign aid legislation. The foreign aid legislation itself declares the fostering of free and democratic trade unionism as a legitimate purpose for foreign assistance expenditures. And, finally, other trade union movements of the world also provide assistance to unions in the developing nations, using funds received from their Governments. In fact, the

percentage of AFL-CIO funds to U.S. Government funds involved in AALC programs is probably much higher than in the case with the foreign assistance work of the trade union movements, of most other countries - including Germany, the Scandinavian countries, Canada and the East European nations.

We also make no attempt to hide the fact from our African friends that we receive U.S. Government funds. We do emphasize, quite correctly, that we remain an independent organization and that they will deal with us and not with the U.S. Government. It is this aspect which is more important to them, and to their Governments, than is the original source of the funds.

- 4) On the basis of the foregoing, we would disagree with the second, third and fourth recommendations of the evaluator with respect to Zaire.

C. "LIBERIA"

- 1) On page 25, it is untrue to say that AALC has "resisted Embassy suggestion that its trade union contacts in Liberia should be broadened." We have contacts with all elements of the trade union movement in Liberia.
- 2) On page 34 the evaluator suggest that "AID and AALC should begin to look for other clients because neither Agency can realize its goals in Liberia with the status quo." We are not sure what the evaluator means with respect to AID, but, concerning our own organization, we are not in the client searching business. The LFLU is a frustrating organization to deal with and it is far from being a viable organization, but at the moment it is the only game in town and it is of extreme importance to us to do everything possible to nudge it in the direction of improvement.
- 3) On page 35 is the following statement:

"The AALC representative in Liberia has been effective in maintaining such relationship as exists among the three entities. (Embassy, AID and AALC) the relationship that exists serves the purpose of AALC but not necessarily those of the Embassy and AID."

This last sentence is puzzling in the context of what the evaluator has said previously, and, considering that he has recommended in other countries the establishment of Labor Coordinating Committees on the Liberian pattern.

- 4) With respect to the evaluator's recommendations we have no objections to numbers 1,2, and 3 as long as it is realized that AALC is dealing with a sovereign, independent organization and there are practical limits to what we can do beyond recommendations.

With respect to recommendation #4 we feel it is our responsibility alone to make these determinations. We will continue to keep the Embassy and AID advised of what we do but will not submit to the requirement that they give prior approval.

We reject recommendation 5.

D. "SENEGAL" (pp. 37-43)

- 1) On page 37, first paragraph, the Evaluator remarks on AALC's lack of enthusiasm for Senegalese programs. Bilateral activities have existed in Senegal since the AALC tailoring school was launched in the early 1970s. A modest trade union education program sponsored by AALC for CNTS began in 1978 using impact project funds. Late in 1981, a protocol was signed between the two organizations making this bilateral relationship even more formal.

AALC believes Senegal has an excellent labor movement. Ever since President Senghor initiated his policy of political liberalization in 1974, Senegal has served as a model for multi-party democracy in Africa. The internal climate has certainly encouraged the growth of more independent labor organizations, including three or four opposition groups. CNTS disaffiliated from the PS government party. In April 1982, Babacar Diagne, a cabinet member, was defeated for the post of Secretary General of CNTS in open elections. His successor refused to serve in any ministerial position. This is clear proof of democratic, independent trade unionism in action.

In the third paragraph the Evaluator notes little interest in worker education. Linkage between governments and trade unions has little effect on bilateral cooperation programs in Senegal or anywhere else in Africa. CNTS has as an active worker education program as most other unions on the continent--8 to 10 seminars per-year--and has resident expatriate directed educational projects with both AALC and the Freidrich Ebert Foundation. As a follow up to the November 1981 protocol, three seminars for teachers' union cadres have just taken place in the Eastern Senegal Region.

- 2) On page 39, fourth paragraph, there is a comment on AALC "remoteness". There has traditionally been a very close relationship between AALC and the Embassy since Dakar is the site of a Regional Labor Attache Office. On page 40, first paragraph, it is unclear how this 'relationship' might be extended beyond frequent discussions in which information concerning AALC programs and African labor movements are shared by the two parties. This has always been considered quite satisfactory by both AALC and the Regional Labor Attache prior to the evaluation.
- 3) It is doubtful if labor alone is 'central to the interests' of any embassy in Africa, as mentioned on page 40, second paragraph, so this should not be singled out as a special problem in Senegal. The internal importance of trade unionism in Senegalese political life is obvious when one looks at the past when unions nearly toppled the government three times (1963, 1968, 1969) in the past two decades. In addition, CNTS holds 2 ministerial posts and 8 seats in the National Assembly.
- 4) Contrary to what is stated on page 40, third paragraph, AALC has not executed accords with African governments, with the exception of Botswana, but directly with trade unions, as was done in Senegal. The Government of Senegal is kept closely informed of AALC activities but the evaluator chose not to meet with the Labor Minister to confirm this. Neither of the two AALC staff members present at referenced meeting recall the emphasis placed on procuring 'special license plates' stressed in the evaluation report. The protocol mentions neither duty free privileges nor license plates at any time! This quote from The Ambassador cannot be confirmed as having been made by the AALC representatives at the meeting and certainly distorts the overall character of the meeting.
- 5) On page 42, first paragraph, measurable results might have been obtained by the Evaluator had he cared to examine the participant lists of the colloquia organized by the institute and reviewed the detailed conclusions published in the collection of working papers prepared after each session for distribution throughout Africa. All were available, as he notes, in the AALC office. Former participants were also available for interviews but these were not requested. It would be interesting to learn just what measurable results the Evaluator was seeking.

- 6) On page 42, paragraph 5, the statement that trade union activity in Senegal appears to be of minimal interest, at least to AALC, cannot be taken seriously. The existence of an AALC office in Dakar for 10 years and the close relationship between the two labor organizations contradict this opinion. A similar conclusion might be drawn from the fact that the State Department has maintained a Labor Attache (1 of 3 in Africa) in Senegal for many years.

- 7) On page 42, paragraph 6, CNTS, after several troubled years in the early 1970s, has made a remarkable comeback in reestablishing a free, democratic organization. One need only look at the April 1982 congress where the incumbent Secretary General--who is also Minister of Social Action--was defeated in a hotly contested election with no government interference. Such an open exercise of labor democracy is a rare event in most parts of the world.