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CLASSIFICATION
PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY (PES) - PART I

Report Symbol U-447

1. PROJECT TITLE ENTENTE FOOD PRODUCTION AND ENTENTE LIVESTOCK II			2. PROJECT NUMBER 626-11-130-0203+0204	3. MISSION/2. D/W OFFICE REDSO/WA, ABIDJAN
5. KEY PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DATES			4. EVALUATION NUMBER (Enter the number as defined by the reporting unit, e.g., Country or AID/W Administrative Code, Fiscal Year, Serie No. beginning with No. 1 each FY)	
A. First PRO-AG c. EQUIPMENT: FY 76	B. Final Obligation Expected: FY 81	C. Final Input Delivered: FY 83	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> REGULAR EVALUATION <input type="checkbox"/> SPECIAL EVALUATION	
6. ESTIMATED PROJECT FUNDING			7. PERIOD COVERED BY EVALUATION	
A. Total \$ 50,000,000			From (month/year) 1976	
B. U.S. \$ 27,490,000			To (month/year) DECEMBER 1981	
			DECEMBER 1981	

8. ACTION DECISIONS APPROVED BY MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE DIRECTOR

A. List conditions and/or unresolved issues for those items needing further study. (NOTE: Most of decisions will be made by A. D. W. or regional office but you should specify type of document, e.g., Report, SPAR, P.O., which will present detailed results.)

B. NAME OF OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION

C. DATE ACTION TO BE COMPLETED

1. Entente Fund (EF) Project Management Team (PMT) should be restored to four qualified professionals as soon as possible. A. Letter to EF Admin Secretary Kaya B. Recruitment action initiated	Wagner EF	11/23/81 2/82
2. REDSO/WA should initiate regular monthly meetings with PMT to review project performance and plans. A. Letter to Kaya B. First meeting	Wagner Wagner	12/28/81 2/82
3. EF should improve quarterly report content per recommendation 4 of evaluation. A. Discuss at first regular monthly meeting B. Incorporate in next quarterly report	Wagner EF	2/82 4/82
4. EF should improve procedures and content of reporting from sub-projects and forward regularly to REDSO/WA. A. Discuss at first regular monthly meeting B. Incorporate in quarterly report	Wagner EF	2/82 7/82
5. EF should correct deficiencies in compliance with AID regulations and notify REDSO/WA of actions taken. A. Notify EF of compliance deficiencies (14 pages) B. Review and discuss at first regular meeting C. EF responses	Wagner Wagner EF	11/23/81 2/82 4/82
6. Assure that follow-up project addresses weaknesses identified by this evaluation and make concerted effort to avoid repetition by addressing in PID and PP preparation process.	Osborne	8/82
7. Appropriate action on 24 financial management recommendations in September 1981 Arthur Andersen section of the evaluation.	MSmith	7/82

9. INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS TO BE REVISED PER ABOVE DECISIONS

<input type="checkbox"/> Project Paper	<input type="checkbox"/> Implementation Plan (e.g., CPI Network)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) FOLLOW-ON PID + PP
<input type="checkbox"/> Financial Plan	<input type="checkbox"/> PID/T	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)
<input type="checkbox"/> Logical Framework	<input type="checkbox"/> PID/C	
<input type="checkbox"/> Project Agreement	<input type="checkbox"/> PID/P	

10. ALTERNATIVE DECISIONS ON FUTURE OF PROJECT

A.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Continue Project Without Change
B.	<input type="checkbox"/> Change Project Design and/or Change Implementation Plan
C.	<input type="checkbox"/> Discontinue Project

11. PROJECT OFFICER AND HOST COUNTRY OR OTHER RANKING PARTICIPANTS AS APPROPRIATE (Name and Title)

Hadley E. Smith
Hadley Smith, Mission Evaluation Officer

12. Mission/AID/W Office Director Approval

Signature: *William F. Mulcahy*
Typed Name: William F. Mulcahy
Acting Director
Date: January 6, 1982

**INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING FORM AID 1330-15 & 15A,
PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY (PES)—PART I & II**

EVALUATION PROCESS - Officials of the Host Government and AID Mission should collaborate in periodic evaluation of the progress of each project. (For AID/W projects, participation of grantees is appropriate.) Timing of such regular evaluations should be linked to the key decisional requirements of the project, as listed in the Evaluation Plan included in the Project Paper and as confirmed in the Evaluation Schedule of the Annual Budget Submission; otherwise annually. A description of the evaluation process is found in Handbook 3, Part II, Chapter 8.

PURPOSES OF SUMMARY - The Project Evaluation Summary (PES) is prepared after each review to record information which is useful both to the implementors (including the Host Government and contractors) and to concerned AID/W units. It serves four purposes:

- (1) Record of decisions reached by responsible officials, so that those who participated in the evaluation process are clear about the conclusions, and so that headquarters is aware of the next steps.
- (2) Notice that a scheduled evaluation has been completed, with a brief record of the method and participation for future reference.
- (3) Summary of progress and current status for use in answering queries.
- (4) Suggestions about lessons learned for use in planning and reviewing other projects of a similar nature. The PES and other project documentation are retained in DS, DIU, DI and are available to project planners.

CONTENTS OF SUMMARY - A PES submittal has two parts, plus relevant attachments if any.

PART I REQUIRED: Form AID 1330-15 contains identifying information about the project and evaluation (Items 1-7), action decisions about the project's future (Items 8-10), and signatures (Items 11-12). Since the PES reports decisions, it is signed by the Director of the Mission or AID/W Office responsible for the project. Space is also provided for signatures of the project officer, host country and other ranking participants in the evaluation, to the extent appropriate.

PART II, OPTION 1: For regular evaluations, use continuation sheets to respond to Items 13-23 as outlined in the attached Form AID 1330-15A.

PART II, OPTION 2: For a special evaluation, the reporting unit may opt for a somewhat varied format, with a different sequence or greater detail in some areas, however, Items 13-23 should all be addressed.

ATTACHMENTS - Appropriate, reports of host governments, contractors, and others, utilized in the preparation of the evaluation summary, should be labeled A, B, C, etc., attached to the PES submittal (Missions are to submit 7 copies and AID/W Offices 7 copies) and listed under Item 23. Where it is necessary to transmit these source documents separately from the PES, Block 23 of the PES should note how this material was transmitted, when, number of copies and to whom.

SUBMITTAL PROCEDURE: Missions will submit the PES Facesheet, continuation sheets, and attachments under cover of an airgram which will be received by the Cap e Room. AID/W Offices will submit the PES Facesheet, continuation sheets, and attachments to MO PAV, Room B-930, NS under cover of a memorandum which cites any distribution instructions beyond the standard distribution. All AID/W Offices and most Missions will use the blank cut PES Facesheet and plain bond for continuation sheets, which can be reproduced on copiers. Those Missions preferring to use hecto, may order the form in hecto sets from AID/W, Distribution Branch. There will be a standard distribution made in AID/W of all field-originated PES's. Copies will be sent to the corresponding bureau's DP, DR, the country desk and Evaluation Office. Other copies will be sent to PPC, SER, PDC and DS (including DI and ARC). For AID/W-generated PES's, copies will be distributed to all bureaus.

PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY (PES) – PART II

The following topics are to be covered in a brief narrative statement (averaging about 200 words or half a page per item) and attached to the printed PES facesheet. Each topic should have an underlined heading. If a topic is not pertinent to a particular evaluation, list the topic and state: "Not pertinent at this time". The Summary (Item 13) should always be included, and should not exceed 200 words.

13. SUMMARY - Summarize the current project situation, mentioning progress in relation to design, prospects of achieving the purpose and goal, major problems encountered, etc.

14. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY - What was the reason for the evaluation, e.g., clarify project design, measure progress, verify program/project hypotheses, improve implementation, assess a pilot phase, prepare budget, etc? Where appropriate, refer to the Evaluation Plan in the Project Paper. Describe the methods used for this evaluation, including the study design, scope, cost, techniques of data collection, analysis and data sources. Identify agencies and key individuals (host, other donor, public, AID) participating and contributing.

15. EXTERNAL FACTORS - Identify and discuss major changes in project setting, including socio-economic conditions and host government priorities, which have an impact on the project. Examine continuing validity of assumptions.

16. INPUTS - Are there any problems with commodities, technical services, training or other inputs as to quality, quantity, timeliness, etc? Any changes needed in the type or amount of inputs to produce outputs?

17. OUTPUTS - Measure actual progress against projected output targets in current project design or implementation plan. Use tabular format if desired. Comment on significant management experiences. If outputs are not on target, discuss causes (e.g., problems with inputs, implementation assumptions). Are any changes needed in the outputs to achieve purpose?

18. PURPOSE - Quote approved project purpose. Cite progress toward each End of Project Status (EOPS) condition. When can achievement be expected? Is the set of EOPS conditions still considered a good description of what will exist when the purpose is achieved? Discuss the causes of any shortfalls in terms of the causal linkage between outputs and purpose or external factors.

19. GOAL/SUBGOAL - Quote approved goal, and subgoal, where relevant, to which the project contributes. Describe status by citing evidence available to date from specified indicators, and by mentioning the progress of other contributory projects. To what extent can progress toward goal/subgoal be attributed to purpose achievement, to other projects, to other causal factors? If progress is less than satisfactory, explore the reasons, e.g., purpose inadequate for hypothesized impact, new external factors affect purpose-subgoal/goal linkage.

20. BENEFICIARIES - Identify the direct and indirect beneficiaries of this project in terms of criteria in Sec. 102(d) of the FAA (e.g., a. increase small-farm, labor-intensive agricultural productivity; b. reduce infant mortality; c. control population growth; d. promote greater equality in income; e. reduce rates of unemployment and underemployment). Summarize data on the nature of benefits and the identity and number of those benefitting, even if some aspects were reported in preceding questions on output, purpose, or subgoal/goal. For AID/W projects, assess likelihood that results of projects will be used in LDC's.

21. UNPLANNED EFFECTS - Has the project had any unexpected results or impact, such as changes in social structure, environment, health, technical or economic situation? Are these effects advantageous or not? Do they require any change in project design or execution?

22. LESSONS LEARNED - What advice can you give a colleague about development strategy, e.g., how to tackle a similar development problem or to manage a similar project in another country? What can be suggested for follow-on in this country? Similarly, do you have any suggestions about evaluation methodology?

23. SPECIAL COMMENTS OR REMARKS - Include any significant policy or program management implications. Also list titles of attachments and number of pages.

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~~XD-AAJ-001~~
XD-AAJ-079-A

ISN = 417

EVALUATION OF ENTENTE FUND
RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS:
LIVESTOCK II, AND FOOD PRODUCTION

REDSO/WA

Abidjan, Ivory Coast

December 1981

ACRONYMS

AAPC	African American Purchasing Corporation
BOAD	Banque d'Ouest Africaine de Developpement
CARDER	Rural Development Center of Regional Action (Centre d'Action Regionale pour le Developpement Rural)
CEAO	West African Economic Community
CERFER	Rural Roads Training Maintenance Center
CEBV	Communaute Economique du Betail et de la Viande
CILSS	Comite Permanent Interetats de Lutte contre la Secheresse dans le Sahe!
CNCA	National Agricultural Credit Bank (Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole)
DAI	Development Alternatives Inc.
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EF	Entente Fund
FED	European Development Fund
FAC	Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation (France)
IBRD	International Bank of Reconstruction and Development
IITA	International Institute of Tropical Agriculture
ICRISAT	International Crop Research Institute of Semi-Arid Tropics
IDESSA	Institut des Savanes
IRR	Internal Rate of Return
IRRI	International Rice Research Institute
IRAT	Institut de Recherche Agronomique Tropical et des Cultures Vivrieres

MASI Multi Agribusiness Systems Inc.

ORD Regional Development Organization
(Organismes Regionaux de Developpement)

REDSO/WA Regional Economic Development Services Office, West Africa

SAFGRAD Semi-Arid Food Grain Research and Development

SODEPRA Societe pour le Developpement des Productions Animales

SORAD Societes Regionales d'Aménagement et de Developpement

UNCC Nigerian Credit and Cooperative Union
(Union Nigerian de Cooperative et Credit)

WARDA West Africa Rice Development Association

PROJECT DATA SHEET

Country: Entente Fund Member States: Ivory Coast, Togo,
Benin, Upper Volta, Niger.

Project Title: Livestock II, Food Production.

Loan Terms: 40 years, 10 years grace
2% during grace period: 3% thereafter.

Project Implementation:

1. Food Production Authorized - April 1976
2. Livestock II Authorized - April 1976
3. Obligations - \$27.49 million

Project Completion--Final Disbursement: June 30, 1984

Project Funding: (\$000)

- | | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------|
| 1. AID Total | 27.490 |
| 2. Host Country | 10,398 |
| 3. Entente Fund Secretariat | 1,247 ^{1/2} |

Implementation:

1. Loan, capital grant and technical grant agreements between AID and the Entente Fund; implementation of subprojects by the member states.
2. Monitoring responsibilities from a central unit, rural development division, in the Entente Fund, Abidjan.

Evaluations:

1. Mid-term evaluations of subprojects by Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI) in 1979-81.
2. Mid-term evaluation of Food Production and Livestock II Projects by REDSO/WA.
3. A final evaluation of Food Production and Livestock II Projects in 1984.

Responsible Mission Officials during Life of Project:

1. REDSO/WA Directors: Miles Wedeman, Gordon W. Evans.
2. Program Officers: Arthur Boehme, Roy Wagner.

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I. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Performance Evaluation

The evaluation team has assessed the quality of the implementation of the Food Production and Livestock II projects using the indicators discussed in Section V. Overall performance was good.

I. SUMMARY OF IMPLEMENTATION EFFECTIVENESS

<u>Indicator</u>	<u>Fair</u>	<u>Good</u>	<u>Very Good</u>	<u>Excellent</u>
Project Management Team		X		
Disbursement	X			
Cost Effectiveness			X	
Management Audit				X
Compliance with AID Regulations	X			
Procurement		X		
Strengthening National Institutions				X
Effects on National Policies		X		
Recurrent Cost	X			
Impact on Production and Income	X			
Regional Cooperation			X	
Evaluation of Subprojects			X	
Other Donor Support			X	
Overall implementation		X		

Findings and Conclusions

During the period assessed by the evaluation team, the Entente Fund was a cost effective vehicle for channeling AID funds for design, implementation, and evaluation of agricultural development projects in Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Togo and Benin. Financial contributions by member states and the Fund itself for day-to-day operations of the rural development division were consistent with project agreements.

The fifteen subprojects, on average have not been monitored adequately, mainly because of inadequate data collection and reporting. The project size is moderate reflecting the objective of initiating pilot projects. Mid-term evaluations of the subprojects have indicated positive income and production impact. Livestock projects which are not production oriented, i.e., in which outputs were improved livestock health and assessment of national strategies, have enhanced the production potential of national livestock programs. Subprojects which have the purpose of strengthening village institutions, in some cases initiated by the Entente Fund, have been highly successful in doing so.

The Entente Fund has initiated cooperation and strengthened its relationship with ministries of agriculture in member countries. The EF staff has conducted training seminars for subproject managers and selected participants for graduate study at West Virginia University. A historic event was achieved by the first meeting of the five Ministers of Agriculture in 1981 to discuss agricultural prices, trade, and marketing policies which are at the heart of

production incentive problems.

The design of some subprojects did not include adequate participation of target beneficiaries which, particularly in the livestock subprojects, resulted in implementation problems. The livestock and food production projects with the Entente Fund have been responsive to priority needs of member states. However, EF needs to concentrate more sharply on the implementation lessons learned from the 15 pilot projects.

The participant training program is underway and the participants are performing well. Implementation of subprojects is significantly behind schedule. Certain problems were universal: (1) weak design of some aspects of subprojects; (2) long delays in delivery of commodities; and (3) delays in obtaining customs clearance.

The economic return of subprojects appears to be lower than expected. Even though most projects are expected to have a positive cash flow for the farm, the economic viability of the project is yet to be demonstrated. Technological packages for food production subprojects tentatively seem sound but management teams remain flexible regarding the possibility of mid-term redesign. Some livestock projects have high recurrent costs and continued external assistance is required.

A beneficiary survey shows that target beneficiaries support the projects. However, more effort is needed to involve the local population in implementation of subprojects.

DAI was unable to measure the cost effectiveness of subprojects during the mid-term evaluation because of insufficient data. Increases in production or productivity in food and livestock subprojects could not be quantified. Farm records do not exist, therefore, changes in net income for farm budgets were merely projected. The rate of return could not be calculated to assess competitiveness of technology packages.

No plan has been prepared for member governments to meet recurrent costs of subprojects after donor financing is completed. Subproject agreements do not require collection of data on production and income from subproject operations. Original subproject designs by Louis Berger did not specify data collection. Project designs, therefore, were deficient. Neither the project management team nor subproject managers have corrected this shortcoming.

Expatriate American staff, financed by AID work under contract for the Entente Fund and are considered by the Secretariat as representatives of Entente Fund policies and practices. This role has constrained communication with REDSO/WA management.

The project management team composition and size was adequate between 1977 and 1979. In 1979 and 1980, the team size was reduced from four to three, but monitoring responsibilities also decreased somewhat, since most projects were well under way and were being implemented by qualified subproject managers. In late 1981, the team was reduced to one and is inadequate to implement subprojects

and carry out reporting responsibilities under project agreements. Delinquent procurement plans have not been received and the most recent quarterly report was unacceptable.

Because of the unanticipated transfer of livestock coordination responsibilities from Entente Fund to the Entente Livestock Community, the project purpose of fostering increased regional cooperation and coordination in livestock production and marketing has not been fully implemented (Appendix X). An important, but unstated, implicit assumption of the project was that the Entente Council would continue to delegate to Entente Fund the responsibility for coordination and sectoral analysis among member states. As a result, regional protocols, further sector analysis, and regional meetings organized by the Entente Fund have been discontinued. The bulk of the objectives of the project have been achieved or are in progress but recognition should be given to the fact that an important external variable has changed, resulting in a significant shortcoming in the achievements of Livestock II through no fault of Entente Fund management or AID.

In some cases, the Entente Fund has failed to comply with AID regulations. Following are major shortcomings: (1) no reports received from the EF on the status of government contributions for the food and livestock production projects; (2) financial statements do not show current period and cumulative subproject expenditures nor are estimates of expenditures required to complete projects indicated; (3) financing receipts are not submitted with receipts

nor explanations for use of goods and services; (4) review of EF outstanding balances on advances reveals that advances were not used in their entirety; (5) some of the project locations visited by REDSO staff did not display signs indicating participation by the U.S. Government; (6) review of AID/W statistical records through 4/30/81 indicates the EF purchasing agent has not been in compliance with cargo preference; and (7) the Rural Development Division has not submitted quarterly reports regularly.

Entente Fund has not provided to REDSO/WA audited accounts of the project, either separately or as part of the audited accounts of the Fund, as required by Section 5.06 which specifies that Entente Fund will furnish information and reports that AID may reasonably request, will maintain books and records in accordance with sound accounting principles and practices, will audit such books and records regularly in accordance with sound auditing standards, will afford representatives of AID the right to inspect books and records, and will cooperate with AID to facilitate such inspection. On the contrary, Entente Fund declined to provide such information to the 1981 African Enterprises impact evaluation team, failed to respond to a REDSO/WA letter dated May 31, 1979, requesting the information, and has responded to verbal requests by the REDSO/WA evaluation team by stating that audit reports are not available.

Recommendations

1. The size of the project management team should be restored to four members as soon as possible to raise project management capability to an acceptable minimum.
2. A letter should be sent to the Administrative Secretary from the REDSO/WA director requesting a response to the May 1979 letter and stating that no further disbursements will be approved until a satisfactory response is received.
3. REDSO/WA should initiate regular monthly meetings with the project management team to review project performance and plans.
4. Entente Fund should strengthen its project and subproject monitoring and reporting procedure culminating in a quarterly report which is more informative.

The following indicators illustrate items which should be included in quarterly reports:

- a. estimated expenditures required to complete subprojects and a technical review of how targets are to be attained or adjusted;
 - b. narrative reviewing activities planned for next quarter;
 - c. data on production and income;
 - d. assessment of implementation problems; and
 - e. extent of financial self-sufficiency of subprojects.
5. The subproject reporting procedure should be formalized and standardized to simplify and expand reporting by the project

management team. Data on subprojects should include financial, production, yield and other information needed to assess the feasibility of the technology in use and the financial self-sufficiency of subprojects. Copies of reports by subproject managers and technical advisors should be forwarded regularly to REDSO/WA.

6. Deficiencies in compliance with AID regulations should be corrected by Entente Fund with notification to REDSO/WA of action taken.

7. The potential recurrent cost burden of subprojects on member governments at the EOP and the willingness of governments to assume such costs should be assessed.

11. INTRODUCTION

Background

The food crisis resulting from the 1969-1974 drought in Sub-Saharan Africa gained widespread international attention. The food objectives of the five Entente states--increasing food and livestock production, are, in part, a reaction to the drought, long-term neglect of these sectors, and increased imports of food. The Entente Fund responded with a regional rural development program for the five member countries--Benin, Ivory Coast, Niger, Togo, Upper Volta. The program consists of two projects administered by the Entente Fund with the financial assistance of the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), seven livestock subprojects and eight food production subprojects.

As these projects progress, a midterm assessment of accomplishments and lessons learned is needed and an opportunity is presented to assess the effectiveness of Entente Fund as a multicountry development financing institution.

Increasing attention is paid by AID to effective implementation and impact of projects. Some of the questions addressed in this evaluation are: How appropriate and effective are the agriculture and livestock technologies proposed? What administrative bottlenecks occur to transfer of these technologies? How effective are midterm evaluations in influencing subproject operations? What forms of beneficiary organization and participation best serve

project purposes? How appropriate are incentive structures within the project and in cooperating organizations, for stimulating desired performance and facilitating coordination? How do agricultural policies impinge on the effectiveness of project operations?

Entente Fund

The Mutual Aid and Loan Guaranty Fund of the Entente Council was established June 9, 1966, by the five Chiefs of State of the Entente Council. The Entente Council was established seven years earlier on May 29, 1959, by Houphouet Boigny, President of the Ivory Coast. The aim of the Council was political solidarity of four francophone states (Benin, Ivory Coast, Niger and Upper Volta). Togo joined the Council in 1966. The Council sought to provide economic and social solidarity through a Guaranty Fund which was to multiply the impact of the limited resources available for economic development in the region. This would facilitate investment borrowing through payment guarantees at a modest cost of one-half of one percent. The guarantee was to counter investors' fears of coups in the Entente area. Eligible borrowers included governments, semi-public institutions, and private corporations.

The Entente Fund (EF) has been charged with the task of contributing to the economic development of the Entente States in accordance with statutes adopted December 8, 1973. These provided that the Fund may accept grants and donations; contract on behalf of the States for specific loans for regional development programs;

and make loans or grants to member states for specific economic activities within Entente countries.

The Fund is directed by an Administrative Secretariat which has the functions of an agency for economic development in accordance with the statutes adopted December 1973 and the Internal Regulations on Privileges and Immunities adopted November 25, 1974. The budget to meet the operating expenses of the Secretariat is provided from interest earnings on the guarantee fund. Such budget does not exceed 15% of the annual interest earnings.

The objective of the Fund is to promote economic development by attracting new investments through extension of payment guarantees; financing projects from the net proceeds of interest earned on capital; attracting development loans and grants from as many donors as possible; and cooperating with other regional financial organizations.

The Entente Fund is responsible to the Council which determines its policies and areas of activities. This is evident from the appointment of an Administrative Secretary to head the staff as distinct from the common practice in such a situation of appointing an Executive Secretary. The first and only Administrative Secretary, Mr. Paul Kaya, has ready access to and frequent contact with Chiefs of State.

The Administrative Secretariat of the Fund consists of 14 professionals supplemented by limited support and clerical staff of 22. Of this total of 36, six are permanent policy and management

positions. The Administrative Secretary is African. Three senior advisors are expatriates (all French). There are six U.S.-funded temporary positions for professional staff for project design, analysis, monitoring and supervision of subproject directors, for the life-of-project. Four positions are directly responsible for the food and livestock projects and two are for the African Enterprises project. The Administrative Secretary and the planned deputy are funded by the general budget as are twenty-two clerical, maintenance, and other local staff. The professional expatriate staffing is a key resource of the Entente Fund.

The Entente Fund is financed by: (1) capital contributions from member states; and (2) loans and grants from foreign donors. Since the establishment of the Entente Fund Secretariat in 1966, member governments have made annual contributions for a capital guaranty fund. The shares of annual contributions are:

<u>Country</u>	<u>CFA million</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Ivory Coast	500	77.0
Upper Volta	42	6.5
Niger	42	6.5
Benin	42	6.5
Togo	24	3.5

Capital contributions by member states total CFA 650 million annually. REDSO/WA does not know whether payments are current. The capital is held in reserve in two Paris banks as security for the guaranties granted by the Fund. Guaranties are limited to ten

2. LOAN GUARANTIES AND DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1980

	(CFA billions)		
	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>% Change</u>
<u>Loan Guaranties</u>			
Total number	28	32	14.3
Cumulative amount	6.4	12.3	92.2
Cumulative amount of total investment	16.9	34.7	105.3
<u>Economic Development Operations</u>			
Entente Fund resources	1.4	2.1	50
Foreign resources	18.8	19.8	5.3
Short and medium term loans from member states' credit institution	1.5	1.5	—
Foreign aid (grants & loans)	17.3	18.3	5.8

Source: Entente Fund.

3. CUMULATIVE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, DECEMBER 31, 1980

	(CFA billions)					
<u>Type</u>	<u>Source</u>					<u>Total</u>
	<u>USA</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Netherlands</u>	<u>Canada</u>	<u>EEC</u>	
Grants	5.190	2.847	.639	.3	.28	9.256
Loans	<u>8.480</u>	<u>.513</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>8.993</u>
Total	13.670	3.360	.639	.3	.28	18.249
Percent	75	19	4	1	1	100

Source: Entente Fund

times the capital and may not be used for other purposes. Interest received on capital deposits and commissions for guaranties finance the operating budget. The amount of capital on 31 December 1980 was CFA 9,225 million, approximately \$33 million (\$=CFA280). Other donor assistance is for specific project activities. Development loans and grants have been provided by the French AID and Cooperation Fund (FAC); Canada; European Development Fund (FED); Netherlands (DFO); and AID.

Evaluation Requirements

Project Agreements. The project agreements for both the Livestock II and Food Production projects provide for an evaluation program. Section 1.04, Project Evaluation, of all six grant and loan agreements states:

"The parties agree to establish an evaluation program as an integral part of the Project. Except as AID may otherwise agree in writing, the program will include, during the implementation of the Project and at one or more points thereafter:

- a. evaluation of progress toward attainment of the objectives of the Project;
- b. identification and evaluation of problem areas or constraints which may inhibit such attainment;
- c. assessment of how such information may be used to help overcome such problems, in this or other projects;
- d. evaluation, to the degree feasible, of the overall development impact of the Project; and

e. a sector assessment.

Specific details of the evaluation program for the Project will be agreed upon at a later date by the two parties."

The Entente Fund Rural Development Advisor prepared a project management plan, June 29, 1977, which included subproject evaluations (Appendix V). This document specified mid-term evaluations of subprojects approximately 18 months after signing of subproject agreements. The project management plan proposed an evaluation of the Livestock II and Food Production projects to be conducted jointly by REDSO/WA and the Entente Fund after the second full year of project operations.

In 1981, grantee and grantor agreed informally the REDSO/WA would conduct the current evaluation without direct, full-time participation of the project management team of the rural development division. A letter dated April 1, 1981, from the Director, REDSO/WA, to the Entente Fund Administrative Secretary, established arrangements for this evaluation (Appendix N). This is the first evaluation of the Food Production and Livestock II projects. However, the Livestock I project, initiated in 1971, was evaluated in April-May 1975 and by CRED in 1978 under Contract REDSO/WA 78-150.

Scope of work. The scope of work of the evaluation was outlined in Abidjan 03278, April 1, 1981:

11. Entente Fund performance/effectiveness as an AID-delivery intermediary.
 - a. review organizational structure of EF, including staff, management practices, financing, and operating procedures;
 - b. determine whether support to and monitoring of subproject implementation in field has been adequate by addressing frequency of site visits, field reports, and quality of TA provided by or through EF;
 - c. analyze EF financial management system, including accounting practices, procedures to disburse funds to subprojects, and reporting requirement from field to EF and from EF to REDSO;
 - d. review procurement procedures, including commodities and personal services, with special focus on required time between order and delivery. If there appears to be undue delay analyze reasons why.
 - e. determine compliance with AID regulations, and degree to which compliance has helped or hindered program support and monitoring;
 - f. evaluate cost-effectiveness of EF as mechanism to implement, support and monitor AID-financed projects as compared to U.S. bilateral mission;
 - g. review non-AID inputs by and to EF, both within Secretariat and in field programs and evaluate their importance to success of AID-funded activities; evaluate EF coordination and collaboration in project design, funding and implementation with other donor governments/institutions; review success of EF in obtaining non-USG support in past and prospects for future;
 - h. review extent to which EF and its programs have strengthened national institutions,

from national level down to village level and comment on types of sub-projects that have been more successful in institution building;

- i. analyze effects EF has had on national policies and attempt to determine which types of subprojects have been more successful in influencing same;
 - j. determine success of EF as mechanism to encourage and strengthen inter-country cooperation through interchange of experience and problem-solving techniques and its contribution to encouragement of regional cooperation
 - k. analyze EF as organization to effectively design, support and monitor sizeable follow-on rural development program and recommend changes to increase EF effectiveness.
2. Effectiveness of EF Mid-Term evaluation system.
 - a. review general approach and methodology applied in evaluating the 15 active subprojects and comment on whether approach and methodology was successfully carried out by EF and its contractors;
 - b. review performance of the chief contractor.
 3. Which subprojects or elements of subprojects were most successful and should be drawn upon in designing follow-on RD project which will impact more fully on the national scale over next five-year time-frame."

Evaluation findings have been derived from: (1) materials at the EF and REDSO/WA in Abidjan; (2) field trips to selected subproject headquarters and sites; (3) interviews with project

personnel at all levels; and (4) discussions with Entente Fund staff.

To assess effectiveness, the evaluation team reviewed EF organizational structure, management practices, and operating procedures. The team attempted to ascertain the quality of EF technical assistance by interviewing American members of the team and the African counterparts. Procurement procedures, financial management, monitoring procedures, and implementation guidance were also analyzed to determine appropriateness and effectiveness.

The evaluation team reviewed the approach and methodology applied by the contractor in evaluating the 15 active subprojects. Performance of the contractor in assessing each subproject was examined regarding relevance of subproject design, impact on the small farmer, elements of failure and success, soundness of technological package, validity of recommendations, and other elements involving operational effectiveness. Field trips were made to Niger, Upper Volta and Togo to selected sites for more in-depth analyses.

The issues raised and the recommendations in this report are by no means exhaustive. They are intended to highlight salient strategy issues for improving EF effectiveness.

Agriculture in Entente States

AID, the Entente Fund, and the governments of Entente countries have a common goal of increasing food production. For Niger and

Upper Volta, the objective is to enhance national food security, but for Ivory Coast, Benin and Togo, high priority on increasing the food supply stems mainly from a need to limit foreign exchange outlays.

Each of the five countries is concerned with growth and equity, as indicated by large investments in the potentially rich agricultural areas, such as the Niger River Basin or Tove Basin in Togo and support of production and consumption through subsidies. In all countries, urban preference is given through low producer and consumer prices for food. The management of prices and markets for export crops and, to a lesser degree, for locally produced food commodities, is practiced widely. The system has helped stabilize local prices and generate savings, but has shifted resources from rural to urban areas.

The price mechanism doesn't always take into account comparative advantages that may exist in a certain region. Niger, Togo, and Upper Volta have agricultural price programs. Food surpluses have been infrequent and unofficial sales often occur above official prices.

Producer prices, principally in Niger and Upper Volta, focus on guaranteeing a minimum price to the producer. Various problems exist which have resulted in grain selling above the official price in free markets. Wide seasonal fluctuations exist and during peak supply periods free market prices are below the official

price. The producer price often is not announced until immediately before harvest which, in effect, does not give farmers an opportunity to adjust planting decisions.

Subsidies concern all countries, including the United States. Fertilizer, for example, is a subsidized input in all Entente Fund countries. The cost is recovered easily by marketing organizations for cash crops but when used for consumable crops there is no automatic recovery. The small amounts used for food crops do not drain national agricultural budgets, but more fertilizer application is needed if increased productivity of the soils is to be achieved.

Each of the member states has low productivity in food crops. Substantial improvements have been made in production technology for coffee, cocoa, and cotton. However, research is needed on improving a productive unit in a small village, for example, in the Lama Kara in Togo or Mossi plateau in Upper Volta. Some new techniques, such as seeds, pesticides, and animal traction have been introduced but only in selected areas and replication has been limited. There are numerous reasons for low farmer initiative. In the drought areas, survival is predominant and farmers are reluctant to take additional risk. In richer, coastal, lowlands marketing surpluses are channeled into urban areas by marketing agencies to finance other development activities. There is also little consultation between local producers and program planners in setting producer prices which discourages farmer initiative.

Food crop research is relatively new. Some work is proceeding in institutes such as ICRISAT, IITA, IRRI, WARDA, SAFGRAD, IDESSA. More needs to be done, and REDSO/WA and the Fund are searching for ways to synthesize results and improve extension.

The main organizations promoting agricultural development are the ministries of agriculture and rural development. The ministries are concerned with policy-making and coordinating implementing agencies. Upper Volta has ORD, Benin has CARDERS, Togo has DRDR's, and Niger has departmental entities. In the Ivory Coast, public enterprises exist with geographic responsibilities including food crops. There are a series of developmental companies focusing on export crops, which are generally self-financed, while agricultural development organizations focusing on food crops, have never been self-financing and rely on external aid. Development activities by the ORD's in Upper Volta, for example, have been financed exclusively by donor nations.

Only Niger has a relatively good system of village cooperatives with management and financial self-interest being a priority consideration. The national cooperative organization, UNCC, is a relatively strong administrative and implementing agency in supplying credit, inputs, marketing, and extension. The fact that UNCC's structure is strong and that village participation is also well developed, contributed to surplus food production in 1981.

Without reiterating all the factors and constraints inhibiting increased productivity and production of basic foods in the five

Entente countries, review is needed of EF subproject accomplishments in research, policy, and organization to indicate the lessons learned from the fifteen subprojects, and effectiveness in achieving common goals. Inefficiencies in the marketing of agricultural inputs and outputs are a major obstacle to increased output. Public sector marketing monopolies have inefficient organizational structures and operations, and need budget support. Substantial private marketing occurs outside official channels.

Correcting weaknesses and restructuring agricultural policies requires time, and may exceed the budgets of member states. Fran Lebeau's report, Agricultural Policies in the Entente States, identified several structure weaknesses, and has been well received at high levels in ministries. Governments may be ready to consider new approaches toward structural inefficiencies. EF could provide assistance for reform.

III. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

Background

Two groups of rural development activities, Livestock II and Food Production, consisting of six separate funding agreements, assist small farmers and livestock producers to increase per capita production of staple food crops and livestock, and the availability of reasonably priced animal and vegetable protein for rural and urban domestic consumption.

AID funds are used by EF to make sub-loans and grants to finance foreign exchange and local currency costs of equipment, materials, training, and technical services for implementation of subprojects. Several subprojects receive inputs from other donors and voluntary agencies.

Subprojects are experimental or pilot in nature and were initially designed for three-year duration. After a year, an extension appeared necessary for some projects. The EF and REDSO/WA requested waivers to extend the projects to five years. The manager for each subproject is a local national who is trained by the EF project management and overseas. A number of subprojects receive both financial and technical assistance inputs from other donors and voluntary agencies as well.

Each subproject is to have a mid-term evaluation after eighteen months and a final evaluation upon completion. Project designs may be modified in accordance with the findings of the

4. AID/EF AGREEMENTS FOR FOOD PRODUCTION AND LIVESTOCK II PROJECTS

<u>Title</u>	<u>Project Number</u>	<u>Amount (\$000)</u>	<u>Date Signed</u>
<u>Food Production</u>			
Capital Assistance Grant ^{1/}	626-11-130-203	5,750	8/31/76
Technical Assistance Grant ^{2/}	626-11-130-203	2,430	9/29/76
Loan	625-T-015	<u>10,000</u>	3/17/77
Subtotal		18,180	
<u>Livestock II</u>			
Capital Assistance Grant ^{1/}	626-11-130-204	3,250	9/29/76
Technical Assistance Grant ^{2/}	626-11-130-204	1,080	9/29/76
Loan	625-T-014	<u>1,500</u>	3/17/77
Subtotal		9,310	
Total		27,490	

^{1/} Used exclusively for subprojects. Includes increase in capital grant of \$1 million on 3/27/81, \$750,000 for Food Production and \$250,000 for Livestock II.

^{2/} For support of project management team and consultant.

mid-term evaluations.

The EF is administered by an Administrative Secretariat which has a mandate from the Chiefs of State to promote regional economic development. The staff works to identify projects, provide technical studies, seek financing of projects, and guide project implementation. The staff is supplemented by consultants on short-term contracts who perform project evaluations, write project proposals and special studies.

The project management team provides policy guidance, coordination of activities, seminars and other exchanges of information among African and international development institutions, the EF and the member states, and arrangement of U.S. training of Africans to increase the capacity of the Entente countries to plan, implement, and evaluate the subprojects and follow-on activities.

AID looked to the EF in the 1960's as an efficient body through which development assistance could be channelled. At that time, AID was forced to narrow development assistance because legislation restricted the number of overseas missions. Now EF has a sixteen-year record of performance, and AID has missions in three of the five Entente countries.

Livestock II

Purpose. The project agreements specify that a purpose of the program is to increase the efficiency and productivity of

the livestock sector in the Entente countries while increasing the level of living of small livestock producers. Sub-objectives are: (1) increase the efficiency and productivity of the livestock sector in the Entente States and, in doing so, to give increased emphasis to development and testing of low-cost technological improvements which can benefit small livestock producers and to developing systems through which livestock services in the member states can provide these technological improvements to large numbers of small livestock producers at acceptable costs to government; (2) increase the production of alternative sources of animal protein (small ruminants, poultry, pigs) as a means to augment the supply of animal protein which can be readily purchased by consumers at low-cost. Progress in relation to this purpose is measured in terms of (a) the degree to which government programs reflect greater understanding of the importance of small producers in the livestock sector (number of projects designed to affect this target groups; trends in government-supported research; specializations in which government cadres are trained); and (b) the degree to which government programs support increased production of alternative sources of animal protein.

The second purpose of the program is to foster increased regional cooperation and coordination in livestock production and marketing in the Entente States and to support within the region a process of sectoral analysis which serves to provide continuing assistance for policy and program refinement, evaluation and

development.

The sub-objectives are to: (1) improve regional livestock marketing channels which facilitate the effective movement of livestock and meat between the Entente states and to fully implement existing regional agreements (protocols); and (2) endeavor to promote improved regional cooperation and coordination in the development of livestock policy within the Entente states.

Inputs. The inputs of the project consist of: (1) capital assistance; and (2) technical assistance. Capital assistance consists of a \$4.5 million loan and \$3.25 million capital grant for subprojects to member states. AID provides a technical assistance grant of \$1.08 million for a three-year period. The AID funding is complemented by an annual Entente Fund contribution from the Fund. After the AID grant is expended, technical assistance will be financed from reflows to the Entente Fund from Entente Livestock Sector Loans I and II.

Aid technical assistance consists of:

a. Project Management: A livestock production specialist was to work under Entente Fund direction in Abidjan for the first three years of the project to be responsible for coordinating EF and ELC project design activities and assist those organizations in the review of subproject proposals. He also was to assist in establishing agendas for the annual meetings of the Entente states to discuss livestock sector objectives.

b. **Subproject Design and Implementation:** Short-term consultants were to be provided for project feasibility and design studies for 40 man-months (assuming 4 man-months for each of 10 subproject designs). The livestock production specialist and the Entente Fund was to have recourse to these technical services as needed. The EF was to prepare scopes of work for consultant services in collaboration with the government where the project was to be designed. The EF was to contract for needed services or ask AID to do so. Consultants were to work in close collaboration with host country officials.

c. **Training of African Personnel:** Practical training was to be provided for Livestock Service staff of Entente member countries in the U.S. or Africa in subject matter such as livestock production, range management, agricultural economics, management/administration, and project design. Up to 35 Africans were to be trained over a 4-year period (20 in U.S., 15 in Africa).

Outputs. The outputs of the project consist of (1) subprojects; (2) training; and (3) research.

1. Subprojects. A major output is the design, implementation and evaluation of subprojects which test the viability of various means to achieve sectoral objectives. Approximately 4-6 loan-funded and 3-5 grant-funded subprojects were to be financed from the \$4.5 million in loan funds and \$3.25 million in capital grant funds from AID and host government counterpart funds.

2. Training. Up to 35 Africans from member states were to receive training over a 4-year period -- 20 in the U.S. and 15 in Africa.

3. Research. A major objective of the program is to encourage continuous sectoral analysis within the Entente region. This process consists of:

- a. bringing together in a descriptive manner existing knowledge about the sector, its performance and its relationship to other sectors of the economy in the Phase I, CRED report;
- b. identification of sector development problems and of subject matter areas for which analysis and information are lacking. From this data, an array of particular micro-analyses required to provide answers to key sectoral questions was to be prepared and the priority of micro-studies established;
- c. conducting a series of studies, in accordance with the priorities established, by 5 field researchers in the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, and Niger with host government assistance;
- d. through two broader sub-sector studies dealing with livestock production marketing systems, along with feedback from subproject evaluations, alternative policies and investment programs will be identified and discussed by the participating organizations. The Center for Research on Economic Development (CRED), at the University of Michigan has begun a research program of this nature with AID financial assistance and with the

cooperation of Entente Fund and member states.

Food Production

Purpose. The project agreement specifies that:

"The purpose of the project is to assist Entente countries to adjust agriculture sector policies which will enable them, with the assistance of the Entente Fund, to implement a strategy of assistance to small farmers and to evaluate the effectiveness of the strategy for increasing food production.

"The Entente Fund and member states have agreed on policies to:

1. Give increased emphasis in national and other programs of basic and especially adaptive agricultural research to small farmer production systems, the needs of small farmers for packages of improved production technologies, farm management practices, and other inputs, and to means of delivering credit and other services and inputs, such as seeds and fertilizers, to small farmers;
2. Incorporate food production components into existing cash crop production schemes to take greater advantage of installed capacities for the delivery of inputs and services to the small farmer;
3. Adjust small farmer credit policies so as to increase the amount of credit available, offer longer grace and repayment terms, and allow higher interest rates to provide credit institutions with sufficient financial incentives to institutionalize the supply of such credit;
4. Coordinate programs of basic and adaptive agricultural research carried out by African and international development research institutions in the Entente region and to foster exchange of information concerning the findings of those programs;

5. Evaluate small farmer food production projects financed by this and other sources of funds and exchange within the region the results of evaluations to be able to incorporate them into the design of subsequent projects;
6. Begin in FY 1977 an on-going process of sector assessment which will refine the identification of constraints to small farmer food production and sharpen the focus of the solutions proposed; and
7. Give increased emphasis in national manpower development policies to training in fields directly related to small farmer development and food production."

Inputs. The project inputs consist of (1) capital assistance; and (2) technical assistance.

1. Capital Assistance. AID project inputs include both capital loans and grant. Capital assistance totals \$15.75 million-- \$10 million in loan funds were to be provided primarily to the coastal Entente states--Benin, Togo and Ivory Coast, although the Sahelian Entente states are eligible to use loan funds for revenue producing components of subprojects. Capital grant funds of \$5.75 million were for Sahelian Entente states--Niger and Upper Volta, and to Benin. Togo was added last year as a recipient of grant funds.

2. Technical Assistance. The Entente Fund's project management plan was for four AID-funded advisors--a team manager, an agricultural economist, a livestock production and management technician, and a general agronomist. These advisors were to work closely with the Entente Fund's agricultural expert and report directly to him

and to the Administrative Secretary. The team was to be responsible for all aspects of subproject identification, design, implementation and evaluation, relying to the extent possible on local institutions.

Outputs. The project was designed to produce a series of mutually reinforcing outputs which contribute toward achievement of the overall objective.

1. Institution Building. At the outset of this project, the Entente Fund had limited capacity to administer rural sector projects. Its capability to design, implement, and evaluate small farmer, food production projects was to be strengthened by addition of a four-man project management team, financed by the technical assistance grant, as well as through the actual subproject design and implementation.

2. Small Farmer-Oriented Food Production Subprojects. The most visible of the project's outputs was to be small farmer, food production subprojects which the EF would finance and to test the value of a strategy focused on small farmers for narrowing and eventually closing the gap between the production of staple food crops and domestic demand.

3. Other Outputs. Other outputs were to flow primarily from the technical assistance and project management team in the Entente Fund including: seminars; short-term, in-country training courses for rural development personnel of member countries, and other exchanges of information; studies of small farmer, food

production projects and other research projects carried out by the project management team or short-term consultants; meetings to discuss the results of such studies or evaluations with national rural development staff; meetings with national staff and the staff of African and international research organizations to discuss research being carried out, coordinate plans for future research, and determine how research may affect planning for small farmer development projects. These outputs were considered subsidiary, but nonetheless important since they would contribute substantially to achievement of other outputs.

IV. ACTUAL OUTPUTS

Livestock II

Subprojects. The Entente Fund contracted with Louis Berger in 1977 to prepare subproject proposals. Louis Berger designed eight proposals. The Small Remnant Production Project design for Benin was the only proposal rejected. Of the seven projects approved, four are grants and three are loans (Appendix A). The grant funded projects total \$3 million and the loan funded projects \$3.55 million. The terminal disbursement dates (TDD) of each project vary depending on the date of signature of the respective subproject agreements and decisions extending the TDD. The implementation of each project has been the responsibility of the subproject managers who were selected by the Ministers of Agriculture in each member state.

Entente Fund has met one of two subproject requirements specified in the Livestock II project regarding subproject design and implementation (Appendix X). Output indicators specify that 10-13 interventions would be designed and that 4-6 loan-funded, and 3-5 grant-funded subprojects would be funded. Eight subprojects were designed and eventually seven were actually implemented. The subprojects met eligibility criteria to affect small livestock producers and encourage the marketing of livestock meat between Entente-member states.

Development Alternative Inc. (DAI) was chosen to evaluate the seven subprojects eighteen months after start-up. One project was evaluated jointly by the Entente Fund and REDSO/WA. The Entente Fund is expected to meet evaluation targets proposed in the project management plan (Appendix V).

Training. The project management team has trained 15 livestock and food production subproject managers in various areas of agricultural development theory in order to help them be more effective managers. Practical training in financial control and reporting, procurement, and identification of development problems in the implementing of subprojects were explored. On-site seminars are held periodically by the team as necessary.

Eleven students from the Entente states commenced graduate studies in the United States at West Virginia University in September 1980. Group I students will complete the requirements for their Master's degree by the end of the summer 1982; Group II students will complete work by the end of the fall semester 1982; and Group III students will complete work by the end of the spring semester 1983.

Table 7 gives name of each student and his thesis topic. Overall, the students are doing well. Of the eleven students, only one is in danger of failing. Another student changed his field and became ineligible for the graduate program. However, REDSO/WA has given approval for him to work toward a B.Sc. degree in Hydrological Engineering. Prior to departure, the College of

5. ENTENTE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AS OF 9/30/81

Projects	Obligations FY 1976 thru FY 1981				Commitments thru 9/30/81				Disbursements thru 9/30/81				Undisbursed as of 9/30/81			
	Total	Loan	Cap. Grant	TA Grant	Total	Loan	Cap. Grant	TA Grant	Total	Loan	Cap. Grant	TA Grant	Total	Loan	Cap. Grant	TA Grant
Food Production	10,100	10,000	5,750	2,430	15,015	10,000	4,085	1,930	11,715	5,468	4,530	1,717	6,465	4,532	1,220	713
CI-V-1 NE RD	3,700	3,700	-	-	3,700	3,700	-	-	3,700	3,700	-	-	3,700	3,700	-	-
T-V-1 Notae Doyca	2,400	2,400	-	-	2,400	2,400	-	-	2,400	2,400	-	-	2,400	2,400	-	-
T-V-2 La Kara	1,300	1,300	-	-	1,300	1,300	-	-	1,300	1,300	-	-	1,300	1,300	-	-
F-V-1 Corn/Sorghum	3,500	2,600	900	-	3,500	2,600	900	-	6,175	5,468	-	-	4,725	4,532	-	-
HV-V-1 Animal Traction	2,000	-	2,000	-	2,000	-	2,000	-	2,002	-	707	-	a/	-	193	-
H-V-1 Firgoun	1,200	-	1,200	-	1,200	-	1,200	-	1,077	-	1,077	-	(2)	-	(2)a/	-
N-V-2 Func. Literacy	360	-	360	-	360	-	360	-	335	-	335	-	25	-	25	-
H-V-3 Coops & Village Groups	425	-	425	-	425	-	425	-	407	-	407	-	18	-	18	-
Project Management Team	695	-	-	695	695	-	-	695	669	-	-	669	26	-	-	26
Experts & Consultants	522	-	-	522	522	-	-	522	480	-	-	480	42	-	-	42
Sector Assessment	150	-	-	150	150	-	-	150	104	-	-	104	46	-	-	46
Training	377	-	-	377	377	-	-	377	335	-	-	335	42	-	-	42
Office Management	186	-	b/	186	186	-	-	186	129	-	-	129	57	-	b/	57
Unattributed	1,365	-	865	500	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,365	-	865	500
Livestock II	9,310	4,500	3,250	1,080	8,097	3,550	3,000	1,067	6,246	2,082	2,822	862	3,064	2,418	428	218
CI-E-1 La Pale	1,050	1,050	-	-	1,050	1,050	-	-	1,050	1,050	-	-	1,050	1,050	-	-
CI-E-2 Trails & Posts	675	675	-	-	675	675	-	-	675	675	-	-	675	675	-	-
T-E-1 Small Ruminants	1,825	1,825	-	-	1,825	1,825	-	-	2,082	2,082	-	-	1,468	1,468	-	-
E-E-2 Small Ruminants Health	500	-	500	-	500	-	500	-	390	-	390	-	110	-	110	-
HV-E-1 Helminthoses	1,000	-	1,000	-	1,000	-	1,000	-	1,000	-	1,000	-	-	-	-	-
HV-E-2 Awlia Visual	250	-	250	-	250	-	250	-	250	-	250	-	-	-	-	-
H-E-1 Vetophar	1,250	-	1,250	-	1,250	-	1,250	-	1,182	-	1,182	-	68	-	68	-
Project Management Team	345	-	-	345	345	-	-	345	260	-	-	260	84	-	-	84
Experts & Consultants	434	-	-	434	434	-	-	434	394	-	-	394	40	-	-	40
Training	216	-	-	216	216	-	-	216	144	-	-	144	72	-	-	72
Equipment (ELC)	10	-	-	10	10	-	-	10	4	-	-	4	6	-	-	6
Office Management	62	-	d/	62	62	-	-	62	60	-	-	60	2	-	d/	e/
Unattributed	1,213	950	250	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,213	950	250	13
Total Rural Development	27,490	14,500	9,000	3,510	23,912	13,550	7,885	2,997	17,961	7,550	7,352	2,579	9,529	6,950	1,648	931
Food Prod. Subprojects	15,750	10,000	5,750	-	14,885	10,000	4,885	-	11,715	5,468	4,530	-	5,752	4,532	1,220	-
Livestock II Subprojects	7,750	4,500	3,250	-	6,550	3,550	3,000	-	6,246	2,082	2,822	-	2,846	2,418	428	-
Project Management Team	1,053	-	-	1,040	1,040	-	-	1,040	929	-	-	929	111	-	-	111
Other Personnel	1,106	-	-	1,106	1,106	-	-	1,106	978	-	-	978	128	-	-	128
Training	593	-	-	593	593	-	-	593	479	-	-	479	114	-	-	114
Commodities	10	-	-	10	10	-	-	10	4	-	-	4	4	-	-	4
Other Costs	248	-	-	248	248	-	-	248	189	-	-	189	189	-	-	189
Unattributed	500	-	-	513f/	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,578	950	1,115	513f/

a/ Disbursements in excess of obligation.

b/ Prospective attributions approved in principle are: T-V-1 250, T-V-2 100, N-V-2 25.

c/ Includes 400 direct to CRED not elsewhere attributed.

d/ Prospective attributions approved in principle are: CI-E-1 200, CI-E-2 750.

e/ Prospective attributions approved in principle are: T-E-1 150, HV-E-2-100.

f/ Unattributed TA grant funds are available for Project Management Team salaries.

6. FINANCING OF LIVESTOCK II SUB-PROJECTS

Code	Project Name	USAID			Host Country	Total Cost of Project	TDD	
		Grant	Loan	Total			Grant	Loan
		(5000)						
B-E-1	Small Ruminant Production ^{1/}							
B-E-2	Small Ruminant Health	500		500	50	550	11/4/81	
CI-E-1	La Pale Grazing Zone		1,050	1,050	1,200	2,250		4/29/82
CI-E-2	Cattle Trails and Ports of Entry		675	675	500	1,175		3/14/82
N-E-1	Vetophar	1,250		1,250	200	1,450	1/6/82	
T-E-1	Small Ruminant Production		1,825	1,825	698	3,973		5/19/83
HV-E-1	Helminthoses	1,000		1,000	290	1,290	2/28/81	
HV-E-2	Audio-Visual Training-- Livestock Health and Production	250		250	30	280	7/27/82	
	Total	3,000	3,550	6,550	2,968	9,518 ^{2/}		

^{1/} Disapproved.

^{2/} Excludes other donor contributions.

Source: Entente Fund

7. LIVESTOCK II: PARTICIPANTS STUDYING IN U.S.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Thesis Subject</u>	<u>Department</u>
<u>Group I</u>			
Batino, Boniface	Upper Volta	Relative Costs Incurred in the Distribution of Agricultural Tools	Agricultural Economics
Pale, Samidou	Upper Volta	The Impact of Animal Traction on Small Farmer Incomes in Upper Volta	Agricultural Economics
DeRego, Marc	Benin	Optimum Organization for a Mixed Crop--Livestock Farm in Benin	Agricultural Economics
Andandedjanm, Claude	Benin	Key Factors in the Production of Eggs in Benin	Animal Science
Guitoba, Katawala	Togo	Poultry Production in Togo and Opportunities for Its Improvement	Animal Science
<u>Group II</u>			
Kpowbie, Ayenam	Togo	An Economic Analysis of the UNDP Project--Togo North	Agricultural Economics
Buegre, Marie-Laure	Ivory Coast	An Analysis of the Impact of the Sugar Program on Small Farmer Holdings in the Ivory Coast	Agricultural Economics
Tchapkro, Tchemi	Togo	A Study of Two Soil Profiles in West Africa (Togo)	Soils
Nonoa, Salima	Togo	The Utilization of Nitrogen on Corn Crops in Togo	Soils/Crops
<u>Group III</u>			
Assouma, Moussa	Benin	Corn Marketing Systems in Benin	Agricultural Economics
Dianda, ascal	Upper Volta	No thesis--undergraduate program in Hydrological Engineering	

Source: Entente Fund, Quarterly Report.

Agriculture and Forestry accepted him as a graduate student in Agricultural Engineering. Upon arrival at West Virginia University, he indicated a preference for the hydrological engineering program. The College of Engineering determined that his undergraduate work was inadequate for graduate work in this field and, after several discussions, the undergraduate program was proposed. The student is from Upper Volta and this fact played a role in the Fund's decision to permit him to stay in school at the undergraduate level because of water resources is an important priority in that country.

All eleven students returned to their home countries during the summer of 1981. During the summer visit, they compiled information and data for the thesis. The Fund authorized a small stipend to assist with the cost of performing this research. In some cases, a visit by a faculty advisor was also scheduled to guide the students' research efforts.

The project paper anticipated that 35 Africans from the Livestock Services of member countries would receive training over a four year period--20 in the United States and 15 in Africa. To date, 11 Africans who were selected for specialized training in the United States, two are studying animal science, six are studying agricultural economics, and two are studying soil science. The remaining student is in an undergraduate program in hydrological engineering. The training plan reduced the number of participants to study in the U.S. to 15, however, no participants were selected by Niger and 11 students actually were sent to the U.S.

The project has met design requirements regarding training of subproject managers. Fifteen managers were trained in Africa, i.e., in seminars, on-site practical training, and informal training sessions during project team monitoring of the subprojects.

Research. The Center for Research on Economic Development (CRED), University of Michigan, entered into formal discussion with AID/Entente Fund in March 1977 resulting in contract AID/afr-c-1169, to undertake a major study of livestock production and marketing in the five Entente states. The contract was for \$480,000. CRED conducted a three-year study of West African livestock economics under Contract AID/afr-c-1169. The full study consisted of four eighteen-month field studies, two focusing on production and two on marketing, in addition to several investigations of existing data and literature. The geographic area of focus was the five member states of the Conseil de l'Entente--Ivory Coast, Togo, Benin, Niger, and Upper Volta--but also included, Mali and Nigeria. The following documents were produced:

- K. Shapiro, ed., Livestock Production and Marketing in the Entente States of West Africa: Summary Report. (This volume contains an overview plus separate summaries of each monograph.)
- A. Ergas, ed., Livestock Production and Marketing in the Entente States of West Africa: Annotated Bibliography. (Included as part of the summary report.)

Monograph

Delgado, C., Livestock versus Foodgrain Production in Southeast Upper Volta: A Resource Allocation Analysis.

Staats, J., The Economics of Cattle and Meat Marketing in Ivory Coast.

Eddy, E., Labor and Land Use on Mixed Farms in the Pastoral Zone of Niger.

Herman, L., The Livestock and Meat Marketing System in Upper Volta: An Evaluation of Economic Efficiency.

Working Papers

Ferguson, D., A Conceptual Framework for the Evaluation of Livestock Production Development Projects and Programs in Sub-Saharan West Africa.

Wardle, C., Promoting Cattle Fattening Amongst Peasants in Niger.

Swift, J., West African Pastoral Production Systems.

Sleeper, J., An Economic Analysis of the Role of Ox-Plowing and Cattle-Feeding in the Stratification of West African Livestock Production.

DeBoer, A.J., The Short Run and Long Run Position of Australian Beef Supplies and the Competitiveness of Australian Beef in International Trade.

Porter, R., The Uses of Economic Models in Analysis of the Cattle Sector.

These documents are available from CRED.

The final report was submitted in 1979. The report recommended two major regional approaches: (1) AID should encourage development within ECOWAS of an organization, such as CEBV (Communaute Economique du Betail et de la Viande) and OCBV (Office Communautaire du Betail et de la Viande), to facilitate integration of the West African livestock sector; (2) AID should continue to work with the Entente Fund to encourage livestock production and marketing within the region.

Subsequent to the design and approval of the Livestock II project, the Entente Livestock Community (ELC or CEBV) with headquarters in Ouagadougou, sought and obtained autonomy from the Entente Fund. The Entente Chiefs of State, via the Entente Council, have transferred to ELC livestock development coordination responsibilities for the Entente States. As a result, the Administrative Secretariat to undertake new activities or continue sectoral livestock initiatives. The new policy is for the Administrative Secretariat to confine itself to implementing existing livestock subprojects. Following disapproval of the Benin Small Ruminant Production subproject, seven subprojects remain. Follow-on or second phase activities relative to these seven subprojects may be proposed by the Administrative Secretariat if appropriate, e.g., under a follow-on Rural Development project, but no new subprojects would be considered.

Because of the decision of the Chiefs of State to transfer livestock policy coordination responsibilities to the Entente Livestock Community, the Administrative Secretary has declined to undertake additional livestock sector studies or policy reviews which are considered the responsibility of ELC. Thus, certain livestock sector activities which, under the Livestock II project were considered appropriate for the Entente implementation, are no longer the responsibility of the Entente Fund.

The major sector studies completed by CRED fulfilled requirements set forth in the Livestock II project paper. The only studies not completed were micro-studies of each country which would have dealt with specific problems of production and marketing. The Entente Fund has not implemented protocols concerning animal health, statistics, customs and regulation of profession, because the responsibility has shifted to the ELC. The funding earmarked for the studies and policy reviews not undertaken have been reprogrammed.

Food Production

Institution Building. After the project agreements were signed in late 1976, the member states were invited to prepare subproject proposals for consideration by the Fund. Initially, the nine subprojects under the Food Production project and eight under Livestock II were not well thought out and some failed to meet AID's criteria.

In nearly all cases the Fund played a major role, through contract consultants, in preparing the subprojects. The appraisal of Livestock I by the Livestock II design team identified limited capabilities of the respective countries to plan and design subprojects as a serious weakness of Livestock I. This led the food production design team to propose a project management team and consultants for technical assistance to member countries in design, monitoring, and evaluating subprojects.

8. FINANCING OF FOOD PRODUCTION SUB-PROJECTS

Code	Project Name	USAID			Host Country	Total Cost of Project	TDD ^{1/}	
		Grant	Loan	Total			Grant	Loan
B-V-1	Production of Maize and Sorghum	900	2,600	3,500	850	4,350	10/29/82	8/11/81
CI-V-1	NE Savannah Rural Development		3,700	3,700	4,470	8,170 ^{2/}		4/8/84
N-V-1	Reconstruction of the Firgoun Irrigation System	1,200		1,200	400	1,600	8/19/81	
N-V-2	Support for Agricultural Extension and Education Activities for Irrigated Perimeters/ Functional Literacy and Farmer Training	335		335	37	372	12/16/81	
N-V-3	Improvement of Traditional Rice Production in Tillaberi/Support of Coops. and Mutual Village groups	425		425	22.25	447.25	4/2/82	
T-V-1	Notse-Dayes Rural Development		2,400	2,400	650	3,050		11/25/81
T-V-2	LaKara Rural Development (Atchangbade and Sirka)		1,300	1,300	450	1,750		7/14/82
HV-V-1	Animal Traction	2,000		2,000	550	2,550	2/2/81	
	Total	4,860	10,000	14,860	7,429.25	22,289.25		

^{1/} Original TDD for both projects was 8/80, three years after the first disbursement.

^{2/} Excludes IBRD, and FAC support of \$12 million. The total cost of the project is about \$20 million.

Unfortunately, because of the long time between original consultations with the project design team and selection of subprojects, most of the designs were undertaken prior to arrival of the team. As a consequence, the design effort was carried out mainly by contract consultants.

The development of 16 subprojects by the consultant teams, usually teams of three, during April to December 1977, was nevertheless a substantial accomplishment. However, virtually none of the subproject proposals completely satisfied the analytical framework set forth in the two AID project papers.

By virtue of its relationships to governments and flexibility of action, the team consequently modified the proposed subprojects as necessary. The relatively modest levels of investment in the agro-livestock sector which the Fund made in each of the five states were not planned in themselves to have a major impact on the rural sector. However, lessons learned from the successes and failures of the subproject designs, implementation, and evaluations could have positive consequences beyond the subprojects themselves.

The concentration of American technical resources in a central unit relatively independent of the subproject implementing entities has strengthened assistance in implementation. In October 1979, the team, led by three agricultural technicians from DAI, conducted a one-week evaluation seminar at Natatingou, Benin, for the 15 subproject managers. Following the seminar, the group conducted an in-depth

evaluation of two subprojects in Benin and Upper Volta. The seminar was an effective means of transferring analytical evaluation concepts to African subproject managers.

Sectoral analysis was launched in February 1979, in accordance with the capital grant agreement and the companion loan agreement through an IQC with Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI), and a personal services contract with Dr. Francis LeBeau. The cooperation of Ministries of Plan and Rural Development with the team was enthusiastic. Dr. LeBeau's report, Agricultural Policies in the Entente States, was submitted to the Entente Fund and REDSO/WA in June 1979.

In summary, the team's strong coordination and cooperation with subproject managers and other government officials in the member states has increased the capabilities of the agricultural officers in member countries in design, implementation, and evaluation.

It is too early to determine whether reflows to the Entente Fund resulting from the interest rate differential which are in excess of the amounts needed to guarantee the Fund's timely repayment to AID will be used to provide the continuation of technical services. Although, the Fund has met design requirements regarding size of staff to adequately strengthen counterpart capacity, the reflow requirements for institutionalizing the organizational structure of the regional central unit has not been determined.

Small-Farmer Food Production Projects. The Entente Fund contracted Louis Berger in 1977 to prepare food production subprojects for the member states. Eight designs were approved for loan and grant funding. The grant funded projects total \$4.884 million and loan funded projects total \$10 million. DAI was selected to conduct a midterm evaluation of the subprojects. Evaluations have been completed and reports sent to EF and REDSO/WA.

The design, implementation and evaluation of subprojects have met the requirements of the Food Production project paper. The beneficiaries have been small farmers in well defined regions of the member states. The staple crops on which the subprojects concentrated were chosen according to the priorities of the member states. The subprojects ranged from large integrated rural development projects, such as the North East Savannah project in the Ivory Coast, to single-function projects, such as the seed multiplication project in Benin. Most projects have provided credit for agricultural inputs including animal traction equipment; training in timing of agricultural activities; dissemination of higher yielding varieties; training of extension or credit agents; and support of research to adapt technological packages to local conditions.

DAI was selected to conduct mid-term evaluations of the subprojects. Seven of eight food production projects have been evaluated to date and reports submitted to the Entente Fund.

Effectiveness of the evaluations is discussed in Part V.

Other Outputs. Other outputs from the project result primarily from training by project management team and consultants including seminars, in-country training courses for subproject managers, and meetings. The following list of courses, seminars, and meetings illustrates progress to date:

Seminars:

1. Problems of agricultural land titles, 1978;
2. Problems of agricultural credit, 1979;
3. Analytical skills for evaluation of subprojects, 1979;
4. Problems with implementation, 1980.

Short-term in-country training:

1. Practical implementation problems discussed during monitoring of subprojects as needed;
2. Training of managers in proper financial control and quarterly reporting as needed.

Meetings:

1. Technical meeting of agricultural officials of the Entente member states, 1979;
2. Meeting of the Ministers of Agriculture, 1980.

The project paper did not specify how many seminars or short-term in-country training courses and meetings were to be completed. The project management plan, prepared in accordance with conditions precedent of the project agreement, also did not specify the kinds of seminars or how often they should take place. The training

program followed appears appropriate to training needs and EF responsibilities are considered fulfilled. However, the logical framework specified that ten host country nationals were to be trained to the M.S. level in agronomy and food production and five trained to the M.A. level in rural sociology or similar field. These targets have not been fully met. The logframe also listed as objectively verifiable indicators, ten two-week training seminars for host country nationals and ten one-month study trips. This output might have been overambitious and difficult to achieve given time and staff constraints.

Subproject Loans

This section discusses the subproject loans under both the Livestock II Project and the Food Production Project. An important measure of the effectiveness of the Entente Fund as a development finance intermediary is its performance in negotiating 15 separate subproject loan agreements with the five member governments. Of \$27.49 million funding for the Livestock II and Food Production projects, \$14.5 million (53%) is for subloans to member governments for 15 subprojects--8 food production and 7 livestock subprojects. The average food production subproject loan is \$1.25 million, approximately double the size of the average livestock loan. (642,900) (Table 9). Average financing through loans and grants from AID funds is \$1.97 million for production subprojects and \$1.1 million for livestock subprojects.

The Entente Fund repays AID loans in U.S. dollars. The member governments repay the Entente Fund in CFA francs. However, the Entente Fund passes on the burden of maintaining the value of the repayments to the member governments by requiring that all payments in CFA francs be made in the dollar equivalent as calculated at the time the payment is requested. The fund is fully protected as regards the maintenance of the value of the loan, but the subprojects may suffer because of unfavorable exchange rates. Part of the need for \$1 million of additional funding in April 1981 was the added cost during the first stage of implementation resulting from appreciation of the U.S. dollar.

AID loan funds are subloaned to member governments at 3.5% interest during grace and loan periods. Grace periods average from 2-7 years and the repayment periods from 15-25 years. Subloan repayments are used by the Entente Fund for technical assistance as well as for relending in the livestock and food sectors. Entente Fund has not reported repayments.

Table 10 shows three subloan agreements were signed in 1977, nine in 1978, one in 1979, and two in 1980. The subloan agreements signed in 1980 were delayed because of special circumstances. The North East Savannah Rural Development Project signed in September 1980 is a larger, \$20 million IRD project in which IBRD is the major lender. As a result, signing was contingent on actions by IBRD and other donors. The design of the Togo Small Ruminant Production subproject had design flaws which postponed finalizing

the loan agreement. With the exceptions noted elsewhere, the subloan agreements appear to have been properly prepared. However, they have not been reviewed by legal experts for this evaluation.

9. TOTAL AND AVERAGE OBLIGATIONS FOR SUBPROJECTS

(\$000)

<u>Type</u>	<u>Total AID Funding</u>	<u>Average</u>		
		<u>Livestock</u>	<u>Food Production</u>	<u>All</u>
Loan	14,500	642.9	1,250.0	966.7
Capital Grant	<u>9,000</u>	<u>464.3</u>	<u>718.8</u>	<u>600.0</u>
Total	23,500	1,107.2	1,968.8	1,566.7

Source: Table 5

10. DATES RURAL DEVELOPMENT SUBRPROJECTS WERE SIGNED

<u>Project No.</u>	<u>Type of Funding</u>	<u>Title of Subproject</u>	<u>Date Signed</u>
<u>Food Production</u>			
B-V-1/FE/AID	G	Production of Maize and Sorghum	February 28, 1978
N-V-1/FE/AID	G	Reconstruction of the Fugoun Irrigation System	July 5, 1978
N-V-2/FE/AID	G	Support for Agricultural Extension and Educational Activities	December 12, 1977
N-V-3/FE/AID	G	Improvement of Traditional Rice Production in Tillaberi	September 12, 1978
HV-V-1/FE/AID	G	Animal Traction	October 29, 1977
B-V-1/FE/AID	L	Production of Maize and Sorghum	February 28, 1978
CI-V-1/FE/AID	L	North East Savannah Rural Development	September 16, 1980
T-V-1/FE/AID	L	Notse/Dayas Rural Development	June 3, 1978
T-V-2/FE/AID	L	LaKara Rural Development	June 22, 1979
<u>Livestock II</u>			
B-E-2/FE/AID	G	Small Ruminant Health	June 16, 1978
CI-E-1/FE/AID	L	La Pale Grazing Zone	March 13, 1978
CI-E-2/FE/AID	L	Cattle Trails/Ports of Entry	December 4, 1978
N-E-1/FE/AID	G	Vetophar	February 14, 1978
T-E-1/FE/AID	L	Small Ruminant Production	April 14, 1980
HV-E-1/FE/AID	G	Helminthoses	October 29, 1977
HV-E-2/FE/AID	G	A.V. Training Livestock Health and Production	May 29, 1978

V. IMPLEMENTATION EFFECTIVENESS

Introduction

The REDSO/WA evaluation team gave the Entente Fund good marks for implementation effectiveness. Project management involves a complex and diversified assortment of actions: (1) training in a variety of disciplines and jobs, both in Africa and abroad; (2) provision of long and short-term technical consultants; (3) technical and financial reporting; (4) assistance to policy planners in the member countries; and (5) quarterly analysis of obligations and disbursements of both AID resources and local currency contributions to the Fund.

Monitoring of subproject implementation is a formidable task. In spite of a good overall performance, the evaluation team found substantial deficiencies in data collection, reporting, and design of subprojects.

Project Management Team

The Entente Fund Rural Development Division comprises the professional staff responsible for project design analysis, implementation, coordination, and supervision of rural development activities (Appendix V). The team functions separately and reports through one of the four permanent Conseillers Techniques, Mr. Jean Ruche, to the Administrative Secretary.

The team manages the two AID-funded food production and livestock projects and will exist only during the life of the projects.

The composition of the team can change in response to project needs for technical skills. The team members have one to three-year contracts with Entente Fund. The former and current members of the team are:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Profession</u>	<u>Contract began</u>	<u>Contract expired</u>
L. Rasmussen	Agriculture	May 1977	May 1981
D. Antroinen	Veterinary	September 1977	March 1980
G. Reusche	Agronomist	July 1977	July 1979
I. Licht	Ag. Economist	September 1977	July 1980
W. d'Epagnier	Agriculture	June 1979	July 1981
E. Tamari	Agriculture	October 1980	October 1982
B. Garfink	Accounting	June 1977	June 1979
S. Lehman	Accounting	June 1979	December 1981

W. d'Epagnier's contract expired July 1981. Steve Lehman, the accountant, extended his contract through December 1981. After July 1981, the team consisted of E. Tamari, the rural development chief replacing L. Rasmussen, and M. Allasani, an agricultural economist/engineer.

In June 1979, the division consisted of L. Rasmussen, agriculturalist, as team leader; Gary Reusche, agronomist; Irving Licht, agricultural economist; and Dr. Aaron Antroinen, the livestock and management specialist. All four experts were technically qualified and three had several years of AID experience.

Mr. Reusche was the first to depart in 1979 and was replaced by Mr. William d'Epagnier, who had several years of experience in agricultural projects in Niger and Upper Volta. Dr. Antroinen departed early 1980, and his monitoring responsibilities of livestock projects were absorbed by the remaining three members. Subproject

monitoring was particularly effective between March 1980 and May 1981. A Togolese counterpart, M. Allusani, an agricultural economist, arrived in October.

In May and June of 1981, the project management team decreased to two persons. After the Rasmussen and d'Epagnier contracts expired, only Elias Tamari and M. Allasani remained to monitor fifteen subprojects. The on-site monitoring initially seemed effective, but the reporting required by project agreements has been inadequate and not received by REDSO/WA in a timely manner. Mr. Stephen Lehman, seconded from the accounting section but not a trained agriculturalist, is assisting in project monitoring and reporting. Mr. Lehman is scheduled to leave by mid-December. A replacement qualified in agronomy is being recruited but the team has not had an agronomist for more than a year.

REDSO/WA is concerned regarding the Secretariat's present and future capacity to manage rural development activities. The director of REDSO/WA sent a letter to the Entente Fund in November relative to staffing deficiencies which would jeopardize project success.

Experience during the last three years with the complex mix of subprojects which the team must monitor indicated that four qualified agriculturalists is the minimum necessary for adequate management of subprojects.

The duties of the project management team are to:

1. Carry out programs of technical assistance, including training, in order to develop an understanding of the food production sector;

2. Stimulate regional cooperation and coordination in food production and livestock development and marketing, through seminars, regional meetings and similar programs, for the purpose of exchanging information;

3. Develop, design, implement and evaluate subprojects that meet the criteria outlined for the AID-financed loan and grant programs;

4. Apply the strategy and experience thus developed to other projects, to the extent that these are found effective and are compatible with national and regional development priorities, and can be undertaken with available resources.

The team assures that subproject designs are sound, reviews designs and obtains required approvals, prepares subloan and grant agreements and implementation letters, monitors compliance with conditions precedent to disbursement of subproject funds, supervises contract procedures, and monitors disbursement procedures to insure adherence to AID requirements.

The monitoring of project progress is a principal responsibility. Each member of the team monitors four to six projects. On-site visits to each subproject were planned to follow implementation progress and to assist subproject managers solve implementation bottlenecks. Quarterly reports are submitted on each project, which provide data on obligations, disbursements, activities in progress, and activities planned for the coming quarter. Whenever implementation of a subproject lags seriously, the technician discusses problems

with the team leader, the REDSO/WA program manager, and, if necessary, with other advisors to the Administrative Secretariat.

Analysis of the Entente Fund's ability to design, support, and monitor development programs must include a review of the performance record. On January 14, 1977, the Administrative Secretary signed a contract with Louis Berger, Inc. for design services. In the following weeks, members of the Louis Berger staff toured the five countries to identify potential projects. Between April and October 1977, Louis Berger produced project papers for 16 subprojects.

There were problems with several of these designs, but significantly, Louis Berger was not asked to revise them. In February 1978, the Entente Fund signed a contract with MASI. MASI redesigned the Togo and the Benin Small Ruminant Production subprojects. The Togo subproject then went through several revisions before adoption. The Benin subproject was eventually dropped. The Northeast Savannah Integrated Rural Development subproject in the Ivory Coast (CI-V-1) also went through several revisions before the final IBRD design was accepted.

The other thirteen subproject proposals were modified as a result of Entente/REDSO discussions. Ten subproject agreements were signed between October 29, 1977 and June 20, 1978. The last two were signed before the end of 1978. The Entente Fund was required to obtain the formal approval of REDSO/WA for subprojects in excess

of \$1,000,000. Nevertheless, Entente Fund submitted all subprojects to REDSO/WA for formal approval regardless of the level of funding.

A second problem was underemphasis of the credit component of subprojects. Credit problems have emerged in the Upper Volta Animal Traction subproject (HV-V-1), the Niger Cooperative Support subproject (N-V-3), the Benin Corn and Sorghum subproject (B-V-1), and the Togo Notse-Dayes Food Production subproject (T-V-1). In general, the designs were technically adequate but not enough thought was given to support services such as credit. The two-year Upper Volta Animal Traction subproject (HV-V-1) contained a similar weakness. No credit was provided after the second year. Even with 100% repayment of loans the reserve would not be rebuilt to its original level until year six. With no funding for years three, four, and five, the project would have difficulty financing its activities. Moreover, animal insurance was added which reduced the supply of funds.

The Upper Volta Helminthoses subproject (HV-E-1) assumed that helminthoses is an acute animal health problem. There are still no data on the incidence and gravity of helminthoses. The Upper Volta Audio-Visual subproject (HV-E-2) was intended to support the helminthoses treatment project. However, during implementation, the audio-visual materials on helminthoses were produced too late. Spending \$73,000 to design an audio-visual project of \$250,000 also is questionable. In the Fargoun Irrigation subproject (N-V-1) the

design team made a serious error by underestimating by two-thirds the amount of earth to be moved. Funds were exhausted early since three times as much work as originally estimated had to be done.

The Vetophar subproject (N-E-1) mid-term evaluation says:

"The original project paper did not thoroughly analyze animal health in Niger and consequently recommended uneconomic treatments (p.29)."

Moreover, the design team did not assess the marketing and distribution aspects of the project, which are now proving troublesome.

The Benin Corn and Sorghum subproject (B-V-1) was too ambitious and complicated. The mid-term evaluation states:

"Most of the problems cited above stem from the fact that credit as such has never received proper attention either in the planning stages of this project or in implementation."

Ironically, this is the only project that appears to have been overbudgeted. Disbursement of funds is relatively slow and the project may operate for four years on funds allocated for three years.

The design of the Togo Notse-Dayes Food Production subproject is symptomatic of the problems of many of the designs. The design was too much a technical blueprint and did not pay enough attention to support services or organizational questions. The design lacked a clear statement of subproject objectives. But the mid-term evaluation states:

"The main problem is that the successful operation of the bloc farms will depend not just on the efforts of the small farmers themselves but on a number of activities over which the farmer has little or no control or influence (p.48)."

The design is too complicated and the welfare of the small farmer is precariously balanced on the doubtful coordination of diverse elements that have not been well analyzed.

The project management team might have benefited from a French speaking rural sociologist with research experience in the West African pastoral system during the design of subprojects.

Disbursement

The rate of disbursement for some subprojects has been slow. New agricultural production projects with subagreements normally experience slower disbursement compared to projects without subagreements, because of additional processing from the time of project signature to subproject implementation. The complex nature of production loans compared to construction projects also slows disbursement.

Analysis of the pipeline as of September 30, 1981, indicates:

1. Of the \$27.5 million obligated FY76 through FY81, \$23.9 million (87%) was committed/sub-obligated and \$18.0 million (65%) disbursed;
2. Of \$8.0 million capital grant obligated in FY76 (\$6.0 million) and FY78 (\$2.0 million), all but \$648,000 (8%) has been disbursed (none of an additional \$1.0 million of FY81 capital grant fund has been disbursed, Table 5);
3. Of \$14.5 million of loans obligated in FY77 (\$12.5 million) and FY78 (\$2.0 million), only \$7.55 million (52%) was disbursed, leaving an unexpended balance of \$6.95 million (48%);

4. Of \$3.5 million TA grant obligated during FY76 through FY79, \$931,000 (27%) remains undisbursed.

11. DISBURSEMENT RATIOS FOR CAPITAL GRANTS AND
LOAN FOR FOOD PRODUCTION AND LIVESTOCK II PROJECTS.

	(percent)			
<u>Type</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981 (Sept)</u>
Food Production Grant	57	68	92	80
Food Production Loans	9	19	50	55
Livestock Grants	29	60	90	86
Livestock Loans	7	22	38	46

Source: Derived from Entente Fund quarterly reports

The above table indicates that 90% or more of the food production and livestock grants were disbursed through 1980. In March 1981, an increase in capital grant funding by \$1 million, caused the ratio to decrease somewhat. However, disbursement of subproject loans was only about 50% through September 1981. The following reasons resulted in slow disbursement of loans:

1. Less animal traction units and fertilizer were needed in both the Alacora and Oueme Province project sites (1 project);
2. Expenditure was less because civil servants filled posts which otherwise would have been financed by project funds (1 project);
3. Physical infrastructure originally planned was not required (3 projects);
4. Delayed start-up (8 projects);
5. Slow implementation (7 projects).

The terminal disbursement date for the four grant agreements of the livestock and food production projects was extended to June 30, 1984. Obligations were also increased by \$1 million for the two capital grant agreements.

The original terminal disbursement date (TDD) in the capital and technical grant agreements, Section 7.04, was five years after signature. A one-year TDD extension waiver was initiated by REDSO/WA and a two-year waiver initiated by AID/W because of delays in project start-up and projects not meeting intended objectives during original LOP. LOP of subprojects was extended from maximum of three to maximum of five years.

Cost Effectiveness

The costs of administration of the Rural Development Division which are paid by AID include salaries and living allowances of four expatriates to monitor the projects. Housing, travel, and per diem are paid by the Entente Fund. Entente Fund also pays the salaries of the office support staff and operating costs of the Rural Development Division. In 1980, the Entente Fund share of the costs was CFA 63 million, approximately \$275,000, increasing in 1981 to about \$330,000 (Appendix K). Through September 30, 1981, the division had received a total of \$2.179 million in administrative support--\$929,000 (43%) from AID and \$1.25 million (57%) from Entente Fund.

The use of \$929,000 of AID technical assistance funds to elicit a 35% larger amount of support from other sources is an

illustration of the cost effectiveness of AID support of Entente Fund rural development projects. Central monitoring of 15 subprojects in five different countries also is efficient use of AID management resources. While team expertise now is spread too thin, regional management of the subprojects permits administration economies. The Entente Fund is able to apply regional experience to national problems and to organize seminars and other training programs on a more economic scale.

Management Audit

A management audit by Arthur Anderson in September 1981 concluded that Entente Fund is an effective vehicle for administration of loans and grants financed by AID, and that the Entente Fund, in general, has fulfilled its responsibilities under agreements with AID. Seven short-term and fourteen long-term recommendations are given in Appendix T. REDSO/WAAC comments on the recommendations are presented in Appendix W.

Compliance with AID Regulations

REDSO/WA has conducted a review of requirements included in the project agreements and identified deficiencies. A letter was sent in November 1981 from the Director of REDSO/WA to the Administrative Secretariat requesting correction of the deficiencies. Examples of noncompliance with agreements include: (1) no reporting submitted by the Entente Fund on interest earned; (2) no reports on the status of government contributions; (3) quarterly financial

statements of the subproject managers do not show current and cumulative expenditures nor are estimates given of expenditures necessary to complete projects; (4) financing requests are not submitted with receipts; (5) borrower shipping reports have been received irregularly; (6) some funds have been comingled; and (7) U.S. cargo preference has not been given. Appendix U gives requirements, status, and actions requested.

Procurement

Procurement procedures and problems are discussed briefly in each subproject analysis. REDSO/WA supply management officers consider the problems modest and more-or-less average for AID projects in Africa. In most cases, when bottlenecks occurred, special attention was given and they were corrected. A review of the delays and errors in procurement indicates insufficient procurement planning during project design. Procurement plans and detailed listings of commodities were incomplete. AID regulations require that each project paper contain a detailed implementation plan, procurement plan and an equipment list. Cost estimates did not consider inflation and waivers and special provisions for non U.S. source/origin procurement were not followed properly. There was, however, a \$500,000 blanket waiver for vehicles and \$200,000 waiver for technical assistance.

Ordering and Documentation. Host country counterparts are responsible for local commodity procurement support, such as

customs exoneration, clearance, and inland transportation from port-of-entry. The signing of agreements between the EF and host governments authorizes ordering of commodities. U.S. source procurement under the subprojects is through AAPC which solicits bids, for items priced as low as \$200, from at least three suppliers. Time between issuance of the purchase order and procurement or production (the case for vehicles) averages approximately three months. AAPC has set up good communications links with the EF and issues a computer readout periodically on the status of the commodities. AAPC selects a forwarder. Four sets of shipping documents are required on the P.O. and are supposed to be forwarded to the EF, EF project counterpart, and the respective port forwarders to whom the commodities are consigned. Despite the fact that the shipping documents should be with the freight and also mailed first class, projects have experienced serious delays due to late or non receipt of documents.

Customs Clearance. Upon receipt of the shipping documents, the subproject management requests the appropriate Ministry for exemption from customs duty. In some cases, notably, the Benin Corn and Sorghum subproject, commodities have arrived and accumulated storage charges in a bonded warehouse before the exoneration was granted. Follow-up by the responsible implementing agency was irregular.

The project management team monitors deliveries arriving in Abidjan. In the case of Benin and Togo, transshipping from Abidjan

caused additional problems, such as loss of papers and theft. Transit between ports and project sites presents problems in commodity tracking, security and delivery, although problems are modest relative to the number of projects involved. Other problems include:

1. Project commodities arrive late in relation to proposed start-up, with technicians and local beneficiaries awaiting important commodity inputs. Sometimes commodities are inappropriate: e.g., slide projector lamps for the Upper Volta audio-visual project were of the wrong voltage or tattoo pliers ordered for cattle in the animal traction project were manufactured for sheep. Or in other cases, disagreements over specifications as in the case of the Benin Corn and Sorghum seed production facility caused long delays.
2. Subproject implementation agency lacks information on documentation and procedural requirements such as customs exoneration, vehicle registration, and insurance and damage claims which have caused delays in obtaining release of goods from warehouses.
3. Certain local freight forwarders impose arbitrary and sometimes unreasonable requirements when they handle project commodities. Complaints of non-payment of bills are often heard.
4. Continuity in project implementation and monitoring, including commodity procurements, can be interrupted by turnover of personnel. A short-term consultant might be helpful in improving the procurement process. A more efficient mechanism needs to be

devised to assure systematic overview of commodity procurement throughout its complicated phases. The problem of lack of continuity is not unique to the Entente Fund. It must be noted that procurement problems exist throughout the bilateral missions in West Africa.

A short-term procurement consultant could have expedited procurement during the first and second years of the program. He would write detailed design requirements for the proposals and monitor the ordering and tracking to ultimate destination all project commodities. He would also give seminars to subproject managers on AID compliance of regulations and other tracking procedures necessary for continued efficiency. Subproject managers should be given special instructions on procurement matters.

Strengthening National Institutions

Several subprojects strengthened national and local institutions. For example, the Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole (CNCA) was established as the result of recommendations by the project management team regarding the Upper Volta animal traction subproject (HV-V-1). The subproject is now the main focus of CNCA activity and was the first rural credit program active in all eleven ORD's of the country.

The Niger cooperative subproject (N-V-3) also has stimulated a refinement in the structure and administration of agricultural credit. In the Niger Vetophar subproject (N-E-1), a new national institution was created to manage the purchase and distribution of veterinary pharmaceuticals.

The Ivory Coast livestock subproject (CI-E-1) and (CI-E-2) complemented the program of SODEPRA (Societe pour le Developpement des Productions Animales). The three Togolese subprojects (T-V-1, T-V-2, T-E-1), perhaps for reasons peculiar to Togo, were established as autonomous institutions within their appropriate ministries. As such, they strengthened ministry programs as well as village cooperatives. The two Upper Volta livestock subprojects (HV-E-1 and HV-E-2) added new functions to an ongoing service which complement these services.

Several projects have promoted use of animal traction equipment (HV-V-1, T-V-1, T-V-2, B-V-1, CI-V-1, N-V-3). The demand for animal traction equipment in the Savannah and Sahelian zones, in part the result of these projects, has become so large that manufacturers of equipment cannot supply demand. New manufacturing firms, both private and parastatal, have been established or proposed in Upper Volta and Niger.

Many of the projects have affected local institutions. The most influential have been the food production projects. In each case, except for the Firgoun Irrigation Project (N-V-1) which was a construction project, villagers have been required to organize themselves into some sort of cooperative in order to participate in the project. The other seven food subprojects have involved production of foodcrops. Participation in activities in all seven subprojects has been contingent on membership in a cooperative group. Some subprojects have been more successful than others in

promoting the organization of local groups. The LaKara subproject in Togo (T-V-1), for example, has been more successful in promoting groups in the Dayes zone than in the Notse zone. In the Benin Corn and Sorghum subproject (B-V-1), members are adhering to the groups for convenience without special commitment to the cooperative concept. The groups in the Upper Volta and Niger projects (HV-V-1), (N-V-2) and (N-V-3) seem to be functioning well. At the local level, all food production subprojects have promoted village instructions. Despite problems and set-backs, West Africa seems to be ready for village cooperatives. Encouragement of village cooperative organizations should continue in Entente food production subprojects. Certain aspects though should be reviewed, however, such as criteria for membership, size, and rights, duties and privileges of members.

Effects on National Policies

Meetings of ministers on national policy issues arranged by the Secretariat, and subsequent deliberation by chiefs of state, have been effective in bringing about discussion of national policies. Particularly significant was the first meeting of the ministers of agriculture and rural development in early 1981 who adopted policy recommendations for rural development in Entente Council countries for 1982-86 (Appendix S).

Entente Fund subprojects also have had some impact on national policies in member countries. The Upper Volta animal traction subproject (HV-V-1) has influenced national policy. The newly created

Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole evolved from the project and its structure and operations policies for small farmer credit were improved in response to lessons learned from collaboration with the animal traction subproject. The Togo Lama Kara subproject (T-V-2) may have a similar impact on future approaches to rural extension work in Togo. It is, however, still too early to measure the impact. The two Ivory Coast livestock subprojects (CI-E-1 and CI-E-2) may provoke a re-examination of the rationale and objectives of Operation Zebu.

Recurrent Costs

The scope of work of this mid-term evaluation did not include examination of recurrent costs and potential self-sufficiency of subprojects. REDSO/WA strongly recommends review of the following three topics during final evaluation in 1984. Findings will not only guide the EF in design and implementation of future projects but will assist AID in understanding recurrent costs problems in West Africa.

1. Many subprojects entail substantial recurrent costs for items such as salaries, vehicle operation and maintenance, and subsidies on commodities, particularly fertilizer. Some of these costs are borne during the life of the project by donors. To the extent that these costs continue, and even increase, after donor funding is completed, project continuation will depend on the capacity of governments to assume them. Thus, an important indicator of the willingness of governments to support projects will be line items in annual government budgets to cover recurrent costs,

2. Government policies are another indicator of financial self-sufficiency of subprojects. Pricing policies affect the financial viability of production. The policies that must be monitored for their effects on financial return include:

(1) food crop price policy; (2) subsidies; and (3) creation and maintenance of infrastructure.

3. The last indicator to be thoroughly assessed at the time of final evaluation is observable behavior changes by the target populations, the most important being adoption of new technology (animal traction, credit, fertilizer, and improved seeds).

Impact on Production and Income

Although the eight food production projects have commenced agricultural production, the amount of production during the first year was not recorded. The subprojects as a whole, do not have systems to monitor yields or impact on beneficiaries which prevents measuring the effects of different production technologies. Returns to labor were not measured by EF monitoring or in mid-term evaluation reports. The current strategy of intercropping for optimum returns to labor assumes that although animal traction or tractors add to the cost of land preparation, certain technology packages could increase net cash incomes significantly. Reliable information on economic variables must be collected. The subprojects have achieved, in most cases, planned area under cultivation. The only projects which have not achieved land clearing goals are those which have had slow start-ups.

Impact of livestock projects on production and income has been difficult to assess. Of the seven livestock projects, five were animal health projects with subsequent increased production as a subpurpose rather than a primary purpose. All the livestock subprojects are expected to contribute eventually to national food production and to increase farmer awareness of debilitating parasitic and bacterial diseases which attack herds. The livestock projects have not progressed far enough to have measurable production results. The most noticeable improvement was the increased strength

of local organizations. By channeling agricultural inputs into pre-cooperatives, projects are promoting and strengthening local organizations and local participation in development.

Regional Cooperation

The Entente Council and the Entente Fund are household words in francophone West Africa. Within the member states, probably more citizens are familiar with the Entente than with the United Nations. When the Entente Chiefs of State meet formally each year the event is covered with red-letter, front-page headlines for several days in the Fraternite Matin in Abidjan and in national newspapers of other member states. Frequent, less formal meetings between two or more of the Chiefs of State receive prominent coverage in evening television newscasts, invariably presented as an Entente meeting. The Council's twentieth anniversary in 1979 was accompanied by a major celebration and publicity. There is even an Entente Cup which generates intense annual soccer rivalries.

The Entente Secretariat hosts annual, week-long meetings of key rural development ministry personnel from the five countries in order to draft joint rural development policies which are then presented for approval to a shorter meeting of ministers. Throughout the year, special purpose, Entente-hosted seminars and workshops bring together operating level personnel, e.g., project managers and technicians and their expatriate advisors, for training and problem solving sessions. Entente underwrites visits from one member country

to another of project personnel engaged in similar projects or endeavors, e.g., animal traction and small ruminant production, for exchange of experiences and ideas.

In short, the Entente organization is a well-known and highly regarded cooperative mechanism created and sustained by the Entente nations themselves and accorded full confidence and support. U.S. policy interests in West Africa are well served by recognizing, utilizing and enhancing this African approach to development problems.

The Entente Council is gradually strengthening its regional role, especially with younger regional organizations for economic development. The Entente Fund has initiated cooperation with:

1. ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States).
2. L'Etude Regionale de Telecommunications, completed in 1978, in which the Fund took the lead, co-financed by BOAD and CEAO.
3. CEAO association with Comite Superieur des Transports Terrestre (a committee set up by the EF).
4. The Fund's village water supply project cooperates closely with CISS and CEAO.
5. Fund founded, and supports CREAM (merchant marine, Abidjan); CERFER (road maintenance, Lome).
6. Fund provides seminars for project managers, long-term training (13 graduate students at West Virginia, most writing agricultural theses).

7. Several studies were completed in rural development:
 - a. Agricultural Policy of Entente States;
 - b. Study on Credit and Livestock (4 countries);
 - c. Small Industries which Manufacture and Distribute Agricultural Material.

8. Training seminars:
 - a. Problems of agricultural credit and land titles;
 - b. Statisticians in livestock at school in Abidjan;
 - c. Slaughterhouse training in Niger and Benin;
 - d. Installation and operation of cattle weighing machines (5 countries).

Evaluation of Subprojects

The mid-term evaluation of subprojects was a major effort undertaken over a period of about 18 months at a cost of \$279,000 (Appendix L). The head of the rural development division sent a letter to the Development Alternatives Incorporated (DAI), Experience, Inc., and Practical Concepts, Inc. (PCI), November 14, 1978, requesting proposals to conduct mid-term evaluations of the Livestock II and Food Production subprojects. The evaluation approach employed was a joint REDSO-Entente Fund plan. Evaluations were not regarded merely as disinterested appraisals but as mid-term opportunities to recommend corrective actions to improve implementation and, if necessary, adjust design. An IQC contract was signed with DAI, February 22, 1979. The key focus of the mid-term evaluation was

to provide the necessary information to make project corrections, respond to problems, and, if necessary, redesign subproject activities.

The scope of work for the evaluation was prepared by the rural development division. Four major elements constituted the evaluation plan. First was a review of national agricultural goals, policies, and priorities in the countries of the Entente. A DAI team visited all five countries during April and May 1979, for this purpose. Second was the organization of two training seminars to prepare project managers for the evaluation by instructing them in project information systems and evaluation methodologies. A one week seminar was held in Natitingou, Benin, in September 1979. The third element was evaluation of each of the rural development sub-projects. This process began with the Upper Volta Animal Traction Project in November 1979, and is continuing. The fourth element in the work plan was a series of comparative intercountry studies of the small farmer sub-sector. By mutual agreement, DAI has not undertaken these studies. The final part of the work plan consisted of other miscellaneous services including a social anthropologist to organize data gathering in the Lama Kara project.

DAI regarded the process as self-evaluation by Entente Fund. DAI evaluation personnel met all of the subproject managers well before the evaluation dates of the projects. All of the evaluations were conducted with at least one representative of subproject management as an active participant. The approach was to make specific,

constructive suggestions to strengthen the subprojects. Many of the criticisms and suggestions came, in fact, from subproject management. The subproject managers were uniformly pleased with the way in which DAI conducted the evaluations and satisfied with their own participation. Each evaluation required a two-to-three week visit to Entente Fund Headquarters and subproject sites by a two-to-three person team.

The following table gives planned and actual mid-term evaluations.

12. PLANNED AND ACTUAL SCHEDULE OF MID-TERM EVALUATIONS

<u>Project</u>	<u>Planned Date</u>	<u>Actual Date</u>
HV-V-1	November 1979	November 1979
HV-E-1, HV-E-2	November 1979	December 1980
B-V-1	December 1979	December 1979
CI-E-1, CI-E-2	February 1980	February 1980
T-V-1	April 1980	April 1980
N-V-1, N-V-2, N-V-3	May 1980	March 1980
B-E-2	June 1980	In-house REDSO/ EF evaluation
N-E-1	July 1980	August 1980
T-V-2, T-E-1	March 1981	July 1981
B-E-1	April 1981	Project not implemented

DAI followed fairly closely the original evaluation schedule. The most important findings of the mid-term evaluations

were financial. DAI prepared a list of questions on each subproject which was transmitted to subproject managers prior to the commencement of the evaluation. The major question asked was to what extent the subproject would need additional financing to reach its objectives. A related question was whether subproject performance justified continued funding. Were the subprojects achieving their objectives and having development impact?

All the evaluations used the same format and logical framework. The format was improved in some of the later evaluations by highlighting the recommendations. In general, the reports are clear and direct. Only the Niger Food Production projects N-V-1, N-V-2, and N-V-3 were analyzed as lacking in depth. The evaluations were handicapped by incomplete subproject data. A quantitative evaluation of subproject impact was not possible because implementation was not sufficiently advanced. Subproject managers with whom the REDSO/WA evaluation team spoke were satisfied with the quality of the French translation. In the case of the T-V-1, a minor revision of the French text was necessary. Finally, there was considerable overlap among evaluation team members which helped provide consistency of outlook and standards.

Evaluation reports were not released to REDSO/WA until the French version was sent to the subproject concerned. In general, REDSO/WA received the evaluation reports promptly. The delay

In receiving the B-V-1 report was caused by discussions prompted by the report, which was probably the most negative evaluation. DAI corrected factual errors pointed out by project management and made some revisions before releasing the report. The T-V-1 report was also delayed somewhat.

In the case of T-V-1, the evaluation was probably premature. Implementation was delayed and the subproject had not gone through a complete production cycle prior to the evaluation.

The Niger Food Production evaluations were hastily done. This is particularly true for N-V-2. Assumptions for the calculation of the IRR are not given.

In the case of two subproject evaluations, the REDSO/WA evaluation team disagrees with the conclusions of the DAI team. For T-V-1, the best possible case alternative used in the evaluation to calculate the IRR assumes the cultivation of 700 hectares under the project. The project now expects to cultivate close to 800 hectares during the 1981 season. This puts the project in a more favorable light than seen by the DAI evaluation team. In the case of CI-E-1, REDSO/WA concludes the DAI team did not fully appreciate the extent to which local herder range management strategies clash with the strategies of the project. The primary problem with this project is sociological. While the DAI team recognized this, it concentrated, instead, on the technological question of tse-tse fly control. This led the DAI team to observe that the prognosis for CI-E-1 was much

better than CI-E-2. Evidence now indicates the reverse is true. The grazing zone still has trouble attracting settlers but the entry posts have become self-sustaining. The Ivorian Government now claims that they are the most successful posts of the group.

The REDSO/WA evaluation team followed up the DAI evaluation recommendations (Appendices A and B). In the Upper Volta Animal Traction project (HV-V-1), the annual interest rate on credit was raised from 5% to 9% this year and will be raised to 11% next year. The project management has detected no farmer resistance to the 9% rate. There are still not enough veterinarians to assign one to each ORD to participate in the animal traction program but more veterinarians are available than a year or so ago. The Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole (CNCA) has been in operation for the last 8 months and has established criteria for credit. It also has set up an autonomous credit office in each ORD to monitor repayment.

The Upper Volta Helminthoses project (HV-E-1) has procured applicators as recommended. Unfortunately, they were plastic and have broken. The subproject manager did not follow the recommendation to devote a major effort to teaching and motivating stock owners to treat animals themselves after the TDD. There are still no data on the extent of the helminthoses problem in Upper Volta or on the impact of the treatment program. However, the manager adopted a strategy of concentrating on treating calves, heifers, and cows on the cycle recommended by the DAI team and is trying to follow the recommendation

that only vaccinated animals receive the parasitic treatment. Record keeping also has improved.

The Upper Volta Audio-Visual subproject (HV-E-2) also has made progress in adopting the recommendations of the DAI team. The subproject produced the audio-visual presentation originally intended and has made progress in preparing presentations in local languages on subjects tailored to the conditions in the area where the presentation is to be made.

The options presented in the mid-term evaluation of the Firgoun Irrigation project (N-V-1) have stimulated discussion. Option 2 has been accepted.

The Niger Animal Traction project (N-V-3) has established the recommended stock of spare parts in each cooperative to be sold to farmers as needed. The subproject is attempting to train blacksmiths in each cooperative to repair equipment. At the same time, the subproject is soliciting funds to establish an animal traction equipment production facility in Niamey.

Finally, the Notse-Dayas Food Production project (T-V-1) has adopted several recommendations of the mid-term evaluation. It has recruited extension personnel and cleared by hand rather than by bulldozer. It is emphasizing cultivation of cleared land rather than clearing more land and has engaged a potato expert to advise on the project.

The principal design flaws encountered by DAI during mid-term

evaluations of subprojects were: (1) underestimates of inflation; (2) lack of provision for fluctuation of the exchange rate; (3) inadequate management of credit components; (4) insufficient detail for commodity procurement; (5) overambitious and complex designs; and (6) lack of baseline data. The most widespread deficiency was overlooking inflation and fluctuations in the foreign exchange rate. In order to protect the projects from these factors, designers should have assumed higher inflation and possible foreign exchange fluctuations.

On balance, the mid-term evaluations of subprojects were well done. A well qualified contractor was selected through normal competitive procedures. Primary responsibility for the evaluations was assigned to a French-speaking professional with many years' experience in West Africa. Individual teams were made up of well qualified French-speaking professionals with similar experience. By and large, work was done on schedule and in a professional manner. The mid-term evaluations included participation of subproject staff as well as the evaluation team. Recommendations centered on appropriate points. Allowing more time or increasing the team size could have strengthened some of the evaluations, particularly the three Niger Food Production projects, N-V-1, N-V-2, and N-V-3.

Other Donor Support

With efficient management, operating with limited staff, and curtailing administrative costs, Entente Fund has attracted other donors. The Entente Secretariat remains open to proposals by other

donors consistent with the development aims of member states. Other donors view the EF as a suitable instrument for aid to countries in which they do not have bilateral missions and for those cases where a small team can carry out project activities in several countries with administrative economy.

Approximately \$86.7 million has been contributed by non-member donors for project and technical assistance. The United States has contributed the bulk of that, about \$65.0 million or 78% (Table 3) of the total. The other major donor is France which, in addition to contributions to the staff of the Fund, has undertaken a series of studies including telecommunications, agricultural credit, livestock, and a five-country survey for 5,000 wells for which France and the Netherlands are expected to extend assistance. The German Government is considering contributing to a major grain storage project.

Three of the 15 AID-funded rural development subprojects receive significant support from other donors than the United States. They are: (1) CI-V-1, Northeast Savannah Rural Development project; (2) T-V-2, La Kara Rural Development project; and (3) T-E-1, Small Ruminant Production.

<u>Project</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Funding Source (\$000)</u>				<u>Host Country</u>
		<u>AID</u>	<u>IBRD</u>	<u>FAC</u>	<u>BNDA</u>	
CI-V-1	19,400	3,700	9,400	1,400	700	4,200
T-E-1	2,882	1,825		359		698
T-V-2	<u>2,000</u>	<u>1,300</u>		<u>250</u>		<u>450</u>
Total	24,282	6,825	9,400	2,009	700	5,348

In these three subprojects non-U.S. donors provided 50% of the funding.

Other subprojects also have benefitted directly or indirectly from inputs of other donor expertise, e.g., HV-V-1 and CI-E-2 .

APPENDIX A

ASSESSMENT OF LIVESTOCK II SUBPROJECTS

Niger, N-E-1 Vetophar: Establishment of a Central National Veterinary Pharmacy and a Sales and Extension Network.

Funding: USAID Grant - \$1.25 million; Host country - \$200,000

TDD: January 6, 1982

Cooperating GON Agency: GON Livestock Service and Ministry of Rural Development

N-V-1 Vetophar was conceived to create a commercial distribution system for veterinary medicine in Niger. Prior to this project all medicines had been procured and distributed by the Livestock Service. EF/USAID funds were used to construct a central pharmacy in Niamey and three regional pharmacies. procure supplies of most needed animal health medicines and to train the project director in Pharmaceutical Management. A revolving fund was established for the purpose of purchasing initial stocks of medicines. Eventually, the sales of all products was designed to cover 1) the delivered cost of medicines, 2) the operating expenses including depreciation, 3) a sales commission for private salesmen; and 4) inflation. It was assumed, however, in the design that the funds would not cover operating expenses. The USAID/EF funds were to cover salaries of support staff, operation and maintenance of vehicles and travel expenses to the field. The GON has contributed the salaries to professional staff and is still expected to do so after project completion.

The product mix of medicines were deemed adequate as a starting block. It is very difficult to ascertain most efficient economic medicines because of lack of data on disease prevalence and incidence. The medicines of marginal value should be removed. Specific recommendations were given which proved valuable to the Vetophar staff.

Some developmental lessons learned which the evaluation revealed for future implementation and redesign were the following:

- 1) Herders lacked instruction on use of medicines. They would probably

be willing to pay for medicines if they have a consistent impact on animal production; however, without proper instruction, it could have a negative effect on health. A strict training component directed toward staff (in conjunction with existing Livestock Service) is needed to achieve a better degree of instruction to the herder.

2) A real need for a market analysis to ascertain the viability and sustainability of Vetophar as a commercial entity. In this sphere a marketing specialist knowledgeable in veterinary pharmaceuticals needs to determine a proper level of prices for medicines. This could be determined after a proper product mix is established after a thorough diagnostic epidemiological survey of the livestock sector is established.

3) An organizational restructuring to include first and foremost inclusion of the Livestock Service as a major purchasing agent of medicines from Vetophar as well as donor assisted livestock projects, and secondly, to free up the project manager, Mr. Sani, to concentrate on day-to-day activities that are market oriented.

The project has been implemented at this stage without too many difficulties from the Central pharmacy due to the level of the regional pharmacies.

The funds for construction of a central pharmacy in Niamey and three outgoing pharmacies (Zinder and Tahora) have been made available by the GON, USAID and EF. The GON contribution toward infrastructure was \$113,000 or 22% of total costs.

The only equipment problem found during the evaluation stage (DAI Nov. 6-21 1980) was the inadequacy of refrigeration. Funds were made available to purchase larger refrigerators for the two regional pharmacies and a functional thermostat for the central pharmacy.

It was found that the staffing was satisfactory although additional training was necessary in market orientation. One problem which required special attention

is financial management. The current record keeping system in use was designed primarily for stock control. There are no up to date records on expenditures or revenues with no analysis on profit and loss. There has been action taken on these issues, but a marketing economist is needed to put the records back on track.

There seems to be no generation of demand for the medicine product mix. Neither a distribution or extension system is in effect to generate the demand for medicine. Project design mentioned first year sales to have totalled 180 million CFA and were to have increased to 425 million CFA by the third year. But, monthly sales have been running at only 2 million CFA per month.

At this time Vetophar's role is mainly a distributor to the Livestock Service for resale through the veterinary posts. But the Livestock Service and other donor-funded livestock production projects are and could be a larger source of demand. Many of the medicines of other projects are procured abroad in isolation to Vetophar.

There is wide agreement that the design was expecting too much from Vetophar. The project couldn't possibly be effective as a marketing, extension and distribution intermediary as drug companies in the U.S. There has been some question on EF management's lack of monitoring and late action on suggesting a marketing consultant. The mid-term stated that a survey was never taken to ascertain targets and types of medicines most demanded by specific geographic areas. If, for instance, Vetophar determines annual sales volume should be X, and X million CFA is needed to cover O & E, there needs to be some initial projections of where sales are to take place, and thusly, budget accordingly.

The major policy of Vetophar with respect to benefit distribution was to provide medicine to all segments of the livestock industry. This was the main reason for the regional pharmacies. But, because of lack of an extension arm,

and infrastructure and high O & E, it runs at a loss.

The product line mix of medicines appears not what the herders need. A significant portion of first sales have been to horse and poultry owners in Niamey. Because Vetophar cannot have a long-term development impact until it becomes financially viable, the marketing must concentrate its efforts in reaching the large number of sedentary herders where the greatest demand is and where marketing costs are lowest.

In summary, our recommendation is to extend this project's TDD, provide additional funding for an American technical assistant in marketing, develop a credit scheme consistent with on-going CNCA policy and make assurances for additional provisions of most economic medicinal product mix. The training component composed of strengthening the agents in marketing analysis should follow after the T.A. is on board.

Upper Volta Helminthoses: HV-E-1

Project Agreement Signed: October 29, 1977

Funding: USAID Grant - \$1 million; Host country - \$290,000

Cooperating GOUV Agency: Service de la Protection Sanitaire
of the Service de l'Elevage

The purpose of this project is to introduce a treatment program for helminthoses into the Sudan zone of Upper Volta. The project hopes thereby to contribute to reaching the goal of increasing animal productivity. The project output was expected to be treatments twice a year for three years of a herd of 500,000 cattle and 1.5 million small ruminants as demonstrated by project records.

All of the treatments procured under the project were administered; but records show that only about 1/2 the cattle and 1/3 the small ruminants expected to be treated were in fact treated. To some degree, these figures are the results of poor record keeping. On the other hand, the shortfall was caused by an underestimation of the number of treatments per animal required. For example, pills were bought on the assumption of one 750 mg tablet per bovine and 150 mg tablet per small ruminant. In fact 3 1/2 large tablets are needed per treatment per mature bovine and 3 small tablets per treatment per small ruminant.

The project ran into several design problems. The LOP was too short to generate substantial stock-owner commitment to helminthic treatment at their own expense after the TDD. The design was not generous enough in its financial estimations. It did not take account of the need for bolus applicators. Without these stock owners will not administer the treatments themselves. It did not put in enough money for personnel or for enough fuel for necessary travel. Finally, it did not take account of inflation. The basic problem with the design, though, was that it did not test the assumption that helminthoses is a serious health problem in Upper Volta livestock.

Since the extent of the problem before the project is unknown, it is not possible to measure the impact of the project on the stock owner. There is simply a dearth of data. On the other hand stock-owner response to the project is very positive. In order to make up for some of the budgetary deficiencies in the project, management has decided to speed up the schedule on which stock owners will pay for anthelmintic treatments. Stock-owner participation in the project, nevertheless, is staying strong.

In the opinion of the mid-term evaluation (P.19) "In summary the helminthoses treatment program has experienced few implementation problems, and most of the problems that do exist are related to inadequate funding." The program is run by the Service d'Elevage as an adjunct to its ongoing vaccination program. It, therefore, avoids a lot of personnel problems of a newly created institution. USAID, through the Entente Fund, has contributed 220 million FCFA; the GOUV has contributed 78 million FCFA for the treatment.

There are no major conflicts, contradictions or inconsistencies between national sector policies and experiences noted during implementation.

The project has made a contribution to the refinement of national food production strategy insofar as it has confirmed the appropriateness of the strategy for small producer assistance. The project simply added a function to the existing Service de Protection Sanitaire. Its relative success has confirmed the role of the service in the overall national strategy.

The greatest strength of the project is the way in which it used the Service de Protection Sanitaire to deliver its treatment. The greatest weakness is the data collection and record keeping aspects of the project. The project does not know the extent of the helminthoses problem in Upper Volta and it is unable to gauge the impact of its program on the problem.

There is need for some budgetary supplement to make up for deficiencies in the design. In addition there is need for donor assistance to assure continued extension efforts after the TDD to assure herders become competent to administer treatments to their animals.

The design of the project had to be adjusted to bring the bolus applicators to encourage stock owners to administer treatments themselves. The design had to be adjusted also to reschedule the treatment campaigns and focus them better on certain classes of animals for most efficient use of available resources. Finally, the design should have been adjusted to create a research component to define the extent of the helminthoses problem in the beginning.

The basic problem with the technical package is that of the extent of problem. What was needed was a strategic anthelmintic program to link the administration of treatment to the annual ecological and nutritional cycle. This problem was not well thought out in the design. Treatment should also have been focused on calves and lactating cows and lambs and lactating ewes. Goats should have been left out of the program altogether. However, again, as the mid-term evaluation states (P.15) "Most of the problems concerning implementation are related to inadequate funding."

The project has demonstrated three developmental lessons. First, animal health programs generally are able to generate a positive response from stock owners. Second, organizationally the project was very simple. It merely asked the service de Protection Sanitaire to add one more operation to its inventory. The strategy helped make the project operate smoothly. The final lesson is that project budgets must make a realistic estimate of rates of inflation and international currency fluctuations or the project will be hamstrung.

The central element of the project was the most successful element, the delivery of health treatments to livestock.

In summary, this was a relatively successful project. Its success was somewhat mitigated by budgetary deficiencies factored in at the design stage. The project deserves further support if a request comes forth.

Upper Volta Audio-Visual Extension Films: HV-E-2

Project Agreement Signed: May 29, 1978

Funding: USAID Grant - \$250,000; Host country - \$30,000

Cooperating GOUV Agency: Service de l'Elevage

The short-term purpose of this project was to support the helminthoses treatment project (HV-E-1) with slide presentations on the effects of internal parasites and ways of administering anthelmintics. A longer term purpose was to promote audio-visual training capacity in the areas of external parasites and contagious diseases, of livestock and range management, and of animal production and marketing. The project shares the goal of the helminthoses project (HV-E-1) of increasing animal productivity in Upper Volta. The outputs of the project were intended to be three twenty-minute color films, a number of slide shows and two mobile units making 400 audio-visual presentations each throughout Upper Volta.

The mid-term evaluation found (P.47) "The audio-visual project is considerably behind schedule and is operating at a considerable (sic) lower level than planned for this stage of the project. Only three slide presentations have been completed and only one mobile unit is operational. The second project vehicle is being used for miscellaneous tasks around Ouagadougou." Moreover, the project had produced no internal parasite presentation. It thereby was incapable of giving any of the planned support to the helminthoses treatment project. It is unknown why the audio-visual project was falling so short of its objectives.

There is nothing evident in the design of the project to explain its poor performance. The only possibility that suggests itself is that the LOP was too short. The project did experience some procurement problems which set its schedule back. It is hard to procure 941 source and origin

photographic and electronic equipment. Moreover, once it arrived it was found to respond to standard American current and not standard Voltaic current.

On the subject of the impact of the project on the small producer level the mid-term evaluation states (P.47) "Because of the delays, it was not possible to coordinate the audio-visual program with the helminthoses treatment program. Therefore, it is unlikely that the audio-visual project will have much impact during the treatment program period."

The budget for the project, at then current exchange rates, was to be 64.5 million FCFA from USAID funds and 7.2 million FCFA from the GOUV. The value of the AID contribution fell 15% with the drop in the dollar. This was a problem for the project.

There was one disagreement over policy that was ominous in terms of the project's future. The GOUV felt, as a question of principle, it did not want to create a discrete sub-unit to take charge of the audio-visual program within the Service d'Elevage. The GOUV did not want to engage itself in the cost of such a new service. AID, however, fears that without assurances by the Service to absorb this component it will be hard to assign responsibility for the fate of the audio-visual program and equipment after TDD.

From all accounts the audio-visual sub-project has made no significant contribution to analysis, revision and refinement of national food production strategies for small producer assistance. In fact, it appears that the level of GOUV commitment to the project is relatively low.

The greatest strength of the project has been its ability to produce high quality technical audio-visual presentations. The weaknesses of the program lie in its inability to produce the material on schedule, and in the content of the presentations. The most important developmental lesson of this sub-project is that it is very difficult to coordinate implementation of two sub-projects as though they were two components of the same project. Linkage and mutual

interdependence in implementation are problematic and should not be the basis of sub-project design.

The element of this sub-project that could be drawn on over the next five years is the technical ability to produce audio-visual presentations. If it is felt valuable to pursue sub-projects in this area the content and format of the presentations will have to be considerably revised.

In summary, this project has not been able to achieve its primary objectives despite considerable accomplishment. If it is to be continued it must be thought out again, revised and reoriented. The high cost of services rendered by the French consultant needs also to be reviewed. Perhaps utilizing an American PCV in this role or French volunteer would be a wise alternative.

Benin Small Ruminant Health (E-E-2)

Grant Agreement Signed: June 16, 1978

Funding: USAID Grant - \$500,000; Host Country - \$50,000

Cooperating Government Agencies: The Societe des Ressources Animales (SODEPRA),
a parastatal organization of the Ministry of Animal
Production.

The purpose of this project is to treat all sheep and goats in Benin against pests and internal parasites. This project is working toward the goal of increasing the availability of reasonably priced animal protein for the people of Benin while improving the well-being of animal producers. The project outputs are seen in the number of vaccinations and anti-parasitic treatments recorded during a given period.

According to the mid-term evaluation (P.4), "The results indicate that 16% of the estimated population of sheep and goats in the three provinces have been treated the first year. Only in Mono province have any animals received the second parasitization." There are two reasons for this disappointing performance. The first is a general lack of awareness on the part of the stock owners. The second is a series of equipment deficiencies. Transportation equipment has not been available. The necessary cooling equipment has not performed well and is poorly designed for project purposes.

The original design of the project did not take into account the problem of convincing stock owners that they have a material interest in protecting the investment they have in small ruminants by a further investment in their health care.

The impact at the small stock owner level has therefore been small. Small stock owners have not responded well to project interventions.

This project was supposed to be implemented in tandem with B-E-1, a small stock production project. For a number of reasons, the B-E-1 project was never funded.

The greatest strength of this sub-project is the animal health component. It is, in principle, quite effective. The weakness in the project is the difficulty it is experiencing in motivating stock owners and delivery services.

At the present time FAC is considering financing a continuation of the project along with a small Ruminant Production project. If FAC does not follow through, AID should consider continuing the small Ruminant Health project. It has a high potential positive impact on the small stock owner level.

One alternative would be simply to extend the LOP. Otherwise, delivery systems should be redesigned. Some kind of motivational program should be put in place as well.

While the technological package in this project is quite sound, the operational effectiveness has been poor. This is true mainly because the design team did not have a clear idea of the demand for small ruminant health interventions.

The most important development lesson of the project is, therefore, to make sure of the demand for a development intervention before embarking on a project.

In summary, this project is in an area where animal health on which donor intervention has historically been quite successful. The problem is that the stock owners themselves do not seem to feel a need for its services. Extending the LOP and building in a motivational component may help bring performance up to its potential.

Togo Small Ruminants - T-E-1

Funding: USAID Loan \$1,818,000; Host Country: \$698,000

TDD: 5/19/83

Cooperating GOT Agency: Ministry of Rural Development

Cooperating Donors: EF, USAID, FAC

The purpose of this project is to promote the production and care of small ruminants in Togo. This project is aimed at the goal improving small producers' income and improving rural nutrition. The output from the sub-project will be a technical package and a system of delivery for improved small ruminant management, nutrition, and health practices on the local level.

This project went through five designs before the project design was accepted. It, therefore, got off to a late start. Moreover, implementation has been retarded by procurement problems. Consequently, the project is on the verge of beginning its first extension agent training session albeit without access to many of the essential implements whose effective use will be among the agents' daily tasks.

The project was designed originally to be a pilot project in three regions of Togo. The project mandate has since been broadened to cover all five Togolese regions. This is probably spreading project resources too thin at this early stage in implementation.

To date, no significant impact at the small producer level has been identified. It must be remembered, however, that the project is in its earliest stages of implementation.

The financing of the project comes from several sources. AID, through the Entente Fund, is lending \$1,818,000.

The GOT is contributing \$698,000. FAC is granting \$800,000 to construct and equip a complementary small ruminant research center which will serve as headquarters for the whole sub-project.

No major conflicts, contradictions and/or inconsistencies between national sector policies and experiences noted during implementation have been identified.

It is too early in the implementation process to determine if the sub-project has made or will make a significant contribution to analysis, revision or refinement of national production strategies for small stock-owner assistance.

It is too early to tell the strengths of the project. It appears that construction is on schedule. Procurement has been a weakness. To some degree a function of the procurement problem, the extension recruitment and training program may be a bit weak. However, as with strengths, it is premature to discuss weaknesses of the project.

For the time being no new donor assistance is needed.

Because of the slow pace of start-up of implementation and of the broader mandate for the project than anticipated, it may be necessary to extend the LOP to get an accurate picture of the project's impact and of its long run potential. Here again, however, it would be premature to reach that conclusion at this time.

The technological package of the project seems sound. It will have to be tested more by experience before a final judgment can be made. One weakness of the project is that no research was done into the market demand for small ruminants. The sub-project assumes there is ample demand to encourage substantial increases in supply given a

removal of present technical constraints on the small producer.

It is too early to abstract developmental lessons from the project.

In summary, this is potentially a very good project. It aims at helping a large number of small-scale ruminant producers increase their production and, if they so choose, increase their income. It could have a positive impact at the small producer level. For the time being, however, actual impact of the project cannot be assessed.

La Pale Grazing Zones (CI-E-1)

Project Agreement Signed: March 13, 1978

Funding: USAID Loan \$1.05 million; Host Country - \$1.2 millions

Cooperating Government Agencies: Societe de Developpement de la
Production Animale (SODEPRA) a parastatal corporation
of the Ministry of Animal Production.

This project is one component of Operation Zebu, a project whose overall goal is the stabilization and control of the movement of the Fulbe herders and their Zebu cattle in the northern Ivory Coast. The purpose of the La Pale grazing area is primarily to isolate transhumant Zebu herds in order to protect fields of farmers in the Boundiali area from crop destruction. Another purpose of the La Pale grazing area is to permit an increase in the size of the national herd. To some degree these purposes are in conflict. The output from the project is planned to be the development of a 190,000 hectare tse-tse fly free zone devoted exclusively to herding activities. The zone is expected to be the home for a 30,000 herd of cattle organized into about 150 cow-calf herds. Other outputs include project and residence buildings.

The physical facilities of the project have been constructed well, on-time and within the budget. However, by January 1961, the zone was the home for only 6,000 herd of zebu cattle, one-fifth of the number expected at this time. This has meant that there is no range management or range monitoring program yet in place in the zone. The reason for the slow rate of settler adherence lies first in the questionable reputation the project acquired among the pastoral Fulbe due to difficulties in the first year in mounting an effective tse-tse fly control program. More importantly, however, the project has been retarded because its structure and organization do not take adequate account of Fulbe economic strategies. First of all the range management practices to be

promoted by the project clash in a fundamental way with Fulbe range use strategies. Secondly, Fulbe generally live in a symbiotic relationship with sedentary cultivators. They depend on the cultivator as a source of food grains, for an outlet for dairy products and for other revenue producing and consumption ends.

The main problem with the sub-project design was that it did not accommodate the Fulbe life-style. As many other African range management schemes, it concentrated on a technical package inconsistent with Fulbe practices. At the same time the design overlooked several essential elements. It did not take account of the reciprocal interdependencies of the Fulbe and the sedentary cultivators. It did not provide the infrastructure to carry out the three pasture rotational grazing system it called for.

In terms of the impact of the project at the local level, the mid-term evaluation states, (P.58) "On the surface, it would appear that the project is contributing significantly to the reduction of conflict in the local area." However, it qualifies this by saying (P.47) "The problem of conflict between herders and farmers in the northern Ivory Coast, then, cannot be resolved solely through isolation zones like Pale." The reason is that (P.47) "When a family is recruited into the zone from outside the perimeter, other nomadic families soon took their place. The nature of the complex livestock production system of the Fulani people, in fact, virtually requires that a certain number of herders be maintained just outside the zone to manage stocking programs complementary to the cow-calf production programs of the Pale residents." Finally, many beneficiaries of the project are non-Ivorian. Others, are influential Ivorians domiciled elsewhere keeping herds in the zone.

Financing for the first year of the project (1977) was provided entirely by the GOIC. The U.S. loan represented 90% of the financing for the subsequent four years. FAC contributed technical assistance.

There are some inconsistencies in the objectives of Operation Zebu of which the La Pale project is one component. First of all it is hard to reduce farmer/herder conflict while pursuing policies designed to increase the cattle population in an area. Secondly, it is hard to reduce farmer/herder conflict when the design of the project implicitly requires that a stocker program be generated just outside the project perimeter. In fact this probably increases farmer/herder tensions. In addition, the segregation of herders and farmers is in direct conflict with GOIC's objectives of promoting mixed farming in the north. Finally, the project is a direct challenge to the regionalist rationale of the Entente Fund. It is attempting to reduce Ivorian dependence on Upper Volta for beef despite the latter's comparative advantage in cattle production.

As a result of the experience of this project SODEPPA seems to be shifting its interest toward the establishment of micro-zones aimed at sedentarizing Zebu herds grazing in proximity to farming villages.

The greatest strength of this project has been in its ability to create infrastructure. Its chief weakness is its cost. It will have to spend large amounts of money for the indefinite future to control the tse-tse fly problem. Also, since it cannot provide the means for making up for the rupture of symbiotic relations with sedentary cultivators it will continue to have trouble attracting settlers.

As the mid-term evaluators point out (P.22) "Continued donor and government support will be necessary to sustain the financial burden of tse-tse fly control,

animal health interventions and management." Donor aid is also necessary to develop a water source in the western part of the zone to make year round grazing possible.

The mid-term evaluation states (P.49) "The team believes that the ZOIC should look more closely at the economic feasibility of Operation Zebu in relation to such options as (a) continuing to import cattle from the Sahel; (b) increasing the production of Taurin cattle and/or (c) beginning a long-term process of cross-breeding Zebu and Taurin cattle in order to combine the benefits of larger size with trypano tolerance." No economic analysis has ever been done of Operation Zebu. The comparative efficiency of raising Zebu versus Taurin cattle in the northern Ivory Coast environment has never been analyzed. Major changes are needed in the area of recruitment and admittance policy, in the area of animal production and range management policy and in management procedures.

There are difficulties with the technological package. In terms of the physical facilities, "The evaluation team determined that in some instances the original design and layout was not as efficient or as utilitarian as it might have been." (P.56). Otherwise the project has lacked a range management program. It had no data on range usage, conditions or trends. The annual quarantine program was too short to prevent the spread of pleuropneumonia effectively. There were no guidelines on herd size. Record keeping of any sort was minimal for the first two years of the project. The mid-term evaluation concludes (P.72) "The improved physical facilities in Pale, together with a sound range management program, should make it possible to develop a technically sound program of animal production and management.

The most important developmental lessons taught by this project are that animal health components usually work well, that project objectives must be few,

clearly stated and arranged by priority and that the sociology of African pastoralist economic strategies is so complex that range management projects must give sociological considerations top priority in implementation.

The elements that were successful enough to inspire other projects were the construction component, the animal health component and, to some degree, the extension component.

In summary, this is not a successful project. Due to lack of sociological attention, the project has not attracted enough to its intended beneficiaries to justify the investment. An economic analysis of its objectives was never done. Moreover, tse-tse fly control, an essential element in the ability of the project to survive, will be a constraint and heavy drain on project resources. The present evaluation does not feel USAID should continue its support of the project unless it can be made more sociological consistent with Fulbe life and, at the same time, economically justified.

Cattle Trails and Entry Posts: CI-E-2

Project Agreement Signed: December 4, 1978

Funding: USAID Loan - \$675,000; Host Country - \$500,000

Cooperating GOIC Agency: Societe de Developpement de la Production Animale (SODEPRA), a parastatal corporation of the Ministry of Animal Production.

This project is one component of Operation Zebu, a project whose overall goal is the stabilization and control of the movement of Fulbe herders and their Zebu cattle in the northern Ivory Coast. The purpose of the cattle trails and Entry Posts is to improve the regulation and control of cattle herds that are brought into the country from Mali and Upper Volta and that are destined for market. The current Cattle Trails and Entry Posts project is an extension of a project begun in 1975 and financed by an Entente Fund Livestock I loan. The output from the present project will be the construction of two more entry posts, to complete construction at the four original posts, to continue improvements in the cattle trails and to construct a veterinary headquarters at Bouna.

At all of the sites planned construction was either on or ahead of schedule and kept within budget. Commodity procurement activities, likewise were carried out on schedule. At the time of the mid-term evaluation (P.103) "The major problem at the posts at least those at Ouagadougou and Nielle is that they are at present receiving minimal use." Recent quarterly reports, however, (c.f. March 1, 1981 P.28-30) maintain that "Now, according to the SODEPRA, all of this has changed. They cite impressive figures for the passage of animals through most of the stations and declare that time was needed to develop a system that would prepare the nomadic herders to use the posts. SODEPRA states that the entry post at Tengrela is by far the largest cattle market in West Africa, that the posts at Ouangolodougou and Nielle and Tienko also function extremely

efficiently and that the possibility of bringing contagious diseases into the Ivory Coast has rapidly diminished as a result of the use of these stations." In the meantime, in regard to the cattle trails the mid-term evaluation states (P.111) "The cattle trekking trails for transhumant use have been improved by brush clearing, the digging of seasonal ponds and the placing of picket markers.... The trails appear to be serving the function for which they were intended."

At the time of the mid-term evaluation (P.97) "The team's basic impression was to question the utility and development impact of the posts as they are now being used or as they were originally conceived." More specifically (P.43) "The evaluation team believes that the reason for the lack of use is that the facilities provide services for which there is little demand, and the infrastructure itself cannot create the demand. Few animals are required for local slaughter; herders do not share the government's concern for vaccination; cattle dealers would rather trek their animals to terminal markets. Additionally, there appears to be a personnel problem." Apparently, this situation has greatly changed in the last year. While the criticism of the project was focused on faulty conceptualization and design, remedial action seems to have resulted at the level of health law enforcement.

The impact foreseen for the project was in the realm of animal health, marketing and regulation of livestock entry and transhumance. Apparently, the project has followed up on the mid-term evaluation recommendation to use the entry posts to police cattle vaccination regulations. This has had an impact on potentially contagious diseases. The presence of animals in posts for health control purposes has had a positive effect on marketing in the posts. Consistent with recommendations in the mid-term evaluation, this positive turn in the project is probably a function of the resolution of personnel problems.

The USAID contribution to the project is a \$675,000 loan. Through the Entente Fund, the GOIC is supplying a 16 million FCFA counterpart. All of the AID/EF money has gone into construction.

There are some inconsistencies in the objectives of Operation Zebu of which the Cattle Trails and Entry Posts project is one component. First of all it is hard to reduce farmer/herder conflict while pursuing policies designed to increase the cattle population of the area. Secondly, it is hard to reduce farmer/herder conflict when a project is designed to bring larger and larger numbers of animals down a few corridors bordered by farmland.

This sub-project appears to have made no significant contribution to analysis, revision and refinement of national food production strategies for rural development.

The main weakness of the project seems to have been its poor conceptualization which led to the lack of use of the cattle posts. The strength now appears to be the vigorous enforcement of animal health regulations. This has apparently led to a marked increase in use of the posts.

The GOIC has recently been asking for further aid for the project. An investigation should be carried out to confirm claims of GOIC on current use of the entry posts. If use is as high as claimed, the project does deserve further support.

Whatever project design adjustments that might have been necessary must have already occurred because the project has turned around dramatically in one year's time. A further change may be to make facilities available to Ivorian as well as transhumant livestock. This would increase the health protection of the national herd and also increase marketing activity at the posts.

The mid-term evaluation was critical of the technological package. For example (P.41) "All of the animal handling facilities were suitable for their respective functions but should have been of better design. They could have been built for safer and more efficient use and at much lower cost. A more convenient integrated facility would have been much cheaper to build." Elsewhere (P.99) "The major criticism of the facilities at each post is that individual components (dipping tank, market corrals, loading chutes, watering site, abattoir and hide shed) are all unique units that are not interconnected for mutual use opportunity." And finally (P.100) "Although individual structures (cattle dip, corrals, abattoir, water trough, etc.) are relatively well built of concrete and steel, the original design and layout of the various components at each post are inefficient and lack utility." In regard to the cattle trails developed by the project, the mid-term evaluation states (P.43) "The trails appear as if they would expedite transhumant migration, but it was questionable whether there was enough reserve land for grazing to keep the herds off of adjacent agricultural land."

The most important developmental lesson revealed by the evaluation is that project objectives must be few, clearly stated and arranged by priority. A further lesson seems to be that animal health components work well and may be used as a lever to reach other goals.

One successful element in the project was, therefore, the construction element. The mid-term evaluation states (P.41), "The evaluation team found that construction and commodity procurement activities had been carried out on schedule and within the budget." Since the mid-term evaluation, the animal health component and the marketing component seem to have worked well.

In summary, this was a project which was assessed as not having a promising future. The GOIC has apparently been able to turn this project around by strict enforcement of animal health regulations. It claims the project is now self-sustaining.

APPENDIX B

ASSESSMENT OF FOOD PRODUCTION SUBPROJECTS

NIGER - Firgoun (N-V-1) - The Development of Irrigation for Rice Production in the Firgoun Basin.

Funding: USAID Grant - \$1.2 million; Host country - \$400,000.

TDD: Extension to 8/19/82

Cooperating Government Agency: ONAHA, Genie Rural, Ministry of Rural Development

This project involves converting rice production in the Firgoun Basin from a partial controlled system to a completely modern irrigated controlled system to permit multi-cropping. The project area encompasses 282 hectares; 230 hectares are to be developed for rice. The area is divided into a North sector of about 130 hectares and a South sector of 100 hectares.

The project includes irrigation, drainage and flood protection measures.

The principal elements are:

- 1) construction of a dike along the river to prevent flooding;
- 2) construction of a protecting perimeter drainage channel along the eastern edge of the perimeter to prevent flooding;
- 3) installation of two pumping stations for irrigation drainage at the upper and lower ends of the perimeter;
- 4) construction of concrete lined irrigation and unlined drainage systems within the perimeter; and
- 5) leveling of fields within the perimeter.

Accomplishments to date:

- 1) Main dike protecting the perimeter from Niger Basin has been constructed as well as the center dike. They are in satisfactory condition.
- 2) Gates along the main dike were constructed but failed to accommodate higher flood flow that could be expected under the new dike. The two dikes in the south sector were damaged in August 1980. They are presently under repair but won't be ready for the 1981 rains and planting season.

- 3) The irrigation supply diesel pumps located at the southwest corner of the perimeter and drainage pumps located at the southwest are installed with pump houses and are operable. The construction and installation conforms to acceptable standards. The pumps will deliver a water supply to provide a duty of water of 3 liter per second per hectare over the perimeter area. This is acceptable in the Sahel zone for rice.
- 4) The protective perimeter drain along the east border has been completed.
- 5) The main primary canal is 63% complete. The flood removed 100 meters.
- 6) Secondary canals in the north sector are 79% complete.
- 7) Land levelling and parcel perimeter field bunds were constructed.
- 8) The drainage systems in the North sector have been completed.

The work accomplished to date (as reviewed by MASI's engineer) is of an acceptable quality and approximately two-thirds of the north sector of the perimeter is ready for irrigation. A private construction firm was contracted to construct the perimeter dike, the protecting ditch and two pumping stations, land levelling and water distribution and drainage system were undertaken by Genie Rural. Contract work is approximately 90% complete, and forced account Genie Rural work less than 35% complete.

Unfortunately, there has never been cultivation of any sort occurring in the area. Before the project began, about 200 families farmed about 150 hectares of traditional rice. This implies a loss of 240 tons of paddy per season. At current prices this represents over 35 million CFA cost over the three years.

The reasons for failure of this project has been political, climatic and economic ones. At the top rungs of power in ONAHA and Genie Rural a seemingly

petty personality conflict between the two directors caused a complete construction halt of the North Sector. In 1979 GON created ONAHA and charged this state corporation with the development of physical facilities in the creation of irrigated perimeters. As soon as this occurred, Genie Rural and their equipment were pulled from the project site which necessitated renting equipment to finish the job. This caused delays and great expenses and, therefore, total project funds were exhausted by fourth quarter 1979. After the August flooding 1980 additional work at great expense was needed. At this stage a DAI evaluation team was fielded and provided 4 options open to the GON and EF. Of the 4 only two seemed valid.

Option two: Complete the irrigation and drainage structures presently under construction to allow approximately 50 hectares already levelled in the northern sector to become available for modern controlled irrigation at an estimated cost of 25,000,000 CFA;

Option three:

Complete the 130 hectares of the northern sector which entails completing all irrigation/drainage components, reverting southern sector to traditional agriculture at an estimated cost of 100,000,000 CFA.

The useful life span of any improvements with conceivable benefits are also calculated. Option 3 is much more appealing an option if cultivation in the project area would occur for over 15 years, because of increased double cropping in the northern sector.

One major drawback to any option and further funding is the potential flooding of this area by the proposed Kandjani dam. The GON has expressed that the construction of the dam is of high priority to development needs. Estimated costs of the dam approach \$1 billion (1980 prices). It is the

belief of this evaluation team as well as discussions with members of the EF, representatives of UNCC and USAID representatives that the dam will never be built. GON would need heavy donor support. At a time of economic recession throughout the industrialized West, the results coming from the proposed donor meeting in Niamey scheduled for mid-July would most likely be of little consequence.

It is recommended that the EF put tight conditions on UNCC and ONAHA to finish all necessary construction applicable to option two at their own expense and then grant them the needed funds applicable from the original design to reach option three. If the Kandadji dam appears to be a pipe dream, option four should be considered after at least two planting seasons. Yield, prices of inputs and producer prices of rice and technical factors should then be ascertained to determine if option four would be economically efficient over a 25 or more year lifespan (option 4 is to complete modern irrigated construction in both sectors).

Given the history of inadequate support from the government, limited funds should be granted only after certain conditions are met. The following conditions are recommended:

- 1) Propose system of production inputs and marketing structure.

Considering newness of production technology to this area, will the small farmers selected to work this area be fully prepared to accept a double cropping rice calendar year with all the technical components intact.

- 2) Selection of farmers to work the field. The choice and selection criteria should be proposed by UNCC with close collaboration with the outlying villages. From the farmers' point of view, there is an urgency to return the land to cultivation as rapidly as possible.

The question of EF ability to remedy this costly situation at an earlier date has been raised. But, this project seemed out of control by political

self interest groups at the start. The EF should have, in a hindsight, brought in more influential parties at the initial problem stage to put the project on track.

NIGER, N-V-2: Support for Agric. Extension and Education Activities For Irrigated Perimeters/Functional Literacy and Farmer Training

Project Agreement Signed: December 1977

Funding: USAID Grant - \$335,000; Host Country - \$37,000

TDD: December 16, 1980

Cooperating GON Agency: UNCC, Ministry of Rural Development

N-V-2 consisted of 3 principal elements:

- 1) Creation and operation of functional literacy training centers for leaders of cooperatives and other village groups.
- 2) Staff recruitment and development for village level institutions such as extension services, irrigation, management organizations and literacy centers.
- 3) Strengthening agricultural extension through establishment of demonstration plots.

As with most of the Entente Fund rural development projects, effective implementation was delayed due to compliance of satisfying conditions precedent prior to the project agreement signature. Actual initiation of the functional literacy program began one year after agreement signature. Although the delay seemed protracted this gave the management team, vested in the UNCC, additional time to establish the local technical committees and specific cooperatives which were to be involved. The delay also gave the management team time to establish demonstration centers, placement of animal traction units, training and placement of farmer-extension agents and construction of thatch classrooms.

The project was able to fulfill projected goals for the most part. Sixteen irrigated perimeters totalling about 1,900 hectares and involving 5,100 farm family units were to be affected. The projected and actual accomplishments at the end of year 3 of the objectives are summarized below:

	<u>Projected</u>	<u>Actual</u>
1. Perimeters involved	16	14
2. Functional literacy centers established	24	20
3. Instructors trained	48	26
4. Enrollment in classes	1,440	210
5. Farmer extension agents trained	260	260
6. Retraining for perimeter directors	16	14
7. Demonstrations	16	10
8. Animal traction units	16	16

The limitation of this project of only 3 years duration inhibited the proposed number of individuals being trained. This time constraint also inhibited realization of the proposed refresher courses. Absenteeism was indeed high, because of definite labor constraints which competed directly with classroom time, but there was strong indication from year 2 to year 3 that enrollment was on the increase. Also, limiting enrollment to less than 10 individuals per center was not deemed an optimum use of resources, and only offering courses to selected cooperative officers appeared too restrictive. The LOP should have been extended to offer refresher courses and include a satisfactory time frame to complete a full 3 cycles of instruction which was originally proposed. Although the government has stated that this project is a success and plans are being formulated to absorb it into its overall governmental functional literacy program, the sub-project manager deems it necessary that external donor assistance be extended and expanded to fill in credit gaps that may occur. The project manager has identified 20 additional cooperatives along the Niger River which have given strong intentions of wanting coops.

There were no inconsistencies or contradictions of this project with national agricultural sector policies. The National Literacy Service of the National Education Ministry supervises the program and also provides instructors in the

arrondissement. Since the project has finished the Service has incorporated this specific region into the nation-wide program system. The Service has been slow in establishing Centers Perfectionment Techniques (CPTs) to take over and the UNCC who has the responsibility of managing the project wants increased funding. The Fund has strong intentions to grant additional increments as long as assurances can be made by the Service to absorb this region in the overall national program.

The impact upon the small farmer level was deemed favorable by DAI.

The mid-term evaluation divided developmental impact into four categories:

1) institution building, 2) food production, 3) employment, and 4) internal rate of return. It was felt by this evaluation team (Dorman/Waldestein) that this section of the DAI mid-term was very weak. The DAI team did not survey graduates from the centers nor make estimated judgments on changes of food production. There was no analysis on the impact of increased employment if it did indeed exist and calculations of an IRR was an exercise utilizing unrealistic and unwarranted assumptions.

The recommendations which were outlined in the mid-term, however, were practical and relevant to the sub-project manager and had been accepted by him and a strong attempt has been made to comply with the recommendations. It is recommended that since USAID Niger has had good relationship with the Functional Literacy Center in the past they should work closely with CNCA, UNCC and the Center to aid in the government's absorption of this geographical region. There have been basic questions raised concerning the revolving credit scheme for use of animal traction inputs, size of classrooms, and most effective means of utilizing existing extension arms of the government, and most practical areas of instruction which could be most relevant that the USAID mission could plug into. The Niger USAID mission accepts this EF pilot project as a sound starting block for future interventions into functional literacy training.

Niger, N-V-3: Improvement of Traditional Rice Production in Tillaberi/
Support of Coops. and Mutual Village Groups.

Funding: USAID Grant - \$425,000; Host Country - \$22,250

TDD: April 2, 1982

Cooperating GON Agency: UNCC, CNCA, FNI, Ministry of Rural Development

The three major elements in N-V-3 project were:

- 1) Establishment of a revolving credit fund for purchase of animal traction units by farmers in the cooperatives;
- 2) Staff recruitment and development for UNCC agents and farmer extension agents; and
- 3) Establishment of demonstration centers equipped with animal traction units for each of the 11 cooperatives concerned.

This project complements N-V-2 and to some degree N-V-1 in that it pertains to increasing the production potential of small farmers along the Niger River. The revolving credit fund was designed to assist small farmers in purchasing needed inputs. The administrative scheme for the credit developed by the project management team in Abidjan was deemed practical and innovative. UNCC actually procures all necessary animal traction inputs at a set governmental subsidized price and delivers it to the farmer. When actual delivery takes place CNCA reimburses the project for the credit extended. It also assume responsibility of credit extended, but the UNCC sub-project manager actually collects the money due. This may be a flaw in design. It is deemed satisfactory that CNCA is responsible for credit administration but should also follow up on collection. The sub-project manager, who also works for UNCC, should only act as change agent offering advice on debt servicing and agri-techniques and leave bill collecting to CNCA. By releasing this unpleasant duty from the UNCC representative, an improved degree of trust could be established.

The project was deemed a success by the DAI evaluation team as well as UNCC representative and this evaluation team. The projected and actual accomplishments are summarized below for end of year 3:

	<u>Projected</u>	<u>Actual</u>
1. Cooperatives involved	11	11
2. Animal traction units distributed	300	300
3. Oxen pairs distributed	300	300
4. Demonstration of animal traction units	6	6
5. Demonstration plots in place	6	6
6. Piroques placed	300	(could not determine)
7. UNCC agents trained	11	11
8. Farmer extension agents trained	30	30
9. Motorbikes procured	6	6

Implementation progressed very well throughout the LOP. Programming of projected expenditures over the three-year life of project had been prepared and financial reporting was submitted on time to the headquarters in Abidjan. The sub-project manager was very well qualified in the opinion of all governmental representatives and evaluation teams. Reimbursement rates were very high ranging from a height of 98% in one cooperative to a low of 76% in another. All things considered liquidity has been stable throughout and drawdown on project's funds has been kept at a minimum because of the credit scheme's high repayment ratio.

It was felt by DAI evaluation team that the project should be duplicated and extended not only within the Tillaberi district but along other suitable locations on the Niger River. Farmer acceptance was exceedingly high.

One large constraint on any duplication effort would be the lack of available equipment and spare parts for animal traction. Zinder, being the closest factory to the region was already at full capacity. The demand is so great in relation to supply that a dire shortage of spare parts just aren't available. Consequently,

a private entrepreneurial market has sprung up outside the subsidized governmentally controlled market that could give us valuable developmental lessons. EF and USAID realize this great demand for animal traction technology but progress is slow in building the desired production centers. A factory needs to be established in Niamey that could provide enough equipment for all the southern river region. Blacksmiths need be trained in the cooperatives in order to provide spare parts to farmers on a timely basis.

This project was designed for a short time (3 years) as a pilot project. The project provided a greatly needed service although at a level far below demand. The cooperatives should be encouraged and provided with assistance for establishing stocks of spare parts and maintenance services. There is great liquidity coming out of the fund than originally designed. There should, therefore, be better forward planning in ordering and placing units in the most needed project area. There had been in the past a backlog of orders and orders coming through after planting season had already begun--all indicating increased demand relative to existing supply. The LOP should have been originally designed for at least 4 years. At this juncture, EF should bring on a consultant to ascertain potential of the private equipment producer--the economic and marketing potential as compared to the existing governmental structure and ascertain demand in this region.

The performance and contribution of the Nigerians, both government and non-government was deemed effective to the success of this project. The three governmental agencies involved were the FNI, the financial arm of the government; CNCA, the agricultural credit institution; and UNCC, the agricultural extension service responsible for supplying needed inputs to farmers as well as formulating agricultural marketing arrangements. FNI provided the usual subsidy accorded

to animal traction units, UNCC provided a very competent manager and the credit institution CNCA provided manpower to oversee project financing and forward provision of credit to the farmers.

The benefits which accrued from the demonstration plots and use of farmer-extension agents in N-V-3 are similar to those noted in N-V-2. The addition of animal traction demonstration units and credit for purchase of oxen teams and equipment has an added set of benefits. Before the onset of the project the project area had been largely undeveloped and the soil was tilled by hand. Labor constraints had been the reason for low productivity and a reasonably small area under cultivation.

It was very difficult to ascertain on site visits and was not addressed in the mid-term by DAI if more land had been put into cultivation after the introduction of oxen. The DAI evaluation gave no indication that the introduction of animal traction to the area would be suitable because of the marginal utility of the soil if one should increase area under cultivation. There is some indication that good surplus soil is now exhausted--the rest, marginal.

One additional benefit which was observed was that the cooperatives have seemed to be strengthened and are now more cohesive because of the introduction of a new technology and injection of money through the revolving credit fund. Both have aided farmers in reaching their economic goals.

Lastly, the technological package was one of the most sound and well-thought through design packages, that was initiated. Seeds, fertilizer, and equipment were all appropriate to the existing methods of cultivation. Because of the smallness of the project the management was kept at a minimum. Lessons have been learned on this project which will hopefully aid the PID team in designing a broader project with an expanded development impact.

Upper Volta Animal Traction; HV-V-1

Project Agreement signed: October 29, 1977

Funding: SUAID \$2,000,000 grant; Host Country \$550,000.

Cooperating GOUV Agencies: Rural Institutions and Agricultural
Credit Office of the Ministry of Rural
Development

The purpose of the project is to promote the adoption of animal traction throughout Upper Volta. The project is one element in the achievement of the sectoral goal of improving small farmer productivity and income and the national goal of food self-sufficiency and widespread rural development. The most important project output has been the placement of a variety of animal traction packages with close to 5,000 small farmers during the first two seasons.

In its first two years the project actually extended 60% of the sum it had projected providing to small farmers. This shortfall was caused by delays in releasing monies and in acquiring animals and equipment. The extension component disbursed few of the monies at its disposal. It had trouble mobilizing veterinary services in the villages. Evaluation tasks were having trouble. The training and information component has performed adequately.

There was a major flaw in the design. The LOP was too short. No provision was made for the replenishment of the revolving credit fund after year two. Credits were to be paid back in five annual installments after a one year grace period. Another design problem was that little thought was given to how administrative costs of the credit system would be maintained after the withdrawal of donor support.

Identification of a final design oversight during implementation led to the creation of a draft animal insurance program which was added to the project.

The impact of the project has apparently been quite positive. No quantitative measures though are available. However, the mid-term evaluation of the project estimated that farmers who had adopted the animal traction package were cultivating twice their previously cultivated area. Their gross returns had increased by half what they had been.

The GOUV had problems putting its counterpart funds, not identified previously into the project. There were problems following through on the evaluation component of the project. In general the project was competently run. The biggest implementation problem was in procurement.

The only conflict the project had with national policies was in the interest rate charged farmers. The GOUV is committed to interest rates too low to make the project self-sustaining.

The greatest strength of the project is the credit component. It is successful because it offers small farmers access to a technical package for which they apparently feel a need. The weakness of the project is that it will need recurrent infusions of funds to survive.

The areas where design adjustments would have been helpful were those that would make the project self-sustaining. In addition, it was seen necessary to add a draft animal insurance program to the design.

The main lesson of this project is that there is a considerable demand, at least in Upper Volta, for access to animal traction technology.

In summary, this is, on balance, a successful project. It would be worthwhile to explore the possibilities of replicating it in comparable ecological, social and institutional situations.

Benin, B-V-1: Development of Corn and Sorghum Production Project
in Atacora and Oueme Provinces.

Funding: USAID Loan - \$2,600,000; Grant - \$90,000; Host country - \$850,000

TDD: Extension to 2/2/82 for the Grant; 8/11/81 for the Loan

Cooperating Government Agency: Ministry of Rural Development

The purpose was to increase maize and sorghum production in Benin--
Atacora in the Northwest and Oueme in the Southeast.

Seeds were to be produced and multiplied on two seed farms, one in
Oueme province and the other in Atacora. Each farm was to cultivate about
200 hectares and be supplied with infrastructure and equipment. Its target
was to produce 150 tons of hybrid corn seed and 15 tons of sorghum.
Fertilizer use, observation fields to establish fertilizer rates to rotation
systems, improved extension and training and an establishment of a revolving
credit fund for the extension of animal traction were all components of the
project.

A project management unit (PMU) was created under the MRD. The PMU was
in charge of all accounts, procurement, programming and total management.

CARDERS, a province level organization, were responsible for execution
of daily activities. USAID, through the EF was to contribute 840 million CFA
over 3 years. GOB was to contribute 323 million CFA to help meet animal
traction and salary expenses.

Accomplishments to date: April 1981

One hundred of the 150 hectares of the area farm at Dougha has been
cleared. Seventy-five of the 150 hectares at Ketou have been cleared.

Construction is almost complete on the two farms. Seed production is
progressing at much less than programmed rates. Forty-four demonstration
fields have been established in Atacora and 25 in Oueme. About 400 animal

traction units have been provided. The credit scheme has been established. There have been several problems, but recommendations have been given by the project's headquarters and resolution should be forthcoming. All commodities ordered thru AAPC are now in Benin. It was found throughout the first two years of this project that AAPC mismanaged their end. All fertilizer, insecticide, bulldozers and tractors, seed processing equipment, and A.V. equipment were procured from the States. The basic problem was indicated by the fact that after two years after project agreement signature no orders had been received in the project areas. Most equipment had either not left the United States, or reached Cotonou the freight bill. The process by which commodities were procured from AAPC has been slow--lost documents and poor communication.

The DAI recommends:

- 1) procurement from the U.S. discontinued with procurement of commodities with waivers to procure in Benin;
- 2) for commodities that must be procured in the U.S. the EF insist AAPC to send complete documentation to the PMU, EF, and SONAGRI; and
- 3) EF should meet with SONATRAC and SONAGRI to improve the delivery system and documentation process.

The revolving fund credit scheme was failing because of improper design. Hardly any mention of credit was noted in the original design. Improvements in the scheme plus recommendations to improve repayments and to facilitate other changes were given by DAI and are being considered.

The management of the project has been poor from the beginning. Insufficient attention had been given to planning and coordination. There was never a programmed schedule drawn up or budget presented. A recommendation by the EF to place an expatriate to fill in as management advisor was rejected by the GOB. The GOB wanted to place the Director of Agriculture in the position.

This was rejected by the EF. DAI recommended that the DA be nominated as a technical advisor.

Financially, the project has been unable to expend money at the rate initially envisaged by the project design. As of 31/03/81 only 2,270,273.47 CFA has been disbursed. There remains 329,726.53 CFA undisbursed. It was recommended during the DAI evaluation that a complete rebudgeting of the project take effect. MASI then recommended a two-year extension of the project offering several implementation guidelines affecting increased production of the seed farms, observation trials, animal traction training, etc. A continuation of activities are outlined in the "Plan de Compagne 1980-81", presented by the PMU.

This evaluation team believes that it is most desirable to have some indirect intervention in Benin via the EF. Even though the project was beset with many problems from the design stage throughout the implementation stage, penalizing the small farmer in the project areas would not be wise. There will be some beneficiary impact and a definite learning experience for the PMU and farmers if the project continues. Regardless of past problems, a further extension should be considered.

Actually, an increase of \$350,000 and extension of PACD to June 30, 1983 has been awarded this project. The additional funds will: a) allow the construction of originally overlooked essential infrastructure, b) allow the procurement of additional animals and equipment and the expansion of health extension services in support of the animal traction element, c) allow the provision of short-term technical assistance in programming/budgeting, development of credit programs, and d) allow for the provision of a fourth year of technical assistance from a seed consultant.

Lama Kara (T-V-2)

Funding: USAID Loan - \$1,300,000; Host Country - \$450,000

Cooperating Government Agencies: Ministry of Rural Development

Cooperating Donors: Entente Fund, FAC, GOT and Freres Missionaires
des Campagnes

The purpose of the project is to establish and institutionalize a self-sustaining system for increasing farmers' capacity to recognize and solve problems of food production and other economic and social needs. Accomplishment of this purpose will be a contribution toward increasing per capita food production, cash revenues, satisfying institutional requirements of urban and rural residents and reducing economic disparities between regions in Togo. Project outputs to include local development councils, a multi-level extension staff, a field tested agricultural package and a number of newly cleared fields under cultivation.

No evaluation has yet been done of this project. Judging from the reports that have come from the contract anthropologist the project is essentially on schedule.

The original design of the project was not well conceived. It was based on false assumptions in several critical areas. For that reason, the project had to be completely redesigned. The new design is innovative insofar as it is an attempt at bottom up development. To what degree it has succeeded will begin to emerge in the forthcoming evaluation.

Indications are that there has been significant positive impact of the project on the small farmers in the zone. In the Atchangbade zone the project now has 283 farmers on 160 hectares. In the Sirka zone the project is active in four villages.

This project, if successful, could contribute to a major revision of agricultural strategy at both the Togolese national level and at a more general development level. The importance of the project is its bottom-up methodology. This methodology may be applicable elsewhere.

The major strength of the project to date has been its ability to enlist the participation of the beneficiaries. Its production impact will have to be evaluated at a later date. There seem to have been, however, some misunderstanding and even conflict between different levels of the extension staff.

The main developmental lesson this project will teach, if it is successful, is that such things are possible and that a reorientation of the development process is feasible.

In summary, this is a very promising project from the point of view of the methodology of its implementation. If all goes well this project should be self-sustaining. On the other hand, the project must await a formal project evaluation before its significance can be discussed in greater depth.

Food Production in Notse and Dayes Zones in Togo; T-V-1

Loan Agreement signed - June, 1978

Funding - \$2,400,000 loan; host country \$650,000.

Cooperating Government Agencies - Ministry of Rural Development

One of the difficulties the project has experienced has been the lack of a clear statement of project objectives. This has apparently been resolved. The primary purpose that has emerged is increased small farmer productivity of food grains in two zones. The project will thereby contribute to the overall goal of food self-sufficiency in Togo. The most important outputs of the project have been the clearing of 1150 hectares for cultivation. If the rains cooperate there is every prospect that over 800 hectares will be planted in food grains in 1981. Approximately, 280 small farmer families are beneficiaries of the project.

It was projected to clear 800 hectares per year (400 in each of 2 zones) for 3 years for a total of 2400 hectares. It was expected that all of this land would be put under cultivation immediately upon clearing. The expected beneficiaries were approximately 1500 small farmer families. Delays in the procurement of land clearing machinery have held back the amount of land cleared. The caprices of rainfall in the two zones have played havoc with the plowing schedule and have limited the amount of cleared land that could be cultivated. Progress in the Notse zone, moreover, has been retarded by the lack of commitment of the local people to the project. It should be pointed out, however, that the mid-term evaluation of the project has

proven to be overly pessimistic. The project will, in 1981, put under cultivation more land than the projected best possible case alternative in the mid-term analysis.

The original design was too ambitious. It required the coordination of too many components to meet its performance goals. There were start-up delays, due mainly to procurement problems. For this reason the LOP was not long enough. It has been extended. The project has not been able to assure a marketing function to absorb increased food grain production. The credit function, such as it is, has problems. Collection is difficult. The research component will produce no useful results during the life of the project.

The mid-term evaluation finds (Page 46) "the intent of PVND as well as its actual impact is clearly to benefit small farm families." Furthermore (Page 46) "the evaluation team finds, in other words, that virtually all benefits from the project are, in fact, getting to the population for which they were intended--the small farmer." The impact will be measureable at the end of the 1981 season in terms of average yield per hectare. First, due to mechanized production techniques, farmers are able to cultivate larger surfaces than in pre-project times. Second, due to an improved technical package, the production per hectare has risen. Farmers in the Dayes zone appear to be

embracing the project more wholeheartedly than those in the Notse zone. Population densities in the former are high and good land is scarce. In the latter good land is plentiful enough so that people need not be wedded to the project to meet their production needs.

The main non-government contribution to the project has been the crop research conducted in the project's favor by IRAT. Due to the nature of IRAT's research approach and the inevitable delays in establishing reliable agronomic research results, the results of this research will probably not be used during the project's lifetime.

The only conflict noted between national sector policy and the experience of the project lies in the area of animal traction. It is current GOT policy to promote the adoption of animal traction. This is meeting resistance in the Notse zone and only slow acceptance in the Dayes zone. In southern Togo people in general are historically unfamiliar with bovine husbandry. It is, therefore, that much more difficult for them to adopt animal traction.

Another aspect of current GOT agricultural strategy is the promotion of bloc cultivation schemes exploited by cooperative farming groups. This is the organizational plan of the PVND project. It is working better on the Dayes plateau than in the Notse zone. Within the PVND the plan was to use a rotational cultivation system which includes a period of pasture fallow. This has not worked due to limited research, lack of farmer incentives, and absence

of mixed farming practices.

The greatest strength of this project have been its ability to put significant amounts of new land under cultivation. It has also built up a highly qualified and very effective extension staff. It has taken longer than expected to accomplish this but the quality of the staff seems to be worth the delay. The project has generated a number of cohesive cooperative groups. It has generated an increase in food production. The weaknesses are that the groups have no structure through which to market their production. If unresolved, this problem could slow the growth of farmer commitment to the project. Credit is also a weak element on the project. The production element has been successful because of its technical soundness and because it addresses itself to a felt need. The extension element has been successful because of the care and high standards that have gone into recruitment and training.

The project will not be self-sustaining after the TDD. As the mid-term evaluation report states (P.48) "The main problem is that the successful operation of the bloc farms will depend not just on the efforts of the small farmers themselves, but on a number of activities over which the farmer has little control or influence." Farmers need mechanical services to be able to cultivate the amount of land allocated to them. They need access to cultivation inputs, provision for marketing and storage, and a line

of credit. They need continued subsidies to keep them committed to the project system. The mid-term evaluation report concludes (P.119) "Notwithstanding the numerous problems that have been discussed in this chapter the evaluation team is of the opinion that PVND should be continued with donor assistance beyond the current budget life. The main reason for this is that the three-year life of the project is not, and will not be, sufficient to ensure that benefits become self-sustaining."

Major adjustments had to be made in the design of the technological package. "In short, the project does not have a tested and proven technological package to offer small farmers." (P. 54). Development of this package is still going on. At the same time the design was virtually silent on essential questions such as the organizational means by which small farmers were to participate in the project, the credit program, a marketing program, and pricing policy. Here the mid-term evaluation concludes, however, (P.54) "There is insufficient time remaining in the project to undertake a major redesign of the technological package. To make such an attempt would probably destroy the project's ability to function. The evaluation team believes that the project's human and financial resources could be better employed during the time remaining in preparing for a follow-up project exercise. Implementation of the current project should be seen as a pilot effort aimed

at answering many of the existing questions about the feasibility and desirability of crop and variety selection, fertility management, animal production and animal traction."

The soundness of the technological package is questionable for reasons cited above. Part of the problem is the lack of clarification of project objectives. If the objective is simply to raise more food grains a more cost effective project could have been designed. If increased quantities of food grains on the market was the objective, there should have been a marketing study in the design. Operational effectiveness has been impeded, in addition, by the weakness of Togolese rural development institutions. The PVND is not well integrated with any of the national institutions.

There are a number of developmental lessons that emerge from analysis of this project. Large, complicated, multi-component projects heavily dependent on U.S. procurement are fraught with implementation delays and difficulties. Projects must have only one or two objectives and have a clear priority among them. Projects should not aim at specially created institutional entities that cannot survive the TDD. Projects should be designed to be self-sustaining after their TDD.

The elements that lead themselves to replication on projects are land clearing by hand and the extension recruitment and training program. They have permitted the production increases credited to the project.

Ivory Coast North-East Savannah Rural Development Project (CI-V-I)

Project Agreement signed: September 16, 1980

Funding USAID: \$3,700,000 Loan; Host Country: \$4,470,000

Cooperating GOIG Agency: Compagnie Ivoirienne Pour le Developpement des Textiles (CIDT) under authority from the Ministry of Agriculture.

CIDT will sub-contract with DSREA, IDESSA, ONPR, DCH for particular components of the program.

Cooperating Donors: Entente Fund, GOIG, Work Bank and FAC.

The purpose of this project is to promote the expansion of agriculture in the north-east savannah through integrated rural development. The project is seen as a contribution to reaching the national goal of reduction of regional income disparities. The outputs of the project will appear in several areas. The project will work out suitable technical packages to be recommended to farmers under different climatic, soil and population conditions of the project area. It will produce a corps of extension agents. It will improve rainfed rice cultivation for 800 farm families, improve traditional crop cultivation for 1350 farm families and rehabilitate the Kpoda irrigation scheme. It will promote 50 village cooperatives. It will construct about 10 wells and 50 tubewells in the project area to improve village water supplies. Finally, it will commission a number of studies and surveys.

Implementation of the project has only just begun so it is not possible to determine the progress of the sub-project toward its goals.

It is the opinion of this evaluation team, however, that the design of the project is far too ambitious. By itself it represents 37% of the money lent out in the food production project. Although only one of eight food production sub-projects it represents 25% of the combined loan and grant funds in the project. The design has too many components. Many of the components will not be managed directly by the CIDT. Successful implementation will be too dependent on the coordinated execution of these disparate elements. Such a challenge make successful implementation extremely difficult.

To date progress and impact on small farmers cannot be assessed.

The whole North East Savannah Rural Development Project is a \$17 million multi-donor undertaking. The Entente Fund is contributing \$5.1 million to the project. Of that sum \$3.7 is coming from USAID and \$1.4 million from FAC. The GOIC is contributing \$4.9 million. The World Bank is contributing the remaining \$7 million. The CIDT is the main implementation agency but it will coordinate its activities with appropriate Ivorian government agencies in the case of socio-economic research, road construction, well-digging, etc.

A problem seems to be emerging in the course of project implementation. The problem is that there is a seeming conflict of interest in the role of the CIDT. The CIDT is a privately-owned profit making enterprise whose main interest in the north east Ivory Coast is the promotion, production, processing, and marketing of cotton. Recent Entente Fund quarterly reports complain that the CIDT is not giving the project the attention it requires.

To date the project has had no visible impact on national agricultural strategies for small farmer assistance.

It is difficult at this early date to assess properly the project's strengths and weaknesses.

C. BENIN: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DATA

LAND AREA (THOUSAND SQ. KM.)	BENIN			REFERENCE GROUPS (WEIGHTED AVERAGES - MOST RECENT ESTIMATE) ^{1,2}	
	1960 ^Δ	MOST RECENT		LOW INCOME AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA	MIDDLE INCOME AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA
		1970 ^Δ	ESTIMATE ^Δ		
TOTAL	12.6				
AGRICULTURAL	33.0				
GDP PER CAPITA (US\$)	90.0	120.0	250.0	260.0	868.0
ENERGY CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA (KILOGRAMS OF CPAL EQUIVALENT)	39.0	42.0	56.0	80.0	699.4
POPULATION AND VITAL STATISTICS					
POPULATION, MID-YEAR (MILLIONS)	2.1	2.6	3.3	.	.
URBAN POPULATION (PERCENT OF TOTAL)	9.5	12.6	16.0	17.3	28.9
POPULATION PROJECTIONS					
POPULATION IN YEAR 2000 (MILLIONS)			6.0	.	.
STATIONARY POPULATION (MILLIONS)			15.0	.	.
YEAR STATIONARY POPULATION IS REACHED			2160	.	.
POPULATION DENSITY					
PER SQ. KM.	19.0	23.0	29.0	27.4	61.7
PER SQ. KM. AGRICULTURAL LAND	62.0	77.0	97.0	82.6	126.0
POPULATION AGE STRUCTURE (PERCENT)					
0-4 YRS.	44.2	44.9	46.0	44.0	45.5
15-64 YRS.	52.2	52.6	51.3	52.2	51.6
65 YRS. AND ABOVE	2.6	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.8
POPULATION GROWTH RATE (PERCENT)					
TOTAL	2.2	2.6	2.8	2.7	2.7
URBAN	6.0	5.3	4.2	6.8	4.9
CRUDE BIRTH RATE (PER THOUSAND)					
	51.0	49.0	49.0	47.4	46.8
CRUDE DEATH RATE (PER THOUSAND)					
	17.0	22.0	19.0	19.6	16.6
GROSS REPRODUCTION RATE					
	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.2
FAMILY PLANNING					
ACCEPTORS, ANNUAL (THOUSANDS)
WIVES (PERCENT OF MARRIED WOMEN)
FOOD AND NUTRITION					
INDEX OF FOOD PRODUCTION					
PER CAPITA (1969=71=100)	95.0	101.0	92.0	91.8	94.0
PER CAPITA SUPPLY OF					
CALORIES (PERCENT OF REQUIREMENTS)					
	93.0	96.0	94.0	90.2	92.7
PROTEINS (GRAMS PER DAY)					
OF WHICH ANIMAL AND PULSE	14.0	15.0	13.0	18.4	15.6
CHILD (AGES 1-4) MORTALITY RATE					
	41.0	32.0	27.0	27.7	21.3
HEALTH					
LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (YEARS)					
	37.0	42.0	46.0	43.3	50.1
INFANT MORTALITY RATE (PER THOUSAND)					
	206.0
ACCESS TO SAFE WATER (PERCENT OF POPULATION)					
TOTAL	20.0	23.2	31.0
URBAN	42.0	38.0	66.8
RURAL	16.0	18.8	..
ACCESS TO EXCRETA DISPOSAL (PERCENT OF POPULATION)					
TOTAL	..	14.0	..	28.9	..
URBAN	..	83.0	..	67.0	..
RURAL	..	1.0
POPULATION PER PHYSICIAN					
	47000.0	28920.0	26908.0	30910.4	14508.2
POPULATION PER NURSING PERSON					
	..	2910.0	3007.0	5793.2	3279.5
POPULATION PER HOSPITAL BED					
TOTAL	746.0	847.0	736.0	1198.9	1141.5
URBAN	209.0
RURAL	3876.0
ADMISSIONS PER HOSPITAL BED					
	..	30.2	17.7
HOUSING					
AVERAGE SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD					
TOTAL
URBAN
RURAL
AVERAGE NUMBER OF PERSONS PER ROOM					
TOTAL
URBAN
RURAL
ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY (PERCENT OF DWELLINGS)					
TOTAL
URBAN
RURAL

BENIN: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DATA

	BENIN			REFERENCE GROUPS (WEIGHTED AVERAGE) - MOST RECENT ESTIMATE - ^a	
	1960 ^b	1970 ^b	MOST RECENT ESTIMATE ^c	LOW INCOME AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA	MIDDLE INCOME AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA
EDUCATION					
ADJUSTED ENROLLMENT RATIOS					
PRIMARY:					
TOTAL	25.0	40.0	38.0	57.7	61.7
MALE	32.0	46.0	80.0	74.2	69.2
FEMALE	13.0	23.0	37.0	50.1	51.0
SECONDARY:					
TOTAL	2.0	5.0	11.0	10.0	20.6
MALE	2.0	8.0	16.0	13.7	29.2
FEMALE	1.0	3.0	6.0	7.1	14.7
VOCATIONAL ENROLL (% OF SECONDARY)	13.0	4.1	2.1	6.8	7.0
PUPIL-TEACHER RATIO					
PRIMARY	41.0	44.0	48.0	43.0	36.6
SECONDARY	23.0	26.0	31.0	23.2	22.7
ADULT LITERACY RATE (PERCENT)					
	8.0	25.5	..
CONSUMPTION					
PASSENGER CARS PER THOUSAND POPULATION					
	1.0	4.0	5.0	3.6	38.8
RADIO RECEIVERS PER THOUSAND POPULATION					
	12.0	32.0	48.0	31.5	83.5
TV RECEIVERS PER THOUSAND POPULATION					
	0.1	1.8	..
NEWSPAPER ("DAILY GENERAL INTEREST") CIRCULATION PER THOUSAND POPULATION					
	2.0	1.0	0.3	4.6	24.2
CINEMA ANNUAL ATTENDANCE PER CAPITA					
	0.2	0.4	0.7
LABOR FORCE					
TOTAL LABOR FORCE (THOUSANDS)					
	1048.9	1285.7	1530.2
FEMALE (PERCENT)					
	45.1	44.9	44.9	33.5	38.1
AGRICULTURE (PERCENT)					
	54.0	49.7	47.0	80.7	54.3
INDUSTRY (PERCENT)					
	8.9	11.8	48.0	8.1	17.8
PARTICIPATION RATE (PERCENT)					
TOTAL	51.2	49.0	46.4	42.2	38.8
MALE	57.1	54.9	51.0	53.1	48.4
FEMALE	45.5	43.3	42.1	29.5	29.4
ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY RATIO					
	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3
INCOME DISTRIBUTION					
PERCENT OF PRIVATE INCOME RECEIVED BY					
HIGHEST 5 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS	31.4/ ^c
HIGHEST 20 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS	51.7/ ^c
LOWEST 20 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS	5.5/ ^c
LOWEST 40 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS	15.8/ ^c
POVERTY TARGET GROUPS					
ESTIMATED ABSOLUTE POVERTY INCOME LEVEL (US\$ PER CAPITA)					
URBAN	138.2	..
RURAL	84.0	86.1	..
ESTIMATED RELATIVE POVERTY INCOME LEVEL (US\$ PER CAPITA)					
URBAN	107.0	..
RURAL	82.0	65.0	..
ESTIMATED POPULATION BELOW ABSOLUTE POVERTY INCOME LEVEL (PERCENT)					
URBAN
RURAL	53.0	66.9	..

.. Not available
 . Not applicable.

NOTES

^a The group averages for each indicator are population-weighted arithmetic means. Coverage of countries among the indicators depends on availability of data and is not uniform.

^b Unless otherwise noted, data for 1960 refer to any year between 1959 and 1961; for 1970, between 1969 and 1971; and for Most Recent Estimate, between 1974 and 1978.

^c Population.

A

Most recent estimate of GNP per capita is for 1979, all other data are as of April, 1980.

October, 1980

BENIN: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DATA

CROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IN 1980

	US\$ Million	% of GDP
GDP at Market Prices	1,145.7	103.0
GDP at Factor Prices	1,112.4	100.0
Gross Domestic Investment	271.5	26.4
Gross Domestic Saving	50.9	4.6
Current Account Balance	-124.0	-11.2
Exports (G + NFS)	306.1	27.5
Imports (G + NFS)	526.7	47.3

ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH (CURRENT PRICES, IN %)

1975-80

GDP at Market Prices	16.2
GDP at Factor Prices	16.1
Gross Domestic Investment	24.0
Gross Domestic Saving	-
Current Account Balance	-
Exports (G + NFS)	16.2
Imports (G + NFS)	16.8

OUTPUT, LABOR FORCE AND PRODUCTIVITY IN 1980

	Value Added		Labor Force		Value Added per Worker	
	US\$ Million	%	Thousand	%	US\$	%
Agriculture	430.4	43.1	906	55.7	475.0	77.2
Industry, Construction and Public Works	118.6	11.8	52	3.2	2,280.7	170.7
Government	119.0	11.8	72	4.4	1,652.8	268.6
Commerce and Transport	298.0	29.8	597	36.7	499.2	81.1
Other Services	34.8	3.2	-	-	-	-
GDP at Factor Cost	1,000.8	100.0	1,627	100.0	615.2	100.0

GOVERNMENT FINANCE

	Central Government		
	(CFAP Billion)	% of GDP	
		1980	1975-79
Current Receipts	34.5	14.8	16.3
Current Expenditures	35.3	15.1	16.0
Current Surplus	0.8	0.0	2.3
Capital Expenditures	30.2	13.0	10.9
External Debt Disbursements (gross)	21.4	9.2	5.6

MONEY, CREDIT AND PRICES

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980 1/
			(Billion CFAP Outstanding End Period)					
Money and Quasi Money	14.79	18.45	31.86	30.63	34.91	39.01	43.67	41.25
Bank Credit to Public Sector	-1.16	-2.42	-2.95	-2.30	-4.13	-4.92	-7.30	-10.97
Bank Credit to Private Sector	12.73	16.45	32.60	32.10	37.60	43.10	59.60	73.46

(Percentage or Index Number)

Money and Quasi Money as % of GDP	..	17.1	28.2	23.5	23.5	22.8	22.7	17.6
General Price Index (1974 = 100)	89.6	100.0	116.7	124.1	136.3	145.6	160.4	177.9
Annual Percentage Changes in:								
General Price Index	1.6	11.6	16.7	8.1	9.8	6.8	10.2	10.9
Bank Credit to Public Sector	-127.5	-108.6	-21.9	-89.0	-46.5	24.6	-48.4	50.2
Bank Credit to Private Sector	22.3	29.2	98.2	-1.5	17.1	19.9	31.7	23.6

1/ As of end June 1980

Note: All conversions to dollars in this table are at the exchange rates noted on the following page.

.. not available.

March 26, 1981

BENIN: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DATA

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS	1974	1977	1978 (US\$ Million)	1979	1980 1/
Exports (C + NPS)	133.0	177.6	191.1	756.8	306.2
Imports (C + NPS)	276.9	308.3	360.6	668.6	526.7
Resource Gap (deficit - -)	-143.9	-130.7	-169.5	-193.8	-220.5
Interest Payments (net)	36.4	37.0	31.8	33.3	38.4
Workers' Remittances	13.9	17.0	24.5	23.3	28.6
Other Factor (net)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Net Transfers	28.3	28.4	22.1	26.2	28.0
Balance on Current Accounts	-65.3	-66.3	-88.9	-110.8	-124.8
Direct Foreign Investment	6.3	6.7	4.4	7.4	6.4
Net MLT Borrowing	31.8	34.2	61.9	71.4	96.7
Capital Grants	26.3	28.9	23.2	23.8	17.1
Other Capital (net)	-9.6	-14.6	5.3	10.3	-
Other Items n.s.t.	5.8	9.3	14.1	10.9	-28.0
Use of Reserves (increase - -)	-5.4	0.4	21.7	12.8	12.8
Net Reserves (end year) 1/	27.6	25.6	0.0	-27.6	-
Petroleum Imports as % of Total Imports	4.4	3.6	3.5	3.4	3.2

EXCHANGE RATES (CFAP PER US\$)

YEAR	RANGE AVERAGE	End of Period
1973	223	230
1974	241	222
1975	214	224
1976	239	248
1977	246	235
1978	226	209
1979	212	201
1980	210	226
1981	250	-

1/ Net foreign assets of Central Bank
 2/ Estimates
 3/ Preliminary estimate of ratio of debt service to exports of goods and NPS

.. Not available

April 21, 1981

IBRD.

COMMODITY EXPORTS (AVERAGE 1975-1978, RECORDED)	US\$ Million	
Cotton	7.2	21.1
Cocoa Beans	1.2	11.1
Palm Products	5.0	18.1
All Other Commodities	17.3	100.1
TOTAL	27.7	100.1

EXTERNAL DEBT, OCTOBER 31, 1980

	US\$ Million
Public Debt (Disbursed)	269.1
Including Guaranteed	-
Non-Guaranteed Private Debt	-
Total Outstanding and Disbursed	-

DEBT SERVICE RATIO FOR 1980 2/

Public Debt (Disbursed)	3.1
Including Guaranteed	6.0
Non-Guaranteed Private Debt	-
Total Outstanding and Disbursed	-

DEBT/IDA SERVICE AS % OF EXPORTS IN 1981

	IDA	ICA
	US\$ Miln	
Outstanding and Disbursed	56.0%	-
Undisbursed	13.7%	-
Outstanding including Undisbursed	69.7%	-

D. IVORY COAST: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DATA

LAST AREA (THOUSAND SQ. KM.)	IVORY COAST			REFERENCE GROUPS (WEIGHTED AVERAGES - MOST RECENT ESTIMATE)-A	
	1960	1970	MOST RECENT ESTIMATE	MIDDLE INCOME AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA	MIDDLE INCOME LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN
TOTAL	322.5				
AGRICULTURAL	171.6				
GDP PER CAPITA (US\$)	230.0	450.0	800.0	720.2	1380.1
ENERGY CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA (KILOGRAMS OF COAL EQUIVALENT)	76.0	229.0	357.0	699.4	1055.9
POPULATION AND VITAL STATISTICS					
POPULATION, MID-YEAR (MILLIONS)	3.5	5.0	7.8		
URBAN POPULATION (PERCENT OF TOTAL)	19.3	27.6	35.6	28.9	63.4
POPULATION PROJECTIONS					
POPULATION IN YEAR 2000 (MILLIONS)			14.0		
STATIONARY POPULATION (MILLIONS)			37.0		
YEAR STATIONARY POPULATION IS REACHED			2130		
POPULATION DENSITY					
PER SQ. KM.	11.0	16.0	24.0		
PER SQ. KM. AGRICULTURAL LAND	21.0	30.0	45.0	61.7	20.1
POPULATION AGE STRUCTURE (PERCENT)					
0-14 YRS.	43.2	42.5	44.1	45.5	41.4
15-64 YRS.	34.0	34.8	33.9	31.6	34.7
65 YRS. AND ABOVE	2.8	2.7	2.0	2.8	3.9
POPULATION GROWTH RATE (PERCENT)					
TOTAL	2.1	3.7/L	5.6/L		
URBAN	..	7.3	9.2	2.7	2.7
CRUDE BIRTH RATE (PER THOUSAND)	50.0	49.0	50.0	46.8	40.1
CRUDE DEATH RATE (PER THOUSAND)	27.0	22.0	19.0	16.4	34.9
GROSS REPRODUCTION RATE	2.2/L	3.1	3.3	3.2	8.9
FAMILY PLANNING					
ACCEPTORS, ANNUAL (THOUSANDS)	2.5
USERS (PERCENT OF MARRIED WOMEN)
FOOD AND NUTRITION					
INDEX OF FOOD PRODUCTION					
PER CAPITA (1969-71=100)	99.0	98.0	103.0	96.0	106.9
PER CAPITA SUPPLY OF CALORIES (PERCENT OF REQUIREMENTS)					
0-14 YRS.	90.0	122.0	103.0	92.7	107.4
15-64 YRS.	42.0	59.0	51.0	33.0	65.6
65 YRS. AND ABOVE	11.0	15.0	15.0	15.6	33.7
CHILD (AGES 1-4) MORTALITY RATE					
	41.0	32.0	27.0	21.3	8.4
HEALTH					
LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (YEARS)					
MALE	37.0	42.0	46.0	50.1	63.1
FEMALE	66.3
ACCESS TO SAFE WATER (PERCENT OF POPULATION)					
TOTAL	19.0	31.0	65.9
URBAN	50.0	66.8	80.4
RURAL	5.0	..	44.0
ACCESS TO EXCRETA DISPOSAL (PERCENT OF POPULATION)					
TOTAL	..	5.0	25.0	..	62.3
URBAN	..	23.0	33.0	..	79.4
RURAL	22.0	..	29.6
POPULATION PER PHYSICIAN					
TOTAL	23277.0/L	14085.0	15220.0	16508.2	1849.2
URBAN	2920.0	2880.0/L	2368.0/L	3279.5	1227.5
RURAL
POPULATION PER NURSING PERSON					
TOTAL	679.0	784.0	..	1141.5	480.3
URBAN	..	382.0
RURAL	..	1348.0
ADMISSIONS PER HOSPITAL BED					
TOTAL
URBAN
RURAL	6.0
HOUSING					
AVERAGE SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD					
TOTAL
URBAN
RURAL	6.0
AVERAGE NUMBER OF PERSONS PER ROOM					
TOTAL
URBAN
RURAL	2.5/L
ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY (PERCENT OF DWELLINGS)					
TOTAL	1.0/L
URBAN
RURAL

IVORY COAST: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DATA

	IVORY COAST			REFERENCE GROUPS (WEIGHTED AVERAGES - MOST RECENT ESTIMATE) ^a	
	1960 ^b	MOST RECENT ESTIMATE ^c		MIDDLE INCOME AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA	MIDDLE INCOME LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN
		1970	1970	1970	1970
EDUCATION					
ADJUSTED ENROLLMENT RATIOS					
PRIMARY:					
TOTAL	46.0	76.0	92.0	61.7	99.7
MALE	68.0	97.0	113.0	69.2	101.0
FEMALE	24.0	55.0	69.0	31.4	95.6
SECONDARY:					
TOTAL	2.0	11.0	17.0	20.6	34.4
MALE	4.0	17.0	26.0	29.2	33.3
FEMALE	1.0	5.0	8.0	14.7	34.7
VOCATIONAL ENROL. (% OF SECONDARY)	13.0	7.0	13.0	7.0	38.2
PUPIL-TEACHER RATIO					
PRIMARY	41.0	45.0	44.0	36.6	30.3
SECONDARY	..	21.0	..	24.3	14.5
ADULT LITERACY RATE (PERCENT)	3.0 ^d	20.0	76.3
CONSTRUCTION					
PASSENGER CARS PER THOUSAND POPULATION					
	3.0	10.0	12.0	38.8	43.0
RADIO RECEIVERS PER THOUSAND POPULATION					
	16.0	17.0	120.0	83.3	243.3
TV RECEIVERS PER THOUSAND POPULATION					
	0.4	5.3	31.3	..	84.2
NEWSPAPER ("DAILY GENERAL INTEREST") CIRCULATION PER THOUSAND POPULATION					
	2.0	10.0	7.2	24.2	63.2
CINEMA ANNUAL ATTENDANCE PER CAPITA					
	1.5	0.7	..
LABOR FORCE					
TOTAL LABOR FORCE (THOUSANDS)					
	1837.9	2437.7	3099.7
FEMALE (PERCENT)					
	44.0	43.8	43.0	38.1	22.2
AGRICULTURE (PERCENT)					
	88.8	84.5	81.0	54.3	37.1
INDUSTRY (PERCENT)					
	2.1	2.6	3.0	17.8	23.5
PARTICIPATION RATE (PERCENT)					
TOTAL	35.6	33.4	31.6	38.8	31.3
MALE	61.4	39.4	37.7	48.4	48.9
FEMALE	49.6	47.3	43.5	29.4	14.0
ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY RATIO	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.3	1.4
INCOME DISTRIBUTION					
PERCENT OF PRIVATE INCOME RECEIVED BY					
HIGHEST 5 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS	30.9/1
HIGHEST 20 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS	51.8/1	..	50.0/1
LOWEST 20 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS	6.6/1	..	9.0/1
LOWEST 40 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS	16.5/1	..	20.0/1
POVERTY TARGET GROUPS					
ESTIMATED ABSOLUTE POVERTY INCOME LEVEL (US\$ PER CAPITA)					
URBAN	274.0
RURAL	95.0	..	190.8
ESTIMATED RELATIVE POVERTY INCOME LEVEL (US\$ PER CAPITA)					
URBAN	487.0	..	474.0
RURAL	244.0	..	332.5
ESTIMATED POPULATION BELOW ABSOLUTE POVERTY INCOME LEVEL (PERCENT)					
URBAN
RURAL

.. Not available
 . Not applicable.

NOTES

- ^a The group averages for each indicator are population-weighted arithmetic means. Coverage of countries among the indicators depends on availability of data and is not uniform.
- ^b Unless otherwise noted, data for 1960 refer to any year between 1959 and 1961; for 1970, between 1969 and 1971; and for Most Recent Estimate, between 1974 and 1978.
- ^c Due to immigration population growth rate is higher than rate of natural increase; ^d 1957-58, African population only; ^e 1963; ^f Government personnel only; ^g 1956-57; ^h 1962; ⁱ Population.

IVORY COAST: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DATA

(\$ million)

	1961	1971	1972(a)	1962	1963	1970	1965- 1973	1975- 1977	1978- 1981	1982- 1983	1961	1971	1981
	1977 Prices and Exchange Rates						Annual Growth Rates					As Percent of GDP	
NATIONAL ACCOUNTS													
Gross Domestic Product	2834	3309	3247	3067	3030	3300	4.3	11.2	4.6	3.2	100.0	107.3	113.3
Exports (incl. trade in services)	221	1163	2112	1181	1237	1184	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	107.3	113.3
Gross Domestic Income	2613	3193	3035	2949	2903	3186	4.8	17.8	3.8	4.4	100.0	100.0	100.0
Imports (incl. SPS)	623	1146	1135	1886	1793	1114	9.1	18.0	3.1	4.4	35.2	38.4	36.7
Exports - Imports (import capacity)	-1152	-1303	-1223	-715	-563	-630	3.0	14.3	4.2	4.0	66.0	72.3	76.3
Accounting Gap	475	-	87	146	130	-131	-	-	-	-	18.8	0.9	1.8
Consumption & investment	1728	2032	2018	1937	1903	2019	7.5	8.3	3.4	3.2	63.8	65.0	73.0
Investment (incl. stocks)	409	995	2097	2166	2170	2070	9.3	32.3	0.1	6.2	15.3	33.4	24.4
Domestic Savings	995	891	2048	1870	2195	2079	-0.1	24.7	6.8	4.1	34.4	30.3	24.0
National Savings	430	373	1323	1387	1623	1666	2.4	20.6	1.8	3.2	17.1	22.2	18.2
MERCHANDISE TRADE													
Annual Rate of Change Prices													
As Percent of Total													
Imports													
Capital goods	61	323	700	835	1286	1285	18.5	33.8	6.1	19.3	23.9	24.4	23.2
Intermediate goods (incl. fuels)	59	311	464	627	1140	2910	10.1	17.8	16.3	11.8	27.1	19.2	22.1
Fuels and related materials	13	137	218	700	924	2459	28.3	11.7	27.8	9.3	1.0	9.5	17.8
of which Petroleum	4	146	171	700	884	1430	43.2	3.4	27.3	9.3	1.0	7.4	10.3
Unutilized goods	122	309	824	1111	1823	2082	11.2	22.2	17.2	10.2	47.8	16.0	16.8
Total Merch. Imports (cif)	253	1105	2317	2909	3199	4261	16.2	23.8	13.7	16.3	100.0	100.0	100.0
Exports													
Primary products (incl. fuels)	246	1010	2324	2792	4266	7089	13.3	32.8	7.4	10.7	86.0	90.1	80.4
Fuels and related materials	-	47	86	120	812	0	-	0.7	32.3	-	-	7.4	10.3
of which Petroleum	-	47	86	120	812	0	-	0.7	32.3	-	-	7.4	10.3
Unutilized goods	40	113	108	236	309	1127	14.3	17.6	18.4	14.7	14.0	4.1	9.1
Total Merch. Exports (fob)	286	1241	2378	3150	3977	9116	13.8	24.2	16.3	14.7	100.0	100.0	100.0
Average 1977 = 100													
Export Price Index	22	40	93	111	131	143							
Import Price Index	49	97	117	132	218	308							
Terms of Trade Index	45	40	81	73	89	81							
Exports Volume Index	34	100	134	119	264	210							
VALUE ADDED BY SECTOR													
Annual Rate of 1977 Prices and Exchange Rates													
As Percent of Total													
Agriculture	1277	1319	1360	1731	2102	2301	4.0	1.5	0.1	0.2	35.9	27.0	22.0
Industry and Mining	491	928	1408	1416	2007	2515	6.7	10.8	0.4	0.6	17.1	21.0	21.0
Services	1204	2322	2121	2422	3066	3211	6.3	9.2	2.2	2.8	47.2	52.4	57.0
Total	2964	3569	4781	5569	7333	8311	6.3	6.7	4.8	3.1	100.0	100.0	100.0
PUBLIC FINANCE													
Annual Rate of 1977 Prices and Exchange Rates													
As Percent of GDP													
Current Receipts	372	926	1244	1750	1950	1850	4.9	10.3	3.2	3.8	20.0	18.1	16.2
Current Expenditures	418	749	722	1290	1120	1220	6.3	7.6	2.8	3.3	34.0	17.9	12.0
Budgetary Savings	154	177	522	460	830	630	0.2	22.0	3.8	4.8	5.4	4.1	4.2
Other Public Sector	15	581	1273	1280	1450	1700	64.1	29.0	1.0	3.2	0.3	19.3	15.2
Public Sector Investment	139	736	1356	1580	1830	2280	18.2	28.3	2.3	3.3	4.8	22.4	19.4
CURRENT EXPENDITURE DETAILS													
As % of Total Current Exp.													
Education	19.2	12.2	12.7	11.7	28.3	29.6							
Other Social Services	17.9	32.8	31.0	11.0	11.3	11.9							
Agriculture	10.4	16.1	11.0	11.0	2.5	2.6							
Other Economic Services	4.6	3.2	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.6							
Administration and Defense	16.3	23.5	25.6	23.8	23.8	23.8							
Other	37.0	22.0	22.2	22.0	21.3	21.3							
Total Current Expenditures	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0							
SELECTED INDICATORS													
(Calculated from 3-year averaged data)													
Average GDP	1961	1970	1971	1980									
Import Elasticity	1.4	1.6	1.7	1.7									
Marginal Domestic Savings Rate	0.8	1.4	1.7	1.3									
Marginal National Savings Rate	0.12	0.22	0.34	-0.90									
LABOR FORCE AND OUTPUT PER WORKER													
Total Labor Force													
in millions													
	1961	1971	1972	1973	1981	1982	Value Added Per Worker (1977 Prices & Exchange Rates)		in U.S. Dollars		Percent of average 1961-77		
Agriculture	1943	2083	2117	2152	2187	2222	1961	1971	1981	1971	1971	1971	
Industry	143	236	236	236	236	236	200	215	236	236	236	236	
Services	127	72	72	72	72	72	1210	1173	1210	1173	1173	1173	
Total	2013	2378	2378	2378	2378	2378	200	215	236	236	236	236	
Growth Rate													
Agriculture													
Industry													
Services													
Total													

- not available - nil or negligible

IVORY COAST: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DATA

(\$ million)

	Actual				Estimated 1978	Projected					Average Annual Growth Rate 1976- 1985
	1976	1977	1978	1979		1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	
SUMMARY BALANCE OF PAYMENTS											
Exports (incl. GPE)	1420	1400	1333	1360	1388	1322	1360	1437	1229	1353	1411
Imports (incl. GPE)	1200	1211	1222	1212	1201	1248	1283	1302	1169	1211	1219
Resource Balance (X-M)	222	-111	-89	148	187	-126	-123	-65	60	142	192
Interest	-30	-36	-44	-106	-101	-159	-186	-129	-200	-123	-113
Direct Investment Income	-53	-83	-60	-36	-80	-80	-83	-87	-80	-86	-121
Workers' Remittances	-120	-162	-170	-237	-230	-270	-309	-243	-272	-201	-282
Current Transfers (net)	47	27	40	-31	33	39	63	30	53	19	70
Balance on Current Accounts	-51	-200	-220	-230	-178	-212	-212	-150	-100	-118	-120
Private Direct Investments	33	81	37	3	20	20	22	20	27	20	83
Official Capital Grants	15	19	17	20	21	22	23	23	27	29	33
Public M&T Loans											
Disbursements	218	280	351	684	906	1087	1477	1495	1618	1821	2038
Repayments	-81	-72	-102	-183	-221	-258	-321	-323	-392	-400	-421
Net Disbursements	137	208	249	723	775	929	1156	1172	1226	1421	1617
Other M&T Loans											
Disbursements
Repayments
Net Disbursements
Capital Transactions a.e.i.	70	51	-3	-276	71	..	0	0	0	0	0
Change in Net Reserves	-41	93	-30	-62	-122
DEBT AND LOAN COMMITMENTS											
Official Grants and Grant-like	19	17	20
Public M&T Loans											
IBRD	28	136	60	80	61
IDB	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
Other Multilateral	36	0	20	40	30
Government	47	31	121	283	40
Suppliers	89	189	149	237	90
Financial Institutions	131	87	400	831	60
Banks	0	0	0	0	0
Public Loan a.e.i.	0	0	0	0	0
Total Public M&T Loans	129	257	230	434	207
REVENUE DEBT											
World Bank	175
IDB	0
Other Multilateral	173
Government	637
Suppliers	610
Financial Institutions	1393
Banks	20
Public Debt, a.e.i.
Total Public M&T Debt	2218
Other M&T Debt
Short-term Debt (diag. only)

.. not available
 .. not available
 - nil or negligible

IBRD.

E. NIGER: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DATA

LAND AREA (THOUSAND SQ. KM.) TOTAL 126.0 AGRICULTURAL 180.0	NIGER			REFERENCE GROUPS (WEIGHTED AVERAGES - MOST RECENT ESTIMATE) ^{1,2}	
	1960	1970	MOST RECENT ESTIMATE	LOW INCOME AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA	MIDDLE INCOME AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA
	^a	^b	^c		
GNP PER CAPITA (US\$)	110.0	140.0	270.0	260.0	869.0
ENERGY CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA (KILOGRAMS OF COAL EQUIVALENT)	5.0	25.0	38.0	80.0	699.4
POPULATION AND VITAL STATISTICS					
POPULATION, MID-YEAR (MILLIONS)	2.9	4.0	5.0	.	.
URBAN POPULATION (PERCENT OF TOTAL)	5.8	8.4	11.6	17.3	28.9
POPULATION PROJECTIONS					
POPULATION IN YEAR 2000 (MILLIONS)			9.0	.	.
STATIONARY POPULATION (MILLIONS)			24.0	.	.
YEAR STATIONARY POPULATION IS REACHED			2170	.	.
POPULATION DENSITY					
PER SQ. KM.	2.0	3.0	4.0	27.4	61.7
PER SQ. KM. AGRICULTURAL LAND	18.0	22.0	28.0	82.6	126.0
POPULATION AGE STRUCTURE (PERCENT)					
0-14 YRS.	44.7	45.0	46.6	44.9	45.5
15-64 YRS.	53.0	52.7	50.9	52.2	51.6
65 YRS. AND ABOVE	2.3	2.3	2.5	2.8	2.8
POPULATION GROWTH RATE (PERCENT)					
TOTAL	2.3	3.3	2.8	2.7	2.7
URBAN	4.5	7.0	7.1	6.8	4.9
CRUDE BIRTH RATE (PER THOUSAND)					
	52.0	51.0	51.0	47.4	46.8
CRUDE DEATH RATE (PER THOUSAND)					
	27.0	24.0	22.0	19.6	18.4
GROSS REPRODUCTION RATE					
	3.1	3.5	3.5	3.2	3.2
FAMILY PLANNING					
ACCEPTORS, ANNUAL (THOUSANDS)
USERS (PERCENT OF MARRIED WOMEN)
FOOD AND NUTRITION					
INDEX OF FOOD PRODUCTION					
PER CAPITA (1969=71=100)	112.0	96.0	88.0	91.8	94.0
PER CAPITA SUPPLY OF CALORIES (PERCENT OF REQUIREMENTS)					
	90.0	89.0	91.0	90.2	92.7
PROTEINS (GRAMS PER DAY)					
	59.0	57.0	64.0	53.0	53.0
OF WHICH ANIMAL AND PULSE					
	18.0	19.0	27.0	18.4	15.6
CHILD (AGES 1-4) MORTALITY RATE					
	41.0	35.0	32.0	27.7	21.3
HEALTH					
LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (YEARS)					
	37.0	41.0	42.0	45.3	50.1
INFANT MORTALITY RATE (PER THOUSAND)					
	212.0
ACCESS TO SAFE WATER (PERCENT OF POPULATION)					
TOTAL	..	20.0	27.0	23.2	31.0
URBAN	..	37.0	38.0	58.0	66.8
RURAL	..	19.0	26.0	16.8	..
ACCESS TO EXCRETA DISPOSAL (PERCENT OF POPULATION)					
TOTAL	..	1.0	7.0	28.9	..
URBAN	..	10.0	36.0	67.0	..
RURAL	3.0
POPULATION PER PHYSICIAN					
	7408.0/ ^e	57928.0	42605.0	30910.4	14508.2
POPULATION PER NURSING PERSON					
	8431.0/ ^e	7040.0	5162.0	5793.2	3279.5
POPULATION PER HOSPITAL BED					
TOTAL	1934.0	1936.0	1194.0	1198.9	1141.5
URBAN	173.0
RURAL	389.0
ADMISSIONS PER HOSPITAL BED					
	10.4/ ^d	34.7/ ^e
HOUSING					
AVERAGE SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD					
TOTAL
URBAN
RURAL
AVERAGE NUMBER OF PERSONS PER ROOM					
TOTAL
URBAN
RURAL
ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY (PERCENT OF DWELLINGS)					
TOTAL
URBAN	A	..
RURAL

NIGER: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DATA

	NIGER			REFERENCE COUNTRIES (WIGHTED AVERAGE - MOST RECENT ESTIMATE) ^{1/2}	
	1960 ^{1/3}	1970 ^{1/3}	MOST RECENT ESTIMATE ^{1/3}	LOW INCOME AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA	MIDDLE INCOME AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA
EDUCATION					
ADJ.-TIC ENROLLMENT RATIOS					
PRIMARY:					
TOTAL	5.0	14.0	17.0	57.7	61.7
MALE	7.0	18.0	N/A	74.2	84.2
FEMALE	3.0	9.0	N/A	34.1	51.4
SECONDARY:					
TOTAL	0.3	1.0	2.0	16.0	20.6
MALE	0.5	2.0	N/A	13.7	29.2
FEMALE	0.1	1.0	N/A	7.1	14.7
VOCATIONAL EMPOL. (% OF SECONDARY)	4.0	3.0	7.0	6.8	7.0
PUPIL-TEACHER RATIO					
PRIMARY	43.0 ^{1/4}	39.0	41.0	45.0	38.6
SECONDARY	17.0	20.0	21.0	25.2	24.5
ADULT LITERACY RATE (PERCENT)					
	1.4	..	8.0	25.5	..
CONSUMPTION					
PASSENGER CARS PER THOUSAND POPULATION					
	0.3	1.0	2.1	3.6	38.8
RADIO RECEIVERS PER THOUSAND POPULATION					
	3.0	36.0	..	31.5	83.5
TV RECEIVERS PER THOUSAND POPULATION					
	0.1	1.8	..
NEWSPAPER ("DAILY GENERAL INTEREST") CIRCULATION PER THOUSAND POPULATION					
	0.3	0.3	0.3	4.6	24.2
CINEMA ANNUAL ATTENDANCE PER CAPITA					
	..	0.2	0.7
LABOR FORCE					
TOTAL LABOR FORCE (THOUSANDS)					
	945.9	1272.6	1569.1
FEMALE (PERCENT)					
	9.3	9.9	10.0	33.5	39.1
AGRICULTURE (PERCENT)					
	95.2	92.3	91.0	80.7	50.3
INDUSTRY (PERCENT)					
	1.4	2.2	3.0	8.1	17.8
PARTICIPATION RATE (PERCENT)					
TOTAL	32.2	31.9	31.5	42.2	34.8
MALE	58.3	58.3	57.5	55.1	48.4
FEMALE	5.9	6.2	6.3	29.3	20.6
ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY RATIO					
	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.2	1.3
INCOME DISTRIBUTION					
PERCENT OF PRIVATE INCOME RECEIVED BY					
HIGHEST 5 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS	23.0
HIGHEST 20 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS	42.0
LOWEST 20 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS	6.0
LOWEST 40 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS	18.0
POVERTY TARGET GROUPS					
ESTIMATED ABSOLUTE POVERTY INCOME LEVEL (US\$ PER CAPITA)					
URBAN	133.0	138.2	..
RURAL	63.0	86.1	..
ESTIMATED RELATIVE POVERTY INCOME LEVEL (US\$ PER CAPITA)					
URBAN	133.0	107.0	..
RURAL	53.0	65.0	..
ESTIMATED POPULATION BELOW ABSOLUTE POVERTY INCOME LEVEL (PERCENT)					
URBAN
RURAL	35.0	66.9	..

.. Not available
 . Not applicable.

NOTES

^{1/2} The group averages for each indicator are population-weighted arithmetic means. Coverage of countries among the indicators depends on availability of data and is not uniform.

^{1/3} Unless otherwise noted, data for 1960 refer to any year between 1959 and 1961; for 1970, between 1969 and 1971; and for Most Recent Estimate, between 1974 and 1978.

^{1/4} 1962; ^{1/5} 1964; ^{1/6} 1966.

Most recent estimate of GNP per capita is for 1975, all other data are as of April, 1980.

October, 1980

NIGER: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DATA

GNP PER CAPITA IN 1979: US\$250

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IN 1979 **

ACTUAL RATE OF GROWTH (% CONSTANT 1972 PRICES)

	<u>US\$ Million</u>	<u>£</u>	<u>1972 - 79</u>
GNP at Market Prices	1,450	100.0	
Gross Domestic Investment	424	29.2	4.2
Gross National Savings	220	15.2	..
Current Account Balance	227	15.7	..
Exports of Goods, NFS	423	29.2	7.6
Imports of Goods, NFS	578	29.8	9.8

OUTPUT, LABOR FORCE AND PRODUCTIVITY IN 1979

	<u>Value Added (Factor Costs)</u>	
	<u>US\$ million</u>	<u>%</u>
Agriculture	495	32.4
Mining 1/	297	19.4
Industry	269	17.6
Services 2/	468	30.6
TOTAL	1,529	100.0

GOVERNMENT FINANCE

	<u>General Government</u>		<u>% of GDP</u>	
	<u>(CFAP billion)</u>		<u>1975</u> <u>1978</u>	
	<u>1974/75</u>	<u>1977/78</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1978</u>
Current Revenues	22.4	56.0	13.4	18.2
of which uranium revenue	(2.5)	(24.6)	(1.5)	(8.0)
Current Expenditures	17.5	38.7	10.5	12.5
Current Balance	4.9	17.3	2.9	5.6
Capital Expenditure	1.9	17.6	1.1	5.7
External Assistance
Overall Balance	+3.0	-0.3	1.8	-0.1

MONEY, CREDIT AND PRICES

	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>
	<u>(CFAP billion at end of year)</u>								
Money and Quasi Money	12.1	12.9	15.5	20.3	22.3	29.2	37.6	54.2	66.9
Bank credit to Public Sector	-2.3	-3.5	-3.4	-7.2	-11.5	-12.3	-16.4	-21.9	-16.4
Bank credit to Private Sector	9.7	10.7	12.5	21.0	28.5	21.6	32.7	34.2	74.5
	<u>PERCENTAGES OR INDEX NUMBERS</u>								
General Price Index (1970=100)	104.2	114.4	127.8	132.1	144.1	178.2	219.2	241.6	259.2
Annual percentage changes in:									
General Price Index	..	9.8	11.7	3.4	9.1	23.6	23.0	10.2	7.3
Bank credit to Public Sector
Bank credit to Private Sector	..	10.3	16.8	68.0	35.7	0.4	14.3	65.7	37.5

- ** Staff estimates.
 .. Not available.
 . Not applicable.
 1/ Mostly uranium mining
 2/ Including Government and duties and taxes on imports.

April 2, 1981

NIGER: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DATA

TRADE PAYMENTS AND CAPITAL FLOWS
(in millions of current US\$)

<u>BALANCE OF PAYMENTS</u>	1975 *	1979 *	<u>MERCHANDISE EXPORTS</u> ^{2/} : (Annual Average: 1975-79)	USS Million	%
Imports of Goods, NFS	167.8	571.0	Livestock	38.7	15.1
Imports of Goods, NFS	226.5	697.9	Uranium	177.1	69.2
Resource Gap (deficit = -)	-58.7	-126.9	Groundnuts	.6	.2
Interest Payments (net)	-10.7	-18.7	All other	39.5	15.5
Workers' Remittances	-18.7	-31.3	TOTAL	255.9	100.0
Other Factor Payments (net)	3.0	.			
Net Transfers	77.1	87.6			
Balance on Current Accounts	8.0	-89.3			
Direct Foreign Investment (net)	15.8	48.7	<u>EXTERNAL DEBT, DECEMBER 31, 1979</u>		
Net MLT Borrowings	17.0	38.3	Public Debt, including guaranteed		
Disbursements	(18.8)	(.)	Non-Guaranteed Private Debt		
Repayment	(1.8)	(.)	Total outstanding and		
Other items ^{1/}	-19.8	.	disbursed		593.2
Change in Reserves (end year)	5.0	-2.3			
Foreign Reserves (end year)	51.4	85.3	<u>DEBT SERVICE RATIO FOR 1979</u>		
Fuel and Related Materials			Public Debt, including guaranteed		
% of imports	12.8	11.0	Non-Guaranteed Private Debt		
			Total outstanding and		
			disbursed		3.4%
<u>RATE OF EXCHANGE</u>			<u>IBRD/IDA LENDING, December 31, 1979</u>		
1971: US\$1.00 = CFAF 277.03			Outstanding and disbursed	48.1	
1972: US\$1.00 = CFAF 252.21			Undisbursed	53.4	
1973: US\$1.00 = CFAF 222.70			Outstanding including undisbursed	101.5	
1974: US\$1.00 = CFAF 240.50					
1975: US\$1.00 = CFAF 214.32					
1976: US\$1.00 = CFAF 245.00					
1977: US\$1.00 = CFAF 245.00					
1978: US\$1.00 = CFAF 220.00					
1979: US\$1.00 = CFAF 212.72					

^{1/} Including errors and commissions.
^{2/} Recorded exports only.

* staff estimates.
. not applicable.
.. not available.

April 2, 1981

IBRD.

F. TOGO: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DATA

LAST YEAR (THOUSAND SQ. KM.)	TOGO			REFERENCE GROUPS (WEIGHTED AVERAGE - MOST RECENT ESTIMATE)	
	TOTAL	MOST RECENT		LOW INCOME AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA	MIDDLE INCOME AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA
		1960	1970		
AGRICULTURAL	26.0				
GNP PER CAPITA (US\$)	80.0	160.0	340.0	260.0	866.0
ENERGY CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA (KILOGRAMS OF COAL EQUIVALENT)	23.0	67.0	96.0	80.0	689.4
POPULATION AND VITAL STATISTICS					
POPULATION, MID-YEAR (MILLIONS)	1.5	2.0	2.4	.	.
URBAN POPULATION (PERCENT OF TOTAL)	9.8	13.1	16.5	17.3	24.0
POPULATION PROJECTIONS					
POPULATION IN YEAR 2000 (MILLIONS)			4.0	.	.
STATIONARY POPULATION (MILLIONS)			12.0	.	.
YEAR STATIONARY POPULATION IS REACHED			2135	.	.
POPULATION DENSITY					
PER SQ. KM.	27.0	36.0	43.0	27.4	61.7
PER SQ. KM. AGRICULTURAL LAND	64.0	83.0	96.0	82.6	126.0
POPULATION AGE STRUCTURE (PERCENT)					
0-14 YRS.	46.4	43.0	46.0	44.9	43.5
15-64 YRS.	53.0	52.4	51.3	52.2	55.6
65 YRS. AND ABOVE	2.6	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.8
POPULATION GROWTH RATE (PERCENT)					
TOTAL	2.2	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7
URBAN	5.5	5.6	5.7	6.8	6.9
CRUDE BIRTH RATE (PER THOUSAND)	31.0	49.0	52.0	57.4	64.8
CRUDE DEATH RATE (PER THOUSAND)	27.0	22.0	19.0	19.6	16.6
GROSS REPRODUCTION RATE	3.5	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.2
FAMILY PLANNING					
ACCEPTORS, ANNUAL (THOUSANDS)
USERS (PERCENT OF MARRIED WOMEN)
FOOD AND NUTRITION					
INDEX OF FOOD PRODUCTION PER CAPITA (1969=71=100)	99.0	101.0	83.0	91.8	94.0
PER CAPITA SUPPLY OF CALORIES (PERCENT OF REQUIREMENTS)	93.0	95.0	90.0	90.2	97.7
PROTEINS (GRAMS PER DAY)	44.0	46.0	48.0	33.0	53.0
OF WHICH ANIMAL AND PULSE	11.0	12.0	13.0	18.4	14.6
CHILD (AGES 1-4) MORTALITY RATE	41.0	32.0	27.0	27.7	21.3
HEALTH					
LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (YEARS)	37.0	42.0	46.0	45.3	50.1
INFANT MORTALITY RATE (PER THOUSAND)	177.0
ACCESS TO SAFE WATER (PERCENT OF POPULATION)					
TOTAL	..	17.0	16.0	23.2	31.0
URBAN	49.0	58.0	66.8
RURAL	..	3.0	10.0	16.8	..
ACCESS TO EXCRETA DISPOSAL (PERCENT OF POPULATION)					
TOTAL	..	1.0	13.0	28.9	..
URBAN	..	4.0	36.0	67.0	..
RURAL	..	1.0	12.0
POPULATION PER PHYSICIAN	35130.0/€	27940.0	18360.0	30910.4	14576.7
POPULATION PER NURSING PERSON	5341.0/€	4170.0	2040.0	5793.2	3274.5
POPULATION PER HOSPITAL BED					
TOTAL	598.0/€	651.0/€	705.0	1198.9	1141.5
URBAN	111.0/€	125.0/€
RURAL	1166.0/€	1781.0/€
ADMISSIONS PER HOSPITAL BED	..	24.3
HOUSING					
AVERAGE SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD					
TOTAL
URBAN
RURAL	5.8
AVERAGE NUMBER OF PERSONS PER ROOM					
TOTAL	..	3.8
URBAN
RURAL
ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY (PERCENT OF DWELLINGS)					
TOTAL
URBAN
RURAL

TOGO: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DATA

	TOGO			REFERENCE GROUPS (WEIGHTED AVERAGES - MOST RECENT ESTIMATE) ^a		
	1960 ^b	MOST RECENT 1970 ^b ESTIMATE ^c		LOW INCOME	MIDDLE INCOME	
				AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA	AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA	
EDUCATION						
ADJUSTED ENROLLMENT RATIOS						
PRIMARY:	TOTAL	44.0	72.0	104.0	57.7	61.7
	MALE	63.0	100.0	135.0	74.2	69.2
	FEMALE	24.0	44.0	78.0	54.1	51.4
SECONDARY:	TOTAL	2.0	1.0	27.0	10.0	20.6
	MALE	4.0	11.0	41.0	13.7	29.2
	FEMALE	1.0	3.0	12.0	7.1	14.7
VOCATIONAL ENROL. (% OF SECONDARY)		10.0/19	10.0	8.0	6.8	7.0
PUPIL-TEACHER RATIO						
PRIMARY		63.0	58.0	61.0	45.0	36.6
SECONDARY		..	25.0	38.0	23.2	24.3
ADULT LITERACY RATE (PERCENT)						
		10.0/15	12.0	18.0	23.3	..
CONSUMPTION						
PASSENGER CARS PER THOUSAND POPULATION						
		0.3	4.0	6.0	3.6	38.8
RADIO RECEIVERS PER THOUSAND POPULATION						
		4.0	23.0	23.0	31.5	63.5
TV RECEIVERS PER THOUSAND POPULATION						
		0.7	1.8	..
NEWSPAPER ("DAILY GENERAL INTEREST") CIRCULATION PER THOUSAND POPULATION						
		2.0	7.0	3.2	4.6	24.2
CINEMA ANNUAL ATTENDANCE PER CAPITA						
		0.2	..	1.0	..	0.7
LABOR FORCE						
TOTAL LABOR FORCE (THOUSANDS)						
		689.0	870.2	1016.5
FEMALE (PERCENT)						
		40.2	42.1	41.0	33.3	38.1
AGRICULTURE (PERCENT)						
		79.3	73.3	69.0	80.7	56.3
INDUSTRY (PERCENT)						
		8.1	10.9	14.0	8.1	17.8
PARTICIPATION RATE (PERCENT)						
TOTAL		45.4	43.8	42.4	42.2	38.8
MALE		36.1	32.2	30.9	33.1	48.4
FEMALE		35.4	35.9	34.3	29.3	29.4
ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY RATIO						
		1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3
INCOME DISTRIBUTION						
PERCENT OF PRIVATE INCOME RECEIVED BY						
	HIGHEST 5 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS
	HIGHEST 20 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS
	LOWEST 20 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS
	LOWEST 40 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS
POVERTY TARGET GROUPS						
ESTIMATED ABSOLUTE POVERTY INCOME LEVEL (US\$ PER CAPITA)						
	URBAN	243.0	138.2	..
	RURAL	118.0	86.1	..
ESTIMATED RELATIVE POVERTY INCOME LEVEL (US\$ PER CAPITA)						
	URBAN	121.0	107.0	..
	RURAL	121.0	63.0	..
ESTIMATED POPULATION BELOW ABSOLUTE POVERTY INCOME LEVEL (PERCENT)						
	URBAN	42.0
	RURAL	66.9	..

.. Not available
 . Not applicable.

NOTES

^a The group averages for each indicator are population-weighted arithmetic means. Coverage of countries among the indicators depends on availability of data and is not uniform.

^b Unless otherwise noted, data for 1960 refer to any year between 1959 and 1961; for 1970, between 1969 and 1971; and for Most Recent Estimate, between 1974 and 1978.

^c 1962; ^d Government hospital establishments; ^e Including teacher training.

Most recent estimate of GNP per capita is for 1979, all other data are as of April, 1980.

TOGO: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DATA

GRGSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IN 1980

	US\$ million	%	Annual rate of growth (% current prices)	
			1975-80	1977-80
GNP at market prices	1,052.8	99.1	11.3	
GDP at market prices	1,062.4	100.0	11.4	
Gross domestic investments	272.8	25.7	9.9	
Gross domestic savings	141.9	13.3	17.5	
Current account balance	-172.3	-16.2	-	
Exports (G + NFS)	384.3	36.2	22.2	
Imports (G + NFS)	536.2	50.5	17.1	

CENTRE, LABOR FORCE AND PRODUCTIVITY IN 1980

	Value added		Labor force		Value added per worker	
	US\$ million	%	Thousand	%	US\$	%
Agriculture	249.5	23.0	750	79.0	332.7	33.0
Industry, construction and public works	195.2	20.4	24	3.0	8,132.3	508.0
Government	107.1	11.2	39	4.1	2,745.1	172.9
Commerce and transport	322.5	33.7	67	7.0	4,817.9	278.9
Other services	81.4	8.7	70	6.9	1,162.8	115.6
GDP at factor costs	956.2	100.0	950	100.0	1,006.0	100.0

GOVERNMENT FINANCE

	CFA billion		% of GDP	
	1975	1980	1975	1980
Revenue	32.9	62.0	24.9	27.8
Tax receipts	31.4	52.0	23.7	23.3
Other	1.5	10.0	1.2	4.5
Expenditures	35.0	68.0	26.4	30.5
Current budget	22.6	55.6	17.0	24.9
Investment budget	9.0	17.0	6.8	7.6
Other	3.4	4.5	2.6	2.0
Special accounts	0.3	-	0.0	-
Annex budgets	0.3	1.0	0.0	0.4
Overall deficits	-2.7	-7.0	-2.0	-3.1
Memo item :				
GDP current prices	132.3	223.1	100.0	100.0

MONEY, CREDIT AND PRICES

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980 1/
	(Billion CFAF outstanding end period)							
Money and quasi money	15.9	30.5	23.2	41.2	45.1	64.9	75.2	78.5
Bank credit to public sector	-1.3	-2.5	1.4	1.2	1.9	6.2	11.2	6.4
Bank credit to private sector	13.3	16.3	24.7	32.0	44.2	51.0	57.5	59.5
	(Percentage or index number)							
Money and quasi money as % of GDP	17.5	22.6	21.3	27.8	25.2	32.5	34.5	--
Consumer price index (1975 = 100)	75.1	84.7	100.0	111.6	136.7	137.3	147.6	155.3
Annual percentage change in :								
Consumer price index	-	12.7	15.0	11.6	22.4	0.2	7.5	-
Bank credit to public sector	-	-31.5	-	-14.3	58.3	326.3	80.6	-
Bank credit to private sector	-	22.5	51.5	29.5	32.1	15.4	13.3	-

1/ As of end September 1980.

TOGO: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DATA

<u>BALANCE OF PAYMENTS</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
			(US\$ million)			
Exports (G + NFS)	141.2	158.9	195.1	257.5	250.9	334.3
Imports (G + NFS)	-242.9	-212.5	-300.4	-519.9	-524.5	-535.2
Resource gap (deficit = -)	-101.7	-53.6	-105.3	-262.4	-273.9	-191.9
Interest payments (net)	-1.9	-3.3	-5.7	-24.3	-20.0	-27.6
Workers' remittances	3.3	5.4	5.3	5.3	7.1	7.1
Other factor payments (net)	-14.0	-5.4	-13.0	-13.2	-23.2	-26.0
Net transfers	18.7	16.7	20.3	22.1	27.8	25.6
Balance on current account	-95.6	-43.2	-98.4	-277.4	-290.9	-172.3
Direct foreign investments	4.8	6.3	5.1	8.5	10.5	5.5
Net MLT borrowing	50.5	55.6	113.8	246.0	250.0	155.7
Capital grants	19.1	15.0	15.0	25.7	26.2	35.7
Other capital (net)	14.0	-16.7	-32.5	4.0	-31.4	42.5
Other items, n.e.i.	15.4	-15.0	-31.7	4.4	-31.3	15.7
Change in reserves (increase = -)	-7.0	-2.1	25.6	52.6	29.0	20.0
Net reserves (end year) ^{1/}	38.6	56.1	33.7	50.4	23.5	51.4
Petrol imports as % total imports	-	-	9.0	11.4	11.9	23.9
Petrol exports as % total exports	-	-	-	20.6	23.0	32.2

^{1/} Net foreign assets of the Central Bank

MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (average 1975-80, recorded)

	<u>US\$ million</u>	<u>£</u>
Phosphate	97.1	41.7
Cocoa beans	40.5	12.4
Coffee	23.3	10.0
All other commodities	71.9	30.9
Total	232.8	100.0

EXTERNAL DEBT, December 31, 1980

	<u>US\$ million</u>
Public debt (disbursed) incl. guaranteed	569.6
Non-guaranteed private debt	-
Total outstanding and disbursed	988.0

EXCHANGE RATES (CFAS per US\$)

<u>DEBT SERVICE RATIO FOR 1980 ^{2/}</u>	<u>£</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Period average</u>	<u>End of period</u>
Public debt, incl. guaranteed	36.3	1973	223	230
Non-guaranteed private debt	-	1974	241	222
Total outstanding and disbursed	-	1975	214	224
		1976	239	219
		1977	242	235
		1978	226	209
		1979	212	201
		1980	210	222
		1981	235	-

IBRD/IDA LENDING, February 28, 1981 (US\$ million)

	<u>IBRD ^{3/}</u>	<u>IDA</u>
Outstanding and disbursed	53.0	44.3
Undisbursed	-	40.5
Outstanding including undisbursed	53.0	84.8

^{3/} \$53.0 million of which \$3.5 million CIMA0 loan to Togo and \$49.5 million loan to CIMA0 with the guarantee of Ghana, Ivory Coast and Togo.

IBRD.

G. UPPER VOLTA: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DATA

LAND AREA (THOUSAND SQ. KM.)	UPPER VOLTA			REFERENCE GROUPS (WEIGHTED AVERAGES - MOST RECENT ESTIMATE) ^{1/2}	
	1960 ^{1/2}	1970 ^{1/2}	MOST RECENT ESTIMATE ^{1/2}	LOW INCOME AFRICA SOUTH OF SARAPA	MIDDLE INCOME AFRICA SOUTH OF SARAPA
TOTAL	274.2				
AGRICULTURAL	193.7				
GDP PER CAPITA (US\$)	70.0	100.0	180.0	260.0	868.0
ENERGY CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA (KILOGRAMS OF COAL EQUIVALENT)	5.0	13.0	23.0	80.0	698.4
POPULATION AND VITAL STATISTICS					
POPULATION, MID-YEAR (MILLIONS)	4.2	4.9	5.6	.	.
URBAN POPULATION (PERCENT OF TOTAL)	4.7	6.8	8.1	17.3	28.9
POPULATION PROJECTIONS					
POPULATION IN YEAR 2000 (MILLIONS)			9.0	.	.
STATIONARY POPULATION (MILLIONS)			24.0	.	.
YEAR STATIONARY POPULATION IS REACHED			2170	.	.
POPULATION DENSITY					
PER SQ. KM.	15.0	18.0	20.0	27.4	61.7
PER SQ. KM. AGRICULTURAL LAND	22.0	26.0	29.0	82.6	126.0
POPULATION AGE STRUCTURE (PERCENT)					
0-4 YRS.	43.2	42.8	44.4	44.9	45.4
15-64 YRS.	54.0	54.4	52.7	52.2	51.6
65 YRS. AND ABOVE	2.8	2.8	2.9	2.8	2.8
POPULATION GROWTH RATE (PERCENT)					
TOTAL	1.9	1.6/5	1.6/5	2.7	2.7
URBAN	6.3	5.3	3.9	6.8	4.9
CRUDE BIRTH RATE (PER THOUSAND)	49.0	48.0	48.0	47.4	46.8
CRUDE DEATH RATE (PER THOUSAND)	27.0	24.0	22.0	19.6	16.4
GROSS REPRODUCTION RATE	..	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2
FAMILY PLANNING					
ACCEPTORS, ANNUAL (THOUSANDS)
USERS (PERCENT OF MARRIED WOMEN)
FOOD AND NUTRITION					
INDEX OF FOOD PRODUCTION					
PER CAPITA (1969-71=100)	101.0	102.0	99.0	91.8	94.0
PER CAPITA SUPPLY OF CALORIES (PERCENT OF REQUIREMENTS)					
	86.0	84.0	79.0	90.2	92.7
PROTEINS (GRAMS PER DAY)					
	64.0	65.0	60.0	53.0	53.0
OF WHICH ANIMAL AND PULSE					
	18.0	18.0	16.0	18.4	15.6
CHILD (AGES 1-4) MORTALITY RATE	41.0	35.0	32.0	27.7	21.3
HEALTH					
LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (YEARS)	37.0	40.0	42.0	43.3	50.1
INFANT MORTALITY RATE (PER THOUSAND)	263.0
ACCESS TO SAFE WATER (PERCENT OF POPULATION)					
TOTAL	10.0	23.2	31.0
URBAN	48.0	38.0	66.8
RURAL	3.0	16.8	..
ACCESS TO EXCRETA DISPOSAL (PERCENT OF POPULATION)					
TOTAL	..	4.0	4.0	28.9	..
URBAN	..	49.0	47.0	67.0	..
RURAL
POPULATION PER PHYSICIAN					
	59849.0	84257.0	56660.0	30910.4	14508.2
POPULATION PER NURSING PERSON					
	4090.0/d	3839.0	4210.0	5793.2	3279.3
POPULATION PER HOSPITAL BED					
TOTAL	1801.0/d	1518.0	1530.0	1198.9	1141.3
URBAN	204.0/d	259.0
RURAL	1264.0/d	2350.0
ADMISSIONS PER HOSPITAL BED	31.0
HOUSING					
AVERAGE SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD					
TOTAL	7.5/e
URBAN
RURAL
AVERAGE NUMBER OF PERSONS PER ROOM					
TOTAL
URBAN
RURAL
ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY (PERCENT OF DWELLINGS)					
TOTAL
URBAN
RURAL

UPPER VOLTA: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DATA

	UPPER VOLTA			REFERENCE GROUPS (WEIGHTED AVERAGES - MOST RECENT ESTIMATES) ^a	
	1960 ^b	1970 ^b	MOST RECENT ESTIMATE ^c	LOW INCOME AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA	MIDDLE INCOME AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA
EDUCATION					
ADJUSTED ENROLLMENT RATIOS					
PRIMARY:					
TOTAL	8.0	13.0	16.0	37.7	61.7
MALE	12.0	16.0	20.0	74.2	69.2
FEMALE	5.0	9.0	12.0	56.1	51.4
SECONDARY:					
TOTAL	0.5	1.0	2.0	10.0	20.6
MALE	1.0	2.0	3.0	13.7	29.2
FEMALE	0.3	1.0	1.0	7.1	14.7
VOCATIONAL ENROL. (% OF SECONDARY)	21.0	15.0	17.0	6.8	7.0
PUPIL-TEACHER RATIO					
PRIMARY	47.0	44.0	48.0	45.0	38.6
SECONDARY	20.0	23.0	20.0	25.2	24.3
ADULT LITERACY RATE (PERCENT)	1.5 ^{ff}	5.0 ^g	..	25.5	..
CONSUMPTION					
PASSENGER CARS PER THOUSAND POPULATION					
	0.4	1.0	1.8	3.6	38.8
RADIO RECEIVERS PER THOUSAND POPULATION					
	1.0	16.0	17.0	31.5	83.5
TV RECEIVERS PER THOUSAND POPULATION					
	0.1 ^g	1.0	1.0	1.8	..
NEWSPAPER ("DAILY GENERAL INTEREST") CIRCULATION PER THOUSAND POPULATION					
	..	0.4	0.3	4.6	24.2
CINEMA ANNUAL ATTENDANCE PER CAPITA					
	..	0.2	0.7
LABOR FORCE					
TOTAL LABOR FORCE (THOUSANDS)	2379.9	2678.5	2978.0
FEMALE (PERCENT)	47.3	46.6	47.0	33.5	38.1
AGRICULTURE (PERCENT)	91.5	86.8	83.0	80.7	54.3
INDUSTRY (PERCENT)	5.4	8.5	12.0	8.1	17.8
PARTICIPATION RATE (PERCENT)					
TOTAL	37.7	55.7	54.3	42.2	38.8
MALE	60.9	59.5	58.4	55.1	45.4
FEMALE	54.5	51.9	50.2	29.5	29.4
ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY RATIO	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.2	1.3
INCOME DISTRIBUTION					
PERCENT OF PRIVATE INCOME RECEIVED BY					
HIGHEST 5 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS
HIGHEST 20 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS
LOWEST 20 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS
LOWEST 40 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS
POVERTY TARGET GROUPS					
ESTIMATED ABSOLUTE POVERTY INCOME LEVEL (US\$ PER CAPITA)					
URBAN	164.0	138.2	..
RURAL	103.0	86.1	..
ESTIMATED RELATIVE POVERTY INCOME LEVEL (US\$ PER CAPITA)					
URBAN	107.0	..
RURAL	53.0	63.0	..
ESTIMATED POPULATION BELOW ABSOLUTE POVERTY INCOME LEVEL (PERCENT)					
URBAN
RURAL	66.9	..

- .. Not available
 . Not applicable.

NOTES

- ^a The group averages for each indicator are population-weighted arithmetic means. Coverage of countries among the indicators depends on availability of data and is not uniform.
- ^b Unless otherwise noted, data for 1960 refer to any year between 1959 and 1961; for 1970, between 1969 and 1971; and for Most Recent Estimate, between 1974 and 1978.
- ^c Due to migration population growth rate is lower than rate of natural increase; ^{ff} 1963; ^g 1964; ^h 1962; ⁱ 1972.

Most recent estimate of GNP per capita is for 1979, population and related estimates have also been revised; all other data are as of April, 1980.

UPPER VOLTA: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DATA

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IN 1978

	<u>US\$ MILLION</u>	<u>%</u>
GNP at Market Prices	906.4	100.0
Gross Domestic Investment	215.5	23.8
Gross National Savings	32.3	3.6
Current Account Balance	183.2	20.2
Exports of Goods, NFS	123.6	13.6
Imports of Goods, NFS	356.8	39.4

OUTPUT AND ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION IN 1977

	<u>Value Added</u>		<u>Economically Active Population</u>	
	<u>US\$ million</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>('000)</u>	<u>%</u>
Agriculture	243.2	40.5	2472	83.0
Industry	107.4	17.9	357	12.0
Services	250.2	41.6	149	5.0
<u>Total</u>	<u>600.8</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>2972</u>	<u>100.0</u>

GOVERNMENT FINANCE

	<u>General Government</u>			
	<u>CFAF billion</u>		<u>% of GDP</u>	
	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978^x</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978^x</u>
Budget Revenues	28.6	31.2	17.0	16.7
Budget Expenditures	-26.5	-30.1	-15.8	-16.1
<u>Budget Surplus or Deficit</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>0.6</u>
<u>Net Treasury Operations</u>	<u>-6.0</u>	<u>-2.9</u>	<u>-3.6</u>	<u>-1.6</u>
Overall Balance	-3.9	-1.8	-2.4	-1.0

MONEY, CREDIT AND PRICES

	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>
	<u>(CFAF billion at end of year)</u>				
Money and Quasi Money	17.53	24.32	31.4	35.58	42.52
Bank credit to Public Sector	-9.27	-4.90	-6.95	-7.74	-3.29
Bank credit to Private Sector	15.38	21.59	32.41	45.75	54.81

PERCENTAGES OR INDEX NUMBERS

Money and Quasi Money as % of GDP	15.3	19.2	22.7	21.2	22.8
Low-income Price Index (1958 = 100)	182.4	219.2	186.9	265.8	285.9

Annual percentage changes in:

General Price Index	20.2	-14.7	42.2	7.9
Bank Credit to Public Sector	47.2	-41.8	-11.2	57.5
Bank credit to Private Sector	40.4	50.1	41.2	19.8

x/ Provisional - - - - - Not available - - - - - / not applicable
August 1980

UPPER VOLTA: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DATA

(\$ million)

TRADE PAYMENTS AND CAPITAL FLOWS

<u>BALANCE OF PAYMENTS</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977*</u>	<u>1978*</u>	<u>MERCHANDISE EXPORTS</u>	
Exports of Goods, NFS	97.1	104.9	173.6		
Imports of Goods, NFS	249.0	292.7	356.8		
Resource Gap (deficit = -)	-151.9	-187.6	-233.2	(Average of 1974 - 77)	
Workers' Remittances (net)	48.6	54.7	67.7	Livestock	14.5
Other Factor Payments (net)	1.9	-14.7	-9.1	Cotton	14.8
<u>Net Transfers</u>	<u>-1.4</u>	<u>-5.7</u>	<u>-8.6</u>	Oilseeds	12.5
Balance on Current Accounts	-102.8	-153.5	-183.2	<u>all other</u>	<u>5.0</u>
				<u>total</u>	<u>46.8</u>
					<u>100.0</u>
Direct Foreign Investment (net)	2.5	6.9	13.2	<u>EXTERNAL DEBT, DECEMBER 31 1978</u>	
Official Capital Grants	71.2	77.6	100.0	Public Debt, incl.	
Net MLT Borrowings	14.5	38.8	36.4	guaranteed	337.3
Disbursements	(15.3)	(40.0)	(38.2)	Non-guaranteed Private	
Repayment	(40.8)	(-1.2)	(-1.8)	Debt	..
Other items <u>1/</u>	10.3	20.8	-2.3	Total outstanding and	
Change in Reserves (increase-)	4.3	9.4	35.9	disbursed	190.7
Fuel and related materials				<u>DEBT SERVICE RATIO FOR 1978/ <u>2/</u></u>	
Imports, c.i.f.				Public Debt incl.	
of which: Petroleum	11.0	18.0	29.1	guaranteed	..
Exports				Non-guaranteed private	..
of which: Petroleum	-	-	-	debt	..
				Total outstanding and	
				disbursed	6.2
				<u>IBRD/IDA LENDING December 1979</u>	
				Outstanding and	
				Disbursed	65.4
				Undisbursed	43.4
				Outstanding incl.	
				undisbursed	108.8
<u>Rate of Exchange</u>					
1971: US\$1.00 = CFAF 277.03					
1972: US\$1.00 = CFAF 252.21					
1973: US\$1.00 = CFAF 222.70					
1974: US\$1.00 = CFAF 240.50					
1975: US\$1.00 = CFAF 214.32					
1976: US\$1.00 = CFAF 245.00					
1977: US\$1.00 = CFAF 245.00					
1978: US\$1.00 = CFAF 220.00					

1/ Including errors and omissions - 2/ ratio of Debt Service to Exports of Goods and non-factor services.
 * preliminary - .. not available
 . not applicable.

August 1980

IBRD.

H. PRODUCTION OF SELECTED AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES, BY COUNTRY, AVERAGE 1969-71, 1973-75, ANNUAL 1976-80

(1,000 METRIC TONS)

COUNTRY AND YEAR 1/	WHEAT	CORN	SORGHUM AND MILLET	RICE PADDY	CASSAVA	OTHER ROOT CROPS 2/	CITRUS	BANANAS AND PLANTAINS	SUGAR RAM	PEANUTS IN SHELL	COTTON-SEED	TOBACCO	COFFEE	COCOA BEANS	COTTON
BENIN															
AVERAGE:															
1969-71.....	--	281	57	4	513	573	--	--	--	58	24	1	1	--	12
1973-75.....	--	278	85	9	513	586	--	--	--	48	24	1	1	--	11
1976.....	--	182	76	18	674	679	--	--	--	61	14	1	1	--	8
1977.....	--	242	81	15	625	598	--	--	--	67	11	1	1	--	6
1978.....	--	303	65	4	721	693	--	--	--	69	17	1	1	--	7
1979.....	--	380	61	9	751	682	--	--	--	70	16	1	1	--	8
1980.....	--	318	65	10	758	787	--	--	--	79	16	1	1	--	8
IVORY COAST															
AVERAGE:															
1969-71.....	--	257	45	335	544	1,746	--	832	--	39	24	1	211	193	14
1973-75.....	--	245	56	405	799	2,085	--	1,056	4	46	44	1	211	227	24
1976.....	--	247	72	426	1,208	2,254	--	1,265	32	49	50	2	292	252	25
1977.....	--	258	73	477	977	2,130	--	1,221	31	49	44	2	196	303	38
1978.....	--	264	77	508	1,056	2,231	--	1,320	32	58	67	2	277	314	41
1979.....	--	275	74	554	1,112	2,315	--	1,346	52	52	68	1	245	378	46
1980.....	--	284	79	558	1,150	2,412	--	1,500	103	69	83	2	250	365	50
NIGER															
AVERAGE:															
1969-71.....	--	2	1,237	34	143	--	--	--	--	257	7	--	--	--	3
1973-75.....	--	4	897	35	178	--	--	--	--	82	5	--	--	--	2
1976.....	--	12	1,305	29	197	--	--	--	--	79	4	--	--	--	2
1977.....	--	6	1,672	27	188	--	--	--	--	83	4	--	--	--	2
1978.....	--	9	1,407	33	205	--	--	--	--	74	4	--	--	--	2
1979.....	--	8	1,592	28	218	--	--	--	--	70	2	--	--	--	1
1980.....	--	8	1,750	28	215	--	--	--	--	68	3	--	--	--	2

PRODUCTION OF SELECTED AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES, BY COUNTRY, AVERAGE 1969-71, 1973-75, ANNUAL 1976-80

COUNTRY AND YEAR 1/	WHEAT	CORN	SORGHUM AND MILLET	RICE PADDY	CASSAVA	OTHER ROOT CROPS 2/	CITRUS	BANANAS AND PLANTAINS	SUGAR RAW	PEANUTS IN SHELL	COTTON- SEED	TO- CO	COF- EEI	COCOA BEANS	COTTON
TOGO															
AVERAGE:															
1969-71.....	--	102	138	19	438	456	--	--	--	18	5	--	12	27	3
1973-75.....	--	114	158	13	448	438	--	--	--	20	6	--	11	16	3
1976.....	--	95	113	15	392	428	--	--	--	23	5	--	11	14	2
1977.....	--	123	187	16	319	403	--	--	--	27	3	--	5	16	2
1978.....	--	139	115	17	371	507	--	--	--	15	9	--	7	14	4
1979.....	--	158	136	11	443	476	--	--	--	38	18	--	9	14	5
1980.....	--	140	110	26	458	518	--	--	--	35	18	--	10	14	5
UPPER VOLTA															
AVERAGE:															
1969-71.....	--	63	842	37	38	62	--	--	--	68	25	--	--	--	13
1973-75.....	--	68	977	37	28	61	--	--	--	73	20	--	--	--	18
1976.....	--	68	1,087	41	35	67	--	--	--	87	34	--	--	--	17
1977.....	--	97	940	23	40	63	--	--	--	85	37	--	--	--	18
1978.....	--	128	1,015	28	40	69	--	--	--	78	25	--	--	--	13
1979.....	--	80	1,038	23	35	67	--	--	--	78	27	--	--	--	13
1980.....	--	80	1,000	27	35	68	--	--	--	78	27	--	--	--	13

PRODUCTION OF SELECTED AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES, BY COUNTRY, AVERAGE 1969-71, 1973-75, ANNUAL 1976-80--CON.

COUNTRY AND YEAR 1/	WHEAT	CORN	BORGHUM AND MILLET	RICE, PADDY	CASSAVA	OTHER ROOT CROPS	CITRUS	BANANAS AND PLAINAINS	SUGAR, RAW	PEANUTS IN SHELL	COTTON-- SEED	TO-- CO	COP-- FEE	COCOA BEANS	COTTON
TOTAL/ AVERAGE:(West Africa)															
1969-71.....	3	3,249	11,000	2,335	27,166	25,179	211	7,419	85	2,818	319	23	447	1,041	160
1973-75.....	2	3,565	10,251	2,680	26,077	25,854	263	7,664	155	2,317	334	27	462	956	170
1976.....	2	3,635	11,461	2,953	32,561	26,749	269	7,783	170	2,611	408	21	499	838	225
1977.....	3	3,828	11,307	2,934	33,235	26,502	267	7,675	182	2,463	338	18	335	918	177
1978.....	4	4,163	12,267	3,180	31,032	27,043	280	7,829	192	2,510	378	18	403	860	196
1979.....	5	4,168	11,694	3,241	33,599	27,278	285	7,938	215	2,049	363	22	463	987	194
1980.....	6	4,243	12,052	3,401	34,131	27,445	285	7,937	276	2,012	351	22	466	976	217
TOTAL/ AVERAGE:(Africa)															
1969-71.....	8,023	20,108	10,530	7,222	37,209	29,268	3,033	11,564	2,482	4,307	2,321	180	1,120	1,041	1,243
1973-75.....	8,784	23,270	17,575	7,282	39,946	32,402	3,321	12,230	2,834	4,147	2,132	212	1,157	957	1,135
1976.....	10,202	23,897	10,628	7,647	44,062	33,952	3,211	13,060	3,191	4,504	1,783	252	1,114	838	974
1977.....	7,463	29,954	10,719	7,552	45,356	33,040	3,300	12,950	3,293	4,403	1,700	241	1,037	918	961
1978.....	8,507	26,957	20,320	7,854	44,518	34,053	3,451	13,171	3,458	4,722	2,008	248	1,048	860	1,099
1979.....	8,978	23,273	18,517	8,263	46,598	34,723	3,768	13,291	3,556	3,941	1,923	305	1,050	991	1,079
1980.....	8,423	26,024	19,206	8,511	47,391	35,174	3,746	13,376	3,308	4,029	2,034	296	1,054	976	1,163

1/ Data for 1980 are preliminary.

2/ Other root crops may include yams, cocoyams, sweetpotatoes, and white potatoes.

Source: USDA, Economics and Statistics Service, Agricultural Situation: Africa and the Middle East, August 1981.

REDSO/WA:PADS:HSmith:9/15/81

I. INDICES OF FOOD PRODUCTION,
TOTAL AND PER CAPITA, BY COUNTRY, 1976-80

(1969-71 = 100)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Total</u>					<u>Per capita</u>				
	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
Benin	111	115	130	128	132	94	95	103	99	100
Ivory Coast	147	148	158	170	179	118	115	119	124	127
Niger	112	116	121	125	136	95	96	97	98	103
Togo	88	84	98	105	103	75	70	79	82	79
Upper Volta	<u>110</u>	<u>104</u>	<u>109</u>	<u>104</u>	<u>104</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>89</u>	<u>91</u>	<u>85</u>	<u>83</u>
Total Africa	111	110	113	113	115	94	90	90	88	87

Source: USDA, Economics and Statistics Service, Agricultural Situation:
Africa and the Middle East, August 1981

J. INDICES OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, TOTAL
AND PER CAPITA, BY COUNTRY, 1976-80

(1969-71 = 100)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Total</u>					<u>Per Capita</u>				
	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
Benin	109	112	126	124	129	92	92	100	97	98
Ivory Coast	138	124	146	151	159	111	97	110	110	113
Niger	111	115	120	124	135	94	95	96	97	103
Togo	88	82	97	104	103	75	68	78	82	79
Upper Volta	<u>111</u>	<u>106</u>	<u>109</u>	<u>104</u>	<u>104</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>91</u>	<u>85</u>	<u>83</u>
Total Africa	109	108	111	112	114	92	88	89	87	86

Source: USDA, Economics and Statistics Service, Agricultural Situation:
Africa and the Middle East, August 1981.

K. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT CELL ^{1/}


<u>Year</u>	<u>CFA (million)</u>	<u>US\$</u>
1977	37	164,000
1978	50	222,000
1979	57	253,000
1980	62	275,000
1981	75	333,000

^{1/} Includes housing, travel, medical, secretarial, drivers, other. US\$ = 225CFA
Source: EF

L. COST OF DAI EVALUATIONS
(as of end of calendar 1980)

<u>Work Order</u>	<u>Project</u>	<u>Total Project Budgets</u>	<u>Cost of Evaluation</u>
5	HV-V-1	\$ 2,000,000	\$ 34,000
6	HV-E-1, HV-E-2	\$ 1,250,000	\$ 22,000
7	B-V-1	\$ 3,500,000	\$ 40,000
8	CI-E-1, CI-E-2	\$ 1,725,000	\$ 56,000
9	N-V-1, N-V-2, N-V-3	\$ 1,960,000	\$ 38,000
10	T-V-1	\$ 2,400,000	\$ 48,000
13	N-E-1	<u>\$ 1,250,000</u>	<u>\$ 41,000</u>
		\$14,085,000	\$279,000

M. ORGANIZATION OF THE ENTENTE FUND



N. EVANS/KAYA LETTER

April 1, 1981

Mr. Paul Kaya
Administrative Secretary
Mutual Aid and Loan Guaranty
Fund of the Entente Council
Abidjan

Dear Mr. Kaya,

As I mentioned verbally at our March 27 meeting, REDSO is scheduling an April-May evaluation of the two EF/AID rural development projects and a June-July timeframe for preparation of a PID to propose a follow-on FY82-86 EF/AID Rural Development Project.

Although we previously mentioned this intent informally to members of your Rural Development Division staff, we had delayed writing you on the subject in hopes that we would be able to include information on evaluation and PID preparation assistance which we have requested AID/W to provide. We have still received no definitive response, but we feel we should wait no longer in providing this formal advice since our in-house preparations are beginning even now with the full-time assignment effective April 1 of John Dorman, one of REDSO's two Agricultural Economists for a four-month period to assist the EF/ECOWAS Program Manager in preparation of these key documents.

Our request to AID/Washington was for an economist from the Development Planning Office of the African Bureau from id-April to the end of May, to assist in the evaluation, and a rural development specialist from the Development Resources Office's Agriculture & Rural Development Division to assist in preparation of the PID during June and July. Absent assistance from AID/W, we will have to make do with occasional short-term assistance from other offices within REDSO as needed and available.

Although this evaluation of the parent Food Production and Livestock Production Projects is an AID initiative (as opposed to the sub-project evaluations which were appropriately EF initiatives with REDSO inputs and assistance as appropriate), we trust that we can look forward to the full support and cooperation of your Rural Development Division staff. And as regards subsequent preparation of the PID, we hope that a fully collaborative effort

effort can be undertaken.

As indicated in the draft terms of reference which I provided you informally on March 27, the evaluation will focus on (a) an overview of the Entente mechanism's performance and appropriateness as an aid-delivery intermediary in the rural development sphere, (b) in terms of specifics, on the effectiveness of the Entente's evaluation system in contributing toward achievement of sub-project objectives, and (c) implications of the above for the five-year follow-on Rural Development project to be proposed.

Unless there are unforeseen major developments in this regard on which information needs to be exchanged between us, I trust that most exchanges in respect to requirements relative to the evaluation and the PID can take place directly among and between our respective staffs who in turn will keep us informed as the work progresses.

Sincerely yours,

Gordon W. Evans
Director

O. ENTENTE FUND FIELD VISITS, 1979

<u>Month</u>	<u>Benin</u>	<u>Ivory Coast</u>	<u>Niger</u>	<u>Togo</u>	<u>Upper Volta</u>
January	Antroinen Licht		Antroinen		Antroinen
February	Reusche				Reusche
March	Licht	Antroinen	Antroinen	Licht	Reusche
April	Licht Reusche	Licht		Licht Rasmussen	Licht Reusche
May	Licht		Licht Reusche	Licht	Antroinen
June	Antroinen Licht Reusche Rasmussen		Antroinen Reusche D'Epagnier	Licht	Antroinen Licht Reusche D'Epagnier
July		D'Epanier	Rasmussen	Antroinen	
August		Antroinen		Rasmussen	D'Epagnier
September	Licht D'Epagnier Rasmussen			Licht D'Epagnier	
October	Licht D'Epagnier		Licht	Licht	Antroinen Licht D'Epagnier
November	D'Epagnier		D'Epanier	Antroinen D'Epagnier Licht	D'Epagnier
December	-	-	-	-	-
Total	19	4	11	13	18

Source: Entente Fund

P. ENTENTE FUND FIELD VISITS, 1980

<u>Dates</u>	<u>Person</u>	<u>Place</u>
January 7-11	d'Epagnier	Togo
January 7-11	Antroinen	Niger
January 14-18	Antroinen	Benin/Togo
January 14-18	Rasmussen	Benin/Togo
January 31-Feb. 2	Rasmussen	Niger
February 4-9	d'Epagnier	Upper Volta
February 12-14	Antroinen	Ivory Coast
February 20-22	Licht	Togo
March 3-7	Rasmussen	Upper Volta
March 19-21	d'Epagnier	Togo
March 20-25	Licht	Niger/Upper Volta
March 24	Rasmussen	Togo
March 24	Antroinen	Togo
April 8-10	d'Epagnier	Togo
May 15-17	Licht	Togo
May 19-23	d'Epagnier	Upper Volta
June 17-20	d'Epagnier	Togo/Benin
July 31-Aug. 2	Lehman	Niger
July 31-Aug. 2	Rasmussen	Niger
August 18-21	Rasmussen	Togo
September 8-13	Rasmussen	Benin/Togo
October 1-3	d'Epagnier	Benin
October 20	d'Epagnier]	Upper Volta
November 2-9	Rasmussen	Togo

<u>Dates</u>	<u>Person</u>	<u>Place</u>
November 6-15	Lehman	Niger
November 28-Dec. 7	Tamari	Togo/Benin
December 1-5	d'Epagnier	Togo
December 15-18	Alassani	Togo/Benin
December 26-Jan. 3	d'Epagnier	Togo

Q. ENTENTE FUND FIELD VISITS, 1981

<u>Dates</u>	<u>Person</u>	<u>Place</u>
January 12-17	Tamari	Ouagadougou, Niamey HV-E-1, HV-E-2, HV-V-1, N-E-1
January 22-29	D'Epagnier	Bondouko, Bouana CI-V-1
January 22-28	Rasmussen	Visit students Morgan Town
February 5-12	Rasmussen	Lome Ministerial Meeting
February 5-12	Alassani	Lome Ministerial Meeting
February 11-22	Tamari	T-V-1, T-V-2, T-E-1 (Togo)
February 23-March 4	D'Epagnier	Niamey, Ouagadougou N-V-2, N-V-3, HV-V-1, N-E-1
February 28-March 3	Alassani	HV-E-2 Ouagadougou
March 11-17	Rasmussen	B-V-1 Benin Attacora, Oueme
March 11-17	Tamari	B-V-1 Benin Attacora, Oueme
March 11-17	Alassani	B-V-1 and T-V-1, T-V-2
March 30-April 2	Alassani	CI-V-1, CI-V-2
March 30-April 2	Tamari	CI-V-1, CI-V-2
April 13-18	Tamari	T-V-1, T-V-2, T-E-1
April 13-21	Lehman	Niamey N-V-1, N-E-1, N-V-2
April 14-21	Alassani	Ouagadougou HV-V-1, HV-E-2
April 27-May 2	D'Epagnier	Niamey N-V-3, N-V-2, N-V-1 with Dorman
May 5-8	Alassani	Ouagadougou. Accompany REDSO evaluation team - Dorman HV-E-2, HV-V-1, HV-E-1
May 7-8	Rasmussen	Cotonou B-V-1
May 25-June 2	Rasmussen Tamari	Accompany Mr. Kaya to D.C.

R. REDSO/WA MONITORING OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, 1977-81

<u>Country</u>	<u>Traveler</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Purpose</u>
Upper Volta	A. Boehme	1/17-24, 1977	Review program matters
	R. Wagner	2/2-8, 1978	Orientation
		2/2-8, 1979	Animal Traction and Helminthoses Project
		3/10-14, 1980	3-days Livestock Project 3 Audio-Visual Trips
Togo	R. Wagner	1/19-25, 1978	Orientation
	R. Rogers	1/16-18, 1979	Food Production Project
	R. Wagner	9/2-7, 1979	Notse Dayes Monitor
		11/5-9, 1979	La Kara, Notse Dayes
		3/14-23, 1980	Notse Dayes
		5/12-14, 1980	Lome (ABS)
		4/13-17, 1981	La Kara, Notse Dayes
Benin	R. Wagner	1/16-19, 1978	Orientation
		1/16-19, 1979	Policy, Small Ruminants
	J. Shea	9/30-10/8, 1979	DAI Eval. Seminar
	R. Roger	4/29-5/2, 1980	Corn and Sorghum Project
	J. Shea	5/5-11, 1980	Small Ruminant Health
	R. Wagner	3/11-17, 1981	Seed Production, CAPDER
Niger	R. Wagner	1/29-2/2, 1978	Orientation
		1/29-2/1, 1979	Grain Stabilization, Firgoun, Vetophar, N-V-2, N-V-3
	R. Rogers	9/24-28, 1979	Orientation
		3/20-27, 1980	DAI Eval. N-V-1, N-V-2, N-V-3
	E. Reddick	11/6-17, 1980	Vetophar Evaluation
	G. Evans	4/6-7, 1981	Firgoun
	Ivory Coast	R. Wagner	10/1-11, 1979

Source: REDSO/WA

<u>Dates</u>	<u>Person</u>	<u>Place</u>
May 25-June 7	Alassani	N-V-1, N-V-2, N-V-3, T-E-1
July 30-August 2	Tamari	CI-E-1, CI-E-2
August 6-18	Alassani	T-V-1, T-V-2, T-E-1 B-V-1, B-E-2
August 31-September 8	Lehman	Ouagadougou, Niamey HV-V-1, HV-E-2, HV-E-1, N-V-1 N-V-3, N-E-1
August 20-September 13	Tamari	Visit to agricultural institutions in southeast U.S. with directors of projects T-V-1, T-V-2, B-V-1
September 14-19	Lehman	CI-E-1, CI-E-2, with Hess
October 19-24	Lehman	Benin B-V-1, B-E-2
November 16-24	Lehman	Togo T-V-1, T-V-2, T-E-1
End November	Tamari	Ouagadougou, Niamey HV-V-1, HV-E-1, HV-E-2 N-V-1, N-V-2, N-V-3, N-E-1

Source: Entente Fund

S. RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE MINISTERS OF
AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT FOR
THE 1982-1986 RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. 1/

After a thorough analysis of the various problems brought up at the session of the Experts, responsible for Rural Development and

Considering that in order to achieve the objective of self-sufficiency in food, production should be considerably increased and productivity improved.

Considering the human, technical and financial constraints which are related to the achievement of these objectives,

Considering the advantages derived from the regional approach which enables the member-states to solve their problems namely as regards how the means can be judiciously used-the exchange of experience between member-states and interstate assistance,

The Ministers Agriculture and Rural Development recommend that the Administrative Secretary of the Mutual Aid and Loan Guaranty Fund of the Entente Council,

In the domain of Projects underway:

1. Make contacts with Aid sources in order to continue and reinforce through the Entente Fund, the Food and Livestock production projects underway.
2. Implement as early as possible, in compliance with decision N°50 made in 1978 by the Heads of State of the Entente Council at their summit meeting in Lome, and with Recommendations N°1,2, and 3, adopted in Niamey in 1980 by the Ministers in charge of water programs, the ENTENTE REGIONAL WATER PROGRAM for villages, an essential factor which will improve health and is absolutely necessary for the increase of plant and animal production.

1/ Entente Fund, Rural Development Program for Entente Council Countries, February 1981.

3. Study in cooperation with offices concerned in each member-state, national and regional projects, dealing with storage, preservation and transport of agricultural products - solicit financing for these projects.
4. Continue negotiations undertaken with the Federal Republic of Germany with a view to obtaining a financing for the study and the implementation of national and regional projects concerned with storage, preservation and transport of agriculture products.
5. Undertake a study concerning the establishment in each member-state of a National Guaranty Fund system for Agriculture Credit Institutions and Mutual Insurance Companies. Such a system should protect producer's interests.
6. Look for a long term financing which would be available for agricultural national credit institutions.
7. Study the modalities tied to the creation of a regional center and to the improvement of existing centers, specialized in the manufacturing of agricultural equipment.
8. Give the support of the Entente Fund to national animal traction and small mechanized farming projects.
9. Give the support of the Entente to projects concerned with the intensification of agriculture and livestock water use, in particular, where such projects, cross national boundaries.
10. Follow-up on programs related to the training and support of peasant-farmers, particularly in self governing institutions such as cooperatives and pre-cooperatives

In the domain of New Operations:

1. Provide information on production, preservation and distribution of seeds in the Member-States.

- a. Bring support through specific projects to national existing structures concerned with production and distribution of seeds in the member-states.
 - b. Carry out a study in the appropriateness of creating regional centers for production and distribution of rootstocks for food production in the sub-region.
2. Make a study on the appropriateness of creating regional production units of fertilizers, weed killers and pesticides.
3. Examine the conditions for setting up a High Committee for Agricultural research that should facilitate the flow of information and the exchange of results and make concertation possible for the drawing up of national programs in the field of agricultural research.
4. Study the modalities for setting up a technical bulletin dedicated to Agriculture research information in the Entente Countries.
5. Compile an index of research institutions, researchers research programs and also of theses and memoirs, related to the member-states agricultural problems.
6. Promote permanent exchanges between various states not only for producers but also for extension agents.
7. Give support to programs concerned with improving national structures in order to better production systems and protect plants and crops.
8. Investigate issues pertaining to losses after harvesting.
9. Give the support of the Fund to Training Programs meant for agents participating in agricultural development at every level (popularization, cooperation preservation, agricultural credit, research etc...) through the creation and the improvement of adequate training and retraining centers.

10. Add "rural tracks" as new component to the Entente Rural Development projects in order to improve distribution and marketing networks.
11. Give support to national projects concerned with land utilization.

In the domain of the implementation of the program above:

Systematize the convening of annual ministerial meetings to allow the Ministers of Agriculture and Rural Development to follow up the implementation of the projects and to exchange information and experience.

T. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS BY
ARTHUR ANDERSON, SEPTEMBER 8, 1981 1/

We consider that the Entente Fund is an effective vehicle for the administration of loans and grants made by USAID. The Entente Fund has generally fulfilled its responsibilities under the agreements with USAID.

A summary of our recommendations for improvement of financial management is as follows:

Short-term action

1. Benchmark data should be established for sub-projects still in a start-up phase along with efficient systems for the continued collection of such data.
2. Sub-project requests for advances should be submitted on a quarterly basis and the bank transfer of such funds should be confirmed by the Entente Fund by telex or telegram.
3. The quarterly reports prepared by the Entente Fund should indicate, on a sub-project basis, the amount of available funds committed and the status of contractual negotiations for the uncommitted balance.
4. The Entente Fund should review accounting and reporting procedures covering revolving funds.
5. The financial manager of the Entente Fund should make more frequent visits to sub-projects.
6. The Entente Fund should inform each sub-project on a quarterly basis of the balance in dollars of undrawn funds.
7. Overdue deliveries from AAPC should be followed up immediately; if and when satisfactory delivery dates are not obtained, consideration should be given to using an alternative purchasing agent.

1/ Arthur Anderson, Financial Management Analysis of the Rural Development Projects of the Entente Fund: Report of Findings and Recommendations. September 1981.

Long-term action

1. Operating procedures between REDSO/WA and the Entente Fund should be documented.
2. The level of detail to which REDSO/WA accounting records are maintained should be reviewed.
3. Consideration should be given to ways in which the effect of currency fluctuations can be minimized or eliminated.
4. The additional costs and difficulties inherent in the application of U.S. "source and origin" rules should be identified and reflected in sub-project proposals and planning.
5. REDSO/WA should review with the Entente Fund the merits of funding by means of the reimbursement of incurred expenses.
6. Each sub-project should submit to the Entente Fund (for consolidation) quarterly statements analysing cumulative expenditures, estimated expenditures to complete and an analytical review of how objectives are to be attained or adjusted in the light of the finance remaining available.
7. The Entente Fund should develop a standard set of quarterly financial statements to be completed by all sub-projects.
8. The role of outside consultants in the preparation of mid-term and final evaluations should be reviewed to determine whether more emphasis should be placed on their involvement in sub-project planning and the establishment of appropriate financial and other reporting procedures.
9. Future sub-project proposals should use more conservative estimates of future inflation.
10. The Entente Fund should develop for sub-projects standardized accounting procedures and bookkeeping systems.
11. Minimum standards of sub-project internal control should be set by the Entente Fund.

12. The Entente Fund should recruit an internal auditor.
13. The Entente Fund should ensure that sub-project directors receive a formal training program in financial management and that bookkeepers are given courses in accounting and reporting procedures.
14. Consideration should be given to the employment of an outside consultant to assist the Entente Fund in the establishment of an efficient book-keeping system.
15. The advantages of accrual accounting at sub-project level should be reviewed as well as the use at all sub-projects of a formal system of double-entry bookkeeping.
16. The advantages of recording at sub-project level all expenditures should be considered.

SOURCE OF REQUIREMENT	REQUIREMENTS	STATUS	ACTION REQUESTED
<p>1. Livestock Loan Agreement of 3/17/77 - Section 2.04(c)</p> <p>2. Evans letter of April 2, 1981 to Kaya</p>	<p><u>Sub-project Approval</u> Prior to the execution of a sub-grant Agreement, or amendment thereto providing funding for a sub-project, the Entente Fund shall (i) take into consideration AID's views expressed pursuant to the preceding sentence and (ii) obtain AID written approval of any sub-project involving more than one million United States Dollars (\$1,000,000) of AID funds.</p>	<p>REDSO takes strong exception to the Entente Fund signing within the last two months of a loan amendment with the government of Benin and a grant amendment of Upper Volta without regard for REDSO dis-approval.</p> <p>When REDSO requested a breakdown on the use of the 1 million dollar grant by AID, a budget summary dated 11/6/81 from Tamari to Wagner was found to be inadequate because of the many inconsistencies.</p>	<p>(1) Withdraw and re-program additional AID funding accorded by EF to Benin Corn and Sorghum sub-projects (B-V-1). (2) Either provide specific assurances requested, re Upper Volta Audio-Visual sub-project (HV-E-2) or withdraw and reprogram these funds as well.</p> <p>REDSO needs as soon as possible a com-prehensible budget breakdown with correct figures in order to process some outstanding vouchers.</p>
<p>1. Food Production Capital Grant Agreement of 8/31/76 - Section 5.01 - (b)(11)</p> <p>2. Food Production Technical Assistance Grant Agreement of 8/31/76 - Section 2.01(iv)</p> <p>3. Livestock Loan Agreement of 3/17/77 - Article VII - Section 7.01 (b)(11).</p> <p>4. Livestock Capital Assistance Grant signed 9/29/76 - Article II - Section 2.01</p>	<p><u>Execution of Project - Qualified and Experienced Management</u> The Entente Fund will: (i) carry out the project or cause it to be carried out with due diligence and efficiency, in conformity with sound technical, financial, and management practices, and in accordance with this Agreement.</p>	<p>Presently the Entente Fund Rural Development Cell is composed of two people: A community development specialist who is acting as a Project Team Manager and an Accountant who is encountering the position of a general agronomist. This has</p>	<p>The Entente Fund should immediately re-evaluate its personnel needs in relation to the number of projects and the execution state of each of them and initiate appropriate recruitment action.</p>

SOURCE OF REQUIREMENT	REQUIREMENTS	STATUS	ACTION REQUESTED
<p>1. Livestock Loan Agreement of 3/17/77 - Section 2.04(3)</p> <p>2. Evans letter of April 2, 1981 to Kaya</p>	<p><u>Sub-project Approval</u> Prior to the execution of a sub-grant Agreement, or amendment thereto providing funding for a sub-project, the Entente Fund shall (i) take into consideration AID's views expressed pursuant to the preceding sentence and (ii) obtain AID written approval of any sub-project involving more than one million United States Dollars (\$1,000,000) of AID funds.</p>	<p>REDSO takes strong exception to the Entente Fund signing within the last two months of a loan amendment with the government of Benin and a grant amendment of Upper Volta without regard for REDSO disapproval.</p> <p>When REDSO requested a breakdown on the use of the 1 million dollar grant by AID, a budget summary dated 11/6/81 from Tamari to Wagner was found to be inadequate because of the many inconsistencies.</p>	<p>(1) Withdraw and re-program additional AID funding accorded by EF to Benin Corn and Sorghum sub-projects (E-V-1). (2) Either provide specific assurances requested, re Upper Volta Audio-Visual sub-project (HV-E-2) or withdraw and reprogram these funds as well.</p> <p>REDSO needs as soon as possible a comprehensible budget breakdown with correct figures in order to process some outstanding vouchers.</p>
<p>1. Food Production Capital Grant Agreement of 8/31/76 - Section 5.01 - (b)(11)</p> <p>2. Food Production Technical Assistance Grant Agreement of 8/31/76 - Section 2.01(1v)</p> <p>3. Livestock Loan Agreement of 3/17/77 - Article VII - Section 7.01 (b)(11).</p> <p>4. Livestock Capital Assistance Grant signed 9/29/76 - Article II - Section 2.01</p>	<p><u>Execution of Project - Qualified and Experienced Management</u> The Entente Fund will: (i) carry out the project or cause it to be carried out with due diligence and efficiency, in conformity with sound technical, financial, and management practices, and in accordance with this Agreement.</p>	<p>Presently the Entente Fund Rural Development Cell is composed of two people: A community development specialist who is acting as a Project Team Manager and an Accountant who is encumbering the position of a general agronomist. This has</p>	<p>The Entente Fund should immediately re-evaluate its personnel needs in relation to the number of projects and the execution state of each of them and initiate appropriate recruitment action.</p>

SOURCE OF REQUIREMENT	REQUIREMENTS	STATUS	ACTION REQUESTED
<p>1. Food Production Capital Grant Agreement of 6/31/76 - Section 2.23(d)</p>	<p><u>Sub-Project Criteria</u> At the time of presentation of a sub-project, the Entente Fund will obtain from the sub-grantee or the appropriate Member State, satisfactory assurances that the latter will provide or obtain all funding which may be necessary beyond the period of availability of AID funding to insure achievement of the sub-project objectives.</p>	<p>The financial status contained in the quarterly reports does not indicate the stage of project completion for comparison with expenditures made to date, does not estimate future expenditures required to complete projects and does not show sub-project expenditures prepared on an accruals basis.</p> <p>Few cases in the Entente countries have indicated failure on the part of Member States to provide or obtain funding necessary for a particular project beyond the period of availability of USAID funds. In some cases governments (Togo and Upper Volta) have budgeted contributions to their respective sub-projects but EF didn't report on the status of those contributions.</p>	<p>with more quantitative data. Statements of sub-project expenditures should show expenditures for the period under review, cumulative sub-project expenditures and projected future expenditures required to complete each project.</p> <p>Entente Fund should include Member States budgeted contributions in the December 1981 Progress Report.</p>

SOURCE OF REQUIREMENT	REQUIREMENTS	STATUS	ACTION REQUESTED
<p>1. Food Production/Livestock Implementation Letter of 5/12/78 - Part V.B(2)</p>	<p><u>Quarterly Shipping Reports</u> This report is required until all shipping under the Loan and Capital Grant have been completed and should be submitted within 30 days of the end of each calendar quarter. The report should begin with the first calendar quarter in which there are actual shipments. Attachment A, the Borrower's Shipping Statement, contains the format for this report. The Summary Statement, Part I, should give the cumulative actual tonnage shipped beginning with the initial report through the month of the last report, for the United States and non-United States-flag vessels, by category of vessels, as applicable.</p> <p>If the summary indicates a lag in compliance with Section 8.06(b) of the Loan Agreement and/or Section 6.06(b) of the Capital Grant Agreement, a statement should be included indicating how the deficit in shipping on United States-flag vessels will be made up. If no shipping occurs during a particular calendar quarter, a statement to that effect must be submitted.</p>	<p>Borrower-shipping reports have been received on an irregular basis. No statements to indicate provisions made to make up shipping deficit on United States flag vessels. Shipping reports should be always submitted. If no shipping occurs a statement to that effect must be submitted.</p>	<p>Shipping reports must be submitted on a quarterly basis with all pertinent information.</p>
<p>1. Food Production/Livestock implementation Letter of 5/12/78 - Part V.B(1)</p>	<p><u>Quarterly Progress Reports</u> Reports should cover three month periods and should be mailed or delivered within thirty days of the end of the period reported on, until the project is completed. A final "Completion Report" should be submitted within 30 days of project completion.</p>	<p>Entente Fund Rural Development Cell hasn't been submitting its Quarterly Progress Reports on a regular basis. The last report dates back to March 1st, 1981.</p>	<p>Entente Fund should comply with reporting deadlines for future reports which are expected to be comprehensive</p>

SOURCE OF REQUIREMENT	REQUIREMENTS	STATUS	ACTION REQUESTED
<p>1. Food Production Loan Agreement of 3/17/77 - Section 8.06</p> <p>2. Livestock Loan Agreement of 3/17/77 - Section 8.06</p> <p>3. Livestock Capital Grant Agreement of 9/29/76 - Section 6.06.</p>	<p>All AID-financed equipment and materials and their shipping containers must be suitably marked to indicate that they are part of a program of United States aid. Project construction sites and other project locations must display signs suitably marked and indicating participation by the United States in the Project. Temporary signs should be erected at an early date in the construction or implementation phase and be replaced by permanent signs, plates, or plaques, suitably marked, at the end of this phase. The term "suitably marked" used in this statement means marking with AID red, white and blue hand-clasp emblem.</p> <p><u>Shipping and Insurance</u> Goods financed under the Loan shall be transported to the Member States on flag carriers of any country included in Code 935 of the AID Geographic Code Book as in effect at the time of shipment.</p> <p>(i) at least fifty percent (50%) of the gross tonnage of all goods financed under the Loan (computed separately for bulk carriers, dry cargo liners, and tankers) and transported on ocean vessels, and (ii) at least fifty percent (50%) of the gross freight revenue generated by all shipments financed under the Loan and transported on dry cargo liners shall be paid to or for the benefit of privately owned United States-flag commercial vessels.</p>	<p>Many items of AID-financed equipment are not suitably marked.</p> <p>Review of AID/W statistical records through 4/30/81 indicates that EF Purchasing Agent has not been in compliance with cargo preference.</p>	<p>An immediate action is required from the Entente Fund. All future shipments under USAID-financed projects must be in compliance with cargo preference.</p>

SOURCE OF REQUIREMENT	REQUIREMENTS	STATUS	ACTION REQUESTED
<p>1. Food Production/Livestock Loan Agreement of 3/17/77 - Section 7.07.</p> <p>2. Food Production Implementation Letter of 5/12/78 - Part V. B(4).</p> <p>3. Livestock Capital Grant Agreement of 9/29/76 - Section 5.07.</p>	<p>The Entente Fund's Expenditure Report should be supported as necessary by individual sub-project Expenditure Reports prepared by sub-borrowers and sub-grantees. Funds advanced to the Entente Fund are to be accounted for separately by the Entente Fund for operations under the Loan, the Capital Grant and the Technical Assistance Grant, and all receipts and disbursements shall be recorded by the Entente Fund's financial department in such manner that it will be possible to ascertain the unutilized balance of the advance payments under the Loan and under each of the subject Grants at any time. The records thereof shall be preserved and be subject to inspection and audit in accordance with Section 7.06 of the Loan, Section 5.06 of the Capital Grant and Section 2.04 of the Technical Assistance Grant. Any interest earned on AID's funds advanced to the Entente Fund or sub-advanced to any sub-borrower or sub-grantee shall accrue to and be paid to AID.</p> <p><u>Information and Marking</u> The Borrower and the Grantors shall each give publicity to the Loan and the Project as a Program of United States aid, instruct the sub-borrowers to so identify their sub-loans and sub-project sites and mark goods financed under the Loan, as prescribed in Implementation Letters.</p>	<p>Some of the project locations visited by REDFO staff did not display signs indicating participation by the U.S. Government in the projects.</p>	<p>EF should immediately take remedial actions to correct marking deficiencies at all USAID-funded project sites and assure non-recurrence.</p>

SOURCE OF REQUIREMENT	REQUIREMENTS	STATUS	ACTION REQUESTED
<p>1. Food Production/Livestock Implementation Letter of 5/12/78 Part VII. F(1).</p>	<p>under (a) the loan, (b) the Technical Assistance Grant and (c) the Capital Grant. Advances should be on the basis of expenditure projections covering a period not to exceed three months from the date of the request.</p> <p><u>Initial Advance of Funds</u> For an initial advance of funds, the Entente Fund must submit to AID Voucher Form SF-1034 in an original and three copies identified by the Agreement number and indicating the amount of funds required to cover estimated expenditures for a period of not to exceed three months. The voucher must be supported by an original and three copies of an Expenditure Report describing the individual activities for implementation and the anticipated requirements for the ensuing three month period.</p>	<p>submitted for initial advances of funds do not provide a comprehensive expenditure report covering individual activities. Request for an advance of funds should be based on the best estimates of EF staff for sub-project needs.</p>	
<p>1. Food Production/Livestock Implementation Letter of 5/12/78 Part VII. F(2).</p>	<p><u>Replenishment of Advances</u> As advances are utilized, the Entente Fund may request replenishment of advances as required to cover additional funding requirements of the project provided that such requests will not be made more frequently than once monthly. The Entente Fund will submit the request for replenishment on AID. Voucher Form SF-1034 in an original and three copies; each voucher should identify the Agreement number and should have as its attachment an Expenditure Report including details of utilization of funds previously advanced as well as an estimate of funding requirements for the next three month period.</p>	<p>Vouchers SF-1034 are not being submitted with an Expenditure Report including details of utilization of funds previously advanced. USAID has not as yet received sub-project Expenditure Reports prepared by sub-borrowers and sub-grantees. Commingling has happened sometimes because funds advanced to EF haven't been kept separate under each type of funding.</p>	<p>All future vouchers should be submitted with an Expenditure Report on previously advanced funds and on the anticipated use of future funds.</p>

SOURCE OF REQUIREMENT	REQUIREMENTS	STATUS	ACTION REQUESTED
<p>1. Food Production/Livestock Implementation Letter of 5/12/76 Part VII.F.</p>	<p>(b) For equipment and materials, the Entente Fund shall describe such equipment and materials by categories either in commercial terminology, or in terms of the AID 3-digit commodity code. The request shall include estimates for both quantities and their dollar costs; state whether those estimates include the costs of delivery to the Entente Fund or a Member State; and indicate any degree of flexibility between individual category amounts within the total amount of the requested financing.</p> <p>(c) For training, the request shall be accompanied by one copy of the training program in sufficient detail to identify individuals to be trained; name of institution providing training; course content/duration; implementation plan; and a budget.</p> <p>3. The estimated date by which financing of the specified project activity can reasonably be completed. In no case may this date be later than the terminal disbursement date as established in the applicable loan or grant Agreement.</p> <p><u>Advance of funds</u> The Entente Fund may request and obtain an advance of funds to meet cash requirements for implementation of the project. The necessity for an advance of funds will be determined by mutual agreement of the Entente Fund and AID with the understanding however, that to the extent practicable the Entente Fund will utilize its own resources for minor requirements for cash outlays. Requests for advances and replenishments shall be separately submitted for funds</p>	<p>A review of EF outstanding balances on advances reveals that advances were not used in their entirety and that much of the time barely a third of the amount was used. This leads to an accumulation of USAID funds bearing interest. Vouchers</p>	<p>Future advances should be limited to immediate disbursing needs. All requests for advances should be accompanied by supporting documents and be submitted on a quarterly basis.</p>

SOURCE OF REQUIREMENT	REQUIREMENTS	STATUS	ACTION REQUESTED
<p>1. Food Production Loan Agreement of 3/17/77 - Section 7.06 (b)</p>	<p><u>Maintain sound accounting principles and practices.</u> Books and records relating to project(s) should be adequate to show without limitation (i) the receipt and use of goods and services acquired under the loan; (ii) the progress of the project. Such books and records shall be regularly audited.</p>	<p>Financial statements do not show current-period and cumulative sub-project expenditures nor are estimates of expenditures required to complete projects indicated.</p>	<p>EF to review its own accounting and management practices to meet with USAID standards by end of first quarter of 1982. Entente Fund should encourage the sub-project to adopt a standardized reporting system. Quarterly reports requested until action completed.</p>
<p>1. Food Production/Livestock - Implementation Letter of 5/12/78 Part VII.A.</p>	<p><u>Form and Content of Request for Financing</u> For each of the sub-project elements or activities selected and approved for implementation in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Loan and Grant Agreements the Entente Fund shall submit to AID a Request for Financing. Such request may be by memorandum or letter and shall be submitted in duplicate in the English language. The request shall set out the AID project number assigned to the Agreement and shall contain the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The U.S. dollar amount of financing requested. 2. An identification of the items to be financed and (a) For construction or for professional or other services, three copies of the governing contract shall be submitted with the request for financing. 	<p>Financing requests are not submitted with receipts, explanations for use of goods and services. EF accounting procedure differs greatly with the one from USAID. Data submitted is incomplete. At times there is a commingling of funds, which often leads to confusion.</p>	

SOURCE OF REQUIREMENT	REQUIREMENTS	STATUS	ACTION REQUESTED
1. Livestock Loan Agreement of 9/29/76 Section 7.05.	<u>Use of Disbursements</u> Any interest or other earnings on Grant funds disbursed by AID to the Entente Fund under this Agreement prior to the authorized use of such funds for the project will be returned to AID in U.S. dollars by the EF.	No indication of any interest gains or other earnings on USAID grant funds prior to authorized disbursements.	In the event there are any excess balances and interest earned, these must be promptly returned to AID.
1. Food Production Loan Agreement of 3/17/77 - Section 5.01 (b) 2. Livestock Loan Agreement of 3/17/77 Section 5.04 (a) 3. Livestock Capital Grant Agreement of 9/29/76 - Section 1.03 (a) 4. Technical Assistance Grant Agreement of 9/29/76 - Section 1.02.	<u>Additional Resources for the Project</u> a) The Entente Fund agrees to provide or cause to be provided for the project all funds in addition to the Grant, and all other resources required to carry out the Project effectively and in a timely manner. b) The sub-borrowers or the member states in which sub-projects are located shall contribute as a minimum, 25% of the sub-project costs as well as whatever additional funding may be required, following the termination of AID funding, for the punctual and effective carrying out and operation of the sub-projects.	Unknown No reports received from the Entente Fund on the status of government contributions for food and livestock production sub-projects.	Request status reports as of 9/30/61 An update on country contributions to the sub-projects should be included in the next quarterly report October through December 1961.
1. Food Production Loan Agreement of 3/17/77 - Section 7.03 (a) 2. Evans April 2, 1961 letter to Kaya.	<u>Utilization of Goods and Services</u> Goods and services financed under the loan shall be used exclusively for the Project.	Vehicle No. A1619HW01 and audio-visual equipment destined to project HV-E-2 were not being used for the purposes of the project as indicated in our letter of April 2, 1961.	Letter from EF to certify appropriate use of vehicle and audio-visual equipment.

U. COMPLIANCE WITH AID REGULATIONS

SOURCE OF REQUIREMENT	REQUIREMENTS	STATUS	ACTION REQUESTED
<p>1. Food Production Loan Agreement of 3/17/77 - Sec. 5.01 (a)</p>	<p><u>Special accounts</u> Until the loan is repaid, the borrower agrees that all funds received from sub-borrowers, pursuant to sub-loans made under the project, and all income derived from such funds will be <u>deposited</u> in one or more special accounts in a reputable bank or banks of international standing.</p> <p><u>Reports on Special Accounts</u> This report should be prepared on a semi-annual basis and should include a summary of all activity within the special account(s) as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Balance from previous report; b) Amounts received during the report period from sub-borrowers pursuant to sub-loans made under the projects; c) Income derived from the special account(s) such as interests; d) Amount utilized from the special account(s) for (i) debt servicing of the loan, (ii) administrative and overhead costs relating to livestock program in the Entente States, (iii) provisions of technical assistance, and (iv) loans directed toward achievement of the agreed sectoral objectives; e) Balance at end of report period. 	<p>No indication of opening of account(s) for funds received from USAID and income derived from such funds.</p>	<p>Provide a report as of 9/30/81 covering all aspects of Entente Fund Rural Development special accounts (establishment of special accounts, interest earned and uses, refund due to USAID, etc.)</p>

U. COMPLIANCE WITH AID REGULATIONS

SOURCE OF REQUIREMENT	REQUIREMENTS	STATUS	ACTION REQUESTED
<p>1. Food Production Loan Agreement of 3/17/77 - Sec. 5.01 (a)</p>	<p><u>Special accounts</u> Until the loan is repaid, the borrower agrees that all funds received from sub-borrowers, pursuant to sub-loans made under the project, and all income derived from such funds will be <u>deposited</u> in one or more special accounts in a reputable bank or banks of international standing.</p> <p><u>Reports on Special Accounts</u> This report should be prepared on a semi-annual basis and should include a summary of all activity within the special account(s) as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Balance from previous report; b) Amounts received during the report period from sub-borrowers pursuant to sub-loans made under the projects; c) Income derived from the special account(s) such as interests; d) Amount utilized from the special account(s) for (i) debt servicing of the loan, (ii) administrative and overhead costs relating to livestock program in the Entente States, (iii) provisions of technical assistance, and (iv) loans directed toward achievement of the agreed sectoral objectives; e) Balance at end of report period. 	<p>No indication of opening of account(s) for funds received from USAID and income derived from such funds.</p>	<p>Provide a report as of 9/30/81 covering all aspects of Entente Fund Rural Development special accounts (establishment of special accounts, interest earned and uses, refund due to USAID, etc.)</p>

SOURCE OF REQUIREMENT	REQUIREMENTS	STATUS	ACTION REQUESTED
<p>1. Food Production/Livestock Implementation Letter of 11/30/78 - (2)</p>	<p>(ii) provide qualified and experienced management, and such staff as may be necessary, for the implementation of the project, and cause the project to be operated and maintained in such manner as to assure the continuing and successful achievement of the purposes of the project.</p> <p>The Project Management Team will be composed of <u>four</u> AID-funded, full-time experts representing the following specialities and disciplines: A project team manager, a general agronomist, an agricultural economist and a livestock production and management technician.</p> <p><u>Submission of a Procurement Plan</u> A Procurement Plan should be submitted within 60 days of the signing of a sub-project agreement between the Entente Fund and the cooperating country.</p>	<p>been the situation since June 1981 (nearly 6 months). It is hard to visualize 2 people handling some 15 projects without all the required skills.</p> <p>Procurement plans have not been received for the following projects: CI-E-2; T-E-1 and T-V-2. Their TDDs are in 1982 and 1983. The Entente Fund never complied with this requirement. The North-East Ivory Coast CI-V-1 sub-project agreement has been signed a year ago; REDSO has yet to receive a Procurement Plan.</p>	<p>Provide all required procurement plans not later than 12/31/81.</p>

SOURCE OF REQUIREMENT	REQUIREMENTS	STATUS	ACTION REQUESTED
<p>1. Food Production Technical Assistance Grant Agreement of 8/31/76 - Section 1.01(b)</p> <p>2. Livestock/Food Production Project Management Plan</p> <p>3. Livestock Capital Assistance Grant of 9/29/76 (b)</p>	<p><u>Use of Grant Proceeds</u> Grant proceeds will be used by the Entente Fund to finance the services of a project management team in the Entente Fund, experts to conduct the sector assessment, and other contractors; local agricultural and sociological research in support of sub-project design, implementation, and evaluation.</p>	<p>The Entente Fund has been under-staffed for 6 months now. Grant proceeds for financing part of the management staff are idle; they should be used for their intended purposes or de-obligated by USAID. This situation has been an impediment to efficiently overseeing all project activities in the five Entente countries.</p>	<p>Entente Fund to justify use of grant proceeds intended for staff salaries no later than the next quarter ending December 31, 1981.</p>
<p>1. Food Production/Livestock Project Management Plan</p>	<p><u>Monitoring Sub-Project Progress</u> The implementation of the sub-projects by the Project Management Team constitutes a formidable task including the preparation and execution of formal grant/loan agreements, the preparation of letters of implementation, assistance to the cooperating countries with contracting for goods and services, the accounting for and the financial management of dollar and local currency resources provided by two different institutions, each with its own requirements, and of course, sub-project development and evaluation. For these reasons annual budgets which have been painstakingly prepared should be used to monitor overall progress of the two projects and to indicate the areas where growth is slower than had been anticipated.</p>	<p>Quarterly reports do not indicate overall picture of budget operations and progress on the two programs: Food Production and Livestock. EF has not devised systems to collect and periodically report benchmark data to monitor project performance.</p>	<p>Quarterly reporting by the EF should include a review of actual performance of entire Food Production, Livestock program against planned objectives. Objectives should be revised annually in order to reflect performance to date and future expectations.</p>

SOURCE OF REQUIREMENT	REQUIREMENTS	STATUS	ACTION REQUESTED
1. Food Production/Livestock Project Management Plan	<p><u>Monitoring Sub-Project Progress</u> The technicians will prepare quarterly reports on each project commenting therein on <u>obligations and disbursements</u>, implementation progress for the various actions underway, problems encountered and the activities planned for the coming quarter.</p>	Quarterly reports, when received, do not contain full information on obligations and disbursements.	Future quarterly reports must contain detailed information on obligations and disbursements.
<p>1. Food Production Implementation Letter of November 30, 1978</p> <p>2. Food/Livestock Production Project Management Plan</p>	<p><u>Annual Evaluations of all sub-projects approved under the Program.</u></p> <p>Sub-projects are to be evaluated midway in the implementation process and again within six to ten months following the Terminal Date for Disbursement as stated in the Project Management Plan.</p>	The Entente Fund has generally done a commendable mid-term evaluation of sub-projects. EF needs to begin to schedule terminal evaluations.	The Entente Fund should immediately schedule evaluations for all sub-projects which haven't had their mid-term or final evaluations with view to improving the basic strategy so as to accomplish the sectoral objectives.
1. Food Production Implementation Letter of 5/12/78 - Part III	<p><u>The Entente Fund and the Member States - Sectoral Objectives</u> Activities which contribute to the furtherance of the sectoral objectives should be covered in the periodic reports of the Entente Fund to AID and in Member States' reports to the Fund.</p> <p>Furthermore, the Entente Fund should consider the sectoral objectives as items for discussion and action at the annual meetings with Member States.</p>	Has not generally been dealt with in quarterly reports	Include in future quarterly reports.

SOURCE OF REQUIREMENT	REQUIREMENTS	STATUS	ACTION REQUESTED
<p>1. Food Production Loan Agreement of 3/17/77 - Section 5.04(a)</p>	<p><u>Additional Resources</u> The Sub-borrowers and/or the Member States in which sub-projects are located shall contribute as a minimum, 25% of the sub-project costs as well as whatever additional funding may be required, following the termination of AID funding, for the punctual and effective carrying out and operation of the Sub-projects.</p>	<p>Sub-project country contributions haven't been made as agreed on by member states. So far, only promises have been obtained from Entente countries via EF staff. Governments which budgeted contributions are Upper Volta, Togo and Senin.</p>	<p>All future quarterly reports from the EF Rural Development Cell should give the status of sub-project country contributions.</p>
<p>1. Implementation Letter No.15 of 3/3/80 - Ivory Coast sub-project North-East Savannah Rural Development</p>	<p>Covenants of Implementation Letter No.15 state the following: a) that no later than September 30, 1980, or such date after that as the parties may agree to in writing, CIET enter into operational agreements acceptable to the Entente Fund with each of the following institutions concerned with project execution: IDESSA, ONPR and FCH. b) that a contract between CIET and FOREXI for construction of village wells be signed no later than December 31, 1980, except as the parties may otherwise agree to in writing</p>	<p>Terms of REDSO's 3/3/80 Implementation Letter haven't been satisfied on time. The contract between CIET and FOREXI was signed six (6) months after the scheduled date. REDSO is not in possession of operational agreements signed by CIET with IDESSA, ONPR and FCH.</p>	<p>Entente Fund should send REDSO copies of all agreements entered between EF member states and institutions concerned with project execution and follow-up as necessary if agreements have not been executed.</p>

PROJECT MANAGEMENT PLAN

I. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AID FINANCED PROJECT MANAGEMENT TEAM

Under the general direction of the Administrative-Secretary of the Entente Fund, the Project Management Team (PMT) will assume the responsibility for the planning and operational aspects of the AID financed loan and grant projects for the development of livestock production and food production in the Entente States. The PMT will be administratively responsible to the Economic Development Advisor of the Entente Council; and will be technically responsible to the Rural Development Advisor of the Council.

More specifically the PMT will assist the appropriate national Services of the five Entente States to :

- carry out programs of technical assistance, including training for the purpose of developing an assessment of the food production sector;
- stimulate regional cooperation and coordination in food production as well as in the area of livestock development and marketing, through seminars, regional meetings and similar programs, for the purpose of exchanging information;
- develop, design, implement and evaluate sub-projects that meet the criteria that has been outlined for the AID-financed loan and grant programs;
- apply the strategy and experience thus developed to other projects, to the extent that these prove effective and are compatible with national and regional development priorities, and that they can be undertaken with available resources.

To these ends, the PMT will be composed of four AID-funded, full-time experts representing the following specialties and disciplines :
A Project Team Manager, a general agronomist, an agricultural economist and a livestock production and management technician. Under the supervision

of the Team Leader they will identify the needs for technical assistance, training, short-term and long-term experts and studies, that will be required to meet the project's objectives. The team will likewise arrange for the implementation of said assistance, monitor program progress and assist with periodic evaluations.

The PMT will be responsible for assuring that the final sub-project designs are sound and have been reviewed in order to receive appropriate clearances; the PMT will prepare sub-loan and sub-grant agreements, prepare implementation letters, rule on the satisfactory resolution of condition precedents to the disbursement of sub-project funds; supervise contracting procedures undertaken by the recipients of AID-provided funds; and generally watch over the disbursement procedures to insure adherence to the principles of AID project management.

The Project Team Leader will maintain contact with AID field officers in the Entente States, and with the assistance of the Economic Development Advisor and the Rural Development Advisor of the Entente Fund, negotiate sub-project approvals and related matters with USAID/REDSO. The Project Team Leader will likewise be responsible for the recruitment of personnel, the development of project implementation plans for the two USAID financed programs, the preparation of annual budgets, the maintenance of adequate financial and accounting records, and for the preparation of such reports as may be required by the Entente Fund and other external donors.

By means of frequent travel within the region, the PMT will insure a full exchange of information and experience among the national and regional institutions, and within the various donor agencies providing assistance in these and related fields.

II. PROCEDURES UNDER WHICH THE PROPOSED PROJECTS WILL BE APPRAISED

The project appraisal process will begin when the proposals are submitted by the cooperating countries to the Administrative Secretary of the Entente Fund. Since the responsible officials of the Entente States have received copies of the criteria that have been established for sub-project approval and have agreed to these in writing, it is anticipated that the majority of the submissions will conform to said criteria.

The Rural Development Advisor, The Economic Development Advisor and the Project Management Team Leader will first examine the proposals to satisfy themselves that the sub-project has been described in sufficient detail for preliminary discussions to be undertaken with the USAID. If this finding is in the affirmative, a summary dossier will be prepared by the PMT and transmitted to USAID/REDSO for discussion and comment. As a minimum the preliminary document should contain :

- a brief description of the sub-project
- a description of the target beneficiaries, to include the role of women;
- an indication of the potential of the project for replicability;
- the degree of support of the sponsoring government;
- a preliminary estimate of project costs;
- a brief institutional analysis, covering those organizations deemed essential for progress success. . e. g. , farmers organizations, extension services, agricultural credit organization etc. . as applicable.

If the initial submission by the participating government does not include the essential information noted above, and if the Entente Fund believes that the potential of the project so justifies, further analysis will be undertaken by the PMT, prior to the submission of the project to the USAID for preliminary approval.

Preliminary approval to proceed with sub-project development will be provided through an exchange of letters between the Entente Fund and REDSO. Official comment on projects will also be transmitted via a written reply from the REDSO to the Entente Fund, even though formal and informal discussions may have previously taken place.

'Mini' PP's (project papers) will be prepared for those projects that are carried forward for probable financial assistance. The Entente Fund will encourage the cooperating states to take the lead in the preparation of the sub-projects, assisted as necessary either by the PMT or by short-term experts provided for this purpose, or through the use of other resources available to the cooperating government. The burden of proof, as regards the successful development of the sub-project proposal, rests with the appropriate Entente State. This includes the furnishing of necessary information, the development of implementation schedules and implementation arrangements, plus a commitment to support the proposal, materially and morally as it is being developed.

Training will be considered an essential element of the process of developing sub-project papers, and technical assistance provided by the Entente Fund for this purpose is considered to be a training tool. At the end-of-project it will be desirable that the cooperating governments be capable of preparing, submitting and justifying project proposals before the Entente Fund.

The 'mini-PP's' will include as a minimum :

- those items included in the preliminary submission, expanded upon, or revised if a need for same was expressed during the preliminary review.

- PLUS

- a statement of the technical feasibility of the project;
- economic supporting analysis as necessary, and tailored to the project being proposed. For example, for agricultural credit projects farm-budget data should be developed, indicating the probabilities of debt-retirement by the recipient farmers -- risk analysis may also be included as an integral portion of this study;
- an expanded profile of the target group, if this is suggested during the preliminary review;
- a cost-benefit analysis for capital projects
- a marketing analysis when applicable to the project purposes;
- additional information regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the implementing institutions, and for the delivery system that is being proposed;
- other relevant information regarding the rural sector such as the land tenure system, soils, cropping systems, only if these have a bearing on the project development;
- such sociological information as may affect the success or failure of the sub-project;
- an evaluation plan, preferably proposing the acquisition of baseline data before the project begins, and periodically during implementation. Not only should the kinds of information be described, but also the plan should indicate who will be responsible for its acquisition.
- a full-fledged environmental assessment will rarely be required, however, mention of existant environmental risks must be stated as well as issues relating to public health.

When the Rural Development Advisor and the Economic Development Advisor of the Entente Fund are satisfied that the project paper meets the basic requirements, the PMT will transmit the proposal on behalf of the Administrative Secretary to the USAID for review and comment. It is understood that for those projects requiring the expenditure of \$1.0 million or more in AID-provided funding, formal USAID approval will be required. It is assumed that the USAID/REDSO, and the Entente Fund will schedule formal reviews for the discussion of individual sub-projects in this category, following exchanges of letters will formalize the approval process.

The foregoing represents the ideal in procedures for the submission and study of sub-projects proposed for financing under the two Grant/Loan programs. It must be stated and also understood that in the early stages of the operations of the PMT, several proposals have been received and several projects have been developed which will not completely conform to the guidelines listed above. These should not be rejected out-of-hand, ex-post facto, for the reason that they do not adhere completely to this implementation plan, for the plan is considered the ideal for which all parties to this agreement will strive, and for which increased member country capability should be considered as one of the eventual outputs of the overall USAID program.

III. THE PLAN FOR MONITORING AND EVALUATING OVERALL PROJECT AND SUB-PROJECT PROGRESS

A. Monitoring Overall Project Progress

The monitoring of overall project progress will be accomplished principally through the quarterly analysis of obligations and disbursements of both the USAID provided resources and the local currency contributions of the Entente Fund.

The overview of the task of project management indicates a complex and diversified assortment of actions, including such items as, sectoral assessments, assistance to the Center for Research and Economic Development of the University of Michigan (CRED) Livestock Project, assistance to the Entente Livestock Commission (ELC), the training of cooperating country personnel in a variety of disciplines and jobs, both at home and abroad, the provision of long-term and short-term technical assistance, the development, implementation and evaluation of sub-projects, all within the framework of the USAID's regulations.

The implementation of the sub-projects alone constitutes a formidable task, including the preparation and execution of formal grant/loan agreements, the preparation of letters of implementation, assistance to the cooperating countries with contracting for goods and services, the accounting for and the financial management of dollar and local currency resources provided by two different institutions, each with its own requirements, and of course, sub-project development and evaluation.

For these reasons we believe that annual budgets which have been painstakingly prepared, and which are reviewed and adjusted quarterly, will become useful tools to monitor overall progress of the two projects and to indicate the areas where growth is slower than had been anticipated.

In addition to this fiscal monitoring, the individual technicians comprising the PMT, will prepare periodic reports on their individual activities (see below), which when combined with the Project Manager's report, will provide both a narrative and a tabular report for the sponsoring institutions. The overall project monitoring will thus be shared by the four members of the PMT, consulting as necessary with the Economic Development Advisor of the Entente Fund as regards Entente Fund and USAID policy.

B. Monitoring Sub-Project Progress

It is assumed that the total number of sub-projects that will be developed within the framework of the two overall programs will number between fifteen and twenty. Hopefully, some of these projects will include other aspects of the total project purposes such as sectoral assessments, training and technical assistance and thereby obviate the necessity for additional special sub-projects for these purposes.

Each member of the PMT, will be responsible for from 4 to 6 sub-projects, which will conform as closely as possible to the respective technical disciplines represented. The projects will be monitored quarterly, or more often if conditions require, and a physical visit to each project location will be scheduled at least three times per year.

The technicians will prepare quarterly reports on each project commenting therein on, obligations and disbursements, implementation progress for the various actions underway, problems encountered and the activities planned for the coming quarter.

When projects are lagging seriously, the individual technicians will bring this to the attention of the PMT Team Leader who will discuss same with the Rural Development Advisor and the Economic Development Advisor to the Entente Fund, so that steps may be taken to develop a strategy to deal with the difficulty. It should be noted here, that the implementation of the project is the responsibility of the Entente States concerned, and not a responsibility of the Project Management Team. Monitoring progress of the projects periodically and offering assistance and guidance as needed is the principal task of the aid-funded PMT. It is not intended that the PMT will act as 'implementers' on behalf of the participating countries.

C. Evaluating Overall Project Progress

The Project Papers (PP's), for both the Loan and Grant Livestock and Food production projects, include plans for the periodic evaluation of movement towards attainment of project purposes and goals. The indicators are clearly stated, and need not be repeated here. Standard evaluation procedures will be utilized to match performance against planned targets, and the results subjected to analysis.

The first evaluation is proposed for the period following the second full-year of project operations. For that evaluation, a Project Appraisal Report (PAR) will be developed. Following the collection of data, outputs and schedules of outputs will be adjusted, as well as the implementation strategy, if the results so indicate.

The first evaluation of the overall project should be conducted jointly by the REDSO and the Entente Fund, with the participation of cooperating country personnel as needed. Outside assistance (consultants for example) should be used for this initial evaluation only, if there is no other recourse. The reason for this is to bring Grantor and Grantee together to formally review their program, and plan for adjustments that may (or may not) have to be made. Following the initial evaluation, annual or bi-annual evaluations may be scheduled as to be decided.

Evaluating the Sub-Projects

Whether or not it will be possible or practicable to schedule annual evaluations of each and every sub-project, remains to be seen. Certainly they should be evaluated individually mid-way in the implementation process and again within six to ten months following the TDD. The implementation schedule for each sub-project has a duration on a bare thirty months, thus the sheer weight of numbers, and the relatively short implementation period versus the staff limitations of the Entente Fund appear to opt against more frequent evaluations.

It should be remembered that the evaluations will provide another training opportunity for the cooperating country institutions, and not only should they be encouraged to participate fully, but they should become sufficiently comfortable with evaluation procedures to begin initiating their own activities in this area as the project progresses.

The acquisition of baseline data has been previously mentioned as a requisite part of the project presentation, prior to implementation, in order to provide the evaluators with a 'yardstick' for measuring or quantifying accomplishments. In addition to such data, financial records, interviews with personnel of the implementing institutions, interviews with the beneficiaries, and the quarterly reports of project accomplishments, should provide a good basis for evaluating performance.

In the case of the sub-projects, the possibility of using outside evaluators could provide the means of performing the numbers of evaluations that will be required during sub-project implementation. There are increasing numbers of contractors who are specializing in project evaluation, and this may prove to be the best method for training host-country personnel, and performing sub-project evaluations simultaneously.

W. WAAC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

DATE: November 19, 1981

REPLY TO: *Martha A. Smith*
ATTN OF: Martha A. Smith, Financial Analyst, REDSO/WAAC.

SUBJECT: Financial Management Analysis of the Rural Development Projects of the Entente Fund - Submitted by Arthur Anderson & Company

TO: Mr. Gordon W. Evans, Director, REDSO/WA

Attached are WAAC responses to the recommendations included in the report. Recommendations 1-6 are suggestions that, if accepted, would require WAAC action. Specific responses have been made to these recommendations. Some are accepted wholeheartedly and implementation letters will follow.

Recommendations 7-21 are suggestions that would require EF action and WAAC, ORP support if accepted. WAAC and ORP shall meet in the near future pending the completion of the program evaluation of the Rural Development Projects begun July, 1981. At that meeting WAAC and ORP officers can discuss the recommendations and the most expedient method of implementation as necessary.

Collectively, these recommendations advise establishing new book-keeping methods and accounting systems. The result, of course, would be a new format for reporting financial and program information.

Perhaps a practical alternative for implementation is to hire a consultant. The person responsible must be (come) well versed in AID/ORP Program Management, EF project monitoring, EF accounting practices, and AID/WAAC accounting procedures, restrictions.

Recommendations 22-24 address sub-project practices and possibly can be discussed at the WAAC/ORP meeting.

cc: Jim Ito
William Mulcahy
LeRoy Wagner
~~Rama Bah~~, ORP
Tony Bilecky, SMG

DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS

A. REDSO/WA and USAID

RECOMMENDATION 1

- that REDSO/WA should review and document the operating procedures to be applied in the oversight of finance provided to the EF.

WAAC RESPONSE

Concur. The funding, disbursing and reporting procedures administered on behalf of EF are very complex for WAAC. Complying with the myriad of AID regulations must be just as complex for EF. A complete description of the mechanics of disbursing funds throughout the life of the project would be useful. An implementation letter prepared by WAAC shall be drafted.

RECOMMENDATION 2

- the basis on which the accounting records with the EF are maintained be reviewed. (Sub-projects basis vs. TA, training, construction, commodities, O/C basis)
- that REDSO and EF accounting records be periodically reconciled, possibly on a semi-annual basis.

WAAC RESPONSE

WAAC, ORP and EF had previously discussed the positive effects of accounts maintained on a sub-project level. These procedures should be established in any new project.

Concur. EF should reconcile with the records at WAAC and maintain this on a current basis.

RECOMMENDATION 3

- that REDSO give consideration to the various ways by which the effect of currency fluctuations on sub-projects could be minimized or eliminated.

WAAC RESPONSE

AID must account for all transactions in dollars.

As sub-projects are designed and budgeted, a contingency amount should be added to the sub-project totals.

As stated page 20 of the evaluation, EF "requests the transfer of funds for local currency expenditures on a quarterly basis." Continuing, "sound financial management would dictate the holding of minimal cash balances by the Entente Fund and each sub-project."

At present when an advance is requested for the quarter by EF, the balance outstanding and not disbursed to sub-projects is shown. By minimizing advance requests and by disbursing quickly, EF could help reduce fluctuations to sub-projects.

RECOMMENDATION 4

- that consideration be given to a relaxation of the "source and origin" rules or, that the difficulties and the additional costs that their application is likely to entail should be adequately reflected in sub-project proposals.

WAAC and SMO RESPONSE

Source and origin requirements cannot be "relaxed". Waivers necessary for efficient implementation should be determined and incorporated into the PP. When the project is authorized, the waivers are automatically approved.

At any time, whether waivers are approved or not, funds necessary to ensure the success of a sub-project should be budgeted.

RECOMMENDATION 5

- that REDSO obtain from EF a list of all materials and equipment ordered from AAPC but not yet arrived. All deliveries more than two months overdue should be followed up by telex with AAPC. If satisfactory explanations and new delivery commitments are not received within a reasonable period from AAPC then consideration should be given to revoking those orders and using an alternative purchasing agent.

WAAC and SMO RESPONSE

Sub-projects should be adequately monitored by EF project managers so that deliveries past due are reported to GRP as a normal procedure. Perhaps EF should establish guidelines for the sub-project managers to follow for reporting past due deliveries.

Once past due deliveries are questioned and the reason(s) for lateness determined, a decision could be made as to satisfactory performance of the purchasing company.

RECOMMENDATION 6

- that REDSO review with EF the merits of funding by means of reimbursement of incurred expenses.

WAAC RESPONSE

Concur. As AID tightens its Cash Management procedures, reasons for continuing the type of advance procedure currently in existence will be scrutinized more closely in the future.

The regulation most stringently limiting advances is TFRM 6-8000 (Treasury Fiscal Requirement Manual). The opening paragraph of Section 8050 Cash Advances states:.....monitor the cash management practices of their recipient organizations to ensure Federal cash is not maintained by them in excess of immediate disbursing needs.... Agencies will establish such systems and procedures as may be necessary to assure that balances are maintained commensurate with immediate disbursing needs, excess balances are promptly returned to the Treasury, and, except where contrary to law, interest earned on Federal funds by recipient organizations is promptly paid over to the Treasury; and advance funding arrangements with recipient organization unwilling or unable to comply with Treasury regulations are terminated in accordance with the provisions of 1 TFRM 6-2075.

WAAC will be drafting an implementation letter in the near future to effect the Treasury and AID imposed Cash Management restrictions.

B. ENTENTE FUND

Sub-project Control and Reporting Procedures

RECOMMENDATION 7

- that for those projects which are still in a start-up phase, notably CI-V-1 and T-E-1, appropriate benchmark data should be established. Quarterly reporting by the EF should include a review of actual performance against plan.

RECOMMENDATION 8

- that EF prepare periodic, possibly quarterly, statements of sub-project expenditures which should show expenditure for the period under review, cumulative sub-project expenditures and projected future expenditures required to complete each project. This latter figure will not necessarily be equal to the balance of undrawn PEDSO/WA funds plus amounts held by EF. To the extent that total estimated project expenditures are not equal to the finance agreed then the quarterly report should indicate the action proposed.....

RECOMMENDATION 9

- that all sub-projects should submit quarterly requests for advances. These should be consolidated by EF and would form a documented basis for drawdowns of USAID funds.

RECOMMENDATION 10

- that EF develop a standard set of financial statements which each sub-project should complete on a quarterly basis.

RECOMMENDATION 11

- that the quarterly reports prepared by EF should indicate, on a sub-project basis, the amount of available funds committed and the status of contractual negotiations for the uncommitted balance.

WAAC RESPONSE

Enactment of Recommendations 7-11 would certainly strengthen the EF and REDSO program management functions by more carefully defining the role of the sub-project manager and shifting a greater share of the responsibility for project management and success.

Recommendation 9 is what was apparently envisioned when the projects were begun. Requests for advances have become the result of an estimate of EF project monitors of likely sub-project needs, as stated Page 20 of the evaluation.

Recommendation 9 is the same as Recommendation 1 made in AS Audit Report No. 80-31 dated February 29, 1980. Shortly before the audit a large advance balance outstanding existed in the Rural Development projects indicating the estimates by the project monitors were overstated. However, a conscious effort had already begun to pare the advances and to more prudently request advances. WAAC understood that sub-project managers were increasingly being drawn into the decision-making process. As a result of this effort the advance balance as of September 30, 1980, was down to approximately \$415,000.

As of the quarter ending September 30, 1981, the advance balance outstanding is over \$700,000 with quarterly expenditures averaging approximately \$234,000 in FY 81. Perhaps greater participation by the sub-project directors in the accounting process and on a more formal basis will reduce the advance outstanding.

WAAC assumption is that advances requested by sub-project directors as recommended (#9) would become the basis for reimbursing "incurred" (quotes added) expenses to EF as recommended (#6).

See Response to Recommendation 6 on Cash Management restrictions.

PROJECT EVALUATION

RECOMMENDATION 12

- that the EF should review the role and usefulness of mid-term and final evaluations performed by outside consultants. Consideration should be given to devoting more resources to sub-project organization, planning and reporting of operating and financial information as sub-projects commence their activities.

WAAC RESPONSE

Concur that sub-project design and implementation should be the emphasis of limited resources. However, evaluation of a sub-project by outside consultants can contribute insight and a "fresh look" that might otherwise be missed. In one recent instance, the report was valuable as the evaluation of the sub-project and later served as background material for an audit.

INFLATION

RECOMMENDATION 13

- that the design of future sub-projects should use more conservative estimates of future inflation. Furthermore, the EF should endeavor to monitor the overall impact compared to plan of inflation on future expenditure.

Concur.

STANDARDIZED ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES

RECOMMENDATION 14

- that the EF should draw up, in French, a simple accounting procedures manual. Visits to a variety of sub-projects would be necessary in order to properly understand local conditions and problems of implementation.

RECOMMENDATION 15

- that the EF consider the advantages of establishing a standardized book-keeping system to be applied at sub-project level.

WAAC RESPONSE

Standardization of sub-project book-keeping and accounting procedures insofar as possible, should streamline EF reporting to AID as well as EF monitoring of sub-projects.

ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING OF PENDING FUND MOVEMENTS

RECOMMENDATION 16

- that EF should request sub-projects to periodically report movements (opening and closing balances, sales and cash receipts) in revolving funds. Consideration should also be given to the accounting procedures to be followed at sub-project level. A review should be made of existing procedures to verify to what extent satisfactory controls exist over revenues, cash collections and physical stocks.

WAAC RESPONSE

Cementing accounting procedures for revolving funds now could relieve EF of possible future involvement when the sub-projects are complete.

INTERNAL AUDIT

RECOMMENDATION 17

- that EF should recruit an internal auditor.

INTERNAL CONTROL

RECOMMENDATION 18

- that EF set minimum standards of internal control for sub-projects.

WAAC RESPONSE

Recommendation 17 reflects the reliance that will be placed upon the person responsible for the internal audit function. The person should be qualified to give advice to sub-project directors and to accounting staff. Recommendation 18 reflects the importance to the accounting system of adequate internal control.

TRAINING OF SUB-PROJECT PERSONNEL

RECOMMENDATION 19

- that EF plan to incorporate aspects of financial control into its program of director-level training.

- improvement in book-keeping routines would be assisted with the initiation of periodic training courses for sub-project accountants.

WAAC RESPONSE

Implementation of this recommendation would simplify implementation of recommendations beginning with #7.

QUALIFICATIONS OF EF ACCOUNTING PERSONNEL

RECOMMENDATION 20

- In order to assist the financial manager we believe that consideration should be given to the employment of an outside consultant who would advise on ways in which the present efficiency of the book-keeping process could be improved, assist with technical problems, provide on-the-job training, etc.....

WAAC RESPONSE

The responsibilities of this consultant could be combined with the services suggested in recommendations 7-19 where new systems, procedures, and reporting requirements are discussed.

SUB-PROJECT REVIEW BY EF PERSONNEL

RECOMMENDATION 21

- that EF financial manager should make occasional visits to sub-projects.

Concur.

C. SUB-PROJECTS

CASH BASIS ACCOUNTING

RECOMMENDATION 22

- that consideration be given to maintaining accounting records on a double-entry accrual basis incorporating the use of a general ledger.

RECOMMENDATION 23

- that consideration be given to recording at sub-project level all sub-project expenditures, including those payments made by EF and REDSO.

LOCAL CURRENCY EQUIVALENT OF DOLLAR FINANCE

RECOMMENDATION 24

- that EF inform each sub-project on a quarterly basis of the balance in dollars of undrawn funds. Each sub-project will then translate this amount into francs CFA for comparison with estimated future local currency expenditures.

Project Title: Livestock

X. LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Summary	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Important Assumptions
<p>A.1. Goal</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) To increase the availability of reasonably-priced animal protein for consumption within the region. 2) To augment the standard of those rural poor associated with livestock production. 	<p>A.2. Measurement of Goal Achievement</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Stable or increased per capita consumption of animal protein in the region. 2) Degree to which government policies are designed to increase livestock production by working through rather than around the rural poor. 	<p>A.3. Assumptions</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Participating governments recognize the long-term economic and political benefits of increasing the productivity and standards of living of the rural poor. 2) Appropriate livestock strategies and livestock-related interventions are available or can be devised to increase livestock production among the rural poor.
<p>B.1. Purpose</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) To increase the efficiency and productivity of the livestock sector in the Entente countries while increasing the standard of living of small livestock producers. 2) To foster increased regional cooperation and coordination in livestock production and marketing in the Entente states and to support within the region a process of sectoral analyses which serves to provide continuing information to be used in policy and program evaluation and development. 	<p>B.2. End of Project Status</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Government policies and projects reflect a greater understanding of the importance of the small producer in the livestock sector. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Increased number of projects designed to affect small producer target group. (b) Trends in government-supported research. (c) Government cadre trained in ways to affect small herder production. 2) Government policies and projects indicate greater government support to increased production of alternative sources of animal protein. 3) Existing regional protocols fully implemented and new protocols investigated and (if appropriate) approved. 4) Increased number of regional livestock marketing and transportation projects designed and funded. 5) Institutionalization of periodic annual meetings of EF for discussion of alternative livestock sector strategies and projects, review of results of sectoral research, etc. 	<p>B.3. Assumptions</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Entente member-states will continue to find regional cooperation in the livestock sector in their mutual self-interest.
<p>C.1 Outputs</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) The careful design of interventions (sub-projects) which will test the viability of various means to achieve sectoral objectives. 2) The funding, implementation and evaluation of sub-projects. <p>Research:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Review and synthesis of available information of major sector development problems. b) Field research studies to provide critical information relating to major sectoral development problems. c) Detailed sub-sectoral analysis of livestock production and livestock marketing in the Entente region with policy recommendations. <p>(cont'd. under B.12)</p>	<p>C.2. Output Indicators</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) 10-12 intervention designed with EF/AID assistance or by other donors. 2) 4-6 loan funded sub-projects, 3-5 grant funded sub-projects, 2-3 projects funded by the donors. 3) a) CRH Phase I report b) 5 field research studies c) Final Phase of CRH research 4) annual meetings sponsored by the Entente Fund. 5) Government officials provided practical training in livestock production, range management, ag economics, project design, etc. 6) Protocols concerning animal health, statistics, customs, and regulation of professions. 	<p>C.3. Assumptions</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Close working relationships can be established and maintained between Entente staff and member country livestock officials. 2) Entente member states will reject their pledge to fully implement regional protocols within reasonable time frame.
		<p>D.1. C.1. Outputs (cont)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4) Series of periodic meetings to discuss livestock policy issues within a regional form. 5) Training in member state livestock cadre in key disciplines. 6) Full implementation of livestock protocols. <p>Inputs Technical Assistance, Research, Capital Assistance, Training, Equipment.</p>

Y. LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Est. Project Completion Date: October 1981
Date of this Summary: March 24, 1976

Project Title: Entente Food Production

BRIEF SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
<p>Program Goal: The broader objective to which this project contributes:</p> <p>To increase the per capita production of staple food crops for domestic consumption.</p>	<p>Measures of Goal Achievement:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Comparison of year-one crop production figures with end-year figures shows increase for staple goods (one or more crops per country). 2. Average annual growth rate of food production (calculated from above) is in excess of current population growth rate. 3. Increments in food production not being exported. 	<p>Baseline and subsequent national agricultural, demographic, and trade statistics.</p>	<p>Concerning long-term value of program/project:</p> <p>Increased per capita food production is an economically sound target, that is, the Entente countries have a comparative advantage in food crop production.</p>
<p>Project Purpose:</p> <p>To assist the Entente Countries to make necessary adjustments in their agriculture sector policies which will enable them, with the assistance of the Entente Fund, to implement the strategy of assistance to small farmers and to evaluate its efficacy as a means of meeting their needs for increased food production.</p>	<p>End of Project Status:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The Entente Fund, as appropriate, and the Member States will have made policy changes in agriculture sector resulting in: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> A. Greater emphasis in national and other programs of research to ways of improving small farmer food production. B. Food production components incorporated into existing cash crop production schemes. C. Small farmer credit policies adjusted with respect to terms offered borrowers and financial incentives to credit institutions to institutionalize supply of credit. D. Programs of small-farmer-oriented research being coordinated in region. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Semi-annual report of Entente Fund's project management team. 2. Plans and reports of African and international agricultural and sociological research institutions. 3. Reports of national Ministries of Agriculture and credit institutions. 4. Reports of national Ministries of 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Rainfall is adequate. 2. Small farmers will be responsive to packages of improved technologies and inputs and will take advantage of easier access to and greater availability of agricultural credit.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS

MEANS OF VERIFICATION

CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS

End of Project Status: (continued)

- E. Small farmer food production projects being systematically evaluated and results fed into new project design.
- F. On-going process of sector assessment established.
- G. Greater allocation of national training resources to fields directly related to small farmer development and food production.
- 2. Entente Fund, as appropriate, and Member States designing, seeking financing for, implementing, and evaluating additional small farmer food production projects.

Outputs:

Small farmer food production projects studied, designed, implemented, and evaluated in each Member State.
 Increased capability in Entente Fund and national Ministries of Agriculture and/or Rural Development to design, implement, and evaluate small farmer food production projects.
 On-going sector assessment.
 Seminars and meetings to exchange information, discuss results of subproject evaluations or other research, coordinate and plan future research -- attended by Entente Fund, representatives of concerned national ministries, and representatives of research organizations in region.

Magnitude of Outputs:

1. 7-10 Loan-financed small farmer food production projects, primarily in Benin, Ivory Coast, and Togo.
2. 3-4 Grant-financed small farmer food production projects, primarily in Niger and Upper Volta.
3. Meetings, seminars, and other exchanges of information organized and held at least annually.
4. Ten host-country nationals trained to M.S. level in agronomy and food production; five trained to M.A. level in rural sociology or similar field.
5. Ten 2-week training seminars for host-country nationals and ten 1-month study trips.

1. Semi-annual project reports of Entente Fund.
2. Reports and plans of African and international research organizations.

1. Training and experience of designing, implementing, and evaluating subprojects will be effective in increasing independent capability of Entente Fund and Member States to design, execute, and evaluate small farmer food production projects.
2. Sector assessment, sociological and adaptive agricultural research, and subproject evaluations will provide results useful in refining the strategy of assistance to small farmer food producers.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPACT ASSESSMENTS
Inputs: (continued) Short-term and long-term practical and academic training programs for personnel of concerned Member State ministries and agencies, in Entente Region and in U.S.			
Inputs: Types of Resources AID: A. Grant technical assistance - \$1,680,000 B. Grant capital assistance - \$5,000,000 C. Loan capital assistance - \$10,000,000 Entente fund: Minimum of F CIA 15,000,000 per annum Member States: a. % of sub-project costs b. Candidates for training	Timing of AID Inputs: 1. <u>FY 1976</u> A. Grant TA - \$790,000 B. Loan CA - \$8,000,000 2. <u>FY 1977</u> A. Grant CA - \$3,000,000 3. <u>FY 1978</u> A. Grant TA - \$890,000 B. Grant CA - \$2,000,000 C. Loan CA - \$2,000,000	1. AID Controller Records 2. Entente Project Management semi-annual reports	1. Competent project management team will be located. 2. Financial inputs will be available in timely fashion. 3. Member States' training candidates will be accepted by universities for long-term academic programs.