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PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY (PES) - PART I

Report Symbol U-447

1. PROJECT TITLE Manpower Development and Training			2. PROJECT NUMBER 632-0069	3. MISSION/AID/W OFFICE USAID/Lesotho
5. KEY PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DATES			4. EVALUATION NUMBER (Enter the number maintained by the reporting unit e.g., Country or AID/W Administrative Code, Fiscal Year, Serial No. beginning with No. 1 each FY) 80-632-9	
A. First PRO-AG or Equivalent FY 78	B. Final Obligation Expected FY 82	C. Final Input Delivery FY 83	6. ESTIMATED PROJECT FUNDING A. Total \$11,502,000 B. U.S. \$9,970,000	
			7. PERIOD COVERED BY EVALUATION From (month/yr.) October 79 To (month/yr.) August 80 Date of Evaluation Review	

REGULAR EVALUATION SPECIAL EVALUATION

8. ACTION DECISIONS APPROVED BY MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE DIRECTOR

A. List decisions and/or unresolved issues; cite those items needing further study. (NOTE: Mission decisions which anticipate AID/W or regional office action should specify type of document, e.g., airgram, SPAR, PIO, which will present detailed request.)	B. NAME OF OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION	C. DATE ACTION TO BE COMPLETED
All recommendations listed on page (u)	J.P. Carney, HRDO & B.H. Bahl, PRM	Dec. 1981

9. INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS TO BE REVISED PER ABOVE DECISIONS			10. ALTERNATIVE DECISIONS ON FUTURE OF PROJECT	
<input type="checkbox"/> Project Paper	<input type="checkbox"/> Implementation Plan e.g., CPI Network	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)	A. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Continue Project Without Change	
<input type="checkbox"/> Financial Plan	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/T		<input type="checkbox"/> Change Project Design and/or	
<input type="checkbox"/> Logical Framework	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/C	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)	<input type="checkbox"/> Change Implementation Plan	
<input type="checkbox"/> Project Agreement	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/P		C. <input type="checkbox"/> Discontinue Project	

11. PROJECT OFFICER AND HOST COUNTRY OR OTHER BANKING PARTICIPANTS AS APPROPRIATE (Names and Titles)		12. Mission/AID/W Office Director Approval	
1. Joseph P. Carney, USAID/L Project Officer 2. Helen Soos, REDSO/EA, Evaluator		Signature <i>F. Correl</i>	
		Typed Name Frank D. Correl	
		Date 5 August 1981	

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the GOL strengthen the coordination between the National Manpower Development Service and Training Officers of line Ministries which are active participants in the SAMD project. As part of this process the GOL should also strengthen the capabilities of Training Officers, as necessary, and organize regular meetings with the USAID HRDO and the Training Officers of line Ministries participating in the SAMDP.
2. That USAID/Lesotho request the GOL to honor the covenant in Article V, Section 6 of the Grant Agreement to "make available other suitable housing for use by the A.I.D.-financed technicians and their families in the event A.I.D.-financed houses are not then available", so that the full number of OPEX technicians may be recruited under this project.
3. That USAID/Lesotho investigate the need for a resource materials allowance for OPEX technicians to the extent that such resources (a) are not provided by their Ministries or organizations, and (b) are essential to institutionalize their job responsibilities within their ministries.
4. That USAID/Lesotho conduct a series of Technical Assistance Seminars for OPEX technicians and other contractors in Lesotho in order that they may fully understand and appreciate the overall USAID country development strategy and the objectives and roles of specific projects, as well as the obligations and benefits of various contractual relationships.
5. That the GOL undertake in collaboration with USAID/Lesotho an evaluation of participant training in the U.S. from all AID funding sources, in order to determine the contribution which training has made to the institutional development of the GOL and to the localization of key positions.
6. That USAID/Lesotho require that PSF comply with AID Handbook 10, Chapters 20 and 25 on clothing allowance and maintenance allowance respectively, or with such modifications to these policies as are approved in writing by AID. (This should be accomplished in coordination with USAID/Swaziland and USAID/Botswana.)

LESOTHO SOUTHERN AFRICA MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

EVALUATION

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I. SUMMARY

The SAMD project is the outgrowth of two predecessor regional projects, the Southern Africa Development Personnel and Training (SADPT) Project of 1973, and the Southern Africa Academic and Skills Training (SAAST) Project of 1978. The first project provided OPEX technical assistance along with participant training, and the latter was limited to training of Basotho participants. Since 1973, 166 Basotho have been trained from AID funds in a variety of fields, including primarily agriculture, engineering, education, personnel management, health and financial accounting. Of these 166 participants, 112 have returned from training. About 34 of these participants received short-term training. Some of this training occurred under sector specific projects, but the majority was under SADPT, SAAST and currently SAMD. The SADPT project also provided long-term technical assistance to the Lesotho Government prior to SAMD. The AID involvement in conservation efforts of the GOL resulted from OPEX assistance under the SADPT project.

The main findings of the evaluation demonstrate that the significant contributions of the predecessor project are continuing, both in terms of strengthening GOL institutional capability in the short-term through technical assistance, and developing indigenous capability in the long-term through training. Although several major donors provide technical assistance, no other major donor has linked it with training in an effective manner. Interviews with OPEXers in country at the time of the evaluation confirmed that they are contributing to improved management as well as furthering the development objectives of the GOL. Select interviews with their superiors confirmed that their role extends far beyond merely filling a position, but results in managerial improvements, assessment of training needs, policy-level analyses and enhanced institutional capabilities.

The current status of project implementation shows good progress. The AID contribution to the project was set at \$9,970,000, of which \$5,654,000 has been obligated. Of this amount \$3,647,000 is estimated to be committed, or 37% of total projected funds. Currently 43 Basotho are in long-term training from the combined SAMD/SAAST project, and 18 long-term technicians are in country.

The Mission approach to this flexible project and development tool seeks to meet articulated GOL priorities while being consistent with the AID strategy set forth in the CDSS. Within these two parameters, it has been a Mission concern to endeavor to provide OPEX technicians in areas where prospects are favorable for making an effective impact on the institutional capacity of the GOL. One consideration in this approach has been the selection of areas which reinforce AID programmatic interests, particularly at the policy levels. Another consideration has been to concentrate assistance in several thematic groupings so that the probability of sustained improvement in institutional capability is high. Thus the aim of the Mission is to establish viable functional units which can sustain

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improved performance rather than merely to replace a counterpart during a training program. The project has therefore provided technical assistance reinforced by both long-term training for senior staff and in-country training for middle level and support staff. The areas of concentration to date have been manpower planning and personnel management, marketing, road construction, rural roads, water supply and sanitation, conservation, crop production, educational systems analysis and planning, agricultural curriculum development, housing and Basotho enterprise development. While the overall implementation of the project is achieving steady progress toward the purpose and goal, several minor areas remain for improvement. First, the cost of the core contract should be reduced to eliminate excessive overhead costs. Second, the GOL should honor its covenant to provide housing for OPEX technicians; without additional housing, the targeted level of OPEX assistance cannot be attained, and the project life may have to be extended. Third, the Mission and the GOL should not overlook the usefulness and availability of short-term consultants and in country training to reenforce institutional capability. Fourth, the GOL and AID should strengthen the coordination between the National Manpower Development Secretariat (NMDS) and the line ministries which participate in the projects, including the capabilities of training officers if necessary. Fifth, the GOL and AID should undertake an evaluation of returned participants to assess the function and utility of training, and to determine to what extent training contributes to localization and sustained institutional development. Finally, several small adjustments should be made with regard to OPEX technicians to improve their morale and facilitate their existence.

Given the overall success of the project and the high priority which it addresses within the GOL and the USAID Mission, the evaluation endorses the Mission's intention to fund a follow-on project. At the present time, the SAMD project reflects the initial phase of manpower planning capability. The GOL and the Mission have worked together closely to coordinate project inputs in such a way as to achieve a sustained improvement in institutional capability. Since significant work on a coherent manpower plan has only just begun, the GOL and the Mission have carefully selected priority areas to which project inputs are channeled to produce change in meaningful ways which will be consistent with the intended plan. The next project should build on the contributions of this project to move toward a coherent, considered national manpower development approach which clearly sets forth prioritized functional units which require strengthening.

11. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The evaluation constitutes the mid-project external evaluation which is specified in the Project Agreement. The purpose of the evaluation is to clarify/confirm the design of the project, to measure progress against the Logical Framework, to verify project

hypotheses and to recommend measures to improve the implementation of the project, as necessary. The evaluation methodology is based on a review of project files, discussions with AID implementing staff, and interviews with OPEX technicians, the contractor's field representative and select senior government officials.

Since most participants trained under the project have not yet returned to Lesotho, this element of the project was not adequately evaluated. The evaluation recommends that the Mission conduct an evaluation of returned participants, both from this project and other AID funding, prior to the termination of this project, in order to have results available for the final evaluation as well as for feedback into Mission implementation of all participant training.

The major element of the project which this evaluation addresses is the contribution of OPEX technicians to institutional development within their assigned departments and to furthering the overall development objectives of the GOL and the AID program in Lesotho. A survey questionnaire was administered to the 16 OPEX technicians in Lesotho at the time of the evaluation. This information was supplemented by select interviews with senior GOL officials in the departments and/or ministries to which these technicians were assigned and information from AID staff who have supported this project.

III. EXTERNAL FACTORS

The major external factor which has delayed the implementation of the project is the delayed start-up caused by the slow approval process in AID/W and the lengthy process of identifying and negotiating with a contractor to implement the project. The GOL and USAID/Lesotho identified eight mutually acceptable positions between February and July of 1978 and were anxious to fill these positions. Owing to the lengthy project approval and contract negotiation processes, the Mission placed P10/T requests with the Institute of International Education in December 1978, just prior to the termination of their contract with AID for the placement of OPEX technicians. Subsequently IIE did not win the project implementation contract, and there was a nine-months hiatus before the Mission could place additional requests for OPEX technicians with the new contractor, TransCentury Corporation (TCC). Thus long lead times have been a major factor which has affected the implementation of the project.

The key assumptions on which the success of the project was predicated are in the process of being fulfilled at the time of this evaluation. The GOL has demonstrated its recognition of the need to plan, design and implement programs in an effective and efficient manner, and has requested the assistance of OPEX technicians for this purpose. The GOL has also demonstrated its support for a moderate, realistic localization policy, and has provided counterparts for OPEX technicians, both for training abroad and for collaborative work with OPEX technicians. AID has also been able to provide qualified technicians for the most part, and has placed Basotho participants

for training in appropriate institutions. The only assumption which has not been adequately met is that AID program levels in Lesotho remain sufficiently generous to allow for funding of new project activities spun-off from the SAMD project. In fact, AID program levels have been drastically reduced as compared to projected levels, resulting in persisting programming problems.

IV. MISSION APPROACH TO PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

The basic approach of the Mission guiding the utilization of SAMD project funds has been to meet articulated GOL priorities while being consistent with AID's strategy as set forth in the CDSS. Within these two parameters, the Mission has endeavored to provide OPEX technicians in areas where prospects are favorable for making an effective contribution and impact on the institutional capability of the GOL. One consideration in this approach has been the selection of areas which reinforce AID programmatic interests, particularly at the policy levels. Another consideration has been to concentrate assistance in a select number of thematic groupings so that the probability of sustained improvement in institutional capability is high.

Based on this approach, the Mission has responded favorably to requests for assistance in agriculture, education, road construction, rural roads, housing policy and construction, manpower planning and personnel management, and marketing. In two instances, USAID sought to place OPEX technicians in strategic positions within ministries with which they expected to enter into project agreements. Owing to funding constraints, these projects did not materialize, and the OPEXers have had to initiate many elements of a project without having the benefits of project funds. In general, these have proved to be positive experiences, with significant organizational improvements carried out long before the institutions are burdened with project implementation responsibilities. One of these projects (PMC) has subsequently been funded by another donor.

Training has been regarded by the Mission as an additional means to strengthen functional units within the GOL where OPEX technicians have been placed. The Mission has established a general guideline whereby a functional unit of Basotho are trained for every OPEX position. OPEX technicians are requested to assist in the identification of training requirements. Thus the Mission has orchestrated training (long-term and in-country) to support the establishment of viable functional units which will be able to sustain improved performance. While the availability of several counterparts is important, the Mission feels that support staff is also critical. The first step in this process is on-the-job training by OPEX technicians. Staff with the potential and desire for further development are subsequently placed in appropriate short-term courses, or even sent for long-term training, if necessary. For example, there are currently three OPEX technicians serving as financial controllers in road construction, produce marketing and livestock respectively. Departing from the traditional British accounting function, these OPEXers are introducing financial management based on historical costs, which represents a formidable tool for financial management. The SAMD project endeavors to support training needs for all levels of accounting staff, so that the unit will be able to function as a coherent entity, leaving

it less vulnerable to changes in personnel. Furthermore where there are other expatriates within a functional unit, the Mission is willing to fund participants to replace several expatriates, so that the entire unit has an improved probability of eventual localization. Annex G provides a list of OPEX technicians matched by participants who have been or are being trained for their functional units. The Mission has an excellent working relationship with the National Manpower Development Secretariat, the GOL entity responsible for the implementation of the Project, and with the GOL ministries to which SAMDP support is concentrated. The HRDO and technical AID Staff maintain close contact with the OPEX technicians, since in many cases AID is involved with projects which relate to OPEX roles. The Mission has required that all OPEX technicians submit tri-annual reports which are addressed to their Basotho superiors, and which summarize achievements, identify constraints, establish goals and targets for the next trimester, and enumerate progress toward identifying Basotho participants and other training needs so that an effective operational unit will be left in place when the OPEX technician departs. This mechanism has proven to be useful both to further the participant training element of the project, and to identify problems which OPEX technicians may have. There have been isolated instances where OPEX technicians were criticized for less than adequate performance. Close Mission contact with their supervisors undoubtedly contribute toward the resolution of these types of problems.

The capability of the Government's National Manpower Development Secretariat (NMDS) to develop training proposals has improved considerably since the initial stages of project implementation. The NMDS staff currently coordinates all requests for SAMDP support, and cooperates fully with the Mission's strategy for placing both OPEX technicians and participants. The NMDS has also benefitted from the placement of an OPEX manpower planner in order to carry out major base line research which will be utilized as the basis for a national manpower development plan which includes the private and parastatal sectors as well as the civil service. Thus the GOL is moving toward a capability to develop and maintain a considered manpower plan. As part of this process, there is a continuing need for closer collaboration between NMDS and the line ministries on a regular and substantive basis. The evaluation's first and most important recommendation is that the GOL strengthen the coordination between NMDS and Cabinet Personnel as well as training officers in line ministries which are assisted by the SAMDP. As part of this process, the GOL, with SAMDP assistance if necessary, should also strengthen the capabilities of training officers, where necessary. Regular meetings attended by the USAID HRDO and the training officers of the concerned ministries would strengthen NMDS's coordination capability. Better coordination with the ministries and joint determination of training needs and priorities, combined with improved manpower planning capability, will eventually result

in coherent manpower planning and development, which constitutes a laudable long-term objective for a project such as SAMDP.

V. INPUTS

The Project Grant Agreement was signed on August 31, 1978 for an initial obligation of \$1,767,000. Total project funding over a five-year period was set at \$9,970,000. As of FY 1981 \$5,654,000 have been obligated, of which an estimated \$3,647,000 is committed and \$1,764,000 is disbursed. Taking into account training and technical assistance plans for the current fiscal year, all available funds are far-marked for four additional OPEX technicians and 20 additional participants for training in the U.S. and Africa.

As presented in Annex A, Project Implementation Actions, the Request For Proposals (RFP) for contractor services to recruit OPEX technicians and to place participants was not issued until January 31, 1979, five months after the Grant Agreement was signed. Responses for the RFP were received on April 2, but a contract was not signed until August 31, 1979, fully one year after the ProAg was signed.

General conditions precedent to disbursement were requested by USAID on February 27, 1980, nearly 18 months after the ProAg was signed. (See PIL No. 1 as summarized in Annex A.) There is no PIL to indicate when conditions precedent were actually met. However, numerous commitments for the expenditure of project funds were entered into prior to the fulfillment of conditions precedent, such as the core contract with TransCentury Corporation, construction of housing and OPEX contracts under both TFC and TCC.

At the instigation of AID/W, the remaining funds available under the SAAST project were merged with SAMDP funds for implementation purposes. Thus SAAST funds have been utilized for participant training and in-country training. Since criteria for training under SAAST were more broadly defined than the SAMDP criteria which the Mission has utilized, the merging of funds has caused some redefinitions with respect to eligible categories for training. The following section reviews the status of project inputs as compared to inputs anticipated in the project paper. Annex C provides a summary of the status of all project inputs.

A. Technical Assistance.

AID originally planned to provide 90 years of long term technical assistance and 65 months of short term assistance. At the time of this evaluation, 36 years of long term assistance have been funded, of which about half has been delivered. Two short term consultants totalling five months have been provided for manpower planning and a low cost housing survey. Annex F provides a list of long term technicians provided under the SAMDP project.

USAID encouraged the GOL to identify OPEX positions long before the ProAg was signed on August 31, 1978. Between February and July 1978, eight mutually acceptable positions were identified. USAID sought to expedite the implementation of the project by issuing PIO/T's for eight OPEX technicians in December, 1978. These were forwarded to AID/W, which in turn transmitted them to IIE. Thus five of the 18 OPEX technicians currently in Lesotho have contracts with IIE rather than TransCentury Corporation who was finally awarded the SAMD contract in August 1979.

A major constraint to the provision of additional technical assistance has been the limited availability of housing. Ten houses have been built from project funds. To supplement this housing, the Grant Agreement included a provision under Section 5.6 whereby the GOL covenants to "make available other suitable housing for use by the A.I.D. - financed technicians and their families in the event A.I.D. - financed houses are not then available". To date the GOL has not provided any housing under this covenant, and OPEX technicians have been assigned houses built under other USAID projects. Some of these houses are intended for project-funded technicians who have not yet arrived. Thus there exists an impending housing shortage which will affect AID's ability to recruit more technicians under SAMD and other projects. The GOL must make available housing if the target level of 25 OPEX technicians is to be attained. Therefore the evaluation recommends that USAID/L request the GOL to honor this covenant so that the full number of OPEX technicians may be recruited under this project, as well as other projects.

The relative lack of short term technical assistance provided under the project reflects several factors. GOL government entities have made few requests for short-term consultants in the past. The Mission intends to support such requests when they address mutual GOL/USAID priorities and especially strengthen the works effort of other long term technical assistance under SAMD and other projects. The Mission's emphasis to strengthen functional units results in a more defined and manageable focus for SAMDP assistance which presently utilizes extensively long term technical assistance. Perhaps units already benefitting from long term assistance require little short term assistance. The evaluation suggests that USAID should analyze the reasons for the paucity of short term assistance, and determine whether short term assistance is necessary for the Mission's approach to implementing SAMDP.

B. Participant Training.

The project originally established a target of 90 years of long term training and 24 months of short term training. To date, 22 years of long term training have been provided from SAMDP funds, and approximately 40 years through SAAST funds since the two projects were merged. Approximately 102 months of short term training have been

provided or programmed under SAMD and SAAST. See Annex D for a list of participants benefitting from long term training.

Project funds allocated to training have reached almost 85% of levels anticipated in the PP. Owing to the high priority which the Mission and the GOL attach to training, it is anticipated that funding for training will exceed targeted levels. Although the Mission had intended to forward-fund all training requirements, this policy was reversed owing to AID/W concern regarding pipeline problems, as well as limited funding owing to the incremental nature of project obligations. Currently there exists considerable un-earmarked commitments for training in future years. This will necessitate careful planning during the later stages of project implementation.

C. In-Country Training.

In-country training has proceeded slowly under the project. In part, this situation results from the availability of training funds in several sector-specific projects. The Mission strategy of utilizing SAMDP to re-enforce a certain number of priority concerns has focussed the horizon over which training needs are accepted for SAMDP funding. Three in-country training programs have been undertaken to date: 1) twelve Basotho have been enrolled in the Center for Accounting Studies which conducts a one-year program for relatively advanced accountants, and 11 Basotho have attended a nine-months course in health administration in Botswana which is offered by the Institute for Development Management. SAMD funds for another 30-40 participants in IDM programs have been ear-marked for 1981. It is recommended that USAID/I actively seek to support relevant in-country training programs which address the severe constraint of a lack of skilled manpower throughout the government.

D. Special Support.

This input for \$32,000 was built into the project as a source of support funds to supply OPEX technicians with equipment, publications and photocopy services necessary to carry out their duties, in the event that the GOL could not provide such support. The Mission policy has been that the GOL should provide this type of support to all OPEX technicians. While this is a laudable policy, interviews held during the evaluation revealed that there are isolated instances of specialized needs for resource materials which would facilitate the work of OPEXers and contribute towards the institutionalization of their functions. Two specific instances where reference materials are necessary involve engineers who in the normal course of their work refer to technical materials in the design of roads and sanitation infrastructure. These references are essential to the resolution of numerous engineering problems which arise frequently in the normal conduct of business. While the Mission should encourage these OPEX technicians to introduce the concept of limited budgetary allocations for reference materials within government budgets, there is necessarily a time lag before GOL funds can become available. In some areas USAID should consider initially financing specific materials which are necessary within select GOL departments for the conduct of their functions.

E. Construction.

The project provided funding for 10 houses for OPEX technicians at a cost of \$35,000 each. This input was provided through GOL construction which was reimbursed on a FAR basis. As of August, 1980, AID transmitted through PIL No. 5 a payment of \$170,000 based on a completion of 90% of the houses. The additional 10% of the payment was withheld on the basis that a variety of items needed to be altered prior to the final acceptance of the houses. These included faulty wiring and plumbing, poor drainage, doors which were hung from the outside, etc. The GOL has been unwilling to correct these problems, despite repeated and strenuous efforts on behalf of the Mission. The evaluation underscores the need to continue to press this point at higher levels of the GOL, so that payments can be finalized and OPEX technicians can be freed from the hassles of contending with these problems.

F. Contract Support.

The project budget provided \$500,000 for contract support, which was specified as one person year of home office support and one year of field support for five years for Lesotho. It was subsequently decided that one contract should serve all three BLS countries for the implementation of their bilateral SAMD projects. Thus AID/W negotiated a contract on behalf of the three BLS Missions which included about 20 years of home office support and one year of field support per annum. The contract was signed on August 31, 1979 with TransCentury Corporation (TCC) for a two year period at a cost of \$2.01 million, or \$670,000 per country. TCC in turn subcontracted with Phelps-Stokes Fund (PSF) to handle the participant training element of the project. With the contract due to expire in August, 1981, each Mission will have to commit additional funds to extend the contract. It is anticipated that the cost of the core contract will be borne at varying levels by each Mission, depending on the anticipated level of utilization.

1. Institute of International Education. Since the TCC contract was signed fully one year after the initiation of the project, USAID /L sought to expedite the implementation by utilizing the services of the Institute of International Education (IIE), which had a contract with AID which would expire in December, 1978. As of August, 1978, the AID Mission had agreed to fund eight OPEX positions requested by the GOL. Job descriptions were written and PLO/T's were issued by December, 1978. At that time, AID/W had not even initiated procedures for selecting a new contractor. The Mission's effort to expedite the placement of OPEX technicians proved to be efficacious in four instances, with these positions filled in May, August (two positions) and November, 1979. These dates could not have been achieved under the TCC contract. The two other recruitment actions could have been transferred to TCC, since IIE was not able to fill these positions until June and November, 1980. This would have

resulted in some cost savings on overhead, since the TCC contract included an expensive overhead which is not downwardly flexible. The recent management audit of TCC shows that only through increased volume of business can overhead costs be reduced to acceptable rates.

Apart from cost considerations, the quality of services rendered by IIE has been poor as compared to TCC. The IIE-contracted technicians received no orientation and no support once they were in Lesotho. According to interviews with OPEXers, this was not felt to be a problem until TCC provided orientation in Washington as well as assistance in settling in and resolving personal logistical and financial problems. Now that TCC is well established, IIE-contracted OPEX technicians feel that they have been deprived of essential services. The IIE contract with individual OPEXers does not include Rest and Recuperation Travel, even though the AID contract with IIE refers to R and R as a standard AID provision to be granted in countries where applicable. Thus IIE-contractors have not been granted R and R travel on the same basis as TCC contractors. This is inequitable and has created a morale problem in several cases. The Mission sought to rectify the situation in September, 1980 by requesting AID/W's advice in amending contracts. AID/W's response stated that the contracts could not be amended without consideration and advised against it as a bad business practice. As a result of the SAMD audit and this evaluation, the Mission has consulted the RLA's in Nairobi and Mbabane and has affirmed that position.

2. TransCentury Corporation. TCC's performance to date has been high quality in most respects. In general recruitments have not taken too long, and the quality of technicians provided has been good. Orientations in the past 6-8 months have been generally useful, although some OPEXers complained of misinformation with respect to items to bring and advice on shopping. Several also complained of excessive political and moral orientation with respect to South Africa, including admonitions against making purchases there. There is no place in TCC's contract for TCC's private views on these political/moral issues. TCC should devote this aspect of orientation to objective presentations of the views of the Lesotho Government, which abhors the situation and harbors refugees, but recognizes that the two countries must coexist. A discussion of the Customs Union and other economic ties between the two countries would also be appropriate.

In terms of orientation in country, TCC has performed outstandingly in Lesotho. With Mission consent, TCC hired locally a representative to meet new arrivals and to assist them with numerous problems related to settling in. The TCC "welcomer" works on a per arrival basis, and has prepared a guide to Lesotho which includes practical information on what to bring and how to pack, as well as in-country information on where to shop, etc. Thus there have been minimal problems related to settling in in Lesotho.

3. Phelps-Stokes Fund. The performance of the Phelps-Stokes Fund in placing and supporting participants has been commendable. The summer of 1980 brought numerous requests for placements which PSF successfully handled even though lead times were short. In general,

placements have been in quality institutions. PSF has provided sound orientation for participants in Washington, and prides itself on "personalized" care for every participant. The management review conducted by the BLS Missions in March, 1981, shows that support costs are somewhat high at over \$300 per participant month. However, the conclusion of the management review is that case loads should be increased substantially (to 40-50 per program officer) to reduce per participant costs, and to compare better with competing participant placement institutions in terms of both case loads and costs.

The main problems experienced by USAID/E with respect to PSF are administrative. PSF has presented poorly prepared budgets for participants which do not reflect actual projected costs. Although the BLS Missions requested detailed breakdowns based on actual cost estimates for each participant, PSF failed to do so by the March 15, 1981 deadline. PSF has also been liberal with allowances, including a clothing allowance for each participant, even though this is not permitted by AID regulations as prescribed in Handbook 10, Chapter 20. The BLS Missions are in the process of resolving this problem. It is critical that the allowance issue be resolved as soon as possible.

VI. OUTPUTS.

The outputs of the project are summarized in Annex C. With approximately 37% of project funds committed, Annex C shows that outputs relating to OPEX technicians and participants training are proportionately ahead of targeted levels, while in country training is considerably behind target. The Mission believes this target is not realistic until NMDS/COL prioritizes and coordinates its various in-country training programs.

A. Nationals Trained in the U.S. and Africa.

The project paper anticipated that 48 Basotho would benefit from long term training. To date, 18 Basotho have been funded under SAMDP, and a total of 40 Basotho from SAMDP and SAAST since 1979. The average length of training ranges from 2 years for M.S. degrees to 2-5 years for B.S. degrees. Nine of the participants are studying for Masters degrees and 8 are studying for B.S. degrees, with one participant studying for a certificate in workshop management. The fields of training for these participants is as follows:

Agriculture	2
Engineering	2
Architecture	2
Business Admin	1
Financial Mgt	2
Health	2
Economics/Stat	2
Urban Planning	1
Water Resources	1
Law	1
Public Admin	1
Workshop Mgt.	1
TOTAL	18

No interviews were held with participants because it is too early to assess the relevance and quality of training from a representative group of participants and sponsoring ministries. The evaluation recommends that the GOL undertake in collaboration with USAID/L and evaluation of past participant training from all AID funding sources, in order to assess the relevance and utility of training, and the contribution which it has made to the institutional development of the GOL and to the localization of key positions.

B. Nationals Trained Through In-Country Courses.

The project anticipated that 420 nationals would be trained through at least 18 in-country courses. To date, 23 nationals have been trained through 2 courses, both of which are offered regularly by Lesotho Institute of Development Management and the Lesotho Center for Accounting Studies respectively. Funds are allocated in 1981 for approximately 60 participants to take in-country training programs at these two institutes. At present the National Manpower Development Secretariat is endeavoring with the assistance of a SAMD sponsored Manpower Planner to develop an overall manpower planning policy and implementation plan. Because donors have begun a number of in-country training programs in the absence of an overall manpower training policy and plan, a few of these institutions have withered on the vine within a few years of establishment. Others are competing for limited personnel and financial resources to accomplish often the basically same objectives. USAID/Lesotho will continue to apportion SAMD resources to in-country training programs in conformity with official requests and guidance of the National Manpower Development Secretariat, as it prioritizes its own Manpower training policy for in-country programs. At this stage of development it may be premature to target a level of 420 Basotho to be trained in-country as called for in the SAMD PP. Rather the Mission intends to work closely with NMDS in providing financial support for in-country training programs which are regarded by the GOL as genuine priorities within their development plan. The Mission will continue to survey the training institutions of Lesotho to see how they best might serve both the final NMDS manpower training policy and the individual training plans of various USAID sponsored projects.

One in-country training opportunity is currently being researched and developed for construction supervisors, a skill which does not necessarily require an engineering degree. Such a specialized course would be useful for GOL units dealing with road construction, water and sewerage, housing construction, etc. This type of training would probably be of interest to other countries in the region.

C. Spin-off Projects.

At the time SAMDP was designed, it was thought that OPEX technicians assigned to various ministries would be the source of ideas for new development projects in Lesotho, and that as these ideas were developed into project proposals, donor agencies (including AID) would be willing to fund them. This concept was modeled after the findings of the SADPT Evaluation of June, 1976, which noted that several important AID initiatives developed from OPEX contributions.

While the Mission continues to endorse the validity of "spin-off" projects as a concept for which SAMDP is ideally suited, circumstances have generally worked against the development of new project proposals of a most significant nature. Expectations of sharply increased funding for Lesotho have not materialized and the Mission is not now in a position to plan any new projects. In only two cases out of 18 OPEXers currently in Lesotho have projects truly developed, and these cases (PMC) and (Rural Roads) represent ones in which an AID projects were originally planned. Several OPEXers are assigned as part of their duties a coordinating role with respect to donors (e.g. in road construction, industrial development, housing, and water supply and sanitation), but projects developed as a product of such a coordinating role represents a qualitatively different contribution with respect to project initiation than that intended by "spin-off" projects.

While a valid concept in principle, the evaluation questions whether "spin-off" projects constitute a valid measure of project success. Many OPEX technicians are assigned to functions which do not constitute normal areas of donor intervention, such as personnel management, manpower planning, educational statistics, architectural designs, etc., because such functions are endemic to government and should be institutionalized. To the extent that OPEX technicians succeed in institutionalizing these functions within their assigned government departments, the departments will no longer require external assistance, thereby obviating the need for "spin-off" projects. This achievement represents a higher level of success than the generation of a "spin-off" project. Apart from the above considerations, the concept of "spin-off" projects has largely become out-moded by subsequent events. Rather than searching for new project ideas, as it did in the era of the SAMDP design, AID in Lesotho has too many existing commitments and possible program/project designs for the limited funding which has been available in recent years.

D. Organizational Efficiency in Government Departments.

The Project Paper anticipated "a sustained or improved levels of organizational efficiency in Government departments in which OPEX technicians serve" as the fourth output of the project. This output was to have occurred in 15 to 25 departments to which OPEX technicians were assigned. As of April, 1981, 18 OPEX technicians have assumed

positions within GOL departments. Sixteen of these OPEXers were surveyed as part of this evaluation, the other two being on leave or arriving during the evaluation. The following assessment of OPEX contributions to organizational efficiency in government departments is based on this survey.

The 18 OPEX technicians assigned to GOL departments in April, 1981 were assigned to 15 functional departments. Three OPEXers were assigned to the Roads Department of the Ministry of Works: two engineers and a financial controller. Two were assigned to Water and Sewerage Division of the Ministry of Water, Energy and Mines: one as General Manager and one as Training Officer. To date, eleven of these OPEXers could be said to have contributed to increased organizational efficiency within their departments. Three of these are financial controllers who are introducing financial management concepts into their departments as well as upgrading the capabilities of the staff with whom they work. Two are involved with personnel management and manpower planning respectively, and are making significant contributions through developing data bases and management techniques or analytical capabilities, so that the data can be utilized for both management and planning. Another OPEX technician is an educational systems analyst who is developing a computerized data base for the entire educational system, including training staff to maintain the system. Both technicians assigned to the Water and Sewerage Department are contributing to organizational efficiency through stream-lining of the operations of the department, including staff, procurement practices and organization of the workload, as well as the development of training plans to implement and sustain these improvements. An adviser to the Ministry of Agriculture in Special Crops has been instrumental in the organization of ministerial committees to advise the Permanent Secretary on various policy matters in an organized fashion: previously these policy issues were handled on an ad hoc basis rather than benefitting from systematic analysis. A rural roads engineer assigned to the Ministry of Rural Development is developing the institutional framework necessary to implement the GOL's ambitious rural roads program, as well as developing essential policy guidance such as socio-economic feasibility criteria necessary for the selection of successful rural roads activities. Finally, the Roads Department of the Ministry of Works is benefitting from improved procedures and maintenance of records which is being promoted by an engineer assigned to that department.

Other advisers are either too recent in their arrivals or have not been able to improve significantly their organizations owing to various problems. Some work situations have not lent themselves to achieving improved efficiency. It should be pointed out that all OPEXers are filling line positions within GOL departments which enable them to identify areas where organizational improvements may be made. It is entirely understandable that some should succeed more than others in making improvements, since all work situations are necessarily different.

The most critical assumption with respect to sustaining improved organizational efficiency in the long term is the provision of counterparts. Although the Project Paper assumed that this would be a critical problem, only in three instances is the counterpart situation poor. These are instances where counterparts have either left (for employment in the private sector) or are too busy with other tasks to be effectively trained for the function which the OPEX technician is filling. There are numerous other instances where counterparts are in training, and this situation is in fact the one which the project paper anticipated. In two of the three problematic instances cited above, there are counterparts in training but they may not overlap with the OPEX technician. In one instance only in-country training has been offered to counterparts. Apart from the three problem situations, all OPEXers have counterparts either in training or working with them, or both.

The contributions of all OPEX technicians is summarized in Annex F. Based on the above discussion, supplemented by Annex F, the evaluation finds ample evidence that the project has already achieved a significant level of improved organizational efficiency within 11 government departments. The substantive contribution of the project to Lesotho's development planning and implementation capability is clearly established, and can only expand as more OPEX technicians continue to work within GOL departments.

VII. PURPOSE

The approved purpose of the project is "to reduce critical manpower constraints to development mainly in the fields selected by the U.S. Congressional Mandate while strengthening the public sector's institutional capability to meet the development needs of the country". USAID/Lesotho's interpretation of this purpose has been to respond to GOL priorities while being consistent with the AID strategy as set forth in the CDSS. In general, USAID has promoted areas which support AID programmatic interests in Lesotho, such as road construction, rural roads, water and sanitation, marketing, crop production, conservation and agricultural curriculum development. There are also some overall areas which AID has supported because of their potential to improve government administration, e.g. manpower planning and personnel management. Educational statistics and analysis has also been selected as an area since it is fundamental to the development of a sector assessment and planning, which the GOL is undertaking at its own initiative. Housing and Basotho enterprise development or industrial development also constitute areas of SAMDP support, although all assistance in this often overlooked sector has been channeled through the Lesotho National Development Corporation which represents the parastatal sector rather than the fledgling private sector. In effect, the project purpose is being met in areas which USAID/L. has selected to support through the SAMD project.

The first indicator for the end-of-project status is that there will be more nationals in positions of responsibility with substantive inputs into the planning, design and implementation of the Government's programs. This indicator rests on the training element of the project,

and is therefore premature to evaluate. However, based on survey finding in other BLS countries, this indicator is likely to be fulfilled.

The second indicator states that a high level of operational efficiency of GOL departments with OPEX staff will be maintained while counterparts are being trained. This evaluation argues that the project provides more than the "maintenance of high level of efficiency", but that it substantially improves the operational efficiency of most departments in which OPEX technicians are working. As discussed under the Output section and documented in Annex F, OPEX technicians have contributed in substantial ways to improved organizational efficiency. The significance of this aspect of SAMDP should not go un-noticed. As OPEX technicians improved organizational efficiency, they pave the way for returned participants to assume more productive jobs. Often, the organizational improvements which OPEX technicians instigate require high level support which is more forthcoming for expatriate technicians. Often, these improvements require mature professional experience which recent trainees may lack. And often, as confirmed by interviews, these organizational improvements require the fresh approach of an outsider familiar with an American approach to management and organization, rather than a insider's primarily British orientation. It is easy to overlook the significant contribution which American technicians have been able to make in the context of the SAMD project, and to underestimate the impact which this contribution is making toward a sustained improvement in organizational efficiency.

The third end-of-project indicator is improved GOL project preparation and planning capability for funding by AID and other donors. This indicator is the end result of both training and improved operational efficiency from OPEX personnel. In the short term, several OPEX technicians are already improving project preparation and planning capability since part of their assigned function is to coordinate assistance from other donors. This has already occurred in industrial development, housing, water and sewerage, road construction, rural roads design and implementation, and special agricultural crops, and is expected to occur in education when more data are available in an analyzed form.

Since the project is making effective contributions in relation to every indicator of purpose achievement, the evaluation confirms that it is making significant strides towards the achievement of its purpose, and that this progress will expand exponentially with time as organizational improvements are sustained and expanded into new areas, and as trained Basotho assume positions of increased responsibility within their government.

VIII. GOAL

The goal of the project is to "increase the Government's capability and efficiency in planning, designing and implementing national economic and social development programs". This goal subsumes

the indicators and the discussion in the previous section, and is the logical culmination of the long-term impact of all elements of the project. As the operational efficiency of all aspects of the GOL's administrative capability improves, both internally and in terms of collaborating with other government departments as well as the beneficiaries of national economic and social development programs, the goal of the project will become increasingly fulfilled. Some concrete steps toward this goal are already identifiable, as evidenced by this evaluation, and it is anticipated that by the end of the project other steps will have been taken. However, the fulfillment of such a goal as this should be expected to be measured in decades rather than years, especially if localization is taken into account. The evaluation wishes to point out that even donor countries such as the United States have room for improvement on sustained planning for effective localization.

IX. BENEFICIARIES

This project does not lend itself to the usual social soundness analysis generally conducted by AID. The direct beneficiaries of the project are Basotho civil servants who receive long term training, short term training or in-country training. Government ministries to which OPEX personnel are assigned are also direct beneficiaries to the extent that they benefit from on-job training and improved operational efficiency. To date there are 45 beneficiaries in terms of training, and 15 governmental departments which have benefitted from OPEX assistance.

The indirect beneficiaries of the project are those Basotho who in the long term will benefit from improved government services and utilization of public resources. To date, indirect beneficiaries of the project include rural Basotho who benefit from improved road services, both trunk roads and rural roads; those who benefit from improved marketing infrastructure and rural shop coverage, as well as those who utilize livestock services or engage in special crop production and conservation programs; those employed in local industries, or involved as partners or managers of local businesses; urban users of water and sewerage facilities for both domestic and industrial ends; urban home-owners and would-be home-owners who benefit from improved low-cost housing policies; eventually all Basotho families who wish to educate their children; and ultimately the entire Basotho civil service and public when the manpower planning and personnel system of the GOL are rendered more efficient. It is difficult to conceive of an AID project which produces so many tangible benefits for such a broad spectrum of beneficiaries as this type of manpower development project.

X. UNPLANNED EFFECTS

There are no unplanned effects which have been identified by this evaluation. Since the project design was based on two predecessor projects, the anticipated effects of the project have been accurately predicted, with the exception of "spin-off" projects which was based on

assumptions which have not proven to be valid.

XI. LESSONS LEARNED

Several small lessons can be learned from this evaluation with respect to the design and implementation of manpower development projects. The first of these relates to the Government's provision of essential project inputs, in this case, of housing. Housing for OPEX technicians is likely to become a key constraint to the implementation of the project, and could affect other AID projects as well. Since this GOL input is an essential ingredient for the implementation of the project, the Mission must now take firm steps to ensure that the GOL will be forthcoming. The need for GOL provision for OPEX housing should have been emphasized much earlier in the life of the project; indeed it should have been more prominent in the design of the project. Including a covenant to cover such an essential ingredient of project implementation is not the appropriate way to handle an essential project input. Since the GOL has been exempted from contributing other project inputs such as transportation for OPEX technicians, its reluctance to provide housing for OPEX technicians over and above the minimum ten for which AID-funded housing is available must now be challenged.

Another lesson relates to the field delegation of contracting authority to AID/W. In the case of the TransCentury contract, too much authority was delegated to AID/W, with no authority retained in the field even for a review of major contract elements. Thus a costly, top-heavy contract has absorbed far more funds than anticipated. Furthermore, several administrative aspects of the contract were ill-defined, resulting in serious deviations from AID regulations with respect to the administration of funds for participant training. Rectifying this situation will require considerable effort on behalf of the BLS Missions, as well as the unnecessary expenditure of project funds. The devolution of OSARAC into separate missions in 1978 may have been a factor in this omission.

Another lesson relates to project implementation. In the case of this project, the meeting of conditions precedent and the issuance of project implementation letters has not followed usual AID procedures at the beginning of the project. While this has not resulted in undue harm, AID rules and regulations should be followed in all project implementation actions in order to protect U.S. government interests and to comply with Congressional requirements. USAID/L has now adopted a project management structure which ensures that AID rules are followed for all projects with regard to essential project implementation actions.

Another lesson relates to the importance of examining carefully all elements of the Government's ability to perform essential implementation functions during the design stage of the project. Although significant progress has been made toward the development of a GOL capability to develop training plans at the ministry level as well as the NMDS level, an assessment of GOL capability to perform this essential function during the design stage of the project would have ex-

pedited project initiatives to promote this capability. Since this assessment was not conducted as part of the design process, both the GOL and USAID/L soon realized that enhancing GOL capability to develop training plans and to undertake national manpower planning would contribute to the implementation of the project. As noted previously in this evaluation, improved manpower planning for training and localization constitutes a worthy output of this project.

Finally, one lesson which can be learned from the project is generalizable to all AID country programs which include the provision of technical assistance. In almost all AID programs, there are contractors who perceive differences between themselves and direct hire AID personnel. These differences are often exacerbated through inadvertent behavior on the part of official Americans which underscores differences, especially in widely circles. Since contractors are the first line of development initiative, usually far closer to effecting development than AID staff, their role is indeed an important one. Their perception that AID does not appreciate their function and treats them as second-class citizens is unfortunately both frequent and nearly universal. AID Missions should in general take all measures within their power to sensitize the official American community to the frequent morale problems which exist, and to demonstrate interest and concern in both the work and the well-being of OPEX technicians so that their job performance may be optimal.

XII. SPECIAL COMMENTS

This evaluation reconfirms that manpower training and OPEX assistance addresses one of the most fundamental development priorities of Lesotho. This view was confirmed by interviews held with senior GOL officials as well as with OPEX technicians and AID staff in Lesotho. That the United States has recognized this constraint to Lesotho's development, and has acted constructively to address it is highly appreciated by GOL officials. The SAMD project has effectively linked technical assistance and training into a formidable development tool, as no other donor has on a significant scale. Since the GOL is responsible for identifying areas for SAMDP assistance, the assistance provided under the project generally falls on fertile territory where long term development can occur. The evaluation strongly underscores the high payoffs which select assistance tailored to the specific felt needs of a government can have. That OPEX technicians work within a bureaucratic structure along with counterparts and other colleagues and support staff only serves to reinforce their contribution at numerous levels of bureaucratic organization, thereby enhancing its effectiveness. The OPEX model also forces the Government to accept responsibility for the outcome of assistance, since Government initiates requests for assistance, and creates a situation where long term institutional development can occur, especially since technical assistance is reinforced by training. Compared to traditional, intensively focused AID and other donor projects, the SAMD project appears to be capable of achieving significant institutional development objectives over a relatively short time frame, with a far more modest price tag. Therefore this evaluation endorses the basic precepts on which the SAMD project is based,

and recommends that similar assistance continue to be provided to Lesotho, with increasingly great responsibility delegated to the GOL to identify areas for assistance.

ANNEX A

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ACTIONS

DATE Action

PROJECT AGREEMENT

- 31 August, 1978 Project Grant Agreement signed for initial AID obligation of ; 1,767,000 of total AID contribution of \$9,970,000.
- 28 Dec., 1978 Project Agreement signed for additional \$500,000, for cumulative AID obligations of \$2,276,000.
- 28 Feb. 1980 Project Agreement Amendment No. 1. AID obligation increased by \$1,496,000 for cumulative obligations of \$3,763,000.
- 26 Sept., 1980 Project Agreement Amendment No. 2. AID obligations increased by \$91,000 for cumulative obligations of \$3,854,000.
- 4 Dec., 1980 Project Agreement Amendment No. 3. AID obligations increased by \$1,000,000 for cumulative obligations of \$4,354,000.
- 7 Jan., 1981 Project Agreement Amendment No. 4. AID obligations increased by \$800,000 for cumulative obligations of \$5,654,000.

CONTRACT ACTIONS

- 31 Jan., 1979 RFP No. 1879 issued. Responses due April 2, 1979.
- 27 Aug., 1979 PIO/T No. 645-0069-3-80179 issued for contractor services to recruit OPEX technicians and to place participant trainees.
- 31 Aug., 1979 Transcentury Corporation contract signed..

- 28 Sept., 1978 Amendment No. 1 Establishes operational procedures.
- 18 Oct., 1979 Amendment No. 2. Operational procedures modified to include, inter-alia, establishment of Deliver Orders mechanism.
- No Date Amendment No. 3. Authorizes TCC to recruit OPEX technicians for Bunda College in Malawi.
- 18 Aug., 1980 Amendment No. 4. Authorizes salary adjustments in AID's contribution if employer increases contribution by 5% or more, so that amount specified in OPEX contract remains constant.

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION LETTETS (PIL)

- 27 Feb., 1980 PIL No. 1. Requests statement indicating GOL representative responsible for project and a specimen signature for that person in order to fulfill legal requirements of the project.
- 29 May, 1980 PIL No. 2. Approves 8 of 10 \$ houses as being 90% complete for reimbursement purposes, for total disbursement of \$280,000.
- 16 June, 1980 PIL No. 3. Authorizes Rand 3650 for IDM-GOL research consultancy on role of civil service vis-a-vis the functions of parastatals and the private sector.
- 20 June, 1980 PIL No. 4. Establishes schedule for internal evaluation to be conducted July 8-18, 1980.
- 22 Aug., 1980 PIL No. 5. Transmits payment for \$357,000 representing 90% payment for 10 houses under SAMD project as well as fullpayment for three houses under the Rural Health project. Upon USAID/lesotho's inspection and approval of 10 SAMD \$ houses, a final payments of \$98,000 will be processed.

Financial Status of SAMDP
 (Estimated as of March 1981)
 (in '000 U.S.\$)

	<u>PP Budget</u>	<u>Committed</u>	<u>Disbursed</u>
OPEX Technicians	7,320	1,640	592
Participant Training	968	837	339
In-Country Training	90	150	52
Construction	350	350	320
Contract Support	500	670	461
Special Support	32	-	-
Inflation	710	-	-
Total Project	9,970	3,647	1,764

TOTAL Funds Obligated: \$5,654,000

PROJECT INPUTS AND OUTPUTS

<u>INPUTS.</u>	<u>PROJECT PAPER</u>	<u>PROVIDED AS OF 3/81</u>
OPEX - Long term	90 years	34 <u>1/</u>
OPEX - Short term	65 months	5
Training - Long term	90 years	22 <u>1/</u> (62) <u>2/</u>
Training - Short term	24 months	10
In-country training	18 courses	2
Construction	10 houses	10 houses
Contract Support	10 years	8½ years <u>1/</u>
 <u>OUTPUTS</u>		
1. Nationals trained in U.S. and Africa	48 nationals	21 (43) <u>2/</u>
2. Nationals trained through in-country courses	420 nationals	21
3. "Spin-off" projects funded by donors	6 projects	
4. Sustained or improved organizational efficiency where OPEX technicians assigned	15-25 units	14 <u>4/</u>

1/ Funding provided, as opposed to length of service completed.

2/ Combined SAMD and SAAST projects since 1979.

3/ Includes participants for USDA course lasting 2 months.

4/ Does not include units where OPEXers have not yet arrived, or where more than one OPEXers are performing similar work.

ANNEX D

BASOTHO PARTICIPANTS TRAINED UNDER SAND AND SAASST PROJECTS

Name of Participant	Sex	PIO/P Number	Program	Institution	Departure Date
1. Walter RALITSOELE	M	0069 - 90660	Master of Business Admin	American University	8/80
2. Joel T. SEMOKO	M	90664	Master of Public Admin.	U. of So. California	8/80
3. Thabiso NGOZWANA	M	00610	B.S. Civil Engineering	S. Dakota Sch of Mines	8/80
4. Sixtus TOHLANG	M	00611	B.S. Civil Engineering	Delaware State College	8/80
5. Mampiti SEKAKE	F	00612	B.S. Architecture	Tuskegee Univer. Ala.	8/80
6. Mamolepa K. LEBOTSA	F	00613	B.S. Arch.	Howard University	8/80
7. Agnes MOTHIBELI	F	00619	M.S. Social & Econ Statist.	George W. University	8/80
8. Lucia MAMBAE	F	00615	B.S. Nursing Education	Univ of Botswana	8/80
9. Josephine LETEKA	F	00616	B.S. Nursing Education	Univ. of Botswana	8/80
10. Phyllis MOHLALA	F	00624	Cert. of Licensed Acct.	(in-country Trg)	9/80
11. David P. NOSEBO	M	00643	Ag. Planning Seminar	JSDA Washington	10/80
12. Daniel MATEBESI	M	00647	M.S. Financial Management	Univ. of Rochester	12/80
13. Jacob MOSHABESHA	M	00648	Cert. W/Shop Mgmt	TSTI, WACO	2/81
14. Pusetso M. MAKOTOANE	M	00649	M.S. Financial Management	U. of Rochester	12/80
15. Lehlohonolo PELEPELE	M	00650	B.S. Water Resource Mgmt	Penn State Univ.	3/81
16. Phillip MAKEKA	M	00625	Master of Laws	Columbia University	8/80
17. Jerry M. PEKO	M	00632	M.S. Urban Planning	Rutgers University	8/79
18. Lietsiso MOHAPELOA	M	00658	M.S. Econ Planning	Univers. of Nairobi	11/80
19. 'Musi 'MATLI	M	00635	M.S. Agronomy	Texas Tech Un.	1/80
20. Teboho KITLELI	M	80653	B.S. Ag Edu/Extension	Raleigh State U.	4/76
21. Bataung LELEKA	M	0083- 80603	B.S. Mechanized Agric.	Oklahoma State U	1/78
22. Donald TSEKOA	M	80606	B.S. Civil Engineering	Syracuse Univ.	1/78
23. Thabang TSIETSI	M	80131	M.S. Economics	Middle Tenn State U.	5/79
24. Zacharia MOHAPELOA	M	80139	B.S. Agronomy	Texas Tech. Univ.	5/79
25. 'Molawa TLALE	M	80622	B.S. drafting	Piedmont Community College	6/79

Name of Participant	Sex	PIO/P Number	Program	Institution	Departure
26. Palo KOTELO	M	0083-90605	M.S. Financial Administration	Morgan State U.	1/80
27. Gerard KHADIKANE	M	90602	6 weeks USDA Course		4/79
28. Ada MOTEANE	F	90621	M.S. Accountancy	Univ. of Illinois	5/80
29. Seaja NTSEKHE	M	90625	B.S. Elect. Engr	Kansas State Un.	8/79
30. Joseph NOTHOPI	M	90626	BSEE	Kansas State U	8/79
31. Palesa SEBILO	F	90656	M.A. Education	Lesley College	6/80
32. Margaret LEBONA	F	90663	M.A. Guidance Counseling	U. of North Carolina	8/80
33. Mampho PINDA	F	90672	B.S. Home Economics	Eastern Kentucky Univ.	8/79
34. Thomas KHALI	M	90639	B.S. Pers Mgmt	U. of So. Calif.	12/79
35. Nathaniel MOSHOESHOE	M	80628	B.S. Manpower Economics	Utah State Univ.	9/79
36. Nehemia S. BLRENG	M	80629	M.S. Public & Int. Affairs	U. of Pittsburgh	8/80
37. Mabotse C. LEROTHOLI	M	90607	M.S. Dev. Plan & Econ Infrastr.	U of Pittsburgh	1/80
38. Kelebene NYOKONG	M	90632	M.S. Econ & Statistics	George W. Univ.	9/79
39. Peverett CWEBA	M	90627	B.S. Range Mgmt	New Mexico State U	9/78
40. Monis LEPHOTO	F	90604	3 month Workshop (Mgmt)	University of Connecticut	6/79
41. Alina RAMOKOENA	F	90631	B.S. Nursing Education	Univ. of Bswana	8/79
42. Z.A. MATSELA	M	80097	Ed.D. Education Admin.	Univer. of Massachusetts	8/77
43. L. MASUOANE	M	80134	Financial Mgmt	Lansing Comm. College	4/79
44. Khoboko/Thabane/Raphoka		80135	Short Pharmacy Course	Toledo Univ.	9/78
45. I. P. MATAMANE	M	80145	Personnel Management	Univ. of Connecticut	9/78
46. Jerry 'Mabathoana	M	80146	" "	" "	"
47. Tseliso MONNAPULA	M	80148	" "	" "	"
48. Eric L. QHOBELA	M	80149	" "	" "	"
49. Mokuba PETLANE	M	90603	F.P. Management Course	FP Centre, Chicago	9/79
50. MAILE/MOFLETSI	F	90611	Women in Mgmt	CEFPA	6/79

Name of Participant	Sex	PIO/P Number	Program	Institution	Departure
51. LEPHOMA/TOLOFI	M	0083-90612	FP Mgmt	CEFPA Washington, D.C.	6/79
52. MALIEHE/THAMAE	F	90613	FP Mgmt	FP Center, Chicago	6/79
53. Elias POTLOANE	M	90614	USDA Course	USDA	6/79
54. Ellen MAKHABA	F	90622	Women in Development Course	Washington D.C.	8/79
55. Q. M. MOJI	F	90623	Labor Policy Seminar	Washington, D.C.	7/79
56. Samson MATLANYANE	M	90637	WTI Seminar	WTI Center N.Y.	10/79
57. Bella Morakeng	F	80147	Pers. Mgmt	Univ of Connecticut	9/79
58. Mokhele LIKATE	M	80132	M.A. Administration	So. Calif. State U	1/79
59. Mary Theresa MANYELI	F	80133	M.A. Education(Mathematics)	Columbia University	1/79
60. Joang MOLAPO	M	80633	Higher Education	Ball State University	9/79
61. Temperance LELOKA	F	80636	M.S. Health Education	UMASS	8/79
62. Lehlohonolo PHEKO	M	90606	M.S. Legislative Drafting & Taxation	Columbia University	8/79
63. Malefetsane NKHAHLE	M	90630	Housing Seminar	Washington, D.C.	11/79
64. Lebohang MOLAPO	M	90636	Manpower Planning Seminar	Wash DC	10/79

ANNEX E

Basotho Students Studying Abroad 1/

<u>Country/Sponsor</u>	<u>No. of Students</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
United States	69	17.4
USAID <u>2/</u>	(54)	
AFGRAD	(15)	
United Kingdom	67	16.9
ODA	(18)	
EEC	(15)	
Canada	56	14.1
CIDA	(49)	
Ireland (Government)	28	7.1
India (Government)	27	6.8
West Germany (Government)	25	6.3
USSR	24	6.0
Private	(13)	
Int. Civil Aviation Org.	(8)	
Government	(2)	
Australia/New Zealand	12	3.0
Other Western Europe	9	2.2
Eastern Europe	7	1.8
Africa	70	17.6
Kenya	(22)	
West Africa	(12)	
East & Southern Africa	(36)	
Egypt (Arab League)	5	0.8
TOTAL	597	100.0

1/ Source: National Manpower Development Secretariat, October, 1980.

2/ Includes - from S.MDP Project and 5 from LASA project.

ANNEX F
LONG-TERM OPEX TECHNICIANS FUNDED UNDER SAHDP

<u>Name/Position</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Counterpart</u>	<u>Spin-Off Projects</u>	<u>Key Functions/Performance</u>
1. Kweku Appiah/Manpower Planner, NHDS	11/79-11/81	Yes, but peripherally involved. Needs more than one.	None, not ready yet, and possibly not appropriate for Donor funding.	Conducting manpower survey for government, private and parastatal sectors; developing staff to handle survey related work and analysis.
2. Donald Bostwick/Marketing Officer, MOA	9/80-9/82	Yes	No	Collecting and analyzing marketing data; developing a supply model for food grains to assess status of self-sufficiency.
3. Bodo Brathe, Financial Controller, Produce Marketing Corp. MOA.	5/79-5/81	Identified and trained. left for private sector. Worked with other staff on-job.	IFAD has designed \$4.8 m project based on AID's PNC Project Paper. Mr. Brathe worked closely with IFAD.	Financial Manager for marketing operation. kept operation afloat by careful buying and selling; streamlined staff, controls and procedures; introduced bid basis for sales; closed many loopholes; involved in all aspects of managing operation.
4. Carl Clewlow, Chief Organization & Methods Officer, Cabinet Personnel.	11/80-11/82	Yes, several in trg; also considerable on-job training.	No; not yet applicable.	Chief of 18 staff division; preparing establishments list against filled positions, developing organization charts as basis for manpower planning; developing control system for government equipment and purchases, developing forms, records and reports for centralizing control responsibilities in one office.
5. Clarence Czaja, Financial Controller Livestock - MOA	4/80-4/82	Yes, in training; also considerable on-job training.		Improving financial and managerial operations of Livestock Services through numerous organizational/operational adjustments. Improving inventory control for drugs, vaccines etc.

<u>Name/Position</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Counterpart</u>	<u>Spin-off Projects</u>	<u>Key Functions/Performance</u>
11. Richard Metcalf Housing Advisor Min of Interior	8/79-8/81	Yes: one in training one in-country scarcely involved, is busy with foreign travel etc.	Yes, implements World Bank project.	Developed COL policy on housing for all civil servants, encouragingly abolishing most civil service housing; instrumental in transfer of Lesotho Finance Corp. (for housing) to Ministry, encouraging reorienta- tion to middle class housing; implementing World Bank low class housing project.
12. David Ramer, Education Systems Analyst, HOE	12/80-12/82	4 counterparts in training.	No need - function will be institutionalized. Working with World Bank project.	Identified equipment and personnel require- ments for primary and secondary school surveys, directories, and analysis; developed flow model to be applied; involved in procurement of computer.
13. Firouz Rooyani, Conservation Lecturer, Lesotho Ag College	3/81- 3/83	None; works with 3 Basotho lecturers in department.	Too soon	Teaches courses in conservation; supervising pilot project; expects to initiate pilot projects, research plots, etc in collaboration with MOA cooperative Division, assisting MOA with development of soil map.
14. Mir Sediq Chief Rural Roads Engineer Min of Rural Dev.	6/80-6/82	One in trg, another will go in Sept. Needs about 4 engineers to handle fully developed Rural Roads unit.	Developing a rural roads project (AID project didn't materialize.	Operates Rural Roads Dept with 164 rural roads under construction, develops and standardized designs including culverts; drafted socio- economic feasibility criteria- solicits conor assistance.
15. Henry Stepack, Roads Engineer MOW.		Two engineers in trg.		Responsible for design and planning and material testing laboratory.

<u>Name/Position</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Counterpart</u>	<u>Spin-Off Projects</u>	<u>Key Functions/Performance</u>
16. Gayani Tewari, Special Crops Officer, MOA	9/80-9/82	Yes: are in L/T trg are working with him and others on-job.	Involved with all donor activities related to crop production.	Involved in policy proposal on conservation (writing position paper for inter-ministerial committee); organized Ministerial Committee as mechanism to advise P.S.; handled crop-related problem including processing at district level; developing in-service training plan for entire Ministry
17. Wayne West, Trg. Officer, Water & Sewerage, Min of Water, Energy & Mines	8/79-8/81	One counterpart in trg.	Not part of job; assisting donors in developing water standards.	Developed comprehensive training plan for 580 staff unit, incl. local training, in BLS region and with S.A. suppliers; filled in for senior staff vacancies; worked special projects, etc, developed laboratory for testing residues in water; assisted in development sewage standard laws.
18. William Frazier, Ag Curriculum Develop ment, National Teachers Training College.	4/81-4/83	One counterpart in training.		

SOUTH AFRICAN MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT
PROJECT

<u>OPERER</u>	<u>LESOTHO</u>	<u>FUNCTIONAL</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
1. BODO BRATHE - IIE - 1979-81 (April) Financial Controller PRODUCE MARKETING CORPORATION	A. PHELE MOHLALA Lesotho Center for Accounting Studies - Registered Acct. 12/79-12/80		
	B. B.K. MOHAU Lesotho Center for Accounting Studies - Registered Acct. Failed trial Test?		
	C. LIABOEA PHORORO Lesotho Center for Accounting Studies - Registered Acct.		
2. KWEKU APPIAH IIE - 1979-81 (July) Manpower Planner National Manpower Development Secretariat	A. THABANG TSIETSI M.S. Economics Middle Tennessee State Univ. 5/79 - 5/80 (OIT)		
	B. MABOTSE LEROTHOLI M.S. Development Planning University of Pittsburgh 1/80 - 5/81 - CPDO (OIT)		
	C. NATHANIEL MOSHOESHOE B.S. Manpower Planning Utah State University 1/80- (OIT)		
	D. MARGARET LEBONA M.A. Guidance Counseling North Carolina State Univ. 8/80 - 8/81- (OIT)		
	E. LEBOHANG MOLAPO U.S.D.L. Manpower Planning Seminar 10 - 11/79		
	F. Mrs. QENEHELO MOJI U.S.D.L. Seminar on Eco. Distribution, Poverty and Development.		
WAYNE WEST IIE - 79 -81 (August) Training Officer Ministry of Water, Energy and Mining.	A. LEHLOHONOLO PELEPELE B.S. Water Resources Management University of Penn. (OIT)		

OPEXER

BASOTHO FUNCTIONAL UNIT

4. JEFF HENDRICH
TC - 80-82
Director - Water Branch
Ministry of Water, Energy and
Mining
 5. RICHARD METCALF
IIE 1979-81 (July)
Housing Advisor
Ministry of Interior
 6. HENRY STEPACK
IIE 1977-78
TC 1979-81
Senior Roads Engineer
Ministry of Works, Roads Division
 7. EDWARD KIM
TC - 1980 - 82
Roads Project Coord.
Ministry of Works
Roads Division
 8. SAM HALL
IIE 79-81
Architect
Ministry of Works
- A. JEREMIAH PEKO
MS Urban Planning
Virginia Polytech.
University of Rutgers
9/79 - May 1981 (OIT)
 - B. THIBISO MATETE
M.S. Housing Planning/
Management, Cornell Univ.
8/81 - 8/85 (TC/PS)
 - A. DONALD TSEKOA
B.S. Civil Engineering
Syracuse University
1/78 - 5/82. (OIT)
 - B. THABISO NGOZWANA
B.S. Civil Engineering
South Dakota School
of Mines 8/80- 8/84
(TC/PS)
 - A. SIXTUS TOHLANG
B.S. Civil Engineering
Delaware State College
8/80 - 8/84 (TC/PS),
 - B. SYDNEY MATSEPE
BS. Civil Engineering
8/81 - 8/85 (TC/PS)
 - C. PAUL MATETE
B.S. Civil Engineering
8/81 - 8/85 (TC/PS)
 - D. MARTIN TIKISO
Cert./Diploma Constru-
ction Project Management
Africa Placement TC/PS
8/81
 - A. MOLOMO MOHALE
B.S. Architecture
Southern University, LA.
8/79 - (OIT)

OPEXER

BASOTHO FUNCTIONAL UNIT

- 9. (TC) - 81-83 BILL KUGIER
Financial Controller
Ministry of Works
Roads Division
 - B. MAMPITI SEEAKE
B.S. Architecture
Tuskegee University 8/80-84
(TC/PS)
 - C. KAELEHO LEBOTSA
B.S. Architecture
Howard University 8/80-84
(TC/PS)
 - D. NAOMI SIMATLANE
B.S. Architecture
8/81 - 85 (TC/PS)
 - E. ANDREW TOMANE
B.S. Architecture 8/81-85
(TC/PS)

- 10. C.J. CZAIA
Financial Controller
Livestock Division
Ministry of Agriculture
80 - 82 (TC/PS)
 - A. MALEFETSANE MOHAFI
MA Finance & Accounts
8/81 - 83 (TC/PS)
 - B. M. NTSAMAENG LENGOASA
B.S. Financial Management
8/81 - 84 (TC/PS)
 - C. Daniel Matebesi - M.S.
Financial Management
University of Rochester
12/80 - (TC/PS)
 - D. PAUL S. MPOKO
BS. Financial Management
8/81 - 83 (TC/PS)

- 11. GAYARI TEWARI
Crops Officer
Ministry of Agriculture
80 - 82 (TC/PS)
 - A. P.M. MAKOTOANE
MS Financial Management
University of Rochester
1/80 - (TC/PS)
 - B. ERIC MOLISE
M.S. AG. Crop Science
Texas Tech. University
8/76 - 6/79 (OIT)
 - B. ERIC MOLISE
USDA Seminar on AG
Administration 6-8/81 (OIT)
 - C. P. RAHLAO
B.S. Agronomy
8/81-85 - (TC/PS)

OPEXER

LESOTHO FUNCTIONAL UNIT

- 12. DON BOSTWICK
Marketing Officer
Ministry of Agriculture
1980 - 82 (TC)
 - 13. CARL GIEWLOW
Personnel Management
Cabinet Personnel
1980 - 82 (11E)
 - 14. MIR SEDIQ
Roads Engineer
Ministry of Rural Development
& Cooperatives (TC) - 1980-82
- A. ELIAS POTLOANE
M.S. AG. Economics
Oklahoma State University
12/75 - 6/78 (OIT)
 - B. WENTON NTSEKHE
M.S. AG. Economics
Washington State Univ.
5/78 - 4/80
 - C. S. LEJAHA
B.S. AG Marketing
8/81 -85 (TC/PS)
 - IASA- D. MOAHLOLI, MOTSAMAI,
NGHAPI, PHOOFOLO,
TUOANE, MAPETLA
B.S. & M.S. AG Economics
Colorado & Michagan
State University
 - A. MOKHELE LIKATE
MPA
U. of Southern Calif.
1/79 - 1/80 (OIT)
 - B. THOMAS KHALI
B.S. Personnel Manage-
ment University of
Southern California 8/79 -
8/83 (OIT)
 - C. NEHEMIA BERENG
MPA
University of Pittsburgh
8/80 - 8/81 (OIT)
 - D. JOEL SEMOKO
MPA
University of South
California 8/80-81 (TC/PS)
 - A. JACOB MOSHABESHA
Dipl. Vehicle Workshop
Management, Texas State
1/81 - 1/82 (TC/PS)
 - B. RAYMOND MAHAMO
B.S. Civil Engineering
8/81 - 8/85 (TC/

OPEXER

BASOTHO FUNCTIONAL UNIT

15. WILLIAM ELLIS
Real Estate Project
Officer
Lesotho National Development
Corporation 1980 - 82 (TC)

A. SALUKWEI MOLAPO
M.A. Development Economics
Williams College, Mass.
6/78 - 6/79 (OIT)

B. MOSALA MAKEKA
M.A. Law
Columbia University
8/80 - (OIT)

C. WALTER RALITSOELE
MBA
American University
8/80 - (OIT)

D. BEATRICE DZINGWA
MPA
University of Hartford
12/79 - 8/81 (OIT)

16. DAVID RAMER
Systems Analyst
Planner
Ministry of Education
1980 - 82 (TC)

A. AGNES MOTHEBELI
M.S. Social & Eco.
Statistics
George Washington & IPSU
8/80 - 81 (TC/PS)

B. LITSEBE LEBALLO
MS Computer data systems
8/81 - 8/82 (TC/PS)

C. NAHA NKUEBE
B.S. Computer Science
8/81 - 83 (TC/PS)

D. KELEBONE NYOKONG
M.S. Eco & Statistics
George Washington Univ.
9/79 - 12/80 (OIT)

17. FIROUZ ROOYANI
Conservation Lecturer
Lesotho AG College
MOA
1981 - 83 (TC)

18. WILLIAM FRAZIER
NTTC AG Curriculum
Development Specialist
Ministry of Education
1981 - 83 (TC)

A. HENDRICK MOKUOANE
B.S. AG Education
Texas Tech. Univ.
8/79 - 1/81 (OIT)

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May 1981

1. TCC should assume more active responsibility for its subcontract with Phelps - Stokes Fund, and should ensure that AID requests are met on a timely basis.
2. TCC should keep prospective recruits informed of the status of the recruitment process, especially when bureaucratic delays occur within AID on the host government.
3. TCC should initiate a recruitment search for positions where AID or the host government identify a "pre-selected" candidate only after confirming that alternative suggestions are welcome.
4. TCC should negotiate lower salaries where possible, instead of regarding a 17% adjustment on current salary as a firm formula. The 7% compensation for retirement should not be offered if the OPEXer is already retired and drawing a retirement. AID and TCC should also enforce the U.S. Government ceiling on salaries, unless a special exemption is granted.
5. TCC should consider shortening or eliminating some aspects of its orientation, and allowing, on an individual basis, time for professional contacts and information gathering.
6. TCC should give all OPEXers two months' salary advance in addition to their settling-in allowance prior to departure from the U.S.
7. TCC should establish a "Welcome" in each BLS country to assist new recruits in settling-in.
8. USAID Missions, in collaboration with TCC should determine how best to authorize use of a rental vehicle during the initial period of settling-in (e.g. as part of settling-in allowance, or as tax deductible moving expense).
9. TCC should follow-up on OPEXer reports in Swaziland and Botswana, and should incorporate reporting requirements into OPEX contracts.
10. PSF should submit an illustrative participant training budget for AID approval, as per the TCC contract, and up-date actual budgets for all participants, based on allowances authorized in AID Handbook 10.

EVALUATION OF CORE CONTRACT OF TRANSCENTURY/PHELPS STOKES

I. Background

The implementation of the bilateral SAMD projects in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland has been handled through one core contract with TransCentury Corporation. This contract was negotiated during April to August, 1979, out of nine responses to the Request for Proposals. The contract was signed on August 31, 1979 for a two-year period at a cost of \$2.01 million, or \$670,000 for each bilateral project. Under the contract, TransCentury Corporation (TCC) was to handle the recruitment of OPEX technicians, while Phelps Stokes Fund (PSF) was sub-contracted to handle the placement of African participants in U.S. and African training institutions.

The core contract is due to expire on August 31, 1981. In order to prepare for the extension of the contract, the BLS missions scheduled evaluations of each SAMD project during the second quarter of FY 1981. These evaluations were followed by a regional conference held in Maseru from April 21 to 23 to discuss the major findings of the evaluations and to determine the scope of the follow-on contract. This evaluation of the core contract is drawn from findings of the three bilateral SAMDP evaluations, and supplemented by the management review of the contractor(s) which the BLS missions conducted in March 1981 and discussed during the Maseru conference.

TransCentury Corporation has assumed responsibility under the contract for the recruitment of OPEX technicians. TransCentury is also responsible for placement of participants under a subcontract with Phelps-Stokes Fund. Other minor elements of the program, such as in-country training and overall projects implementation have been handled by TransCentury Corporation. The performance of the contractor and sub-contractor are discussed in the following two sections respectively. However, owing to recent administrative problems experienced by AID with the sub-contractor, the first recommendation of this evaluation is that TCC should assume more active responsibility for its subcontract with Phelps-Stokes Fund, and should ensure that AID requests are met on a timely basis. The role of the field representative, issues relating to the cost of the contract, and comments pertaining to the renewal of the contract are the subjects of the last three, brief sections.

II. TransCentury Corporation (TCC)

TCC's primary responsibility under the contract is for the recruitment of OPEX technicians. As of February, 1981, TCC received 71 requests for technical staff. These requests

include short-term assistance requests which were subsequently cancelled, and contract extensions, since each of these types of requests is made under the Delivery Order mechanism. Thus TransCentury has provided about 62 long-term technicians, of which 40 were funded by SAMDP, and the others were recruited under other AID projects.

No TransCentury involvement in in-country training has been requested, and it is unlikely that the USAID Missions will request TCC assistance in this aspect of the project which they monitor carefully from the field, unless short-term technical assistance is required for specific in-country training programs. Thus this section of the evaluation is limited to TCC's role in the recruitment of technicians.

(A) The Recruitment Process. TCC utilizes an active, intensive approach to recruitment based on the publications of a newsletter (funded under another AID project) and advertisements in journals and newspapers which are published frequently. TCC also has an extensive roster of possible candidates which is checked against every delivery order. Thus TCC has been able to provide a choice of three candidates whom they screen using a group interview technique. The candidates are then placed in order of preference and submitted to the requesting AID Mission, which in turn forwards them to the respective BLS government. Final selections are made in the field, which notifies TCC of its choices in order of preference. TCC then proceeds to finalize a contract with the selected candidate. Occasionally the first candidate is no longer available, in which case TCC proceeds to negotiate with the second candidate.

In general, this recruitment process has worked well. Some OPEX technicians complained of long lead times required for recruitment, and of lack of communication by TCC during this period. (One technician was first contacted in December and told he would depart in March. The next communication he received was in May, this time for an August departure.) Although most delays occur because of bureaucratic delays within AID and the host government, TCC should nonetheless keep potential candidates up to date on the progress of their recruitment. This would perhaps reduce the number of candidates who find alternative employment prior to hearing from TCC.

There have been a significant number of cases where candidates are identified in the field, and TCC is requested to sign a contract with them. TCC has stated a preference for conducting a recruitment search even for these positions. While the AID Missions agree in principle on the desirability of conducting such a search; in specific instances they feel confident that the pre-selected candidate is the best alternative. This is especially true in Botswana, where not only the Mission, but the government has pre-selected candidates. In some cases, these candidates come from outside Botswana but are remembered by the government from previous assignments to Botswana. Given the high incidence of exceptions in the area of pre-selection of candidates, the evaluation can only recommend that TCC proceed on a case by case basis, and initiate a recruitment search only after confirming with the Mission concerned that they would consider alternative candidates. Only one major mistake has been made on TCC recruitment when TCC informed an OPEXer he would live in Gaborone, when in fact he was assigned to a small town forty kilometers away. The OPEXer did not know about the change in residence until he arrived in-country. This mistake is inexcusable.

(B) Quality of Technicians. The quality of OPEX technicians has been high with only two exceptions. One of these was a pre-selected candidate and another was selected through the regular recruitment process. It should be noted, however, that this evaluation is limited to the forty technicians which are funded by SAMDP: technicians recruited for other projects, as each of the Missions has undertaken under the TCC contract, are not included in this evaluation. This represents a good track record.

For historical reasons, TCC's role in development is widely known among third country nationals. Several TCNs have been recruited for SAMDP positions, and the quality has been impressive. In isolated instances, however, recruits have had little job experience and are thus at a relative disadvantage in terms of initiating organizational improvements within the departments to which they are assigned. It should be noted that USAID/Botswana does not concur in the placement of TCNs unless they hold a U.S. Green Card, because they consider that the project is a demonstration of American technical capabilities.

(C) Salaries. TransCentury Corporation utilizes guidelines from AID in establishing salaries for OPEX technicians. Salaries are based on past earnings and are increased by 10% for incentive and 7% in lieu of retirement and other benefits. TCC views 17% as a firm formula which is offered in every instance where an earning history exists. TCC recognizes that this formula is capable of producing anomalies. The evaluation indicates that TCC should regard the 17% increase as a maximum, not a rigid formula. Often technicians would be willing to work for less, as AID experience with previous contractors amply demonstrates. Particularly questionable is the practice of offering 7% in lieu

of retirement for technicians who are already retired, usually from U.S. government service. In these instances TCC should simply offer a minimal salary adjustment as an initial negotiating position.

TCC generally conducts comparability studies when there is no earnings record, or the earnings record is extremely low. USAID authorization is generally requested when TCC wishes to carry out a comparability study. AID may wish to specify a wider latitude to TCC in conducting comparability studies, or simply request to be informed. Two salary cases which seem to be out of line were encountered during the evaluation. However, it should be pointed out that the evaluation did not undertake a systematic analysis of salaries. Both of these cases were based on comparability studies. In the first case, TCC was confronted with an ex-Peace Corps Volunteer who was in a Ph.D program and was looking for an overseas position so that he could develop material for a Ph.D dissertation. TCC apparently treated the candidate as if he already had a Ph.D, and undertook a comparability study which was fundamentally flawed by the fact that comparable positions in the U.S. require significant job experience, whereas this candidate had virtually none. Ignoring the lack of a Ph.D or prior experience, TCC offered this young candidate a \$40,000 salary. Even if a strict comparability study indicated such a high salary, TCC should have applied basic good sense and judgment, or requested guidance from AID. The second instance represents a doubling in salary for an IIE-recruited OPEXer who felt he was underpaid. His bargaining paid off, since the department in which he had worked needed his assistance badly. The salary offered in this case was not egregiously out of line, although his previous salary had also been based on an earnings history in the United States.

Some salary issues occur periodically with OPEXers who make more than U.S. Government ceilings permit. AID and TCC should enforce a salary ceiling in accordance with U.S. Government regulations, unless special exemptions are granted by AID. These regulations should include country differentials paid in addition to their salaries.

TCC has forwarded the proposition that OPEX technicians receive mid-tour merit/inflation increases. The consensus at the Maseru conference was that an increase of 5% was appropriate followed by another increase of 5% or so at the end of the contract. These increases could be specified in PIO/Ts and should be included in individual contracts.

(D) Orientation. TCC's orientation in Washington varies from one to four days depending on the number of OPEXers and other factors. In general, interviews held with OPEXers confirmed the utility of these orientations, especially for those who had never worked overseas before. It should be noted that TCC's orientations have improved significantly with time, as feedback has become available. However, TCC could shorten

the formal portion of the orientation to allow time for professional contacts and information gathering, if a technician requests such contacts.

Several OPEXers complained about inadequate information on items to bring or not to bring. Many have had to purchase kitchenware and linen at far greater cost than in the U.S. Others complained that this type of advice came too late at orientation, after they had already packed. The main conclusion of the interviews is that TCC should make available more accurate information as soon as a contract is negotiated. Recent advice prepared by the TCC "Welcomer" in Lesotho on packing would be useful. TCC should also distribute orientation materials prior to orientation, so that recruits can review them thoroughly.

TCC should also be more realistic about shopping in the region. Admonitions against shopping in South Africa are unrealistic and naive, since a customs union covers the entire region, and the same goods are available in every country, with only the price tag revealing a difference. The predominance of South Africans in the commercial sectors of the BLS countries renders TCC's admonitions meaningless, as well as expensive for OPEXers.

One frequent complaint about TCC orientation was excessive political/moral orientation with respect to South Africa. These views represent TCC's private views, and are inappropriate in the context of the contract, unless clearly labelled as private views and handled informally. This is not to suggest that South Africa should not be mentioned in the orientation. An objective presentation of relevant historical facts, including a discussion of relationships between South Africa and the BLS governments constitutes essential background material for Americans living in Southern Africa. Economic relationships should also be discussed, as well as official BLS governments' views on racial policies in South Africa, the refugee situation and other pertinent facts.

Visas to South Africa are essential for numerous reasons, including access outside of the region and medical emergencies. TCC has realized this and now recommends multiple entry visas. They should also give OPEXers the option of obtaining South African visas on separate paper, as is customary for official Americans. This would avoid problems in visiting some other African countries, or other more serious problems for third country nationals. Recently, a third country national has been caused much distress by the fact that his visa is in his passport: he fears that his government will question the visa and make it difficult for him to renew his passport when it expires.

Orientation is the time when TCC discusses financial arrangements and offers advances to OPEX technicians. Since TCC salary payments are made one month after the end of the month worked, there is generally a two to two and a half month lag before an OPEXer receives salary. TCC has often underestimated the cash necessary to settle in, purchase a vehicle, acquire furniture, curtains, rugs, and establish a household. One OPEXer was told that \$5000 was ample: he spent that amount during the first week on a vehicle, and suffered considerable hardship and difficulty since his assets were tied up in the U.S. Another OPEXer, one of the first in Botswana, arrived in-country with no advance or settling-in allowance, and only \$200 to tide him over his first two months. In fairness, this occurred before a non-accountable settling-in allowance was approved. Nonetheless, it demonstrates minimal concern for the welfare of this OPEXer, who was offered no advance. In January, TCC agreed that all OPEXers would be given two months salary advance and their settling-in allowance prior to departure from the U.S. This should be done whether the OPEXer feels that he must have the advance or not, since the unexpected has been the norm rather than the exception with requirements for cash during the settling-in period. TCC failed to carry out this agreement with an OPEXer who arrived in Lesotho in April, 1981. During the forthcoming contract negotiations with TCC, AID should insist that all advances and allowances be given to every OPEX technician without fail.

One other complaint about orientation and recruitment in general relates to job knowledge. Most OPEXers interviewed felt that they knew too little about their job prior to arriving in-country. Generally, the only information available to TCC and the OPEXers is the scope of work included in the PIO/T. In at least two instances, TCC misplaced the PP for project-funded contractors: these can be obtained again from AID, and should be sent to OPEXers even before they arrive in Washington for orientation. In order to supplement information available, TCC should prepare a list of representative questions describing jobs, and request the assistance of the field coordinator and the USAID Missions in obtaining answers to these questions.

Other aspects of orientation appear to be sound. TCC is to be commended for including advice on income taxes. They should consider allowing more time during orientation for professional appointments which would be individually tailored to the interests and job requirements of each OPEXer, so that their resource base is as complete as possible. It is inherent in the nature of evaluation that problem areas receive more attention than good performance. In general, OPEXers have been satisfied with orientations, and the additional feedback provided in this report may prove to be useful to TCC for further improvements.

(E) In-Country Support. TCC's support after OPEXers have arrived in-country varies considerably within each country. The best support has been in Lesotho, where TCC hired, with Mission concurrence, a "Welcomer" to meet new arrivals and to assist them with logistical support, shopping, bank accounts, furniture, etc. This "Welcomer" is paid on a per arrival basis. She has also prepared a guide to Lesotho which includes practical information on what to bring, how to pack, where to shop in Lesotho, select Sesotho phrases, a map of Maseru, etc. This support has been highly appreciated by OPEXers, as they have someone available to assist them with any questions which might arise.

In Botswana, the difficult experience of a recent arrival who felt particularly lost has prompted TCC to contract for a similar guide to Botswana. The TCC field representative who is located in Botswana does not feel that his role should include such intensive assistance with settling-in. Also, the field representative is frequently out of town. Swaziland has had relatively few OPEXers, most of whom are involved with an agricultural project. An AID wife has generously assisted them in settling-in. The Swazi Mission is now interested in identifying some-one to assist all OPEXers, with remuneration, as is done in Lesotho. The evaluation recommends that each country establish a "welcomer" position, since the field representative should not be burdened with this level of detail.

During the Botswana evaluation, another problem related to settling-in was identified by an OPEXer: the availability of transportation. A vehicle in all of the BLS countries is not a luxury, but a necessity for shopping, commuting and following up on the myriad details of settling-in. Thus one OPEXer suggested that the rental of a car should be authorized during the first two weeks in-country. The evaluation finds that this is a reasonable suggestion. USAID Missions should consider authorizing this as part of the settling-in allowance. TCC should also recommend car rental during orientation, and point out that at a minimum it represents a tax deduction as a legitimate moving expense. One Mission suggested that this should be paid for out of settling-in allowance, if the OPEXer so desires.

TCC support after the settling-in period is generally limited to salary payments and reimbursements for various expenses. Initially there were complaints that payments were made without notifying the employee, and that additions and deductions were not explained. TCC therefore developed a notification slip which explains payments and is mailed to each contractor when a deposit is made. The TCC field representative also is available for post-settling-in support, which generally relates to R&R travel and the administration of other items in the contract, as well as a variety of personal matters depending on the OPEXer.

After settling in, all BLS Missions feel that TCC's role should be limited to logistical and administrative problems. The professional performance of the OPEXer, or any work-related

problems, should be handled by the host government and AID.

(F) OPEXer Reports. TCC noted in a January, 1981 document that OPEXer reports are called for in the SAMDP Project Paper, and that TCC should remind OPEXers of this requirement. To date, TCC has not acted on this self-recommendation. In Lesotho, the AID Mission has taken the initiative on OPEXer reports, and requires tri-annual reports in March, July and November. During the evaluation, the AID Missions in Swaziland and Botswana also noted the need for reports, and suggested that reports should be due initially three months after arrival to highlight any problems which may be impeding job effectiveness. Thereafter reports should be due semi-annually. At the present time TCC should follow-up on OPEXer reports in Botswana and Swaziland. TCC should also incorporate reporting requirements in its individual contracts with OPEX technicians, keeping in mind the different requirements for different Missions.

III. Phelps-Stokes Fund

Phelps-Stokes (PSF) has sub-contract responsibility for placing participants in U.S. and African training institutions. The following section evaluates their performance.

(A) Placements. Although the contract was signed August 31, 1979, PSF received no delivery orders for placing participants until March, 1980. Between March and August, 1980, seventy-three requests for placements were received, including ten in May, twenty-two in July and fourteen in August. PSF performed outstandingly in effecting these placements, often relying on special relationships with individual training institutions.

Several problems can be attributed to the speed with which these placements had to be effected. In isolated instances, housing was a problem or registration/acceptance was not finalized; however, these problems were generally resolved promptly. In other instances, participants were not pleased with enrollment in minority institutions. There were also problems with some institutions accepting credit for course work completed in Africa: e.g. a junior in college would find that he was enrolled as a freshman. These problems require special monitoring on behalf of PSF, as well as intervention at appropriate times.

In general, host governments and AID Missions have been pleased with PSF placements. As PSF has more lead time, alternative placements would be desirable for each participant.

(B) Orientation. PSF offers a one-week orientation to participants in Washington, D.C. It is reported that participants find this orientation useful and enjoyable. No direct access to feedback or orientation was available to the evaluator.

(C) Support. PSF prides itself on personalized care and support for every participant. This includes frequent contact by phone as well as occasional visits if necessary. There is a consensus among the BLS Missions that too much support is undesirable and results in "hand-holding". Telephone calls should be limited to emergency situations, and visits should not be regularized, but should be limited to incidental trips resulting from other PSF business.

(D) Reports. PSF has recently submitted its first set of reports on participants based on the first semester. The normal reporting to which PSF has committed itself includes quarterly narrative progress reports, grade reports as they became available and semi-annual academic reports. The BLS Missions feel that this reporting is excessive. Semi-annual reports should suffice, with grades attached or submitted later when available.

The content of reports has also been criticized, particularly with respect to frank discussions of problems and proposed actions. The BLS Missions have recently advised PSF of the preferred content of reports.

(E) Allowances of Administration. Only recently, the BLS Missions have encountered a major problem with PSF in terms of allowances. Although PSF was required under its contract to present for AID approval an illustrative participant training budget, it has not done so to date. Both AID and the contractors PSF and TCC are remiss in this matter. PSF has also been slow in presenting Training Implementation Plans (TIPs) for each participant, and an actual budget, as requested by March 15, 1981.

Owing to late reporting, AID has only recently been confronted with evidence that PSF is making allowances far in excess of those allowed in AID Handbook 10, which establishes monthly living allowances (Chapter 25) and excludes special allowances such as clothing allowances (Chapter 20). PSF has claimed that the AID Office of International Training informed them that they need not comply with Handbook 10. USAID/Botswana is seeking confirmation at this point. In fairness, the TCC contract did not specify that Handbook 10 regulations would apply to participant training. However, PSF has been advised that it must comply with Handbook 10 beginning May 1, 1981, and that any deviation from Handbook 10 will be based on written approval from the appropriate USAID Mission.

Apart from problems with allowances, PSF's delays in submitting TIPs and individual budgets call into question its administrative capability. As the primary contractor, TCC should monitor PSF's performance until these required submissions are made.

(F) African Institutions. The SAMDP Project Paper called for approximately half of long-term training to take place in African institutions. To date, only a handful of placements have been in Africa, for a variety of valid reasons discussed below. The Missions have criticized PSF for not making available information on training opportunities in Africa. Rather than relying on secondary sources, PSF has sought to seek out all information through site visits, and expensive and time-consuming method of obtaining information.

Evidence gathered during the evaluation suggests that AID did not investigate the possibilities of training in African institutions prior to setting its preferences in the SAMD PP. Interviews with senior BLS officials involved with training revealed that (1) places for non-nationals with African institutions are becoming increasingly limited; (2) the BLS countries send large numbers of students to African institutions from other funding sources: Lesotho had more students in Africa than in the U.S. (73 vs 69) in 1980; (3) Botswana recently requested SAMD/PSF assistance in placing students who were not able to find places in African institutions, and (4) some African countries, e.g. the humid coastal English and French speaking countries, are not popular among BLS participants owing to climatic and language difficulties.

Any attempt to promote SAMDP placements in African institutions must therefore begin with an assessment of the availability of places, and compare this to the demand for training. In general, senior BLS officials are knowledgeable about African training institutions. PSF should tap this knowledge prior to further investigation.

IV. Field Representative

The TCC contract called for a field representative to be posted in one of the BLS countries, which turned out to be Botswana. Since Botswana has been the primary user of TCC services, this placement has proved to be a logical one. The job of the field representative is to provide support to OPEX technicians as necessary. Thus the field representative has made quarterly visits of one to two weeks to Lesotho and Swaziland. During these visits he has been available for consultation with OPEXers who are having administrative, contractual or personal problems. The field representative's job deliberately excluded official or substantive involvement with OPEX work assignments, since this involvement was reserved for host governments and USAID Missions. USAID/Botswana estimates that the presence of the field representative to handle TCC problems directly via telex has saved about 25% of an AID/W backstop officer's job as well as an equivalent proportion of the USAID HRDO's time.

The main issue surrounding the presence of a field coordinator is the cost of maintaining him in the field. Total support costs are over \$150,000 per annum when office expenses, personal benefits, allowances and housing are included. If the field representative's services are only required for up to two weeks per BLS country per quarter, it would make sense to station him in Washington, where he could assist with other TCC operations including orientation. (He was cited as the most useful source during orientation by one OPEXer.)

The consensus of the BLS Missions is that they would like to utilize the services of the field representative more rather than less. However, the field support requirements of OPEX technicians tend to diminish as they spend more time in the field. Some OPEX-related demands will continue to be felt as new OPEXers arrive, albeit on a reduced scale. The BLS Missions would like to involve the field representative in other tasks such as organizing pre-departure orientations for participants, administering TOEFL and other examinations, assisting in participant placements, providing advances to participants, assisting with supplementary information for OPEX positions, and administering the "Welcomer" program in each country. USAID/Lesotho is already in the process of relying on the field representative to organize a pre-departure participant orientation in collaboration with the GOL in May. They also plan to request his assistance in conducting a survey of returned participants, as the other Missions have done. Thus the role of the field representative is continuing to evolve to meet the changing requirements of the BLS Missions.

V. Cost of the Contract

The BLS Missions conducted a management review of the contractor in early March, 1981. The review should be considered as a supplement to this evaluation. The review analyzed core contract costs for both TCC and PSF.

(A) TCC. TCC core costs (in addition to a 2.4% fee which is attached to each individual contract) averaged \$12,000 per technician month during the first four months of the contract, when only six Delivery Orders were placed. With twenty-six new orders in January, 1980, monthly unit costs dropped to about \$1,300. In the past year, the TCC overhead has been about \$850 per month, plus the 2.4% fee. The figure would be somewhat higher if short-term contracts which have expired were excluded from the calculations.

TCC has submitted a "rough cut" budget for a contract extension. The low option includes 1.8 years of recruiters, as well as administrative staff and an additional 10% C&A fee which did not exist in the first contract. During the management review, TCC stated that one recruiter could handle about five recruitments over a three-months period, or twenty recruitments per year. Yet TCC budgeted 1.8 years for a low option of fifteen

recruitments, whereas 1.8 years should be reasonable for about thirty-six recruitments. The BLS Missions will have to resolve the discrepancies in the "rough cut" budget during the contract negotiations in July/August, 1981.

(B) PSF. The management review of PSF shows that participant training costs are potentially reasonable if case loads can be increased. Presently, support costs are somewhat high at over \$300 per participant month. However, if case loads can be increased to a suggested level of forty to fifty per program officer, participant support costs would fall to about \$150 per month. This figure is comparable to that of other placement institutions in terms of both costs and case loads.

It should be pointed out that the PSF contract began in September 1979, and ran for six months before a single participant was named for placement. Core costs for PSF during this period ranged from \$11,897 to \$30,890 per month, totalling over \$100,000. During this period, PSF did not produce an illustrative training budget or consult available information on African training institutions. AID should be more careful about timing these types of contracts to coincide with demand for participant placements. With such a long AID history of participant training, it should have been known that requests for placements are usually made after March of a given year, and almost never in the fall.

(C) Cash Flow Problems. TCC has frequently complained about delays in payments which have resulted in cash flow problems for TCC. In response to these complaints, the USAID/Botswana controller has adopted procedures for both USAID/Botswana and USAID/Lesotho which expedite payments far more than is normally the case, with delays of only about two weeks. In addition to expediting payments, USAID/Botswana has regularly pre-positioned \$90,000 every month, resulting in AID payment of OPEXer salaries one month before TCC pays the OPEXers. Although unusual for AID to authorize such payments, and to allow salaries to be paid one month after AID pays the contractor, this agreement was negotiated as part of the contract. Thus while TCC complains of having to borrow for a few days each month at high interest rates, in effect they have the use of \$90,000 for one month prior to making payments to OPEX technicians. During the contract negotiation, AID should investigate whether TCC should maintain its delay in paying OPEX technicians and whether AID pre-positioning of payments to TCC continues to be justifiable.

VI. Contract Renewal

The BLS missions developed consensus on the major issues relating to the renewal of the TCC contract at the Maseru meetings. There is one aspect of the contract which must be revised, in view of the scheduled completion of the SAMD projects in FY 1983.

Currently, the contract does not provide for the continued support of TCC and PSF for technicians and participants after the contract expires. Since new technicians will continue to be hired, and new participants placed over the next two years, it is probable that there will be continuing support requirements after the contract expires. Support costs should therefore be built into both OPEX contracts and participant training budgets, so that the contractors have both the funds and the commitment to maintain technicians and participants after the core contract expires.

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MANAGEMENT AUDIT

TransCentury Contract No.: AID/afr-C-1569

Washington, D.C. March 4-13, 1981

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Maseru
March 31, 1981

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Attachment I - TransCentury Contract Cost Data
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I. TRANSCENTURY POLICY AND METHODS

A. Long Term OPEX Technician

1. Recruitment

In general, TC uses an active, intensive recruitment approach designed to find and recruit those in the job market as opposed to a passive, extensive approach based on general mass media advertising. When a Delivery Order arrives, the designated recruitment officer checks it against resumé's on hand and contacts those who appear promising. They also place the opening in their own job bulletin (published under a different AID contract.) The recruitment officer also checks various state employment services, professional listings, and various federal bureaus. Finally, the Program Director and the Senior Recruitment Officer attended six professional society conferences (three in Washington) during 1980 to make openings known, get leads, and meet possible candidates.

Candidates are interviewed and ranked by TC recruiters for relevancy of professional qualifications, experience, and interest. They are also tested and interviewed with respect to their ability to work in an African setting. Recruiters also review, check out, and discuss (i.e., vet) statements given by references. Interviews are conducted in a group setting so that interviewers can cross check their impressions.

In response to a query on this point, the TransCentury recruiters and the Program Director indicated that TransCentury has no particular preference for third country over American candidates and that their recruitment systems are set up to recruit the most qualified eligible source. Nevertheless, for historical reasons TransCentury's role in development is widely known and third country persons with development related skills leave their resumé's with TransCentury. Consequently, TransCentury is particularly able to provide third country candidates for OPEX positions if such candidates are desired. To date Swaziland has selected no third country technicians, Botswana one, and Lesotho four.

The AID review team concurs in the TC recommendation that even candidates pre-selected by the field go through this process and that alternatives to the candidates pre-selected by the field also be considered. In one case, all the pre-selected candidate's references indicated certain managerial shortcomings which also come up during interviews with the recruiters. These shortcomings eventually proved the candidate's undoing the job. The TransCentury interviewees also indicated their feeling that many of the other pre-selected candidates represent known quantities as opposed to the best qualified and experienced candidates available.

With regard to placing greater reliance on mass advertising to recruit, TransCentury recruiters pointed out that professional journals generally come out only quarterly. Indications of interest in response to advertisements in these journals are too few and too slow in coming to serve the project. This opinion corresponds to AID experience with efforts of a previous contractor where their efforts generally were limited to advertisements in professional and popular publications.

On balance, the TransCentury team approach to recruitment seems to be recruiting better qualified candidates more quickly than with the previous contract. We have not encountered the long delays in nominating candidates nor have the host governments rejected entire lists of candidates as occurred under the predecessor contract.

2. Orientation

Orientation of OPEXers and their spouses varies from one day to four days according to number of recruits to be oriented, their requirements as determined by interest and experience, and by time available. It commences with a written and oral review of administration and logistics (which TransCentury regards as the minimum). It also includes reviews of concerns expressed by OPEXers, presentations by host country embassy representatives and State geographic officers, and cultural considerations. Orientation is continually adjusted based on written and oral feedback given immediately afterwards, or later feedback from the field, and development or receipt of new informational materials. While there were early complaints that orientation was incomplete, sometimes inaccurate, and reflected TransCentury views over USG policy, these seem to have subsided. Written comments from recently arrived OPEXers are generally complimentary.

3. Monitoring and Maintenance

Like orientation, monitoring and maintenance has been progressively refined to meet evolving needs. At present, OPEXers are actively offered an advance to cover furniture and two months salary. TransCentury has developed and is refining a series of form letters designed to inform the OPEXers of receipt of request for reimbursement, how much is involved, and estimated date of payment. Forms along the lines but simpler than AID T & A slips have been developed to notify the OPEXers of deposits to his bank account in the U.S. On balance, as various allowances and procedures are becoming more widely and thoroughly understood on all sides and the information system from orientation through assignment to the field is becoming more formalized, breakdowns are becoming less frequent and the volume and the frequency and intensity of OPEXer complaints is diminishing.

4. Evaluation

This appears to be the least developed and least institutionalized aspect of the OPEX operation. This is true both in respect to reports from OPEXers on their work and reports from counterparts on how OPEXers are doing. The Program Director indicates this is a point which TransCentury will commence working on. The recruiters wish to receive performance feedback in order to shape future recruitment activities and selections.

B. Short-Term Consultants

TransCentury has the same network and process as for long termers except they have more university prospects and also people who would take leave from business. Short termers are generally easier to recruit than long termers as university people get off for a term and business people

can take short leaves. We think the Mission should try TransCentury more for short termers.

II. TRANSCENTURY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

A. Accounting Procedures

TransCentury requires employees to maintain time cards that identify daily work hours against various activities (contracts and grants) in typical consulting firm fashion. This procedure provides TransCentury some flexibility to allocate workforce to meet fluctuating activity needs and maximize employee productivity.

B. Expenditure Review

Attachment I draws on these records to outline the level of effort by position each month. It also measures total core contract costs against Delivery Orders to give support costs per technician month. While support costs per technician were several times higher during the initial start up period, they have averaged \$852 per technician per month from July 1980 through February 1981. Attachment I cost data does not include any technician financing provided through the Delivery Order Mechanism, although the 2.4% overhead charge included in Delivery Orders could be considered a core support cost. Applying the 2.4% as core support would add \$100 per technician month on a \$50,000 a year Delivery Order. On the other hand, a significant element of TransCentury field salaries underwrite the participant training efforts of the Phelps Stokes Fund.

C. Cost Projections

The TransCentury "rough cut" estimate for a two year contract extension (Attachment II) further indicates that support costs per technician months should continue to fall as OPEX levels rise. That is, Attachment II indicates a \$572 monthly support cost per technician at a peak technician load of 100. The problem here is that the reverse is also true. Should OPEX levels fall, per month support costs will rise even with some reassignment of staff to other duties.

D. Cash Flow

According to backup documentation in support of invoice FYR-81-05-0051-18, dated March 2, 1981, the core contract has a balance of \$667,286 as of February 28, 1981. This balance would permit monthly expenditures of over \$111,000 through end of contract on August 31, 1981. This is from \$10,000 to \$15,000 more than average monthly expenditures for the past several months. An estimated additional \$20,000 in participant training was wrongly charged to the core contract rather than to PIO/P's in late CY 1980. This amount will soon be credited back to the core contract and, consequently, the contract should have a substantial surplus balance on August 31, 1981.

III. NUMBER AND QUALITY OF TRANSCENTURY STAFF REQUIRED TO RECRUIT, ORIENT, MONITOR AND MAINTAIN, AND EVALUATE LONG-TERM TECHNICIANS AND SHORT-TERM CONSULTANTS

A. Recruitment and Orientation

The Senior Recruitment Officer is an Ethiopian refugee who has a Ph.D in African studies and economics from Johns Hopkins. He performed a five months manpower study for AID in Cameroon and served as Chief of Party for an AID agricultural development project in Chad. TransCentury pays him at the rate of \$48,000 per year. The second major recruiter, a South African refugee, has a Ph.D. in non-formal education from the University of Massachusetts and has taught there. She is paid at the rate of \$25,000 per year. Other recruiters are used as needed. The review team was impressed with the range and intensity of interest and perceptiveness of the recruiters demonstrated during our discussions with them.

While there are strong arguments for maintaining a recruitment staff with the comparatively high qualifications and relevant background of the TransCentury recruiting staff, there is comparatively more room for discussion with regard to workload. The recruiters themselves estimate that using the current system, each can recruit for five positions at once and turn over each recruitment action in a maximum of three months. The Program Director estimates eleven recruitment actions at once. Even the lower estimate given by the recruiters would mean about twenty replacements per year per recruiter. Actually, during CY 1980 when recruitment activity was at its height, the average number of recruitment actions per recruiter at any one time over the year was 5.26. There were 62 placements during the year and a total of 67 placements to date. Of these 67 placements, however, only an estimated 25-35 involved intensive recruitment activity. The remainder involved extending existing technicians carried over from earlier contracts or signing on pre-identified candidates. (See Attachment IV).

B. Monitoring and Maintenance

The direct charges to the contract for the positions of Voucher Assistant and Accounting Assistant have averaged approximately one individual full time in each position, although this represents the sum of several individuals' time within the Controller's office. This level of effort does not seem unreasonable given the flow of cost reimbursement payments to OPEXers, financial support of field operations, staff and OPEX payroll, travel and transportation payments, overhead payments, accounting for Delivery Order specific and core costs, billing process to AID, etc. The level of effort in this area should not increase significantly as total active OPEX technicians increase (and this is reflected in the TransCentury Phase II Budget--Attachment II which forecasts two persons full time at both the high and low options).

On balance the TransCentury operation is one that is improving with experience and becoming more cost effective as volumes increase. The cost/output ratio may be improved by seeking efficiencies in TransCentury operations as noted above, but the better pay-off would be in operations or raising the level of TransCentury recruitment support USAID

country programs across the board with appropriate rather than a single common project.

Looking into the future, it would seem that there are two prime areas that cause TransCentury costs projected in Attachment II for the two year extension appear high. First is the level of effort required (low option) for recruitment of 15 long term and four short term technicians per year--a minimum of 1.8 persons of recruiter staff time. This comes out to just over eight placements per recruiter year, far less than anyone's estimate of feasible workload.

The second area of costs projected in Attachment II which is of concern involves initiation of a G & A charge on subcontract costs. This would represent an additional cost element not present in the existing contract.

IV. PHELPS STOKES POLICY AND METHODS

A. Participant Training in United States

Phelps Stokes has established a participant training structure and operation very similar to that traditionally used by OIT. The main difference is that the participant program staff also organizes and manages the orientation.

1. Placement

Like OIT, the placement process begins with assignment of a placement action to a Program Officer according to existing case load, subject matter, and geographic location of most likely institutions. The Program Officer draws on professional reference books, personal contacts, Phelps Stokes experience, and stated Mission preferences to make initial inquiries. In addition to using these factors to select a list of the schools with the most appropriate programs, Phelps Stokes also, according to their Program Director, attempts to distribute students throughout a variety of schools. This is to avoid the possibility of a group of students from any one country forming a country group isolated from the life of the school as a whole. Phelps Stokes endeavors to provide three alternatives for placement to the Mission and host government.

One major difficulty in making placements involved arranging for timely administration of the TOEFEL examination in the field. The TransCentury Field Coordinator is now administering the examination on a practice (unofficial) basis in Botswana. The TransCentury Program Director believes he can become formally certified and able to administer the examination regularly.

The Field Coordinator arranges for advances, travel arrangements are made by the respective Missions, and the Field Coordinator arranges payment for the tickets. This appears suitable.

2. Orientation

Pre-departure orientation has not yet fully developed although preparations are underway. The Field Coordinator is taking steps in conjunction with the Mission EIRO's to improve and formalize these orientations. In contrast, the Phelps Stokes Orientation in Washington takes up to 1 week. Organized by the Program Officers, it appears quite thorough and appropriate. If anything, it could be reduced.

3. Monitoring and Maintenance

Monitoring and maintenance occurs by mail, phone, and visit. Tuition is paid by quarter or semester while allowances are paid directly to the students monthly. The Program Officer reviews charges for correctness, and the accounting clerk draws up sheets for payment, and passes the sheet on to the Phelps Stokes Controller in New York for payment.

4. Evaluation

Formal evaluation of ongoing participants under Phelps Stokes hasn't yet occurred as the first group entered training in September 1980. The review team envisions it will revolve around receipt of grade reports and course records and course reports. We don't think much formality or extensive effort will be required.

B. Third Country Training

Phelps Stokes' capability for third country training is just now being developed and reportedly will be in place for the 1981-1982 school year. Their review of Third Country possibilities based on catalogs and visits to institutions is reported by Phelps Stokes to be enroute to the Missions.

Once established, this will likely be AID's only capability for regular Third Country placement in Africa. The present OIT contractors have not developed this capability. Further, it is very possible that there will be a changeover in OIT contractors when current contracts come up for renewal in October-November 1981 as OIT and many Missions are highly dissatisfied with at least one of them and somewhat disgruntled with others.

V. PHELPS STOKES FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

A. Accounting Procedures

1. Core Contract Costs - The system employed by Phelps Stokes to allocate costs to various grants/contracts is to budget employees' time and then charge expenses based on the budget. As a private/non profit organization, Phelps Stokes has far less flexibility to shift staff among activities--it tends to staff programs based on approved positions.

2. PIO/P Costs - Phelps Stokes submits monthly vouchers for reimbursement by line item by PIO/P. The procedure seems to be working well generally, with Phelps Stokes closely monitoring costs. There have been two problems to date, both now in the process of reconciliation. The first is that Phelps Stokes established their own allowance levels rather than using AID standard allowances as given in Handbook 10. The second is that initial Phelps Stokes cost estimates merely reflected suggested assignments of the amounts made available in PIO/Ps rather than independent estimates and were prone to error. Phelps Stokes interviewees attributed this to inexperience and promised that budget estimates would become more realistic as they established a track record. Nevertheless, while Phelps Stokes now has one semester's experience with dozens of participants in forty one colleges, their most recent estimates continue to reflect initial practices and are not realistic.

B. Expenditure Review

Attachment III outlines the level of effort by the Phelps Stokes Fund by organization position, by month. It also shows the core contract support costs per participant month. Use of the Phelps Stokes accounting structure combined with the Mission participant schedules led to two things under SAMDP: (1) Phelps Stokes incurred six months worth of core contract costs (\$116,000) prior to receiving any Delivery Orders; and (2) the position of Program Director, as agreed during original contract negotiations, has been financed 100 percent under the contract even though this senior official does become involved in a wide range of policy and operational activities of the Phelps Stokes Washington Bureau - the majority of which are directly associated with SAMDP.

However, the cost effectiveness that Phelps Stokes has been able to achieve is impressive. Taking the costs through AID/OIT as a benchmark, we found that OIT's participant training contractor support costs varied from contractor to contractor but that \$150 per participant month represented a current average cost. However, this cost level has been achieved by high volume placements under mission programs around the world. By February 1981 Phelps Stokes had lowered their support cost per participant month to \$246. This level was achieved using five programmers managing 112 participants. The Program Director advised us that the fund could, as the current contract

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outlines, backstop 150 participants, 30 per programmer, with no increase in level of effort. Using amounts billed in February 1981, this would lower the per participant monthly core support costs to \$184. Further, the Program Director indicated a willingness to review operations with a view towards further raising the programmer case load. Moreover, we found that programmers are involved in monitoring payments to institutions as well as participants to a very large degree. The Fiscal Officer and Program Director both felt that some of this work could be assumed by accounting staff which would help case loads to rise. There may be a trade-off in lessened control but Phelps Stokes is willing to evaluate their procedures from this perspective.

While Phelps Stokes activity had a slow start, progress improving cost effectiveness to current levels has been significant. As with TransCentury, the best opportunity for further improvement in cost effectiveness lies in increasing volume.

C. Cost Projections

Phelps Stokes was not asked to do a rough cut estimate along the lines of the one done by TransCentury and included as Attachment II. However, Attachment II and the discussions in V.B. and V.E. provide the basis for making such projections.

D. Cash Flow

Per earlier Section II.D.

VI. QUALITY AND NUMBER OF PHELPS STOKES STAFF REQUIRED TO PLACE,
ORIENT AND MONITOR AND MAINTAIN PARTICIPANTS

The Phelps Stokes Fund Program Officers all have graduate degrees and related work experience in training, international development, or both. Salary levels are comparable to those of OIT direct hire programmers at the GS 11-12 level.

As with the TransCentury Programmers, we would support keeping Program Officers of the comparatively high qualifications of the Phelps Stokes staff but increase the work load at least to that originally projected (30 participants per Program Officer) and preferably to a higher level of at least forty.

Also, Phelps Stokes appears to be top-heavy on the management side with both a Director and Deputy Director being charged to the project full time. The Deputy Director also has, however, a participant case load. Nevertheless, given that the Director has outside duties and that training operations are now well established, Phelps Stokes should be able to sustain operations with a part time Director.

VII. THE FIELD COORDINATOR POSITION

Throughout the management review, discussions regarding number, type, and geographic placement of administrative staff needed to perform contractor functions frequently touched on the role of the field coordinator position and whether the position is necessary. The position is new with this contract and represents a separate identifiable cost that could be greatly reduced, if not eliminated, were the position to be abolished.

The Field Coordinator estimates that he spends forty percent of his time working on arrivals, travel, and personnel matters for OPEXers, forty percent of his time working on departures, travel, and transmitting other information on participants, and twenty percent of his time on self-support and management of his own office.

Many of the Field Coordinator's tasks have evolved over time, the responsibilities of his position are not yet fully defined, and the nature of the position should continue to evolve. Consequently, it is difficult to determine with precision which tasks and what level of workload would justify continuation of the position. During the management review, the most vocal support for continuation of the position came from the Phelps Stokes staff and from the USAID/Lesotho HRDO. The former cited the need to have a central point of communication and follow-up in the field. The latter cited the significantly lesser Mission involvement with arrivals and support of TransCentury OPEXers as compared with those OPEXers still here under the previous IEE contract. USAID/Botswana concurred in the value of having a contractor field representative but also expressed concern at the costs involved. The Field Coordinator himself estimates that ten OPEXers and twenty participants per country are needed at any one time to justify the position.

While, say, Lesotho has received less of the Coordinator's time than Botswana, he has always been available when most needed. His comparative value to Lesotho is thus greater than would be indicated by a straight breakdown of the comparative amounts of time spent in each country.

To enhance the benefits of this position in the future we suggest that comparatively more of his time be concerned with: (1) arranging and facilitating participant departures; (2) administering TOEFEL tests; (3) refining information necessary to facilitate recruitment; and (4) establishing and maintaining evaluation for participants and technicians. Consideration should also be given to his active participation in development of project training plans.

VIII. SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The TransCentury/Phelps Stokes Fund System as it has evolved no longer represents the old OPEX recruitment mechanism of earlier efforts. Rather it's now a hybrid blending characteristics from each of a number of other types of development assistance activity. Recruitment is more along the lines of an executive placement service than the old hiring hall approach and is clearly more sophisticated than that of some of the institutional contractors. Administrative support approaches that of an institutional contractor or that of backstopping a direct hire. Participant training orientation and placement resembles that of OIT when OIT programmed its participants internally.

The review team was struck by the openness, responsiveness, and receptivity of TransCentury/Phelps Stokes Fund. Compared to other activities recently reviewed there was a good sense of joint AID-Contractor effort. There was also an appealing sense of organizational pride at both TransCentury and Phelps Stokes.

1. Professional Operations in general are conducted competently with persons as highly qualified for the money as AID is likely to get. The two immediate improvements needed are to: (1) obtain budget breakdowns against existing technician Delivery Orders where they haven't yet been provided, and (2) provide budget breakdowns and assign costs against existing PIO/P's. The latter may be facilitated by the TransCentury Controller or an AID Controller meeting with Phelps Stokes staff.

2. There are examples of less than the maximum optimum workload, especially with regard to OPEX recruiting and participant placement, but this is largely because the project isn't as large as expected. There appears to be room to make staff cuts among the recruiters and among the participant Program Officers.

Attach I

Page 1 of 2

JOB CODE	HOURS										
	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APRIL	MAY	JUNE	
RECRUITING BACKUP COORD.	152	153	152	144	174	134	120	152	152	105	
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER	96	24		128	164	125	217	284	314	223	
RECRUITMENT OFFICER	152	96	99	104	122.5	113.5	155	154	165.5	168	
RECRUITMENT ASSISTANT	152	176	160	146	176	6	60	190	166	164	
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	81	84	82	105	163.5	193	197	253	238	152	
SECRETARY	133	32	42	4	20	150	147	168	168	141	
VOUCHER ASSISTANT	3			6	6		5	2	15	155	
ACCOUNTING ASSISTANT		175	120	120	120	168	168	168	168	168	
TRAVEL CLERK		45	3	5	5	6	3	16	168	168	
FIELD COORDINATOR	48								18	15	
TOTAL HOURS	507	914.5	820	922	1267	1190.5	1408	1709	1740.5	1641	
TOTAL MAN-HOURS (160 hrs)	5.1	5.7	5.1	5.8	7.9	7.4	8.8	10.7	10.9	10.3	
LONG TERM SALARIES	226	8,311	2869	2,815	13,913	11,624	17,481	17,690	21,362	14,602	
TOTAL TO DATE SALARIES	25,244	35,820	52,348	34,448	41,847	37,487	52,138	66,589	62,108	61,754	
COSTS TO DATE SALARIES		3	2		26	1	7	11	4		
COSTS TO DATE SALARIES		4	6		32	33	40	51	55	55	
TOTAL TO DATE	5,324	8,955	5,391	5,441	1,308	1,134	1,303	1,306	1,129	1,123	

	JULY	AUG. 57	SEPT.	OCT.	NOV.	DEC.	JAN.	FEB.
BOSS	96	154	154	92	65	104	50	152
ASSISTANT, EXEC COORD	252	223	221	170	123	78	164	144
ASSISTANT TO EXEC	152	168	148	176	144	164	168	140
ASSISTANT - SPECIAL	176	160	128	176	136	109	144	40
ASSISTANT - ASSISTANT	168	162	161	165	96	142	126	144
ASSISTANT - ASSISTANT	152	136	152	176	104	144	160	114
SECRETARY	2	2	1	176	299	176	172	152
SECRETARY TO EXEC	168	168	168	112	168	112	112	112
ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY	145	122	141	157	118	300	301	296
TOTAL			15	18	16	14		33
FOOD (GROUPS)	76	128	168	176	144	40	168	304
TOTAL MONTHLY	1,538	1,430	1,453	1,597	1,416	1,383	1,665	1,631
TOTAL MONTHLY (GROSS)	9.6	8.9	9.1	12.0	8.9	8.6	10.4	10.2
LONG TERM DEBITORS	1200	2050	18,745	15,052	12,474	15,602	18,257	15,885
TOTAL LONG TERM DEBITORS	62.77	59.62	70,835	57,753	57,199	36,545	51,570	69,430
DELIVERY DEBITORS	7	5	-	1	1	1	-	-
DELIVERY DEBITORS	12	67	67	68	69	70	70	71
DELIVERY COSTS FOR								
PERIODIC MONTH	363	500	1,058	840	830	522	757	978

EN SECONDARY HOURS REFLECTED
FIRST TIME PRIOR MONTHS AND
FROM ACTY CASH

DELIVERY ORDERS RECEIVED
BY TC

T
TransCentury Corporation
1739 Columbia Road, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009

TELEPHONE: (202) 328-4400
CABLE: TRANSCEN
TELEX: 64408

WARREN W. WIGGINS, PRESIDENT

March 10, 1981

Mr. Robert Bonifon
Agency for International Development
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bob:


As you, Jon Gant and Byron Bahl have requested during our various discussions about the Southern Africa Manpower Development Assistance Project, enclosed are the three items.

1. Two preliminary, "rough cut" budgets reflecting the levels of effort needed for both the low and high estimates of recruitment per year.
2. A chart reflecting the level of recruitment activity throughout the life of the project to date.
3. A budget indicating the total cost of the Field Coordinator in Botswana, including his office and staff charges as well as his personal allowances.

We have already given each of you a packet containing various orientation materials which we provide to OPEXers prior to their departure to post. If you have questions about any of this, please let us know.

We've all enjoyed the chance to discuss the project in detail with you. Best wishes,

Sincerely,


Carolyn H. Long
Vice President

Enclosures

Jon Gant
Byron Bahl

EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER

SAMDAP BUDGET

	<u>Low Estimates</u> ^{1/}		<u>High Estimates</u> ^{2/}	
	<u>% Time</u>	<u>Dollars</u>	<u>% Time</u>	<u>Dollars</u>
<u>Personnel - Home Office</u> ^{3/}				
Project Director - C. Long	75%	\$ 37,500	90%	\$ 45,000
Recruitment Coordinator - A. Birara	80%	32,000	100%	40,000
Administrative Officer - J. Parker	100%	25,000	100%	25,000
Recruiter - N. Seshibe	50%	10,950	100%	21,900
Recruiter - E. Walters	50%	10,403	50%	10,403
Orientation Trainers - R. Baras	40 days	8,767	60 days	13,151
Accounting Assistant - G. Dopwell	100%	14,235	100%	14,235
Accounting Assistant - M. Zeraf	100%	12,000	100%	12,000
Administrative Assistant - T. Dillon	100%	15,000	100%	15,000
Secretary - R. Wolde Marian	100%	<u>12,000</u>	100%	<u>12,000</u>
SUBTOTAL		177,855		208,689
<u>Field Staff</u>				
Field Coordinator - D. Smith	100%	37,400	100%	37,400
Administrative Assistant - F. Serema	100%	<u>6,625</u>	100%	<u>6,625</u>
SUBTOTAL		44,025		44,025
Home Office Fringe @23%		40,907		47,998
Field Staff Fringe @27%		10,126		10,126
Overhead @60% of I & III		131,257		154,012
Overhead @30% of II & IV		16,245		16,245
Travel & Transportation		32,000		32,000
Allowances		42,000		42,000
Other Direct		<u>55,000</u>		<u>65,000</u>
Total Direct Costs Plus Overhead ^{4/}		549,415		620,095

SAMDAP BUDGET

(continued)

	<u>% Time</u>	<u>Dollars</u>	<u>% Time</u>	<u>Dollars</u>
XI. General & Administrative Expenses @10.6% of X <u>5/</u>		\$ 58,238		\$ 65,730
XII. Subcontract		<u>-0-</u>		<u>-0-</u>
SUBTOTAL		607,653		685,825
XIII. Fixed Fee (7%) <u>6/</u>		<u>42,536</u>		<u>48,008</u>
SUBTOTAL		650,189		733,833
Second Year (add 10%)		<u>721,709</u>		<u>807,216</u>
GRAND TOTAL - 2 yrs		\$1,371,898		\$1,541,049
AVERAGE MONTHLY COST		<u>57,162</u>		<u>1210</u>
PEAK OPEX LEVEL		100		120
CURRENT COSTS PER TERM. MONTH		572		535

- 15 Long-Term OPEX recruitments/year
- 4 Short-Term OPEX Recruitments/year
- 3 OPEX To Maintain In-Country - ~~copy~~ ~~copy~~
- 1 In-Country Training Workshop

- 25 Long-Term OPEX Recruitments/year
- 8 Short-Term OPEX Recruitments/year
- 3 OPEX To Maintain In-Country - ~~copy~~ ~~copy~~
- 2 In-Country Training Workshops

Salaries used are as of September, 1981.

No G&A staff have been budgetted as direct charge. Prefer 10.6% of travel and orientation; 2.41% of salary toppings and allowances in D.O.'s.

No G&A % was taken on subcontract in original budget. Should be taken on renewal budget.

Fee will continue @7%, as originally negotiated.

- see discussions with the 2/13/82.

YEARLY COSTS FOR

FIELD STAFF PERSONNEL AND FIELD OFFICE

I. Payroll Costs

Field Coordinator	\$37,400
Field Secretary	6,625

TOTAL FIELD STAFF SALARIES	\$44,025
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Fringe Benefits	<u>10,126</u>
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TOTAL FIELD STAFF SALARIES AND FRINGE BENEFITS	\$ 54,151
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II. Overhead: 30% of Total Field Staff Salaries and Fringe Benefits	16,245
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III. Routine Annual Field Coordinator Allowances and Reimbursable Living Expenses

Post Allowance	775
Post Differential	3,740
Annual Rent (Est. P8580)	11,400
Utilities (Est. \$150 per month)	1,800
Guard Service	900
Storage	2,200
Education Allowance	10,000
R & R or Home Leave (\$2200 x 4 persons)	8,800

TOTAL ROUTINE ANNUAL ALLOWANCES AND LIVING EXPENSES	39,615
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Field Coordinator Travel

Round Trip Circuit Air Fare Gabs/Manzini/Maseru/Gabs	600
Per Diem: 7 days each city	<u>800</u>
ONE TRIP TOTAL	1,400

ESTIMATED COST - 5 TRIPS ANNUALLY	7,000
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FIELD COSTS FOR

FIELD STAFF PERSONNEL AND FIELD OFFICES
(CONTINUED)

V. Field Office Annual Expenses

Rent	\$ 3,000
Communication Charges	1,000
Office Supplies and Equipment	750
Postage/Xerox/Printing	1,000
General Miscellaneous Office Charges	500

TOTAL FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL EXPENSES

\$ 10,650

End of Year Costs

Return Travel to U.S.	\$ 3,000
\$1350 x 4 persons	
Air Freight	1,000

TOTAL END OF TOUR COSTS

10,400

Total Items I-VI

138,061

Cost at 10.5% of Item VII

14,634

TOTAL COSTS

\$152,695

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EFFORT - PERCENTAGE OF SALARY CHANGE

		1980	EFFORT - PERCENTAGE OF SALARY CHANGE								
		SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUNE
RESEARCH	LEVEL	DATA NOT READILY AVAILABLE			100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
RESEARCH	LEVEL				60%	60%	60%	60%	60%	60%	60%
RESEARCH	LEVEL				50%	30%	30%	30%	30%	30%	30%
RESEARCH	LEVEL				60%	30%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
RESEARCH	LEVEL				100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
RESEARCH	LEVEL				100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
RESEARCH	LEVEL				100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
RESEARCH	LEVEL				100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
RESEARCH	LEVEL				100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
RESEARCH	LEVEL				100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

RESEARCH	LEVEL	-	-	-	6.7	6.7	6.7	8.9	8.9	8.9	8.9
HOME OFFICE SALARY PLAN		8,232	8,232	8,250	18,186 ^U	2,032	10,907	14,532	14,282	13,828	14,282
TOTAL P/S CORE COSTS		11,907	22,891	2,770	30,840	19,324	20,329	23,543	22,901	21,228	23,066
RESEARCH	LEVEL	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	14	10	7
RESEARCH	LEVEL	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	20	30	37
RESEARCH	LEVEL	-	-	-	-	-	-	\$ 3,923	\$ 1,145	\$ 704	\$ 623

^U COST INCLUDES TWO POSITIONS WHICH TERMINATED IN DEC NOT INCLUDED IN 6.7 MM FIGURE.

	PERCENTAGE OF SALARY CHANGE 1981								
	JULY	AUGUST	SEPT.	OCT.	NOV.	DEC.	JAN.	FEB.	
DIRECTOR	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
DEPUTY DIR.	60%	60%	60%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
PROBATION	30%	30%	30%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	
ADMIN. CLERK	100%	100%	100%						
RESEARCH/MATERIAL LEVEL	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
ACCOUNTING CLERK	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
FISCAL OFFICER	100%	100%	100%	100%	50%	50%	50%	50%	
ADMIN. ASSISTANT	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
SECRETARY	100%	100%	100%						
FIELD OFFICER	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
RESEARCH & EVAL OFFICER				100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
ADMIN. ASSISTANT				100%	100%				
TR. PROB. OFF.						66%	66%	66%	
TOTAL MAN MONTHS	8.9	8.9	8.9	9.5	9.0	8.7	8.7	8.7	
OFFICE SALARIES	14,786	14,573	14,338	17,414	17,964	18,168	16,121	16,121	
TOTAL PLS CORE COSTS	23,114	25,608	26,337	29,626	38,912	23,206	27,579	27,579	
PARTICIPANT DELIVERY WORKS	62	14	3	2	4	6	9	15	
SUPPORTIVE DELIVERY WORKS	59	73	76	78	82	88	97	112	
SUPPORT COSTS PER TECHNICIAN MONTH	\$ 392	\$ 351	\$ 347	\$ 320	\$ 475	\$ 264	\$ 284	\$ 246	

* DEC. INCLUDES CREDIT CORRECTION FOR ERROR IN NOV.

TransCentury Recruiter U.C. Levels

PM = Person Months of TC recruiter time
 R = Number of positions under active Recruitment
 D = Departure (1-5 days per)

<u>1979</u>	PM	R	D	$\frac{R}{PM}$	$\frac{R + D}{PM}$
Sept.	1.00 p/m's	-	-		
Oct.	1.58	3	1	1.69	2.25
Nov.	1.58	3	1	1.90	2.53
Dec.	2.37	3	-	1.27	1.27
<u>1980</u>					
	3.15	19	11	6.03	9.52
Feb.	2.03	18	2	8.87	9.58
Mar.	2.96	18	6	6.08	8.11
Apr.	4.54	23	7	5.07	6.61
May	4.49	25	2	5.57	6.01
June	3.37	19	6	5.64	7.42
July	3.73	20	3	5.36	6.17
Aug.	2.45	20	8	5.80	8.12
Sept.	3.19	12	8	3.76	6.27
Oct.	3.21	10	3	3.12	4.05
Nov.	2.26	9	2	3.98	4.87
Dec.	2.06	8	2	3.88	4.85
$\frac{1}{2}$					
Jan.	2.71	7	1	2.58	2.90
	2.05	7	1	3.41	3.90