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PD-AAK-238-21

9320076

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FINAL REPORT

EVALUATION OF

OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS, INTERNATIONAL

(OICI)

Work Order No. 7, Contract AID/otr-C-1381

May 18, 1978



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PREFACE

Under the terms of Work Order No. 7 to Indefinite Quantity Contract No. AID/otr-C-1381, AID requested Wolf and Company to conduct a programmatic evaluation of Opportunities Industrialization Centers, International (OICI) to measure its performance effectiveness and development impact.

Work Order No. 7 calls for an assessment of progress toward improving the management of OICI headquarters in Philadelphia, as suggested in an AID-funded Wolf and Company survey of management and personnel in 1975; general recommendations concerning diversification of sources of support and project effort; and assessment of the field impact of OICs in selected project areas. AID, OICI and Wolf jointly selected three field programs to be evaluated; OIC/Nigeria, a self-sufficient effort, two years after the end of OICI funding and technical assistance; OIC/Ghana, a mature program in the replication phase; and OIC/Togo, OICI's first experience in agricultural development training.

The evaluation team consisted of three Senior Evaluation Generalists:

> Stanley A. Barnett, for 16 years director of Wolf and Company's national Socio-Economic Development Planning Division.
>
> Nat Engel, for the past 11 years deputy director of Wolf's national Socio-Economic Development Planning Division.
>
> Herman L. Myers, international evaluation specialist, formerly director of evaluation design and planning of AID/IA.

The evaluators performed project research and detailed the project design at OICI/Central in Philadelphia from March 1 through 17, 1978, interviewing all headquarters professionals. From March 18 through April 7, Messrs. Barnett and Engel undertook primary and secondary research in Ghana, Togo and Nigeria,

visiting OICs in Accra, Kumasi, Lome and Lagos, and the OIC/Togo Farm at Notse, meeting with local staffs, Boards of Directors and American advisors of the OICs, relevant host country and U.S. officials, and others. Analysis and evaluation, and preparation of the draft report began on April 10. Preliminary findings and recommendations were discussed with the management of OICI/Central on May 3, and the draft report was submitted to and reviewed in person with PDC/PVC on May 19.

Financial data in this report are in dollars. Where it is deemed appropriate, amounts are given in local currency and converted (parenthetically) to dollars at the rate prevailing when field research was performed. In many instances, dollars are reported when the original data were in local currency. At the time of the evaluation team's field work, official exchange rates were as follows:

Ghana:	$1.00 = ₵1.15 cedis	-	₵1.00 = $ .87
Nigeria:	$1.00 = ₦ .59 naira	-	₦1.00 = $1.70
Togo:	$1.00 = CFA232	-	CFA100 = $ .43

The names of persons interviewed during the course of the evaluation are listed in an appendix to the report.

I. SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

OICI/Central

OICI and AID have instituted most of changes recommended in Wolf and Company's 1975 evaluation of Central Office management and personnel:

- o New top and middle management are in place. They are competent, professional and analytical.
- o Lines of authority and responsibility have been simplified and strengthened; they are more easily understood throughout the organization.
- o The five-year period now deemed necessary by both AID and OICI for full development and viability of a country OIC is realistic and provides a common basis for measuring performance.
- o Feasibility and demand surveys are conducted during the design and proposal stage for new projects to focus training emphasis on high-demand skills and ensure job placement and retention.

These changes have resulted in a relatively effective and efficient headquarters organization. Morale is generally high. Financial controls are comprehensive.

From 1975 to the present, country programs and project funding have more than tripled while the number of Central personnel has been almost constant and budget increased 25%. Top and middle management work at near-capacity as programs have proliferated. Vacant positions should be filled on a priority basis. The recruitment process needs improvement.

Alternative, non-Aid funding of the Central Office remains a problem.

Development of an evaluation system is embryonic. Guidelines for feedback have yet to be developed, although an initial attempt has been made to evaluate Central Office operations.

As the newer country programs mature, performance measurement should shift from supply of advisors and number of trainees/ placements to assessment of the degree to which OICs are effective and viable. Grant support amendments should reflect these measures.

The Management Information System appears helpful for project monitoring and is well-accepted in the field. But lateness of data arrival hampers management decision-making, and Central Office response to OIC operational problems tends to be sluggish. International travel by OICI's professional staff should be increased in order to intensify direct, personal contact with the field.

Supplementing traditional, urban-oriented vocational training with agricultural production training expands OICI's ability to assist LDCs. Agricultural programs involve more complicated recruiting, logistical and administrative problems than urban-oriented programs.

Field Programs

Training in sites visited appears to be less time-consuming and more cost-effective than available alternative training.

OIC/Nigeria, from which OICI technicians and funding were withdrawn in 1976, is a fully viable and self-sufficient indigenous operation, with an active growing program, a placement rate exceeding 90%, and plans for a large expansion of its Lagos program and extension to other cities.

OIC/Ghana, now in the replication phase, has a national office and three centers that function efficiently. Thoroughly accepted and supported by Ghanaians and their government, OIC/ Ghana has achieved dramatic success in training and placements. With OICI phasing out in 1980, localization is well-advanced. Host government financial and political commitments to the program point to further geographical expansion and on-schedule viability.

The Togo program design appears to fit the country's needs, but effective operation requires great skill and sensitivity. The program is somewhat behind plan because of unanticipated delays and site problems that can characterize agricultural production efforts. However, long-term viability has not been seriously impaired. Movement of the project from

research to implementation phase requires better program integration into Togo's socio-economic development process, and broadened advisor skills. Scheduled departure of the Program Advisor and availability of a second vacancy on the field team provide the means for adding needed management, operations and OICI-oriented training skill. French language capacity must be reinforced among the project team.

The three evaluated field programs are tailored to priority host-country development objectives. Verifiable indicators in terms of trainees and job placements are close to or in excess of target in the mature Ghana and Nigeria programs, with long waiting lists for enrollment and strong demand for graduates. In Togo, training has just begun. The Ghanaian program has had indirect impacts of some significance. OIC Ghana and OIC/Nigeria receive unusually strong host government support.

OICI's field advisors in Ghana and Togo are dedicated and competent. They perform well under difficult conditions and are generally highly regarded. They represent a reservoir of expertise that OICI can ill-afford to neglect. More effective reuse of this seasoned cadre will advance OICI's institutionalization.

II. PROGRESS TOWARD IMPROVED MANAGEMENT AT OICI/CENTRAL

II-A. BACKGROUND: THE WOLF EVALUATION, 1975

Under Work Order No. 1 of its current IQC, Wolf and Company evaluated the management practices and effectiveness of OICI's headquarters organization and staff in Philadelphia. None of the field programs was visited.

The evaluation report presented findings and recommendations. in six key areas:

1. Effectiveness, viability and cost-efficiency - AID and OICI should agree on a realistically longer period for attainment of full local funding and quantify intervening levels of financial self-sufficiency which are attainable and acceptable. OICI lacked policy or guidelines to determine cost-effectiveness...should plan each country program along lines of the AID Logical Framework matrix; and design the logframe to ensure agreement with AID/ Washington on objectives, organization and consistency.

2. Existing program and organization - OICI/Central needed a program feasibility and evaluation officer to design projects and evaluate results, and a program development specialist to develop projects and monitor operations and accomplishments. The qualifications of Central staff professionals should be tightened and upgraded. There should be increased cross-fertilization with and utilization of the seasoned staff of OIC/America.

3. Assessment of personnel - Assessment was made of the qualifications and competency of certain OICI/Central staff, and recommendations were made for changes in function for heightened efficiency.

4. Improved communications - AID's project officer should meet periodically with the functional committees of OICI's National Board of Directors on issues of common interest and concern.

5. Role of the OICI Board - The Board of Directors should reshape its role to become less passive in shaping policy and in its relationship to Central.

6. New Management Information System (MIS) - A newly designed MIS, then in the process of being demonstrated, was reviewed and deemed appropriate to the reporting needs of OICI/Central and its operating units.

A Table of Organization proposing modifications that reflected the foregoing findings and recommendations was presented at the conclusion of the report.

II-B. OICI CHANGES SINCE 1975

By the time of Wolf and Company's 1978 evaluation, the number of active OICI programs in Africa had more or less tripled over the number extant during the 1975 evaluation. During the first study, OICI programs were operative in three countries (Nigeria, Ghana and Ethiopia) and their capital cities. In April 1978, OICI had active programs in five countries (Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Togo and Zambia), and in seven cities (Accra, Kumasi and Takoradi in Ghana; and in Monrovia, Bo, Lome and Lusaka). Further, it was hiring staff for two other approved projects: Lesotho (Maseru) and the Gambia (Banjul).

The various overseas OICs provide training in commercial, industrial and agricultural occupations that include:

- Animal Husbandry
- Auto mechanics
- Carpentry
- Electrical construction
- Catering
- Crop Science
- Farm mechanics
- Intermediate-level farming
- Masonry/Bricklaying
- Plumbing
- Secretarial Sciences (Typing and shorthand)
- Body and fender repair
- Farm extension services

II-B-1. Cost Effectiveness

The 1975 evaluation team had noted a number of cost-related shortcomings in their assessments of OICI management. They included inadequate quantitative analyses in the selection,

design and development of new country projects; premature--and sometimes naive--bases for anticipating replication; poor identification of demand for the skills that were to be taught at OICs, and therefore potential for placement of trainees; failure to recognize possible duplication of training at existing institutions in host countries; and inadequate plans and projections with respect to progress toward financial self-sufficiency for local OICs.

Review of more recent analyses of overseas OICs reveals substantially more realistic and analytical quantifications. For example, the economic analysis section of OICI's April 1977 "Response to Technical Questions--Addendum to the OICI Liberia Proposal" projects average trainee costs at $1,852 for construction trades, $2,045 for auto mechanics.* Placement costs of $220 are also added to overall expense, bringing the per-trainee cost in construction trades a little over $2,000.

This pre-activation survey--typical of several recent studies --demonstrates that OICI's grasp of the elements affecting cost has been enhanced dramatically by top and middle-management personnel changes. In the case of Liberia, data on alternative training facilities suggest that training under the OIC method is accomplished in a third to a quarter of the time required elsewhere; and can cost from $700 to $12,000 less per trainee. While these comparisons do not address relative quality of training, the current evaluation team determined to its satisfaction while in the field investigating the Ghana and Nigeria OICs that employers of OIC trainees, government officials concerned with manpower development and training, and educators are beginning to accept the validity of OIC's foreshortened training period and the focus upon quality/employability of their trainees.

The cost-effectiveness of OICI/Central has improved markedly since 1975. It has tightened financial and administrative procedures, and prepared an extensive "Finance and Administrative Guideline" for headquarters personnel which details

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* OICI points out that these totals are atypically high, reflecting initial construction costs at a new OIC and initial costs for equipment and expatriate specialists that normally would be amortized over long periods. They skew the per-student costs upward.

OICI's MIS system (see II-B-3, below) and personnel policies, and contains material relating to the PVO's basic support grant. It provides information on timing of reports, and is used for monitoring and for pre-service training for new finance officers assigned to field program.

The budgetary share of the Central Office for FY 1976 was $406,481, or 37% of the $1,087,974 overall budget for OICI. In FY 1977 -- with added budgets for new projects in Togo, Sierra Leone, Ghana Phase II, Liberia, Lesotho and The Gambia -- the budgetary share of Central rose to $509,400, while OICI's overall budget rose to $3,808,800, bringing Central's share of total down to 13%, a sizeable drop.

Although OICI's programmatic activity has tripled since 1975, the 20-person level of staffing at Central has remained substantially unchanged since that time. This is a noteworthy reflection of heightened cost-effectiveness; that the current top and middle management echelon in Philadelphia have continued to perform professionally and effectively in spite of expanding workloads and administrative and financial accountability problems of major dimensions.

The $269,000 of AID cost disallowances faced by the new management team arriving in late 1975 and in 1976 has now been reduced to $26,000, with an additional $5,000 in still unresolved training cost allocations. Concurrently, as noted elsewhere in this report, OICI/Central has established sound record-keeping systems, upgraded the quality of program proposals so that a succession of unacceptable proposals for new country initiatives has been replaced by a series of successful ones, and administered a new MIS.

However, at times, this has resulted in work overloads for Central's professionals which reduce efficiency. The increased staffing level permitted by Amendment No. 17 to the basic support grant should correct the situation for the near-term future. OICI's management should accelerate recruiting efforts to ensure that the new personnel and current staff vacancies are filled speedily.

II-B-2. Guidance from the OICI Board of Directors

Our current review of the role of the Board confirms reports provided to Wolf and Company by cognizant AID officials that the Board has become far more active in its oversight role concurrent with the management changes it effected some four months after the 1975 evaluation.

Professional representation on the expanded Board has been increased; e.g., holders of doctorates, such as a specialist in industrial relations and manpower, who has provided incisive comments on reports by Program Advisors (country project directors) from the field; a person with field experience in Africa, who has reinforced the capacity of the Board to analyze planning documents realistically; and an educator who specializes in adult education.

The Board's specialized committees have been active. The Personnel Committee looks closely at AID guidelines and makes independent recommendations. The Program Planning Committee weighs policy decisions and selection of new country programs; was forceful in requiring OICI executives to submit longer-term planning objectives; and brought its influence to bear on changes in program agreements in host countries. While the OICI decision on undertaking agricultural training was under consideration, the Economic Development Committee functioned in close contact with OICI staff personnel. The Finance Committee has monitored audit reports on country programs.

The oversight exercised by OICI's Board of Directors was particularly intensive during the period in which the new management team was installed. Now that the OICI program is running relatively smoothly, the Board meets quarterly, with its Executive Committee getting together more frequently.

II-B-3. The OICI Management Information System (MIS)

At the time of the 1975 Wolf evaluation, the MIS had been designed by OICI's auditors, Touche Ross & Co., and was being explained and installed in the field. The comprehensive users' manual governing MIS implementation procedures states that it was established to provide OICI with "(1) The data necessary to routinely monitor and evaluate local OIC performance and to facilitate management decision-making; (2) The information needed to meet the reporting requirement of AID and other funding sources."

Every OIC supported by OICI/AID is required to provide narrative, statistical and fiscal reports at stated intervals--most monthly, a few more frequently. At the appropriate times, semi-annual and annual reports are also required. The following reports are generated:

Narrative Reports (2)

Program Narrative Report - Internal	Monthly
Semi-Annual Report to Local AID mission	Semi-Annual

Statistical Reports (8) - Internal

10-C	Intake/Orientation Activity	Monthly
30-C	Attendance Analysis	Monthly
31-C	ET&MD Activity*	Weekly or Monthly
40-C	Job Development Follow-up	Monthly
70-C	Statistical Summary	Monthly
71-C	Program Activity Summary	Monthly
72-L	Summary of Trainee Characteristics	Monthly
73-C	Board of Directors Activity	Monthly

Fiscal Reports (7) - Internal

61-C	Request for Reimbursement	Monthly
62-C	Statement of Financial Position	Monthly

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* Enterpreneurial Training and Management Development

63-C	Statement of Revenues and Expenses and Fund Balance	Monthly
64-C	Position Control and Personnel Status	Semi-Annual
65-C	Property Report	Semi-Annual
66-C	Summary of Shipments Received /Open Purchase Requisitions	Monthly
67-C	Report on Local Funding	Monthly

Other, supplementary documentation is required with respect to enrollments, readmissions, transfers and discontinuance of trainees each month, and fiscal reports are backed with copies of month-end trial balance of the OICs grant fund; voucher register or cash disbursements journal; and reconciliations of every bank account.

Compliance with the fiscal reporting requirements has been linked administratively with reimbursement requests, and the fiscal MIS has been instrumental in the process of institutionalizing the OICs. Field adherence to the narrative and statistical report schedules has lagged in Ghana and Togo, the countries visited by the 1978 evaluation team. Both OICI/Central and its advisors in the field ascribe lateness, at least in part, to host country sociological/traditional customs in which alacrity is less important than in the U.S. While gathering the required data can create administrative problems and delay submissions from the field -- particularly in Ghana, with its three OICs -- local staffs and their expatriate advisors are in common agreement that the burdens imposed by the comprehensive sweep of the MIS are not onerous, are justified, and its purposes are sound.

OICI/Central, in turn, acknowledges that its formal responses to narrative reports from Ghana have been retarded by (a) the above-noted pressures of a rapidly expanding workload, and (b) the need for Central's functional divisions and its executive director to coordinate responses that overlap jurisdictions or concern matters of policy. It is the opinion of the evaluators, however, that some of the delay has been excessive. Unless narrative reports are submitted in a timely manner by the field and responded to promptly by OICI/Central, they are of little value as bases for top management decision-making or for improvement by the field.

Financial and programmatic data provided in MIS reports are in part monitored against financial and programmatic Program Progress Tracking System (PPTS) charts, milestone-keyed projections of results. Instituted in January 1977, the financial PPTs have set forth 3-month projections, detailed by line item. OICI/Central executives recognize that this short-term perspective has tended to obscure potential problems and distort management vision of what is happening, actual vs. planned. Central plans to expand PPTS range to six months insofar as detailed work plans are involved, and reports that it will implement the change at the start of FY 1979.

In Togo, OICI's first agricultural project, it is evident that the MIS -- designed for a program of industrial/ commercial vocational training -- is not responsive to some aspects of the two-way flow of data. That facet of the MIS is being evaluated by the newly arrived fiscal officer in Lome, who will propose modifications to fit the needs of that new type of OICI initiative.

II-B-4. Project Design and Implementation

The current Executive Director of OICI assumed his post in October 1975, and his two key assistants -- the Directors for (a) Finance and Administration, and (b) Planning/Program Development -- and other professional staff at Central were recruited subsequently.

Earlier, OICI had submitted four new project proposals for funding under Grant AID/pha-G-1125, all of which had been deemed unacceptable. Subsequent proposals have been accepted and were prepared (under the supervision of the Director of Planning and Operations) by new technical staff personnel; primarily a planning research specialist who is responsible for programmatic aspects and social/cultural analyses, and an economic analyst who develops baseline data and performs project analysis. Preliminary research and feasibility reports have been upgraded in quality and content, and program design on consequent proposals has been realistic. Projects in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Lesotho and The Gambia are based on proposals researched and developed between March and December 1976.

The process leading to new project proposals is defined in a comprehensively and clearly stated project development methodology to which OICI adheres. Essential elements include prerequisites which must be met at various stages:

1. Initiatives for new programs must come from serious, locally-formed "Interest Groups" which express desire to establish an OIC.

2. Information and data submitted in first contacts are checked with USAID missions for verification of the validity of concepts and to assess potential for support by AID. The host country embassy in the US, program officials at AID/Washington, host country ministry officials and other local interests are also seen to validate potential acceptance before further development effort is expended.

3. A visit by OIC Founder Rev. Sullivan and/or the Executive Director, most often including talks with a head of state, is conducted as a step preceding formal feasibility studies, to ensure that the project would be well-received.

4. Pre-feasibility data and information are assembled in-house from AID, the World Bank, UN, universities and similar sources to ascertain the economic situation in the host country; its educational pattern, particularly with respect to OIC-type non-formal skills training; and a social/cultural profile.

5. AID issuances and pertinent documents re reviewed to determine AID's perspective and the type of project in whicl it would be interested, and assessments are discussed with AID.

6. Findings are communicated to the Interest Group to learn their priorities for the proposed OIC.

7. OICI consults the host country's development plan to ensure compatibility.

8. Technical specialists in OICI/Central's planning unit prepare a scope of work for the project.

9. A feasibility study team is sent to the field for a two-to three-week visit to validate research findings and to detail the report. The team may include technical advisors from nearby operating OICs or consultants when specialized expertise is required. Reports are prepared by individual members and for the team.

10. OICI/Central's Planning and Operations unit writes the proposal to AID.

The project development process is lengthy and exhaustive. It can take up to four or five years. The Ivory Coast Interest Group first communicated with OICI in August 1976; a proposal may go forward to AID early in FY 1979. At key stages in the process, approval of the OICI Board of Directors is required before project concepts are moved ahead.

One particularly important element has been added to the final stage prior to implementation, to help ensure timely startup and support. Negotiations are conducted and an agreement is signed with the host country government before an OIC is launched. Key concessions concerning duties on supplies and equipment, and other government support provisions are specified. The first three projects for which such agreements have been formalized before implementation are those in Liberia, The Gambia and Lesotho.

II-B-5. Operational and Management Reorganization

Improvement in the quality and professional capabilities of OICI/Central personnel is obvious. The changes are visible in both the background credentials of individual staff members and in the caliber of the analytical, administrative and managerial work they are producing.

II-B-5(a). Continuity and Institutionalization

OICI/Central was reorganized after the 1975 evaluation report. The Deputy Director was appointed International Director (now Executive Director) and his post eliminated. Technical specialists were recruited for the two Assistant Directors' positions--now called Director for Finance and Administration and Director for Planning/Program Development. The OICI Tables of Organization in 1975 and 1978 are presented on the following page.

The echelon below the two departmental directors also has been strengthened appreciably. Functional specialists and field operations personnel are combined under the Director of Planning/Program Development; they include an economic/evaluation analyst, a planning/research specialist, and a vocational/curriculum specialist.

Administration has been strengthed with a procurement specialist who has installed control systems and innovative approaches to supplying OIC needs in the field. OICI personnel at Central and at the OICs visited agree that this vital function serves program requirements exceptionally well.

Figure 1. Table of Organization, OICI/ Central; January 1, 1978 and May 1975





The 1975 evaluation recommended that OICI recruit an agriculturalist to provide technical expertise at Central as OICI's projects in this field were emerging. During the interim, this need has been filled on a consulting basis, using professionals from land-grant schools. Under Amendment #17, funding was provided for this position and it is to be filled within the next two months.

The two functional directors and their staffs constitute a significant change in the caliber of OICI/Central; a clear shift to professionalism. The Program Progress Tracking System (see II-B-3), designed initially as a management tool for monitoring fiscal controls, serves as a bridge between programmatic requirements and financial scheduling. The economic/evaluation analyst is moving toward development of evaluation methodology for field projects. The planning research specialist, in conjunction with the economic analyst, has elevated the competence of feasibility surveys and project proposals.

The high degree of qualifications and competence now manifest at OICI/Central does not affect its organizational capacity to promote good people. Lack of upward mobility is in part a function of the limited manning table and modest salaries; but it also reflects the specialized expertise of OICI's professional staff. The Field Support position, recently filled by the last Program Advisor in Nigeria, is currently vacant mainly because the incumbent could not be afforded any upward career path in OICI. Conversely, excellent people on the staff of Central are generally not candidates for positions in OICs overseas. We note elsewhere that recruitment for vacant positions must be stepped up.

II-B-5(b) Operations Backstopping

At the time of the 1975 evaluation, OICI's field operations were the direct purview of the Deputy Director. During the following year, operations management was structured as a discrete function, with its director heading a staff of three specialists responsible for field support, pre-service training of field staff and personnel/recruitment. In a

subsequent realignment to the table of organization that has obtained since the beginning of calendar 1977, all headquarters responsibilities were placed under the two departmental directors, and the field support/operations function now reports to the Director, Planning and Operations. Thus, the backstop support sought by TCT members in the field flows through the Director of Planning and Operations, and the field support specialist does not report directly to the Director of OICI.

Improvement in headquarters-field rapport need not call for reversion to an independent Operations unit at Central reporting to the Executive Director. The function can be retained under the Director of Planning and Operations, but the new vocational training field support specialist should be accorded more direct access to the Director when an issue of priority importance has to be resolved. At the same time, memoranda and reports from the field requesting information or guidance on problems of operation should be routed quickly to the field support specialist.

The same approach should be taken when the new agricultural development specialist joins Central. He should serve as the coordinator of agricultural program field operations, paralleling the role of the coordinator of vocational training field operations. With agricultural projects now gaining momentum in OICI, priority assistance re field problems will be needed by new TCT and local program managers.

Notwithstanding organizational changes at Central, improved direction, communications and rapport necessitate more frequent field visits by OICI/Central's top management and middle management professionals. OICI's budget for international travel should be raised.

* * * * *

The absence of operating experience in the field among the top officials and key planners and analysts in the programmatic and financial departments of Central is a weakness; it may be a contributing factor in the sometimes slow pace of Central Office response to questions in the field.

II-B-5(c) Evaluation and Feedback

OICI has not developed an evaluation system which provides sufficient feedback to redirect and redesign projects, or which would measure OICI advisors' interpersonal relations and effectiveness. This results in part from the fact that all of its country programs are relatively new, except for OIC/Ghana, and still in the process of installing basic human and physical infrastructure (outputs); and in part from the inability of OICI/Central's economic/evaluation analyst to devote time to field evaluation methodology, due to press of other work.

An initial internal evaluation of OIC/Central has taken place. Covering the three-month period from October 4, 1976 to January 4, 1977, it provided management an opportunity to ensure that technicians and their supervisors were using the same indicators for measuring performance. The evaluation methodology focused on measurement of individuals ability to plan, organize, direct, coordinate and control. It was not tied to a "management-by-objective" criterion related to successful field backstopping.

OICI now has the capability of adapting the AID Logical Framework for each project to a time-phased system of measuring performance. A minor amount of revision of approved project designs will be necessary in order to redefine indicators which have been misplaced between outputs and purposes, or which are not easily measurable. We do not believe that OICI should be concerned at the goal level with the ultimate direct effect of a particular program on national income (miniscule at best). It should be content to measure income received by trainee graduates, numbers of trainees with jobs for which they were trained, and numbers which continued to be so employed.

At the purpose level, evaluation should determine the degree to which an OIC is effective, efficient and self-sufficient in terms of trainees, placements and local financing -- keeping in mind that 100% of performance is expected in no more than five years. (The basic (output) infrastructure -- local training staff and auxiliary services, facilities, course and curriculum development, Board of Directors activity and policy, and other coordinating systems -- has to be in place and operating independently during the final year of OICI technical assistance.)

The periodic amendments to OICI's Specific Support Grant No. AID/pha-G-1125 do little more than specify initial or amended funding and/or new or modified program parameters. This practice, in effect, confirms the agreement between OICI and AID on the nature and cost of outputs to be developed for particular periods. As the country projects become institutionalized, it would be helpful to longer-term planning efforts for amendments to the present grant or other project grant instruments, to make more specific ference to the degree to which outputs are to be in place, and to what degree ultimate self-sufficiency is expected during the period covered.

Tying funding to viability and a planned flow of support leads to agreement on the broader aspects of a program and underlines the need of OICI to understand that each year's activity is tied to the ultimate purpose -- a self-sufficient local institution. To do otherwise encourages OICI to concentrate on means, such as recruiting and backstopping, rather than provide motivation to measure ends -- progress in terms of end-of-project, rather than particular grant support terms.

II-B-5(d) Personnel Recruitment

Finding continuing sources of funding is difficult for the typical PVO; thus, the remuneration it offers is frequently not competitive to that obtainable elsewhere on the marketplace. Its life expectancy tends to be low, limiting the possibility of long-term tenure. Yet, it requires specialists with sufficient dedication and stability to function effectively under often hectic and trying conditions both in the U.S. and the emerging world. Recruitment of personnel in such an atmosphere is difficult.

OICI's personnel recruitment position has undergone frequent turnover during the past two and a half years. The OICI personnel officer's slot was vacant from December 1976 until the arrival six months later of an accountant who had been a fiscal officer with the Urban League. Classified as OICI's administrative officer, he has been devoting the majority of time to personnel functions, and less to financial analysis. At the time of the 1978 evaluation, he was scheduled to spend full time on financial analysis, as soon as a new, but as yet unselected, personnel officer was hired.

Recruitment for vacant positions at OICI/Central and for the new programs in The Gambia and Lesotho has lagged. OICI must professionalize and fill its personnel/ administrative officer position on a priority basis.

III. FIELD IMPACT OF SELECTED OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS

III-A. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE PROGRAMS

III-A-1. OIC/Nigeria

In 1966, a group of Nigerians, concerned with growing unemployment and attendant socio-economic ills, organized for action. Dr. Salawu, organizer of the group, had read about the work of OIC/America and brought it to the attention of his colleagues, who liked the self-help, attitudinal and short training period aspects of the program. The group contacted OIC/America in March 1969, and the AID-supported project was initiated on June 27, 1970.

Through Contract No. AID/Afr-653, OICI undertook to implement the project objectives of (a) developing the job potential of needful persons, (b) reducing the shortage of intermediate level skilled manpower, and (c) creating new job opportunities, in cooperation with OIC/Lagos, a private non-profit organization.

The USAID/Lagos "Project Completion Report" of August 18, 1976 summarized the accomplishments of the OICI/AID-sparked effort in three major areas:

"1. The OIC method was successfully adapted to the Nigerian environment...the OIC/Lagos program is now fully Nigerianized and capable of continuing full volume operation without further international assistance...(and it) has a fully functioning program planning and management system.

"2. The effectiveness of the OIC method in producing qualified skilled personnel in the vocational areas offered by the OIC/Lagos program has been significantly demonstrated...it is clear that OIC costs per trainee are

at least comparable to costs per trainee of (similar) training facilities in the Lagos area.

"3. Ongoing financial support is secured. The program... will be almost 100% supported (through the Industrial Training Fund (ITF)) for at least the first few years..."

During the six years (FY1971-FY1976) of the AID-supported program, OICI's funding totaled $1,741,531. The End-of-Project Report states that 809 trainees were graduated, and 328 trainees (40.6%) were placed in jobs.

The evaluation team found OIC/Nigeria flourishing two years after the end of OICI assistance. In April 1978, the Center had a professional staff of 12 and a support staff of six. The professional staff comprised a director, training manager, senior counselor, two feeder instructors (one slot vacant), six vocational instructors, and a job developer. Two additional counselors and another job developer were to be hired when expected ITF funds arrived. Key personnel have been with the program for several years.

In July 1978, OIC/Nigeria is moving from its original rented site to a 16-room temporary structure being constructed in a four-acre tract donated to the Center by the Lagos State Government. By the end of the year, OIC/Nigeria plans to have 400 to 450 trainees enrolled in the temporary structure and in the first section of a permanent building to be built with funds provided mainly by the Netherland's Interchurch Coordinating Committee for Development Projects.

With its financial position reportedly improving (see III-B-3 for details), OIC/Nigeria is investigating the possibility of assisting other groups in the country. These include OIC/Ikare, an agriculturally-oriented organization, and Interest Groups in Calabar, Enugu, Kano, Maiduguri, Ibadan and Ilorin.

The continuing and still growing success of OIC/Nigeria appears to result from the practicality of the training offered, the impetus provided under the AID/OICI project, and an expertise developed by the Center's Program Director and its Board, after years of experience.

III-A-2. OIC/Ghana--Phase II

Phase II of the OIC/Ghana project--the replication phase--began in FY 1977, after a successful six-year experience with OIC/Accra. Expansion of the concept was sparked by a 1975 visit to the Center by the Ghanaian Head of State, who suggested that OIC eventually open OICs to serve all of the nation's nine states and who promised continuing support. The choice of Kumasi and Takoradi as the sites for the first new OICs was made by OIC/Ghana's Board of Directors with agreement of OICI and AID.

The AID Phase II Grant of September 24, 1976 calls for expansion and replication of the OIC training program in Ghana to include a National Office and three Centers, "in order that school dropouts may qualify for and acquire productive employment." Like other OICs, those in Ghana are community-based, fee-free, non-profit, non-formal vocational training entities.

The four-year AID project, backed by a Government of Ghana commitment of $1,300,000, is limited to the National Office, OIC/Accra, OIC/Kumasi and OIC/Takoradi. (A proposed further expansion of the project to Kpando, Tamale, Atebube, an Accra slum, settlement farms, and Adukrom has been approved by OIC/Ghana's National Board of Directors and forwarded for comment to the Ghanaian government, which has committed an additional $1,300,000 to the supplementary program. The AID/OICI Phase II program does not include the further expansion. Two of the four OICI Advisors are scheduled to leave at the close of FY 1978, with all OICI support ending in FY 1980.)

The Phase II project is behind schedule, primarily because the National Board refused to take official action (e.g., transform the Kumasi and Takoradi Interest Groups into local Boards of Directors, employ required staff for the National Office, etc.) for almost five months, until it had received a commitment from the Government of Ghana for an increased level of funding.

The National Office has a management role. It also offers technical expertise to the OICs, ensures that OICI regulations and ideals are followed, and assists in fund raising. In addition to executing its full program of training, OIC/Accra has, at government request, assumed charge of the

troubled Accra School of Arts, which trains youth in arts and crafts. Land has been surveyed for a building to house OIC/Ghana's National Office, but construction appears some time off.

Feeder training started at OIC/Kumasi during the last half of 1977, and vocational training began in November. The Kumasi Center occupies a small, renovated compound belonging to the Ministry of Social Welfare.

Feeder training started at OIC/Takoradi in October 1977 and vocational training began in February 1978. OIC/Takoradi shares a building with that city's Fire Service.

The OIC/Ghana program is a marked success in the eyes of Ghanaians, the Government of Ghana and disinterested observers. It exemplifies the government's stress on self-reliance and dramatizes the idea that even the least educated can help himself, his extended family and his community; is seen, proudly, as a Ghanaian, not foreign institution; its Ghanaian staff is skilled and hard-working; its Board is strong and effective in generating local support, and--perhaps most important of all--its trainees are highly regarded and sought after by the Ghanaian business community.

USAID/Ghana officials were unanimous in their high praise of the OIC program to the evaluators; they were eloquent in their opinion of its worth and necessity; of its "unique" ability to relate to Ghanaians and concurrently further U.S. standing in Ghana; and of the skill and capability of its American advisors and Ghanaian staff.

III-A-3. OIC/Togo

The OIC/Togo agricultural training project is intended to further national efforts to rejuvenate a stagnant agricultural economy by stemming migration of the unemployed from the farm to the city and improving farm management practices. The program is targeted for young school leavers and young adult farmers residing in the Plateau Region of Togo. Its origin dates back to 1969, when Yao Afantchao, a Togolese student at the University of Pennsylvania, came in contact with OIC/America. After his visits to OIC/Ghana and OIC/Nigeria, the

formation of a local Interest Group, and completion of the long OIC project development process (see II-B-4), the AID/OICI grant agreement for Togo was signed on June 29, 1976.

The project--OICI's first non-urban and Francophone-country effort--is to establish a self-supporting agricultural training and demonstration farm that will introduce intermediate level agricultural technology at a donated site near the village of Notse, 100 kilometers from Lome. Work of the Pilot (Research) Phase of the project spanned eight months, through June 30, 1977. It included a soils study; determined that irrigation of the site at reasonable cost was not feasible; assessed the suitability of crops and adaptability of livestock proposed for production; found that recommended cultural practices were agronomically feasible; and investigated the ability of Togolese farmers to sustain the system.

Beginning in FY 1978, a four-year Implementation Phase began. Pigs and goats are being raised; initial areas of land have been cleared and are farmed by trainees, who plan to use mechanized hand cultivators for the current growing season; and offices, housing and classrooms are under construction.

The project is approximately six months behind schedule; its training component lags by two months. Contributing causes include: absence of an OICI Finance Officer/Advisor until December 1977; late approval for and/or arrival of equipment; land clearing delays; and abnormally dry weather conditions in the Plateau Region during the first two years of the project. Problem areas include: the farm site, about half of which has unsuitable soils; insufficiency of local and on-site water supply for both farming and animal husbandry (well drilling is apparently uneconomic); incompleteness of land-clearing (over 40% of the site still contains stumps and roots, and 25% still has standing trees); and the shift of project emphasis from research to operations and training, which requires new OICI-advisor talents (see III-D-2(a)). Land tenure customs may also pose difficulties. It is uncertain how much land and which lands will be made available for farming to OIC/Togo trainees after their training has been completed.

OIC/Togo is training farmers and extension workers at a time when the government is emphasizing rural development, intermediate-level farming is becoming increasingly important, and when there is a dearth of farm extension workers and farm

mechanics. The official American community in Togo is pleased with OIC's accomplishments, and considers the delay in project performance insignificant in view of the fact that the project staff has begun to overcome many unanticipated problems.

III-B. PERFORMANCE

III-B-1. Verifiable Indicators; Trainees and Job Placements

III-B-1(a). Trainees

Trainees at OICs undergo two, successive types of instruction, to prepare them for employment: feeder courses and vocational skills courses. The preparatory feeder courses teach language skills, computational skills, cultural heritage, personal/attitudinal development, consumer education and job-finding techniques. The vocational courses teach business and industrial skills (as at OIC/Ghana or OIC/Nigeria), or agricultural skills (as at OIC/Togo). Instruction is individual in nature; trainees proceed at their own speed.

Ghana

Figure 2 indicates average enrollment at the three Ghana OICs during FY 1977, the first year of the Phase II project, and the first five months of FY 1978:

Figure 2. AVERAGE ENROLLMENT, OIC/GHANA, FY 1977 AND FIRST FIVE MONTHS OF FY 1978

	FY 1977	5 Months of FY 1978 (Oct. 1977 - Feb. 1978)			
	OIC/Accra	OIC/Accra	OIC/Kumasi	OIC/Takoradi	Total
Feeder	51	69	41	42	152
Vocational Skills	128	201*	16	4	221
Total Avg. Enrollment	179	270	57	46	373

* Including trainees at the Accra School of Arts
Source: OIC/Ghana

An average of 179 trainees were enrolled at OIC/Accra in FY 1977 (October 1976-September 1977). Neither OIC/Kumasi, which started instructing during the final months of FY 1977, nor OIC/Takoradi, which did not begin instruction until FY 1978, appear in the 1977 totals.

The FY 1978 to-date figures for OIC/Accra are swelled by 67 students who are undergoing vocational instruction at the non-project-related Art School. The Kumasi and Takoradi vocational totals are also skewed--in their cases, because the programs are so new. OIC/Kumasi averaged 16 vocational skills trainees in FY 1978 to-date; however, the number ranged from zero in October 1978, when all trainees were in feeder training, to 33 in February 1978. The four vocational trainees for OIC/Takoradi represent a meaningless average; all Takoradi trainees were in feeder instruction until February 1978, when 21 transferred to vocational training.

Enrollment in courses at Accra has been generally steady. However, some changes have been caused during the past three years by shortages of raw material. For example, the lack of spare parts for automobile engines has reduced the demand for motor mechanics, but increased the demand for body and fender work. OIC/Accra and OIC/Kumasi plan to institute body and fender vocational instruction upon receipt of equipment ordered from U.S. suppliers.

Office skills trainees apparently face a placement problem. English proficiency is important to potential employers, who want capability higher than the basic entry skills taught at OIC, and private secretarial schools tend to skim off the more capable students from higher-income families.

At the time of the evaluation, OIC/Ghana had annual capacity for training 270 in vocational skills:

Figure 3. TRAINING CAPACITY AT OIC/GHANA FOR VOCATIONAL SKILLS COURSES

Course	Length in Months	OIC/ Accra	OIC/ Kumasi	OIC/ Takoradi	Total OIC/G
Carpenter	18	30	15	15	60
Masonry	18	30	15	15	60
Office Skills	12	30	15	15	60
Plumbing	9	15	15	-	30
Electricity	12	15	-	-	15
Motor Mechanics	12	15	-	-	15
Body and Fender	9	15*	-	15*	30
		150	60	60	270

*When ordered equipment arrives. Source: OIC/Ghana

Training capacity at the Centers is expanded by the fact that trainees undergo three to six months of On-The-Job (O-J-T) training at business firms (free of charge to the businessman), before they are finally placed in a job. Thus, OIC/Accra estimates its total training capacity at 210. On March 20, 1978, it had 193 vocational skills trainees, including those in O-J-T.

The demand for OIC instruction in Ghana is dramatized by the backlog of applicants for admission: in March 1978, OIC/Accra had a waiting list of over 3,000; OIC/Kumasi a waiting list of 108; and OIC/Takoradi a waiting list of over 200. OIC/Ghana does not advertise for or recruit trainees; applicants are attracted by word-of-mouth and the continuing publicity received by the program.

Interestingly, the well known OIC/America course in entrepreneurial training and management development has not proven transferable to Africa, although it was tried in Ghana and Nigeria. It ceased as a vocational skills course in OIC/Accra in 1975. That Center expects to resurrect it in somewhat different form in the short-term future. The course, to be called "Commerce," will train/upgrade small businessmen.

Trainees: Togo

At the time of the visit of the evaluation team, OIC/Togo had 25 trainees who had been undergoing feeder instruction for three months. Twenty of this first group were to be selected for the two-year agricultural extension vocational skills course, scheduled to start May 1, 1978. All 25 reportedly come from the surrounding area and are from farm families. Their average age is 30. Some are secondary school-leavers. Applicants were screened in a preliminary test which included mathematics, French language ability and agricultural knowledge. Ten of the group, who became affiliated with the project in February 1977, participated in Pilot Phase activities. For each semi-annual planting season, the agricultural extension trainees will devote 75% of their time to practical work on the Notse farm, and 25% to theory. After graduation, they are to assist farmers in the area.

The second group of trainees entering the Notse OIC in May 1978 are the first group of 20 local farmers. They will train for six months, then return to their villages. During the first two months, they will undergo feeder instruction; during the final four months they will receive technical training.

All trainees are to learn basic farm mechanics and construction. They will also study small gas engines. The agricultural extension trainees also are to study advanced engine repair and maintenance, and machinery and equipment. The farm mechanics aspect of OIC/Togo's instruction has aroused considerable interest.

Trainees: Nigeria

Statistics indicate that 809 trainees received instruction at OIC/Lagos during the six years (June 1970-June 1976) of the OICI-directed program.

During FY 1977, the first year of full indigenous operation, OIC/Nigeria produced 191 job-ready trainees, compared to a goal of 202.

Figure 4. JOB-READY TRAINEES, OIC/NIGERIA, FY 1977

Course	Goal	Actual
Accounting Machine Operation	27	27
Air Conditioning/Refrigeration	25	23
Auto Mechanics	30	31
Electronics	30	25
Hotel/Catering/Baking	60	55
Secretarial Science	30	30
	202	191

Source: OIC/Nigeria

The Center attributes failure to reach goal to: student withdrawals, uncertain arrival of funding, and electricity shortages. Lack of electricity during daytime hours has made it necessary to confine the electronics, air conditioning/refrigeration, and accounting machine operation courses to evening hours.

With completion of its new Center (see III-A-1), OIC/Nigeria plans to expand enrollment and establish training programs in the construction trades: brick-laying, carpentry, electrical work, and plumbing. OIC/Nigeria's recently updated waiting-list contains the names of 1,212 applicants. The average entering trainee has been on the waiting list for a year or more.

III-B-1(b). Placements

Placements: Ghana

Data at OIC/Accra indicate that 498 trainees were placed in jobs during Phase I, between April 1971 and September 1976. During FY 1977, the first year of Phase II activity, 140 of the Project Paper's goal of 150 were placed. (The Center expects to offset the short-fall during the current Fiscal Year.)

Figure 5. JOB PLACEMENTS OF OIC/ACCRA TRAINEES THROUGH FY 1977

Course	During Phase I	FY 1977, Phase II	Total Thru FY 1977
Carpentry	88	36	124
Masonry	68	25	93
Plumbing	82	21	103
Electrician	61	14	75
Motor Mechanics	47	13	60
Office Skills	96	25	121
Catering	0	2	2
Feeder	21	4	25
Entrepreneurial Tng. & Mgmt. Dvpmt.	35	0	35
	498	140	638

With respect to the FY 1977 placements:

- OIC/Accra reports that the 140 placements represent 100% of job-ready trainees; the program was unable to produce enough carpenters or masons to fill job orders, because of space and equipment limitations.

- The office skills trainees did not move as rapidly as expected. The Center has again included shorthand in the course, in an effort to produce trainees with fuller qualifications.

- The catering course experienced instructional and location difficulties, which reportedly have been cleared up.

Because the Kumasi and Takoradi Centers were just getting under way during FY 1977, they had no job-ready trainees or placements during the period.

In general, OIC/Ghana is unable to keep up with firm job orders from local businessmen. The OIC/Accra Supervisor of Job Developers reports that, in February 1978, his staff developed 53 jobs in various skills: carpentry 25, masonry 15, office skills 8, electrician 3, plumber 1, and motor mechanic 1. However, only 30 trainees in those skills were job-ready and could be placed.

Figure 6, below, indicates job orders and job placements during the first 18 months of Phase II, October 1976 through March 1978:

Figure 6. JOB ORDERS AND JOB PLACEMENTS, OICI/ACCRA, FY 1977 AND FIRST SIX MONTHS OF FY 1978

	Fiscal 1977		6 Mos. 1978		Total for 18 Months		
Course	Job Orders	Place-ments	Job Orders	Place-ments	Job Orders	Place-ments	% Placements to Job Orders
Carpentry	65	36	120*	41	185	77	41.6%
Electrician	17	14	7	7	24	21	87.5%
Masonry	70	25	37	24	107	49	45.8%
Motor Mechanics	13	13	6	4	19	17	89.5%
Office Skills	38	25	11	9	49	34	69.4%
Plumbing	26	21	13	11	39	32	82.1%
Catering	2	2	0	0	2	2	100.0%
Feeder	0	4	0	0	0	4	---
	231	140	194	96	425	236	55.5%

* 80 job orders in one month. Source: OIC/Ghana

OIC/Ghana's Industrial Advisory Council and its Technical Advisory Committees reportedly provide important assistance in placing trainees. The Center estimates that about three-fourths of job placements are with firms or public agencies represented by members on the advisory bodies. The Board of Directors is a subsidiary source of employment.

By all accounts, job retention is high because of economic and cultural factors. In addition, OIC/Accra's Job Developers have played an important followup role. Functioning also as advisor/counselor, they check to ensure that the new employee shows up on his first day of work (Job Developers sometimes accompany the new employee to the firm). During the normal 3-month probationary period for new employees, the Job Developer contacts the employee/employer at the end of the first week, the third month, and the probationary period. Trainees often return to the Center if they lose their job. Employers are requested to contact OIC when graduates are absent from work for three days without notice; and are urged to contact the Center if related problems arise.

The first placements of OIC/Kumasi trainees are expected in early 1979. Center officials express no concern about their placement.

Placements: Togo

First placements of OIC/Togo are not scheduled to take place for some time, because of the newness of the program.

Placements: Nigeria

Placements of job-ready OIC/Nigeria trainees during Fiscal 1977 (July 1976 - June 1977) were 174, or 91.1% of the 191 who were available.

Figure 7. JOB PLACEMENTS OF OIC/NIGERIA TRAINEES, FY 1977

Course	Job-Ready Trainees	Job Placements
Accounting Machine Operation	27	27
Air Conditioning/Refrigeration	23	18
Auto Mechanics	31	31
Electronics	25	19
Hotel/Catering/Baking	55	49
Secretarial Science	30	30
	191	174

Source: OIC/Nigeria

As with OIC/Accra, OIC/Nigeria finds itself unable to fill demand for its graduates. Figure 8, on the next page, indicates that it has an eight-month backlog of job-orders compared to its ability to produce job-ready candidates.

Figure 8. JOB ORDERS ON HAND AT OIC/NIGERIA, COMPARED TO ANNUAL CAPACITY FOR JOB-READY TRAINEES

Course	# Unfilled Job Orders	Annual Capacity	Backlog Job Orders
Accounting Machine Operation	15	30	6 months
Air Conditioning/Refrigeration	10	21	6 months
Auto Mechanics	58	25	2-1/3 years
Electronics	6	20	4 months
Hotel/Catering/Baking	15	60	3 months
Secretarial Science	22	30	8 months
	126	186	8 months

Source: OIC/Nigeria

OIC/Nigeria's trainees reportedly do well at their jobs. The Center states that many On-The-Job trainees are hired by the firms at which they undergo their training. Many are also paid salaries.

III-B-2. The Multiplier Effect

III-B-2(a). Trainers Trained

In Ghana, the OICI advisors trained functional counterparts and local instructional and support staff during a large part of Phase I. With two of the four advisors scheduled to leave the Phase II project by October 1978, and the remaining advisors by the end of September 1980, the process has accelerated. The American specialists are training the individual Program Coordinators and Program Directors of the three Centers, as well as counterparts. However, since the feeder and vocational skills instructors teach unskilled trainees entry-level or intermediate skills, rather than train trainers of others, the direct multiplier effect of the project is limited.

(The quality of the Ghanaian counterparts and staff is considered excellent by the Boards of Directors, Ghanaian officials, the OICI advisors and impartial observers.)

Potentially, the direct multiplier effect of the Togo project should be somewhat greater than that of OIC/Ghana. The 20-25 agricultural extension workers-in-training are expected to teach improved farm management practices to agriculturalists in the Plateau Region.

III-B-2(b). Indirect Impacts of the OICs

Other training and educational institutions in Ghana have emulated elements of the OIC instructional techniques. Although the magnitude of the impact is perhaps immeasurable, OIC/Ghana's program appears to have had significant indirect impact in several areas:

- OIC/Ghana personnel have lectured and participated in University of Cape Coast/Institute of Education's training sessions for counselors (1975-present); and in University of Ghana/Institute of Adult Education's seminars on guidance, counseling and training (1974-1975). Student counseling is spreading throughout much of Ghana's formal and some of its non-formal school system. OIC and a number of knowledgeable outside observers credit OIC/Ghana as the impetus behind this trend.

- With OIC/Ghana's success in turning out job-ready trainees in 12 to 18 months, the country's vocational/technical schools have begun reducing training periods for apprentices from four to three, and in some cases, two years. The tendency has begun reducing per-student training costs.

- The National Vocational Training Institute, regulator of vocational training in Ghana, has hired away OIC Job Developers; has instituted feeder-type pre-vocational-skill training; and is scaling down its entrance requirements for students.

- OICI advisors report that OIC curriculum material--especially that concentrating on various aspects of feeder instruction--has begun to appear in courses offered by other Ghanaian vocational schools; others note that OIC has generated a ground swell at the Ministry of Education to improve the traditional, academically oriented British vocational training system that has prevailed until now.

- OIC trainees have gained wide acceptance by prospective employers, who no longer require certificates or proof of completion of apprenticeship training.

Indirect impacts of the embryonic Togo programs are less visible. The following have been attributed to it: the Institute for Research in Tropical Agriculture is to undertake an AID-supported seed improvement program, as a result of Pilot Phase findings of OIC/Togo; and farmers of the Notse region have been impressed with, and are said to have begun emulating OIC/Togo demonstrations of the "two-row planter," chisel plow, bark-shaved wooden fencing, and A-frame farrowing house for swine.

III-B-3. Viability: Local Contributions and Revenues

Viability: Ghana

The breakdown of contributions by source for the four years of Phase II is commonly reported to be: 40% from OICI/AID, 40% from the Government of Ghana, and 20% from private contributions. The Project Paper, however, divides contributions according to the following ratio:

47.1% ($1,900,000)	- AID, through OICI
36.6% ($1,476,000)	- Government of Ghana, through the Ministry of Labor
16.3% ($656,000)	- Private contributions

The Government of Ghana subsequently committed a four-year contribution of 1,500,000 cedis, worth $1,304,000 at the current official rate of exchange. Drawdowns of GOG funds have been sporadic, but no long-term problem is anticipated in that regard.

Private contributions to date have not been impressive, compared to planned receipts. Figure 9 indicates that only $39,000 was received in FY 1977 from that source, and that a revised fund-raising program calls for rapidly increased donations:

Figure 9. REVISED FUND RAISING PLAN FOR PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS, OIC/GHANA
(In dollars, rounded to nearest hundred)

Program	4-Year Goal	Actual 1977	Goal 1978	Goal 1979	Goal 1980
OIC/Accra	$251,700	$28,700	$ 74,400	$ 74,300	$ 74,300
OIC/Kumasi	86,800	2,400	28,200	28,100	28,100
OIC/Takoradi	87,000	0	29,000	29,000	29,000
National Office	6[illegible],300	4,400	19,300	19,300	19,300
Sub Total	487,800	35,500	150,900	150,700	150,700
Permanent Center	168,500	3,500*	55,000	55,000	55,000
Grand Total	$656,300	$39,000	$205,900	$205,700	$205,700

*Given by Ministry of Labor Source: OIC/Ghana

Through March 22 of FY 1978, the National Office raised $4,800, OIC/Accra $26,700, OIC/Takoradi $870, and OIC/Kumasi $140, for a total of $32,510. OIC/Accra, with over seven years of history behind it, is well known in the community and the country. On March 17, 1978, the Lebanese community sponsored a dinner dance, raffle and cultural show in OIC's honor, paying for the entire cost of the event and donating an additional 25,000 cedis ($21,700) to the Center.

The National Board of Directors, which (see III-D-2) is unpaid, signs letters asking for donations but lacks the experience and time to perform detailed planning for fund raising. Two of the OICI advisors have drawn up a comprehensive fund raising plan; a hard-driving effort will be needed to meet the private contributions goal.

In-kind contributions have apparently been significant in a number of cases, but have not been recorded systematically. For example, OIC/Kumasi received its training center from the Ministry of Social Welfare, and has received private donations including lumber, training supplies and a refrigerator at cost.

Viability: Togo

Self sufficiency for OIC/Togo is defined in the Proposal/Project Paper in terms of percentage of local operating costs offset by income from sale of crops and animals produced, and

revenue from breeding activities. Local revenues are to be generated, starting the second project year, when 10% of local costs (salaries, fringe benefits and operating expenses) are to be balanced by local revenues. In the third, fourth and fifth project years, respectively, 50%, 55% and 70% of local operating costs are to be offset by local revenues. During the sixth year, a post-project period, 100% of local costs are to be equalled by revenues.

During the first months of FY 1978, a number of pigs were sold (swine are to be marketed two or three times a year). Surplus maize and already-grown cotton are to be sold. The Program Advisor estimates that the second project year will end with revenues $24,000 behind schedule; he anticipates that this can be made up during the succeeding year, in part because 60 acres of crops are to be added to the program. During the five years of the program, $481,000 of local revenues are to be generated.

Viability: Nigeria

OIC/Nigeria's operating budget has been entirely covered by local contributions and revenues since completion of the OICI/AID project in FY 1976. Government support has been forthcoming via the Nigerian Industrial Training Fund (ITF), ever since an AID-sponsored study for ITF confirmed OIC/Lagos' suitability for such funding and recommended that 60% of the Center's budget be so covered. In FY 1977, OIC/Nigeria received 90,000 nairas ($153,000) from the ITF.

For FY 1978, the Center's operating budget is 205,500 nairas ($349,350). Of the total, 60% is to come from the ITF, 27% in the form of contributions from OIC/Nigeria's Industrial Advisory Council, 6% from fund-raising activities, and 7% from consulting services. OIC/Nigeria's consulting services consist of courses--offering post-hiring training (management/performance improvement, attitudinal and motivation training)--for new employees of several large Nigerian and international companies. In FY 1977, OIC/Nigeria presented 11 such courses, ranging from 20 hours to 40 hours in length, thereby generating approximately $28,000 in income.

The ITF commitments have always been honored. However, uncertainties concerning timely receipt of obligated funds have caused OIC/Nigeria problems. For example, at the time

of our evaluation, it was holding in abeyance the hiring of needed counselors and job developers, pending arrival of ITF monies.

III-C. LOCALIZATION OF STAFF

In April 1978, 69 of OIC/Ghana's 75 person staff (92% of total) were Ghanaians. There were six expatriates: two Canadians and four Americans. The Canadians, whose salaries are funded by Canada's foreign assistance programs, are scheduled to leave within several months. Two of the American advisors are scheduled to depart by September 30, 1978. At that time, only two non-Ghanaians (OICI technicians) will remain.

During the evaluation team's research in Togo, 22 of the 26 person staff of OIC/Togo were Togolese. The four OICI technicians were the only expatriates.

OIC/Nigeria is completely indigenized.

III-D. PROJECT MANAGEMENT

III-D-1. Role and Effectiveness of OICI Technicians

Eight of the 21 OICI technicians then in the field were active in OIC/Ghana and OIC/Togo programs visited by the evaluation team. They are competent and dedicated professionals who perform well under difficult conditions, and are generally highly regarded.

The OIC/Ghana Advisors

Section III-A-2 of the report describes the marked success of the OIC/Ghana program in the opinion of Ghanaians, Government of Ghana and USAID officials. Succeeding subsections have detailed the progress of the Phase II program in terms of enrollments and trainees, and its acceptance by that nation's business community in terms of job-placements. In terms of impact and local support, OICI's Ghana program must be considered remarkably effective.

We also attribute the success, in part, to OICI's training techniques and educational philosophy, which mesh closely with the socio-economic development aims of the country and its people. And, certainly, a large share of the credit must be given to the OICI technicians -- especially to its Program Advisor, who has headed the program during most of its existence.

Although the OICI specialists have requisite primary skills in administration, training, education or finance, they are essentially generalists who must and can "change hats" with frequency, to meet programmatic problems and challenges.* Together, the technicians also possess previous, valuable-to-the-project experience with OIC/America; and three of the four have served OICI overseas for four or more years.

With 2 technicians scheduled to leave in September 1978 and the other two departing two years later, training of Ghanaian functional counterparts and program coordinators has been active. There is some feeling on the part of OICI technicians that the student services and training curriculum counterparts --both relatively new to the program--may not be fully prepared to handle their responsibilities alone by the end of FY 1978. The counterparts disagree. In the case of the program advisor and finance specialist counterparts, there appears little question that both, through experience and talent, are capable of performing their functions well when the expatriates leave.

Our caveat concerning the ability of the counterparts to carry on successfully during FY 1979 and FY 1980 is concerned not with its present scope of activity in Accra, Kumasi and Takoradi, but with its potential, non-AID/OICI funded expansion into others of Ghana's nine states (see III-A-2). The pressure accompanying such proliferation might be too strong for a program that is concurrently phasing out its OICI advisors.

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* The Generalist nature of OICI technician activity is not fully represented in the job descriptions which form the basis for their recruitment. For example, the Finance Specialist job descriptions for the Ghana and Togo projects stress the financial aspect of the position, whereas both technicians who fill those positions report that approximately 70% of their time is spent on administrative services, rather than finance.

The OICI/Togo Technicians

The design for OICI's Togo program--its first operational agricultural training project--consists of a first year Pilot (research) Phase to confirm and/or modify program assumptions, followed by four years of implementation. Consequently, OICI/Central concentrated recruiting emphasis on competent agricultural technicians to fill the agronomist, animal husbandry, farm manager and farm mechanic advisor positions specified in the Proposal/Project Paper. The agronomist also was made program advisor. The farm manager slot, filled for a short time by a local-hire American, remains vacant; at the time of the evaluation, the animal husbandry specialist functioned in that position.

A 5th technician--a finance specialist--was subsequently authorized for the program. He began orientation in Philadelphia in October 1977 and arrived in mid-December that year, almost a year and a half after the project began. His financial and administrative services capabilities had been sorely missed.

The four technicians appear to be quite competent in their respective specialties; their related agricultural, finance and research backgrounds are solid.

The program design fits Togo's development needs (see III-E). However, with OIC's recent shift from the exclusively technical orientation of the Pilot Phase to one requiring much closer integration into the country's socio-economic growth effort, new and broader skills are required of OICI's technicians, to ensure active support from the Government of Togo, and Togolese and regional developmental institutions.

This degree of rapport has not been engendered by the program to date, because of three main factors that relate to the technicians. Overall, the group evidences (a) inadequate French language ability; (b) a specialist/research orientation as opposed to an administrative/management proclivity; and (c) an insufficient background in OICI training methodology and philosophy.

No OICI technician is French fluent. While the ability to communicate in French to trainees at the Notse farm could be considered helpful rather than necessary, such is not the case in Lomé, where French is mandatory for effective communication with most officials and project staff. The fact

that the program advisor has minimal French fluency while his counterpart, the program director, has minimal English fluency, has made dialogue between the two ineffective. To a significant degree, the inability of the American and Togolese staffs to communicate effectively with one another, hinders program planning and activity, causes loss of control, makes it difficult to transmit the OICI philosophy, and creates misunderstandings that can prevent the program from fully achieving its objectives.

The evaluation team recognizes the extremely difficult task faced by OICI in recruiting agriculturalists whose technical ability equips them to be effective in the LDC environment, and understands why preference is accorded technical rather than second-language skills.* Nevertheless, French capability must be reinforced among the project team. OICI technicians cannot do the job alone; they must pass on their expertise for the Togo program to become successfully indigenized.

The OICI technicians have, in the face of unexpected problems, completed a successful Pilot Phase, and initiated an Implementation Phase which, while well-started, required continuing close contact with officials of the country and their active support. In addition to French language ability, this will mean the application of a planned effort to relate to Togolese on the human and public relations levels far more fully than to date. (We noted earlier the significant degree to which success of the Ghana program is attributed to the expertise shown by OIC/Ghana's advisors in those areas.)

Because of the agricultural orientation of the OIC/Togo program, OICI's recruiting efforts centered elsewhere than among its own cadre or that of OIC/America to fill technician positions. Unlike the situation in OIC/Liberia, OIC/Lesotho, OIC/Zambia, and of course OIC/Ghana, initial staffing of the Togo program did not include anyone with an OICI/OICA background. In retrospect, this may have been a mistake. Without a continuing emphasis on OICI philosophy and methodology, an OICI program tends to lose the special character that has characterized such efforts and contributed importantly to their success. Only with the arrival of the OIC/America-experienced financial specialist at the close of 1977, did OIC Togo acquire someone with that missing background.

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* The job descriptions for all four technician positions in Appendix B of the Togo Proposal/Project Paper call for candidates to be proficient in the French language.

To strengthen the effectiveness of the OIC/Togo Technical Cooperation Team, we recommend the fielding of two new advisors to replace the agronomist/program advisor who is scheduled to return to the United States in a few months, at the end of his two-year contract; and fill the vacant advisor position now classified "farm manager:

- o A mature, French-fluent agricultural extension agronomist/educator, with management and program operations skills.

- o An OICI/OIC America-experienced training specialist, with student services and/or curriculum development experience. One of the advisors scheduled to phase out of the OIC/Ghana program in September 1978 might well fill the position.

For future pre-service training of agriculturalists recruited for OICI programs, we recommend that more emphasis be placed on overall aspects of the project and on OICI philosophy/methodology. Narrow specialists cannot be completely effective on OICI programs.

Institutionalization of Field Staff

A substantial degree of turnover and attrition is to be expected among a PVO's field personnel. There is a chronic shortage of available, qualified, dedicated and flexible professionals willing to give up or interrupt careers in the U.S. to work under hardship conditions in the LDCs for typically impermanent, low-paying, under-financed PVOs. OICI is no exception to the general rule. The fact that its source of technicians comes primarily from among the ranks of American minorities may exacerbate the problem, for minority members generally have less opportunity to develop the requisite experience, and are less able to leave stable job situations, even temporarily.

In mid-April 1978, two-thirds of OICI technicians in the field or undergoing pre-service training--15 out of a total 22--were on their first assignment for the organization. Three of the seven were on second or third tours in Ghana, and of those, two were likely to depart in September 1978.

Despite some actions to the contrary, it is the considered opinion of the evaluation team that OICI is not sufficiently alert to the need to retain its most experienced and productive advisors; particularly in the period of rapid expansion in which the PVO finds itself. There appears to be insufficient appreciation at OICI/Central of the problems and complexities of field operations, just as there appears to be insufficient appreciation on the part of OICI field personnel of the problems and complexities at OICI/Central. To the extent that this is caused by insufficient communication, we advocate (see II-B-5(b)) more intensive OICI/Central personal contact with the field.

Essentially, OICI's strength and success as an institution depends more on the quality and experience of its headquarters and field staff than any other single factor. It, therefore, is incumbent on OICI's management to do its best to keep effective advisors, and to transform them into a stable, seasoned cadre who leave OICs as country programs attain viability, transferring to new country programs where their expertise is required.

III-D-2. Local Boards and Advisory Bodies

OIC/Ghana Boards of Directors

The National Board of Directors of OIC/Ghana is a serious, prestigious body which has devoted considerable time and effort to the program. Four-fifths of its members are active. The Board meets monthly; however, it plans in the near future to begin meeting quarterly, with an Executive Committee convening more frequently. The Board includes several businessmen, educators, the Director of the National Vocational Technical Institute and a clergyman. It includes three representatives from each of the individual centers. The program director, program advisor and Ghanaian fiscal officer of the National Office participate regularly in sessions as ex-officio members.

The National Board has taken on the task of publicizing the Ghanaian program through press conferences, TV and radio and appeals to commerce and industry for support and job opportunities.

The OIC/Accra Board of Directors for the most part contains members who are also on the National Board. The Kumasi Board meets twice monthly. The Takoradi Board meets monthly. The latter Boards each contain 15 members, almost all of whom participated actively in the local Interest Groups which subsequently became OIC/Kumasi and OIC/Takoradi.

All the Ghanaian Boards formulate policy, review progress, and hire the Center staffs who execute the policy. They are strong, independent, community-based bodies, and take their responsibilities seriously.

OIC/Togo Board of Directors

The Togo Board has eight members, five of whom attend sessions regularly. It consists of businessmen who comprise the local Interest Group, the President of Togo's Agricultural Credit Bank, and an official of a West African regional organization. The Board is generally considered passive and ineffective. At the time of the evaluation, concerned members of the Board were planning to change leadership of the body and strengthen its composition and relevant expertise. The program director and program manager attend sessions regularly as ex-officio members.

OIC/Nigeria Board of Directors

The Nigeria Board has remained essentially the same since the end of the OICI project in 1976. Under a revision in its constitution, it has changed its name to OIC/Nigeria - Lagos Programme. Membership is now set at 15, to provide for representation from other, to-be-developed, OICs in Nigeria. The current body is seen as a National Board.

The OIC/Nigeria Board of Directors is high level and serious. Two of its members--the Director of ITF and Chairman of ITF's Training and Research Committee--who represent its chief funding source (see III-B-3), are relatively inactive, primarily because they are stationed outside of the Lagos area.

Advisory Councils and Committees

The OIC/Ghana Industrial Advisory Council consists of decision-makers from large corporations and public agencies--

officials who theoretically are in a position to provide the OIC with money and/or equipment, and who can ask their personnel managers to hire job-ready trainees. (We noted that some three-quarters of OIC/Accra trainees have been placed with firms or public agencies represented on the program's advisory bodies.) The Council is convened periodically to inform members of OIC needs. It soon is to be asked to help the organization raise funds.

OIC/Accra has Technical Advisory Committees for each vocational skill area of instruction. Membership consists of foremen and supervisors who are involved with workers at the entry level typical of OIC trainees, and who provide technical advice on new techniques and curriculum development.

In Nigeria, the OIC Industrial Advisory Council helps in the Center's fund-raising efforts. There are no active Technical Advisory Committees; curriculum has not been updated recently.

The OIC/Togo agricultural training project does not have advisory bodies.

III-D-3. Participant Training

Participant trainees in the OICI context are Africans on the staffs of OICs or members of Board of Directors, who come to the U.S. for training for four and two weeks respectively. Participant training activity is an integral part of OICI's overall technical assistance program.

Training for local staffers is designed to assist in developing specialists in various fields of activity. It covers: familiarizing the participant with the philosophy, concepts and development of the OIC movement; preparation for increased responsibility in his/her areas of expertise, including administrative and management techniques applicable to the specialis's area of assignment; On-The-Job working experience at OICI/Central; and an insight into the American way, to improve the working relationship between participant and his American counterpart.

The program for OIC staff is divided among a week of in-house activities, a week of instruction in general management techniques and approaches, a week of O-J-T, and a week of observation and participation at the Annual OIC Convocation.

OICI/Central reports that local staffers selected for training are required to sign a contract that they will stay with the program for two years, and that, in the event they resign or leave the program prior to that period, they are expected to reimburse OICI for costs associated with their training.

Through 1977, 17 OIC/Ghana staff members had undergone participant training in the U.S. Most were feeder and vocational skills instructors; others were counselors, a job developer, and members of the OIC/National support staff. Nine of the trainees--somewhat over half of the total--were no longer with the Ghana program on April 1, 1978. Data concerning their departure, whether by resignation or termination, are unavailable. However, continuing high inflation, during which OIC employees have found their salaries and fringes lagging behind adjustments in the private and public sectors, has taken its toll. In light of current conditions in Africa, guarantees by ex-participants to remain with programs may not be realistic.

Three of the four staff participants in 1978 are program directors of OICs; the fourth is a training director. OIC/Ghana, OIC/Sierra Leone and OIC/Zambia were represented among the staff participants.

The two-week training period for Board members consists of in-house activities and participation at the Annual OIC Convocation. Fourteen directors from 11 OIC Boards were participants in 1978. Of these, the training for three (from Nigeria and Belize) was not funded from AID project monies.

III-E. MEETING HOST COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT NEEDS

Meeting Development Needs of Ghana

Early in Section III, we noted that the OIC/Ghana program exemplifies that government's stress on self-reliance and training for the unskilled. The following quotes from the Republic of Ghana's Five-Year Development Plan, 1975/1976 - 1979/1980, published January 1977 show how it dovetails:

> "One of the long-term goals of planning in Chana is the achievement of full employment of all the nation's resources, both human and material. In practice, this

means striving to reduce the level of unemployment of labour...Social justice demands that we should strive to provide job opportunities for all Ghanaians who are able and willing to work. For the unemployed, being without a job means not only a loss of income, with consequent hardship for the family and the possibility of losing self-respect, but also the development of a sense of personal failure and perhaps even a feeling of loss of social standing in the community.*

"The lack of a close relationship between some courses in our training institutions, especially in the middle, secondary and technical institutions, and requirements of the employment world, aggravates the unemployment problems." **

OIC/Ghana expresses the same thoughts in its five-point credo:

"OIC (Ghana) believes that:
"1. Industry needs workers trained in skills.
"2. An employed worker means a responsible member of his community.
"3. An employed worker has more earning and spending power.
"4. Earning and spending power make for economic growth.
"5. TOGETHER, WE CAN HELP OURSELVES."

Government officials confirmed to members of the evaluation team that there has been no change in Ghana's priority development needs since the Five-Year Plan was developed, and that--in spite of current economic problems--vocational/technical education for the unskilled remains a focus of priority action. The Head of State's commitment of an additional $1,300,000 for a supplementary OIC program (see III-A-2) is tangible evidence of the organization's integration into the nation's development effort.

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* Pages 27-28, Part I, Chapter 3.1.2, "Plan Objectives, Priorities and Strategy - Full Employment."
** Page 338, Part II, Chapter 8, "Manpower and Development."

Meeting Development Needs Of Togo

Togo's Third Economic and Social Development Plan (1976-1980) states: "The Third Plan (is) a plan for economic growth... notably in the agricultural sector...Underemployment, urban and rural, unemployment, and an inadequate system of training for the needs of the economy are unsettling problems...(Of these) the most important plague to fight is underemployment."*

Attachment A of the OIC/Togo Proposal Project Paper reproduces an April 23, 1975 letter from Togo's Minister of Planning to OICI/Central, stating: "There is no doubt whatsoever in our minds as to the possibility of applying and adapting the program and concepts of OIC in Togo. It is, in fact, just the kind of program which would be of great benefit to our country in the area of agricultural development."

Attachment B of the Togo Proposal/Project Paper contains an October 2, 1975 letter from the Chief of the Directorate of Livestock Development of the Plateau Region, stating: "...we feel that a program of this type would be of great value to our people and also (would) alleviate some of our local Government's social problems. We would therefore recommend that all efforts be put forth for the realization of this vital program in our country. Also, we feel that going in the direction of small animals husbandry will help our people improve their livestock and, therefore, gain more out of their efforts."

In an effort to curb high unemployment and reduce the townward migration by young, rural school-leavers, the Togolese Government launched a national "Return to the Land" campaign to encourage agricultural development. It is estimated that the rural sector will have to absorb at least 85% of the country's labor force for at least the next decade. OIC/Togo plans to train some 400 Togolese of the Plateau Region in basic agricultural skills and intermediate agricultural technology during the life of the project.

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* Pages 4 and 47, Troisième Plan de Dévéloppement Economique et Social, 1976-1980, République Togolaise, Direction Général du Plan et du Dévéloppement.

Meeting Development Needs of Nigeria

Nigeria's Second National Development Plan, 1970-1974, notes that high unemployment was one of the causes of the downfall of the First Republic; and that most of the unemployed were young, and many were dropouts from secondary schools. It thus set a high priority for programs to train youth in skills that would improve their prospects for employment.

Evidences of OIC/Nigeria's adknowledged role in that country's development effort include active support from the Head of State and continuing funding of the program since 1975 by the Ministry of Labour through the Industrial Training Fund, which (see III-B-3) provides 60% of the Center's annual operating budget.

IV. OICI/CENTRAL PROGRAM SUPPORT AND DEVELOPMENT

IV-A. DIVERSIFICATION OF FUNDING FOR OICI/CENTRAL

As opposed to the proven ability of OICI programs in the LDCs to attract above-average amounts of local resources, both governmental and private, as OIC Centers mature, the level of non-AID funding for OICI/Central's headquarters operation has been notably low. A May 1976 report of AID states that OICI/Central does not raise an acceptable level of funds from non-governmental sources.

Internal documentation of OICI/Central indicates that it may derive as much as 95% to 98% of its operational funds from AID; and that its "Private Account/General Fund," used for purposes and expenses that are unrelated to AID-sponsored programs, has always been small and has been shrinking over the years. Revenues in the Private Account totaled $28,400 in FY 1976 and $22,250 in FY 1977. OICI's Semi-Annual Report to AID for the period ending August 31, 1977 indicates that the Private Account had a positive balance of $2,983 at the close of the period.

OICI states that the extremely limited annual revenue of the Private Account, and its irregular and unpredictable pattern of cash inflow from non-AID donors, has prevented it from meeting Recommendation No. 8 of AID's Audit Report 76-165, that OICI allocate proportions of specific line item costs to the Private Account.

OICI recognizes and is concerned about the problem. Our review of the minutes of recent Board of Directors' meetings reveals that the subject of non-AID fund raising has been discussed often. OICI/Central has invested thought and effort into the search, with little progress to date.

As OICI reaches out to more countries, as inflation increases U.S. costs, and as staff requirements mount, dependence on AID financing for the headquarters operation will continue to rise.

There appears to be no easy solution. OICI faces certain disadvantages in raising private funds:

- Its potential small-scale constituency--minority group members as individuals or as represented in minority organizations (e.g., church groups and OICs in the U.S.)--prefers to concentrate its often limited charitable contributions on agencies which provide assistance at home, rather than overseas.

- OICI receives cash or in-kind contributions from a few large corporations (e.g., Gulf Oil, General Motors, IBM and Coca-Cola), but amounts are limited in size because the corporations, some of which make substantial donations to the OIC/America movement as a whole, tend to divide them on an OIC-by-OIC basis, apparently treating OICI as one, somewhat atypical Center, among hundreds.

OICI has taken tentative initial steps to investigate the potential for non-AID funding. An IBM executive on loan to OICI performed secondary research to identify potential foundation donors, i.e., those with funds for similar programs, and developed a list of targets, their specific interests and funding parameters. She did not cover industry, deemed a secondary source of new donations, because OIC/America concentrates on that group. (A spokesman for OIC/America states that it and other black organizations have limited ability to raise funds from businessmen for domestic programs, let alone for foreign efforts.)

OICI also is formulating a draft proposal, aimed at potential private sources, for the creation of an Office of Special Projects to spearhead its domestic fund raising effort. In preliminary concept, the proposal asks for initial-year funding of $78,700 for a three-person staff who would administer fund-raising activities, identify alternative funding sources, contact them, prepare presentations, design a resource-mobilization information system, and develop newsletters, etc.

Members of OICI's National Board of Directors suggest that, in view of an almost unique ability to obtain funding support and political commitments for local programs from African chiefs of states and their governments, OICI deserves special consideration, and perhaps exemption from AID guidelines which accent the importance of common cost allocation and absorption as a pre-condition for significant continuing support of OICI/Central.

IV-B. CONTINUING ASSISTANCE TO SELF-SUSTAINING PROGRAMS

With a six-year investment in OIC/Nigeria exceeding $1,700,000, OICI and AID have a continuing stake in the now self-sufficient program. Although OIC/Nigeria is functioning well (see Section III), it still faces continuing problems and shortages that would be ameliorated by modestly scaled, judicious assistance from OICI/Central.

We do not refer to financial assistance, for OICI/Central has been unable to generate sufficient non-AID financial resources to meet its own headquarters needs. Nor do we consider practical the provision of training equipment, because non-American materials tend to be costly and difficult to maintain and repair, compared to others available in Nigeria.

The area in which OICI/Central can be of major continuing aid to OIC/Nigeria--and, by extension, to OIC/Ghana when it attains 100% viability in FY 1980--is technical assistance. Because of present expansion plans (see III-A-1), OIC/Nigeria would welcome the services of several specialists on a short-term or longer-term basis. For example:

- Short-term planners, for from two to four weeks. They might include a member or members of OICI/Central's management or technical-specialist team.

- Trainers of trainers in areas of little OIC/Nigeria knowledge and competence, such as an agronomist and/or animal husbandry specialist, for a one- or two-year period.

The need for additional OICI/Central-provided technical assistance could increase as the Nigerian OICs proliferate.

Post-program technical assistance may become an effective followup technique for helping ensure continuing success of OIC training programs. We suggest that OICI and AID consider the allocation of a portion of future support grant monies for that purpose.

PERSONS INTERVIEWED

Kura Abedje, Director, Finance and Administration, OICI
Yao M. Afantchao, Secretary, Board of Directors and former Program Director, OIC/Togo
Ross E. Bigelow, Project Officer, PDC/PVC, AID/Washington
Mr. Byrd, Program Officer, USAID/Ghana
Harry A. Cahill, AID Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy/Lagos
Irving Coker, Director, USAID/Ghana
Hobert Crosby, OICI Technician, OIC/Ghana
Sydney Eckman, Program Audit/Procurement Officer, OICI
S. A. Gbadebo, Executive Director, Lagos State Programme, OIC/Nigeria
Cynthia D. Gilliam, Planning Research Specialist, OICI
James Gordon, Curriculum and Research, OIC/Ghana; and Coordinator, OIC/Accra
Donald A. Green, Chief Accountant, OICI
Ronald D. Harvey, Program Advisor, OIC/Togo
Albert T. Jacobs, Program Advisor, OIC/Ghana
Earl R. Jefferson, OICI Technician, OIC/Ghana
H. Alonzo Jennings, Field Support Coordinator, OICI
Mr. Johnson, USAID/Ghana
S. A. Jones, Executive Director, Ghana Manpower Board
Mr. Klunaté, Director General of the Plan and Development, Government of Togo
H. O. Laryea, Chairman of the Board, OIC/Kumasi
Roderick K. Lyles, Administrative Officer, OICI
Doris Mack, OICI Technician, OIC/Ghana
Connie L. Mannings, OICI Technician, OIC/Togo
Marshae Murrell, IBM Loan Executive to OICI
Mr. N'Daiye, Bank of African Development, Lomé
Quy Nguyen, Economic Analyst/Evaluation, OICI
G. Y. Odoi, Chairman of the Board, OIC/Ghana
Godwin Odumah, Director, Planning and Program Development, OICI
A. E. K. Ofori-Atta, Program Manager, OIC/Accra
Ben Ofori, Training and Evaluation, OIC/Ghana; Coordinator, OIC/Takoradi
Emilia Oguaah, Student Services, OIC/Ghana; Coordinator, OIC/Kumasi
William D. Opare, National Executive Director, OIC/Ghana
Alhaji M. O. Oseni, Chairman, and other Members of the Board of Directors, OIC/Nigeria

Sam Owu, Program Director, OIC/Kumasi
Ronald Palmer, United States Ambassador to Togo
Gary O. Robinson, Executive Director, OICI
Reverend Gus Roman, Board of Directors, OICI
E. E. Sackey, Fiscal and Administrative Services, OIC/Ghana
George K. Sackey, Director of Budget, Ministry of Finance, Government of Ghana
Sally Sharp, AID Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy/Lomé
Amegboh J. Sodatonou, Vice-Chairman, Board of Directors, OIC/Togo
A. P. Sokel, Program Director, OIC/Togo
Stanley Straughter, OICI Technician, OIC/Togo
Lucretia Taylor, Project Manager, USAID/Ghana
Samuel Walton, OICI Technician, OIC/Togo