

PROJECT 279-0031

Community Based Rural Development:

Mahweit

(OPG)

EVALUATION REPORT
(May 1979 - June 1980)

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July 20, 1980

American Save The Children Federation

Grant No. AID/NE-G-1449

Amount: \$1,040,000

PACD (under extension)

December 31, 1980

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

OPG	Operational Program Grant
STC	Save The Children/Yemen
STC/HQ	Save The Children/Headquarters
YARG	Yemen Arab Republic Government
CBIRD	Community Based Integrated Rural Development
CYDA	Confederation of Yemeni Development Associations
MP	Mahweit Project in toto
MOA	Ministry of Agriculture
LDA/CC	Local Development Association/Coordinating Council
EPI	Expanded Program for Immunization
PCV	Peace Corps Volunteer
CD/CBIRD	Community Development/Community Based Integrated Rural Development
MOH	Ministry of Health

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I. Background to Evaluation

A. Reasons for Undertaking Evaluation

In August 1979, AID approved an extension of Phase I of STC Mahweit Community-based Integrated Rural Development Project in Yemen from October 1, 1979 to December 31, 1980. This extension was based upon the results of an STC self-evaluation and a joint STC/USAID Special Evaluation in May 1979. The OPG extension proposal represented a significant redefinition of the Project's objective and introduced several new components such as training opportunities, rural outreach and applied research. At that time it was envisaged that STC would submit a three-year development plan for a Phase II of the Mahweit Project to AID in the summer of 1980. This present evaluation represents a scheduled formal evaluation of the STC Mahweit Project with particular reference to the period May 1979 - June 1980.

In February 1980, as a result of complicated local political events, the Mahweit Project Nutrition and Womens' Centers were forcefully closed by representatives of a faction of the Mahweit community. Other STC activities were gradually terminated and STC expatriate field staff left Mahweit on April 26, 1980, four days short of a deadline imposed by community political leadership. Therefore, the second reason for this evaluation is to examine Project objectives and activities in the light of events which will be referred to here as the Mahweit crisis.

B. Objectives of the Evaluation

There are three interrelated objectives which this evaluation seeks to address:

1. There is an existing need, made more timely by the Mahweit crisis, for a performance appraisal of the past year commencing with AID's approval of the OPG extension. This appraisal should help USAID in the short-term in formulating a plan with STC for the reprogramming of Phase I unexpended funds in the event that STC is able to recommence activities in Mahweit or shift to another area with modified objectives.

2. In wider terms, there is also a longer-term need to formulate options regarding possible continued USAID support of STC activities in Yemen based upon STC's total performance from 1978 - 1980.

3. There is also a need expressed by USAID program management staff to derive lessons from this type of project which could serve as guidance for similar types of projects in the USAID country program.

This evaluation has been developed under three obvious constraints:

1. The total time for the evaluation was eleven days for interviews and site visit and eight days for write-up and discussion of evaluation with USAID and the Embassy.

2. The abrupt departure of Project staff from Mahweit and cessation of Project activities meant that the one and one-half day visit was limited to discussions with a small sample of individuals knowledgeable about the project.

3. The evaluation team came under considerable pressure by USAID and STC staff to quickly develop impressions and recommendations which might shed light upon:

- a) the Mahweit crisis, and
- b) when and under what circumstances could STC staff return to the town and/or province to resume activities.

In the light of these factors, the following evaluation has not been as comprehensive or quantitative as otherwise envisaged. It's achievements are directly the result of the openness and candid nature of all persons interviewed both expatriate and Yemeni alike.

II. Sources of Data

The different data on which this report is based may be conveniently grouped into the following categories:

- A. Interviews
- B. STC/AID Records and Reports
- C. Field visits to Mahweit

A. The evaluators, Benedict/Rassam conducted a series of interviews with a number of people who are/were directly or indirectly connected with the Mahweit Project. These may be grouped into the following categories: central and local government officials, STC staff, USAID staff and a number of Mahweitis (for a partial list of people interviewed, see Annex A.)

The interviews were conducted in English and Arabic as the individual case required (Rassam being fluent in Arabic). The STC staff and some of the Yemeni Field Coordinators were interviewed singly, in groups by sectors and in general group sessions. Government personnel, especially those of CPO and CYDA, were interviewed formally in their offices, and some informally as when members of both agencies accompanied us to Mahweit.

In addition to those listed in Annex A, Rassam managed to interview some women and men informally during the visit to Mahweit.

B. The STC senior staff were very generous in making accessible to us their reports and records (most of which were transmitted to USAID). Grosso modo, these consisted of the following:

In the managerial sector:

- a) STC Annual Management Plan
- b) Semi-annual Administrative Report, July-December, 1979
- c) Financial Summary of July, 1980
- d) June, 1980 Annual Report on Logical Framework Indicators
- e) LDA/Mahweit Three Year Plan Incorporating STC Infrastructure Projects
- f) Work Plans for July, 1979 - June, 1980
- g) STC's Program Manager's Quarterly Reports Beginning July, 1979

In the various sectoral activities:

- a) The Project Coordinators' Quarterly Reports
- b) Report and Evaluation of Field Coordinator's Training Program for September-November, 1979 period and the Training Program for the Course
- c) Training Module (in Arabic) for Health/Nutrition Program
- d) Miscellaneous consultant reports on STC activities, particularly in the Health Sector

Also reviewed was the STC file "Minutes of Meetings" from June, 1979 to June, 1980, and the STC Self-Evaluation of Project Activities, plus the 1979 Special Evaluation of the Mahweit Project.

C. The evaluators, accompanied by representatives one each from the CPO and CYDA, spent one day and a half in Mahweit (July 10-12) during which time the Governor and other people were interviewed (see Annex A) and several projects were inspected.

III. Performance Evaluation of Mahweit Project (May 1979-June 1980)

A. Summary of Major Recommendations of June 1979, USAID/STC Special Evaluation

The unscheduled June, 1979 joint evaluation was undertaken as a result of a mutual recognition that the OPG project was experiencing serious difficulties in the areas of "inadequate project design and incomplete implementation planning".* In general terms, the evaluation

* Sources of information for this section include: F. Pavich: Terms of Reference for Project 279-0031 Evaluation May 6, 1979; Special Evaluation June 20, 1979; and J. Salamack/F. Pavich memo: Responses to Evaluation Report Recommendations August 19, 1979.

concluded that design problems were related to insufficient awareness of critical contextual issues related to working in Mahweil as well as staff inexperience with implementing rural development activities. Project implementation suffered from "unrealistic objectives", and lack of relevance to local problems, creating implementation delays amounting to approximately seven months of a two year Phase I period.

Following the evaluation, STC responded swiftly to many of the evaluation recommendations. The project was extensively redesigned resulting in a new Logical Framework of outputs. The management structure was modified to improve the coordination and management of project field staff, and the OPG project was extended to December 31, 1980 to permit the design and implementation of activities resulting from newly established project objectives. A specific review of the recommendations of the Special Evaluation will serve as a baseline from which to evaluate the year under review. Many of the problems, however, have their origin in the beginning of the project in 1978 and have carried through to the present.

In retrospect, we find that the Evaluation*:

- (a) did not go far enough in identifying basic problems;
- (b) did not establish clear enough revised project objectives; and
- (c) might have recommended changes which ultimately were not in the best interests of the project.

In reassessing the twenty recommendations made in the Evaluation, we have regrouped and summarized issues in terms of the following six areas:

1. The revised 1979 Logical Framework established eight purpose-level indicators (see Annex B) in an effort to (a) identify specific problems the project will address and (b) what improvements it seeks to make. The STC 1980 Annual Report (see Annex C) confidently concludes that "the project has made great progress toward achieving most of these indicators and consequently its objectives".

We find the revised 1979 Logical Framework defective as a planning instrument. The lack of a firm notion of which development sectors should or could be emphasized, in which sequence, involving what percentage of staff time and resources, is reflected in the vagueness of purpose-level indicators. The absence of a reasonable plan of action, drafted and approved with one or more government entities, involving government monitoring and supervision has been, we believe, a chronic problem since project inception. Later sections will document these issues.

* Henceforth, the term Evaluation will be used for the Special Evaluation of June 20, 1979.

2. The recommendation for an increased role for research was intended to contribute to (a) the integration of sectoral activities, (b) improved targetting of project benefits, and (c) project impact evaluation. We believe that subsequent research sector activities did not achieve recommended objectives; namely, that "information is integrated into the project planning and evaluation process (with YARG), and (that) research is shared with counterpart organizations". In addition, we believe that a misunderstanding developed between project staff and community representatives (i.e., officials of Mahweit town, Yemeni project participants and potential project beneficiaries) regarding the utility and value of research. This fostered a climate of differing expectations, impatience and mistrust centering around the need to have detailed information on issues considered sensitive. These issues will be treated later in this report.

3. Despite notable improvements in the overall management plan (i.e., a new management data system centering around improved recording of activities, increased field exposure of all staff, re-assigned staff functions, sectoral work plans), a number of basic and important problems persisted. Management leadership seems not to have been able to reconcile a process approach ("learning-while-doing" adaptability or "what-does-the-context-teach-the-model") with inevitable expectations concerning concrete results engendered in the community through local level day-to-day relations. STC's stated interest in the vertical integration (linking local level institutions to central government agencies) required for rural development seems not to have been pursued with much thoughtfulness. Also, a management preoccupation with modes of participation at the local level, i.e., local development council (LDA), municipal council, failed to mobilize effective participation. The implication made in the Evaluation that poor communication and participation with line agencies, CYDA and the CPO were at the base of a number of problems remained just as true in 1980 as in 1979.

4. As a result of the Evaluation, a new "outreach" strategy was designed wherein survey research, site visits by STC and final selection through functional development criteria would all lead to the establishment of projects in at least one rural area of Mahweit District and in one other district of the province. This outreach would have been accomplished by the project staff remaining based in the town and extending assistance out to selected communities. We believe this process inevitably (a) stretched already slim financial and technical resources beyond reasonable limits, (b) shifted the focus of activities toward undertaking new work while on-going town-based work was incomplete and/or unfocussed and (c) once again moved ahead without adequate communication and joint planning with national and local authorities.

5. In recognition of the need to recruit and train junior to senior level Yemenis to fill critical project counterpart positions, several training programs were initiated, e.g., an on-site training course for seven field coordinators, several individuals sent to short-term formal training courses. Because of the unexpected cessation of project activities, the long-term coordinators' training was not completed. We believe that, despite the current problem, the value of training obtained in the course is debatable and will be discussed in another section.

Another serious issue is the apparent inability of the project to have recruited and trained at least one senior Yemeni counterpart to either the STC Director or the Program Manager position. A predominant expatriate character developed around most project activities. Without senior Yemeni staff (or central government counterpart staff) problems related to communication, cultural/political sensitivity and official contacts became more serious.

6. Perhaps the most fundamental statement made by the Evaluation was the revalidation of the STC philosophy of development; namely, the juxtaposition of community development (CD) and their community-based integrated rural development (CBIRD). If anything, post evaluation changes (see recommendation no. 16) which included U.S. training in the CD/CBIRD methodology for STC staff, elevated the philosophy over the pragmatic considerations of moving ahead in individual sectors and in conveying to the community what STC could in fact deliver in visible concrete terms. If the Mahweit Project (MP) generated confusion and ambiguity on the part of both Yemenis and STC staffers, it did so out of an unyielding commitment to method and not out of the commitments of individuals to improving community welfare. STC staff pursued rapport with the community at great personal hardship. The lack of realism in terms of what could and should be accomplished in the face of complicated and costly need dissipated individual and collective efforts.

B. Major Sectoral Activities

Performance during the period under review can best be assessed in terms of technical sectors defined by STC staffing: agriculture, infrastructure, social and research. Sector or Project Coordinators (expatriate) in each area were responsible for setting priorities (sector specific), establishing six month work plans and attending to the possible integration of the various sectors. Additionally, each contributed to the multifaceted training course for Field Coordinators (Yemeni). We sense that Project Coordinators developed a good collegial relationship with one another fostered, in part, by a style of decision-making which sought consensus by committee.

As sector performance was to a large extent a function of the qualifications of the Project Coordinators, it is important to point out the following:

- all lack any prior comparable rural development experience, had never before worked with STC, and two have rather minimal Arabic proficiency to negotiate issues and handle complex problems with local officials.
- none have graduate level training in their particular area of technical expertise (except in research techniques).
- all have expressed to some degree difficulty in employing the STC CD/CBIRD methods of development and have had considerable concern that ascription to "integration" in fact hindered further possible tangible development in their own areas.
- with the exception of health/nutrition, none developed formal working relationships with their respective governmental agencies, e.g. agriculture, public works, education and social affairs. This was a part of a wider problem of project integration with Yemeni development efforts.

1. Agriculture

The agriculture coordinator arrived within the first six months of the Mahweit Project. In recognition of the fact that Mahweit was an important agrotown in the center of a relatively isolated mountainous region, this sector received high priority in STC planning. Although STC research on local development priorities consistently showed that technical assistance in agriculture was of relative low priority, the community of Mahweit nonetheless seemed to support and identify with STC promoted agricultural activities. Additionally, there is a local Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture in Mahweit through which a number of STC projects were cleared, if not actually coordinated. Agriculture was also a major part of the Field Coordinator's training program and a sector in which special short-term training programs were arranged in other localities for the Mahweiti participants. Unfortunately, despite the apparent local receptivity to agricultural projects, and personal effectiveness of the agricultural coordinator, the cessation of project

* See agreement dated October 20, 1979 between STC/Ministry of Health. This agreement was signed some months after health activities were underway.

activities on April 26, 1980 occurred before most projects reached their stated objectives. In reviewing major agricultural projects, the following general factors should be kept in mind:

- at no time did the STC project enter into a formal agreement with the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) or CYDA to pursue an agreed upon sectoral program of activities with a known budget. Recognizing the difficulties involved in agreeing upon such a protocol, the lack of any pattern of formal communication contributed to an absence of YARG support during the STC/Mahweit crisis.
- agriculture seemed not to be a major priority of the Mahweit LDA/CC and/or CYDA. A comfortable working relationship between CYDA and the MOA was also absent. In this vacuum of inter-agency interest in the agriculture sector, STC activities tended to be viewed by YARG officials as somewhat ad hoc and short-term in impact.
- the bulk of research on local farming systems and regional agricultural conditions seems not to have been communicated in Arabic to the LDA/CC, CYDA or MOA. No satisfactory relationship existed within which STC could help YARG agencies in the development of a regional agricultural plan.
- all STC agricultural projects were restricted to the town of Mahweit and its environs. The agricultural activities of the outreach phase never developed beyond an initial planning stage.

Principal Activities Included:

a) Agricultural Experimental Plots.

Experimental trials of vegetables, forage crops and trees constituted the basis of establishing a controlled plot. Problems related to drought, rental of land and supply of tree material illustrated how natural, local political, and national inter-agency coordination contribute to major delays in establishing a program of limited objectives. Ultimately, a second site of two hectares permitted the slow establishment of a facility beginning in October 1978 which eventually did produce demonstrations in vegetable cultivation (few vegetables are locally marketed, let alone produced for auto-consumption), reaching out to approximately 45 families, either with harvested product or free seed. By March of 1979, at least 500 fruit trees had been established as a nursery and STC began to meet the salaries of one and one-half persons to maintain the experimental plot.

Currently, as a result of the Mahweit crisis, the plot has been abandoned, much of the facility is vandalized, and no crops

or trees are under cultivation. Despite MOA interest during the winter of 1979 to be involved, there appears to be no current plans in taking over this STC activity. Extension activities hardly commenced when the STC team left Mahweit. It is unlikely that more than a few families continue practices introduced from the experimental plot.

b) Poultry Production.

This was a complicated demonstration which failed to develop along stated objectives despite two separate attempts. In May 1979, STC purchased birds and feed with the intention of establishing an experimental poultry unit managed by women. Following site selection, a number of local men objected to the siting (and possibly notion) of the project and no further action was taken. Later, during October-December, a second attempt took place wherein an effort was made to contrast production differentials between local and imported chickens. The experiment took place in the STC Women's Center (a part of the Nutrition Center) to demonstrate improved poultry production practices and the inclusion of eggs in the local diet. The closing of the center in February 1980 prematurely terminated this experiment before any impact could be measured.

c) Training.

Several individuals received short-term training in special programs located elsewhere, e.g., with the British Veterinary Assistance Program, German Plant Protection Program, British Agricultural Mechanization Training Program, and an AID Poultry Program. These training experiences have not been formally evaluated. Up to eight to ten individuals have been involved in such training, some of whom have continued into the Field Coordinator Training Program. While these programs do provide short-term, targetted training leading to a certificate (important in the Yemeni context), they can only provide a limited basic knowledge which must be built upon within an on-going program. How these individuals would be further trained, placed in salaried government programs and developed to eventually replace STC technical assistance staff should have been of concern to the STC project. The untimely termination of project activities highlights these as unanswered issues.

In general, experiences of the agricultural sector raise a number of issues:

- is it conceivable to develop integrated projects with agriculture at the core in a context where the basic

needs in agricultural development require the establishment of region-wide services, e.g., adaptive research, extension services, specialized training?

- given the apparent low level of LDA interest in agriculture, would working directly with the MOA in establishing basic systems components have been a more effective approach?

2. Infrastructure Planning and Implementation

More than any other single area of concern, what is broadly referred to as "infrastructure" was both the cutting edge of the STC project as well as its guillotine. In each of the sub-areas of this broad sector, e.g., transportation networks, building design/construction, water resources development and income generating activities, the town and region of Mahweit face severe net deficits. Few if any communities have nearby, accessible safe supplies of potable water. The major routes connecting Mahweit town to the east and west (although greatly improved over the past two years) consist of dirt tracks which are only modestly more usable than the network of dirt feeder roads linking villages to the two major access routes. The construction of public sector facilities for sectoral services and the administration of government falls well below current need. Town-based and rural off-farm intermediate to small scale industries are still in a nascent stage despite the apparent assistance of considerable private assets. In all these areas, the STC Project attempted to: (a) identify critical needs, (b) initiate planning and design work and, (c) jointly fund and provide material.

In general, the local demand for these services created a high visibility for STC and a series of expectations to match. Attendant upon visibility and expectations, a number of problems developed which included the following:

- the increasingly higher levels of expectations in Yemen (and specifically in Mahweit) entail demands for full coverage, efficient systems such as water supply and sewage disposal systems, safe and cost-effective road networks and free publically provided services such as health and education. The integrated approach of STC, its enforced small-scale operation vis-a-vis financial and technical resources, and an evolved pattern of working outside government channels, mitigated against meeting unsustainable levels of expectations of the community.

- the day-to-day exposure of STC staff to local political priorities and processes left STC vulnerable to local pressures for assistance. A number of these demands were really unrelated to STC's overall approach,- for example, completing the construction of the Youth Center. The construction of the Mawhabah cistern and the Masiyah spring storage facility triggered by a desire to do something visible in the town, were not a part of STC's plans. Other activities such as the purchase, siting, installation, operation, marketing and use of income of the stone cutting machine were not well thought out.
- the continuing, disappointing relationship between STC and the LDA affect the project as a whole, and infrastructure planning requirements specifically. Here, issues centered about: (a) the lack of firm LDA leadership, and/or delegation of leadership, through which effective planning and implementation could occur, (b) level of interest of the LDA in specific projects (high for schools, roads and water, low for others), (c) apparent lack of vertical functional relationships between the LDA and CYDA, and (d) an apparent lack of an STC plan to work on "capacitizing" the LDA as a local development resource.
- the seemingly untimely implementation of an outreach program to develop village water resources at a time when town-based expectations and demands coalesced around signal problems (e.g., the Mahweit sewage and water supply systems), problems which conceivably are beyond STC's resources and mandate.

Turning to the specifics of infrastructure activities, STC achievements both in terms of material products, as yet unimplemented plans and to a lesser extent the degree to which a cadre of Field Coordinators were trained, remains impressive.

a) Transportation/Communication

The Infrastructure Coordinator and his PCV assistant were particularly helpful in providing advice on road alignments within the province and in the design of a town plan for Mahweit. If success is measured by demand, then this element of the project was highly responsive to local need. In its excess, however, local demand often commandeered STC resources away from the central objectives of the project. Road planning often was unrelated to the approach of CD/CBIRD,

out of phase with other project achievements, and frequently substituted for services which Mahweit should have been obtaining from the Ministry of Public Works.

b) Water Resource Development

Although road planning was inherently a politically charged issue (e.g., Mahweit Town Plan evoked images of winners and losers as new roads cut a swath through private property), water resource management was the most politicized issue. From the STC 1978 plan for the Mahweit Town water project to the 1980 design of small village water systems in the Arqub outreach area, STC was embroiled in the local politics surrounding a scarce and vital resource. Ultimately, solid achievements were reached in the design and construction of several outreach small systems in the Gharbi area. Other plans were either dropped due to local political controversy (e.g., Arqub), or to overwhelming expectations for systems beyond STC's capacity (e.g., Mahweit town).

It is to the credit of STC that it continued to emphasize projects to meet the deficit in village potable water and that it fielded two capable infrastructure engineers who were sensitive to localized issues. The specter of an early "commitment" (1978) to deliver a town-wide water project and pressures to develop town water resources (cisterns and closed storage facilities) plagued the STC project from early on. There is some suggestion that infrastructure staff was overextended as a result of being used as translators and mediators for a range of STC problems. It also seems clear that the commitment to an integrated approach (none of the water projects were ultimately designed as integrated projects) did slow the progress of STC further activities in water resource development.

c) Building Design/Construction

One of the first construction activities was the completion of a Youth Club in the town. Occurring within the first months of the project, the developmental rationale for this action remains unclear. Antecedents to this decision probably extends to prior commitments made by the then STC Institutional Coordinator to club members. What is clear, however, are the following:

- (1) this activity relieved pressure on the STC staff to do something quick and visible for a vocal segment of the town population,
- (2) a related Youth Club component was equipping the town's Boy Scout Troop (rationalized as a development activity, e.g., town clean-up, directing traffic and welfare activities), and

(3) the support to the Club (a single political faction of town life) initiated a chain of political reactions which ultimately contributed to the Mahweit crisis and suspension of STC activities.

d) Income Generating

It is unclear whether or not town-based survey work was done on income generating possibilities. Two complementary activities were undertaken with the LDA. A stone cutting machine and a dump truck were purchased for LDA use. The truck is being used for hauling material related to LDA projects as well as water from a nearby source. The cutting machine still in its crate was never installed due to conflicts over the siting of the machine. There is little analysis of the economic potential of this machine. A JCB backhoe is also in-country but has not been delivered to the LDA due to the current crisis. It is difficult to assess the potential importance of these STC subsidized items. An LDA management and work plan for these commodities seems not to exist. CYDA contributions to such purchases is also not clear.

A second category of activity is the Women's Center training in sewing and literacy. STC has provided the facility and machines for two classes of ten women each who trained in afternoon sessions on alternate days. An STC self-evaluation indicates that these trainees were able to use their own machines or to borrow in order to sew for sale and to meet their own needs. This Center, housed together with the Nutrition Center, became the efficient cause leading to community objection to women's training and to the cessation of STC activities in the social sector.

In general, the STC infrastructure component did target upon important needs. It also displayed a lack of good judgment in terms of what commitments to avoid. More than other activities, it became seconded to local political pressures. One serious problem was the lack of a senior Yemeni counterpart either as a STC staffer or a representative of the Ministry of Public Works. This lack of Yemeni field staff was a chronic problem throughout the Project. In this respect, infrastructure, like other project activities, developed in an ad hoc manner divorced from real or potential central government planning and/or resources.

3. Social (Health/Nutrition)

By its nature, this sector attempted to penetrate deeply into problems of human welfare in the town of Mahweit. Because of its objective to modify the intricate relationships between values,

attitudes and beliefs, it entered a sensitive and controversial realm related to parental sustenance of children. In modifying women's knowledge and behavior, it also sought to impart useful skills which could be marketed but in all cases, would assist household welfare. These STC activities were singled out as a convenient target of conservative community forces. In the short space of six months, activities in this area, particularly immunizations, were well received as evidenced by reasonably high levels of attendance in health-related services. STC studies have suggested that not only were services used for curative purposes, but an increasing number of women brought their well infants for health maintenance.

The forceful, and unexpected, closure of the Nutrition and Women's Centers was undoubtedly an end result of a series of complex local political issues in which the STC ("American project") became a visible and convenient target. Additionally, there was a pattern of social relationships (qat parties) which ultimately was misinterpreted by the men of the community. STC social sector activities shared with infrastructure projects the unwelcomed distinction of being highly visible with the addition of being normatively controversial as well. Misplaced expectations in both cases triggered adverse community reaction. If STC infrastructure activities can be said to have lagged behind local expectations, social sector achievements ran too far ahead of local acceptability and sensibilities. Poor communication links with politically effective elements of the community and weak ties to formal governmental services combined here, as elsewhere, to undermine otherwise notable achievements. A brief review of the several activities can illustrate these formidable difficulties.

a) Nutrition Center

The Nutrition Center (N.C.) opened with seemingly widespread community approval on June 28, 1979 following nearly a year of planning, studies and the arrival of sufficient expatriate staff (nutritionist, Peace Corps nurse, and a PCV supervisor of an Expanded Program of Immunization (EPI) all under the supervision of the STC social sector coordinator). The N.C. evolved a set of functions aimed toward monitoring the nutritional status of children under 5 (a general nutritional survey of Mahweil had indicated that 35% of children in Mahweil are in poor nutritional condition), and providing immunization coverage to this target group. Activities included: registration, weighing, gross physical examination, nutrition education for mothers, and immunizations. In the first five month period, over 500 children were registered with return

visits of 89. About 10% of children seen were severely malnourished and were referred to the hospital in Mahweit. Throughout the period of operation, 30 to 40 children were seen daily. Apparently, the N.C. gained a reputation of providing useful services in a context (apart from the hospital) where women could freely come and go. The major educational thrust included: immunization information, aspects of personal hygiene, nutritional advice, importance of breast feeding, general childcare and early introduction of weaning foods. The N.C. was open four days a week and during the fifth day follow-up home visits were made. The N.C. was closed by representatives of the Youth Club on February 18, 1980 as a general reaction against social sector activities.

As an activity which grew rapidly in response to demand the N.C. was not without its issues and problems. Some of these are cited below:

- the record is not clear on the issue of links with the MOH in Mahweit. The N.C. obviously formed a functional relationship with its sister activity, the Children's Referral Room located within the hospital. We know that the EPI program was under STC supervision and not that of the MOH. (It has been suggested that the Mahweit Hospital could not have effectively administered the EPI program), a fact which obviously could have created tension. It is difficult to understand how a separate health facility such as the N.C. with programs in health manpower training and nutrition education could have indefinitely continued divorced from the official auspices of the MOH.
- the apparent lack of a planning/implementation link with the LDA/CC is also an issue. Project documents and interviews suggest that the all male LDA did not develop interest in the detailed planning of N.C. activities, yet the N.C. was, for a period of time, a showcase of community service. Where the LDA, MOH and the Governor's office were when the February crisis developed is unclear, except they undoubtedly were not in a direct line of responsibility.
- the N.C. developed a training program for up to ten female trainees who served as N.C. assistants to the expatriate staff (of the original ten, six were literate and most were young and unmarried - which posed a problem in relating to married N.C. clients). As training

progressed, these women assisted in registering, weighing and in health education. Following a period of voluntary labor, these women were paid 10YR/hour (a sum calculated on the basis of domestic labor foregone). The training program developed along the lines of a program recommended by an outside nurse consultant. However, such training placed inordinate strain on running a community service together with a training school. The lack of STC staff time, the client demands on services and the relative inexperience of N.C. STC staff in running a comparable program combined to lessen the overall quality of the experiment. It seems that insufficient attention was paid to longer term objectives of the training program, e.g., how could they eventually replace expatriate staff with minimal formal skills, would the MOH eventually pay their salaries and, if so, would it not be at a lower level of compensation, would they eventually be absorbed into the local MOH structure at the hospital? The training module developed for this course should have been approved by the Institute for Health and Manpower which certifies health personnel.

b) Children's Referral Room (CRR)

If the N.C. suffered from a lack of formal and functional ties to the Mahweil Hospital, the CRR suffered from systemic problems besetting the MOH hospital. The CRR was opened on October 1, 1979 in a room within the hospital set aside for out-patient pediatric care. From the outset, this STC activity was to have been closely tied to (a) the N.C. from which sick infants and children would be sent for treatment and possible hospitalization and (b) the hospital in which a MOH doctor would screen children referring them to the CRR for treatment. The panoply of children's problems was addressed by the CRR, e.g., wounds, burns, skin conditions, respiratory ailments, diarrhea dehydration, worms, nutritional deficiencies, eye/ear/nose/throat problems. The CRR was, in general, cleaner, better equipped, and better managed than other hospital components. Women felt comfortable in visiting the CRR but in-patient care never really developed due to the reluctance of women to spend the night in a room located adjacent to the men's ward.

Several observations can be made despite the short period of active operation (only 58 days of operation during the period November 1979 to March 1980):

- the CRR was and was not a part of the MOH hospital. When it operated at peak efficiency it did share hospital medical staff, physical facilities and a measure of good will. (It has been frequently claimed that the Mahweil medical director was, at best, tolerant of STC activities but never

an active supporter). When the hospital's water supply was cut and cleaning, laundry and maintenance facilities diminished, the CRR suffered even more than the rest of the hospital. By STC's own evaluation: (a) the CRR staff person was never viewed as a hospital staff member (despite the fact that she was working under a Peace Corps/MOH agreement) and (b) the CRR seems not to have been supported by hospital staff when the chips were down and the CRR was forced to close due to a lack of water. The LDA/CC and the Governor's office seem also to have been either disinterested, poorly informed or reluctant to heavily support the CRR operation. The CRR attempted to train a young Yemeni male salaried by the MOH (at the level of a cleaner) as a nursing assistant. Solid progress was made, building upon a sixth grade education and a practical, hands-on experience. The CRR eventually placed extra demands upon his time which was seen in excess of his low MOH salary. SCF reluctance to top-up or take over his salary led to certain difficulties. This problem of providing ample compensation for Yemeni staff plagued the Project throughout. No single policy for compensating Yemeni counterpart staff emerged during the Project's tenure in Mahweit.

- Throughout the social sector there seems to be a noticeable deficiency in senior staffing. Following the departure of the Social Sector Coordinator in November, 1979, other staff gamely and with strong conviction took over decision-making. A senior expatriate medical specialist should have been recruited quickly to supervise, plan and serve as the key link with important Yemeni institutions, e.g., MOH Mahweit Hospital, MOH in Sana, Health Manpower Institute in Sana and Ministry of Education. These ties, if for no other reason than informing and feedback, were neglected. Similarly, there was no senior Yemeni counterpart operating in the social sector. Training was limited to: (a) the basic training of the ten female N.C. trainees, (b) training in the EPI for eventually two Yemenis (here again sufficient salary was a problem until STC took over their compensation), and (c) a very minimal social/health component in the two month training course for Field Coordinators.

c) Outreach

The outreach program for basic immunizations and health/nutrition education, despite a promising first round of visits to the village cluster of Arqub, never really developed due to the Mahweit

crisis. Social sector staff joined by three Mahweiti female trainees did manage to administer immunizations out of a makeshift clinic in Arqub. The late start-up of the outreach program meant that they just managed to complete a first round when the STC Mahweiti facilities closed. Word of the problem spread rapidly, and Arqub sheikhs opposed further mobile clinic-type activities. This program element was not evaluated.

As described earlier, a Women's Center was opened in December 1979 as a part of the N.C.'s scope of interest. Sewing lessons for up to twenty women and literacy lessons once a week constituted the basic program. A suq-type exhibit for crafts was planned as well as the offering of religious education.

The two centers were abruptly closed on February 18, 1980 by supposedly politically motivated members of the Youth Club. This seemingly followed a period of growing discontent by a number of Mahweiti males over the exclusively women-only activities of the two centers. Rising suspicion over what values, beliefs and new proprieties the "American project" was introducing to Mahweiti women, unmet expectations over other elements of the STC project and a myriad of causes for growing civil disobedience in the town came together and focussed on the one institutional structure STC was attempting to develop, namely the two centers. The CRR during the Crisis was closed due to a lack of water and never reopened subsequently. The EPI program was, by extension, also terminated and when STC withdrew from Mahweiti, it also withdrew all EPI immunization material.

4. Research

The Evaluation noted that although research is one of the two major purposes during Phase I of the Project, the output to date in this area was not significant. Furthermore, none of the field positions had primary responsibility for research. The STC had not developed a coordinated plan of action for collecting base line data, which may have been a factor contributing to the observed lack of integration between sectors.

The Evaluation then recommended that STC should develop a "definite research plan emphasizing base line data collection and analysis of socio-economic problems". One of the Project Coordinators was to be specifically charged with insuring that these objectives are met and that the information gathered is integrated into the project planning and evaluation processes (with YARG), and that research data be shared with counterpart organizations, like LDA/CC, CYDA, etc.

Consequently, and in partial response to the Evaluation recommendations, the position of Research Coordinator, (henceforth RC) was created in May 1979 to replace that of Institutional Development Coordinator.

The new management plan drafted (which incorporated the logical framework, PERT chart and sectoral strategies) specified the tasks of the RC for the six month period. These were data collection and analysis for outreach site selection, and project baseline and feasibility determination. The RC was to design, with the help of STC staff, a Reconnaissance Survey instrument which included site selection criteria, after which he was to conduct field reconnaissance surveys in a number of uzals or subdistricts in the Mahweit district during July and August. Following these surveys, site visits were to be conducted with other STC Coordinators participating and final selection of outreach areas was to be completed by September. The LDA/CC was to be informed and indeed was expected to cooperate throughout the whole undertaking.

The same process of reconnaissance surveying, site visits and selection was to be repeated during the second quarter (September-December), this time in districts other than Mahweit with the objective of identifying outreach areas outside Mahweit District by December 1.

In addition to undertaking this schedule, the RC was to continue to supervise and report on the activities of the Mahweit Youth Club and Boy Scouts, duties left over from his earlier role as Institutional Development Coordinator. Moreover, during the second quarter, the RC was to participate for a period of four weeks in the Field Coordinators Training Program.

It might be easier to take up each of these quarters in turn and examine what actually transpired in the Research Sector in terms of the plan outlined above.

a) First Quarter (July-September)

Having completed the research design and methodology for the Reconnaissance Survey, field work was carried out in nine uzlas or subdistricts of Mahweit between July 3-23. After this, no field work was undertaken until early September when four additional uzlas in the district were surveyed. The fast of Ramadan and the holiday slowed things down in August but more important was the fact that most of STC field staff and administrative officers were away on annual leave or in training in the U.S., which meant that the RC had to fill in and carry on their work at the expense of his own.

The August hiatus contributed to the delay in the analysis and write-up of field reports for this period, nor were any of these reports translated into Arabic to be given to the LDA/CC as envisioned.

Apart from the problems pointed out above, it seems to us that the timetable for research, analysis and write-up was unrealistic to begin with and should have taken into consideration Ramadan, scheduled absence of STC staff in August and the lack of adequate clerical help and translation services.

b) Second Quarter (September-December)

The upshot was that many of the activities of the first quarter were postponed until the second. These included the writing-up of the Mahweit district survey reports and site visits. Simultaneously, the RC had to design and conduct reconnaissance surveys in chosen uzlas outside Mahweit district and participate in the training program which did not begin on schedule but was postponed until the first week in October.

The participation of the RC in the training program was extended from the planned four weeks to eight weeks and lasted until November 19. This, in essence, put research activities one month (at least) behind schedule. Project research outside the Mahweit district was postponed until December when two site surveys were conducted, one in the western area of ar-Rejum, the other in eastern Khabt.

By the end of December (the six month period), the following documents were produced by the Research Sector:

1. Six Reconnaissance surveys, four on areas within Mahweit district, two on areas outside it.
2. Reports (in Arabic) on feasibility of stone cutter project, baseline for Arqub water project, two site surveys in Mahweit district and two outside it.
3. Training module and Training materials for Research Sector.

No impact evaluation reports for the Youth Club/ Boy Scout project or any subsequent projects undertaken by STC Mahweit seem to have been produced, including an evaluation of the eight week training period of the Yemeni field coordinators in research techniques.

By January, as a result of differences of opinion with the STC management staff, the RC had effectively ceased to function as part of the STC team.

Several issues and problems are raised in relation to the Research Sector. These are:

- a) As pointed out above, the research agenda outlined in the management plan was unrealistic and did not provide adequate time for data analysis, translation, consultation with LDA/CC, etc.
- b) There seems to have been (and still is) a lack of consensus among the STC-Yemen staff on criteria of impact evaluation for projects. These should have been resolved and some formalized procedure worked out.
- c) There seems to be little evidence that reconnaissance and other survey data was used by the PC's in making their decisions. In fact, one is tempted to say that research activity followed rather than preceded project planning. At least, this seems to have been the case in the Gharbi outreach water projects' case, and the EPI Arqub activity.

6. It is possible that the research activity (both formal and informal) led to some exasperation and suspicion on the parts of officials and populace alike. Some surely questioned the "real object" of this data gathering and its eventual use. Others had their expectations unduly raised. Still others were simply fed-up; a common criticism we heard over and over again was that the STC "were always doing research, asking this and that and then nothing came of it all".

In all, we feel that the decision to set up the position of RC and adopt a taxing research agenda full steam (in order to meet the June evaluation concern), was taken without due consideration of the needs of the other sectors and of the requirements of the Mahweit Project at that stage of its development.

C. New Program Activities

1. Training Program

Consonent with the recommendation of the Evaluation, a training program for Yemeni Field Coordinators (F.C.) was begun in September 1979. The program was designed for a nine month in-class/on-the-job training period with the objective of producing Yemeni F.C.'s competent in "community education and organization skills required by STC approach to community development" and with the technical and administrative skills required by various stages of project planning and implementation.

It was agreed initially that the trainees would include two present members of the STC Mahweit staff and two nominees from the Mahweit LDA, which will continue to pay part of their salaries during the program. The other trainees will be employed by the Mahweit Project for the duration of training. This was to be a formal community development training program and it seems that some of the students expected to receive certificates at its end in specific technical areas. This ambivalence as to the formal status of trainees who complete the program remains an issue to the F.C.'s.

Besides the four "built-in" trainees, the two being STC staff and the other two LDA employees, four Yemeni young men were recruited ending up with eight trainees in all. One apparently dropped out in the initial phases of the program which left a total of seven.

A senior bilingual Yemeni was lined up as program assistant and the whole training program was put under the directorship of the STC program manager. Both spent August in the U.S. in training and discussion of CBIRD at STC/Home Office in Westport.

On returning to Sana, a training course was designed which consisted of two months in theoretical instruction and the following seven in field training. In an introduction to the STC self-evaluation* of the first phase of the F.C. training course, the Yemeni program assistant wrote that he had mixed feelings about the F.C. course, its aims and design, "when I started to think about it, I felt myself torn. I realized that to discuss the concept of human development will lead us to discuss directly or indirectly politics, religion and Yemeni traditions and myths. To do that in Yemen is an unacceptable revolutionary activity due to limited democracy and the conservative traditional society".

Whether it was because of his ambivalent and skeptical attitude or not, the author proved to be inappropriate in his role as the senior Yemeni staff person charged with the difficult first

* Report and Evaluation: Field Coordinator Training, by J.Moyer, March 1980.

theoretical phase of the course. He was neither "comfortable nor committed" to the STC format in instruction (i.e., objective-method-evaluation) nor was his attendance record and accessibility at Mahweit that exemplary. However, it must be added that given the theoretical and experimental nature of CBIIRD approach and its learning-by-doing philosophy - both totally alien to Yemeni concepts of education - the effort must be judged a qualified success. Interviews with the F.C.s revealed that they have actually learned some of the basics of the CBIIRD approach.

Following the first two months of in-class training, the F.C.s were paired off and assigned to the different STC P.C.s for on-the-job learning in different sectors. This continued (with some of them rotated between sectors) until the April withdrawal. Three of the F.C.s were sent for a two and one-half week period of training in grafting fruit trees. However, it seems that the personality and teaching technique of the instructor left much to be desired and led to acrimony and waste. It appears to us that this training program was not adequately investigated.

As to the current status of the F.C.s: two are back at their regular jobs at Mahweit LDA/CC; one spent June completing an outreach small water project for the LDA (see section C.2); one has been sent by the Ministry of Agriculture to attend a training program in Sana. The cost of this is to be split between STC and the MOA. The rest of the F.C.s are inactive but continue to receive their salaries from STC.

The different problems encountered by the Training Program may be summarized as follows:

1. It became evident during the first months of in-class training that the curriculum and plan of execution were planned without adequate attention paid to the actual educational level of trainees and their backgrounds.
2. There was no standardized selection process applied to F.C. applicants, hence there was no uniformity in background, educational levels, interests, attitudes, flexibility, etc. - all of which are necessary for a program as open-ended as "community development". The lack of common educational background (let alone experience) among the trainees and their widely divergent social and political backgrounds no doubt posed serious challenges to program management.

3. STC realized in March 1980 that the on-the-job training of the F.C.s was putting severe strain on the STC P.C.s who, by then acting as teachers and supervisors, were increasingly drawn into the Mahweit crisis.
4. The training program seems to have been undertaken in a climate of ambiguity as to mutual expectations. The requirements and duties of the F.C.s (attendance, comportment, etc.) and their salaries do not seem to have been discussed in detail and agreed upon before commencement of the training program. This, in turn, led to some false expectations on the part of the F.C.s and general misunderstandings between some of them and STC staff later on.
5. The need of a qualified "committed" bi-lingual Yemeni senior staff person to supervise, manage and be "on call" throughout the program from beginning to end is self-evident, given its experimental nature, the importance of communication and need for continuity throughout.
6. We suspect that better planning of curriculum and the joint participation of the STC staff in designing the specific modules would have been necessary to avoid inconsistencies in sectoral training and intra-STC staff misunderstanding. The Arabic modules could have been ready prior to the beginning of classes so as to impart a more formal (and less ad hoc) aspect to the training of the F.C.s.
7. One of the criticisms leveled at the program by some of the F.C.s is that they did not get sufficient practical experience in a given technical sector. The rotation of their assignment often coincided with a period of inactivity for that specific sector. The fact that much on-the-job training in Mahweit coincided with the crisis is unfortunate. Furthermore, some F.C.s who developed special interest in some specific sectoral activity, felt that they should have been allowed to pursue that interest more systematically and thoroughly.
8. The involvement of the male F.C.s in the social sector, essentially their exposure to elementary nutrition, preventive health, breast feeding, etc., was seen by them as a waste of time at best and as an embarrassment at worst. Training in this sector seems to have been very cursory and unsystematic.

2. Outreach Program

Following the recommendation of the Evaluation, STC adopted an outreach tactic which called for extending Mahweil Project activities to at least two rural areas in Mahweil District by September 19, 1980, and to at least one other area in a neighboring district by November 19, 1980. The selection of these areas was to be jointly undertaken with the Mahweil LDA/CC and the relevant outreach LDA's and to be determined through field surveys, site visits and in accordance with a set of criteria that included the plans and commitments of local LDAs and the "goals and capabilities" of STC. The outreach program was to be accomplished during the extended Phase I period, October 1979 to September 1980, later extended to December 1980.

A research design and site selection criteria were worked out by STC and the Research Coordinator was charged with surveying the approximately eleven uzlas (subdistricts) that were selected jointly by STC and the LDA/CC. During July, nine uzlas were surveyed and four more surveyed in August - September. The Research Coordinator, however, was unable to complete the surveys by the September deadline due to a number of reasons that included Ramadan and the absence of many of the STC staff. Nor were the site visits conducted as planned.

The choice of two outreach areas in Mahweil District, Greater Arqub and Gharbi-Pani Abjar, was made in late October and formalized with the LDA/CC in November. The outreach site selection for neighboring districts did not begin until December when surveys were conducted in a number of uzlas in western Rejm and eastern Khabt. In January, eastern Khabt was chosen as the site for an outreach program.

To date, the tangible achievements of the outreach program seem to be limited to the infrastructure sector, namely the undertaking of five small water projects in Gharbi, a sub-district of Mahweil. The Urqub and Bani-Abjar small water project plans were abandoned because of severe local political problems encountered. The five Gharbi water projects are in various stages of implementation: the Ghayl Za'1 being the only one almost completed by April 1980. A Field Coordinator was sent by the LDA in June to oversee the completion of two of the remaining five and he reports that they were completed. The fate of the other two is still pending.

Otherwise, the one other outreach activity undertaken seems to have been a first round of Thursday visits by the mobile clinic (of the STC Nutrition Center in Mahweil) to five village clusters in the Arqub outreach area. A total of about 200 infants were vaccinated. A follow-up visit (conducted after the February closure of the Mahweil

Nutrition Center) proved unsuccessful. The attendance record was very low and those who showed up complained of reactions to vaccination scars, etc.

It seems clear that the outreach program was beset with problems from its very inception. Some of these problems were "built-in", others were coincidental. Of the former, one must mention the unrealistic deadlines set for primary research and analysis and site selection given the state of readiness of STC and its limited manpower, especially with all the scheduled annual leaves for that summer. Second, there was the failure to see that undertaking a new program (outreach) at the same juncture when STC was reorganizing into a new project could only disperse their limited resources and tax the abilities of the staff. This seems to have been compounded by the scheduled leaves and sending STC staff back to the U.S. for training at the Home Office. All of which clearly taxed the abilities of remaining field staff to develop new programs, meet their sectoral work in Mahweit and fill in for absent colleagues.

At the same time STC was attempting to initiate outreach activities, Mahweit town-based projects began to demand increased amounts of staff time and resources. Mending town-based projects and stretching outreach resources began to dissipate STC resources and introduced further ambiguities into Project planning.

D. Changes in Management

As summarized in III.A., the Evaluation recommended a series of changes, many of which were aimed toward improving a rather flaccid style of Project management. STC responded rather quickly to recommended changes through the creation of needed functional positions (e.g., an essentially field-based Program Manager, a separate coordinator for research), the preparation of sector specific six month work plans, an increase in the recording of project activities and a renewed emphasis on the amount of time staff spent in the field.

Most all of these changes were a positive contribution to the Project. STC staff were in the field more and as a result, more effective at the local level. (June 1979-April 1980 percent of work-days spent in Mahweit: Director, as of October 15, 47%; Program Manager, 74%; Project Coordinators, 71%; 87%; 93%; 95%, respectively). The new Program Manager did enforce some discipline in the way different sectors related to one another. Long range planning schedules made it easier to monitor performance on a quarterly

basis and gradually a relatively flat organizational structure in terms of functions and responsibility was being transformed into a hierarchical system of management.

During the period under review a number of changes occurred to challenge the new Project management. Among the more important were:

- expatriate staff changes were considerable:
 - a) directorship changed; b) Social Coordinator departed, not to be replaced; c) nutritionist is added; d) several Peace Corps staff are added in addition to health-related Yemeni staff.
- new training programs, particularly the Field Coordinator program, added a number of Yemenis under STC responsibility.
- of external changes, the change in the Governor created additional burdens of rejustifying the Project.
- some projects began to come on stream requiring STC management to procure material and major pieces of equipment.
- of major significance, the Mahweit crisis from February to the present, nearly consumed STC management in meetings, memo writing and in the growing controversy of the situation.

On balance, generally high marks should be given, considering the Yemeni contextualism of management. This type of project, we believe, had not been attempted before in Yemen. Even if there were management models of relatively greater or lesser success drawn from STC's experience elsewhere, the Yemeni context would have required extreme acts of adaptation and occasional contrition. STC management practices for Mahweit evolved out of a learning situation. The Mahweit crisis provided a laboratory for reflection and learning. In many respects, however, the Mahweit context was too volatile, too politicized and above all too needy (or greedy in the words of the Governor) to attempt an approach of "learning while doing".

STC management staff have been candid about their experiences and much of the following list of issues and problems has been derived from their own self-evaluations:

1. The failure to identify, recruit, train and place in key positions senior Yemeni staff at each critical management point (e.g., Director, Program Manager, Project Coordinators), ultimately contributed to problems related to communication and functional ties with Yemeni officialdom. The point will not be belabored here since it is treated in sectoral reviews. It is accepted that such counterpart staff is difficult to identify (particularly when the requirement of English is added - a spurious criterion). However, we believe that the Sana-based director could have placed greater priority on this task.
2. Related to the point above, there is general consensus in both the Yemeni official community and within STC that a formal agreement(s) should have been undertaken at the outset or early in the project with one (CYDA?) or more government agencies. Despite an original laxness on the part of the Yemeni government to insist upon this, STC should have shared its work plans and budget projections with a series of relevant agencies and individuals stretching from Sana to the office of the Governor of Mahweit. To date, we have not found a Yemeni official who had been sufficiently informed of the project prior to the withdrawal of the STC team to Sana in April 1980.* Aside from the potential benefits of public relations during the life of the Project, and the need for a benefactor during a crisis (the current situation), closer ties to official Yemeni resources conceivably could have improved the performance of individual sectoral activities. We see STC-Yemen government cooperative relations as one management function which was ineffectively performed.
3. Closely related but perhaps of more importance, is the discontinuous STC relationship with the Mahweit LDA and LDA/CC throughout the Project. The notion of working through the LDA seems to have developed only during late 1979 and probably not until the LDA formulated its Three Year Plan in February-March 1980 is there some evidence of effective STC/LDA cooperation.

The Three Year Plan reputedly reflects STC interests in small water projects broadening the LDA previous emphasis on school construction to include town and village small water systems. There is really no consistent theme, however, to the STC/LDA relationship. The LDA did not engage in long-range integrated

* We have found no Yemeni official who has read the 1979 Special Evaluation, a document which constituted new Project objectives.

planning (the Three Year Plan is a wish list of unrelated projects); it did little in the social sector (particularly as STC defined it); it did not place much priority on agriculture; it undertook no research, and lastly, most of STC's infrastructure projects were not undertaken jointly with the LDA. It is unclear where responsibility rested for the technical assistance assumedly provided to the LDA. Again, it appears to have been a management function to design and implement a work plan for relating to the LDA. Such a systematic plan of action seems to be lacking.

4. We have noted on several occasions STC problems in dealing with Yemeni staff, e.g., various categories of trainees, with special reference to personnel policy. One set of issues deals with salary, benefits, scope of work and working conditions. Another relates to long-term issues of who will assume organizational and financial responsibility for Yemeni trainees once trained and in place. The problem seems particularly acute since the unexpected termination of activities has left an aura of uncertainty around careers only partially developed.

It would seem that more thought should have been given to this problem and again, linkage to Yemeni institutions might have forecasted the need for host government continuity for training and employment.

5. One function of management in the context of this Project should have been to identify additional sources of funding for future activities. It is recognized that the Project did have relations with the Dutch, British and German development programs in terms of very specific activities (e.g., training programs, obtaining poultry). It is also noted that CYDA through the Mahweit LDA did make certain project contributions either in cash or in kind. The fact remains, however, that after two and one-half years of STC activities in Mahweit, there is no other major donor in sight to continue all or some of Project components. Rural development in Yemen has attracted the interest of a number of bilateral as well as international donors (e.g., UNICEF, IBRD). Good performance should be able to attract wider donor interest than has been the case to date.
6. In terms of direct STC staff capabilities, we recognize the difficulty of recruiting qualified staff with an adequate background in rural development, prior Near East experience, and sufficient Arabic language proficiency. Specifically, the Project Coordinators for infrastructure, agriculture and research are particularly well qualified in view of their Yemen

and Near East experience. Rather, it seems more important to point out that no one on the STC Mahweil staff had any prior development-related experience comparable to the CD/CBIRD approach required by STC. In more cases than not, sectoral development activities were constrained by a philosophy and method in which the teacher was only a step ahead of the student.

During the year in review, at critical points in the development of the Project, vital technical staff were removed from the Project for STC training in the U.S. Not only was the timing questionable (to which one could add scheduled leave), but the content of the training as later applied to the Mahweil context was equally questionable. It would have seemed more cost effective for STC to provide in-country group training to STC staff through the visit of one or two qualified STC trainers. In this fashion, the contextualism of Mahweil would have been brought to bear upon theory and the group experiences of Project staff could have served as case material.

The high level of personal commitment shown by most all Project staff coupled by a willingness to engage in personal sacrifice, were ultimately no substitute for solid experience. In the case of management, the Director and Program Manager both lacked comparable experience. It is of great credit to their prowess that they were able to implement most of the recommendations of the 1979 Evaluation. In retrospect, not all the recommendations were sound nor were the changes a panacea or accurate solution of problems which were later incurred. Equally important, earlier mistakes were simply carried into 1979-1980.

IV. The Mahweil Crisis

This section will deal with the Mahweil Project crisis and the issues that led to closing the Project's Nutrition Center on February 18, 1980 and to the withdrawal of STC staff from the town in April. The STC, of course, has its own view of "the problem" which it tends to reduce to the "sewage project". We, on the other hand, tend to see the Mahweil crisis as a more general one that goes back further in time and one which is perhaps inherent in the philosophy and approach of STC and its mode of interaction with the different groups that constitute Mahweil town. From this perspective, "the sewage problem" is but one manifestation of a chronic crisis in confidence and working relationship between STC and the town. Earlier "problems" included those of the water project, the town plan, the women activities, etc. Problems which accompanied the different projects did not seem to abate or be definitively resolved. On the contrary, they seem to have been

compounded and reified so that by the end of March it became clear that the whole STC presence in Mahweil was in jeopardy.

In order to best understand the nature of the problems, a brief sketch of the local social context and political structure of Mahweil is necessary. An appreciation of the local socio-political environment of Mahweil is also important for the evaluation of STC's special approach to rural development and to the practicality of relocating STC in some other Yemeni town, since most of these towns tend to resemble Mahweil - at least those in the northern area of the country.

What were the different social groups in Mahweil? How were they related to each other and to the available resources? How were their different interests represented and who were the leaders? Where did STC fit into this? And how were they viewed? What follows is admittedly an impressionistic synthesis based upon available project documents and a limited set of interviews.

Mahweil is a town of around 7,000 people and is the seat of the governorate of Mahweil Province. As with all provincial capitals, Mahweil is the leading commercial, educational and social center of the region. An old town, Mahweil's physical layout reflects to a large extent its complex social organization. The oldest and highest part of the town is the partially walled section called 'asma'. This houses the governor's quarters and the town's traditional elite made up of the landlords and the qadi families. These latter are "the learned", jurists/judges who until recently functioned as religious teachers and adjudicators.

Below this quarter is the one of Mailab - a mixed neighborhood where the bourgeoisie of Mahweil lived. Made up of the merchant and artisan families, this group shaded into the lower bourgeoisie consisting of ahī al-sūq, the market people; small shop keepers and the barbers, butchers, blacksmiths - all of whom practiced low-status occupations.

On the periphery of the town are a number of different hamlets inhabited by recent immigrants from the rural countryside. Two of these hamlets, al-Dhuhr and Hijrat Athailil have been recently incorporated into Mahweil township, not without some opposition from the townspeople who consider the inhabitants to be outsiders, less "civilized" and competitors for the town's resources.

The different occupational and status groups of Mahweil are all organized into loose "clans", large extended families

occupying different households and generally grouped in specific neighborhoods. These kinship cum local groups are represented by their shuyukh and 'uqqal, the elders who tend to be the heads of the dominant lineages as well as those whose piety and wisdom is generally acknowledged. This collection of elders, collectively referred to as shuyukh, constitute in Mahweit one interest group, albeit neither a homogeneous nor cohesive one, differentiated as these shuyukh are by being urban or rural in origin, rich or poor, member of a large powerful family or representing a recent immigrant one, etc.

It seems that this traditional leadership in the town has had to contend with an emergent group of young men collectively referred to as shabab or shabiba. Coming from different backgrounds and representing different life experiences, these young men are nonetheless united in their sharing a "modern" world view, one which is not characterized by any common ideology, unless it is the rejection of the old Imami order and all that it represented. Rather, between them they represent the different ideologies current in the Arab world: nationalism (wattaniya), Marxism (shuyu'iyā), Islamic fundamentalism (Ikhwan) and even regionalism as expressed in the notion of "fraternal tribalism". Despite their differences, they all share a vision of an independent, "developed" Yemen on par with its fellow Arab states.

The Ikhwan and those who support them seem to be well organized in Mahweit and to be in control of one of the youth clubs, nadi. Financed, no doubt, from the outside, they are a vocal and powerful group - one that "naturally" would choose someone like STC as a convenient target.

Another important group to consider is the LDA, the local Development Association, the group the STC took to represent the counterpart of the "community committee" in rural Yemen.

From its inception as an ad hoc collection of Mahweiti notables in the mid-sixties, to its institutionalization as a cooperative or association in 1968 to its later formalization in 1973 following the creation of CYDA, the Mahweit LDA has always occupied a difficult position as a middleman between the central government and the townspeople. LDA membership is elected and tends to represent the competing local factions. It also has a very limited budget with which to operate and tends to be chronically understaffed with paid fulltime clerical personnel. The LDA must seek the approval and support of the governor and the local notables on both of whom it depends for the money and support

necessary to implement its projects. Given the fact that LDA members have nominal salaries only and are part-time, it is not surprising that they are interested in large scale, "visible" projects.

The central government in Mahweil is largely represented by the governor and other central government representatives, consisting of the Directors of the Health Office and of the Agricultural Office and their deputies. Given the fact that the Yemeni nation-state is still in its formative stage, and where the local presence of national institutions is weak, the importance of the Governor in a place like Mahweil becomes of critical importance to local development projects. The level of support assigned by the central government to the province depends to a large extent on who is the governor. The very presence in Mahweil of STC staff and resources was seen by the Governor as a supplement to inadequate central support and as such went quickly under the Governor's control. It is ironic that STC was greatly influenced by the Governor insofar as it eschews relationships with central government forces.

The unscheduled joint USAID/STC evaluation of June 1979 was in response to common recognition that the Project was experiencing real difficulties in Mahweil. As the summary of the evaluation in Section III.A. of this report indicates, no small part of these difficulties were due to STC's "insufficient awareness of critical contextual issues related to working in Mahweil". These translate into a lack of awareness of the different interest groups, their different expectations, the limited capacity of the LDA and its shifting base of support and the crucial necessity for STC to clearly and unequivocally integrate its projects, especially those in the health and agriculture sectors to appropriate ministries, an issue which has been discussed in the context of the separate sectoral activities.

In effect, one is tempted to say that by the summer of 1979, STC, far from playing its designated role of "community catalyst", had perhaps unwittingly become one more "interest group" in Mahweil town. This role was probably tolerated when small projects were at stake. For example, STC worked with the LDA in the infrastructure sector, allying itself with the LDA when it came to conflict over a road plan or location of small water project. However, when it came to larger projects with political connotations or socially sensitive issues, STC could not muster allies.

STC's role became even more precarious as a result of the water project issue and the coup de grace came with the sewage problem. A brief chronology of the development of this problem is useful as it illustrates how STC had come to be viewed by the

Mahweitis and the nature of the cul-de-sac that the STC had worked itself into by the winter of 1980. (Account is based on Memorandum by Burrowes/Reid, May 1980; 'Brief Chronology and Analysis of the 'Problem'' since my report of March 29, 1980')

Following hard on the heels of the impasse of the Mahweil Town Water Project, the sewage project should have provided an opportunity for STC to repair its relationship with the town of Mahweil. But it turned out otherwise.

After conducting water quality tests on Mahweil's main water source, STC found it to be contaminated from the ineffective sewage disposal of the town. When told of this, Mahweitis became interested in the construction of a system of disposal/treatment of their sewage. STC offered to cooperate in planning, design and construction of such a system - participating within the constraints of their budget. After study, a plan was drawn up for the five quarters of the town with an estimated total cost of \$577,263. The plan was approved by the town representatives, the Governor, LDA/CC, etc. STC, which had pledged \$42,000 out of its 1980 budget to sewage project, proposed that they begin with a partial sewage system for one quarter, Mijlab, which is situated directly above the water source. The cost of this sub-project was estimated at \$115,453.

A meeting was called in the Governor's quarters on April 16, 1980 to publically discuss the issue. All interest groups of the town were apparently represented, including a large contingent of the Ikhwan. The General Secretary of the LDA/CC and a crucial figure in the Mahweil LDA, was out of town. STC apparently misread the nature of this critical meeting and sent a P.C. to represent them, accompanied by one member of the LDA. Neither the STC Director nor the Project Manager were present.

The meeting quickly transformed itself into an open assault on Mahweil Project as a whole, accusing the Americans of breaking promises, bad faith and lying about finances. When the STC P.C. tried to present the sewage project option, he was shouted down. The Governor then was asked for a solution. He proposed that STC should assume full responsibility for the cost of the entire sewage mainline in 1980. This was accepted by the notables present and an ultimatum was given to STC: accept and begin to work by the end of two weeks, i.e., April 30 - otherwise, STC's facilities would be closed down by that date!

The following ten days, April 16-26, were spent in frantic efforts to negotiate a compromise with the Governor and concerned parties. The Director of STC met with the Governor on April 21st and explained to him that STC could not meet the \$150,000 (expected

STC share for the total sewage project) out of its 1980 budget, nor could it draw upon 1981 funds that did not yet exist. The Governor replied that the people of Mahweit were adamant - STC must do something "they can see" and that a compromise will not do. The Secretary General of the LDA/CC, on whom STC counted to mediate the issue, remained abroad. A decision was then made by STC to withdraw before the April 30 deadline (so as to avoid possible incidents). The staff pulled out of Mahweit before dawn on April 26. The U.S. Ambassador was informed of the withdrawal on the same day.

Since the withdrawal from Mahweit, various attempts have been made by STC senior staff to enlist the mediating aid of the U.S. Ambassador, CPO, CYDA and USAID. Enlisting the CPO and CYDA's support was hampered by the fact that senior officials in these agencies knew little or nothing of the Mahweit Project to begin with! Thus, at the same time that their help was being solicited in the crisis, they were being "filled-in" on the Project, something that could and should have been attended to earlier in the Project. The Secretary General of the LDA/CC, back in Yemen, limited his contribution to the suggestion that STC be more "forthcoming on the sewage project" and that they should plan to complete the training of the Yemeni field coordinators regardless of the fate of the Mahweit Project.

V. Appraisal of STC Approach to Rural Development in Yemen

A. Mahweit Town Context for STC Approach

Section IV of this evaluation sketched out some of the areas of socio-political differentiation in Mahweit. The picture presented is one of a large community with the following relevant characteristics:

- highly differentiated in terms of social groups (origins, occupations, tribal affiliations, political ascription and the use of religion as a marker for political action)
- lack of modern, secular, civic institutions which crosscut parochial loyalties
- weak presence of central government authority
- major net deficits in basic infrastructure (e.g., water, roads, sewage, educational facilities, health services)
- distortions in the local economy due to national inflation, and workers' remittances yielding high levels of liquid personal assets.

Given these characteristics, along with the relative physical isolation of the town, we believe that the choice of Mahweit as the site for the STC Project was, at best, problematic if not a major error in judgment.

We believe that the STC philosophy as outlined in the OPG extension document (see pp 7-18) presumes that the subject community possesses a number of requisite characteristics such as:

- a degree of social homogeneity
- a sense of cohesiveness formed around a number of commonly agreed upon objectives
- an egalitarian ideology oriented toward the community good, which works through civic "democratic" institutions.

This model of a recipient community is a near antithesis of Mahweit. As can be seen in various sections of this evaluation, a number of serious problems, misunderstandings, misplaced expectations and delays in implementation were the result of an underlying contradiction between the STC ideal and the Mahweit reality.

In looking closely at the basic premises of the STC philosophy of rural development and its tactics, a number of points emerge which we believe are relevant to the Mahweit context described above.

1. There is an emphasis on the process of developing a program and less on end products, such as projects. This has been characterized as "learning by doing", with the emphasis on the evolution of an awareness of one's environment. Given the level of development of Mahweit and what we sense to be a clear consensus by Mahweitis on what are their basic needs, the STC strategy is misplaced. It can and did lead to heightened expectations which could not be fulfilled with the resources at hand. The nature of the STC-community relationship was one of tolerance within which the STC staff was permitted to pursue a learning process around small projects. Ultimately, even these small projects generated conflict (e.g., over water rights and road alignment).
2. There is also a premium placed upon the intensity and quality of local participation in planning and implementation. In a highly factionalized community, how is it possible for a foreign group to mobilize representative participation? One also has to keep in mind the increasingly sensitive issue of individual affiliation with American activities. Some Mahweitis resisted affiliation because of perceived consequences, others expected bribes

to participate, and yet others found participation culturally alien.

3. There is also a requirement in this approach to simultaneously undertake complex tasks such as: institution building, transfer of skills through training, and the integration of the learning process into the fabric of the recipient community. These requirements, given the contextualism of Mahweit and the resources of STC, were both ambitious and lacked realism. STC's inability to assign priority to tasks and to focus on a limited set of manageable activities dissipated energies and lessened their credibility in the eyes of Mahweitis.
4. There is an emphasis in this approach to reach women through project activities in order to improve the quality of their lives and to encourage them to undertake new economic roles. In Mahweit, as elsewhere in Yemen, women and family represent a bastion of core values which stand at the center of the private sphere of social life. The STC nutrition and women's projects did penetrate this sphere in a manner interpreted as threatening. Aside from the wider political problems which ultimately targetted upon the STC project, we believe that community reaction to the manner in which STC undertook to affect women's values and behavior would have eventually been negative and censorious.
5. One of the stated goals of STC is "the creation of a self-sustaining capacity for self-help" which would presumably lead to internally generated sustained development. It can be argued that this capacity for self-help is a result of "development" rather than a precondition. Many of STC's early activities to generate this consciousness of self-confidence and self-help seem to have been premature given the fact that there was yet no demonstrated change in the Mahweitis' environment, political or socio-economic. It was a case of putting the cart before the horse.
6. Lastly, STC does not place an emphasis upon either strengthening central government capabilities or "shifting rural communities from dependence on their immediate environment to dependence on a remote central government". In the Yemeni context, we believe this constitutes a major flaw in development theory. The experience of the STC project staff by their own admission is that it was a mistake not to have involved central government in initial planning, budgeting, and implementation of project activities. Because of the fact that government services are in their formative stage, activities such as STC can serve to shape and develop the eventual effective delivery of government services.

B. STC Capacity to Adapt Their Approach to Mahweit Context

The STC approach in its full application would ultimately result in a fairly complete integration of staff into the host community. This integration, to be successful, requires a high degree of cultural sensitivity and awareness, linguistic proficiency, a sustained presence, and appropriate skills. It is obvious that this set of qualifications is difficult to satisfy. We believe that many of the STC field staff were well qualified, highly motivated, and committed to their task. However, the essential ingredient lacking was a demonstrated ability to, in fact, employ the tools of rural development. The STC concept of rural development was uncritically accepted and employed by the staff which had little or no prior experience in development assistance and therefore no alternative.

VI. Options for STC Mahweit Project

In the foregoing sections of this evaluation we have tried to point out a number of problems and issues which (a) had been a part of the STC Project from the outset in 1978 and, (b) had developed over the past year in review. Had the Mahweit crisis not occurred, forcing the suspension of all Project activities, we believe that major changes in the Project would have had to take place anticipatory to the development of a possible Phase II. Fundamental changes in the basic STC approach to rural development with particular reference to Yemen have been suggested in Section V. Specific recommendations with regard to sectoral activities, relationships with Yemeni central/local government organizations and style of management have been suggested in various sections of this evaluation.

In making these observations and recommendations, we have tried as much as possible to separate problems inherent in the STC Project itself from issues which may be external or coincidental with the presence of STC within the town of Mahweit. It is clear that STC could have served as the unwitting target of local political forces which have their origins in the contemporary Yemeni political culture. However, the issue is somewhat academic since STC's presence itself within the community and its mode of involvement in politicized issues in Mahweit made it a party to the overall process of political unrest.

With these comments in mind, we have attempted to provide a series of options, qualifying each in terms of the following variables:

- STC's CD/CBIRD dated approach to rural development or whatever modified version it will wish to employ
- STC's performance record in Mahweit with particular reference to the past year
- the continuing unstable political climate of Mahweit and some of the villages in its hinterland
- the continuing spector of the unresolved Mahweit Town water and sewage projects
- anticipated changeover of STC field staff resulting in the departure of now experienced staff, and
- the ambiguous image that STC has projected to Yemeni authorities of a charitable cum quasi U.S. governmental agency (a view also applicable to the Peace Corps which is often confused with STC and which also suffers from an ambiguous status).

The following options are not ranked in order of feasibility or desirability. They do, however, cover the range of plausible options given the current situation:

A. Resumption of Project, as is, in Mahweit town.

Based upon a wide range of interviews both in Sana and in Mahweit town, we understand that for this to be a viable option the following conditions must be met:

1. A formal protocol must be developed and ratified by some or all of the following groups; CYDA, CPO, Governor of Mahweit and at least one line ministry. This agreement must detail precise activities, time schedule, budget and functional responsibilities of each party concerning each project activity.
2. The outstanding issues of the town water and sewage projects (both of which are beyond the mandate and capability of STC) must be resolved; i.e., STC's role vis-a-vis these issues must be clear and U.S. funding must be settled.

3. Local political factions in Mahweit town would have to arrive at a common agreement with the Governor to invite STC back and to remove the ultimatum which triggered the withdrawal.
4. Issues emanating from social sector activities which elicited adverse reactions from elements of the community must be resolved; e.g., opposition to women's participation in the activities of the nutrition and women's centers.

We doubt that these conditions can be met and within a reasonable period of time allowing STC resources to be usefully employed. Additionally, the Governor of Mahweit has made it clear to us that he does not wish to see the return of the STC project to the town. There is also evidence that the CPO shares this view.

B. Return to a Base in Mahweit Town but with a Modified Approach

1. Conditions 1-3 under Option I would have to be met.
2. Based upon interviews and a review of sector-specific problems, we believe that an acceptable proposal from STC would be to pare back a multi-sector approach and concentrate on a) small water projects in outreach areas and b) agricultural adaptive research and selected extension.
3. The EPI program could be continued through the Mahweit hospital until full town coverage is achieved. Following this, EPI outreach could be pursued under MOH auspices.

This option is highly problematic for the same reasons listed under Option A. The current attitude of the Governor and the political climate in the town would undoubtedly reactivate old reactions leading to constraints on project activities and may even endanger personal safety.

C. Move Project to an Outreach Site with (1) The Same Approach and, (2) A Modified Approach

1. It is assumed that a move to an outreach site (a village cluster in Mahweit district or a cluster in a nearby district) would be based upon survey research, site visit, cooperation of Governor, LDA/CC, local LDA, and CYDA. Further, that a program agenda would have been agreed upon by all parties, with clearly defined responsibilities and assignments.

2. We continue to believe that similar to Option B.2., STC should pare back its comprehensive approach to concentrate on one or two sectoral activities which meet local expectations and which are within STC's financial and technical capacity.

Option C is one which has been discussed with CYDA, CPO, MOA and the Governor. There is consensus that with a revised program based upon protocol agreements, STC would be welcomed back to Mahweit province. The districts of al Rejm and al Khabt have been mentioned as possibilities.

D. Terminate the Project at this Juncture and Reschedule the Unexpended Balance of Approximately \$470,000 of STC/AID Funds (as of July 1980) of Phase I.

1. There are a number of training requirements remaining. The seven Field Coordinators received minimal initial training through the Project but do not have a sufficient level of technical knowledge to pursue recognizable careers. There is a need to develop a training plan for some of these trainees, supported by STC, which would insure future employment.

2. Based in Sana, STC infrastructure staff could selectively implement to completion, priority small water projects identified by the Phase I STC Project.

3. The entire balance could be obligated for the undertaking of the complete Mahweit town sewage system in conjunction with LDA and Ministry of Public Works funds and technical assistance.

Mahweith 7/10 - 7/12 :

Muhammad as-Sanabani
'Ali Hammoudi
Hussein Muhsin
Anwar Yahya al-Dhubri

Governor
Municipal Council, Head
Municipal Council, Deputy
Deputy Director Health Services

STC Field Coordinators:

Abd al Rahman Nuzaili
'Ali Mohammad Huneina
Abd al Mumin al Wadi
Ghaleb al Zerraga
Abd al Malik al Qalisi

YEMEN FIELD OFFICE

MAY 1979

GOALS:	INDICATORS:	MEANS OF VERIFICATION:	ASSUMPTIONS:
<p>To help improve the quality of rural life in the Mahweit Governorate and the Yemen Arab Republic</p>	<p>Substantive rural development achievements in—</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increased infrastructure development 2. Improved health/nutrition status 3. Improved agricultural productivity and techniques 4. Increased household productivity, particularly in women's sector 5. Increased number of Mahweit people in skills through formal/non-formal education 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Baseline data comparisons 2. Site inspections 3. Comparison with other relevant information 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. No major political upheavals 2. Stable relationship between foreign agencies and YARG 3. No natural disasters 4. The CBIRD approach does make positive, cost-effective, measurable and demonstrable improvements in the quality of life of the people of Mahweit
<p>PURPOSE: To assist selected Local Development Associations and other community groups to plan and manage integrated rural development activities in the fields of infrastructure development agriculture productivity and social development</p>	<p>END OF PROJECT STATUS:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Integrated projects carried out in two nawaah of Mahweit Governorate 2. At least six integrated development projects undertaken in cooperation with local groups 3. At least four field coordinators hired and working in field in conjunction with SCF and LDA 4. At least 20% of field coordinators' salaries paid by LDA or CYDA 5. At least three projects undertaken involving local groups: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. one of which produces regular income in support of Coordinating Council and its activities b. one of which is organized and operated by women c. one of which directly benefits youth 6. Six projects undertaken in cooperation with local institutions at least one of which is in agricultural, social and infrastructure sector 7. At least 20 meetings held involving groups in project planning and management 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. SCF Semi-Annual Administrative Reports, containing indicators report and narrative. 2. Annual Management Plan, containing sectoral strategies, project application forms, implementation plan, budget 3. End of year evaluation reports (E-1, E-2, E-3) 4. Field coordinator records 5. Project committee records 6. Site inspections 7. Consultations with beneficiaries, LDA officials, YARG ministry officials, local government officials 8. Organizational meeting log book 9. Reports and records of project coordinators 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Rural Yemeni population open to SCF CBIRD methodology 2. LDA willing to critically examine CBIRD methodology under field conditions 3. Field staff available and will continue with program 4. YARG continues to lend its basic support to the proposed SCF program 5. Residents of communities involved recognize the importance of and continue to participate fully in community activities

	<p>8. At least 50 field visits carried out by SCF staff to provide technical advice/assistance in addressing specific local problems</p>		
<p>OUTPUTS:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Integrated rural development activities on-going in selected areas 2. Field coordinators trained in assisting local community groups in planning and management of integrated activities 3. Local citizens trained in skills which are relevant to community needs 4. Strengthening of linkages between local level groups and relevant governmental and other outside agencies 5. Local and governmental contributions to integrated rural development project activities 6. A model for integrated rural development successfully tested 	<p>OUTPUT INDICATORS:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Four field coordinators in place by June 1979 2. Four field coordinators trained and operating in field by December 1979 3. At least 3 non-formal skill training modules designed, one in each sector 4. At least 5 formal skill training opportunities provided 5. At least 20 meetings in which local level representatives have participated in requesting assistance from central level government and other agencies 6. At least 8 new activities involving central level government or other donor assistance 7. 25% total project funding provided by YARG and/or local contribution 8. Project applications refer to and make practical use of results of appropriate research 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. through 9. of Purpose level, plus 10. Baseline studies 11. Other relevant studies and research documents 12. Training curricula 13. Training records 14. SCF inventory and books 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Local human resources (field staff) available and will continue with program 2. Rural Yemeni population open to SCF CBIRD methodology 3. LDA willing to critically examine CBIRD methodology under field conditions 4. YARG continues to lend its basic support to the proposed SCF program 5. Residents of communities involved recognize the importance of and continue to participate fully in community activities
<p>INPUTS:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. U. S. AID and SCF funding for Phase J 2. Director, Project Coordinators and support staff 3. SCF Administration 4. Capital Assets: vehicles, office/housing furnishings 	<p>INPUT INDICATORS:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. \$1,040,000 U. S. AID \$ 125,000 SCF 2. Director, etc. 3. Office and 3 houses in Sanaa Office and 3 houses in Mah-wait 4. 4 Toyota vehicles 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. SCF finance reports 2. SCF inventory reports 3. Price "atorhouse audits 4. Other SCF reports 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Funds are available when needed 2. Personnel with appropriate qualifications available when needed 3. Living conditions are adequate Housing and office space available when needed 4. Project materials available when needed



Report on
Logical Framework Indicators

Program Manager

June 1980

evaluators' notes

Introduction:

This report is a summary of where American Save the Children stands in relation to achieving the Purpose and Output level indicators of the Logical Framework revised for the project in June 1979.

The original logical framework of the September 1977 C-G submitted by Save the Children was reviewed and critiqued as a part of the AID/Yemen, Save the Children/Yemen informal evaluation undertaken in May 1979. That evaluation recommended that the logical framework be revised to give the project a management document that would be more useful in guiding the project, and more accurately measure its successes and failures in terms of the project's objectives.

This was done by the ASFC team, with the guidance and critique of AID/Y staff.

Since then the Program Manager's quarterly reports have continued to monitor the project progress toward those objectives and indicators. At the time of the most recent quarterly report (April-June 1980) the project has made great progress toward achieving most of these indicators and consequently its objectives.

Additionally, the assumptions noted in the revised logical framework have proved relevant to the current state of affairs the project finds itself in.

Progress made towards achieving indicators

I. Purpose level - End of Project Status

- 1) Integrated projects carried out in two nahawi of Mahweh governate.

SMAS - (partially achieved) Integrated sub-projects have been ongoing in Mahweh nahawi since before the May 1979 evaluation. Sub-project activity in Khast nahawi was on the verge of beginning in April 1980 when the project ceased most of its field activities. A meeting had been scheduled with the Khast LDA for the week of the project's withdrawal to finalize and sign project application forms for 1 road project, 3 small water projects and a public toilet. Preliminary discussions had also taken place on ASFC and LDA cooperation on a health clinic in Khast.

See Section III B.

For Mahweh District

Hawra/Nahawi

Projects represent

Maximum Level

of Program Integration

- 2) At least six integrated development projects undertaken in cooperation with local groups.



STATUS - (Achieved) As of the team's departure 12 integrated sub-projects had been undertaken. They included:

- See Section III.B.3. { 1) Nutrition Program - includes 3 sub-projects (Nutrition Center, Children's Hospital Room and Extended Immunization Program). The project focuses on health nutrition education to the general population, institution building through the training of local women as health/nutrition workers and health nutrition intervention services.
- See Section III.B.3. { 2) The Women's Center - which was able to be developed out of the activities of the Nutrition Center. This project as well as being integrated with the activities of the morning center also involved training of literacy and sewing classes to allow women to develop skills that would be a means of producing income.
- See Section III.B.1 { 3) The Chicken Demo/Experiment Project - which by itself demonstrated improved poultry care practices and was used as a tool for discussion and health/nutrition practices in the Nutrition Center. The end results of the experiment also allow for the design of other small poultry projects with locals as income generating projects.
demo. only
- See Section III.B.2. { 4-5-6) Three Small Water Projects - completed in the Charbi area providing more water, more accessible water and cleaner water. Additionally, these are a vehicle for the discussion of the importance of health standards and practices.
- " { 7-8-9) Three small water projects applications signed in Charbi area but implementation held up due to field activities being ceased. The same integrated factors as listed in 4-5-6 apply here.
- " { 10) LDA Truck Project - provide a potential income generating capacity to the LDA, while reducing the cost of transporting materials for all other ASTC/LDA projects.
- " { 11) Stone Cutter - integrated with the use of the LDA Truck in transporting stone to and from the machine.
not implemented
- See Section III.B.2. { 12) Reforestation Nursery - provides seedlings to local people. Fruit trees seedlings which will be income providing for local farmers and other trees to provide a source of fire wood and soil conservation.
no extension

5) At least four Field Coordinators hired and working in field



in conjunction with ASFO and LDA.

See Section
III.c.2.

STATUS:- (Achieved) Beginning September 1979, ASFO and the LDA jointly sponsored a Field Coordinator (F.C.) training course. The course started with 4 F.C.s from the Coordinating Council of the LDA, 1 F.C. already on ASFO payroll, and 4 new F.C. trainees recruited locally. A total of 9 trainees were in the course. Since then 1 F.C. trainee has left Yemen on a scholarship for further training in France, and 1 F.C. trainee has returned to full responsibility in the C.C. There are currently 7 F.C.s working full time with ASFO and the LDA/CC.

- 4) At least 20% of Field Coordinators' salaries paid by LDA or CIDA.

STATUS - (Achieved) Of the eight F.C.s, the C.C. pays 3,900 YR per month and ASFO pays 10,100YR per month. The C.C. percentage is just less than 28%. This was reported in the October - December 1979 quarterly report.

- 5) At least three projects undertaken involving local groups:
a) one of which produces regular income in support of Coordinating Council (C.C.) and its activities.
b) one which is organized and operated by women.
c) one of which directly benefits youth.

STATUS - (Achieved) To date 21 sub-projects have been undertaken involving local groups.

- a) The stone cutter project, designed to generate income for the LDA has been undertaken. Two other projects, the LDA Truck and LDA Backhoe have the potential to generate income, though this was not the primary reason for their implementation.
- b) Two projects, the Nutrition program, with its 3 sub-projects and the Women's Center project were undertaken and operated by women. Although, the Women's Center was the only one actually organized by and at the request of women. The chicken demonstration/experiment sub-project also involved the women of the Nutrition Center in the care, feeding and record keeping of the chickens and project.
- c) Two sub-projects, Community Center Phase I and Community Center Phase II, including the two components, Youth Club and Boy Scouts were undertaken, organized and operated by and for the benefit of youth.

- 6) Six projects undertaken in cooperation with local institutions at least one of which is in agricultural, social and infra-



structure sector.

STATUS - (Achieved) The 24 projects undertaken included the following local institutions:

IDA - involved in all 24 sub-projects.

Youth Club - involved in Community Center both Phase I and Phase II.

Governor's office - Road Project, Kassaya Water Project, Reforestation Nursery, Nutrition Program, Town Plan.

Municipalities office - Town Plan

MCH (Mahweit office) - Nutrition Program, Argub Mobile Clinic.

MCA (Mahweit office) - Reforestation Nursery, Veterinary Program.

- 7) At least 20 meetings held involving groups in project planning and management.

STATUS - (Achieved) As of June 30, 1980 161 meetings were held since July 1, 1979 involving local groups in sub-project planning, problem solving and management.

- 8) At least 50 field visits carried out by ASLO staff to provide technical advice/assistance in addressing specific local problems.

STATUS - (Achieved) Through June 30, 1980 51 field visits were carried out assisting with local problems. These field visits ranged in length from 1 day trips up to 5 day trips.

II. Output Level - Output Indicators

- 1) Four Field Coordinators in place by June 1979.

STATUS - (Achieved) This indicator was achieved in September 1979 at the beginning of the F.C. training course when nine trainees began the course. As of June 30, 1980, there were seven full time F.C.s - 5 ASLO employees and 2 seconded from the LDA/CC.

- 2) Four Field Coordinators trained and operating in the field by December 1979.

STATUS - (Achieved) The first phase of the F.C. training course was completed in December 1, 1979. After this first two months of the basic training the F.C.s continued into the second phase of on the job training.



3. At least 3 non-formal skill training modules designed, one in each sector.

STATUS : achieved. Five non-formal skill training modules were designed.

Social Sector :-Health nutrition workers behavioral objectives.
-Behavioral objectives for trainee in Childrens Hospital Room.

Ag. Sector :-Coffee improvement.

Infrastructure Sector :-Small water project design and construction

Research :-Research module.

4. At least 5 formal training opportunities provided.

STATUS : achieved. Seven formal skill training opportunities were provided:

- a. British Mechanization Centre, Waiz - 2 trainees.
- b. Aid Poultry Project - 1 trainee
- c. Plant Protection - German Farm/ICA - 2 trainees
- d. Extended Program for Immunization - 4 trainees
- e. Heavy Equipment maintenance on-the-job training in Bahweit - 7 drivers
- f. British Veterinary Program - 3 trainees in on-the-job introduction training, 2 of these 3 enrolled in British Veterinary Animal Husbandry Program. One of these three continues on-the-job training.
- g. Fruit tree budding and grafting ICA - 4 trainees.

5. At least 20 meetings in which local representatives have participated in requesting assistance from central level government or other agencies.

STATUS : Partially achieved. As of June 30, 1980, 17 such meetings were held. In the October-December 1979 Program Manager's quarterly report the reliability of this indicator was questioned. This indicator was written to quantify vertical integration and local involvement in that process. Because of Mohammad Husayli's position in the LDA/CC and CIDA and his presence in Jana'a at CIDA most of the time, verticle integration tended to take place without much input from the project.

6. At least 8 new activities involving central based government or other donor agencies.

STATUS : achieved. Activities undertaken include the following 10 activities.



- a. Road Project - Highway Authority - heavy equipment.
- USAID - pipes.
 - b. Mechanization Training - Ministry of Agriculture
- British Mechanization Centre.
 - c. Nutrition Program - Ministry of Health
- Extended Program for Immunization.
 - d. Plant Protection Training - Ministry of Agriculture
- German Farm
 - e. Poultry Training - USAID
 - f. Poultry Demonstration/Experiment - Dutch Chicken Project - Rowda
 - g. Reforestation - Ministry of Agriculture (Mahweit Office)
 - h. Mahweit TOWN Water - UNICEF, Ministry of Public Works, USAID
 - i. Veterinary Program - British Veterinary Program
 - j. Fruit Tree Budding & Grafting Training - Ministry of Agriculture.
7. 28% total project funding provided by YLRG and/or local contribution.

STATUS : As of March 31, 1980 local and governmental contributions totaled \$237,870. This is 23% of the \$1,040,000. This is broken down into sub-totals of \$75,211 - local community, \$76,190 - LDA/CC and \$86,469 the Government. The 25% should be attainable if the project is able to return to it's field activities in Mahweit. A detailed breakdown of these figures is attached to this quarterly report (broken down by project).

8. Project applications refer to and make practical use of results of appropriate research:
1. Feasibility Study of Stone Cutter.
 2. Water Survey for Argub Water Project.
 3. Coffee survey for coffee improvement program.
 4. Various.
 5. Baseline in Health Nutrition; one in Mahweit town and one in Argub.
 6. Chicken questionnaire for chicken Demonstration/Experiment.
 7. Water tests and flow measurements for all water projects.
 8. Massaha Report for involving traditional health workers in Health/nutrition training.
 9. Report on Traditional cooking for possible Loreno stove demonstration/experiment.
 10. Consultant Weber report on Reforestation/Conservation.
 11. Mahweit Town Farmers Survey
 12. Commercial Building Survey
 13. Proposed Reforestation research
 14. Consultant Stern's report on Mahweit town water supply.
 15. Mahweit Town Plan
 16. Haratani/Sherfield - Mahweit water supply report.
 17. Harriet East - Water Report.



Conclusion

Three indicators remain unachieved as of this date. Indicator 1 on the Purpose level regarding projects undertaken in two nahiyas.

Indicator 5 on the Output level regarding meetings at the national level with local representatives.

Indicator 7 on the Output level regarding MARG and/or local funding contributions.

All three are close to being achieved and would certainly be achieved by December 1980 if the project resumes it's field activities by as late as September 1980.

In conclusion, the project has made great achievements in realizing its objectives since the May 1979 evaluation. Three factors are responsible for this. One was the May evaluation itself. It gave us the opportunity to assess where the project stood, what had been achieved and why, and what was hindering the project and why, from other achievements.

Secondly, the refinement and redirection of management and planning tools and giving the project clearly stated objectives and paths to follow in moving towards those objectives.

Finally, but of equal importance, was a staff committed to the objectives of ASIC and the management plans. The staff was always willing to make the personal sacrifices necessary to make the plans and objectives a reality. Without these commitments and sacrifices, the work of the evaluation and all the planning would have remained just that, unfulfilled.

American Save the Children - Yemen
 Financial Summary
 July 1980

F.O. expense through June 1980
 H.O. expenses through March 1980

Expenses	Original OPG Budget	Difference
PERSONNEL		
Payroll	\$316,650.22	
Fringe Benefits	52,702.74	
Ed. allowance	5,469.00	
Casual labor	16,536.61	
Insurance	5,358.35	
Travel	52,827.29	
Sub-total	\$449,544.21	\$441,000
		\$(26,544.21)
ADMINISTRATION		
Office rental	33,872.23	
Off. supplies	11,382.67	
Postage	1,073.17	
Tel and Tel	13,442.43	
Photocopy, mimeo and photography	4,940.53	
Energy	7,481.81	
Insurance	2,761.57	
Vehicle opera.	25,237.14	
Staff housing	66,354.70	
Bank charges	975.63	
Reference material	1,216.85	
Misc. (H.C.)	3,387.24	
Loss on conver	83.85	
Sub-total	\$172,209.82	\$121,000
		\$(51,209.82)
CAPITAL ASSETS		
Furniture and equipment	17,022.02	
Vehicles	40,593.08	
Sub-total	\$57,615.10	\$10,000
		\$(47,615.10)

	Expenses	Original OPG Budget	Difference
HOME OFFICE ADMINISTRATION	\$38,306.00	\$45,000	\$ 6,694.00

PROJECTS

Infrastructure

General Support	\$8,977.88		
Massiya Water, 80-0017	8,000.00		
Road Proj, 79-0005	25,986.30		
Mahweit water, 79-0006	100.44		
Bayt Al-Bahri, 79-0018	1,983.11		
Ghayl Zabl, 80-0013	2,607.06		
Masjid Al-Urr, 79-0007	5,041.94		
Town Plan, 79-0010	13,186.85		
Stone Custer, 79-0011	16,464.46		
LDA Truck, 80-0001	26,776.61		
LDA Backhoe, 80-0016	21,854.30		
Sub-total	\$130,979.15	\$130,979.15	

Institutional

Support & Advanced Train.	022.85		
Community Center, 78-0001	11,622.47		
Community Center, 79-0001	6,946.57		
Advanced Training, 80-0006	10,833.09		
Research, 80-0005	1,471.16		
Yemeni Staff Train., 80-0008	9,798.45		
Sub-total	\$54,694.59	\$54,694.59	

Agricultural/Productivity

General Support	\$3,055.91		
Mechanization Demo & Train	1,836.63		
School Ag. Train, 79-0002	1,458.40		
Poultry, 79-0003	1,819.55		
Plant Protection Train, 79-0016	5,762.45		
Coffee Improvement, 80-0012	3,227.38		
Experimental Plot, 79-0013	9,877.58		
Veterinary Program, 80-0011	5,587.60		
Reforstation, 79-0015	15,210.06		
Sub-total	\$47,835.56	\$47,835.56	

<u>Social</u>	<u>Expenses</u>	<u>Original OPG Budget</u>	<u>Difference</u>
General Support	\$3,396.32		
Nutrition Program, 79-0012	51,089.73		
Womens' Center, 80-0010	1,946.35		
Argub mobile clinic, 80-0014	667.55		
Sub-total	<u>\$57,099.95</u>	<u>\$57,099.95</u>	
Projects Total	\$290,609.25	\$441,000	<u>\$150,390.75</u>
	1. BALANCE (amount remaining from OPG \$1,040,000)		\$31,715.62
	2. ESTIMATED H.O. expenses 4/80 -6/80		- <u>34,000.00</u>
	3. ESTIMATED current balance		\$(2,284.38)
	4. STC H.O. contribution to date		+ <u>46,242.25</u> 43,957.87
	5. REMAINING STC contribution (from \$125,000)		+ <u>78,757.57</u> <u>122,715.44</u>
	6. OPG extension funds - 12/80		<u>350,000.00</u>
	7. TOTAL funds remaining (STC and AID)		\$ 472,715.44