

PD-AAJ-458

DS/DIU/DI 509 P.P. 511-0471/1581

ISN = 961

CLASSIFICATION PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY (PES) - PART I

Report Symbol U-447

1. PROJECT TITLE Rural Development Planning			2. PROJECT NUMBER 511-0471	3. MISSION/AID/W OFFICE USAID/Bolivia
4. EVALUATION NUMBER (Enter the number maintained by the reporting unit e.g., Country or AID/W Administrative Code, Fiscal Year, Serial No. beginning with No. 1 each FY) <u>225</u>			<input type="checkbox"/> REGULAR EVALUATION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SPECIAL EVALUATION	
5. KEY PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DATES		6. ESTIMATED PROJECT FUNDING (\$000)		7. PERIOD COVERED BY EVALUATION
A. First PRO-AG or Equivalent FY <u>78</u>	B. Final Obligation Expected FY <u>82</u>	C. Final Input Delivery FY <u>83</u>	A. Total \$ <u>4,600</u> B. U.S. \$ <u>3,300</u> C. GOB \$ <u>1,300</u>	From (month/yr.) <u>8/78</u> To (month/yr.) <u>11/81</u> Date of Evaluation Review <u>11/19/81</u>

8. ACTION DECISIONS APPROVED BY MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE DIRECTOR

A. List decisions and/or unresolved issues; cite those items needing further study. (NOTE: Mission decisions which anticipate AID/W or regional office action should specify type of document, e.g., a/gram, SPAR, PIO, which will present detailed request.)	B. NAME OF OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION	C. DATE ACTION TO BE COMPLETED
Given the approach taken in carrying out this evaluation, the standard PES format has not been utilized. Pertinent PES information has, however, been included.		
1. The RD project manager is to be responsible for the carrying out and/or verifying the completion of appropriate recommendations for immediate action described in the evaluation report.	T. D. Johnston (USAID/RD)	3/82
2. Subject to AID/Washington approval for proceeding with the reprogramming of the presently suspended Departmental Development Corporation loan (511-T-064, 511-W-065), the RD and PD & I Divisions are to be responsible for revising the project's implementation plan, taking into consideration the recommendations for long term action described on pages 20-21 of the evaluation report.	T. D. Johnston (USAID/RD) R.J. Asselin, Jr. (USAID/PD & I)	(See attached report)

9. INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS TO BE REVISED PER ABOVE DECISIONS			10. ALTERNATIVE DECISIONS ON FUTURE OF PROJECT	
<input type="checkbox"/> Project Paper	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Implementation Plan e.g., CPI Network	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)	A. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Continue Project With adjustment based on evaluation report recommendations.	
<input type="checkbox"/> Financial Plan	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/T		B. <input type="checkbox"/> Change Project Design and/or	
<input type="checkbox"/> Logical Framework	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/C	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Change Implementation Plan	
<input type="checkbox"/> Project Agreement	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/P		C. <input type="checkbox"/> Discontinue Project	

11. PROJECT OFFICER AND HOST COUNTRY OR OTHER RANKING PARTICIPANTS AS APPROPRIATE (Names and Titles)		12. Mission/AID/W Office Director Approval	
Evaluation Team: LAC/DR: TMcKee Abt Associates: JRJordan		Signature:	
Clearances: RD:RVThurston RD:TDJohnston DP:RLeon de Vivero PD & I:RJAsselin, Jr.		Typed Name: Joe O. Hill, Jr. Acting Director	
		Date: 3/10/82	

XD-AAJ-458-A

~~PD-AAJ-459~~

~~ISN 962~~

REVIEW OF BOLIVIA'S
RURAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING GRANT

by
Thomas McKee, LAC/DR
James Riordan, Abt Associates

November 5 - November 19, 1981

Planificar requiere diseñar, ejecutar y evaluar planes, programas y proyectos, pero para ello, no es suficiente contar con metodologías de planificación, sino que también es necesaria la utilización de medios que en la planificación tradicional en nuestro país, no se tomaron en cuenta en forma adecuada. Esos medios tienen que ver con el uso de sistemas gerenciales que permitan incorporar las metodologías de planificación al proceso operativo de las instituciones planificadoras.

Departamento de planificación,
Corporación Regional de Desarrollo
de Chuquisaca, "Plan de Desarrollo
Regional: Lógica de la Elaboración
del Plan de Desarrollo Regional:
Propuesta: Documento I," Sucre,
Junio, 1981.

I. Introduction

II. T.A. Provided to Date

1. Project Identification Methodologies

2. Project Mgt. System

3. Assistance to MPC

III. Regional Planning in Bolivia. How it works

IV. Reorientation for the Future

V. A Possible Framework for Reprogramming and Expansion

APPENDIX: Persons Consulted.

I. Introduction.

This document presents the findings and recommendations of a two-week review of USAID/Bolivia's Rural Development Planning Grant. The review was conducted from November 5 through November 19, 1981. The review was not an evaluation of the project in a formal sense. Rather, past project experience was examined with a view toward making recommendations as to how to focus the project in the future, allowing for the possibility that the project could be extended and expanded.

In the main, we believe the conclusions and the overall thrust of this report are well founded. Given the brief time at our disposal, however, plus the fact that much of this time was absorbed in meetings and in travel to the various DDCs, we were unable to check many things out and we may be in error in certain particulars. If this is the case, we apologize for going on impressions. Even as of this writing, we were continuing to learn more and more about the project but, as with any report, the time had come to draw our review to a close and commit our collective thoughts to paper.

In what follows, we dispense with a lengthy general background description of the project and presume that the reader of this report is familiar with the project and related documentation. The remainder of this report is divided into four sections. In the next section, Section II, we discuss the technical assistance provided under the project to date. Section III lays out our understanding of how

regional planning currently works in Bolivia, with its strengths and its weaknesses. This is followed in Section IV with a brief discussion of how we believe the project should be refocused in the future. And, finally, in Section V, we lay out a possible framework for reprogramming and expansion.

At the end of the report, we append a list of the different personal whom we consulted during our stay in Bolivia.

Section II

Technical Assistance Provided to Date: Results and Lessons Learned.

To achieve the purpose of improving the technical consistency and coordination of the planning systems project designers planned for three general areas of activities:

1. Development of technically sound methodologies for regional planning, project identification, preparation and analysis; 2. The use of these methods to assist the DDCs in preparation of annual operating plans per revised MPC guidelines; 3. Assistance to MPC to develop overall guidelines for the planning system.

To achieve these outputs long and short term technical assistance and training was to be provided. Long-term advisors in regional planning, operations mgt., urban/rural development and agricultural sector planning were to be assigned to the MPC and each DDC where they would under the supervision of chief of the planning office carry on those activities delineated above and provide on the job training to their counterparts while carrying on their activities.

What has happened over the two year life of the project, however, is different from the design. Of the three general areas of focus - methodology development, direct work w/DDCs and assistance to MPC - the bulk of time and effort was expended in methodology development, the work directly with the DDCs occurred only in a few DDCs and the work with the MPC to develop guidelines/criteria for the planning system never got underway.

1. The Five Methodologies

PCI during the two years of the contract developed an internal schism over whether the greatest resources should be expended to develop the five methodologies which are project identifications and selection tools or whether to focus on project design and implementation. In retrospect it is clear to us that too much time and resources were invested in the methodologies while the greatest capacity building impact in the DDCs has been achieved by the introduction of the method of the Sistema de Manejo de Planes, Programas y Proyectos (SM²) which includes the Marco Logico approach to project design and related methods for the implementation and evaluation of programs and projects.

There are several lessons to be learned from the unfortunate business with the methodology development. First, contrary to the original design of the project in most cases the PCI contractors who were working on development of the methodologies were treated as being on "special assignment" by PCI and the MPC. The DDCs although they contributed logistical support never controlled the advisor or felt he was part of their operations. This separatism strategy and the resultant lack in some cases of DDC counterparts fostered the impression in the DDC that the methodologies were high technology beyond their capability or resources to repeat. In fact the methodologies are adaptations of known project/program selection techniques which could have been applied directly to programs by the DDCs.

The success of the Potosi work with Urban Functions points up what could have been done if the DDC's were fully integrated into the process. The lesson to be learned here is that in future work with DDCs on research scopes of work for advisors should be approved by the respective DDC and the advisors should be integrated into the DDC staff.

Second, we found that the impression has been created that the 5 methodologies were to be fitted together into one whole that would be greater than its parts. That a "paquete metodologico" would rise up out of the research which any DDC could take and apply to solve its planning problems. This misconception misses the point that these methodologies are simply tools to address specific project/program identification and selection needs.

There is overlap among the tools and the DDCs first need to figure out what their problems are in project identification and selection before they pick which tool or tools to apply. The point here is that the DDCs must understand that their problems define which tools are to be used not vice-versa. The methodologies are a set of potential tools to address a variety of program/project identification situations. It will be up to DDCs and MPC to figure out which tool is appropriate for specific situations.

As to the future of the methodologies it is important not to let the controversy surrounding them queer the considerable effort and substantial improvements that have been made. Salvaging what has been produced and presenting it to the DDCs and MPC as a methodological tool kit is our recommendation.

For the record the current status of the five methodologies is as follows:

Potosi-Urban Functions in Rural Development

This the most successful of the methodologies enabled Potosi to complete a spatial, diagnosis of its department this past summer. The DDC is now in the stage of identifying packages of projects. However in order to complete the planning process and take the DDC into the actual project/package selection process the DDC has requested additional technical assistance to help it prioritize among the various possible project packages. Our opinion is that the DDC should be provided further assistance during the next 6 months of year needed to complete the process.

A number of other DDCs are interested in this methodology and CORDEPO is proud of its role in this effort.

Oruro - Perfiles Estadísticos

This method of data gathering by using existing statistical sources such as census information will provide DDCs global visions of their departments and will point up economic anomalies and serve as base line information. Completed this past summer this methodology was presented at the September seminar.

Chuquisaca - Lineas de Intervencion

This methodology is designed to assist in the selection of program directions. Field work and data processing have been completed and preliminary documents have been prepared.

Tarija - Analisis Sectorial

The sector analysis work has focused on the identification of key development constraints. A methodological document has been prepared and field work has been completed. The major bottleneck has been data processing in Cochabamba. Although concrete results are not yet in, CODETAR has expressed interest in expanding this work to all of Tarija.

La Paz - ~~EX~~ Post Facto Evaluation

This application of the ex-post facto evaluation methodology to two of CORDEPAZ's principal program areas is essentially complete with English to Spanish translations of the results now underway. It offers the DDCs a methodology that they can adapt to evaluate their major program areas. It needs to be presented to them via a seminar.

2. Work w/DDCs on Project Design and Implementation

The most notable success of the PCI effort has been in the area of the introduction to the DDCs of the SMP method and the Marco Logico. Universally we found the DDCs pleased with this management tool and interested in further developing their capacity in these areas. Although the success in this area has recently been overshadowed by the work on the methodologies, the SMP and Marco Logico have succeeded in lifting the capacity of the DDCs to conceptualize their programs/projects and has introduced a common development language into the dialogue between the MPC and the DDCs. The momentum developed in this area has to be actively maintained. To accomplish this the MPC should develop its capability to service the DDCs in this area by establishing within the MPC the capability to train its staff and DDC staff in the SMP and Marco Logico. The successful work of Heinzen and Diaz in CORDEBENI and CODETAR

respectively offers models of what can be accomplished by working with the DDCs in this area. The MPC should be capable of providing on demand training in this areas and of responding technically when reviewing DDC's Planes Operativos which use this approach. This area-project design and implementation-was not seen as the priority focus of the original project design and indeed most of the resources to date have been spent on project/program identification, however, in retrospect this is the area which has shown the greatest pay off in strengthening DDC programs and projects.

3. Assistance to MPC

This component of the project never really got underway and as discussed in Section II has weakened considerably the project's impact. In fairness to PCI it should be noted that in June of 1980 when relationships between Bolivia and the U.S. were suspended AID instructed PCI to keep a low profile at the MPC and to restrain ministerial level contacts. Also over the two years in question there were 4 governments and 5 new ministers. Assuming that relations continue to warm up this component of the project should receive the priority it deserves as discussed below. One seeming victim of the low level of commitment by MPC to the project was the originally proposed development of a permanent public planning/management training component for MPC and The DDC via ISAP - the Public Administration Institute.

Section III

Regional Planning in Bolivia

This project was designed to strengthen the National System of Regional Planning. Through this project the DDCs and the MPC were to become effective planning agencies with synchronized policies and systems for achieving the best possible impact from national or other funds assigned to them for development. At the time of the project design it was felt that planning efforts had focused on diagnostic studies and collections of baseline data which had influenced selection of priority sectors for project development and investment but that these activities were taking place without a planning framework to intergrate and link projects and programs. The principal objective of this project was not to improve planning exclusively at the DDC level but to improve the overall planning system. Currently the overall regional planning system as operated between the DDCs, the MPC and the Ministry of Finance is an annual, budget limit establishing exercise. It is from our observations heavily weighed toward decision making on the basis of subjective planning strategies and perceptions of the geo-political importance of DDCs. Technical review of strategies, programs and projects is minimal and ad hoc. The planning/budgetory process is initiated by the Ministry of Finanzas setting annual budget limits for the DDCs which then submit

their proposed calendar year programs in the form of an operating plan. This plan is both their proposed strategical and programmatic approach. The operating plan and each specific project is reviewed by the MPC for consistency and duplication and is routinely passed to the Ministry of Finanzas where additional substantial cuts are often made and the plan is returned to the DDCs. New projects must still be passed to the Comité Nacional de Proyectos once feasibility studies are conducted and final project approval must be obtained from CONEPLAN and the Office of the Presidency. As was the case when this project was designed several years ago this approval process which routinely takes 6 months to a year is carried on outside of any regional/national planning framework which integrates and links strategies and programs and works toward efficient, effective use of scarce resources and manpower. At the DDC level they are operating in the dark since no clear GOB national/regional development strategy has been articulated. The "rules of the game" haven't been stated and the functional responsibilities of the several players haven't been defined. The original project design, the subsequent 1980 - 1982 Project Work Plan and the Law of the DDCs assign the responsibility for setting up and enforcing the "rules of the game" to the Office of Regional Planning in the MPC. The seemingly still valid concept, which however, MPC has done little to carry out, was that the ORP in MPC would develop with the assistance of this project its capability to guide and manage a GOB/MPC/DDC national/regional development strategy. The ORP's role is or rather is supposed to be one of establishing and communicating to the DDCs what criteria/standards are

being used to judge DDC strategies, programs, projects, budgets and organization and management of their activities. The yet to be implemented project assistance component for the ORP would in general terms have enabled this group to establish the type of planning and budgetary approach used for example by the LAC Bureau and the LAC USAIDs. The CDSS/ABS process, the PID/PP process, AID/W and LAC guidance cables on strategy, program and projects, AID policies and procedures on design, implementation, evaluation, organization and management taken in their entirety define the rules of the game for the AID players. MPC and the DDCs have not yet established such a common language and conceptual base for the preparation of their strategies, plans, programs, projects and in managing and administering their programs. Some progress has been made as both the DDCs and the MPC are now using the Marco Logico to conceptualize projects but this is a fragile step in the right direction and still required are such important steps as: the conceptualization by the MPC of the policies and mechanisms for the specific coordination of National Planning with regional planning as practiced by the DDCs: the development and adoption of a more agile and technically based DDC-MPC-Min of Fin Planning and Budget Cycle; the establishment within the MPC of the capability to technically review and provide guidance on DDC projects and programs and of its capability to assist DDCs with project identification, design, implementation and evaluation. Given the poor performance by the ORP and the MPC in following through in these areas it is important to determine what their intentions are and require that they provide in a timely manner the originally programmed but never provided counterpart resources to support these activities.

IV. Reorientation for the Future.

On the basis of our findings in the previous sections, we believe that the basic ingredients for reorienting the project for the future are the following:

1. The focus of the entire project should be operational. To put it negatively, making the planning system operational must not be viewed as only one of several project elements. Rather, it must cut across all the major substantive areas of planning, namely, national/regional planning strategy, project identification and selection, and project design, implementation, including organization and administration, and evaluation. The planning system must become more clearly demand and decision driven if lasting operational improvements are to be obtained. Management of the DDCs must perceive that well planned programs and projects will be required and rewarded.

2. The principal actor in the future must be the MPC. For the DDCs to play the planning game efficiently and effectively, the rules of the game must be clearly defined and institutionalized. In the Bolivian context, this function can be performed only by the MPC. Leadership is required first and foremost at the top.

3. The work on project identification methodologies should be integrated in one relatively compact methodological manual, presented to the DDCs in a seminar, and followed up with technical assistance in the DDCs on an as needed basis. The manual should be looked at more as a tool kit to address gaps than as a whole that must be

applied in its entirety. On the other hand, the logic of the relationships among the different methodologies needs to be clearly explained. For example, there is a striking parallelism between Perfiles Estadísticos, Analisis Sectorial, and Lineas de Intervencion, on the one hand, and the logic of the interrelationships among target group identification, constraints analysis, and selection of program directions in LAC's Agricultural Sector Assessment Guidelines, on the other. As far as we have been able to determine, this logic has never been made sufficiently clear to the DDCs.*

* One substantive comment on the methodological work. With the exception of Urban Functions, there appears to have been an implicit assumption that the key solutions to rural problems are largely agricultural. This may not be the case. The 1977 Southern Valleys survey highlighted the significance of non-farm income in total household income. Similarly, a, if not the, major differences between the "Prosperos" and the "Pobres" in one of the Lineas de Intervencion surveys appears to be differences in non-farm income. This whole area needs a whole lot more looking into.

4. The work on the Sistema de Manejo de Proyectos should go forward. PCI's Marco Logico has been well received by the DDCs and needs now to be fully institutionalized throughout the entire system. Beyond that, the Sistema de Manejo de Proyectos, of which the Marco Logico is only a part, needs to be promoted so that project design, implementation, and evaluation are seen operationally as one coherent process.

5. In the short run, that is, over the next six months, technical assistance to the DDCs can be largely short term. Long-term technical assistance will be appropriate again one the rules of the planning game are clearly defined at the MPC level and are ready for operational implementation in the DDCs.

V. A POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK FOR REPROGRAMMING AND EXPANSION

In this section we lay out one possible scenario for reprogramming and expansion of the project. It is by no means definite but is specific enough to serve as a starting point for considering various design options.

The key elements of the framework presented here are the following:

1. In the short run, that is, for CY 1982, three long-term advisors are required. The role of each is to work, primarily with the MPC, in defining in detail the rules of the game of the regional planning system. One advisor is seen as working with the MPC and the DDCs in institutionalizing the *Sistemas de Manejo de Proyectos*; and the third advisor is seen as working with the MPC on the development of a National Regional Development Plan. Specifically, the incumbents for these positions are seen to be Jim Heinzen, Rafael Diez, and a Personal Services Contractor to be determined.

2. After the operational and substantive rules of the game are specified in 1982, the focus of the project is seen as shifting to the implementation of these rules throughout the entire planning system. Heinzen and Diez continue throughout this phase, together with the assistance of an institutional contractor that would place an advisor in several or all of the participating DDCs. Realistically, the institutional contract would not be able to come on stream until the second half of 1982.

This may seem late but is in fact quite appropriate. One of the major problems with the PCI contract was the lack of clear direction as to exactly what DDC advisors were to do and how they were to fit in operational terms. Under the scheme laid out here, the rules of the game would be established during 1982 and when the institutional contractor's advisors came on board, systems would have been defined for them to implement.

(The use of an institutional contractor with advisors assigned to each DDC is admittedly a high cost option. Less expensive options could be considered but certain trade offs in on-site continuity would need to be made. Short-term advisors could be used, for example, or only two or three long-term advisors who would serve more than one DDC. Alternatively, top MPC people who worked in systems design in 1982 could be assigned to specific DDCs the following year).

3. On page 19, a possible organizational chart is presented which outlines suggested relationships among the long-term contractors.


4. The project identification methodology work is seen as going forward to the completion of a packet of methodologies manual. Sam Daines is obviously the appropriate person for this task. Beyond the production of the manual, provision is also made, as discussed in the previous section, for short-term technical assistance to work on the implementation of the methodology on an as needed basis.

5. Table one lays out in schematic form the major task that would need to be performed under the suggested reprogramming of the project. The tasks associated with DDC Operating Plans correspond in the main to the current regional planning cycle. To highlight the importance of strategy, however, the requirement of a yearly strategy document has been added. To focus explicit attention on this whole issue, this is seen as being completed before the Annual Operating Plan, just as Mission CDSSs are submitted to AID/W before their ABSs.

6. Table one lays out ending dates for the major tasks. What are in our judgment the most important tasks are built in early. Hence, if timing or funding restrictions dictate that the project must terminate before 1984, then, if all goes according to schedule, the most critical pieces of work would be accomplished.

PROJECT ORGANIZATION

One reasonable way of organizing the project in the future is as follows:



A POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK FOR THE PROJECT IN THE FUTURE

	Principal T.A. Persons	Starting Date	Ending Date
1. Project Identification Methodologies			
a. Packet of methodologies manual	Daines	1/1/82	6/30/82
b. Seminar to present manual	Daines	7/1/82	7/5/82
c. Follow-up short-term t.a.	Various	7/6/82	6/30/84
2. DDC Strategy Documents, 1982			
a. MPC instructions for DDC preparation, including definition and rationale of target groups, development constraints, priorities for program directions (short-term and long-term), key project interventions, role of other institutions, and criteria for MPC and Min Fin review and evaluation.	Heinzen, PSC TED	1/1/82	3/31/82
b. DDC preparation of CDSS (with short-term t.a. from various persons)	Heinzen	4/1/82	6/30/82
c. Establishment of system for coordinated MPC/Min Fin review and evaluation	Heinzen	3/1/82	6/30/82
d. Coordinated MPC/Min Fin review and evaluation, with establishment of tentative funding level for 1983	Heinzen	7/1/82	8/15/82
3. DDC Operating Plans, 1982			
a. MPC instructions for DDC preparation, including priorities, Marcos Lógicos, and implementation designs for both programs and projects, as well as DDC organizational structures and administrative budgets.	Heinzen, Diez	3/1/82	8/15/82

Table 1
(continued)

	Principal T.A. Persons	Starting Date	Ending Date
B. DDC preparation (with short-term t.a. from various persons)	Diez, Heinzen	8/16/82	10/15/82
c. Establishment of system for coordinated MPC/Min Fin review and evaluation	Heinzen, Diez.	3/1/82	10/15/82
d. Coordinated MPC/Min Fin. review and evaluation, with establishment of minimum definitive funding levels for 1983.	Heinzen, Diez.	10/16/82	11/30/82
4. National Regional Development Plan			
a. MPC preparation	PSC TBD	3/1/82	3/31/83
b. Follow-up t.a. in DDC preparation of Strategy Documents, 1983	PSC TBD	4/1/83	6/30/83
5. Project Management*			
a. MPC refinement of Marco Lógico and establishment of standards for project design	Diez, Heinzen	1/1/83	4/30/82
b. MPC establishment of uniform project; implementation, control, and cost accounting systems	Diez, Heinzen	3/1/82	8/15/82
c. MPC establishment of standards for project evaluation	Diez, Heinzen	10/16/82	12/31/82
d. MPC definition of its role in monitoring and evaluation projects and establishment of systems to institutionalize this role	Heinzen, Diez	4/1/82	2/28/83
e. T.a. to DDCs in program and project design, implementation, and evaluation	Diez, Contractor Institution TBD	1/1/82 7/1/82	12/31/82 12/31/81

* The schedule for activities b., c., and . may be too ambitious. Given other demands on the MPC, these activities may have to slip to 1983.

Table 1

(Continued)

6. Short-Term Technical Assistance, 1982

Provision will be made for short-term assistance to the MPC and the DDCs to meet ad hoc needs. Many of these needs have already been articulated by the DDCs in their evaluations of the project and these evaluations should be consulted for specifics.

One need that has been expressed is the need for computerization for day-to-day DDC operations management. The need for improvement in this area is clear but we are not in a position to judge the appropriateness of alternative computer technologies. In the absence of more detailed information, we are inclined toward small business computers like Apple or Radio Shack that would be relatively inexpensive to purchase (Loan funds suggest themselves for this purpose) and fairly straight forward to operate.

One possibility would be to experiment with such a system in CORDECH in 1982, see how it goes, and if all kinks can be worked out, expand the system to the national level in 1983.

Table 1

(Continued)

7. DDC Strategy Documents and Operating Plans, 1983 and 1984.

The cycle will be similar to the cycle described in two and three above, except the modifications will be made on the basis of prior experience and the focus will shift from the MPC to institutionalization in the DDCs. An institutional contract will be let for this purpose which will run from 7/1/82 to 12/31/84. Under this contract, advisors will be assigned to several or all of the DDCs to help implement all the various systems that have been developed. DDCs will be able to draw on the specific skills of people assigned to other DDCs on an as needed basis. One possible distribution of emphasis might be to have three project management advisors, two organizational management advisors, and two strategy advisors. This would naturally have to be worked out in direct consultation with the DDCs. Note that this scheme calls for no long-term sectoral specialists. This reflects the focus on making the entire planning system work in operational terms. This will be the key bottleneck for the foreseeable future and can only be expected to be exacerbated if and when the \$10,000,000 DDC loan goes forward. Expertise specific to different sectors will be obtainable under the institutional contract, but on a short-term basis.

A P P E N D I X

Persons Consulted

USAID/Bolivia

Henry Bassford

Lawrence Odle

Robert Thurston

David Johnston

Howard Handler

MPC

Adolfo Peters

Willy Santa María

CODÉBENT

Ing. Hans Dallien Barba

Lic. Julio Guzmán Gutiérrez

Dr. Gonzalo Suarez Lens

James Heinzen.

CORDECH

Edmundo Zelada

Ronald Camacho.

CORDEPAZ

Tcnl. Din. Augusto Sánchez Valle

Mario Fernández Velasquez

Pastor Yanguas

Roxana I. de Paz

Jaime Mariscal

Ing. Agr. Edgar Bilbao

Arq. Martin Gutierrez

CORDEOR

Col. Caesar Cordona

Edmundo Espinoza

Miguel Herrera

CORDEPO

Braulio Oré

Staff of Planning Office

CODETAR

Gabriel Ceite

José Arciénega

Jorge Baanante

CONSULTANTS

Robert Brunn

Enrique Gómez

Walter Gómez

Enrique García.