

EXTENSION AND COUNSELING IN APPROPRIATE RURAL TECHNOLOGY

IRT Activity Number	698-0407.15
Country	Zaire
Funding	
AID	\$27,300
Zaire	\$26,500
	<u>\$53,800</u>
	Total
AID Approval	July 9, 1980
Grant Agreement	September 30, 1980
Planned Activity Completion Date	December 31, 1982

The grantee for this activity is the Centre d'Etudes pour l'Action Sociale (CEPAS), an affiliate of the Institut Africain de Developpement Economique et Social (INADES) which is headquartered in Abidjan and has an Operational Program Grant from AID. CEPAS assists villagers to test appropriate technology solutions to their problems and to share their information with others. The purpose of this activity is to permit CEPAS to expand and improve its ongoing activity by increasing its reference library, hiring an engineer so it can increase the level of its extension services, and augment its publication of appropriate technology materials designed for use in the rural areas of Zaire.

Relation to the USAID Program

A more extensive distribution of improved informational materials on rural technologies which have been tested in Zaire will support the rural development objectives of the USAID strategy in Zaire.

Results

Virtually all of the dollar-funded procurement is complete. This procurement was for audiovisual and reproduction equipment and additional appropriate technology documentation. Concurrently, information has been collected on as many examples as possible of innovative uses of rural technology in Zaire.

CEPAS is now ready for the second phase of its operations under the IRT activity, i.e., doubling its publications, holding seminars on the use of water, wood technology, food technology, and others, and training people to utilize the additional information made available. There is currently one stumbling block: CEPAS has not been able to hire a local engineer for carrying out the increased extension activity. The engineer was to be funded from the Zairian counterpart funds. However, the funding was based on Zairian government salary scales which is not enough to attract a qualified engineer. In view of the fact that a year of the activity has passed, its director plans to double the salary offered to ensure a qualified engineer at least for the second year.

Comment

CEPAS may be able to use the foregoing ploy to hire an engineer for the balance of the activity period; however, there is a need to find a means of assuring adequate funding for the position after the termination of the IRT grant.

SMALL AGRICULTURAL TOOL PRODUCTION

IRT Activity Number	698-0407.24
Country	Zaire
Funding	
AID	\$55,000
Zaire	\$55,000
	Total
	\$110,000
AID Approval	March 25, 1981
Grant Agreement	August 28, 1981
Planned Activity Completion Date	December 31, 1983

This activity proposes to increase the production of small agricultural hand tools through a training program at the Institut Professionel de Katoka (IPROKA), a secondary technical school in Kananga. Forty-eight urban blacksmiths will be trained in forging at IPROKA; 18 rural blacksmiths will be trained at centers scheduled for construction under the activity. A total of 75,000 hand tools are to be produced during the two years of the activity. These consist of hoes, axes, shovels, saws, and coupes-coupes (a Zairian implement). The tools are not technically innovative, but are designed to meet local conditions and a shortage of tools. Each trainee will produce his own set. Experience, Inc. is acting as procurement agent for the purchase of offshore equipment. A Peace Corps Volunteer (PCV) will monitor the activity. A second PCV will assist in training.

Relation to USAID Program

The USAID program includes a rural development component which emphasizes agricultural production. A shortage of farm tools exists in rural Zaire and there is no source of production which assures a constant supply. This activity will establish a production unit in a vocational school where it is planned to make the activity a part of the school curriculum. There is sufficient scrap metal in Zaire to assure a source of raw materials.

Results

The activity is on schedule in recruitment of urban blacksmiths; training will begin in March. Sites for the rural training centers have been tentatively selected.

Comment

Experience, Inc. recommends that USAID monitor this activity closely. It is the third tool production project which USAID has funded in the past few years and, although it is designed to avoid weaknesses of the former two projects, evaluations will benefit the activity and provide further information on the feasibility of local tool production in Zaire.

Experience, Inc. believes that at the moment replication of local tool production projects in Zaire would be premature. Thus far, no model has proved to be self-supporting. This activity differs from the preceding ones in that it does not try to create a self-supporting production and training facility but instead

trains blacksmiths, supplies them with raw materials, and proposes to make them self-supporting. Production costs are limited to raw materials and equipment for the blacksmiths. After completion of the activity, training costs will be borne by the trainees and IPROKA; for rural blacksmiths, funding organizations such as USAID or OXFAM should cover expenses. If the IPROKA model appears to function well after two years, it can be replicated in other areas provided that qualified institutions can be located.

KIONZO WATER SUPPLY

IRT Activity Number	698-0407.27
Country	Zaire
Funding	
AID	\$25,000
Zaire	\$22,000
	<u>\$47,000</u>
Total	

AID Approval	August 29, 1981
Scheduled for obligation in FY 1982	

This activity proposes to supply water from two springs to ten small villages and a medical center in Kionzo, Bas Zaire. Three hydraulic rams will pump the water to the villages. Two small water towers and six public standpipes will be constructed. Maintenance personnel will be trained and the villagers instructed in sanitation practices.

Relation to USAID Program

The USAID program includes a rural development component of which this activity is a part.

Status

The activity is scheduled for obligation in FY 1982. Experience, Inc. has modified the original design based on an analysis of the flow from the two springs, elevation of the villages, number of inhabitants, and efficiency of different hydraulic rams.

ANNEX

REPORT OF FIELD VISIT

BOTSWANA

February 11-16, 1982

The evaluation team reviewed the following activities in Botswana:

AIP Activity 698-0410.21	Borehole Drilling
IRT Activity 698-0407.08	Small-scale Sorghum Milling
IRT Activity 698-0407.14	Small Craft Development

In conducting the review, the evaluation team talked with USAID and Peace Corps staff members, a Peace Corps Volunteer (PCV) and a member of the Danish volunteer organization, activity staff personnel, and representatives of the business community in Gaborone. The team visited two activities: Small-scale Sorghum Milling at the Rural Industries Innovation Centre (RIIC), Kanye, and Small Craft Development at Pelegano Village Industries in Gabane.

Evaluation Team Observations

In Botswana, as in other African countries, rural unemployment has led to rural-to-urban migration which has increased the already high unemployment rate among unskilled workers in the urban centers. USAID promotes the development of small-scale rural industries to alleviate the unemployment problem in rural Botswana. The two IRT activities were undertaken for this purpose.

Small-scale Sorghum Milling has had a more far-reaching impact than was anticipated at the time RIIC presented its proposal for an IRT grant. RIIC proposed to produce five sorghum mills and install one in each of five rural communities. RIIC has instead produced 22 sorghum mills and installed them in 22 communities in rural Botswana. The sorghum mills are set up in rural communities of 3,000 to 4,000 people. In a few instances, they were bought by cooperatives or village associations; however, for the most part, they are the property of entrepreneurs who operate them with five to six employees.

The success of the sorghum mills may be attributed in part to government interest in development. Shortly after the IRT activity was initiated, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry requested that the new sorghum mill be demonstrated at a number of agricultural fairs. The response among local entrepreneurs was immediate. RIIC now has more orders than it can fill. The mills have also attracted international attention.

Although the unexpected degree of success of the sorghum mills has created financial and managerial problems at RIIC, the activity itself experienced few implementation problems. Its success may be attributed in part to the fact that RIIC was an established institution at the time the activity was undertaken. RIIC is also the subsidiary of an established institution -- Rural Industries Promotion, a nonprofit rural development organization.

The decision to develop the sorghum mill was based on the results of a survey which RIIC and the government's Southern District Council undertook in planning their 1977 rural development program. The survey revealed that the problem most frequently cited by villagers was that of handstamping sorghum grain for cooking. Villagers had shifted from sorghum meal (which they preferred) to maize meal because it was commercially available as flour and handstamping was eliminated. The small-scale sorghum mill was developed in response to a need which the survey had established.

Small Craft Development is one of six enterprises within the Pelegano Village Industries (PVI) complex at Gabane, Botswana. It has profited from having a sales outlet to handle its products -- Botswanacraft, an organization with established markets. Although the activity has not employed the number of women projected in its proposal, it has increased the income of those employed, doubling it at times.

The activity is replicable if the market warrants replication. PVI is a nonprofit rural development organization which seeks to maximize the effects of its successful activities by supporting replications in other locations.

Peace Corps participation has been highly successful. A PCV has managed not only the activity from its beginning but also other enterprises in the PVI complex.

USAID has had no Women in Development (WID) activities because of the rivalry between the two principal women's groups in Botswana. The Peace Corps has not been deterred by this situation; it participates in activities supported by both groups. USAID supports WID objectives, e.g., through both of the IRT activities.

The AIP Borehole Drilling is an interesting case study. It appears to be outside the AIP guidelines and not part of the principal thrust of USAID's strategy. Nevertheless, it was high priority to the Government of Botswana. It involved expedited procurement of U.S. equipment complemented by other donor technical assistance. It did indeed provide "accelerated impact."

The AID/W reaction was interesting. There was no questioning regarding AIP guidelines. Rather, the activity was treated as if it were a regular project. The USAID cable request for immediate approval brought forth an AID/W cable after three weeks saying a PID was required and citing some 20 pieces of additional information needed. Most of the information really required for a decision had already been included in the government's request to USAID, but given the urgent nature of the request, USAID had hoped it would not be necessary to provide AID/W with answers to every potential question.

Field View

The USAID Director has found that, while AIP and IRT activities can make a valuable contribution to development, they require as much staff time in management as the larger bilateral projects. In general, a proliferation of small projects should be avoided because of the demand on staff time.

USAID Botswana has found the services of the IRT contractor Experience, Inc. to be helpful. Options for securing technical services include their availability at REDSO and inclusion of sufficient funds in the grant agreement to hire local technical services.

PCVs are integrated into the USAID program. The Peace Corps Country Director stated that AID and Peace Corps collaborative projects are given priority. Timing is the most important problem. The Peace Corps cannot always provide volunteers to a USAID project at the time USAID requests them. Conversely, USAID projects are not always ready to start at the time that the Peace Corps has volunteers available.

Review of Individual Activities

The evaluation team's review of the individual activities follows.

BOREHOLE DRILLING

AIP Activity	698-0410.21
Country	Botswana
Funding	
AID	\$474,000
Botswana	\$542,500
	<u>Total</u>
	\$1,016,500
AID Approval	June 2, 1979
Grant Agreement	June 28, 1979
Planned Activity Completion Date	October 31, 1981

This project proposed to expand the borehole drilling capacity of the Department of Water Affairs by acquiring a second U.S.-manufactured Schramm drilling rig. The procurement was urgent because of a recent drought and the threat of another very dry year.

Relation to USAID Program

This activity seems rather marginal to the main thrust of the USAID strategy. It is, however, an ongoing high priority activity of the Government of Botswana.

Results

- The drilling rig was received in Botswana and put in operation by November 1, 1979, just four months after signature of the grant agreement.
- Thirty-five wells were drilled in the first year with 60 percent success rate. This was somewhat lower than hoped for because of time utilized for training personnel. The second year's production was reported to have been on target.
- The activity was successfully terminated in October 1981 on schedule. The government will continue the activity with its own resources.

Comment

- Although this activity seems outside the AIP guidelines and the USAID strategy, it is an excellent example of an activity which provided accelerated impact. This suggests some broadening of the AIP guidelines and a recognition that the implementation of a USAID strategy in a country can sometimes be facilitated by financing an activity outside of that strategy.
- The evaluation report for this activity had been drafted, but was not available to the evaluation team because the project officer had left the country. His replacement had not yet found the documents because of a recent move of USAID into new quarters.

SMALL-SCALE SORGHUM MILLING

IRT Activity	698-0407.08
Country	Botswana
Funding	
AID	\$54,000
Grantee	\$46,000
	<u>\$100,000</u>
Total	
AID Approval	March 4, 1980
Grant Agreement	April 3, 1980
Planned Activity Completion Date	March 31, 1982

This activity proposes to assist the Rural Industries Innovation Centre (RIIC) in its project to introduce a low-cost sorghum milling process in rural Botswana. It was undertaken to finance the expansion of the RIIC workshop and purchase of equipment for production of a sorghum dehuller developed at RIIC. The grant agreement calls for five sets of sorghum milling dehullers to be produced, sold, and operators trained, permitting the establishment of five sorghum mills. The performance and economic feasibility of the mills were to be tested and their impact on the villages in the vicinity monitored and evaluated.

RIIC is a subsidiary of Rural Industries Promotion (RIP), a nonprofit rural development organization. A 1977 survey carried out by RIIC and the Southern District Council in planning their rural development program revealed that the problem most frequently cited by villagers was that of handstamping sorghum grain for cooking. RIIC in cooperation with the International Development Research Center of Canada (IDRC) undertook to develop a prototype dehuller of a kind suitable for small-scale sorghum milling systems in Botswana villages. Tests at RIIC with the dehuller showed that a small-scale mill could be operated profitably.

Relation to USAID Program

This activity is consistent with one of the principal thrusts of the USAID strategy: employment generation. The mills provide local employment and also free women's time which is devoted in part to income-generating activities.

Results

- Workshop Expansion and Production. RIIC workshop expansion was completed and production equipment installed during the first six months of the activity. Five dehullers were produced, assembled, and the auxiliary equipment purchased during the same period. The grant agreement calls for mills to be set up and operators trained at five locations in Botswana; a total of 22 mills are in operation in locations throughout Botswana. Orders for the mills exceed the present capacity of the workshop to deliver.
- Impact Survey. The data collected in the impact survey allow certain tentative conclusions:

-- A sorghum mill in a village saves 2.5 hours in work time daily which a woman may use for household chores, leisure, or in income-producing

activities. Of the women surveyed, 41 percent used the time saved to engage in activities which increased their income.

- The factor which most affects the use of the sorghum mill is distance between household and mill. This may vary from next door to three km. Mill owners could increase usage by providing simple transport, e.g., donkey cart. RIIC is producing carts at present but none has yet been sold to mill owners.
- Profits realized by mill owners are difficult to calculate as no standard system has been established for accounting.
- Mill owners do not have sufficient storage space to handle the volume of sorghum the mills are capable of processing. RIIC is at present developing a design for a storage structure.
- It is costly to millers to shift mill operations back and forth during the day between commercial and service milling. They now allocate a specific part of each day for each operation.

Problems

RIIC has encountered a number of problems in carrying out the activity, most of which have been exacerbated by the decision to expand production more rapidly than originally anticipated:

- With sustained production, technical problems have arisen. RIIC has developed an improved dehuller model which it is ready to produce.
- Production of dehullers by RIIC was delayed because of a shortage of working capital which resulted in inability to procure raw materials on time. This was exacerbated by the attempt to expand production rapidly.
- Management turnover and the inability to find replacements or to afford to pay for qualified managers have contributed to the financial problems.
- Providing technical support to customers who have purchased mills was more time consuming and expensive than anticipated. Again, this was largely a result of expanding too rapidly. This meant that mills were placed too soon in too distant locations. In addition, a large number of mills were set up before all the problems were solved in the prototype model, thereby magnifying the support problem.
- Resupply of stones for the hammer mills, which need to be replaced after about each three months of operation, is a problem because there is a single producer in South Africa and the producer requires advance payments prior to initiating production.
- It has become increasingly difficult to coordinate the training courses for the new mill owners and operators at RIIC, particularly with the rapid expansion of the program and its extension to more remote parts of Botswana. RIIC now plans decentralized training for shorter lengths of time in the villages rather than holding courses at RIIC.

Comment

The rapid increase in demand for the small-scale sorghum mills was not anticipated. The attempt to respond rapidly to this demand created -- or exacerbated -- problems of implementation for the activity. In addition, it created a much higher demand for working capital, both for raw materials for new production and for spare parts for a larger number of operating mills. This, perhaps combined with inadequate financial management of all activities of RIIC, has created a cash flow crisis situation. This, in turn, has resulted in the dismissal of a number of employees and delays in ordering spare parts for operating mills and materials for construction of additional dehullers and other mill components. Thus, RIIC is not in a position to fill the additional orders it has. It anticipates that at least 20 additional mills could be sold.

The problem of resupply of stones for the hammer mills was not anticipated. With the possibility of establishing another 20 mills, it is imperative to establish a reliable system of resupply. It may be economical to produce them in Botswana. It is possible that other spare parts or supplies could also be economically produced in Botswana. This could be studied. The logistical problems of support to new mills was not anticipated, in part because it was not initially planned to expand so rapidly, especially to the more remote areas. This problem also has serious financial implications. Therefore, it is important that the problem be dealt with soon. Possibilities for alleviation which are being considered include contracting with an individual or organization to handle support in the northern area and/or charging for support services. The IRT grant provided funds for supporting five mills, not 20.

The success of the small sorghum mills has led to inquiries from Zimbabwe, Zambia, Kenya, Nicaragua, Tanzania, and Senegal. The sale of a mill to Zimbabwe is under negotiation. This raises the need for a means to work with organizations in other countries to develop their own prototypes utilizing the RIIC model as a starter. Can RIIC afford to provide the means? In addition, it is quite possible that RIIC could manufacture models for use in neighboring countries if it had the management and financial capabilities. The question can be raised, however, if RIIC should devote so much of its resources to such a level of manufacturing or rather focus on meeting the second-generation problems associated with the increased use of the new mills in Botswana.

Since the increase in demand for the mills was not anticipated, inadequate study has been made of the overall impact on sorghum production and consumption from a further expansion of milling. An attempt was made in the impact surveys to determine the likely impact on production by farmers who are newly serviced by mills. However, the frequent changes in weather conditions make it difficult to isolate the effect on production of proximity of a mill. Further study is probably needed also of the extent to which additional mills can be established before the profitability of existing mills is seriously affected.

Initially, RIIC established a mark-up of 15 percent on the mills it sold. However, management decided not to increase the price in 1981 to take account of inflation. The mark-up dropped to about eight percent. Pricing policy as well as the system of cost accounting should be reviewed, perhaps with the help of outside experts.

When going from prototype to field testing, the size of the test should be kept manageable. The importance of extension activity becomes crucial in at least two ways:

- Insuring that the testing is properly carried out;
- Providing feedback to the design unit.

Recommendations

Carrying out this activity has contributed somewhat to the financial crisis now facing RIIC largely because of a too rapid expansion of the activity. Nevertheless, the second-generation problems have been ascertained earlier than they might otherwise have been. It seems appropriate, therefore, that AID provide additional assistance to help find solutions to the problems identified, e.g., funds to strengthen the extension unit and to carry out the studies cited in the discussion of problems. PCV assignments also might help maintain activities of RIIC that might otherwise have to be suspended.

SMALL CRAFT DEVELOPMENT

AIP Activity	698-0407.14
Country	Botswana
Funding	
AID	\$50,000
Botswana	\$39,390
	<u>\$89,390</u>
Total	
AID Approval	July 8, 1980
Grant Agreement	August 28, 1980
Planned Activity Completion Date	August 28, 1982

This activity proposes to build and equip a handicraft facility within the Pelegano Village Industries (PVI) complex at Gabane, Botswana. This facility will provide training in handicraft production and marketing opportunities for local craftspeople now employed or to be employed.

A Peace Corps volunteer has managed the activity since its beginning; she plans to remain until completion in August 1982.

Relation to USAID Program

The activity complements the USAID project Rural Sector Grant which encourages innovative solutions to the unemployment problem in rural Botswana.

Results

- Construction. The craftshop and the workshop is 95 percent complete. The craftshop is scheduled to open on April 3, 1982.
- Craft Production. Seven new items have been added to the crafts line. Experience, Inc. secured the services of a consultant who introduced the new items with great success. His recommendations on production in the home and the allocation of labor from skilled to less-skilled family members increased production. The PCV plans to request the consultant's services for the second time to develop items which will use materials other than those now in use.
- Employment. Twenty-eight women are now working at the center. In 1980, their average net income was around \$600. Their income is now over \$3,000. Women who work in craft production from time to time have more than doubled their daily rate during the two year period (\$3.75 per day in 1982).

Problems

- Raw Materials. The major problem which the activity has encountered is that of obtaining enough raw materials. The crafts produced are made from corn husks and gourds. Corn husks become available during the harvest, but they cannot be purchased in sufficient amount to last an entire year because of lack of storage facilities. A similar problem exists with gourds.

- Construction. Although the buildings are 95 percent complete at present, construction is behind schedule. A rail embargo in South Africa delayed delivery of treated poles; cement import from South Africa was delayed by a shortage there. Problems with the roof design have only now been resolved.

Comment

The PVI complex at Gabane consists of six enterprises: poultry farm, metal working shop, carpentry, cement block manufacture, handicrafts, and sorghum milling. Of the six, sorghum milling is the most profitable. The mill is one of the original five produced under the sorghum milling activity. It provides both commercial and service milling. Management at PVI has always been a problem, and is likely to get worse when the PCV leaves the activity. Since management skills are in short supply in Botswana, PVI should seek ways of reducing the scope of management; e.g., through greater decentralization of authority for individual activities.

PVI has been affected by liquidity problems. It should consider preparing monthly or quarterly cash flow projections; annual budgets are not sufficient to meet PVI's financial management needs.

USAID should help PVI ensure that the discarded water from the corn-husk bleaching is not creating environmental problems.

ANNEX F
REPORT OF FIELD VISIT
ABIDJAN AND NAIROBI

Abidjan, Ivory Coast

The team visited REDSO/WA in Abidjan on February 5, 1982. Discussions were held with REDSO director, deputy director, controller, chief engineer, regional anthropologist, chief economist and two design officers.

Generally, REDSO officers saw the utility of a funding source for small projects. One officer felt that small missions, in particular, needed these regional projects as a preliminary to regular bilateral projects. AIPs were seen as a means of "testing the water" in a country where AID had not been active for a number of years. Small, experimental activities are useful for testing adaptation to Sahelian conditions or to conditions in different parts of a country with a multiplicity of tribal customs.

Although supporting a small project funding source, most of the officers interviewed felt that some missions had abused the AIP concept by obtaining approval of an activity which had no chance of being replicated (a Sahel mission was cited). Some officers stated that the small missions end up with too many small projects, requiring too much management time (Togo was cited). As a result, REDSO officers often are called in to help resolve implementation problems. Other officers commented on the lack of host country participation and interest in some of the AIPs. In response to the McPherson cable in April 1981 to review mission portfolios, one Sahelian mission proposed canceling two AIPs and two WID activities. Recurrent costs implications are not taken sufficiently into account. Design officers felt that some of the activities were not designed carefully enough; small projects may take as much design time as large projects if done well.

Two officers suggested that the time was past for WID projects. WID concerns should be integrated into large projects and not be carried out as separate activities. Project proposals could be examined at the PID stage to ensure that the role of women was recognized. Two other officers stated, however, that only "lip service" is given to WID concerns. While they may be accepted in design, they often are not implemented unless monitored closely or unless there is a woman on the implementing or technical assistance team.

One officer commented that PVOs were not doing a good job in implementing projects. This was elaborated in a cable from REDSO (Annex H, Attachment 7). A particular concern was the WID subproject in Togo.

The controller stated that management ability in Africa is almost nonexistent. AID regulations are so complex that they are not understood. He believes that the limit should be raised for blanket waivers for small projects and a special set of rules written for small projects.

Other comments include:

- Usually no funding for evaluation is provided in the activity budget.
- Activities are not being evaluated, or are not evaluated well.
- There was support for training Peace Corps staff and selected PCVs in project design, implementation, evaluation, but the chief REDSO design officer is reported to feel that such activity is not appropriate for REDSO.
- AID's evaluation training involves too much theory and data collection techniques.
- Missions tend to overdesign at the PID stage of project development in order to ensure funding from AID/W.
- Peace Corps involvement in small AID projects generally has been good.
- Getting good engineering design in projects is usually less of a problem than procuring materials for a project and safeguarding them during project implementation. Getting good contractors also is a recurrent problem.
- IRT criteria are too broad; they should be more specific.
- Using an African institution to build up an intermediate technology data base would be supportive to the IRT project.

Nairobi, Kenya

The team visited Nairobi on February 17, 1982. Discussions were held with USAID director, program officer and project officers, REDSO/EA design officer and social science advisor, and the Peace Corps country director. The director of REDSO/EA was not at post, but was interviewed in AID/W on February 25, 1982.

IRT

The REDSO director likes the IRT concept, especially when activities are implemented in conjunction with the Peace Corps. Procedures are too complex, although better since the institution of the new guidelines in January 1981. At times there are problems of synchronizing AID funding and the availability of PCVs. There is a high level of demand for IRTs. The principal problem is the amount of impact that can be achieved for the amount of work involved in designing and implementing these small activities.

The REDSO design officer also supported the IRT concept. She was concerned, however, that there did not seem to be a way of promoting the extension of adapted technologies from one country to another. She had discovered a cheap hand pump for wells and a village latrine developed in Zimbabwe which she felt should be tried out in other countries in the area. Both of these technologies could be important elements in preventive health programs.

USAID has two IRTs in implementation and two more approved but not obligated. Some personnel complained about the delays in getting approval of the activities,

while others were concerned about having AID/W force the mission to accept projects or activities proposed by stateside organizations.

The Peace Corps has 180 PCVs in Kenya involved in a number of sectors. There is already a great deal of collaboration with AID. The country director would like to see a continuation of IRT funding. He suggested also that funding be made available to finance the participation of host country counterparts in PCV training programs because Peace Corps funds cannot be used for this purpose. He feels that there is a great deal of "reinventing the wheel" in Peace Corps rural technology activities. There currently is no vehicle for sharing information on what has been successful and what has failed in different countries and why. The REDSO director also commented on the weak informational linkages within the region and felt AID should consider tackling this problem within the context of the IRT project.

AIP

The REDSO director felt that AIP activities were important for small countries with small programs. There often is no other source of funding with which to initiate a new activity or to ascertain the feasibility of working in a particular sector. He is concerned, however, about the management implications for the smaller missions and for REDSO's servicing role. This was echoed by the REDSO design officer who stated that 80 percent of REDSO officers' time was spent on resolving implementation problems. The procurement aspects of some AIPs, e.g., the immunization activities, are practically as involved as they would be for a much larger project.

USAID has had only one AIP. The evaluation team did not have the opportunity to discuss the progress of this activity.

WID

The REDSO director said that the field had received the impression that there was declining interest on the part of AID/W in WID concerns. REDSO officers (both female) concurred and said that this is reflected in project design. The role and potential of women in the development process are still overlooked. Design teams often are not sensitive to WID concerns. Women are being put out of business because of AID projects. Women are not included in management training programs. There is inadequate support and guidance from AID/W offices that are supposed to be concerned with WID issues. One officer suggested that the term "Women in Development" should be replaced by "People in Development" or "Family Roles" to overcome the stigma that has come to be associated with WID. The emphasis should be on incorporating women in regular bilateral projects, but there is also a place for a special fund for women's activities. Women's issues should be specified at the PID stage of project development.

USAID has WID components in bilateral projects as well as activities under the regional WID project. USAID officers complained about the time it took to get approval of one WID activity. At the same time, they resented having had a WID activity "forced down their throats" by AID/W. After agreeing to this activity, USAID had to wait seven months for funding. The activity was not doing well. The team had the impression that USAID resented the amount of staff time that it

had required. It might be useful to schedule an early evaluation of the activity to determine whether support should be terminated or whether additional management attention might resolve issues and permit the activity to achieve its objectives.

General

The USAID program officer sees utility in having a small amount of money available to each mission for small projects, particularly for joint Peace Corps-AID activities. Such activities would not need to fit into the USAID country strategy if consistent with country development priorities. Specific functional areas could be designated for such activities and guidelines developed.

ANNEX G

LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED

WASHINGTON, DC

AID

Bureau for Africa

Office of Regional Affairs

Donald F. Miller, Director
Edward E. Butler, Deputy Director
Noel R. Marsh, Senior Project Officer
James W. Dawson, Senior Project Officer
Mary Ann Riegelman, IRT
John C. Rose, AIP
Jeannette Carson, WID

Office of Development Planning

Edward I. Donoghue, Deputy Director
Richard Hynes, Program Analysis & Budget
Glenn C. Cauvin, Program Analysis & Budget

Bureau for Program and Policy

Coordination

Karen Poe, Office of Planning & Budgeting

Bureau for Science and Technology

Office of Agriculture

Roger Moeller, ATI Project Officer
Wayne Dunlap, Contract ATI Evaluator

PEACE CORPS

Arlene Mitchell, Chief of Operations,
Africa Region

EXPERIENCE, INC.

R. Alexander Manoff, IRT Project Manager
Peter Buijs, Staff Engineer
Adriane Wodey, Assistant & Editor,
Rural Technology Bulletin

LIBERIA

USAID

Remo Ray Garufi, Director
Edward E. Anderson, Deputy Director
Evelyn McLeod, Program Officer
Curt C. F. Wolters, Evaluation Officer
Judy Wills, Assistant Program Officer, WID
Fred Hagel, Chief, Institutional
Development & IRT Officer,
Mini-Hydroelectric Project
Jack Cornelius, Chief, Rural Development

CONTRACT

William Jadwin, Rural Development & IRT
Officer, Fired Bricks & Building Materials
Charles Strickland, IDI & AIP Officer,
Zero-tillage Agriculture
Charles Witten, Chief, Public Health
Alan Foose, IRT Officer, Expanded Program
of Immunization (EPI)
Edward T. Giza, Controller
Alexander A. Ralli, Executive Officer
Alan G. Swan, Assistant Executive Officer

Jeanette Carter, Project Coordinator, WID
Profile of Liberian Women
Mark Weeks, Operations Officer, EPI

PEACE CORPS

Charles Martin, Country Director

TOGO**OFFICE OF AID REPRESENTATIVE**

John A. Lundgren, AID Representative
Robert Ritchie, Program Officer
Sidney Bliss, IRT Officer
Rudy Thomas, WID Officer

PEACE CORPS

Warren Weinstein, Country Director
Kodjo Amesefa, Associate Director
Ron Phillips, Associate Director
Phebe Prescott, Peace Corps Volunteer,
Canton Lavie
Don Borkelheide, Peace Corps Volunteer,
Woume

National Council of Negro Women

Carla VanBlake, Project Coordinator
LaKara Skills Development Training

**Solar Energy Laboratory, Science
School, University of Benin**

Dr. Nesson Gnininvi, Director

**Societe de Renovation du Cafe
et du Cacao, Kpalime**

Ankou Ahonsou, Engineer, Canton Lavie

ZAIRE**USAID**

Norman L. Sweet, Director
Walter Boehm, Deputy Director
Edward Hirabayashi, Human Resources and
Development Officer
Lee Braddock, Design & Evaluation Officer
Ann Williams, Design & Evaluation Staff
Derek Singer, General Development Officer
Kim Martinez, Assistant Program Officer

PEACE CORPS

William Pruitt, Country Director
 Jill Burlingame, Associate Director
 Agriculture and Rural Development
 Tom Jeffries, Peace Corps Volunteer

SALVATION ARMY

Captain Mettler, Small Farmer Project
 Lt. Mukoko, Small Farmer Project

CEPAS

Pere de Failly, Project Director
 Extension & Counseling in Appropriate
 Technology

BOTSWANA**USAID**

Louis A. Cohen, Director
 J. D. Stanford, Controller
 Helen K. Gunther, Agricultural
 Economist & IRT Project Officer

PEACE CORPS

Elsa and Norman Rush, Co-Directors
 Dick Mullaney, Associate Director
 for Programming and Training
 Betty Bechtel, Peace Corps Volunteer,
 Pelegano Village Industries, Gabane

Rural Industries Promotion, Gaborone David Inger, Managing Director

Rural Industries Innovation
 Center, Kanye

Geoffrey Ramaribana, Acting Manager
 Deepa Narayan Parker, Chief Extension
 Officer

Botswana Technology Center, Gaborone Derek Medford, Managing Director

ABIDJAN**REDSO WEST AFRICA**

Gordon Evans, Director
 William H. Naylor, Deputy Director,
 Technical Support
 Hadley Smith, Assistant Director,
 Project Analysis & Development
 James Ito, Controller
 Frances Stier, Anthropologist
 Donald Kennedy, Project Development Officer
 Joe Carroll, Project Development Officer
 L. M. Eldredge, Engineer

NAIROBI

REDSO EAST AFRICA

Alexander R. Love, Director
(In Washington)
Dr. Anita Mackie, Agricultural Economist
Carolyn Barnes, Social Science Advisor

USAID

Alison Herrick, Director
William Lefes, Ass't. Director for Program
Edward Greeley, Project Officer
Joseph Pastic, Engineering Advisor
Charles Hash, Agricultural Development
Officer

PEACE CORPS

Reginald Petty, Country Director

ANNEX H

FIELD RESPONSES ON EVALUATION ISSUES

On November 17, 1981, the Regional Affairs Office of the Africa Bureau (AFR/RA) requested field comments on the proposed scope of work for this evaluation (State 305668).

On January 27, 1982, AFR/RA in State 21441 advised the missions that Development Associates, Inc. personnel would perform the planned evaluation and invited missions to provide factual responses to or views about the issues cited in the scope of work (Annex A).

Listed below and attached are State 21441 and the responses thereto, plus selected responses to State 305668 which provided information or views about the issues raised in the scope of work:

- (1) State 21441, 27 January 1982
- (2) Burundi--Bujumbura 3637, 11 December 1981
- (3) Cameroon--Yaounde 1141, 9 February 1982
- (4) Guinea--Conakry 3948, 2 December 1981
- (5) Guinea--Conakry 509, 23 February 1982
- (6) Liberia--Monrovia 1397, 10 February 1982
- (7) REDSO/WA--Abidjan 1349, 3 February 1982
- (8) Rwanda--Kigali 620, 1 March 1982
- (9) Sierra Leone--Freetown 422, 8 February 1982
- (10) Swaziland--Mbabane 593, 24 February 1982
- (11) Tanzania--Dar Es Salaam 8124, 22 December 1981
- (12) Zaire--Kinshasa 1757, 17 February 1982

ANNEX H
ATTACHMENT 1

State 021441, 27 January 1982

Subject: Evaluation of AIP (698-04100); IRT (698-0407); and regional WID (698-0388)

Ref: State 305668 (81)

1. SCOPE OF WORK FOR SUBJECT EVALUATION (REFTEL) WAS CABLED USAIDS FOR COMMENT. SUBSEQUENTLY, A WORK ORDER WAS ISSUED TO IQC CONTRACTOR DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES, INC. TO FIELD A TWO-PERSON TEAM TO CARRY OUT THE EVALUATION. TEAM COMPOSED OF EX-AID OFFICERS JAMES ROUSH AND LEA KNOTT. BETWEEN JANUARY 25 AND FEBRUARY 19, THEY WILL VISIT LIBERIA, TOGO, ZAIRE AND BOTSWANA AND PLAN TO SPEND A DAY WITH REDSO/EA.

2. BELIEVE BROADER FIELD INPUT TO THE EVALUATION WILL ENHANCE TEAM'S FINDINGS. THEREFORE, ADDRESSEE USAIDS ARE INVITED TO PROVIDE FACTUAL RESPONSES TO OR VIEWS ABOUT ISSUES LISTED PARA 4 REFTL. MISSIONS ARE ALSO ENCOURAGED TO SUGGEST WAYS OF IMPROVING ACTIVITY DESIGN, REDUCING IMPLEMENTATION BOTTLENECKS, MINIMIZING MISSION WORKLOAD FOR ACTIVITY MANAGEMENT/MONITORING, AND INCREASING EFFECTIVE PEACE CORPS PARTICIPATION IN THESE ACTIVITIES.

3. FOR CONAKRY AND BUJUMBURA: APPRECIATE RESPONSES ALREADY PROVIDED. WOULD WELCOME ANY SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT/STREAMLINING, PARTICULARLY FOR REDUCING DELAYS IN IMPLEMENTATION START-UP.

4. RESPONSES REQUESTED NLT FEBRUARY 19TH. STOESSEL

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

PAGE 01
ACTION AFD-35

BUJUMB 83637 111351Z

9486 868876 AID7319

ACTION OFFICE AFRA-03
INFO AAAF-01 AFEA-03 AFDR-06 AFCA-03 PPCE-01 PDPR-01 PPPB-03
GC-01 GCAF-01 GCFL-01 FM-02 WID-01 AFDA-01 AFPM-01
/828 A3 312

INFO OCT-00 INR-10 AF-10 EB-08 AMAD-01 /864 W
-----244420 111736Z /38

R 110946Z DEC 81
FM AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2981
INFO AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

*Annex H
Att. 2*

UNCLAS BUJUMBURA 3637

AIDAC

NAIROBI FOR REDSO/EA

E. O. 12065: N/A

SUBJECT: SCOPE OF WORK, PLANNED EVALUATION, AIP (698-0410),
IRT (698-0407) AND REGIONAL WID (698-0388)

REF: STATE 305688

AAO/BURUNDI HAS REVIEWED SUBJECT CABLE AND HAS THE FOLLOWING
COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED SOW:

1. SHOULD ALL THREE OF THESE PROJECTS BE EVALUATED AS A WHOLE? EACH OF THESE PROJECTS HAS A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT OBJECTIVE AND SUBPROJECTS IN THE DIFFERENT PROJECTS THUS MAY NOT BE TRUELY COMPARABLE AS TO WHETHER SUBPROJECTS CONTRIBUTE SUBSTANTIVELY TO PROJECT PURPOSE. WE BELIEVE SUBPROJECTS SHOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH COUNTRY CDSS.
2. EVALUATION SHOULD DIFFERENTIATE ON WORKLOAD IMPACT OF SUBPROJECTS BETWEEN FULL MISSIONS AND SMALL OFFICES. TEAM SHOULD INVESTIGATE WORKLOAD REQUIREMENTS OF PROJECT DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION, ESPECIALLY AT SMALL POSTS WHERE DELEGATION OF AUTHORITIES ARE LIMITED AND CONJOINT WITH REDSO'S. IT IS OUR BELIEF THAT THE AMOUNT OF WORK MONTHS REQUIRED, PARTICULARLY FOR IMPLEMENTING AIP PROJECTS, IS NOT MUCH LESS THAN FOR MUCH LARGER BILATERAL PROJECTS. IN THIS DAY OF LIMITED STAFFING AVAILABILITIES SUCH FACTORS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN DECIDING WHETHER OR NOT TO IMPLEMENT THEM.
3. IT IS OUR VIEW, GIVEN INFLATION, THAT AIP TYPE PROJECTS SHOULD NOW HAVE AN OPEN LIMIT OF DOLS 750,000 TO DOLS ONE MILLION WHICH IS THE APPROXIMATE LOCAL PURCHASING POWER AT PRESENT OF A DOLS 500,000 AIP SUBPROJECT WHEN THE PROGRAM BEGAN.
4. AIPS CAN PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE AS PILOTS AND EXPERIMENTS FOR MUCH LARGER PROGRAMS. ONE REASON FOR THE DECLINE IN AIPS AND WIDS MAY BE THAT SUBPROJECTS CEILINGS ARE INADEQUATE TO MEET THE COST OF A WELL DESIGNED ACTIVITY ACTIVE OVER A TWO YEAR PERIOD, PARTICULARLY WHERE WELL QUALIFIED CONTRACT STAFF WILL COST USAID MORE THAN DOLS 100,000 A YEAR. CONSEQUENTLY PROJECTS WHICH WERE AIPS NOW END UP AS FULL PROJECTS.

COOK

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PAGE 01 YAOUND 01141 100629Z 1100 010646 AID0153
ACTION AID-35

ACTION OFFICE AFRA-03
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CMGT-02 AFDA-01 RELO-01 MAST-01 /024 A4 810

INFO OCT-00 INR-10 AF-10 EB-J8 AMAD-01 /064 W
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R 091037Z FEB 82
FM AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE.
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3318

UNCLAS YAOUNDE 1141

AIDAC

E. O. 12065: N/A
SUBJ: EVALUATION OF AIP (698-0410); IRT (698-0407); AND REGIONAL
WID (698-0388).

REF: A) STATE 021441 B) 81- STATE 305668.

1. MISSION CURRENTLY HAS NOT AIP, IRT, OR REGIONAL WID PROJECT AND
THEREFORE CANNOT COMMENT ON ISSUES RAISED IN REFTEL 8,
PARAGRAPH 4.

2. ALTHOUGH MISSION FEELS THAT SUBJECT PROJECTS CAN BE USEFULLY
EMPLOYED, THERE ARE NO SPECIFIC NEEDS FOR SUCH PROJECTS IN THE MIS-
SION PORTFOLIO AT PRESENT OR IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

3. IRT PROJECT IN CENTRAL AFRICAN PROJECT, INLAND FISHERIES,
RELIED UPON PEACA CORPS TO TRAIN CANTRAL AFRICAN COUNTERPARTS.
USE OF PAACE CORPS IN CAR HAS BEEN USEFUL AND SUCCESSFUL.
MISSION RELIES ON PEACE CORPS TO IMPLEMENT PROJECTS IN CAR.
DUE TO LACK OF AID STAFF IN-COUNTRY.
HORAN

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Att. 3

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PAGE 01
ACTION AID-35

CONAKR 03040 021035Z

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PAST-01 AACE-01 /070 AA 702

INFO OCT-00 100-30 AF-10 EB-00 300744 021410Z /30

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FM AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
TO DESTATE WASHDC 0685
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN

UNCLAS CONAKRY 03040

AIDAC

AID/V FOR AFR/EA

ABIDJAN FOR REDSO/M

E.O. 12958 U/A
TAGS

SUBJECT: SCOPE OF WORK, PLANNED EVALUATION, AIP
0301-04100 (RT 0300-04077) AND REGIONAL VID 0300-03040

REF: STATE 30666

1. ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS PARA 2 REFTEL FOLLOW:

A. AIP'S ARE FUNDAMENTAL TO AID/CONAKRY'S STRATEGY, PURSUANT TO AN AID/V DECISION MADE AT TIME OF FIRST STRATEGY SUBMISSION IN 1978. THAT DECISION WAS TO TEST THE WATERS IN GUINEA WITH SMALL PROJECTS BEFORE ENGAGING IN LARGER PROJECTS OTHER THAN THE ONGOING AND SIZABLE GUINEA AS PROJECT. THE REASONS WERE (1) THE DESIRE TO ESTABLISH A SOLID BASIS OF COOPERATION IN A COUNTRY FROM WHICH AID HAD BEEN ALMOST ABSENT FOR A DECADE, AND (2) A NEED TO DETERMINE HOW BEST AID COULD WORK IN A DIFFICULT POLICY ENVIRONMENT. TWO AIP'S HAVE BEEN LAUNCHED TO DATE IN MOTHER-CHILD HEALTH AND COMMUNITY FORESTRY, IDENTIFIED IN THE SMALL PROGRAM STRATEGY STATEMENT AS PRIORITY AREAS.

B. FROM CONAKRY'S STANDPOINT, SMALL, EXPERIMENTAL PROJECTS ARE INDISPENSABLE. AT A TIME OF SHRINKING BILATERAL FUNDING, REGIONAL FUNDS MAY BE THE ONLY MEANS OF MAINTAINING AND DEVELOPING A SOUND EXPERIMENTAL BASE FOR POSSIBLE LARGER-SCALE PROJECTS IN THE FUTURE. EVEN IF FUTURE FUNDING AVAILABILITIES WILL NOT PERMIT SUCH EXPANSION, THE SMALL PROJECTS ARE TREMENDOUSLY USEFUL IN THEMSELVES; THEY ARE CERTAINLY REGARDED AS SUCH BY THE GUINEA GOVERNMENT.

C. THE TWO AIP'S HERE ARE STILL NEW AND THEIR REPLICABILITY REMAINS TO BE ESTABLISHED IN FACT. HOWEVER, THEY WERE DESIGNED WITH REPLICABILITY AND EXPANDABILITY IN MIND. THEY WERE ALSO DESIGNED TO DEVELOP WITHIN EXISTING GOVERNMENTAL AND COMMUNITY STRUCTURES, AND WITH LIMITED ADDITIONAL COST BURDENS FOR THE HOST GOVERNMENT.

D. THE PROJECTS ARE TOO NEW TO GIVE A DEFINITIVE ANSWER ON COMMON THREADS OF SUCCESS. INDICATIONS ARE, HOWEVER, THAT CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF LOCAL FACTORS DURING DESIGN AND AVOIDANCE OF COMPLEX OBJECTIVES AND COSTLY, SOPHISTICATED INPUTS WILL PAY OFF IN ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT GOALS.

ANNEX H
Att 4

E. SMALL PROJECTS SHOULD NORMALLY BE DESIGNED, APPROVED AND IMPLEMENTED MORE QUICKLY THAN LARGER, MORE COMPLEX PROJECTS. HOWEVER, THE RATE OF PROGRESS, PARTICULARLY DURING THE DESIGN AND EARLY IMPLEMENTATION STAGES, WILL VARY FROM PROJECT TO PROJECT. ONE OF OUR AIP'S TOOK NINE MONTHS FROM DESIGN TO OBLIGATION; THE OTHER TOOK 20 MONTHS BEFORE THE DESIGN PHASE WAS ACCEPTABLE.

BOTH PROJECTS SUFFERED SOME DELAY IN IMPLEMENTATION AT THE ONSET. QUALITATIVELY, WE BELIEVE AIP'S HAVE AN ADVANTAGE IN GREATER SIMPLICITY OF OBJECTIVES AND MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS.

F. OUR AIP'S REQUIRE LESS SUPPORT THAN OTHER BILATERAL ACTIVITIES -- BUT NOT PROPORTIONALLY LESS. THERE IS A "FIXED COST" MINIMUM OF SUPPORT REQUIRED FOR ALL PROJECTS; THUS A \$300,000 AIP WILL REQUIRE MORE THAN ONE-TENTH THE SUPPORT OF A \$3 MILLION PROJECT.

G. WE FIND THE \$300,000 LIMIT QUITE PRACTICAL. CURRENT AIP APPROVAL PROCEDURE IS ACCEPTABLE. WE DO NOT HAVE EXPERIENCE WITH VID AND IRT PROCEDURES. THE AMALGAMATED PROJECT SHOULD DEFINITELY BE BROAD AND FLEXIBLE, WITH ROUGHLY THE SAME FUNDING PROPORTIONS AS ARE AVAILABLE FOR BILATERAL PROJECTS.

H. THERE IS NO PEACE CORPS PROGRAM IN GUINEA, BUT EX-PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS PROVIDE A PRIME SOURCE OF TECHNICAL TALENT.
DAVIS

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PAGE 01 CONAKR 00509 231003Z 7200 024390 AID2735
ACTION AID-35

ACTION OFFICE AFRA-03
INFO AAAP-01 AFCW-03 AFDR-06 PPCE-01 PDPR-01 PPPB-03 WID-01
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INFO OCT-00 AF-10 AMAD-01 /046 W
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R 230923Z FEB 82
FM AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0044
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN

UNCLAS CONAKRY 00509

AIDAC

AID/W FOR AFR/RA, SER/COM

ABIT
AN FOR REDSO/WA.

E. O. 12065: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: EVALUATION OF AIP (698-0412); IRT (698-0407)
AND REGIONAL WID 89'

0388

REF: STATE 021441

1. DELAYS ENCOUNTERED IN IMPLEMENTATION START-UP OF AIP'S IN GUINEA RESULTED FROM SHORTAGE OF PERSONNEL TO COMPLETE PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS. THROUGH USE OF PSC'S WE ARE GRADUALLY INCREASING AID/CONAKRY STAFF AND HOPE TO BE ABLE TO MOVE FASTER IN IMPLEMENTATION. IN FUTURE EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE, WITH THE HELP OF PROJECT DESIGNERS AND REDSO/WA CONTRACT AND SUPPLY ADVISORS, TO COMPLETE PIO'S AT TIME OF PROJECT OBLIGATION OR VERY SHORTLY THEREAFTER.

2. WITH RESPECT TO EXPEDITING COMMODITY PROCUREMENT, RECOMMEND THAT AID UNDERTAKE A STUDY TO DETERMINE ITEMS WHICH ARE COMMONLY PROCURED BY MISSIONS AND FOR WHICH SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT BE MADE TO STANDARDIZE AND EXPEDITE PROCUREMENT AS IS DONE BY STATE DEPARTMENT. ONE CANDIDATE MIGHT BE UTILITY VEHICLES. WE HAVE BEEN ORDERING CJ-7 DIESEL JEEPS FOR PROJECT USE. TO OUR KNOWLEDGE THESE ARE THE ONLY SUCH 4-CYLINDER VEHICLES AVAILABLE ON THE U. S. MARKET. IF THE SUPPLIER COULD BE ASSURED OF A REASONABLY LARGE QUANTITY OF ORDERS FROM VARIOUS MISSIONS, PERHAPS A SINGLE VOLUME ORDER COULD BE PLACED AT A SAVINGS IN DELIVERY TIME AND UNIT COST. DO NOT KNOW, HOWEVER, WHETHER SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT COULD ACCOMMODATE VARIATION IN SPECIFICATIONS WHICH MISSIONS MAY REQUIRE.
DAVIS //

ANNEX H
Att. 5

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PAGE 01 MONROV 01397 01 OF 02 101630Z 3961 015016 A109032
ACTION A10-35

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ACTION OFFICE AFRA-03
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CTR-02 STRD-02 ATPC-04 RELO-01 MAST-01 AGEE-01
/031 A2 X1#

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FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0402

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E.O. 12065: N/A
SUBJECT: EVALUATION OF AIP (698-0410); IRT (698-407)
AND REGIONAL WIO (698-0388)

REF: (A) STATE 021441 (B) 01 STATE 305668

1. AS REQUESTED IN REFTEL B PARA 2, MISSION'S
RESPONSES TO QUESTION A-1 PARA 4 REFTEL A FOLLOW.

2. A. RESPONSE TO QUESTION A: AIP, IRT AND WIO
- DIRECTLY SUPPORT MISSION'S STRATEGY IN RURAL DEVELOP-
- MENT.

- B. RESPONSE TO QUESTION B: THERE IS A CONTINUING
- NEED FOR SMALL EXPERIMENTAL PROJECTS. REGIONAL
- PROJECTS IN THEORY PROVIDE A QUICK RESPONSE
- MECHANISM WHEN PARTICULAR OPPORTUNITIES PRESENT
- THEMSELVES. SMALL PROJECTS PROVIDE ADDITIONAL DI-
- MENSIONS TO LARGER BILATERAL DEVELOPMENT THRUSTS.
- THE USEFULNESS OF SMALL PROJECTS HAS LITTLE RELATION-
- SHIP TO THE SIZE OF THE MISSION'S PROGRAM, ALTHOUGH
- IT MUST BE POINTED OUT THAT SMALL PROJECTS TAKE
- AS MUCH AS OR EVEN MORE TIME TO ADMINISTER AND
- MONITOR THAN DO LARGE PROJECTS.

- C. RESPONSE TO QUESTION C: NONE OF LIBERIA'S ON-
- GOING AIP, IRT AND WIO PROJECTS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED.
- IT IS TOO EARLY TO TELL WHETHER SOME WILL BE SELF-
- SUSTAINING AND REPLICABLE. THOSE THAT ARE CURRENTLY
- OPERATIONAL HAVE BEEN DESIGNED WITH MINIMUM RE-
- CURRENT COST IMPLICATIONS IN MIND. NO SPIN-OFFS
- HAVE OCCURRED THUS FAR.

- D. RESPONSE TO QUESTION D: THREE OF THE PROJECTS
- HAVE RUN INTO PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE BEEN PART OF IM-
- PLEMENTATION RATHER THAN OF DESIGN; ONE HAD TO BE
- REDESIGNED IN THE FIELD AS THE AFTERMATH OF THE COUP
- FUEL PRICE INCREASES MADE THE ORIGINAL CONCEPT
- IMPRACTICABLE; ONE IS IN THE EARLY STAGES OF IMPLEMEN-
- TATION BUT SHOWS PROMISE. IN GENERAL, THE LIMITED
- FUNDING CAUSES TWO PROBLEMS: FIRST, WE IN THE
- MISSIONS TEND TO THINK WE CAN DO MORE WITH THE SMALL
- AMOUNTS OF MONEY THAN WE ACTUALLY CAN; SECOND, IF
- AN UNEXPECTED EVENT OCCURS WHICH THROWS THE PROJECT
- TEMPORARILY OFF THE TRACK, REMAINING FUNDS ARE
- GENERALLY INADEQUATE TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK PLUS
- ACHIEVE THE ORIGINAL OBJECTIVES.

- E. RESPONSE TO QUESTION E: AIP, IRT AND WIO SHOULD
- OFFER RELATIVELY RAPID MEANS OF DESIGNING, APPROVING
- PROJECTS, AND IMPLEMENTING BUT THIS IS NOT GENERALLY
- THE CASE (VIDE THE MINI-HYDRO PROJECT IN LOFA COUNTY,
- 698-0407.7).

- F. RESPONSE TO QUESTION F: AIP, IRT AND WIO
- PROJECTS DO NOT REQUIRE LESS MISSION SUPPORT THAN
- REGULAR PROJECTS. OUR MISSION'S TRACK RECORD THUS
- FAR SHOWS THAT FOR THE SMALL AMOUNTS OF MONEY IM-
- VOLVED, MISSION MANPOWER INPUT COST IS EXTRA-
- ORDINARILY HIGH ALL AROUND (PROCUREMENT, T.A., RE-
- CRUITMENT, CONTRACTING AND ESPECIALLY MONITORING/
- BACKSTOPPING).

- G. RESPONSE TO QUESTION G: UPPER LIMIT SUGGESTED
- SHOULD BE \$500,000 FOR INDIVIDUAL SUB-PROJECT.
- APPROVAL PROCEDURES SHOULD BE MODIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

- 1. FIELD SUBMITS MODIFIED PID TO AFR/RA FOR
- APPROVAL FOR PROJECT DEVELOPMENT AND RESERVA-
- TION OF FUNDS.

- 2. AFTER AFR/RA APPROVAL, FIELD IS DELEGATED
- AUTHORITY TO DESIGN AND AUTHORIZE FINAL
- PROJECT PAPER.

- 3. FIELD CABLE IN WHATEVER INFORMATION REQUIRED
- TO MEET CONGRESSIONAL REQUIREMENTS.

- 4. AFR/RA CABLES FUNDS TO FIELD. FIELD AUTHORIZES
- PROJECT AND PROCEEDS WITH IMPLEMENTATION
- COORDINATING AS NEEDED WITH AFR/RA ON CONTRACT-
- ING, PROCUREMENT, ETC.

- IF THE REGIONAL PROJECT SHOULD BE AMALGAMATED INTO
- ONE, AFR/RA MAY WISH TO CONSIDER A BROAD AND
- FLEXIBLE APPROACH IN ORDER TO ENABLE FUNDING OF A
- VARIETY OF ACTIVITIES WHICH PRESENTLY NOT FULLY
- COVERED UNDER PD&S AND WOULD NOT NECESSARILY QUALIFY
- AS "PROJECTS". THIS COULD ACCOMMODATE SPECIAL
- STUDIES, OBSERVATION TRAVEL, SHORT-TERM CONSULTANTS,

ANNEX H
Att. 6, page 1

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 MONROV 01397 02 OF 02 101640Z 4008 015820 AID9838
ACTION AID-35

ACTION OFFICE AFRA-03
INFO AFCW-03 AFDR-06 PPCE-01 R-01 PPPB-03 WID-01 CMGT-02
CTR-02 STRD-02 ATPC-04 RLO-01 MAST-01 AGEE-01
/031 A2 X10

INFO OCT-00 AF-10 AMAD-01 /046 W
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FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
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AIDAG

- EQUIPMENT, OR OTHER SIMILAR ONE-SHOT INPUTS, AS
- SPECIAL OPPORTUNITIES PRESENT THEMSELVES. A QUICK
- RESPONSE REACTION BY MISSIONS COULD MAKE A MAJOR
- DIFFERENCE IN SELECTED PROGRAM/STRATEGY-SUPPORTIVE
- AREAS ALONG A WIDE SPECTRUM OF PROGRAM CONCERNS.

- H. RESPONSE TO QUESTION H: PEACE CORPS INVOLVEMENT
- THUS FAR HAS BEEN LIMITED TO TWO PROJECTS. THEY
- HAVE BEEN GENERALLY SUCCESSFUL, DEPENDING ON THE
- DYNAMISM, COMMITMENT AND PROFESSIONAL CAPABILITIES
- OF THE INDIVIDUAL VOLUNTEERS.

- I. RESPONSE TO QUESTION I: MINI-HYDRO (PEACE CORPS)
- AND NIMBA COUNTY RURAL TECHNOLOGY (PFP) PROJECTS
- WERE LOCALLY DESIGNED AND DID NOT REQUIRE EXPERIENCE,
- INC. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THERE WILL BE SECOND GENERA-
- TION IRT'S SWING

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PAGE 01 ABIDJA 01349 031517Z 5770 009948 AID4095

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SHOULD NOT BE WITH THE ILLUSION THAT IT IS SELF-EPLANATORY. IDENTIFYING THE PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS KEY ROLE--FOR UNDERSTANDING AN AID DOCUMENT IS ONLY THE FIRST STEP--IS A VITAL MANAGEMENT QUESTION, AS IS ASSURING THAT COMPREHENSION TAKES PLACE. RAWLS

ACTION OFFICE AFRA-02
INFO AAAF-01 AFCW-03 AFDP-02 AFDR-06 PPCE-01 PDPR-01 PPPB-03
CMGT-02 CTR-02 AFDA-01 RELO-01 MAST-01 /027 AS 11-3

INFO OCT-88 AF-10 AMAD-01 /046 W
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FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0797
INFO AMEMBASSY LOME

ANNEX H
Att. 7

UNCLAS ABIDJAN 01349

AIDAC

E.O. 12065 N/A
SUBJECT: EVALUATION OF AIP (698-04107); IRT (898-0407);
AND REGIONAL MID (698-0368)

REFS: (A) STATE 021441, (B) STATE 305668 (01)

1. REDSO/VA RECENTLY ASSISTED IN A REGIONAL MID SUB-PROJECT REDESIGN. FROM THIS EXPERIENCE, FOUR PRINCIPAL OBSERVATIONS FOLLOW WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED DURING DESIGN OF FUTURE ACTIVITIES.
2. BACKSTOP AND SUPPORT CAPACITY OF U.S. BASED INSTITUTION MUST BE CAREFULLY ASSESSED. CLAIMS OF AN QUOTE ACTIVE INTERNATIONAL OFFICE UNQUOTE OR A QUOTE READY DATA BANK OF TECHNICAL EXPERTISE UNQUOTE MUST NOT BE ACCEPTED AT FACE VALUE. U.S. BACKSTOP SUPPORT MIGHT INCLUDE ON-STAFF TECHNICAL COMPETENCE (AS OPPOSED TO A FILE FOLDER FULL OF CV'S OF UNTRIED CONSULTANTS); RECOGNIZED PROJECT MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCE; PLANS TO VISIT PROJECT SITE PERIODICALLY; A RELIABLE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM. REDSO/VA HAS LEARNED THAT WHEN THE ABOVE SUPPORT IS DEFICIENT CONTRACTORS SUFFER SERIOUS MORALE PROBLEMS AND PROJECT PROGRESS IS CONSIDERABLY SLOWER.
3. PVO PROJECTS ARE OFTEN DESIGNED WITH TWO BUDGETS; ONE TO STATESIDE HEADQUARTERS AND ONE TO THE FIELD CONTRACTOR OR HOST GOVERNMENT. WHILE REASONS GIVEN FOR SPLIT FINANCING ARE PLAUSIBLE, THE DANGERS MUST BE RECOGNIZED AND DEALT WITH. CONTRACTOR/HOST COUNTRY RELATIONSHIPS ARE OFTEN STRAINED BECAUSE: (A) HOST COUNTRY CONSIDERS ITSELF UNINFORMED ABOUT HOW A SIZEABLE PROPORTION OF PROJECT FUNDS ARE SPENT, (B) HOST COUNTRY DISAPPROVES OF HOW STATESIDE PROJECT FUNDS ARE SPENT, (C) CONTRACTOR PAYS FOR SERVICES AT A RATE WHICH MAY CONFLICT WITH ACCEPTED HOST COUNTRY RATE FOR SUCH SERVICES, I.E., PER DIEM AND HONORARIA, (D) PROJECT REDESIGN IN THE FIELD IS HINDERED BECAUSE HEADQUARTERS MAY NOT AGREE WITH CONTRACTOR SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING REVISED BUDGET.
4. PROJECT BUDGETS IN NON-ANGLOPHONE COUNTRIES OFTEN NEGLECT COSTS OF TRANSLATION. OTHER IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSLATION ARE SCHEDULING AND QUALITY CONTROL. REDSO/VA HAS OBSERVED INACCURATE TRANSLATIONS PRESENTED TO HOST GOVERNMENTS.
5. FOURTH, THE NECESSITY OF CLEARLY DEFINING PVO RESPONSIBILITIES AND MISSION RESPONSIBILITIES. IN A SUB-PROJECT, THIS AMBIGUITY WAS NOTICEABLE IN TWO SPECIFIC AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY: NOTIFYING HOST GOVERNMENT CONCERNING AN OUTSIDE MISSION (ITS COMPOSITION, OBJECTIVES, DURATION) AND EXPLAINING TO HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS THE CONTENTS OF AN AID PROJECT EVALUATION. DELIVERING EVEN AN ACCURATELY TRANSLATED AID DOCUMENT TO A HOST GOVERNMENT

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PAGE 01 KIGALI 00620 010730Z 9598 029303 A100301
ACTION A10-35

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AND DESIGN ON LOCAL GROUPS, WHICH IN TURN ENSURES BETTER
COMMITMENT TO PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION. THE FUTURE PROJECT
SHOULD NOT BE CONFINED TO ANY ONE AREA, BUT SHOULD BE
ABLE TO RESPOND TO A VARIETY OF CONCERNS. MELONE

ACTION OFFICE AFRA-02
INFO AAAF-01 AFDR-06 AFCA-03 PPCE-01 POPR-01 PPPB-03 GC-01
GCAF-01 GCFL-01 VIO-01 AAST-01 STAG-02 STEY-01 ED-02
ENGR-02 NNS-09 AFDA-01 AGRI-01 RELO-01 DAEN-01 MAST-01
/044 A4 01

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FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2929

UNCLAS KIGALI 00620

AIDAC

FOR AFR/RA

E.O. 12065: N/A
SUBJECT: EVALUATION OF AIP (698-0410), IRT (698-0407), AND
REGIONAL VID (698-0388)

REF: (A) STATE 21441, (B) 81 KIGALI 3120, (C) 81 STATE
305668

1. TO DATE, AAO/RWANDA HAS USED AIP MECHANISM FOR TWO ACTI-
VITIES (RENEWABLE AND IMPROVED TRADITIONAL ENERGY AND
EXPANDED PROGRAM OF IMMUNIZATION), AND IRT FOR TWO MORE (BOY
SCOUT TECHNOLOGY OUTREACH AND GICIYE WATER SUPPLY). THESE
SMALL ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN USED AS A MEANS OF QUICKLY GAIN-
ING IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE IN PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT AREAS
IDENTIFIED IN THE CDGS WHERE DEVELOPMENT OF A NORMAL BILAT-
ERAL PROJECT WOULD REQUIRE A LOT OF TIME.
FOR EXAMPLE, THE IRT BOY SCOUT ACTIVITY SHOULD
PROVIDE INSIGHTS INTO RURAL YOUTH TRAINING THAT WILL BE
RELEVANT TO THE OPERATION OF THE 30 RURAL LEARNING CENTERS
(GERAI'S) FINANCED UNDER THE AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION PROJECT.
AAO BELIEVES THAT THIS "PUMP-PRIMING" ROLE OF THESE SMALL
PROJECTS IS VALUABLE AND SHOULD BE CONTINUED.

2. ON A PRORATED BASIS PER PROJECT DOLLAR, THESE SMALL
ACTIVITIES DO NOT REPRESENT A SAVINGS IN AAO STAFF TIME.
THE STREAMLINED APPROVAL PROCEDURES PROBABLY REPRESENT A
NET SAVINGS IN STAFF TIME FOR THE AGENCY, AS AAO HAS RELIED
MUCH LESS ON REDSO/EA AND AID/W, IN DESIGN AND APPROVAL
OF AIP'S AND IRT'S.

3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION HAS NOT BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY
DIFFERENT FOR AIP'S AND IRT'S THAN FOR BILATERAL PROJECTS.
THE REDUCED REQUIREMENT FOR ENGINEERING AND SOCIOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS HAS NOT RESULTED IN ANY PROBLEMS. FOR THE AIP'S
THERE HAS BEEN NO NOTICEABLE INCREASE IN THE SPEED OF THE
IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS, SINCE THEY ARE TREATED LIKE THE
BILATERAL PROJECTS; I.E., PIL'S AND PIO'S MUST BE WRITTEN
AND APPROVED BEFORE DISBURSEMENTS CAN BE MADE. THE REMOVAL
OF IMPEDIMENTS TO PROJECT APPROVAL IN AID'S INTERNAL ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCESS IS NOT REFLECTED IN CHANGES IN THE IMPEDI-
MENTS TO SUCCESSFUL PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION (E.G., THE 18-
MONTH DELAY IN RECRUITING THE PROJECT ADVISOR FOR THE AIP
RENEWABLE AND IMPROVED TRADITIONAL ENERGY ACTIVITY). FOR
IRT'S, IMPLEMENTATION HAS IN GENERAL PROCEEDED EXPEDITIOUSLY,
REFLECTING THE SIMPLER LEVEL OF ACTIVITY.

4. AAO BELIEVES THAT THE FUTURE AMALGAMATED "SMALL ACTI-
VITIES" PROJECT SHOULD BE KEPT AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO THE
IRT FORMAT, WITH THE UPPER FUNDING LIMIT INCREASED TO DOLS
200-250,000. THE GREAT ADVANTAGE OF THIS FORMAT IS ITS
PLACING PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROJECT IDENTIFICATION

ANNEX H
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ACTION OFFICE AFRA-03
INFO AAAP-01 AFCV-03 AFOR-06 PPCE-01 POPR-01 PPPB-03 WID-01
CMGT-02 AFDA-01 RELO-01 MAST-01 /024 A4 88

H. PEACE CORPS INVOLVEMENT HAS BEEN PRESENT IN ONE OF THREE ON-GOING OR COMPLETED PROJECTS, AND IS PLANNED FOR THE FOURTH. THE INVOLVEMENT OF PEACE CORPS TO DATE MUST BE JUDGED A SUCCESS.

INFO OCT-88 INR-10 AF-10 EB-08 AMAD-01 /064 W
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1. SEE CONTRACTOR EVALUATION REF C. NEALY

R 000014Z FEB 82
FM AMEMBASSY FREETOWN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6432

UNCLAS FREETOWN 0422

AIDAC

E.O. 12065: N/A
SUBJECT: EVALUATION OF AIP (098-0410), IRT (098-0407) AND
REGIONAL WID (098-0388)

REF: A) STATE 021441; B) 01 STATE 305668; C) 01 FREETOWN 0922

PER REF A REQUEST, OUR COMMENTS ON ISSUES PRESENTED REF B
PARA 4 FOLLOWS:

A. THERE HAS BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE TENDENCY/PRESSURE
TO USE SUBJECT PROJECTS ON AID HOC, POLITICALLY EXPEDIENT, BASIS
WITHOUT REGARD FOR MISSION PROGRAM PRIORITIES. IN GENERAL,
HOWEVER, USE HAS BEEN CONSONANT/SUPPORTIVE OF COUNTRY DEVELOP-
MENT PROGRAM.

ANNEX H.

Att. 9

B. THE USEFULNESS OF SMALL, REGIONALLY-FUNDED PROJECTS MAY
BE INVERSELY PROPORTIONAL TO THE SIZE AND SCOPE OF THE
BILATERAL PROGRAM; THAT, AT LEAST, IS THE CASE IN SIERRA LEONE
WHERE BASICALLY OUR ONLY PROGRAM FLEXIBILITY IS THROUGH THESE
PROJECTS. ALL MISSIONS, HOWEVER, NEED RECOURSE TO SOME SOURCE
OF FUNDS FOR SMALL, EXPERIMENTAL, PROJECTS ON AN ON-GOING BASIS.

C. RECORD IN S.L. RE "REPLICABILITY" AND "SELF-SUSTAIN-
ABILITY" OF SUBPROJECTS IS MIXED AND NOT YET COMPLETE.
THE WOMEN'S ARTS AND CRAFTS COOPERATIVE FUNDED UNDER WID
HAS REDUCED ITS SCOPE SINCE COMPLETION OF THE PROJECT, BUT
CONTINUES TO STRUGGLE ALONG. THE OTHER TWO (IRT) PROJECTS
ARE TOO EARLY TO ASSESS IN THIS REGARD.

D. ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONSHIPS, AND LACK THEREOF,
INCLUDING THE RECURRENT OR OPERATING COSTS QUESTION HAVE BEEN
A COMMON PROBLEM; WITH SUCH SMALL PROJECTS ADMINISTRATIVE/
MANAGEMENT CONCERNS TEND TO BE DOWNPLAYED BY BOTH MISSION
AND HC.

E. IRT HAS PROVED A RELATIVELY RAPID MECHANISM; AIP HAS
BEEN SLOWER, BUT DUE LARGELY TO FUNDING QUESTIONS RATHER
THAN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES. BOTH PROJECTS MUST WALK A
VERY FINE LINE BETWEEN RESPONSIVENESS AND APPROPRIATE/
ADEQUATE DESIGN.

F. WHERE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SUB-ACTIVITY CAN BE LARGELY
TURNED OVER TO ANOTHER ORGANIZATION, E.G. PEACE CORPS OR A
PVO, THE MANAGEMENT DEMANDS ON THE MISSION ARE REASONABLE;
OTHERWISE THEY CAN BE ENTIRELY DISPROPORTIONAL TO THE SIZE
OF THE PROJECT.

G. THE FUNDING LIMITATION SHOULD BE SET AT A LEVEL BETWEEN
PRESENT IRT AND AIP LIMITS, I.E. 0.5 200 TO 300 THOUSAND
THE APPROVAL PROCEDURE SHOULD PROBABLY BE CLOSER TO THAT OF
AIPS (PID REVIEW IN AID/W, FINAL APPROVAL IN FIELD) BUT
WITH A CONTRACT FOR DESIGN ASSISTANCE AS IS THE CASE WITH IRT.
SUCH AN AMALGAMATED PROJECT SHOULD MAINTAIN FLEXIBILITY IN ORDER
TO ACCOMMODATE GREATEST POSSIBLE NUMBER OF MISSIONS AND PROGRAM

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INFO AAF-01 AFDR-06 PPCE-01 PDPR-01 PPPB-03 FM-02 WID-01
AAST-01 STRD-02 AFDA-01 RELO-01 MAST-01 AFPM-01
/025 A4 825

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-----332346 241449Z /38

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FM AMEMBASSY MBABANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4026

UNCLAS MBABANE 00593

AIDAC

E.O. 12865: N/A
SUBJECT: EVALUATION OF AIP (698-0410); IRT (698-0407);
AND REGIONAL WID (698-0385)

REFS: (A) STATE 21441, (B) 81 STATE 305668

1. FOLLOWING IS RESPONSE TO REF B KEYED TO PARA 4
ISSUES/QUESTIONS (NOTE THAT USAID/SWAZILAND'S ONLY USE
OF THE THREE PROJECT MODES HAS BEEN TWO IRT ACTIVITIES):

- A. USAID/S HAS MADE LIMITED USE OF IRT PROJECT
MECHANISM BUT IN EACH CASE HAS SELECTED PROJECT PROPOSALS
THAT SUPPORT OUR COSS. PROJECTS TO DATE WERE SELECTED ON
THEIR POTENTIAL TO DEMONSTRATE A REPLICABLE ACTIVITY.

- B. YES, THERE IS A CONTINUING NEED FOR SMALL
PROJECTS. THERE ARE MANY WORTHWHILE ACTIVITIES THAT
REQUIRED SMALL AMOUNTS OF FUNDING BUT HAVE A HIGH
DEMONSTRATION POTENTIAL. AID'S BILATERAL PROJECT SYSTEM
IS MUCH TOO CUMBERSOME TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO THE NEED
FOR THESE SMALL, OFTEN HIGH IMPACT PROJECTS.

- C. THE IRT PROJECTS IN SWAZILAND WERE SELECTED, IN
PART, BECAUSE OF THEIR REPLICABILITY. IN ONE CASE (RDA
OUTREACH), A PROJECT CONCEPT THAT RELIED ON GOVERNMENT
EXTENSION AGENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION WAS MODIFIED TO TEST
THE POSSIBILITY OF USING SMALL-SCALE PRIVATE ENTRE-
PRENEURS. WHILE IT IS TOO EARLY TO DETERMINE THE SUCCESS
OF THIS APPROACH, SIGNS ARE POSITIVE. IF THE EMPHASIS ON
PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURS WORKS, REPLICATION BECOMES MUCH MORE
POSSIBLE. IN ANOTHER CASE, A COMMUNITY PROVIDED LABOR TO
BUILD A DEMONSTRATION WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM. THE SYSTEM IS
NEARING COMPLETION AND WILL NOT ONLY PROVIDE POTABLE WATER
FOR SEVERAL HUNDRED PEOPLE BUT WILL SERVE AS A MODEL FOR
INEXPENSIVE, SELF-HELP WATER SYSTEMS IN THE RURAL
DEVELOPMENT AREAS. INCREMENTAL RECURRENT COSTS FOR THIS
TYPE OF PROJECT ARE MINIMAL SINCE DESIGNS ARE PROVIDED BY
AN ALREADY EXISTING UNIT, LAND USE PLANNING (SUPPORTED BY
THE USAID RDA PROJECT), AND RDA FIELD STAFF CAN ASSIST
IN CONSTRUCTION SUPERVISION.

D. AND E. BIGGEST PROBLEMS WERE THE AID/W REVIEW
PROCESS FOR THE TWO SWAZILAND IRT PROJECTS. IN BOTH
CASES, AID/W REVIEW COMMITTEES WERE A LITTLE TOO STRINGENT
AND DEMANDING WITH RESPECT TO THE INITIAL ENVIRONMENTAL
EXAMINATIONS. WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF CAREFUL
ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING, EVEN FOR A SMALL IRT ACTIVITY,
THERE MUST BE A REASONABLE CUT-OFF POINT. FOR EXAMPLE,
THE COMMUNITY WATER PROJECT WAS DESIGNED WITH THE
PARTICIPATION OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT AREA PROGRAM (RDAP)
HEADQUARTERS STAFF, RDA EXTENSION AGENTS AND COMMUNITY
MEMBERS. R. MAHOFF OF EXPERIENCE, INC., ASSISTED IN
PUTTING TOGETHER A VERY GOOD PROJECT DOCUMENT, AND AFTER

IT WAS SUBMITTED THE COMMUNITY BEGAN TO MOBILIZE ITS
OWN RESOURCES TO BEGIN THE PROJECT. WHAT FOLLOWED WAS A
SERIES OF QUESTIONS OF DUBIOUS IMPORTANCE ON THE
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE PROJECT. THE QUESTIONS
DISPLAYED BOTH A LACK OF PERSPECTIVE AND AN APPARENT
FAILURE TO READ THE PROJECT DOCUMENT ON THE PART OF THE
AID/W REVIEW COMMITTEE. THE RESULTING DELAY COULD HAVE
CAUSED SERIOUS PROBLEMS BECAUSE THE COMMUNITY COULD NOT
UNDERSTAND WHY USAID/S COULD NOT DELIVER ITS PART OF THE
PROJECT AFTER THE COMMUNITY HAD MOBILIZED FOR ITS PART.
THE MORAL OF THIS STORY IS THAT IF THESE SMALL PROJECTS
ARE TO DO WHAT THE GUIDELINES PURPORT, THE REVIEW PROCESS
SHOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH REQUIREMENTS OF THE PROJECT
PROPOSALS.

- F. THE EVIDENCE ON THE TWO USAID/S IRT ACTIVITIES IS
MIXED, AND NO CONCRETE CONCLUSIONS CAN BE DRAWN.

- G. USAID/S CONSIDERS DOLS \$80,000 A REASONABLE UPPER
LIMIT. PROJECT APPROVAL SHOULD REST WITH THE USAID MISSION
AFTER THE SUBMISSION AND APPROVAL OF A SHORT, 3-4 PAGE,
PID-TYPE CABLE TO AID/W. SCOPE SHOULD BE BROAD AND
FLEXIBLE TO ALLOW FOR SMALL PROJECTS DIRECTLY RELATED TO
AND SUPPORTIVE OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY STRATEGIES.

H. WATER PROJECT USED PCV AS PROJECT SUPERVISOR WITH
GREAT SUCCESS. AS LONG AS PROJECT IS TIED TO LOCAL
PRIVATE OR GOVERNMENT INSTITUTION, USE OF PCVS SHOULD BE
ENCOURAGED.

I. EXPERIENCE, INC., PROVIDED VALUABLE ASSISTANCE IN
ORIGINAL DESIGN OF TWO USAID/S IRT ACTIVITIES. MATHERON

ANNEX H
Att. 10

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INFO AAAF-01 AFEA-03 AFCW-03 AFDR-06 PPCE-01 PDPR-01 PPPB-03
WID-01 AAST-01 STAG-02 STEY-01 AFDA-01 RELO-01 MAST-01
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FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4273
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

ANNEX H
Att II

UNCLAS DAR ES SALAAM 08124

AIDAC

ABIDJAN FOR REDSO/WA, NAIROBI FOR USAID AND
REDSO/EA.

E. O. 12065: N/A

SUBJ: SCOPE OF WORK, PLANNED EVALUATION, AIP
(698-0410) IRT (698-0407) AND REGIONAL WID (698-0388)

REF: STATE 305668

1. MISSION HAS ONE COMMENT RE REFERENCED SOW. PARA 3A
WORDING GIVES IMPRESSION THAT "AD HOC" NATURE OF
SUBJECT PROJECTS MAY BE BAD. MISSION EXPERIENCE IS THAT
THE PROJECTS HAVE BEEN USEFUL IN TESTING AREAS FOR
FUTURE INVOLVEMENT OR SUPPORTING AREAS WHICH WHILE NOT
PART OF MISSION STRATEGY ARE PART OF AID'S CONCERNS,
I.E. ENERGY, PRIVATE ENTERPRISE, P.C. LIAISONS. SUGGEST
WORDING BE REVISED TO ALLOW EVALUATORS TO DETERMINE IF
PROJECTS FOLLOWED MISSION STRATEGY. IF NOT, WERE THE
CRITERIA USED FOR UNDERTAKING THE ACTIVITY STILL IN LINE
WITH AID'S GENERAL GOALS. W

2. FYI MISSION PROJECT OFFICERS FOR SUBJECT PROJECTS AS
FOLLOWS:

- HANDMADE PAPER (IRT) J. ANANIA
 - SEAWEED FARMING (IRT) J. ANANIA
 - PHOTOVOLTAIC ENERGY (IRT) J. ANANIA
 - RIFT VALLEY PILOT RICE PRODUCTION PROJECT (AIP)
T. MILLER
 - RUVUMA FISH FARMING (IRT) J. ANANIA
 - TRADITIONAL POTTERY (IRT) J. ANANIA
- MILLER

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PAGE 01
ACTION AID-35

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ACTION OFFICE AFRA-03
INFO AAAF-01 AFDR-06 AFCA-03 PPCE-01 P DPR-01 PPPB-03 WID-01
AFDA-01 ATPC-04 RELO-01 MAST-01 /026 A4 817

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4947

UNCLAS KINSHASA 01757

AIDAC FOR AFR/RA

E. O. 12065: N/A
SUBJECT: EVALUATION, AIP/IRT/WID

REF: STATE 021441

ANNEX H
Att. 12

1. IN VIEW OF ON-SITE EVALUATION BY ROUSH AND KNOTT, USAID WILL NOT DUPLICATE THEIR EFFORTS WITH DETAILED RESPONSE TO REFTEL. IN SUMMARY, USAID HAS FOUND SUBJECT PROGRAMS TO BE USEFUL AND ENDORSES THEIR CONTINUATION. IRT/AIP MODES ALLOW USAID ADDITIONAL FLEXIBILITY IN ADDRESSING RANGE OF DEVELOPMENTAL OPPORTUNITIES AND PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES TO ENGAGE EFFORTS OF LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS THAT ARE NOT ENGAGED THROUGH LARGER BILATERAL ACTIVITIES. IRT/AIP ALSO CAN BE USEFUL IN PERMITTING THE TIMELY TESTING OF IDEAS THAT MIGHT LEAD TO LARGER INITIATIVES. THESE PROGRAMS ARE PARTICULARLY WELL-SUITED TO PEACE CORPS PARTICIPATION IN JOINT UNDERTAKINGS. IRT/AIP PROJECTS USUALLY FALL BETWEEN BILATERAL AND LOCAL CURRENCY SELF-HELP PROJECTS IN SCOPE. THEY OFTEN DEMAND AT LEAST A MODICUM OF ASSISTANCE TO ORGANIZATIONS WITH WEAK TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL CAPACITIES. THIS CAN CREATE A USEFUL ROLE FOR PEACE CORPS. PROBABLY IRT/AIP PROGRAMS ARE MORE VALUABLE FOR SMALL COUNTRY PROGRAMS THAN FOR LARGE. USAID HAS FOUND THEM WELL-TAILORED FOR INITIATIVES IN THE CONGO FOR EXAMPLE. STILL, THEY CLEARLY HAVE A PLACE IN LARGER PROGRAMS AS A PART OF A BALANCED DEVELOPMENTAL PORTFOLIO.

2. EVALUATORS ROUSH AND KNOTT SURFACED THE IDEA OF ASSISTING LOCAL INSTITUTIONS TO DEVELOP THEIR OWN 'IRT' CAPACITIES, I. E. THE PROVISION OF FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO SMALL-SCALE DEVELOPMENTAL INITIATIVES. SUCH CAPACITIES MIGHT BE DEVELOPED THROUGH DEVELOPMENTAL BANKS, INDIGENOUS APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTIONS, OR SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS. USAID BELIEVES THIS IDEA HAS MERIT AND WARRANTS FURTHER STUDY. IF IMPLEMENTED, IT WOULD FILL A NOTABLE GAP IN MANY AFRICAN COUNTRIES.

3. USAID WOULD BE INTERESTED IN THE EVALUATION TEAM'S FINDINGS AND THE FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS. WE SUGGEST AID/W'S CABLING SUMMARY EVALUATION RESULTS AND POUCHING COPY OF FINAL REPORT WHEN COMPLETE. OAKLEY

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**EVALUATION OF ACCELERATED IMPACT
PROGRAM, IMPROVED RURAL TECHNOLOGY,
AND WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS**

**Under Contract No. PDC-1406-I-00-1096-00
Work Order No. 1**

Submitted To:

**Office of Regional Affairs
Bureau for Africa
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

Prepared By:

**James L. Roush
M. Lea Knott**

**DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES, INC.
2924 Columbia Pike
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(703) 979-0100**

March 26, 1982

PREFACE

This evaluation covers three projects managed by the Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau for Africa (AFR/RA):

- Accelerated Impact Program (698-0410)
- Improved Rural Technology (698-0407)
- African Women in Development (698-0388)

The three are umbrella projects which dispense relatively small amounts of money for quick-impact subprojects (designated as activities in this report) in sub-Saharan Africa. The evaluation scope of work (Annex A) points out AFR/RA is considering amalgamating the three projects because of budget constraints, diminishing need for AIP and WID, overlap of activities, and a need to streamline and consolidate approval mechanisms. This evaluation has been carried out to develop recommendations on a means of combining the scope of the three projects into a regional undertaking to begin in FY 1983.

Two Development Associates, Inc. consultants were assigned to the evaluation team: James Roush with primary responsibility for developing the recommendations on amalgamating the three projects and Lea Knott with primary responsibility for reporting the activity reviews which were carried out in the field. The evaluation team visited the AID missions in Liberia, Togo, Zaire, and Botswana; they visited for one day each the REDSO/West Africa office in Abidjan and the REDSO/East Africa office, AID mission, and Peace Corps in Nairobi. In the four countries, where the team had a longer visit, they talked with members of the AID mission staffs and Peace Corps personnel and, when appropriate, with local staff or host country personnel who worked with the activities under review. They visited seven activities in three countries.

The team made no attempt to evaluate the specific activities. The reviews were designed rather to provide the team with information pertinent to evaluating the three projects as a whole and developing recommendations for their future.

The field visits are reported in Annexes B-F. A list of people interviewed in Washington and in Africa is given in Annex G. Some missions cabled their comments on the evaluation issues (Annex H).

DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES, INC.

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- B. Report of Field Visit: Liberia
- C. Report of Field Visit: Togo
- D. Report of Field Visit: Zaire
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- F. Report of Field Visit: Abidjan and Nairobi
- G. List of Persons Interviewed
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I. SUMMARY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

A. Summary Description of Projects

1. Accelerated Impact Program

The Accelerated Impact Program (AIP), Project No. 698-0410, was initiated throughout the Africa region in FY 1977. AIP activities had begun in FY 1976 under the Sahel Recovery and Rehabilitation program to facilitate implementation of small-scale, primarily rural activities not calling for extensive design requirements. Beginning in FY 1979, AIP activities in Sahelian countries were financed under a separate project. The 11 Sahelian activities funded under Project No. 698-0410 in FY 1977-78 were not reviewed as a part of this evaluation.

The AIP project emphasizes: development of low-cost agricultural technology, income expansion for small, primary producers, promotion of rural public health measures, encouragement of activities in nonformal education to help rural populations prepare for participation in productive activities. The AIP project concentrates on experimental, pilot and/or start-up activities. Activities are to be implemented quickly, using primarily local resources and mission contracting authority with limited AID/W backstopping.

The funding level suggested for individual activities is \$100,000 to \$300,000 with possible expansion to \$500,000 if there is special justification. Implementation is expected to take no more than 24 months.

Since November 1977, the AIP approval procedure calls for the submission of a Project Identification Document (PID) for AID/W approval and the subsequent preparation of an abbreviated Project Paper (PP) which would be approved by the USAID director or comparable field representative. Initial Environmental Examinations (IEEs) have to be submitted to AID/W for approval. Section 611 determinations, regular procurement procedures, completion of the statutory checklist and the requirement for a 25 percent host country contribution to each activity are applicable to AIP activities. The 25 percent contribution can be waived for the least-developed countries.

2. Improved Rural Technology

Improved Rural Technology (IRT), Project No. 698-0407, was approved December 29, 1977. The project was established to provide a mechanism through which AID missions in Africa could finance and promote appropriate technology activities in rural Africa. The project was initiated in response to Congress' call in December 1975 that AID take new action to promote intermediate technology.

The project was to react quickly to field proposals for experimental adaptation of technologies to local needs. It would also promote regional and national interest in the state of the art of various technologies by disseminating bulletins, conducting workshops and seminars.

Life-of-project funding was authorized at \$6.1 million, of which \$5 million was for small activity grants and \$1.1 million was for the technical assistance contractor who was to assist in the implementation of the project. Activity grants were initially limited to \$50,000, but this was increased to \$100,000 in the revised IRT guidelines of January 1, 1981. The categories of appropriate activities are:

- Improvement and development of agricultural systems.
- Rural water supply and potable water development.
- Improved sources of nutrition.
- Renewable energies (wind, mini-hydroelectric, solar, biogas).
- Tools and equipment production.
- Housing and construction materials development.
- Food storage and processing.
- Access road construction.
- Sanitation systems development.
- Public health management.
- Income generation from crafts and light capital rural industry.
- Transportation.

According to the project paper, the project should lead to:

- Greater understanding and acceptance of the concept of "appropriate rural technologies" on the part of African governments.
- A considerable accumulation of field experience with various technologies, providing valuable guidance for future development of more sweeping technology projects.

- Positive impact, if only in relatively modest terms, on the Africans who were the direct beneficiaries of IRT activities.

Initially, field missions were to prepare activity papers for each proposal and submit them to AID/W for approval. The January 1981 guidelines simplified the process. The field was to send in an Activity Identification Cable (AIC) with sufficient information to permit AID/W to determine if the activity met IRT funding criteria. If approved, the field was responsible for approving the activity paper. The Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) threshold decision must be approved by AID/W unless the grantee is a Private Voluntary Organization (PVO).

Initially, the IRT contractor (Experience, Inc.) sent personnel to the field to promote the use of intermediate rural technologies. This promotion effort apparently generated more interest than the missions could accommodate. IRT activities turned out often not to be simple even though small in cost. The contractor raised many technical issues in the AID/W review of field proposals and activity approvals were delayed. Because of the field backlash that resulted and the need to provide the missions with some technical backstopping, the approval process was simplified and the contractor became available to field missions to help prepare and/or review activity papers in the field. The contractor's promotion activities were reduced, involving only responding to inquiries and publishing an IRT bulletin for field use.

3. Women in Development

African Women in Development (WID), Project No. 698-0388, is a regional program begun in 1976 to assist rural African women to initiate small experimental activities in such areas as food production, small enterprise development, health and nutrition, and skills training. The project was a quick-response funding mechanism for USAID missions which wished to support small (\$100,000 on average) WID efforts, but which lacked the bilateral funds to do so.

The project was the Africa Bureau's response to the growing perception in the mid-1970s that, compared with men, African women were participating only marginally in development benefits. Equally obvious was the widening

gap in productivity between women and men as a result of outside intervention aimed principally at males. Closing the gap was essential to continued development progress given the myriad duties women already performed in the production sector. Regionwide, women produced 65 percent of all food, but only infrequently were they offered the chance to improve yields through acquisition of farm implements, new seed varieties, improved water supply, and technical assistance and training in better cultivation methods. Labor-saving technologies such as grain mills, wells located close to the family compound, and animal carts could reduce energy and time expended on the burdensome tasks of pounding millet, sorghum, and corn, and fetching wood and water. Women would thus be freed for other productive activity. Providing women the means to develop off-farm, income-generating activities such as village stores, beer-brewing, and handicraft production could further spur their contribution to economic progress.

The project was funded at \$1,265,000 when it was approved in November 1975. Funding was increased to \$2,265,000 in FY 1978 as funds began to run out. The project was evaluated in early 1980. On the basis of the evaluation, it was extended by amendment in September 1980 for an additional five years, and life-of-project funding was increased to \$7,116,000. Sahelian countries which had participated in the original project were excluded from the revised project.

Five programming changes were instituted for the revised project as a result of the 1980 evaluation:

- New subprojects can be women's component add-ons to existing bilateral projects as well as women-specific efforts.
- Design and evaluation assistance will be available through the WID regional project for new subprojects and existing subprojects requiring redesign.
- New subprojects will receive funding for three years instead of two as was the case under the original project.
- New subprojects will average \$250,000 per subproject rather than the previous \$100,000.
- Subproject funding will be directly allotted to USAIDs.

B. Use of Project Activities

Nineteen missions in non-Sahelian countries have participated in one or more of the three projects; of these missions, seven have participated in two of the projects and four have participated in all three of the projects. Two countries have had as many as seven activities financed from the projects. Only seven countries have not participated in at least one project. Table 1 provides a listing of the participating countries and indicates how many activities each country has had under each project.

**TABLE 1
COUNTRY PARTICIPATION BY PROJECT**

<u>Country</u>	<u>AIP</u>	<u>IRT</u>	<u>WID</u>	<u>Total Activities</u>
Botswana	1	3	--	4
Burundi	2	1	--	3
Central African Republic	--	1	--	1
Congo	2	--	--	2
Djibouti	1	--	--	1
Ghana	4	--	1	5
Guinea	3	--	a/	3
Kenya	1	4	2	7
Liberia	2	2	1	5
Rwanda	2	2	--	4
Seychelles	1	1	--	2
Sierra Leone	1	2	1	4
Somalia	3	1	--	4
Sudan	2	--	--	2
Swaziland	--	2	--	2
Tanzania	1	5	--	6
Togo	1	4	2	7
Uganda	--	1	--	1
Zaire	--	4	a/	4
Totals	<u>27</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>67</u>

Note: Seven non-Sahelian countries have not participated in any of the three projects: Cameroon, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

a/ Guinean and Zairian women participated in a regional seminar. For the purpose of this table, the activity is credited to Togo, the site of the meeting.

Most of the AID staff interviewed by the evaluation team assumed that missions with small programs were the heaviest users of these projects, particularly of AIP and IRT. While it is true that there are more small-program participants than medium- or large-program participants, the large-program countries have had the greatest number of AIP and IRT activities and are tied for most WID activities. Five of the eight small-program countries had only one or two activities. A small-program mission and a large-program mission tied for the largest number of activities (seven each). Details on participation by size of USAID program are shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2
PARTICIPATION BY SIZE OF USAID PROGRAM

<u>Amount of Participation</u>	<u>Small</u>	<u>Medium</u>	<u>Large</u>
7 activities	1		1
6 activities			1
5 activities		1	1
4 activities	2	1	2
3 activities		2	
2 activities	2	1	1
1 activity	3		
Total No. of countries participating	<u>8</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>
Not participating	2	2	3
Total No. of activities	<u>22</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>28</u>
Of which:	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>10</u>
AIP	11	7	15
IRT	3	1	3
WID			

^{a/} Average of programs in FY 1980 and FY 1981: small -- up to \$3 million; medium -- \$3 million to \$10 million; large -- over \$10 million.

Activities designed to increase agricultural production are the most popular with missions. Next in importance are other forms of income generation for rural families, followed closely by renewable energy, public health, and rural water supply activities. These five categories account for nearly 80 percent of the activities of the three projects. Additional details are given in Table 3. Further categorization by activity objective (e.g., experimental, start-up, pilot) of AIPs is found in Table 7 in Chapter II and for IRTs in Table 11 in Chapter III. Obligations of each project by fiscal year are found in Table 6 (AIP), Table 10 (IRT), and Table 12 (WID).

**TABLE 3
TYPES OF ACTIVITIES FUNDED**

<u>Activities</u>	<u>AIP</u>	<u>IRT</u>	<u>WID</u>	<u>Total</u>
Agricultural systems	10	7	1	18
Renewable energies	2	7		9
Rural water supply		6		6
Public health	8			8
Income generation	2	5	4	11
Housing construction and materials		4		4
Food storage and processing		3		3
Tools and equipment production		1		1
Nonformal education	2			2
Transportation	2			2
Rural town planning	1			1
Day care center			1	1
WID data base study			1	1
Totals	27	33	7	67

Five of the 27 AIPs seem somewhat outside the guidelines. Two were in energy (an IRT priority), one was meeting an urgent transportation need, and the other two supported the USAID's rural development programs. Five of the AIPs did not appear to meet the criterion of being experimental, pilot, or start-up, but were justified on other grounds: meeting an urgent need or facilitating the relatively rapid initiation or resumption of AID activity in a country. Four of the 27 activities appeared to be outside or marginal to USAID strategies, but they made good sense in terms of host country development priorities. Hence, they should have indirectly facilitated the implementation of USAID strategies.

All IRT activities fall within the 12 functional categories in the revised IRT guidelines -- only seven categories were used. Five IRTs were outside the pilot, innovation, or start-up criterion, but seemed justified on other grounds. There was less correlation of IRTs with USAID strategies than there was with AIPs. However, consistency with USAID strategies is not a criterion for IRTs -- nor need it be in all cases in terms of the overall objectives of the project.

C. Achievements and Problems

Information on achievements is limited, in part because only a few activities have been completed, in part because there has not been much reporting from the field to AID/W. For example, seven AIPs are finished, but information is available only on five. Three of the five appear to have been fully successful, two marginally so.

Only four IRTs have been completed, two of these at the end of 1981. There are no evaluative reports in AID/W files. The evaluation team knows from its field visit that one of the IRTs in Liberia was abandoned, thus results are likely to be minimal. A Togo IRT is nearing completion; it is showing good results. Other IRTs in Togo and Botswana are well along in implementation and are showing promise of being successful, albeit somewhat behind schedule in two cases.

All of the WID activities under the original project had implementation difficulties. At the time of the project evaluation in 1980, the evaluators concluded that none of the activities had been totally successful, but most could be salvaged with appropriate funding, technical assistance, management, and monitoring. Unfortunately, information in AID/W files is insufficient to permit judgment as to whether the activities were salvaged.

Although the WID activities had serious implementation problems, the 1980 evaluation found that there had been enthusiastic reception of activities which succeeded. Women had taken advantage of new training programs. They had discovered how to work together in cooperative structures. They had attended literacy classes and courses in hygiene and maternal and child health care.

During its field visit, the present evaluation team also received confirmation of the enthusiasm of village women for training programs and other activities which can lessen the traditional workload and increase opportunities to augment family income. Some AIP and IRT activities, as well as WID activities, are directed toward these objectives.

Implementation problems have been common, particularly among AIP and WID activities. Of 20 AIP activities that have been active more than 15 months, information is available on only 14, and ten of these have had implementation problems. The planned completion dates of five have been extended. Seven of these activities have experienced procurement delays and four suffered recruitment problems. The political or macroeconomic situation in the country has adversely affected implementation of five AIPs. The necessity to use U.S. equipment or to obtain approval of waivers has been the primary contributing factor to procurement delays.

The 1980 evaluation of the WID project found the following kinds of problems:

- Some of the projects were seriously lacking in local support and participation.
- Host country initiative, interest and commitment were spotty.
- Project design was defective.
- There were no market studies conducted prior to the implementation of income-generating activities.
- The absence of baseline data resulted in weakened design, called into question the validity of projections, and seriously restricted the measurability of activity results.
- Activity goals and objectives were unrealistically ambitious in relation to funding and activity life.
- Activity design did not build in evaluation procedures.
- Implementation was significantly limited by the lateness and inadequacy of inputs, weak management, and the lack of technical assistance, particularly in marketing, management, and mechanical skills.
- Closer monitoring of inputs and management was needed.

It appears that IRT activities are easier to implement in comparison with AIP and WID activities because of their smaller size, less extensive management requirements, and more limited geographic area -- often relating to only one or two villages. There seems to be greater participation by Peace Corps Volunteers (PCVs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs), thereby reducing somewhat the USAID management and monitoring requirements.

A common problem for all three projects was the initial approval process for individual activities. The AID/W approval seemed extremely difficult to obtain, given the small amount of funding required. There may have been some underestimation by the field of the complexity of relatively small projects. On the other hand, it obviously takes a very comprehensive document to answer all the questions that members of an AID/W project review committee can think of, particularly if members are unfamiliar with the country situation.

Fortunately, the process for all three projects was modified to permit the field to approve the IRT activity papers or the abbreviated project paper for AIP and WID once AID/W has approved the activity in principle. This was not done, however, until late 1980 for WID and January 1981 for IRT. Some field personnel did not seem to be aware of the changes. The field has also been frustrated when activities are approved in principle but funding is not available. Understandably, they are reluctant to ask proposers to complete activity design until funding is assured.

AID/W management of the projects seems to have been somewhat lax recently. For example, a number of the activities are past due for evaluation and little, if any, effort has been made to remind missions of their reporting requirements. Such requirements are minimal.

Similarly, the field has not always monitored the activities as closely as needed. The AIP and WID activities particularly seem to need a higher level of management and monitoring, a level considered excessive by most missions in relation to the funding involved. The evaluation team received the impression during its field visit that smaller missions are more attentive to AIP, IRT, and WID activities than are the larger missions.

D. Future Need for Project Activities

All the senior AID officers interviewed in the five field missions visited by the evaluation team cited the value of a prompt funding mechanism for small, experimental projects. Seven additional missions responded to the invitation to provide views on the questions and issues in the evaluation scope of work. All but one echoed the need for a flexible funding source for small projects; the

exception had not used the projects and had no plans to do so in the near future. However, the director of that mission was responsible for an IRT in a neighboring country which was being implemented by the Peace Corps.

Some USAID directors felt that small-project, quick-response funding was more important to missions with small programs than to those with large programs. This is probably true, but missions with large programs have generally been more active participants in the AIP, IRT, and WID projects than the small-program missions. Generally all missions have been utilizing these projects constructively in supporting their country assistance strategies.

Peace Corps country directors consistently favored the continuation of AID funding for small projects. Some favored the IRTs because they are generally smaller, easier to manage, and more "grass roots" than AIPs. AIP, IRT, and WID activities usually support the Peace Corps' program priorities in a country. Peace Corps/Washington also supports the continuation of AID funding for small projects.

Some AID/W personnel suggested to the evaluation team that separate WID activities were no longer needed because WID objectives will be met only through projects that integrate WID concerns. All AID officers should be sensitive to WID issues by now -- the Percy Amendment dates from 1973. The team discussed this issue in the field and concluded that there are still some AID officers who are either not sensitive to WID issues or believe that AID should not be "fooling around with such sensitive issues." Even if AID officers are sensitive to WID concerns, this generally is not reflected in project design unless there is a woman on the design team. REDSO officers also observed that WID components, even when included in project design, usually were not implemented unless there was a woman on the implementation or technical assistance team.

Reflecting the field views and its own analysis of the use of the three projects, the evaluation team concludes that there is still a need for the funding flexibility afforded by the three projects. In addition, the team has identified an additional need of field missions which could be met from a revised and somewhat reoriented regional project. The evaluation team recommends that the AFR/RA proposal to combine the three projects into one

project be reconsidered and modified to provide a three-year extension of the IRT project and the establishment of a new project which might be entitled Development Initiatives and Responses. The rationale for this proposal and the description of these two projects follows:

1. Revised and Extended IRT Project

The IRT project differs from the other projects in that it is supposed to be more than just a funding source for small activities. It is supposed to lead to:

- A greater understanding and acceptance of the concept of "appropriate rural technologies" on the part of African governments.
- An accumulation of field experience with various technologies, providing valuable guidance for future development of more sweeping technology projects.

Neither of these project objectives has been accomplished to date for two main reasons: Although the project has a five year life, it will have been operating only three years by the end of the current fiscal year. Of more importance, the project has not been administered in a way that permits it to make a significant contribution toward the above objectives. The IRT contractor was supposed to promote the use of appropriate rural technologies, but because of problems during the contractor's initial field visits, the contractor is permitted to carry out only minimal promotional activities. There have been neither seminars nor workshops. Furthermore, the contractor has not been permitted to participate in activity evaluations or to make follow-up visits to activities unless specifically requested by a mission, usually to help design a new activity. Thus, the contractor has been inhibited in gathering experience from project activities. The paucity of field reporting on the IRTs has exacerbated the problem.

The evaluation team believes that the foregoing IRT project objectives are worth supporting. The team found examples in which host country officials did not seem to appreciate the importance and potential of intermediate technologies in rural development. In addition, the team was told about or saw examples of technologies adapted to rural African conditions in one

country which could be of great benefit in neighboring countries (e.g., village-level sorghum dehullers in Botswana, village latrines in Zimbabwe, a number of items to reduce the onerous tasks of village women). However, the mechanisms are weak, sometimes nonexistent, for facilitating this intercountry technology transfer.

Although there is a clear need for a continuation and expansion of the kind of activity funded under the IRT project, the evaluation team wanted to determine if this kind of activity could be financed from other sources. For example, a new regional energy project is planned. In addition, Appropriate Technology, International (ATI) has ongoing programs in Africa. The team found that only seven out of 33 IRT activities were in the renewable energy field. Thus, even if all of this kind of IRT activity were to be funded from the new energy project, it would not lessen to any great degree the need for the IRT project.

While ATI finances some activities which are similar to IRT, the evaluation team felt that the needs were sufficiently great to warrant both programs. This impression was confirmed by the AID/W project officer for ATI and by a member of the ATI evaluation team who had just completed a review of ATI activities in a number of southern and eastern African countries. The project officer also pointed out that ATI and IRT usually deal with different groups in a country. Thus, potential for overlap is minimal. Possibilities for mutual reinforcement would be strengthened if the IRT contractor were to play the more active role which is suggested in Section I.E.

The evaluation team concludes that the conditions that led Congress to request greater AID action in the intermediate technology area still exist. The Agency and cooperating countries have scarcely begun to understand, let alone obtain the potential benefit of appropriate rural technologies to the achievement of development objectives. It makes better development sense to maintain and strengthen the IRT project than to eliminate its identity and, most likely in the process, bring about a reduction in its funding.

The IRT project should be given a chance to achieve its objectives. The simplest and most expeditious way to do this is to extend the project, incorporating modifications to make it more effective (see I.E.). This would be much less disruptive to the momentum of the project than going through the process of incorporating it into an umbrella project with different objectives. The team recommends that Sahelian missions be permitted to participate in the revised, extended IRT project as an opportunity to improve their programs and to facilitate achievement of the project's broader objectives.

2. Development Initiatives and Responses (DIR)

This proposed new project should not be looked upon as merely an amalgamation of the old AIP and WID projects. Rather, it should be structured to permit missions to test or to get an early start in implementing initiatives (e.g., those which are the result of new legislation or policy changes by a new AID administration) and to respond quickly to changes in the local development environment.

Examples of past initiatives include women in development, energy, environmental concerns, improved project design, improved project implementation -- these are still of major concern. Current examples include private sector participation in development, technology transfer, influencing development policy of cooperating countries.

It is now possible to test or to introduce an innovation in an experimental, pilot, or start-up activity under the AIP or WID project. This kind of response should be retained. At times, a sample survey or a research study is needed to acquire data to determine how best to introduce an innovation, to influence host country officials' thinking about development policy, or to refine or modify the USAID's country assistance strategy. Such surveys or studies are permitted under WID but not under current AIP guidelines; they should be permitted under the proposed new DIR project.

Often an effective way of influencing host country policymakers is to arrange a visit to the United States or to a developing country to witness

a different approach to a development problem -- sometimes conceptual, sometimes in method of implementation. This technique can be useful in terms of overall development policy or in terms of conceptualizing or implementing individual projects or project components. In the latter case, project implementation often depends upon the cooperation of officials from ministries other than the one with primary implementing responsibility. Observation tours, if sparingly yet imaginatively used, should be permitted under the DIR project.

Another way to influence policymakers is to use consultants to discuss certain problems or to conduct seminars or workshops. This can be funded currently under a project or under Project Development and Support if related to the design of a specific project. There is not, however, readily available funding for consultants to deal with broader development issues; e.g., those that appear to be primarily the concern of the AID Administrator. This would be another appropriate use of the initiatives element of the DIR project.

Some of these examples are equally appropriate as initiatives or as responses. For example, if there is a change in government or a major change in a country's macroeconomic situation, appropriate responses include observation tours, studies, or seminars.

Often, there are emergency situations for which a country seeks USAID assistance, but which are not of a nature sufficiently critical to justify funding under the International Disaster Assistance appropriation. A quick USAID response can do much to improve working relations with host country personnel and thereby enhance the chance of a smooth implementation of USAID's assistance strategy in the country. Quick responses seem to be a natural component of the AIP project, but one of the more successful of these responses (Borehole Drilling in Botswana) did not meet the AIP guidelines because it was not a pilot or start-up activity. Responses to emergency situations should be a part of the DIR project.

A serious bottleneck in efficient project implementation is the lack of trained host country project managers -- sometimes exacerbated by the

limited management experience and training of USAID officers. In one country in the Sahel, an evaluation officer recommended incountry training for host country project managers.^{1/} Although acknowledging the need, mission personnel held that it would take at least two years to get approval for a new project to remedy a pressing need in at least six or eight multimillion dollar projects. The proposed DIR project could provide funding which would permit a prompt response to this and similar kinds of implementation problems which can be dealt with more economically on a multiproject basis than piecemeal.

In the field visits, Peace Corps country directors mentioned two kinds of incountry training needs for which there is no ready funding, but which would enhance Peace Corps effectiveness in utilizing AID funds. One director suggested that selected Peace Corps staff and volunteers be given training in AID's project design, implementation, and evaluation techniques. With such training, they could improve small project or activity design, assume project implementation duties (or do them better) and relieve USAID of some of its monitoring workload. Another Peace Corps director stated that Peace Corps funds are available to train PCVs but not to train host country nationals. Yet, training PCVs would be far more effective if their counterparts could receive the same training concurrently. When this training related to AID's and/or the host country's development priorities (which it normally would), it would be appropriate for DIR funding.

Another kind of response which the AIP project provides is the ability to move quickly in initiating AID activity in a new country or in a country in which the AID program previously had been suspended -- generally for political reasons. In some cases, there is a desire to move quickly to demonstrate support of a more development-oriented government. In other cases, it is prudent to move in with a relatively small, but quick-response

^{1/}Roush, James L., Development is a Joint Effort: Discussion Paper on Improving the Effectiveness of USAID-Funded Technical Assistance to Mali, USAID/Mali, December 15, 1980.

activity to "test the waters;" i.e., to determine whether it is possible to work cooperatively with the new government. In other situations, the U.S. Government wants to have a cooperative relationship with a country but does not wish to have a full AID program and mission. Again, the AIP activity is appropriate.

Given these kinds of situations and needs, it is proposed that the new DIR project have the flexibility to finance subprojects (as is currently done under AIP and WID) plus nonproject activities such as demonstration visits, consultants' services, incountry training, sample surveys and research studies. These subprojects and activities would relate to initiatives and responses in six principal areas:

- Responding to broader U.S. foreign policy objectives.
- Influencing host country development policy.
- Preparing or refining USAID country assistance strategies.
- Promoting local and U.S. private sector participation in country development.
- Improving project design, implementation and evaluation.
- Strengthening AID-Peace Corps collaboration and making it more effective.

E. Suggested Changes in Programming and Implementation Procedures

Even if the bureau should decide to have a single project, the evaluation team believes that IRT would still have to be handled differently. Therefore, proposed changes in programming and implementation are presented separately for IRT and for the proposed new Development Initiatives and Responses project.

1. Revised and Extended IRT Project

The most important change required to achieve project objectives is in the role to be played by the IRT contractor. There are, moreover, some programming and documentation changes that can ease mission workloads for these small activities.

At the moment, the contractor is not promoting the IRT concept or inter-country linkages. Furthermore, the contractor is not able to provide as much support to the missions as they could profitably use. It is suggested, therefore, that the contractor place personnel in Africa -- at least one in each REDSO -- with the one in REDSO/West Africa being French speaking. In this way, the contractor's personnel will be in closer and more continuous contact with field missions and with other experts in REDSO.

With contractor personnel in the field, a mission would be able to discuss a proposed new IRT with the contractor before submitting a proposal. Therefore, AID/W need only ensure that the proposed activity is consistent with IRT guidelines; consultation with the contractor generally would not be necessary.

With increased communication with USAIDs and greater knowledge of the local development scene, the contractor could suggest means of strengthening the technology development, adaptation, and/or diffusion capability of local organizations important to the implementation of the USAID country strategy.

Even if they continue to be based in the United States, the contractor's personnel should undertake visits to USAIDs with IRT activities on a regular schedule. In this way, the contractor can assume a portion of the USAID monitoring duties and, at the same time, learn why things do or do not work. The contractor would acquire an understanding of the capabilities and problems of local organizations concerned with the development, adaptation, and diffusion of rural technologies. The contractor's personnel should be able not only to review or to help with activity design, but should also be able to help prepare implementation documentation.

The present arrangements do not allow for development of an adequate data bank. It is suggested that the organization contracted for implementing the project extension be an institution with an existing data bank in appropriate rural technologies or that the contractor arrange a subcontract with such an institution, preferably one in Africa.

Dissemination of information should be expanded under the project. This could be in the form of additional documentation such as the Rural Technology Bulletin and the IRT Resource Briefs currently distributed by the present contractor. In addition, the contractor should have funds available to finance the travel and per diem of personnel from one African country to another (occasionally outside Africa) to view prototypes or projects or to participate in workshops and seminars. Use of funds for this purpose would require mission concurrence.

It is suggested that the funding limit for IRTs be raised to \$200,000, but missions should be encouraged to keep activities small unless they are quite sure of the managerial ability of the proposer. Missions should be encouraged to look to nongovernmental proposers, including the business sector. Current restrictions on two IRT activities per year should be dropped. More appropriate would be to appraise the total IRT monitoring workload -- which these recommendations are designed to reduce.

In a limited number of cases initially, missions could be encouraged to explore the possibility of a larger IRT grant which would be used by the mission, a PVO, or local intermediate technology institution, with the advice of the contractor, to give smaller subgrants incountry. This could gradually pave the way for larger technology projects which could possibly preclude the need for a follow-on project after the proposed three-year extension.

The evaluation team noted that activity implementation plans are frequently not well done. They are not always included with grant agreements. In addition, the paperwork associated with IRTs is still somewhat cumbersome, particularly for the smaller less-complex activities. It is proposed, therefore, that the activity paper no longer be required. It would be prepared only if the mission director felt that it was needed. The director could require whatever analyses that he/she felt necessary, and in whatever form deemed appropriate, to satisfy himself/herself that the activity was ready for obligation. At least part of the time saved by not doing a formal activity paper should be used to ensure the preparation of a

good implementation plan for attachment to the grant agreement. Such a plan should also provide periodic reporting and/or joint reviews, as well as standard evaluation requirements.

It is suggested that the categories of activities recommended for USAID proposals be reduced from the present 12 categories to the following six:

- Production, storage, transportation, and processing of agricultural commodities, especially food items (including aquaculture).
- Rural water supply and potable water development.
- Village and family sanitation systems.
- Rural housing and construction materials development.
- Income generation, e.g., from crafts and light capital rural industry.
- Natural resource conservation.

USAID proposals generally should be in support of the USAID's development assistance strategy. However, exceptions should be made to this requirement as well as to the foregoing categories if a proposal offers the possibility of a breakthrough in an area of high priority to the host government or is of concern to a number of other countries. In such cases, the funding limit might also be breached.

It is recommended that the current prohibition against follow-on IRT activities be rescinded. It is conceivable that an initial activity might be the development and testing of a prototype. A somewhat broader testing or replication might then be appropriate, and should be feasible under the project. Furthermore, it is possible that replication of small scale activities may provide a better diffusion policy in some countries than attempting to have a large project to manage such diffusion.

2. Development Initiatives and Responses (DIR)

The programming and documentation requirements for subprojects and for nonproject activities would be different. Requirements for subprojects are discussed first.

New criteria for subprojects should be established, drawing on the guidelines set forth in E.1. including particularly the six areas of emphasis.

It is proposed that documentation requirements for subprojects under DIR be similar to those for IRT activities. That is, the missions submit an AIC to AID/W for approval in principle of the proposed subproject. If approved, the mission then proceeds to prepare an implementation plan and appropriate authorizing and obligating documentation unless the mission director decides that more is required. The authorizing document can be the Project Authorization (Handbook 3, Appendix 8B) with a project paper facesheet.

The evaluation team found that there is considerable variety in the formats and contents of the obligating documents used by USAIDs. The financial procedures levied on the proposers also varies considerably. In one case, a USAID attempt to advance only one-fourth of the authorized funding for local purchases would have resulted in a large cost overrun. One small upcountry activity was required to hire an auditor for an annual audit of the activity's account, even though all documentation was required to be submitted through the USAID to REDSO and a PCV was the manager of the activity. It is recommended that AID/W prepare, with field input, guidelines for the content of obligating documentation and for the level of sophistication needed for financial procedures. It should be possible to prepare model formats which could be used with a minimum of modification.

Some missions have suggested raising the funding limit for AIPs to \$750,000. The evaluation team suggests that \$500,000 and a two-year life of project be maintained as general guidelines. However, if U.S. technical assistance or substantial amounts of U.S. procurement are required, a longer life of project would be more realistic. In any case, AID/W should reserve the right to make exceptions to its rules with appropriate justification. The prime concerns of AID/W should be whether the proposed subproject can be expected to achieve the projected impact or policy change and whether the mission has adequately focused on the management capability

of the implementing agent and the USAID ability to monitor and backstop the activity. These factors are more important than life of project and funding limits.

Field personnel interviewed (including female WID officers) do not favor continuation of a separate African WID project because it creates unnecessary antagonism and tends to be counterproductive to WID objectives. Furthermore, it is generally considered preferable to integrate women's needs and concerns into the design of regular bilateral projects. Nevertheless, this is not often done. Therefore, it is appropriate for DIR project funds to be utilized to continue financing individual WID subprojects, women's component add-ons to existing bilateral projects and design and evaluation assistance for new WID subprojects or existing WID subprojects requiring redesign. However, priority should be given to financing:

- Studies of the roles of family members in village economic and social life.
- Evaluations of the impact of completed bilateral projects on village life.
- Seminars, workshops, and publications which can contribute to the sensitization of AID officers and host government officials to WID concerns and to their knowledge of how to deal with those concerns.
- Support to women's organizations or a women's bureau in a government agency where such an initiative could further USAID's WID objectives.

There seems to be no need for special guidelines for funding limits or length-of-project life for WID-type subprojects. The evaluation team would find it most unfortunate if proposed WID subprojects, particularly those falling in one of the priority categories listed above, were not funded because of a shortfall in annual funding for the DIR project. Nevertheless, the team is reluctant to recommend setting aside funds for WID activities, seeing it as an unnecessary complication to an already difficult budgeting process. Rather than setting aside money for requests which may never come or which may come in quantity from the already convinced, it would be better to concentrate on those missions that have had few or no WID subprojects and do not have women's components in their bilateral

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portfolio. A good way to start identifying such missions would be to review the tables on pages 128 and 129 of the Agency's Women in Development 1980 Report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The evaluation team suggests some modifications in the criteria for activity selection in the revised WID guidelines. For example, the criteria require "a definitive expression of host government interest and approval. In some circumstances, it would be desirable to fund studies for the purpose of influencing host government attitudes, and it might not be feasible to obtain a definitive expression. In such a situation, host government acquiescence should be enough. Another criterion requires that activities "reflect genuine participation of African women in design, management, and implementation decisions and activities." Laudable, but it might be possible to have an activity that is designed to foster participation in other activities or projects, but which would not be an integral part of the proposed subproject; e.g., contracting for certain publications or seminars.

It is suggested also that project funding could be utilized by AFR/RA for grants to regional or subregional African organizations or groups to support activities promoting WID objectives. REDSOs could be alert to possibilities.

Criteria need to be developed for handling the special support activities (observation visits, studies, special consultants, incountry training). It is suggested that missions have automatic allocations of perhaps \$25,000 annually (\$10,000 for AID Offices). Those wishing larger amounts would cable their requests, indicating how the previous allocation had been used and describing the new requirement. At the end of the third quarter of the fiscal year, missions would be asked to return any funds they do not expect to need that fiscal year for reallocation to other missions. New allocations the following year would be made only after missions had advised how they had used the funds the previous year. Essentially, there would only be a post-audit on the use of the funds as long as the mission did not have a large need or a cumulative need during the year in excess of its allocation.

F. Other Observations and Recommendations

In the process of undertaking this evaluation, the team became concerned about some issues that transcend the three projects being evaluated. These are discussed under the following headings: "pushing money" vs. fostering development, institutionalizing women in development concerns, commodity procurement, and Initial Environmental Examinations.

1. "Pushing Money" vs. Fostering Development

Because of the Agency's overriding concern with obligating large amounts of money, there is antipathy to small projects. This antipathy was most apparent in the budget office of the Bureau for Africa (AFR/DP) and among REDSO design officers who resent putting in almost as much design time for a small project as for a multimillion dollar project. The Agency bias for large projects is reflected in the guidelines for both IRT and AIP -- guidelines which stress replicability on a larger scale. While all of this is understandable given the perspective of the various offices, there are other factors which point toward a somewhat more flexible approach to small projects.

If the guiding principle of a USAID country assistance strategy is effectiveness in achieving positive influence on the host country's development policy and a favorable impact on development objectives, rather than merely moving large amounts of funds, it is conceivable that a series of smaller projects or integrated subprojects might be as effective (or more so) than a smaller number of large projects. Such an approach seems particularly appropriate in a small country, in a country whose governmental implementing agencies are deficient in management skills, or in a country which has a problem of widespread official corruption. In these cases, the large project is more vulnerable to loss or misuse of funds and poor implementation progress -- likely leading to cost overruns.

The usual argument for the large project is the continuing reduction in USAID personnel and the need to conserve USAID management and monitoring -- theoretically achieved with larger projects. The difficulty is that this

ignores the host country management problems. These are often severe with large projects which involve either multiple implementing agencies or cooperation in the implementation process by a number of agencies. Small projects, especially decentralized ones, are more likely to be within local management capabilities. Furthermore, those in charge of implementation of small projects usually are more subject to surveillance by, and more responsive to, the intended recipients of the assistance.

This suggests to the evaluators that AID should look for ways to foster smaller projects, not to do away with them. This means not only permitting such regional umbrella projects as IRT and DIR, but approving umbrella projects for missions under which funds would be distributed locally to a number of small projects in accordance with procedures worked out with the host government and local officials. To minimize USAID management and monitoring workload part of the project costs could be for U.S. contract assistance of two types: one to provide any technical assistance that might be needed and the other to perform the role of "supervising engineer" as that has been carried out in AID-financed capital projects.

Small AIP and IRT projects have been criticized because the implicit costs of designing the activity may be more than the value of the activity. This should not be an argument for doing away with such projects. Rather, it suggests the importance of choosing activities well. There should be the chance of widespread replicability of a technology being tested. In addition, the IRT contractor should be charged with preparing "how to" booklets on the most popular or most needed technologies so that future design time and implementation monitoring can be reduced. Replicability should not just refer to future AID-financed activities. One of the roles AID has played which has been to its credit is that of catalyst. The investment in testing and demonstrating rural technologies should be viewed in the context of the total developmental benefit possible, not in how much money AID can obligate in an immediate follow-on activity.

The push to obligate money can be counterproductive to good project implementation. There were examples in the files of money allotted to the field after a number of months of AID/W review and dialogue with the field,

with the mission then requested to obligate the money in less than a week so that the obligation would be included in the current quarter's obligations. This would be somewhat understandable at the end of August or September, but not for other quarters of the year. One mission was forced to get a government official to sign the obligating document on March 31st to meet AID/W's demand and then arrange an official signing ceremony on April 3rd. This makes the mission look ridiculous to host country officials! Furthermore, this kind of pressure often precludes working out all of the implementation details before agreements are signed, thereby leading to delayed implementation and slow-moving pipelines.^{1/} Such AID/W demands are an unnecessary and usually counterproductive intrusion into the management of the mission.

2. Institutionalizing Women in Development Concerns

Based on its own interviews and the views of WID officers, the evaluation team believes that there is need for further sensitization of USAID and host country personnel to WID concerns. Action outside the scope of the projects reviewed is needed. The team offers the following suggestions:

- The Africa bureau (AFR) should seek to recruit or train more women project design officers.
- AFR should ensure that design teams include a female officer, or a male officer who has demonstrated sensitivity to WID concerns, if project activity is likely to impact on village life.
- AFR should insure the technical assistance and host country implementing teams have female members or a WID-sensitive male when WID issues or concerns have been cited in the project paper.
- AID should ensure that future evaluations, especially of large agricultural and integrated rural development projects, review the impact of the project on the pattern of village life, including specifically the role of women.

^{1/}For a general proposal for preparing more realistic implementation plans, see pp. 128-130 of Final Report on the Evaluation of Operation Haute Vallee, Mali, Volume 1, James L. Roush, Development Associates, Inc., Arlington, Va., December 31, 1981.

- AID should undertake some special evaluations and/or review a number of past evaluations to identify examples of both positive and negative impact on women.
- Case studies of both good and bad project impact on women should be developed from AID experience and used in project design and evaluation courses, the Development Studies Program, orientation programs for AID and contractor personnel, and other appropriate training opportunities.
- The Office of Development Information and Utilization (S&T/DIU) could enlarge its data bank on women in development concerns.

3. Commodity Procurement

Commodity procurement frequently is time consuming in Africa even under the best of conditions. It is particularly onerous in landlocked countries. For small projects with a short life, U.S. procurement generally does not make sense. In addition, many U.S.-produced items are not appropriate to African conditions. Hence, the preparation of many waivers is involved of the first 22 AIP activities approved, fourteen have required waivers.

There is a need to orient field officers on conditions under which waivers are possible without reference to AID/W. There were a number of examples of missions requesting waivers from AID/W when the missions had the authority to execute the waivers.

There was a large amount of waiver preparation for commodities for which there are no U.S. producers, e.g., kerosene refrigerators and French keyboard typewriters. In certain countries, U.S.-produced vehicles are clearly not appropriate. AFR should request the Office of Commodity Management (M/SER/COM) to prepare blanket waivers for some types of commodities for all or most African countries and for other commodities (e.g., vehicles) in specified countries. This would provide a welcome reduction in both mission and AID/W workload and expedite project implementation.

4. Initial Environmental Examinations

The evaluation team found much cable traffic relating to IEEs. Usually cables were requests from AID/W to send in the IEEs, requests for mission

directors to make threshold decisions which they had assumed AID/W would make, or field requests for AID/W approval. Only once or twice was substance involved. It seems illogical that AID/W should have to review IEEs for such small projects when IEEs for PVO projects can be approved by mission directors, even though PVOs could be implementing multimillion dollar projects. It is recommended that AID modify its regulations to permit mission directors to approve IEEs when they are authorizing projects, except when AID/W has stated at the time of PID or AIC approval that it wishes to review the IEE. This should apply to all projects authorized by mission directors, not just activities under the IRT and DIR projects.

II. ACCELERATED IMPACT PROGRAM

A. Summary Description of Project

AIP activities began in FY 1976 under the Sahel Recovery and Rehabilitation program to facilitate implementation of small-scale primarily rural activities not calling for the extensive design requirements of more technically complex, high-dollar value programs. In FY 1977 the program was extended to other African countries in which bilateral AID development assistance programs were operating. Beginning in FY 1979, AIP activities in Sahelian countries were included in a separate project funded from the Sahel development appropriation category. The 11 Sahelian activities funded from this AIP project in FY 1977-78 were not reviewed as a part of this evaluation.

The AIP project emphasizes: development of low-cost agricultural technology; income expansion for small, primary producers; promotion of rural public health measures; encouragement of activities in nonformal educational assistance to help rural populations prepare for participation in productive activities. The AIP project concentrates on experimental, pilot and/or start-up activities. Activities are to have concrete impact with specific project outputs. They are to be implemented quickly, using primarily local resources and mission contracting authority with limited AID/W backstopping.

The funding levels suggested are \$100,000 to \$300,000 with possible expansion to \$500,000 if there is special justification. Implementation is expected to take no more than 24 months.

Individual AIP activities are based on the following criteria:

- Experimental/pilot/start-up activities which:
 - Lead to comprehensive changes in existing conditions;
 - Encourage local participation and self help in defining new learning systems relevant to local concerns in an attempt to reach significant numbers of rural people;
 - Provide rural people with additional skills, information, and knowledge and other inputs to increase their incomes and improve their well being;

-- Provide an opportunity to introduce new technology on a trial basis until a particular activity proves successful.

- Activities are directed primarily at small, low-income farmers, herders, artisans, labor-intensive industry and service workers in villages, market towns and small rural centers. The target group should be specifically identified for each subproject.
- Activities directly assist in raising productivity and income of rural populations.

Since November 1977, the AIP approval procedure has called for the submission of a Project Identification Document (PID) for AID/W approval and the subsequent preparation of an abbreviated project paper which would be approved by the USAID director or comparable field representative. Because AIP activities do not have to be included in prior budget submissions, it has been necessary to submit congressional notifications before funds can be allotted to the field. Initial Environmental Examinations (IEEs) had to be submitted to AID/W for approval. Section 611 determinations, regular procurement procedures, completion of the statutory checklist and the requirement for a 25-percent host country contribution to each activity were maintained for AIP activities. The 25-percent contribution can be waived for the least-developed countries.

B. Extent and Nature of Use of AIPs

As of February 1, 1982, 40 AIP applications had been accepted by AID/W for processing, one of which was pending, awaiting a decision. Action taken on the others is given in Table 4.

TABLE 4

DISPOSITION OF APPROVED AIPs

Not obligated by mission	2
Transferred to Sahel Local Development project	1
USAID deferred obligation in FY 1981; AID/W requested status in February 1982	1
Obligation initially deferred for lack of funds; funds allotted February 1982	1
Obligated by missions (Of which Sahel countries during FY 1977 and FY 1978)	34 (10)

Fifteen non-Saharan countries have participated in the program (including pending and not yet obligated). The frequency of participation in relation to the size of the AID program is shown in Table 5. Fifty-eight percent of the non-Saharan missions have participated: six missions with large programs, three with medium programs and six with small programs. No mission with a small program has had more than two AIPs. Large-program missions had the largest number of AIP activities.

TABLE 5

AIP PARTICIPATION AND SIZE OF USAID PROGRAM^{a/}

	Number of Missions	Small	Medium	Large
No participation	11	4	4	3
Participated only once	7	4	--	3
Two AIP projects	5	2	1	2
Three AIP projects	2	--	1	1
Four AIP projects	1	--	1	--
Total Participation	<u>15</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>6</u>
Number of Activities	27	8	9	10

^{a/} Size of program in FY 1980 and FY 1981: Small -- up to \$ 3 million; medium -- \$3 million to \$10 million; large -- over \$10 million.

As shown in Table 6, FY 1980 was the peak year for obligation of AIPs -- slightly over \$4 million. The number of AIP submissions declined substantially in FY 1981; FY 1982 is likely to be low also. This appears to reflect primarily a cutback in funding availability. When missions go to the work of preparing PIDs and then are told that funds are not available and may not be until the next fiscal year, their enthusiasm is considerably dampened. Another factor contributing to the drop-off in AIP requests probably is the large number of approvals in previous fiscal years and the need to digest these before undertaking additional ones. This is particularly true for the smaller missions. A number of the AIPs have turned out to be more difficult to implement than missions had anticipated.

TABLE 6
AIP OBLIGATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR AND COUNTRY
(U.S. \$1,000)

<u>Country</u>	<u>FY77</u>	<u>FY78</u>	<u>FY79</u>	<u>FY80</u>	<u>FY81</u>	<u>FY82^{a/}</u>	
Botswana			474				474
Burundi		490			340		830
Congo				500		<u>b/</u>	500
Djibouti				400			400
Ghana	300	370		500		500	1,670
Guinea				460	460	<u>c/</u>	920
Kenya				275			275
Liberia				498	253		751
Rwanda			488	450			938
Seychelles			125				125
Sierra Leone						<u>d/</u>	
Somalia			200		500		1,040
			340				
Tanzania		41		500			541
Sudan				472			472
Togo			500				500
Subtotals	300	901	2,127	4,055	1,553	500	9,436
Sahel	1,416	1,276					2,692
Totals	1,716	2,177	2,127	4,055	1,553	500	12,128
No. of activities	<u>7^{e/}</u>	<u>7^{f/}</u>	6	9	4	1	34
Average \$ Value of Activities	245	311	355	450	388	500	357

^{a/}As of February 1, 1982.

^{b/}Funding provided February 1982, not yet obligated (\$500,000).

^{c/}Originally approved FY 1981, but obligation not assured (\$500,000).

^{d/}Not yet approved, pending (\$193,000).

^{e/}Including six in the Sahel.

^{f/}Including four in the Sahel.

The average size of AIP activities steadily increased up to FY 1980 reaching an average of \$450,000 in that year. FY 1981 AIPs averaged \$388,000; cumulative average is \$357,000.

Of the 26 non-Sahelian activities that have been approved by AID/W and the one now under consideration by AID/W, 22 are consistent with the guidelines with regard to the type of activity (e.g., agricultural technology, small producer income, etc.). Nine have supported agriculture and nine have supported rural public health. Of the 22 that were consistent with the guidelines on type of activity, three did not appear to meet the criterion of being either experimental, pilot or start-up in nature. A fourth appeared to be partially outside the criterion, but it was meeting a crisis situation.

Of the five activities in non-guideline fields, two were in energy, two were transport (one meeting an urgent need), and one was for town planning in rural areas. More details are shown in Table 7.

Of the 27 activities reviewed, 23 appear to be consistent with the USAID development assistance strategy as summarized in the FY 1982 Congressional Presentation. Two activities appear to be outside of USAID's strategy: Borehole (Well) Drilling in Botswana and Expanded Program of Immunization in Burundi; two others seem rather marginal to USAID's strategy: Women's Enterprises in Ghana and Renewable Energy in Rwanda. In terms of impact, the Borehole Drilling activity is one of the most successful. It achieved its purpose and obtained a very favorable reaction from the host government and the intended recipients.

TABLE 7
CATEGORIES OF AIP ACTIVITIES

<u>Functional Category</u>	<u>Total No. of Activities</u>	<u>Objective of Activity</u>				
		<u>a/Experi-mental</u>	<u>Pilot</u>	<u>Start-up</u>	<u>Program Expansion</u>	<u>Urgent Need</u>
<u>Per Guidelines</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>
Low-Cost Agricultural technology	9	2	5	3		
Expand small producer incomes	2	1			1	
Encourage nonformal education	2			2		
Promote rural public health	9		2	5	2	1
<u>Other</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>		<u>1</u>
Energy	2	2		1		
Transport	2	1				1
Rural town planning	1		1			
<u>Totals</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>

a/ Does not always equal the sum of the figures on the line because three activities had components falling in two categories.

C. Results Obtained

Little information is available on results because only seven activities have been completed and only four of them have had evaluations. The evaluation team also reviewed one completed activity in Botswana for which the evaluation was not yet complete. Of the five for which information is available, only three appear to have been fully successful:

Tanzania (.11): Control of Stable Fly tested a successful control method and provided basis for follow-on project.

Togo (.18): Animal Traction provided the basis for larger follow-on projects under bilateral aid and from other donors.

Botswana (.21): Borehole Drilling largely met drilling targets and had impressive start-up; activity will continue without USAID support.

The other two activities appear to have been only marginally successful:

Burundi (.09): Alternate Energy--Peat encountered production shortfalls, lowered selling price was not obtained, villagers have not accepted a shift to peat.

Seychelles (.19): Audiovisual Aids to Extension provided AV equipment, but more training needed to insure an effective unit.

D. Common Threads of Success or Problems

Given the small number of completed activities and availability of evaluative information on only five of them, it is premature to discuss common threads of success. There does not appear to be a common thread among the five completed activities for which information is available.

The project approval process has generally been considered satisfactory, although there have been field complaints about the time taken in specific cases. In some cases, AID/W seems to have demanded excessive information prior to approving an activity or the mission's IEE threshold decision. In other cases, AID/W approved the activity, but was unable to allocate funds or to indicate when it would be able to do so.

Implementation problems have been common. Of 20 activities that have been active more than 15 months, 10 definitely have had implementation problems (5 completion dates have been extended); only 4 activities have been relatively free of problems; implementation information is not available on 6 activities. Two newly approved activities have also encountered implementation problems. The types and frequencies of difficulties encountered by the 12 activities with implementation problems are shown in Table 8.

Of the 5 Expanded Program of Immunization (EPI) activities, 4 have had procurement delays and the other experienced a delay in recruitment of the expatriate technician. The procurement delays seem to reflect waiver problems plus the need to await the arrival of the AID-financed technician before commodities were ordered.

TABLE 8
TYPES OF AIP IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS

<u>Problem Areas</u>	<u>Number of Activities</u>
Procurement	7
Exogeneous (e.g., political or macroeconomic situation)	5
Recruitment	4
Poor planning or design	2
Grantee performance	2
<u>Multi-problem Activities</u>	
No. with 4 types of problems	1
No. with 3 types of problems	2
No. with 2 types of problems	2
No. with 1 type of problem	7

Of the first 22 activities approved, 14 have required waivers. Often these have not been obtained at the time of approval of the activity. At least 5 vehicle waivers have been required. Some waivers have been for extremely small sums, e.g., less than \$3,000 for French keyboard typewriters or kerosene refrigerators or other items available only from Europe and not generally available incountry as shelf items.

E. Peace Corps Participation and Collaboration

Peace Corps participation in the AIP project appears to have been limited. From the information available in the files, Peace Corps Volunteers (PCVs) have been involved in only two activities. This may be understated since the files are not complete, but Peace Corps involvement seems much less frequent in the AIP activities than in the IRT activities. Peace Corps involvement was considered successful in the one activity for which information on Peace Corps involvement is available: Animal Traction in Togo. PCV involvement in this activity predated the AIP activity.

F. Project and Activity Management

AID/W manages the funding for the overall project. With regard to individual activities, AID/W approves a PID (sometimes in cable form) and the IEE. Sometimes waivers must be approved by AID/W also. AID/W processes congressional notifications which are required before funds can be obligated. AID/W generally does not review the abbreviated project paper. Thus, in the AIP activity approval process, the AID/W involvement and workload are considerably less than they would be with regular bilateral small projects.

The AID/W involvement in activity implementation varies, but generally it is less than it would be with regular projects. For example, there often is no contracting or recruiting for offshore technical assistance; the Expanded Program of Immunization activities are notable exceptions.

AID/W monitoring of the project has been somewhat lax. A number of files (7) do not have copies of grant agreements. Evaluations have not been carried out on time, but missions have not been reminded of their delinquencies. The evaluation and implementation reporting requirements set forth in grant agreements vary considerably, reflecting a lack of clear guidance from AID/W on the subject. In fact, there is no current AIP guidance document, just a January 1980 cable repeating two 1977 cables.

Since USAID approves the abbreviated project paper, such documents should be somewhat shorter than if they had to be approved by AID/W because it is not necessary to attempt to respond to all potential AID/W questions. Thus, there

may be some workload savings for USAID under the AID approval process. Frequently, the activities have been just as complicated as larger projects, so the design time is often out of proportion to the dollar contribution to the activity.

Generally, missions have not found it possible to reduce the amount of time devoted to monitoring the AIP activities. If they have, they have usually been sorry. One mission suggested that AID/W has streamlined the approval process, but not eased implementation procedures.

As indicated earlier, there have been a number of implementation problems. In most cases, they do not appear to be a result of lax monitoring by USAIDs. Some involve what appears to be an inordinate amount of time in getting AID/W approval of waivers. In some cases, it appears that delays in procurement could have been ameliorated if missions had developed detailed commodity lists while they were preparing their abbreviated project papers.

Implementation reporting by the grantee and evaluation requirements frequently have not been spelled out in grant agreements. Some cases were noted where the mission had been lax in insisting on required reporting. Only four evaluations had been done on the seven completed activities and no interim evaluations were found in the files. A few, however, are scheduled, having been postponed because of slow start-ups or other factors.

III. IMPROVED RURAL TECHNOLOGY

A. Summary Description of Project

The Improved Rural Technology (IRT) Project 698-0407 was approved December 29, 1977. The project was established to provide a vehicle through which AID missions in Africa could finance and promote appropriate technology activities in rural Africa. The project was initiated in response to Congress's call in December 1975 for AID to take new action to promote intermediate technology. Field responses to a March 1976 circular airgram confirmed that there was considerable interest by African countries in intermediate technology.

The project, managed by AFR/RA, was to react quickly to field proposals for experimental adaptation of technologies to local needs. It would also promote regional and national interest in the state of the art of various technologies by disseminating bulletins, conducting workshops, and seminars.

It was expected that the project would lead to:

- Greater understanding and acceptance of the concept of "appropriate rural technologies" on the part of African governments.
- A considerable accumulation of field experience with various technologies, providing valuable guidance for future development of more sweeping technology projects.
- Positive impact, if only in relatively modest terms, on the Africans who were the direct beneficiaries of IRT activities, such impact to be measured in terms of production, personal incomes, employment, and the quality of village life.

The following hope for the project was set forth in the project approval memorandum:

Within the five-year lifespan of the project, sufficient publicity and hopefully national and regional acceptance of appropriate technology concepts would have been gained to enable AID financing to be withdrawn, leaving the regional appropriate technology function to now nascent African organizations.

Life-of-project funding was authorized at \$6.1 million of which \$5 million was for small activity grants and \$1.1 million for the technical support contractor.

Acting through different rural technology systems, this project supports a variety of specific activities, each one of which normally costs no more than \$50,000. This was changed to \$100,000 in the revised IRT guidelines of January 1, 1981. According to the project paper, emphasis is on small-scale, short-term activities of the following types:

- Innovation. Activities of this sort allow testing and demonstration of new devices or processes. An example might be field testing of an experimental pyrolytic converter to determine its efficiency using African raw materials in an African setting.
- Start-Up. A start-up activity provides information or meets conditions necessary prior to undertaking a particular long-term development project. For example, a sample survey might be taken of village energy uses to determine the desirability of proceeding to a large-scale project to provide alternative sources of energy.
- Pilot. These activities support field testing and demonstration of technologies whose characteristics, cost-effectiveness, and replicability are generally known. The assumption here is that other donors or the host government might choose to continue the program on a broader scale. As an example, several dozen copies of the "dragonfly" pump developed in Southeast Asia might be bought for demonstration in Sahelian river basins, given a preliminary judgment that the pump could be responsive to African needs.
- Roadblock removal. Small barriers at one point in a technology system can impede functioning of the system as a whole. A correspondingly small intervention could remove these roadblocks and return the system to health. For example, progress in supporting village soap making in Upper Volta could be halted by uncertainties about how to address a particular design problem. The issue might be rapidly resolved if personnel could simply be sent for a time to work with Ghanaian experts who had been pursuing similar questions.

Technologies with which development might be pursued in these ways include:

- Agriculture: Animal-drawn implements and carts, hoes, threshers, backyard poultry incubators, rabbit hutches and chicken coops, irrigation pumps.
- Aquaculture: Village fish ponds or tanks.
- Food processing and Preservation: Maize shellers, vegetable oil presses, improved ovens, cassava peelers, food dryers, grain mills, storage bins.

- Energy: Village wood lots, pyrolytic converters, methane digesters, windmills, peat processors.
- Water: Pumps for village water systems.
- Manufactures: Extraction of oils for soap, cosmetics and perfume, small-scale paper plants, brick-making.
- Prototype development:
- Construction: Labor-intensive methods for constructing roads, public buildings, dams, etc.
- Crafts: Handlooms, carpentry, pottery, basketmaking.
- Health: Training in maternal and child care, rural health delivery systems.
- Nonformal education:
- Village organization: Support for PYO work in local institution-building.
- Information: Data collection on food production and other rural issues, mechanisms for information exchange.

The January 1981 revised guidelines reiterate that activities are to be experimental, and are to test and demonstrate technologies and systems which have potential for adaptation and replicability elsewhere in the country or in other African countries. The categories of appropriate activities are listed more concisely but appear to include all of the above technologies:

- Improvement and development of agricultural systems.
- Rural water supply and potable water development.
- Improved sources of nutrition.
- Renewable energies (wind, mini-hydroelectric, solar, biogas).
- Tools and equipment production.
- Housing and construction materials development.
- Food storage and processing.
- Access road construction.
- Sanitation systems development.
- Public health management.
- Income generation from crafts and light capital rural industry.
- Transportation.

IRT Approval Process

The project paper called for the field mission to perform an initial review of any proposal and to prepare an activity paper for submission to AFR/RA. AFR/RA
DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES, INC.

would obtain the IRT contractor's comments on the proposed activity within ten days and then approve, disapprove or suggest revision of the activity paper within five working days. Funds would be allotted to the mission which would take any further action needed and obligate the funds by use of a grant agreement. The first such agreement was to serve as an umbrella agreement, with subsequent activities implemented by an implementation letter.

The January 1981 IRT guidelines revised this system by providing that the field send in an Activity Identification Cable (AIC) with sufficient information to permit a judgment as to whether or not the proposed activity meets basic IRT funding criteria. AFR/RA provides a cable response within 15 days. The activity concept is examined for compliance with the following conditions:

- The activity falls within IRT guidelines and AID priorities.
- Essential items such as the procurement plan and waiver requests are included.

Under the new guidelines, the field has the responsibility for insuring the preparation and approval of the activity paper, except that AID/W must approve the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) threshold decision (unless the grantee is a PVO). Once a Limited Scope Grant Agreement (LSGA) or other authorized form of grant agreement is signed, the mission should pouch to AFR/RA a copy of the agreement, the activity paper, the project data facesheet and the authorization memorandum.

Initially, the IRT contractor (Experience, Inc.) sent personnel to the field to promote the use of intermediate or appropriate rural technology. This promotion effort apparently generated more interest than the missions could accommodate. Furthermore, the approval process was sold as being quick and simple. However, IRT activities turned out often not to be simple, even though small in cost, and the contractor raised many technical issues in the AID/W review of field proposals. Because of the field backlash that resulted, and the need to provide the missions with some technical backup, the approval process was simplified and the contractor was made available to field missions to help prepare and/or review activity papers in the field. The contractor's promotion activities were reduced, involving only responding to inquiries and publishing an IRT bulletin for field use.

B. Extent and Nature of Use of IRT

As of February 1982, 33 IRT proposals have been approved by AID/W; one was in the process of being approved. Of these, one was de-allotted and eight recently approved activities have not yet been obligated.

Fourteen non-Sahelian countries (Sahel countries are excluded) have presented activities under the IRT project. The frequency of participation in relation to the size of the AID program is shown in Table 9. A little more than half of the non-Sahelian missions have participated: five missions with large programs, three with medium programs, and six with small programs. Large missions have had the most IRT activities -- 45 percent of the total.

TABLE 9
IRT PARTICIPATION AND SIZE OF USAID PROGRAM

	No of Missions	Size of USAID Program a/		
		Small	Medium	Large
No participation	12	4	4	4
Participated only once	5	3	1	1
Two IRT activities	4	2	1	1
Three IRT activities	1	-	-	1
Four IRT activities	3	1	1	1
Five IRT activities	1	-	-	1
Total participating	14	6	3	5
No. of activities	33	11	7	15

a/ Average programs in FY 1980 and FY 1981: Small -- up to \$3 million; medium -- \$3 to \$10 million; large -- over \$10 million.

Although the IRT project was approved at the beginning of FY 1978 (December 1977), no activities were obligated until the end of FY 1979 and then only two. Thirteen activities were obligated in FY 1980, ten in FY 1981 and eight are already well along for FY 1982 obligation. Peak obligation was \$629,000 in FY 1981. This reflected the increase in maximum funding from \$50,000 to \$100,000 per activity beginning in January 1981 plus \$66,000 of add-on funding

to previous obligations. The average size of grant went from \$42,000 in FY 1980 to \$56,000 in FY 1981; the average to date for FY 1982 is \$67,500. IRT obligations by country by fiscal year are shown in Table 10.

TABLE 10
IRT OBLIGATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR AND COUNTRY
(US \$1,000)

	<u>FY79</u>	<u>FY80</u>	<u>FY81</u>	<u>FY82 a/</u>	<u>Total</u>
Botswana		93	13	100	206
Burundi				73	73
Central African Republic		50			50
Kenya		14	75	95	184
Liberia	50	50	20		120
Rwanda			110		110
Seychelles		50			50
Sierra Leone	25	26	50		101
Somalia				90	90
Swaziland		79			79
Tanzania		25	201	57	283
Togo		90	105		195
Uganda				100	100
Zaire		45	55	25	125
Total	<u>75</u>	<u>522</u>	<u>629</u>	<u>540</u>	<u>1,766</u>
No. of activities	<u>2</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>33</u>
Average \$ value of activities <u>b/</u>	50	42	56	67.5	54

a/ Approved but not yet obligated.

b/ Based on total value of grant even if part of the grant was obligated in a subsequent fiscal year.

IRT activities fall within seven of the twelve categories of acceptable IRTs. Unused categories are nutrition, access road construction, sanitation systems, public health management, and transportation. The most popular categories are agricultural systems and renewable energies, followed closely by rural water supply systems (see Table 11).

Twenty-eight of the activities were directed to approved objectives (e.g., pilot, innovation, start-up), four were in the nature of program expansion and one was informational and promotional (Renewable Energy and Appropriate Technology Demonstration in Somalia). No activities appeared to be designed to overcome specific roadblocks. One activity does not appear replicable in rural areas (Handmade Paper Manufacture in Tanzania).

Of the 33 activities reviewed, 10 appear to be inconsistent with USAID strategy or only marginally consistent with the strategy. This information is provided because it is called for in the evaluation team's scope of work. It should be noted, however, that the IRT guidelines do not require IRT activities to be consistent with USAID strategies. Rather, the guidelines speak of demonstrating technologies and systems which "have potential for adaptation and replicability elsewhere in the country and/or in Africa."

TABLE 11
CATEGORIES OF IRT ACTIVITIES

<u>Functional Category</u>	<u>No. of Activities</u>	<u>Innovation</u>	<u>Start-Up</u>	<u>Pilot</u>	<u>Program Expansion</u>	<u>Information Promotion</u>
Agricultural systems	7	1	1	3	2	
Renewable energies	7	3		2	1	1
Rural water supply	6			6		
Income generation	5	1	1	2	1	
Housing, construction material	4	3	1			
Food storage and processing	3	2		1		
Tools and equipment production	<u>1</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>
Totals	33	10	3	15	4	1

C. Results Obtained

Because of the delayed start-up of the IRT project, only four activities have been completed, two of these were completed at the end of 1981. There are no

evaluative reports in AID/W files. The evaluation team reviewed one of the four activities during its field visit. The Fired Brick Housing and Building Materials activity in Liberia had been abandoned by the grantee. The political turmoil in the country had delayed implementation and other exogenous factors may have precluded the execution of part of the activity. Perhaps some lessons have been learned which can be helpful in planning Liberian development, but this was not clear at the time of the team's visit.

Of the two IRT activities visited in Botswana, Sorghum Milling had greatly surpassed its objectives although it was not yet complete. The Small Craft Development activity had had implementation difficulties, but still had contributed significant gains in local employment and individual earnings.

Of the other eight IRTs reviewed during the field visits, all are expected to be completed successfully with the possible exception of the Small Farmers Project in Zaire. Even if the latter is not successful in the usual sense, it will provide the USAID with useful information about trying to introduce agricultural innovation in Zairian villages. The Primary School Agricultural Education activity has been successful and has led to the introduction of an advanced version in the secondary schools.

D. Common Threads of Success or Problems

Given the small number of completed activities and the paucity of evaluative information, it is premature to discuss common threads of success. Based on the impression received during the evaluation team's field visits, it appears that the IRT activities may be easier to implement (in comparison with the AIP and WID activities) because of their smaller size, less extensive management requirements, and more limited geographic area -- often concerned with only one or two villages. There is greater participation by Peace Corps Volunteers (PCVs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs), thereby reducing somewhat the USAID management and monitoring requirements. It seems that IRTs are likely to get more USAID attention in smaller missions than in large ones.

A common problem was the approval process under the old system. There is little complaint about the January 1981 revised guidelines. Procurement issues

were raised during the evaluation team's field visits. Otherwise, there is not enough feedback on the activities to discern common implementation problems.

E. Peace Corps Participation and Collaboration

Information is not complete, but PCVs have been involved in at least eight activities in five countries. PCV involvement was crucial to the success of five of the activities which the evaluation team reviewed in the field and was important in others.

Peace Corps Country Directors were favorably disposed toward the IRT activities. They felt the IRTs were small enough to be manageable, yet provided important additional resources to increase the effectiveness of the assistance provided by the PCVs. The IRTs are also appropriate for working at the village level -- a high priority for the Peace Corps.

F. Project and Activity Management

The AID/W role is to manage the funding for the overall project and, since January 1981, respond to the AICs and approve the IIEs. AID/W processes congressional notifications which are required before funds can be obligated. Some waivers may require AID/W approval, but this appears to be less so than in the case of the AIPs. AID/W involvement in the processing of PIOs also seems to be considerably less for IRTs than for AIPs, reflecting the small size of grant and the greater use of incountry resources.

AID/W has generally provided a quick response to AICs since the initiation of the revised guidelines in January 1981. AID/W has been somewhat lax in the monitoring of evaluations.

A number of USAIDs experienced frustration with the original IRT design and approval process. Utilizing the new January 1981 guidelines, however, has reduced USAID workload as well as frustrations. IRT activities are not necessarily easier to design than AIPs, although they are of lower dollar value, but they require less USAID input because of the availability of the IRT contractor. IRTs are also more likely to have a nongovernmental sponsor, often the Peace Corps. Frequently, this means that USAID monitoring can be reduced.

Grantee implementation reporting and evaluation requirements frequently have not been specified in grant agreements. Very few of the grantee progress reports are in AID/W files, but it is unclear whether the grantees are not reporting or the USAIDs are not transmitting the reports to AID/W. (There is no requirement to do so.) On the other hand, evaluation reports (Project Evaluation Summaries) are supposed to be sent to AFR/RA. Ten are overdue, eight of them for a number of months.

G. Role of IRT Contractor

The performance of the IRT contractor, Experience, Inc., was evaluated in May 1981. Therefore, the evaluation team has focused on the contractor's activities since the revised IRT guidelines were established in January 1981. The team was asked to address specifically two questions:

- Has contractor assistance substantially improved design of second generation IRTs, compared with their predecessors, for which no outside help was available?
- To what extent can the current high demand by missions for IRTs be attributed to the quick availability of no-cost (to the mission) contractor assistance in the design phase?

The January 1981 revised IRT guidelines state that the contractor is to provide the following technical support for the IRT project:

- Technical support: The contractor provides technical support in the field for preparation of activity papers, responds to information requests, and supplies Africa-based consultant assistance and training services.
- Bulletin: The IRT project bulletin entitled Rural Technology Bulletin provides a quarterly summary of current appropriate technology applications in Africa. Each issue of the bulletin will feature a "State of the Art" section dealing in depth with some pertinent aspect of appropriate technology.
- Promotion: The contractor documents and publicizes (through the media, workshops, seminars) certain activities which it feels best reflect the goals of IRT.
- Bibliographies: The contractor provides AID/W with a bibliography of appropriate technology materials contained in the IRT project's appropriate technology collection. The bibliography is for the use of USAID field offices and their clients. Specific data are made available to groups actively working on development or execution of project activities. The bibliography is continually updated.

- Consultant's roster: A roster of experts available to consult on technical, economic, or social aspects of appropriate rural technologies, development, and application is maintained by the contractor. The roster identifies people in Africa who can perform these functions in support of the project.
- Workshops: The contractor may organize workshops on specific technology issues at the request of AID. Funds for this purpose are drawn from those available for project activities.
- Evaluation: The contractor is available to perform evaluations of completed IRT activities.

In addition to the foregoing, the contractor is also prepared to handle procurement for missions. No requests had been received for such assistance prior to the evaluation, but one mission is now in the process of requesting procurement services.

Based on mission responses to the issues and questions raised in the evaluation team's scope of work and on the team's field visits, it appears that USAIDs are generally satisfied with the contractor's technical support under the revised guidelines. The Rural Technology Bulletin now has a distribution of over 2,200. Most of the copies are distributed through the missions; Peace Corps gets 75 copies. The Bulletin appears to be well received based on the requests that the contractor receives for excerpts, additional information or permission to reprint articles in other appropriate technology publications.

Rather than continue to provide up dates of the bibliography to AID/W, the contractor now prepares bibliographies on special subjects and distributes them to the field as IRT Resource Briefs. Four Briefs have been distributed to date: Charcoal and Wood Stoves, Solar Cooking, Forestry, and Organic Food Production.

The contractor prepared a consultant's roster, but the requests for consultants have been few. The contractor has been requested by AFR/RA not to undertake promotional activities. The contractor has not been requested to organize any workshops or to undertake any evaluations. The AFR/RA project officer felt that it would not be appropriate for the contractor to participate in an evaluation of an activity which the contractor had helped design. The evaluation team does not share this view. The contractor needs the kind of feedback which

would be obtained from participating in the evaluations. The contractor can be expected to be just as objective as USAID; if not, then USAID can ensure a balanced report.

The May 1981 evaluation of the contractor recommended that AFR/RA instruct Experience, Inc. to provide the project officer a quarterly report of activities so that AID/W will be better informed of workload and project activities. This recommendation has not been acted upon and the AFR/RA project officer is not sure that such a report is needed. The contractor provides a monthly status report of IRT activities. This appears to be sufficient if the table includes an additional column showing evaluations overdue.

The contractor evaluation also recommended that the contractor be provided written guidelines for the preparation of annual reports and written instruction on the preparation and dissemination of information packages. These actions have not been taken. The AFR/RA project officer revised the contractor's proposed outline for the 1981 annual report and discussed with the contractor the handling of information packages. Further documentation is probably not required unless there is a new project officer before the termination of the project. If the contract is extended, such documentation could be included in the contract amendment.

The current role of the contractor is less than indicated in the revised guidelines and is limited in comparison with what was set forth in the project paper. The initial concept was that the contractor would visit missions to follow implementation of activities and would prepare an annual evaluation of the entire project. Without the possibility of performing these follow-up visits and participating in evaluations -- together with the paucity of reporting on the activities by the missions -- it is virtually impossible to build the kind of data base of lessons learned which can ensure improved activity design in the future and the spread of good rural technologies among the countries. Thus, two of the three expectations from this project cannot be realized as the project is presently constructed:

- Greater understanding and acceptance of the concept of "appropriate technologies" on the part of African governments.

- A considerable accumulation of field experience with various technologies, providing valuable guidance for future development of more sweeping technology projects.

The individual mission may learn from the activity, but there is little possibility of extending the lessons to other missions and recipient countries.

If the contractor were permitted to build the kind of data base envisioned by the project designers, an additional contract person would probably be needed to process the information and to respond to requests for informational materials. AID needs to assure continuing access to the information developed, and this presumably will cease under the existing arrangement when the contract with Experience, Inc. is terminated. This suggests the possibility of a different contractor or a tie-in of the present contractor with an institution which has a permanent data base on rural technology if the project activity is to be continued and provide full benefit.

It is not clear that the level of IRT demand should be attributed to the availability of IRT contractor assistance at no cost to the mission. Nevertheless, this assistance is appreciated, particularly by small missions. Assistance by the contractor in facilitating activity start-up and monitoring implementation is more likely to lead to an increase in the demand for IRT activities.

Four of the five missions visited by the evaluation team were satisfied with the contractor's performance in helping with activity design and with the preparation of activity papers. However, it is premature to make a judgment about the degree of improvement, if any, in the design of IRTs in which the contractor participated since adoption of the January 1981 revised guidelines. Moreover, the contractor has had no involvement in the design of three of the fourteen activities approved under the revised guidelines. Support to activity implementation may be even more important than design help.

IV. WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT

A. Summary Description of Project

The African Women in Development (WID) Project 698-0388 is a regional program begun in 1976 to assist rural African women to initiate small experimental activities in such areas as food production, small enterprise development, health and nutrition, and skills training. The project was a quick-response funding mechanism for USAID missions which wished to support small (\$100,000 on average) WID efforts, but which lacked the bilateral funds to do so.

The project was the Africa Bureau's response to the growing perception in the mid-1970s that, compared with men, African women were participating only marginally in development benefits: more disposable income, more education, more leisure, better health. Equally obvious was the widening gap in productivity between women and men as a result of outside intervention aimed principally at males. Closing the gap was essential to continued development progress given the myriad duties women already performed in the production sector. To close the gap required giving women greater access to development inputs normally accorded men, i.e., credit, land, training, and commodities.

Regionwide, women produced 65 percent of all food, but only infrequently were they offered the chance to improve yields through acquisition of farm implements, new seed varieties, improved water supply, and technical assistance and training in better cultivation methods. Labor-saving technologies such as grain mills, wells located close to the family compound, and animal carts could reduce energy and time expended on the burdensome tasks of pounding millet, sorghum, corn, and fetching wood and water. Women would be free to engage in other productive activity. Providing women the means to develop off-farm, income-generating activities such as village stores, beer-brewing, and handicraft production could further spur their contribution to economic progress.

The project was funded at \$1,265,000 when it was approved in November 1975. Funding was increased to \$2,265,000 in FY 1978 as funds began to run out.

The project was evaluated in early 1980. On the basis of the evaluation, the project was extended by amendment in September 1980 for an additional five years and life-of-project funding was increased to \$7,116,000.

This amendment allows implementation of approximately 15 new subprojects or three a year as an average. All sub-Saharan field posts receiving bilateral assistance (except those in the Sahel) are eligible to apply for subproject funding. Implementing agencies can be host country institutions and indigenous and U.S. Private and Voluntary Organizations (PVOs). (Sahelian countries participated in the original project.)

Five programming changes were instituted for the revised project as a result of the 1980 evaluation:

- New subprojects can be women's component add-ons to existing bilateral projects as well as women-specific efforts.
- Design and evaluation assistance will be available through the WID regional project for new subprojects and existing subprojects requiring redesign.
- New subprojects will receive funding for three years instead of two as was the case under the original project.
- New subprojects will average \$250,000 per subproject rather than the previous \$100,000 to help assure provision of required project inputs.
- Subproject funding will be directly allotted to USAIDs to contribute to more regular and improved monitoring of financial status and implementation.

Subproject selection under the revised project will be based on the following criteria:

- AID priority emphasis. Subprojects must reflect AID emphasis on the role of women in development as stated in Section 113 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 (Percy Amendment), AID Policy Determination 60 (September 16, 1974) and Bureau for Africa field guide message CIRC A-311, April 19, 1974.
- Host government interest. All subprojects, including those carried out by PVOs, will require a definitive expression of the host government's interest and approval.
- Beneficiary target group. Priority for subproject funding will be given to rural women who are low-income farmers, herders, artisans or service workers, although urban women will also be eligible for assistance. While

the majority of subprojects will focus on group rather than individual activities, individuals will be eligible for subproject assistance as part of a larger project to support entrepreneurs.

- Participation. Subprojects will reflect genuine participation of African women in design, management, and implementation decisions and activities. This means inclusion of host country women on design teams, placement of indigenous women in key management positions, and obtaining beneficiary women's views on subproject activities as distinct from imposition of preselected interventions on the target populations. Recruitment of expensive expatriate project managers should be kept to a minimum given restricted funding for individual subprojects. If the expatriate assistance in implementation is absolutely essential, the design team should first investigate the possibilities of bringing on a local hire or a Peace Corps Volunteer (PCV).
- Narrowness of scope. Subprojects will emphasize one or two key areas of intervention (e.g., well construction, food production or day care) as opposed to the potpourri approach encompassing diverse subactivities.
- Self-sufficiency. Priority will be given to subprojects which show promise of becoming self-sustaining following termination of AID funding. This criterion ostensibly favors production activities. However, nonrevenue-producing subprojects (e.g., maternal child health clinics, day care centers, vocational training centers) will be eligible for funding, providing the host government or sponsoring PVO demonstrates a serious (in the view of the USAID Mission) commitment to support the activity after subproject termination and presents a detailed plan for phasing out AID funds and assuming recurrent costs.
- Training. Short-term training subprojects will be considered provided they include plans for follow-on activities.

B. Extent and Nature of Use of WID

Twelve activities were approved under the original WID project for implementation in seven countries, six of the activities were located in two countries: Chad and Senegal. Three activities have been approved under the revised project: two in Kenya and a training seminar in Togo for Togolese, Guinean, and Zairian women. Obligations have varied from \$6,000 for a study in Upper Volta to \$612,000 for a major activity in Togo which included significant funding provided under an agreement with a PVO. The average funding level for the program to date is \$180,000. Obligations peaked in FY 1979 and were lowest in FY 1981. Obligations by fiscal year and country, broken down by original and revised project, are shown in Table 12.

TABLE 12
WID OBLIGATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR AND COUNTRY
(U.S. \$1,000)

<u>Country</u>	<u>FY76</u>	<u>FY77</u>	<u>FY78</u>	<u>FY79</u>	<u>FY80</u>	<u>FY81</u>	<u>Total</u>
Chad ^{a/}	80	67 ^{b/} 176	233				556
Ghana	25						25
Liberia				203			203
Senegal	170		235				405
Sierra Leone	62	47 ^{b/}		205 ^{b/}			314
Togo				612			612
Upper Volta	6	65					71
<u>Total Original Project</u>	<u>343</u>	<u>355</u>	<u>468</u>	<u>1,020</u>			<u>2,186</u>
Kenya					184	125	309
Togo/Guinea/Zaire					202		202
<u>Total, Revised Project</u>					<u>386</u>	<u>125</u>	<u>511</u>
<u>Cumulative Total</u>	<u>343</u>	<u>355</u>	<u>468</u>	<u>1,020</u>	<u>386</u>	<u>125</u>	<u>2,697</u>

^{a/} The three Chad activities are inactive because of AID's withdrawal in 1979.

^{b/} Add-on funding to previously approved grant.

The individual WID activities are listed in Table 13 and categorized by the principal objective of the activity. Five have multiple objectives. Seven of the activities have education and training as their principal objective. Such training is usually related to increasing agricultural production or other income generation, but the activities were put in the training category if the impact was not immediate and part of the activity. Five studies were carried out -- most of them designed to explore ways of increasing women's income. Only two activities were designed primarily to provide services for women.

TABLE 13
CATEGORIES OF WID ACTIVITIES

<u>Country and Activity</u>	<u>Studies</u>	<u>Services</u>	<u>Agricultural Production</u>	<u>Other Income Generation</u>	<u>Education & Training</u>
<u>Chad</u>					
.01 Village Women's Project					X
.06 Training of Farm Women for Increased Agricultural Production					X
.09 Earning While Learning				X	X
<u>Ghana</u>					
*.03 Ghana YWCA Day Care Center		X			
<u>Liberia</u>					
.11 Profile of Liberian Women	X				
<u>Senegal</u>					
*.04 Kassack-Nord Women in Senegal River Region			X		
*.07 Casamance Vegetable Growers			X		X
*.10 Tivaoune Women's Project		X	X	X	
<u>Sierra Leone</u>					
*.02 Gara Cloth Industry	X			X	
<u>Togo</u>					
.12 Lakara Skills Development	X				X
<u>Upper Volta</u>					
*.05 Vegetal Tannin and Silkworm Production	X				
*.08 Nonformal Education -- Women in the Sahel	X				
<u>Revised Project</u>					
<u>Kenya</u>					
.13 Rural Women's Extension Service			X		
.15 Partnership For Productivity: WID OPG				X	X
<u>Togo/Guinea/Zaire</u>					
.14 Training of Trainers in Management Seminar					X
No. of activities	5	2	4	4	7

*Denotes activities evaluated in 1980.

C. Results Obtained

Jeffalyn Johnson & Associates, Inc. evaluated seven of the WID activities in early 1980. The following excerpt from their report of April 1980 summarizes their findings as they relate to the asterisked activities in Table 13:

Not one of the projects has been totally successful but most could be salvaged with the appropriate funding, technical assistance, management and monitoring. There has been enthusiastic reception of project activities that succeeded. Women have taken advantage of new training programs. They have discovered how to work together in cooperative structure. They attend literacy classes and take courses in hygiene and maternal health care. The enthusiasm of the women is the best answer to the question. These projects improve the welfare of women when they are viable. When they falter or fail, they are of little benefit to anyone, but the failure is not the fault of the women.

Of the three WID activities in Chad, one had hardly begun before the AID withdrawal. According to reports in the files in AID/W, the Village Women's Project had been overly ambitious and had to be reduced in scope. However, it was effective within its limited purpose and women in other villages were requesting a training center in their village. One of the centers established under the Earning While Learning activity was successful in producing and marketing handcrafted items in spite of increasing internal security problems.

Although the activity Profile of Liberian Women has been plagued with implementation problems (see Annex B), the study was nearing completion at the time of the evaluation team's visit at the end of January 1982. The study is expected to provide information which will be useful in the design of rural development projects in Liberia. In addition, it should offer specific proposals for follow-on activities to support WID objectives in Liberia.

The LaKara Skills Development activity has also been plagued with problems, but it has some useful activities underway in northern Togo. The U.S. PVO's incountry representative has learned what can be effective. If the PVO, USAID, and the host country can agree on a revised design and resolve some long-standing issues, a successful activity is still possible -- albeit expensive because of poor design of the activity and overhead payments to the PVO which are excessive in terms of the degree of field support which the PVO has provided.

Of the two more recent activities in Kenya, the mission is pleased with the progress of activity .13 under which the PVO Partnership for Productivity is promoting and supporting women entrepreneurs. The mission is concerned that the Rural Women's Extension Service activity is overloading an already burdened home economics staff in the Ministry of Agriculture; success is not assured.

The seminar held in Togo for ten women from each of the participating countries (Togo, Guinea, and Zaire) appears to have led to the successful launching of enterprises in Zaire and Guinea. The evaluation team did not obtain any information on the follow-on activities of the Togolese participants.

D. Common Threads of Success or Problems

The Jeffalyn Johnson evaluators found a close correlation between the extent of local participation and the degree of success of the activity. Activities that lack community support are not viable. That is generally true of most activities carried out in rural areas, but it seems worth emphasizing in the case of WID. Women's organizations in the United States and in the capital city of the participating country do not necessarily know any more about what village women need and want than the male-dominated donor organizations which usually design local projects, and the women's organizations will probably have less experience and training in project design. The common problems cited in the Johnson evaluation include the following:

- Some of the projects were seriously lacking in local support and participation.
- Host country initiative, interest, and commitment were spotty.
- Project design was so inadequate as to be nonexistent in one activity and defective in others.
- There were no market studies conducted prior to the implementation of the income-generating activities.
- The absence of the baseline data resulted in weakened design, called into question the validity of projections, and seriously restricted the measurability of activity results.

- Activity goals and objectives were unrealistically ambitious in relation to funding and life of the activity.
- Activity design did not build in evaluation procedures.
- Implementation was significantly limited by the lateness and inadequacy of inputs, weak management, and the lack of technical assistance, particularly in marketing, management, and mechanical skills.
- Closer monitoring of inputs and management was needed.
- Activities or inputs to activities which are expensive (American-made) or mechanically complex were generally inappropriate.

Only three activities have been approved since the Johnson evaluation, and one of these was a six-week seminar. Of the other two activities, it appears that Rural Women's Extension Service may be suffering from some of the problems cited in the Johnson report.

The Johnson report also suggests that USAIDs have not given WID activities the same priority as other projects. In part, this is probably due to the smaller size of these activities because the same phenomenon occurs in some missions with IRTs and AIPs. In addition, the evaluation team found that some missions felt that WID activities had been "shoved down their throats" -- in some cases because the activity was proposed by a stateside PVO. Theoretically, this problem was overcome with the new guidelines established in the revised project in 1980. The Kenya mission is not so sure, although it has successfully rejected one proposal that originated stateside.

Some AID/W personnel suggested to the evaluation team that a separate WID project was no longer needed, because WID objectives will be met only through projects which integrate WID concerns. All AID officers should be sensitive to WID issues by now -- the Percy Amendment dates from 1973. The team discussed this issue in the field and concluded that there are still some AID officers who are either not sensitive to WID issues or believe that AID should not be "fooling around with such sensitive issues." Even if AID officers are sensitive to WID concerns, this generally is not reflected in project design unless there is a woman on the design team. REDSO officers also observed that WID components, even when included in project design, usually were not implemented unless there was a woman on the implementation or technical assistance team.

The evaluation team concluded, therefore, that there still is a need for further sensitization of AID officers to WID concerns and greater knowledge on how to deal with those concerns. The use of regional WID funds to finance additional studies of the roles of family members in the village would help. Furthermore, there is need for studies of the results of regular bilateral projects which focus specifically on family roles. Most project evaluations do not adequately consider changing family relationships and other WID concerns. A stronger WID component in the development studies program and project design and evaluation course is needed.

The continued availability of WID funding is needed for institution-building activities (e.g., to support a women's bureau in a government ministry of women's organizations) when these cannot be incorporated in regular bilateral projects. Continued availability of special funding for WID concerns does not imply the necessity to maintain a WID project. On the contrary, field personnel (including female WID officers) are generally antagonistic to a WID project as such. It appears to raise hackles unnecessarily and tends to be counterproductive to WID objectives.

E. Peace Corps Participation and Collaboration

According to information in the AID/W files, Peace Corps Volunteers (PCVs) have been assigned to only two WID activities: Earning While Learning in Chad and Rural Women's Extension Service in Kenya. However, PCVs are unofficially involved in LaKara Skills Development Training in Togo. A request for PCV assignment to the activity is under consideration. An evaluation of the Village Women's Project in Chad notes in its "lessons learned" section that the activity would have been strengthened by PCV participation.

Peace Corps has supported WID objectives in other ways. The Peace Corps Country Director in Liberia has been a member of the Steering Committee for the WID activity Profile of Liberian Women. Often the PCVs carry out WID-type activities as part of self-help projects financed from AID funds provided through the Embassy. PCVs have also been involved in IRT activities which were essentially of a WID type.

F. Project and Activity Management

During the period of the original project, AID/W was very active in project management. The AFR/RA project officer made trips to the field to promote WID activity. AID/W approved the project papers. In some cases, the grants were made to U.S. organizations.

Under the revised project, the field mission is responsible for approving the project paper and is clearly responsible for managing and/or monitoring the activity.

The evaluation team suggests that the AFR/RA project officer maintain a current list of WID activities with basic information on their approval, obligation, and evaluation.

The Johnson evaluation report suggested that missions were lax in monitoring and supporting WID activities and gave them low priority. The evaluation team also found evidence of that, particularly in larger missions. It is difficult to determine whether this attitude is any more serious with WID than with IRT and AIP. In any case, more active follow-up from AID/W should lead to improved USAID monitoring. Retransmission of WID guidelines and provision of information on new activities or activity accomplishments could also stimulate interest in WID concerns. This seems to have lagged since 1980.

ANNEX A

SCOPE OF WORK

EVALUATION OF ACCELERATED IMPACT PROGRAM, IMPROVED RURAL TECHNOLOGY, WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

A. Issues

The evaluation of the Accelerated Impact Program (AIP), Improved Rural Technology (IRT), and Women in Development (WID) projects will address the following issues:

- How are AIP, IRT, and WID subprojects used by Missions? Do they reinforce a Mission's country development strategy or is there a tendency to use them as ad hoc funding mechanisms with no particular reference to CDSS priorities?
- Is there a continuing need for small experimental projects in Africa? How do small projects compare with larger bilateral efforts in meeting Missions' programming priorities? Does the usefulness of small projects have a relationship to the size (small or large) of a Mission's program?
- In general, are IRT, AIP, and WID subprojects self-sustaining and replicable? What are the recurrent cost implications? Have there been or will there be spin-offs?
- Identify and describe common threads of success or problems running through subprojects which will guide AFR/RA and Missions in design and implementation of any future activities. In particular, were there important technological/engineering and/or sociological considerations affecting implementation which were neglected during design?
- Do AIP, IRT, and WID offer relatively rapid means of designing, approving and implementing subprojects? How do they compare to regular bilateral activities for speed and ease of design and implementation? What is the qualitative difference, if any?
- Do AIP, IRT, and WID subprojects require less AID/W and Mission support than bilateral activities? In this regard, attention should be paid to commodity procurement, technical assistance, recruitment and contracting.
- If the three projects are combined, what would be the most sensible upper funding limit for subactivities? How should approval procedures be modified? Should there be specific areas of emphasis or should the amalgamated project be broad and flexible? If the former, give recommendations as to areas of emphasis.
- To what extent has Peace Corps involvement been present? Has it been successful?

- For IRT, assess the effectiveness of a need for contractor assistance as provided by Experience, Inc. A separate evaluation of the Experience, Inc. contract was performed in May 1981 and should be drawn upon for analysis of this issue. Two key points merit special attention:
 - Has contractor assistance substantially improved design of second generation IRTs, compared with their predecessors (for which no outside help was available)?
 - To what extent can the current high demand by Missions for IRTs be attributed to the quick availability of no-cost (to the Mission) contractor assistance in the design phase?

B. Evaluation of Subactivities

AFR/RA, in consultation with Missions and Experience, Inc., will select AIP and IRT subprojects to be evaluated and will arrange for contractor visits.

Exhaustive and detailed description of the inner workings of subprojects is not the goal of these evaluations. While the contractor should examine the extent to which subprojects have attained their goals and the reasons for success or failure, the thrust of subproject evaluations should be to contribute to the broad picture as delineated in Part A above. In fact, the issues set out in Part A should serve as an outline for points to be covered in subproject evaluations.

ANNEX B

REPORT OF FIELD VISIT

LIBERIA

January 26-31, 1982

The evaluation team reviewed the following activities in Liberia:

AIP Activity 698-0410.28	Zero-tillage Agriculture
AIP Activity 698-0410.26	Expanded Program for Immunization
IRT Activity 698-0407.07	Mini-Hydroelectric Project
IRT Activity 698-0407.02	Fired Clay Brick and Building Materials
WID Activity 698-0388.11	Profile of Liberian Women

In conducting its review, the team talked with a number of the USAID staff and with the Peace Corps Country Director. The evaluation team did not make any field visits because of the distances involved, the state of Liberian roads, the cost of chartered air travel and the limited amount of time available. No discussions were held with Liberian project personnel for a variety of reasons: controversy and delicate negotiations in the WID project, the upcoming evaluations of the Mini-Hydroelectric and Expanded Immunization Program activities, and the general political turmoil existing during most of the team's visit. The USAID was closed one afternoon because of rioting in Monrovia.

The reviews were designed to provide the team with information needed to evaluate the overall projects; there was no attempt to evaluate specific activities. Summaries of the team's findings for each of the activities reviewed is provided below. The Evaluation Team Observations and Field Views sections relate particularly to the nine issues raised in the evaluation team's scope of work (Annex A) Special country situations are discussed under Observations.

Evaluation Team Observations

All of the activities reviewed have been adversely affected in varying degree by the coup of April 12, 1980 and the preceding and continuing political unrest. Most of the activities have also been adversely affected by the economic and financial crisis which has prevailed in Liberia during the past two years.

The Women in Development (WID) activity has been seriously affected by the political developments and climate because of political overtones from its inception. Some Liberians have charged that the activity was designed by the United States and forced on the Liberians. The president of the Liberian Federation of Women's Organizations, which proposed and sponsored the activity, occupied a high political position under the power structure which was overthrown in 1980. Responsibility for implementation of the activity was transferred by the new government to the University of Liberia, which itself is hardly a politics-free institution.

In spite of the political problems and controversy which have surrounded the WID activity, the information being developed should be very useful for designers of rural development, food production and marketing projects, be they from USAID, the

Government of Liberia or other donors. The team's impression was that the information was needed to sensitize some USAID personnel to women's role in, and potential contributions to, agricultural development.

The AIP and IRT activities also are related to the USAID assistance strategy and program. The Zero-tillage Agriculture activity is designed to test a system of rice cultivation. If technically, economically and socially feasible, the new system would become an important component of the country's agricultural strategy and program. Both the Mini-Hydroelectric and the Fired Clay Brick and Building Materials activities could be potentially very important to Liberian rural development, particularly the mini-hydroelectric activity. Liberia has a large number of small streams descending from the eastern highlands which provide many potential mini-hydro sites. The Expanded Program for Immunization is a fore-runner for a USAID project now in the design stage.

All of the activities have had implementation problems. As indicated previously, the coup and related political and economic difficulties have been a major contributing factor to these problems. Other factors have also been involved. Logistical and managerial requirements appear to have been underestimated, particularly in Zero-tillage Agriculture and the WID Profile of Liberian Women. Although a small project, the Mini-Hydroelectric activity is very technical and a more continuous technical input probably would have been beneficial.

There has been direct Peace Corps involvement only in the Mini-Hydroelectric activity. In fact, a Peace Corps Volunteer (PCV) was the initiator of the project in conjunction with the villages involved. The Peace Corps has stationed replacement PCVs at the activity site and has plans to maintain PCVs there through 1984. The Peace Corps has also had an indirect relationship with the WID activity through membership of the Peace Corps Country Director on the activity's steering committee. It is premature to state whether Peace Corps involvement has been successful. Since Peace Corps has a PCV serving full time as a WID officer and another PCV with appropriate technology experience and training, closer working relations in these two areas could be beneficial to both Peace Corps and USAID.

The USAID and Peace Corps experience with the IRT contractor (Experience, Inc.) was not a good one. The contractor's first visit was shortly after the IRT project had been approved and the firm's guidelines included a certain amount of promotion of the IRT concept and the new project. Unfortunately, the rules established for the project initially involved AID/Washington much more in the design and approval process than was anticipated by the field and more than was indicated by the IRT contractor. Thus, USAID became very disenchanted with the IRT process and even more so with the IRT contractor. The latter was considered to be the main stumbling block to obtaining AID/Washington approval. Experience, Inc. personnel were declared persona non grata in Liberia by the USAID Director. The evaluation team believes that USAID's concerns have been largely alleviated by the revision in the IRT process and the contractor's scope of work. It is time to be more open-minded on the possibility of using the IRT contractor to review past activities (e.g., Fired Clay Brick and Building Materials) and thereby save the time of mission staff.

Field Views

Both USAID and Peace Corps feel that there is a need for a continuation of a funding source for financing small projects, particularly of an IRT type. The USAID Director prefers a mechanism by which he would know that a certain amount was

available to the mission each year (up to \$500,000) without having to go through an AID/Washington approval process. In that case, he would work with the Peace Corps Country Director in establishing a joint committee to plan the use of the funds, procedures for obligating and disbursing funds, and implementation procedures.

The Peace Corps Director cited the availability of appropriate technology and WID PCVs, as well as local Peace Corps planning staff, to indicate Peace Corps' ability to utilize a larger amount of funds constructively. Potential areas of activity include building technology, including stoves and latrines, gardening, water supply, market places, beehives, and palm oil presses for the use of village women. The WID contractor's suggestions included rice mills for village women, vegetable production and processing, and food preservation.

Because of the problems previously cited, neither USAID nor Peace Corps saw the IRT, AIP and WID mechanisms as offering relatively rapid means of designing, approving and implementing activities. They had become so disenchanted with their initial efforts that they had not taken cognizance of the new procedures. Some of the USAID staff were discouraged at having to go through the process of getting waivers for Code 935 procurement for small purchases (e.g., \$2,000-\$3,000).

USAID officers felt that activity management and monitoring requirements were little less than that for much larger projects, certainly out of proportion to the dollar amounts involved.

Review of Individual Activities

The evaluation team's review of the individual activities follows.

ZERO-TILLAGE AGRICULTURE

AIP Activity Number	698-0410.28
Country	Liberia
Funding	
AID	\$253,000
Liberia	\$145,000
	Total
	<u>\$398,000</u>
AID Approval	December 11, 1980
Grant Agreement	December 24, 1980
Planned Activity Completion Date	June 30, 1983

This activity proposes to test the technical, economic, and social feasibility of the zero-tillage upland rice production system under demonstration and farm conditions. Using chemicals, fertilizers, and small farming implements, the system does not turn or dislocate the fragile tropical top soil. Field trials are to be carried out in each of Liberia's nine counties -- two plots in each county.

The activity is experimental in nature. Zero tillage has been tested at the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA) in Nigeria with yields five times higher than traditional upland rice yields. If the zero-tillage system can be successfully adapted to Liberian agricultural, economic, and social conditions, projections indicate a threefold increase in production accompanied by a more than 40 percent reduction in the labor required to plant and harvest a crop.

Relation to USAID Program

The project is self-contained; however, other USAID projects such as the Agriculture Sector Study, Agriculture Research Project, and the Agricultural Extension Development Program will provide data during the field trials, the framework within which results will be evaluated, and the means to disseminate the results of the trials. It is planned that the Liberian Agricultural Research Institute absorb the activity when the Institute is in a position to handle the trials.

Results

The first year field trials have not provided data which contribute toward achieving the activity's purpose. Of a proposed 18 demonstration plots, 3 were established. The yields were not recorded on two of the demonstration plots because of technician error. The two farmers who participated in the project used the herbicides and fertilizer which the zero-tillage method requires, but the rice seed was broadcast in the traditional manner. They achieved a high yield in a lowland irrigated area.

The poor results of the first year's field trials may be attributed in part to a number of implementation problems:

- Planting cycle. Planting was scheduled to begin in late February or early March to take advantage of Liberia's rainfall pattern. Planting did not begin until July because of delay in delivery of equipment and commodities. The plots are widely dispersed throughout Liberia and logistic problems are great. Roads become impassable because of the rains. The activity has

sufficient equipment and supplies on hand this year to begin planting as scheduled.

- Offshore commodity orders. These must be placed in January to ensure availability when needed. Orders for the first year were placed in February and March.
- Late delivery of equipment. Planting was delayed until July because of late delivery of rice planters. These planters are produced under a Partnership for Productivity Foundation (PFP) project in Liberia. They are custom made as the Nigerian model had to be adapted to Liberian terrain. Twenty planters were ordered; apparently because of a misunderstanding only six were delivered. The project began its first season with seven planters -- the Nigerian model plus the six produced by PFP. An additional three planters are scheduled for delivery in 1982. The second season will begin with 9 planters plus the Nigerian model.
- Plot size. As originally planned, the experimental plots were to be 12 acres in size. These plots have now been reduced to 1/2 - 1/4 acre in part because of insufficient equipment to plant the larger areas.
- Personnel. The activity specifies that Ministry of Agriculture personnel conduct trials at the test sites in the nine counties. The Ministry staff is technically qualified; however, management problems are evident. Personnel assigned to the sites have no per diem, no transportation, and their pay is late by at least three weeks each month. They leave the test sites and come to Monrovia in search of their salary checks. USAID has now assigned a project officer to assist in managing the activity.
- Seeds. Seeds for the first year trials were supplied by the Ministry of Agriculture. These seeds had a germination rate of 50 percent; only 30 pounds of seed were planted per hectare as opposed to the 60 pounds which were planned. Seeds for this year's trials have been ordered from the West African Rice Development Association (WARDA).
- Soil testing. The first year's trials were carried out without benefit of soil testing. Arrangements for soil testing have been made for this year.

Comment

Although the activity calls for testing the technical, economic and social feasibility of zero tillage of rice, no action has yet been initiated to test either the economic or social feasibility. Economic considerations would appear to be particularly crucial. Under the traditional system of rice planting in Liberia, the greatest expenditure involved is time. The zero tillage system requires chemicals, herbicides, and fertilizer as a minimum investment; it requires a rice planter to be fully operational. The cost of supplies and equipment may well prove prohibitive. Marketing has not been investigated. There are no grain storage facilities and no transportation to market. There are also problems created by government pricing policies.

Dr. Frances Stier, REDSO/West Africa informed the evaluation team during its Abidjan stop that IITA had concluded that it was not feasible to utilize the zero-tillage system in Nigeria. The team suggests that USAID Liberia query Dr. Stier and/or IITA on the latest developments in Nigeria. The results there may suggest

a modification of the activity's implementation plan--or possibly termination of the activity.

The rationale for the widely scattered test plots is technically valid in that this would provide data on soil conditions and yields in diverse areas. This rationale should be weighed against the logistics problems involved. A smaller number of test plots accessible to closer supervision may be necessary to provide sufficient usable data to test the technical feasibility of the method in any area. The project officer conceded the logic of reducing the scope, but felt that USAID could not do so without AID concurrence to an amendment to the grant agreement, and achieving this would take up time needed for implementing the activity. The evaluation team believes that it would not be necessary to seek AID concurrence in this case: AID could be informed in an airgram transmitting the report of the first year's results.

EXPANDED PROGRAM FOR IMMUNIZATION

AIP Activity Number	698-0410.26
Country	Liberia
Funding	
AID	\$498,000
Liberia	\$628,000
Other Donor	\$200,000
Total	<u>\$1,326,000</u>
AID Approval	March 25, 1980
Grant Agreement	July 2, 1980
Planned Activity Completion Date	September 30, 1982

This activity provides technical assistance and commodities to expand and improve the present Liberian immunization program. USAID provides technical assistance in developing and coordinating a training program for health personnel, a method of evaluating the work of the health service units, and training for maintenance personnel.

Relation to USAID Program

The activity was designed to act as a transition to a proposed USAID Primary Health Care Project. Documentation for this project was prepared and submitted to AID in July and August 1981. At the time of this review, the project had not been approved.

Problems

- External. The activity encountered problems which were the result of conditions in Liberia:
 - The 1980 coup which delayed operations for security reasons,
 - A political mandate to provide immunizations for the entire country instead of the six counties originally planned,
 - A decision to change the operational focus from mobile units to clinics.
- Internal. Initiation of the activity and early operations were delayed because of difficulties encountered in:
 - Contract negotiation to obtain the services of a technical advisor,
 - Offshore commodity procurement.

Comment

Two factors tend to obscure the future of this activity: its relationship to

- The proposed USAID Primary Health Care Project and whether provision has been made to integrate the activity,
- The proposed Combating Childhood Communicable Diseases (CCCD) regional project.

MINI-HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT

IRT Activity Number	698-0407.07
Country	Liberia
Funding	
AID	\$70,000
Liberian government	\$20,000
Community	\$17,035
Total	<u>\$107,035</u>
AID Approval	February 28, 1980
Grant Agreement	September 16, 1980
Planned Activity Completion Date	September 30, 1982

This activity calls for the installation of a 25-30 kw mini-hydroelectric power plant and distribution system for the village of Yandohum, Lofa County, Liberia. It is intended as an experimental project to assess the economic, social, and developmental impact of mini-hydroelectric units in rural Liberia.

Relation to USAID Program

There are a large number of streams flowing from the eastern highlands through the rural areas of Liberia, providing a large number of potential mini-hydroelectric sites. Thus, mini-hydroelectric developments, if feasible, could provide an important catalyst to the accelerated development of many rural areas of Liberia, including counties receiving USAID assistance.

Evolution of Activity

September 1979: USAID cable to AID describes high degree of community interest in the activity and presents preliminary technical aspects to determine feasibility for funding.

February 29, 1980: AID approves activity paper.

April 1980: Engineering services for activity requested. Engineering plan prepared and submitted, May-June 1980.

August 25, 1980: AID approves IEE.

September 16, 1980: Limited Scope Grant Agreement signed approximately one year after activity identification cable sent to AID.

January 1981: Amendment provides an additional \$20,000 to make a total AID contribution of \$70,000.

October 1981: Liberian Electric Company questions soundness of dam construction in progress.

February 1982: NRECA evaluation scheduled to resolve engineering issues.

Comment

- Both USAID and the Peace Corps experienced frustration at the length of time required for AID approval and the amount of work involved. IRT had been promoted in Liberia as a quick-response mechanism. It may be that specific guidance is needed for mini-hydroelectric activities: Small does not necessarily equate simple.
- The activity has a high level of community support and should be carried out as expeditiously as possible. Peace Corps has pledged support to the activity through 1984.
- The process of activity conception, development, and implementation should be documented. USAID should request the Peace Corps in Liberia to provide copies of reports on the activity by Peace Corps volunteers for transmittal to the IRT contractor.
- The activity paper calls for evaluation but does not specify an evaluation plan. This project will provide valuable "lessons learned." USAID should ensure that an evaluation takes place at an appropriate interval after the physical completion of the activity.
- Given the potential importance of this activity to Liberian development -- and possibly development strategy -- USAID should be prepared to provide additional support to this activity, if needed, to give it a fair chance to succeed and to collect and disseminate "lessons learned." Such lessons relate to the degree and type of planning needed, implementation problems to be avoided or dealt with, and post-construction requirements.

FIRED CLAY BRICK AND BUILDING MATERIALS

IRT Activity Number	698-0407.02
Country	Liberia
Funding	
AID	\$50,000
Liberia	\$15,000
Grantee	\$10,000
	\$75,000
Total	
AID Approval	September 2, 1979
Grant Agreement	September 29, 1979
Planned Activity Completion Date	September 1, 1980

This project proposed to establish

- One semi-mechanized building materials enterprise which would make bricks for low-cost housing projects sponsored by two mining companies in rural Liberia;
- Three nonmechanized small-scale brick and fired clay enterprises to provide materials for constructing houses, schools, clinics, rice-drying facilities in rural Liberia.

Relation to USAID Program

The activity was planned as an experimental undertaking to be carried out under a grant to the Partnership for Productivity Foundation (PFP). It was to provide data for a large-scale rural development project for which PFP received a five-year Operational Program Grant (OPG).

Evolution of Activity

October 1979: Grantee requests urgently advance of funds to permit immediate start-up of activity.

December 1979: USAID provides advance of \$29,965.

April 1980: USAID requests status report. Grantee responds that nothing has taken place because of failure of Liberian-American Mining Company to move claymixer extruder to site which PFP had selected. Extruder moved to site during 1980. Approximately 1,000 bricks produced.

December 1981: PFP requests balance of grant to undertake a new activity. Grantee states that USAID project officer had been informed that it was not possible to proceed with activity as planned and that project officer had concurred in suspension of activity.

Comment

- The grant agreement provides that the grantee submit quarterly progress reports and statements on use of AID funds. No reports have been submitted. Two letters have given information on developments, but these were submitted only after requests from USAID.
- The revised IRT guidelines provide that USAID submit a PES on each activity completed within 18 months or less. No PES or other report has been submitted to AID on this activity.
- The grantee has stated that it was not possible to go forward with the project because the mine worker's union rejected the mining companies' proposal for low-cost housing. This indeed may be ample reason for discontinuing the large-scale mechanized brickmaking activity. It does not explain the decision not to go ahead with the three nonmechanized activities. Since perhaps 1,000 bricks were produced by the large extruder, there should have been an opportunity to test local acceptance of the bricks as well as determine production costs.
- According to the budget attached to the activity paper, PFP was to pay (or arrange for payment from Liberian sources) transportation for all equipment plus contractor services for site preparation. PFP's initial request for an advance which USAID paid, included \$3,000 for transport of the mixer-extruder, transport for mixer-extruder parts (no separate figure) and \$5,900 for contractor services. In addition, the payment of \$2,500 for activity management and supervision was probably excessive because PFP was to be paid for only 55 percent of this category according to the grant agreement. Thus, the USAID controller's office, which did not have a file for this activity, appears to have provided PFP between \$8,400 and \$10,275 in excess of the amount to which the grantee was entitled.
- USAID monitoring appears to have been minimal and not properly documented. In the more recent period, this apparently was due to the fact that the project officer was unfamiliar with the IRT guidelines and thought the activity was an OPG for which AID/W was responsible.

Recommendations

- That the grantee be required to provide an accounting for the AID funds and requested to reimburse any amounts used for items not covered under the budget included in the grant agreement.
- That the grantee be required to submit a full report on the activity, including reasons for abandoning the activity and providing a "lessons learned" section.
- That USAID submit a report to AID/W explaining the situation and advising AID/W of action taken.
- That USAID review its system for monitoring activities, including particularly reporting requirements and project and activity completion dates.

PROFILE OF LIBERIAN WOMEN

WID Activity Number	698-0388.11
Country	Liberia
Funding	
AID	\$203,000
Liberia	\$92,000
	<u>Total</u>
	\$295,000
AID Authorization	March 9, 1979
Grant Agreement	March 31, 1979
Planned Activity Completion Date	October 31, 1981
Extension	March 31, 1982

This activity proposes to provide basic social and economic data on Liberian women for use in development planning. It consists of two phases:

Phase 1: Review of literature and statistics in United States and Liberia, collection of publications in a document center in Liberia, and a report which summarizes the review and identifies three areas of intensive research.

Phase 2: Completion of three intensive research studies and a final report which incorporates research results and recommends two discrete projects for development and implementation.

The profile focuses on rural women who engage in subsistence agriculture, cash cropping, and marketing.

Relation to USAID Program

The data collected under this activity are intended for use by the Liberian Government and development agencies, including USAID, in planning development projects. The data should be especially relevant to USAID's integrated rural development projects, current and projected.

Results

- A core library of development literature has been established at the University of Liberia.
- The report on the first phase scheduled for publication in April 1980 was not submitted. The activity steering committee, consisting of representatives of the Peace Corps, Liberian Government, and USAID, agreed to its inclusion in the final report to ensure that field work for the intensive research studies could be carried out during the dry season.
- Three areas for intensive research were identified: women's roles in agriculture and marketing and women's legal status.
- The final report is in draft status, its publication delayed by the project coordinator's rejection of the project director's marketing study. The

activity steering committee is scheduled to meet in early February to resolve the issues.

Problems

- Political situation. This activity has been directly affected by the coup of April 12, 1980 and current political conditions, more so than any activity reviewed in this section. The Liberian Federation of Women's Organizations, sponsor of the study, was dissolved after the coup. The University of Liberia which subsequently was assigned responsibility for the activity, was and remains a center of political unrest. Riots and the closing of the university in April and May 1979 delayed start-up of the activity. The project vehicle was confiscated during the coup and returned damaged, thus further delaying data collection.
- Staff disagreement. The project coordinator, a U.S. national whose PhD dissertation research was carried out in Liberia and who has taught at the university is responsible for the final report. She has rejected the study prepared by the Liberian project director on the basis of his methodological approach.

Comment

- The activity has been plagued by administrative and logistic problems and inadequate high-level attention since its beginning. The Liberian project director and member of the university staff faced the logistic and administrative problems of carrying out research and, at the same time, meeting his responsibilities at the university. Unsettled conditions in Liberia have required the attention of high-level officials in the government and at the university. USAID representation on the activity steering committee was at the assistant program officer level while Liberian representation was at the level of minister or assistant minister and vice-chancellor of the University. The steering committee met irregularly in the early stages of the activity.
- The deterioration of relations between the project director and the project coordinator was almost inevitable given the structure of the activity, i.e., the project director was in charge of the project, yet he was undertaking research to be reviewed by the project coordinator and integrated into her final report. He, in turn, would be reviewing the project coordinator's final report.

ANNEX C

REPORT OF FIELD VISIT

TOGO

February 1 - 4, 1982

The evaluation team reviewed the following activities in Togo:

AIP Activity 698-0410.18	Animal Traction
IRT Activity 698-0407.03	Primary School Agricultural Education
IRT Activity 698-0407.09	Rural Solar Technology
IRT Activity 698-0407.20	Exploitation of Spring Water, Canton Lavie
IRT Activity 698-0407.26	Farming Skills Development
WID Activity 698-0388.12	LaKara Skills Development Training

In conducting the review, the evaluation team talked with members of the staff of the Office of the AID Representative (OAR) and of the Peace Corps, Peace Corps Volunteers (PCV) and Togolese who are working with the activities. The team visited three activities: Exploitation of Spring Water, Canton Lavie, Farming Skills Development, Woume in rural Togo and Rural Solar Technology at the Solar Energy Laboratory, Science School, University of Benin, Lome.

Evaluation Team Observations

The AID program in Togo is under the direction of the Office of the AID Representative. The Peace Corps is an important source of personnel for AID projects and activities. At the time of the team's visit, OAR was planning assignment to its sanitation project of PCVs who had left Benin because of the unexpected suspension of the Peace Corps program in that country.

PCVs have worked with the AIP activity and with three of the four IRT activities. They are unofficially involved with the WID activity. Their official assignment is under consideration. PCVs had been working with animal traction in northern Togo for two years prior to the time of the AID grant for this AIP activity. A PCV manages the IRT Spring Water Exploitation, Canton Lavie. She supervises construction, orders supplies and equipment, coordinates the work of the villagers, and administers the budget. A PCV will help instruct the villagers in use of the new water system and sanitation. At the time of the IRT grant for Primary School Agricultural Education, PCVs had been working with the program for four years. PCVs are now assigned to Farming Skills Development which introduces a higher level of agricultural education in secondary schools. Peace Corps participation is an integral part of the AID program in Togo.

These AIP, IRT, and WID activities contribute to rural development which is the most important component of the AID program. The agricultural education activities are designed to introduce young rural Togolese to agriculture as a source of income as well as nutrition. The high level of urban unemployment in Togo is in part the result of rural-to-urban migration which is greater than the urban economy can absorb. Animal Traction proposes to increase agricultural production by teaching farmers to use oxen for ploughing, cultivating, and hauling and providing the facilities for obtaining the oxen. Rural Solar Energy is more experimental in nature than the other activities. The solar water heaters which have

been developed and in use in three clinics. The solar grain driers have not yet been installed. Solar energy is Togo's most abundant natural resource. The results of these experiments can be important not only for Togo but for other developing countries. The WID activity LaKara Skills Development Training proposes to teach remunerative skills to rural women and educate them in nutrition.

The AID and IRT activities have experienced few implementation problems; however, Animal Traction spent two years in the design phase before obtaining AID approval -- this, although it was a Peace Corps project at the time of the request for AID assistance.

As pointed out in the 1981 evaluation of LaKara Skills Development Training, the activity was an early attempt by AID not only to view women as the specific target group, but also to work with national women's organizations as the implementing agencies. The National Union of Togolese Women is a well-established group of influential women. Women also occupy positions of influence in the Ministry of Social Welfare and Women's Resources. Funding the activity under two grant agreements -- one with the government and the other with the PVO, National Council of Negro Women (NCNW) -- has led to difficulty in defining areas of responsibility with consequent managerial problems which have not been resolved. Other problems which have become evident since the activity began indicate that LaKara Skills Training Development was undertaken with too little knowledge of the interests of the women for which it was planned and of the pattern of their daily lives.

OAR experience with the IRT contractor, Experience, Inc., has been favorable. The contractor's engineering consultant prepared the activity paper for Exploitation of Spring Water, Canton Lavie.

Field View

The AID Representative believes that for the smaller missions a regional funding source for small projects is essential. The fund should be multiyear with a minimum of administrative procedures. AID will then be in a position to respond when an appropriate opportunity presents itself and while the host government's enthusiasm for the undertaking is high. In the AID Representative's experience, timeliness of a response is more important than its magnitude.

The AID Representative believes that rural development in Togo is best carried out in small diversified activities. Experimental undertakings are also important. He finds that there are serious drawbacks to large integrated rural development projects in the amount of time required to design them, managerial problems that develop, and host country participating agencies not being equally enthusiastic about all components of the project.

The AID Representative felt that collaboration with Peace Corps was essential for a small mission like Togo. Such collaboration requires speedy action on the part of AID in project approval or PCVs may have to be reassigned to other activities. He felt delayed approval of the AIP and earlier IRTs was due to a proclivity of AID/W officers to be overly concerned with the content of project documents and not sufficiently familiar with local conditions. In addition, too much time is spent reviewing project designs and not enough in searching for ways to improve project management.

The Peace Corps Country Director and his staff believe that a funding mechanism which is flexible and permits a rapid response is an important part of developmental assistance. AIP and IRT have proved valuable funding sources; however, the Director feels that higher funding levels and a longer timeframe in which to carry out an activity would increase their usefulness.

The Director would like help from AID in training Peace Corps staff and selected PCVs in AID's project development and implementation processes. Peace Corps is able to give training to its PCVs related to their expected assignments, but often it would be beneficial to include the Togolese counterparts in such training programs. However, Peace Corps is not permitted to fund their participation. Therefore, the Director suggests that AID provide funding for the counterparts.

The Peace Corps receives small grants from the Ambassador's self-help fund, but these do not obviate the need for IRT and AIP project support. The self-help grants are quite small and used only for small infrastructure activities in an amount of \$2,000 to \$3,000 maximum. They are considered pre-IRT grants.

The Peace Corps staff also proposed that follow-on IRT activities be permitted. An initial grant may demonstrate the effectiveness of a proposed innovation, but it will require a follow-on project to provide the necessary training and orientation to institutionalize the innovation. In a small country such as Togo, this does not necessarily require a larger project. In fact, it might well be a more effective strategy to have a number of small grants rather than one large one.

Peace Corps would favor more flexibility in commodity waivers. On one IRT, Peace Corps felt that they received too much technical input.

The project coordinator of the WID activity, LaKara Skills Development Training, believes that too many WID activities in Africa have been designed without benefit of participation by anyone who has worked with African women and that AID lacks understanding of local problems. The major problem with WID activities, however, is that they are undertaken in response to Congressional pressure and that they are assigned a low priority in implementation.

Despite the difficulties that she has encountered in carrying out the WID activity in Togo, she feels that Togo with its well-established women's organization and women in government is an excellent country for a WID activity.

Review of Individual Activities

The evaluation team's review of the individual activities follows.

ANIMAL TRACTION

AIP Activity Number	698-0410.18
Country	Togo
Funding	
AID	\$500,000
Togo	\$125,000
Total	\$625,000
AID Approval	November 22, 1978
Grant Agreement	April 2, 1979
Planned Activity Completion Date	April 2, 1982
Extension	June 30, 1982

This activity proposes to promote animal traction by helping 60 to 80 farmers increase their agricultural production from less than 2 hectares to 5 hectares per family farm. The method proposes to test an appropriate technology on a sufficient scale to evaluate the feasibility of adopting the technology on a larger scale.

Animal traction had been a Peace Corps project for two years at the time of the request for USAID participation. Nine Peace Corps Volunteers (PCV) are assigned to the animal traction center in northern Togo. Those not working at the training center work with local farmers in introducing animal traction techniques. They experiment with different kinds of ploughs, head and neck yokes with single and pair oxen, minimum and maximum surface for land cultivation. The information as developed is passed on to extension agent counterparts of the PCVs.

Relation to AID Program

The activity responds to a development priority of the Government of Togo which is seeking ways of alleviating its dependence on foreign energy sources. Animal traction is of primary interest at present because of the energy problem.

The AID program in Togo emphasizes rural development of which an increase in agricultural production is an integral part. This activity introduces an appropriate technology with the purpose of testing the extent to which it contributes to increasing agricultural production.

Results

The activity has focused on developing the facilities and services of the animal traction center sufficiently to impact on agricultural production in the region. An evaluation of the activity in July 1981 covers the period from April 1978 through June 1981. During this time, facilities and services at the animal traction center have been developed in excess of the numbers specified in the grant agreement:

- 200 farmers were taught to use oxen teams for ploughing, cultivating, and hauling. The grant agreement calls for 60 farmers to be instructed in animal traction.

- 106 pair of oxen were trained for traction on small farms. The grant agreement calls for training 60 to 80 teams. The center now has the facilities to train 150 pair of oxen a year.

Based on these results, a follow-on activity has been proposed. The PID has been prepared and sent to REDSO/WA for review.

PRIMARY SCHOOL AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION

IRT Activity Number	698-0407.03
Country	Togo
Funding	
AID	\$40,000
Togo	\$1,500
Community	\$3,525
Total	<u>\$45,025</u>
AID Approval	November 1, 1979
Grant Agreement	January 17, 1980
Planned Activity Completion Date	May 30, 1981
Extension	June 30, 1982

This activity proposes to expand and improve the Togolese primary school system by developing agricultural instruction and production methods adapted to Togolese schools, testing these methods in the field, preparing texts and manuals, and training teachers in agricultural education.

The activity was funded for four years by the Ambassador's self-help fund as a Peace Corps project. At the time of the IRT grant, the Ministry of Education had introduced school gardens in 125 schools in the five regions of Togo. The activity is planned to expand the program to an additional 125 schools.

Seventeen Peace Corps Volunteers (PCV) participate in the program. In addition to teaching agricultural skills, the PCVs teach basic marketing techniques and encourage students and their families to include the products of the school garden in their diets. The Peace Corps plans to continue its participation for the next two years.

Relation to AID Program

This activity supports AID rural development strategy.

Results

OAR reported the results of the activity in June 1981 as a prerequisite for AID approval of the proposed Farming Skills Development activity.

- 258 schools in the 5 regions of Togo were participating in the program.
- 261 school garden plots had been planted. 43 school directors and teachers and some 500 students had begun home garden plots.
- 5,000 copies of a manual describing basic food and animal raising techniques were printed and distributed.

Farming Skills Development which introduces an advanced version of the program in secondary schools is now in progress.

RURAL SOLAR TECHNOLOGY

IRT Activity Number	698-0407.09
Country	Togo
Funding	
AID	\$50,000
Togo	\$17,000
Total	<u>\$67,000</u>
AID Approval	March 25, 1980
Grant Agreement	June 10, 1980
Planned Activity Completion Date	June 30, 1982

This activity proposes to introduce solar technology in rural areas by installing one solar water heater in each of four maternity centers and one solar drier in each of four village market locations.

Relation to AID Program

The activity was undertaken in response to the interest of the Government of Togo in developing its renewable energy sources, the most important of which is solar energy. Two ministries submitted proposals for solar energy projects to the Office of the AID Representative in October 1979. AID recommended IRT as the funding mechanism for carrying out the activity. The activity is outside the principal thrust of the AID strategy in Togo.

Results

- Prototypes of the solar water heater and the solar drier were developed at the Solar Energy Laboratory in the Science School at the University of Benin. A prototype for a biogas stove has not yet been completed.
- Three solar water heaters have been installed -- one at the maternity clinic in Lome and two in rural areas. The fourth is scheduled for installation in early February. Bacteriological analysis of the water reveals that it cannot be used for sterilization but is adequate for washing.
- Design is in process for two driers adapted to the specific needs of two of the locations selected for installation.

Comment

The modifications which have been made to the prototype in the solar water heater installed at the maternity clinic in Lome may prove advantageous. The reservoir has been built on concrete supports with sufficient space underneath to install washing tubs.

EXPLOITATION OF SPRING WATER, CANTON LAVIE

IRT Activity Number	698-0407.20
Country	Togo
Funding	
AID	\$60,000
Togo	\$26,345
	<u>\$86,345</u>
	Total
AID Approval	March 21, 1981
Grant Agreement	May 27, 1981
Planned Activity Completion Date	March 1, 1983

This activity proposes to develop and build a system which provides a year-round supply of water to the villages Huime and Apedome, Canton Lavie. The activity was first proposed in 1978 for financing under the Ambassador's self-help fund. The engineer who developed the proposal and design for the water system is a native of the region who works with the Societe de Renovation du Cafe et du Cacao (SRCC). The amount required to build the system prohibited financing under the self-help fund. In June 1980, the Office of the AID Representative (OAR) proposed the activity for funding under the IRT project.

Two Peace Corps Volunteers (PCV) work with the activity: One oversees daily operations and construction; the other will develop health and sanitation instruction for the village as the system nears completion.

Relation to AID Program

This activity addresses the problem of accessibility to safe water supplies in rural areas, a principal thrust of the AID strategy in Togo.

Results

- Land clearing, trenching, and gathering sand and gravel are in process. The sites for two cisterns have been located; the land is cleared but not yet levelled.
- Dam construction is scheduled to take place during February 1982.
- The Comite pour l'Adduction d'Eau de Lavie (CAEL) has been organized to construct, maintain, repair, and operate the system. The SRCC engineer who proposed the activity has arranged that four villagers be trained in maintenance at the Regie Nationale des Eaux.

Problems

- The chlorinator will require the use of chlorination tablets rather than powder which can be purchased locally.
- Because of a misunderstanding, the chlorinator and an initial supply of tablets were sent air freight, increasing expenditures from a planned \$2,000 to \$8,000.

Comment

The activity experienced inordinate delay in obtaining AID approval. It was further delayed after signing the grant agreement, in part because of the rains. Nevertheless, the activity is well integrated into the community and has the enthusiastic support of both villages. The SRCC engineer has provided engineering surveillance on his own time. The village women are transporting sand and gravel from a dry river bed to the site. Because of the distance involved and the difficulties that the women experience in carrying the sand and gravel on their heads, the community has built a bridge, which will make it possible to transport the sand and gravel part of the way by truck. Construction of the bridge cost the activity only nails and a handsaw.

Experience, Inc. and REDSO/WA provided engineering services to the activity. Experience, Inc. prepared the activity paper. The PCV believes that the engineering services were not needed. The SRCC engineer who proposed the activity and designed the specifications was aware of all the local factors and took them into consideration in his design. Some of the engineering visits to the site were too brief to be of benefit.

FARMING SKILLS DEVELOPMENT

IRT Activity Number	698-0407.26
Country	Togo
Funding	
AID	\$45,000
Togo	\$55,450
Total	\$100,450
AID Approval	July 23, 1981
Grant Agreement	September 29, 1981
Planned Activity Completion Date	July 15, 1983

This activity trains students in Togo's secondary schools in modern agricultural skills and small livestock production. Instruction is through classroom teaching and field practice.

The activity is developed on the model of the primary school activity which preceded it. The higher level of education permits the inclusion of more complicated projects such as raising pigs and goats, developing fish ponds, and crossbreeding animals and poultry.

The activity will be introduced in 16 secondary schools in the five districts of Togo. Eight Peace Corps Volunteers (PCV) work with the activity; 20 Togolese teachers are to be chosen as their counterparts. The Peace Corps plans to participate through 1984.

Relation to AID Program

This activity continues the agricultural education program introduced at the primary school level and adapts it to secondary schools.

Results

Following is a description of the activity as it is carried out at Woume secondary school in rural Togo.

The activity began on schedule in September 1981 with the arrival of the PCV. The skills introduced since September include gardening, making compost, crossbreeding chickens, raising goats. The PCV has arranged the import of purebred Rhode Island Reds from France and added new breeds of egg-laying and meat chickens to the school stock. He has introduced the use of vaccines and inoculations.

The Peace Corps allows each PCV to choose an individual approach to carrying out the activity. There are two options: Establish one school as the focus of attention and develop the activity at this school until it becomes a show place or visit all schools in the district and work a portion of the time at each one. The PCV at Woume chose the former approach on the premise that one location permits a concentration of effort which will accomplish more than allotting each school in the district a part of his time.

The PCV has not yet chosen his counterpart. He points out that there are no professional Togolese teachers of agriculture and to be chosen as a counterpart means an additional teaching requirement. They must have an incentive to participate in the program if there is to be any kind of commitment.

The PCV doubts that any pedagogical materials of lasting value will be produced under this activity. He feels that curriculum development is a specialized field which PCVs are not equipped to handle.

In discussing the activity in general, the PCV noted that secondary schools are the final years of education for most Togolese. Instruction that presents agriculture as a profitable undertaking and promotes a positive view of farming can be an important influence in determining the future of rural children.

Comment

Kodjo Amesefa, Associate Director of the Peace Corps, shares the PCV's concern that there are no professional Togolese teachers of agriculture. He is concerned that programs in the primary schools will collapse when the PCVs leave. There are no academic resources for training teachers of agriculture in Togo at present. The only alternative is inservice training, which he believes would be a desirable follow-on activity.

The PCV's decision to choose one school as his center of operation carries with it the danger that other schools in the district will not benefit from the activity. This may not be the case. The Woume school has begun to attract attention. A teacher from one of the schools in the district has asked for help in introducing the activity in his school.

This activity's most important function is the introduction of new technology into rural villages in Togo. Its pedagogical contribution is secondary.

LAKARA SKILLS DEVELOPMENT TRAINING

WID Activity Number	698-0388.12
Country	Togo
Funding	
AID	\$612,000
Togo	\$59,180
Total	<u>\$671,180</u>
AID Approval	September 14, 1979
Grant Agreement	September 28, 1979
Planned Activity Completion Date	September 30, 1982

This activity proposes to train rural women in remunerative skills, assist them in developing cooperatives, and educate them in nutritional practices. The activity has four components:

- Constructing a training center,
- Conducting a series of research studies,
- Providing training to staff and village women,
- Assisting village women in organizing cooperatives.

The training center was to be constructed during the first year. Research studies to be carried out include:

- A socioeconomic survey to provide basic data on agricultural and artisanal activities and needs,
- A baseline nutrition survey,
- A technical survey and analysis of various crafts.

The National Union of Togolese Women and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Women's Resources direct the activity. Funds are provided under two grant agreements -- one, with the Government of Togo, the other with a PYO, the National Council of Negro Women (NCNW).

Relation to AID Program

The activity will contribute to rural development in the area which is the focus of the AID program in Togo.

Results

The 1981 evaluation of the activity covers the period September 1979 through June 1981. It finds that:

- The socioeconomic survey has resulted in a low-quality, methodologically unsound study which should be reviewed by a qualified sociologist.
- The nutrition survey is almost complete, but an NCNW decision to limit the survey to one ethnic group in a multiethnic area limits its value.

- A major modification in construction was made without formal agreement among the parties concerned or appropriate consideration of budget and implementation implications.
- The activity has been marked by poor supervision of field activities by both NCMW and the Ministry of Social Affairs, weak support and direction from NCMW headquarters, and little, if any, monitoring by NCMW headquarters staff.

The activity has not yet been redesigned as recommended by the evaluation. A project advisory committee has been established and the project coordinator requested to submit monthly reports to the Office of the AID Representative.

Comment

The project coordinator believes that if a sociological survey had been undertaken in the Lama Kara district, a crafts activity would not have been planned. She finds that the women are more interested in gardens and palm oil extraction as sources of income. When the activity is redesigned, it should provide the kind of training in which the women are interested.

The project coordinator feels that a centralized location for training is impractical for African women. Participation will be limited because of lack of transportation and household responsibilities. The decision about including a regional center should not have been made until after the socioeconomic survey had been completed.

Having two grants under the activity has created problems. The evaluation team favors a single grant, with full information provided to the Togolese counterparts if they are not a party to the agreement -- the preferred situation.

The OAR requirement for monthly reports from the project director appears excessive if such reports are to be written. It would appear more appropriate to obtain some temporary help for the project director in redesigning the activity and documenting the redesign -- or, if necessary, insist on a new project director.

ANNEX D
REPORT OF FIELD VISIT
ZAIRE

February 6-10, 1982

The evaluation team reviewed the following activities in Zaire:

IRT Activity 698-0407.10	Young Farmers Project
IRT Activity 698-0407.15	Extension and Counseling in Appropriate Rural Technology
IRT Activity 698-0407.24	Small Agricultural Tool Production
IRT Activity 698-0407.27	Kionzo Water Supply

In conducting the review, the evaluation team talked with members of the USAID and Peace Corps staff, Peace Corps Volunteers (PCV), Salvation Army staff, and the director of the activity Extension and Counseling in Appropriate Rural Technology. The team visited this activity at the Centre d'Etudes pour l'Action Sociale (CEPAS), Kinshasa and the Young Farmers Project at the Salvation Army summer camp, Mbanza Nzundu.

Evaluation Team Observations

The four IRT activities in Zaire reinforce USAID assistance strategy which includes among its priorities increasing agricultural production and rural development. The USAID program is carried out in close cooperation with the Peace Corps. PCVs are assigned to USAID bilateral projects and to the IRT activities Young Farmers Project and Small Agricultural Tool Production.

The Young Farmers Project has encountered implementation problems, largely because of a flawed design. This small activity, which involves an AID contribution of \$17,500, is carried out under a grant to the Salvation Army. It proposes to introduce 4H clubs in Zaire, the clubs to be based on a model which has proved successful in Kenya. The Salvation Army in planning the activity did not adapt the model to conditions in Zaire. Three PCVs have been assigned in the less than two years since the activity began.

Small Agricultural Tool Production is unique in that the tools will be manufactured from metal obtained from weapons and vehicles which were left after the post-independence civil war. It is replicable in Zaire if not in other countries.

Although USAID has undertaken no WID activities, the mission encourages the participation of women in the development process. WID provided funds which brought together ten women from Zaire, ten from Togo, and ten from Guinea in a six-week seminar to train African women in planning, managing, and implementing agribusiness projects in which they share ownership. Seven of the ten women from Zaire have set up a pig farm; three have gone into poultry production.

The dollar value of IRTs from Zaire generally has been smaller than from other countries. This is because the mission has available counterpart funds for financing local costs. USAID is also unique in that it sponsored a training

course in project design for local PVOs and other potential proposers of IRT activities, using the IRT guidelines as the basic documentation for the course. As a result, the mission has received a number of IRT proposals. Given the large number of requests and the small value of its IRTs, it is understandable that the mission prefers a dollar ceiling -- if any limitation is required -- to the present restriction of only two IRTs per year per country.

Two Experience, Inc. engineering consultants have assisted in the design of the Kionzo Water Supply activity. Experience, Inc. is acting as procurement agent for the purchase of offshore equipment for the Small Agricultural Tool Production activity.

Field Views

The USAID Director feels that a funding mechanism such as IRT gives the USAID program a degree of flexibility which it would not otherwise have. For example, activities such as Kionzo Water Supply and Small Agricultural Tool Production are innovative in their approach to solving current problems in Zaire which are not of a kind to warrant a bilateral project. AIP is useful, but not essential to a mission such as USAID/Zaire. It is more valuable in a situation in which AID wants to test the possibility for cooperation; e.g., to re-enter the Congo, after a period of no AID activity. It provides a source for funding projects which are finite in nature and for which a national program is not needed.

The director noted that women's issues are becoming increasingly prominent in Zaire. There are influential women's groups and women hold important positions in those departments of government which deal with social affairs. Integrating women into bilateral projects is preferable to separate WID activities; it is, nevertheless, difficult. Actual integration of women into projects has not yet started.

The USAID Design and Evaluation Officer feels that IRT has a definite place in the range of programming options open to a mission. He opposes the limit of two IRTs per year. If a limitation is necessary, he prefers a funding limit with field flexibility on the number of activities. However, he feels that there are too many countries in Africa of such fundamental differences to consider establishing a uniform funding level for this kind of project. IRT funding procedures have not presented any problems. He believes that Experience, Inc. consulting services have contributed to design of the IRT activities; however, he does not feel that such services will be necessary at the replication stage because of the availability locally of technical personnel.

The Peace Corps director agrees that funding mechanisms such as IRT offer a flexibility in planning development programs. Most of the PCVs in Zaire are assigned to AID-financed projects. He pointed out that the Peace Corps cannot always make the commitments which USAID would like. The Peace Corps cannot be sure of retaining the same PCV for a two-year assignment to a project. He is concerned that AID has a tendency to put too high a degree of responsibility on a PCV, particularly in the financial and management fields.

Review of Individual Activities

The evaluation team's review of the individual activities follows.

YOUNG FARMERS PROJECT

IRT Activity Number	698-0410.10
Country	Zaire
Funding	
AID	\$17,500
Liberia	\$12,000
	<u>Total</u>
	\$29,500
AID Approval	March 6, 1980
Grant Agreement	May 15, 1980
Planned Activity Completion Date	December 31, 1982

The original plan for this activity was to establish 4H clubs in 50 primary and secondary schools managed for the Zairian government by the Salvation Army. Twenty-five clubs were to be established during the first year, 25 during the second. An average membership of 50 students for each club was anticipated. The students were to be instructed in gardening by a Peace Corps Volunteer (PCV) and a Salvation Army counterpart. A community member or teacher would supervise the students during the time that the PCV and his counterpart were visiting other schools. Each student was to have his own plot. Students were to be furnished tools and seeds to begin their plots. They would later buy these with the profit from their harvest. The activity is based on a 4H club model in Kenya imported to Zaire by the Salvation Army agricultural program advisor based in London. Three PCVs have worked with the activity: the first requested a transfer after a few weeks; the second remained approximately a year; the third had just arrived.

Relation to the USAID Program

This activity contributes to rural development in its intent of alleviating conditions of poverty among the rural poor. It was undertaken to encourage rural youth to become involved in productive agriculture as an alternative to urban migration.

Results

Experience of the first year showed the activity to be infeasible as originally planned. The Salvation Army schools are dispersed throughout an area so large that the time taken in travelling from one to another is prohibitive if garden plots are to be established and supervised. Roads are impassable during the rains, and even during good weather two or three hours are required to drive between schools. Community members were not interested in supervising the students without pay or free tools. Efforts with students often proved unproductive. There is a bias against farming among the young Zairians who are in school. They feel that they are being educated to escape farming and the school system reinforces this attitude. The primary students are too young to do the field work. The plots were neglected during vacations and holidays. School administrators were uncooperative. It was not feasible for students to return to the school in the afternoon to work their plots because of the distance from school to village.

These circumstances prompted the PCV and his counterpart to change the direction of the activity. They began to work with young, unemployed villagers ranging in age from 18 to 35. Rather than continue to travel great distances, they began to concentrate on villages in a smaller area, using a Salvation Army summer camp and land as a demonstration agricultural plot.

With the end of the PCV's assignment, a period of three months elapsed before the assignment of the third PCV. The village young people who participated in the program have dispersed. The demonstration plot at the summer camp has deteriorated. The process of gathering young people for training or of interesting villages or schools in the project must begin again. The Salvation Army awaits the arrival of the agricultural program advisor from London to approve the new approach of working with unemployed village youth or to combine this approach with work in the schools. USAID does not object to the shift in focus of the activity because this is essentially an experimental undertaking.