

PD-ANJ-022

IVORY COAST
URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
MID-PROJECT EVALUATION
681-HG-003
JANUARY 1980

Office of Housing
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

FOREWORD

The following evaluation of the A.I.D.- funded activities of the joint A.I.D.- World Bank, and Government of Ivory Coast Urban Development Project was conducted during 1978 and 1979 by the staff of the Office of Housing/West Africa Regional Office in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, with the cooperation of the Government of the Ivory Coast officials and Ivorian organizations participating.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Peter Kimm". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

Peter Kimm
Director
Office of Housing

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IVORY COAST 681-HG-003
URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (PDU)
MID-PROJECT EVALUATION

I. Introduction

The Urban Development Project (PDU), a joint undertaking of AID, the World Bank (IBRD) and the Government of the Ivory Coast (GOIC), is unprecedented in terms of size and scope of intended policy innovations. It is also the first shelter project in West Africa to be cofinanced by AID and IBRD.

The project addresses two major urban components: Shelter and Transport. Both components are supported by substantial technical assistance. The total cost of the project is \$122.3 million of which \$63.2 million is earmarked for shelter and \$59.1 million is for transport. AID approved its contribution, a \$21 million Housing Guaranty (HG) in June 1976. IBRD approval came in December 1976.

The shelter activities include the following components, some of which are exclusively financed by AID or IBRD, and others of which are jointly financed as follows:

1. Shelter

a. AID/IBRD/GOIC Joint Financed: slum upgrading and sites/services programs for about 220,000 inhabitants on six sites, totaling 316 hectares in Abidjan and 60 hectares in San Pedro;

b. AID Financed: low-income rental housing in Abidjan;

c. GOIC Financed: relocation of families displaced by upgrading; primary infrastructure in the sites and services project and non-low-income components of the mixed income developments.

d. IBRD/GOIC Joint Financed: a line of credit for small loans for the purchase of construction materials and acquisition of lots; primary schools, health centers and community facilities in the upgrading and sites and services areas; and construction of 2 trunk sewers to serve the Abidjan project sites and other neighborhoods.

2. Technical Assistance

a. AID/IBRD/GOIC Joint Financed: support of the Ministry of Construction and Urbanism's formulation of project and program responses to the newly expanded shelter sector policy guidelines for low income interventions; and support to the BNEC for staff development and training for both the public fund management and financial intermediary roles;

b. IBRD/GOIC Joint Financed: a ten-year development study and preparation of an investment program for Abidjan.

The project as designed represented a substantial innovation in GOIC housing strategy through reduction of reliance on subsidy, adoption of a minimum standards approach, channeling resources into direct benefits for the urban poor, and better overall financial planning for the sector. Previous GOIC efforts, although substantial, lacked adequate planning and realistic standards and had become an increasing drain on public finances. The planned rechanneling of resources was to increase the capacity of the GOIC to provide financing to this sector.

AID and IBRD believed the project would present no technical problems, with proposed activities falling within the capability and the capacity of the existing construction industry and the established GOIC para-statal institutions. Financial resources and ability to manage those resources were available. The shelter solutions proposed for the program were all within the means of the lower 50 percent of the urban income group.

(This assumption was correct in the case of the Transport component of the PDU which, albeit complex, did not require a substantial policy adjustment by GOIC and is proceeding on time.)

Mid-way into the shelter activities, although numerous problems have surfaced, substantial achievements have in fact occurred. In summary, these include:

1. BNEC is operational both as a central bank for management of GOIC resources in the sector and as a savings bank. With the help of project TA, BNEC more than doubled savings to CFAF 3.3 billion (\$15 million) in 21,000 accounts (July 31, 1979). The counterpart

training program is proceeding well with full Ivorian senior staff with the exception of Credit Director.

2. Cost-Recovery Legislation applying to upgrading activity has been passed and established the principle of collecting the cost of improvements from beneficiaries.

3. Progressive Rental Schedules have been introduced at the SICOGI low income rental project thereby assuring full cost recovery within rentals affordable by the target group.

4. Cross Subsidy of development costs in a mixed income community has been instituted in one sub-project. The principle of selling middle-income lots at market value rather than cost both permits cost recovery from low-income lots and reduces an implicit subsidy to upper-income groups.

5. Counterpart Training at BNEC, the Ministry of Construction and SETU (parastatal land development agency) has been quite successful.

6. AID/IBRD Collaboration on the first shelter project to be joint financed in West Africa has been successful despite complexities. Questions of approvals and funds disbursement have been worked out without delays. AID priorities of institutions building, savings generation and counterpart training were supported by IBRD and the combined AID/IBRD effort was substantial enough to influence GOIC actions.

Major problems seem to stem from incomplete understanding by AID and IBRD at the time of project design of how much time would be necessary to mount an effort that relied on a substantial shift in GOIC policy, introduction of new procedures and overall training and retraining of staff.

The following Evaluation will discuss the shelter and technical assistance components in which AID is participating, using as reference the Logical Framework (Annex A) and Implementation Plan (incorporated into Annex B).

II. Project Inputs

A) HG \$21 million

First tranche of \$8.6 million authorized in June, 1976.

First draw: \$2,300,000 May 31, 1977

Second draw: \$6,100,000 November 13, 1978
(released from escrow May 7, 1979)

A U.S. Investor for the Second Tranche of \$12.6 million has been selected. At the present rate of project expenditures, GOIC will need proceeds of Second Tranche in April 1980.

B) IBRD \$22 million (shelter and shelter related TA only)

Conditions Precedent for Effectiveness, scheduled for May 16, 1977, were met March 1978.

CPs for disbursement, scheduled for August 1, 1977, were met February 1979.

As of the time of this Evaluation, IBRD had disbursed \$5.3 million for the shelter component.

C) Technical Assistance

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Man-Months Programmed</u>	<u>Delivered/under Contract</u>
MCU	125	150
BNEC	96	102

D) GOIC \$20.8 million

GOIC financing totaled about CFAF 2 billion (\$9.5 million) as of September, 1979.

III. Project Outputs

Progress in achieving the three Outputs listed in the Project Paper is evaluated in this Section.

A. Establishment of Central Fiduciary for Lower Income Housing Project with trained and strengthened staff

1. BNEC

Measurement of this Output was identified as a consolidated BNEC with staff capable of executing responsibilities.

BNEC is fully operational, both as a central Bank for the management of GOIC housing funds and, as a savings and loan bank. During its initial years, most of its activities were associated with the management of GOIC fiscal resources, the FSH, (a high volume, low overhead operation) and most of its income was from interest on bank deposits. By the end of its 1978 Fiscal Year, it had also loaned out most of its savings.

BNEC staff has increased from 60 to 98, including five expatriates. Ivorians have replaced expatriates as director general and technical director. All key positions, except Director of Credit, are now held by Ivorians.

BNEC now records information and monitors projects financed with a GOIC guaranty (Section 2.06(c)) of the Implementation Agreement, but there is no evidence that GOIC requests BNEC advice before issuing its guaranties (Section 2.06(b)).

There is a high-level GOIC review underway to determine whether control and management of the National Housing Fund (FSH) should remain with BNEC or be transferred to the Ivory Coast Sinking Fund (CAA). The goal of improved management of shelter sector finances need not be compromised by this shift. It would, however, require a review of Section 2.06(a) of the Implementation Agreement, which provides that GOIC should ensure that at all times BNEC manages all public funds earmarked for the housing sector. AID and IBRD have indicated their concern to GOIC.

2. SOGEFIHA Rehabilitation

While not a direct Output, acceptance and implementation of this Plan was a condition precedent to IBRD/AID financing and it is certainly related to the policy goal of better financial management of the Sector. The Implementation Agreement provides that GOIC will carry out a satisfactory rehabilitation plan (Section 2.07), and expenditures on this Plan are a major call on FSH resources and hence on BNEC management of GOIC fiscal resources.

According to an analysis carried out during the IBRD Supervision Mission of November, 1978, the SOGEFIHA Rehabilitation Plan is not working. At that time several measures had not been implemented, notably the increases in State and private rents and a CFAF 9 billion loan from CAA. Other measures in the capital portion of the Plan had not been implemented on schedule. The failure to implement the rent increases and to improve collections of both private and State rentals, and the general underestimation of expenses all contributed to operating losses for 1977 twenty times greater than projected in the Plan. These losses further worsened SOGEFIHA's negative working capital balance and, when coupled with missing capital inputs, forced SOGEFIHA into more short-term borrowing (bank overdrafts). During the period of the Plan to date (through fiscal year 1978), SOGEFIHA's short-term debt has increased considerably rather than decreased as foreseen by the Plan. According to the IBRD analysis, this increasing short-term debt will contribute to further operating losses in succeeding years, creating a "snowball" effect which could render the plan completely ineffective and endanger the resources already applied by it.

B. Completed Sub-Projects

The following table compares the magnitude of the outputs as planned and as presently programmed.

	<u>Lots</u>		<u>Persons</u>	
	<u>Planned</u>	<u>as of 7/79</u>	<u>Planned</u>	<u>as of 7/79</u>
1. <u>Upgrading</u>				
Abobo Gare:	1200	1097	45 000	36 000
Adjame	580	561	20 000	18 600
Palieuville	420	527	8 000	14 300
Port Bouet II	1400	1361	12 000	16 000
Bardo	<u>1400</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>15 000</u>	<u>---</u>
S/T	5000	3546	100 000	84 900
2. <u>Sites/Services</u>				
Koumassi NE	2700	1900	14 800	10 500
+ Abobo Nord	<u>1280</u>	<u>n.a.</u>	<u>7 200</u>	<u>n.a.</u>
S/T	3980	1900	22 000	10 500
3. <u>Rental Housing</u>				
Marcory	766	830	4 000	4 150
Koumassi	<u>1100</u>	<u>1100</u>	<u>5 500</u>	<u>5 500</u>
S/T	1866	1930	9 500	9 650

+ Alternate site to be selected

Short-falls in the magnitude of Project Outputs result primarily from conflicts between PDU initiatives and other GOIC policy objectives, such as the Master Plan for Abidjan and the unsatisfied shelter demands of middle-income Ivorian nationals. These include:

- a) Bardo upgrading changed to demolition and relocation on adjacent site.
- b) Original site for Abobo Nord sites/services pre-empted by Triumphal Boulevard and middle-income squatters.
- c) GOIC cut back low-income lots in Koumassi N.E. sites/services to accommodate middle-income demand.
- d) Koumassi rental housing held up because high infrastructure standards jeopardized affordability and because AID is awaiting GOIC assurance that actual beneficiaries will be from the target group.

C. Trained Monitoring Unit in MCU/SETU

AID originally believed the TA would work as a team. IBRD and MCU preferred to place each TA in an individual position with coordination a function of the GOIC Project Coordinator. In any case, the impact of the TA was not designed to be a "monitoring unit" as such, but a series of interventions to strengthen certain functions necessary to carrying out a substantial shelter program.

Actual coordination is handled by a Project Coordinator, the first secretary to the Minister of MTPTCU. His effectiveness has been limited. AID/IBRD propose to improve this situation by assigning a TA directly to the "coordinator" who will be responsible only for shelter activities.

AID introduced a review of counterpart training in an evaluation of the individual TA's conducted in June, 1978 (attached as annex II). At that time:

- Two counterparts had assumed full responsibility (BNEC, DCDU).
- Six had been assigned and were being trained (DCU, DCDU).
- Two had not been assigned (DCC)

Current status is as follows:

- Three additional C/Ps have assumed full responsibility (BNEC, SETU).
- Four additional C/Ps have been assigned and are being trained (SETU, DCDU).
- Two have still not been assigned (DCC).

Additional TA also was provided to strengthen BNEC savings activity.

The replacement of expatriate with Ivorian Experts has occurred more rapidly than in the case of many comparable IBRD-financed projects and represents a significant achievement.

IV. Achievement of the Project Purpose

The Project Purpose is to establish and strengthen a coordinated GOIC operation to design and implement a comprehensive range of replicable shelter projects suitable for low-income families. The sections which follow discuss progress towards achieving this purpose.

A. SETU, SICOGI, MCU and BNEC cooperate to complete HG Project on Schedule

1. Status of Project Implementation

As a result of GOIC budget constraints, the original time-table for the overall PDU (shelter and transport) was extended to permit GOIC funding over 5 rather than 4 fiscal years.

Even taking this into consideration, project implementation proceeded much more slowly than planned.

- a) Preparation of plans, specifications and bidding documents for each sub-project has taken at least 30 months (with the exception of 10 months for the Marcory East rental project), as compared to the 12 months originally contemplated. This compares to 11 to 13 months required by SETU to prepare each of three GOIC-funded sites/services projects prior to implementation of the P.D.U. Project planning, therefore, has taken longer.

- b) A government reorganization in July, 1977, affected the Ministries of Finance, of Plan, of Budget and of Construction with important ramifications for the PDU.
 - i) A new Minister of Finance was named requiring 3 further months of briefing.
 - ii) MCU was absorbed into the Ministry of Public Works, Transport, Construction and Urbanism (MTPTCU). As a result, the GOIC Project Coordinator left, and his position remained vacant for about nine months.
 - iii) BNETD, the para-statal planning consultant involved with four sub-projects, was dissolved; all work was halted for six months until a new consultant took over.
- c) Lack of coordination within MTPTCU and of full appreciation of the policy shifts initiated by PDU. For example:
 - i) Approval of plans and specifications for any given sub-project requires action by five separate departments. Each department employs its own in-house engineers, and there is little or no interdepartmental communication.
 - ii) Lack of comprehension on the working levels further has created situations where designs are turned down because standards are "too low" - in one case 10 months after approval by all other departments.
- d) Conflicts have developed between PDU objectives and other GOIC objectives, such as the Master Plan for Abidjan which calls for a "Triumphal Boulevard" pre-empting portions of some of the sub-projects; the shelter requirements of middle-income Ivorian nationals, a politically important and very demanding segment of the population, which remains unsatisfied by previous or other ongoing GOIC program.

These and similar implementation difficulties are to be expected in launching a program large enough to provide leverage and implying significant policy initiatives. The three-year start-up time, although it may seem excessive when measured against what in retrospect was an overly-optimistic schedule, is not out of line with the experience of similar projects in other countries.

Close and consistent Project monitoring by RHUDO has made possible identification of bottlenecks and of proposed solutions. Continued monitoring represents the best course of action in the future.

B. Above Institutions prepare proposals for future low-income projects

The present PDU reflects a shift in AID emphasis from support of individual projects to an interest in GOIC policy and practices. These policy goals were defined by RHUDO in separate Aide-Memoires to the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Public Works, and the Director of the Ivory Coast Sinking Fund (C.A.A.) as follows:

- a) Careful financial management of the sector
- b) Adoption of lower standards to permit cost recovery from low-income beneficiaries.
- c) Improve, not demolish, existing housing
- d) Devote an increasing proportion of GOIC resources to low-income programs.

These objectives are ambitious and require substantial innovations in GOIC housing strategy and in the institutions that implement this strategy (or strategies). Changes in institutional behavior occur slowly. They can be achieved only as a result of sustained effort at different levels, employing a variety of instruments, over an extended period. As has been suggested, the start-up period of three years is not unusual for projects of this scope; and it is still too early for any observable demonstration impact.

GOIC development financing in general is project-oriented and committed to high standards. GOIC tries to maintain a balance of 50% domestic and 50% foreign financing: the former is derived principally from coffee-cocoa board receipts and determines the over-all investment program in any given year; the complement of foreign loans is available on commercial bank terms with a GOIC guaranty, which is easily obtained. Within these guidelines, operational ministries have considerable freedom to initiate projects.

Careful underwriting and analysis of alternatives on the part of either partner does not inevitably accompany this process. It seems inevitable that the future demonstration effects of the current project will be profoundly influenced by overall GOIC investment patterns.

At the time of the evaluation, it was too early to determine the extent to which new programs will be developed to carry out PDU objectives. Ongoing project activity has indeed established the basis for future projects compatible with the policy goals identified by AID. The cost recovery decree dated August 24, 1977, established the legal basis for future replicable upgrading projects. Similarly, the concept of cross-subsidization introduced into the design of the Koumassi N.E. sites/services sub-project allows a range of pricing in a mixed use community and the transfer of the benefits of subsidy from upper-to lower-income beneficiaries while still achieving full cost recovery. Progressive rentals permit application of a comparable principle to low-income rental housing.

Discussions with GOIC on the proposed HG-004 to strengthen and expand into up-country areas the initiatives of HG-003, as well as the IBRD appraisal of its proposed second shelter project, are scheduled for CY 80.

C. Affordability of HG-assisted shelter to families below the Median Income

RHUDO estimates median income at CFAF 55-57000 a month. IBRD and GOIC identify the target group as those earning the minimum wage to 2.5 times the minimum wage, or CFAF 23,000 to 57,500. On this basis affordable monthly payments should not exceed CFAF 14000.

Rents in the upgrading areas, based on the "worst case" assumption that all cost increases will be passed on to tenants are estimated to range from CFAF 5200-7500 after increases to achieve cost recovery. Monthly payments in sites/services, including a 25 M2 basic unit to be built by the beneficiary, are expected to range from CFAF 10,500-13,650, depending on financing. Calculations are attached in Annex IV.

Rents for the completed rental housing ranged from CFAF 8500-13,500, using an escalating rental schedule. However, although affordable, less than half the units were allocated by GOIC to the target group, according to an analysis of 728 units allocated by the National Attribution Commission. (No data is available on the remaining 102 units distributed by SICOGI to its employees.)

Allocations by GOIC National Attribution Commission

<u>Monthly income</u>	<u>number of beneficiaries</u>	<u>percent</u>
10,000-19,999	1	
20,000-29,999	27	
30,000-39,999	105	
40,000-49,999	120	
50,000-54,000	81	Median Income 46%
54,001-59,999	63	
60,000-99,999	232	
100,000 plus	<u>99</u>	<u>54%</u>

This compares with the results of a pilot low-income sites/services project undertaken by GOIC in 1972. According to a summary prepared by the Ministry of Construction, 45% of the actual beneficiaries were from the target group.

RHUDO has held up approval of the second rental housing sub-project pending GOIC assurances of improved attribution procedures.

The Implementation Agreement also provides (Section 2.08) that GOIC and BNEC shall undertake to make arrangements for the provision, as and when needed, of credit facilities to home owners, artisans and other businessmen in the sub-project areas under such terms and conditions as to make these loans available to beneficiaries earning less than the median income.

(This obligation is in addition to the \$1 million to be provided by IBRD and GOIC for construction material loans and for purchase of sites/services lots. This particular sub-project, in which HG is not participating, was not yet operational at the time of this Evaluation.

As base line date, this Evaluation considers existing GOIC Programs. In the pilot sites/services project undertaken in 1972, only 8 of 87 beneficiaries interviewed received bank loans. According to BNEC the major problem was that a plan identifying the individual lots had not been registered, and therefore individual liens could not be recorded against the individual land leases. The cost of recording the individual lots was too costly for it to be feasible, given the small size of the lots. Catch 22.

Existing mortgage programs by BNEC and the Ivory Coast Credit Bank (CCI) do not as a rule reach the target group. CCI does have a small-loan program for construction materials that does reach low-income groups (6.4% of the 2,000 such loans in its 1976/77 fiscal year went to beneficiaries making less than CFAF 30,000).

PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY
LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Project Title and Number: 681-HQ-003

Annex A

NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATIONS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
<p>Program or Sector Goal: The broader objective to which this project contributes:</p> <p>Improved shelter and related amenities for low-income urban residents.</p>	<p>Measures of Goal Achievement:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Constantly increasing number of water outlets and sanitary facilities per capita in lower income area. 2. GOIC increases construction of community facilities designed to serve low income families. 3. More manifestations of community pride and organization, i.e., neighborhood associations, improved home and earth maintenance and independent construction projects. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Periodic reports from participating agencies. 2. SER/HI and IBRD on site reviews. 	<p>Assumptions for achieving goal targets:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. GOIC remains committed to concept of carrying-out shelter projects for target group. 2. Target group will accept options offered as solutions to their shelter needs. 3. GOIC able to find funding for future projects. 4. Completed projects will result in savings mental and health improvements.
<p>Project Purpose:</p> <p>Establish and strengthen a coordinated Ivorian operation to design, implement, finance and manage replicable shelter projects for lower income families.</p>	<p>Conditions that will indicate purpose has been achieved: End of project status.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. SETU, SICOGI, MCU & BNEC cooperate to complete HG project on schedule. 2. Above institutions prepare proposals for future low income housing projects. 3. 100% of HG assisted lots/units affordable by families below median income. 	<p>Units to be established within MCU (for upgrading and LEM projects) to gather baseline data and monitor construction, management and socio-economic developments.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Periodic reports from participating agencies. 2. SER/HI and IBRD on site reviews. 3. IBRD/SERH/ evaluation reports. 	<p>Assumptions for achieving purpose:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Inflation/wage relationship remains relatively constant. 2. Lower income housing projects receive only minimal subsidies.
<p>Outputs:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Establishment of Central Fiduciary for lower income housing projects with trained and strengthen staff. 2. Completed projects in <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Slum Upgrading b) Sites and Services c) Low income rental housing 3. Trained monitoring unit in MCU/SETU 	<p>Magnitude of Outputs:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Consolidated BNEC, staff capable of executing responsibilities. 2. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) ± 4,000 lots for from 110,000 to 150,000 people. b) ± 4,000 lots for from 22,000 to 44,000 people. c) ± 2,000 units for ± 10,000 people. 3. Nuclear staff of 6 professionals 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Construction reports. 2. Participating agencies reports. 3. On-site reviews. 	<p>Assumptions for achieving outputs:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. GOIC accepts concept of slum upgrading as viable alternative to slum clearance. 2. GOIC will not enter into loan agreements or future high subsidy shelter programs which would siphon funds from the sector. 3. LEM residents able to finance construction of houses. 4. Rental increases in slum upgrading areas moderate so that relocation for economic reasons avoided.
<p>Inputs.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. HG 2. IBRD 3. TA 4. GOIC 5. Home Loans 	<p>Implementation Target (Type and Quantity)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. \$21 million 2. \$22 million 3. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) 72 man months to MCU monitoring unit and. b) 96 man months to BNEC c) HG short-term to Savings Division of BNEC. 4. \$20 million. 5. \$2 million from IBRD plus \$1 million from GOIC. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Disbursement records. 2. Participating Agency Reports. 	<p>Assumptions for providing inputs:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. US Investor will be found. 2. GOIC able to budget funding for its commitments. 3. Qualified/Trainable local personnel available.

PROGRESS TOWARDS SUB-PROJECT COMPLETION

This annex provides a detailed description of the activity to date on each sub-project; compares actual progress to that established in the original project design; and identifies the causes of the delays to project implementation. The narrative is supported by a series of charts graphically illustrating actual vs. planned progress.

A. Upgrading

Prior to the PDU, there was no upgrading of existing communities, only slum clearance with relocation of residents. Preparing these new types of projects took substantially longer than originally planned because of the general problems described in Section IV of this paper (Ministerial reorganization, slow TA arrival, dissolution of BNETD, disagreement over standards, etc.)

1. Abobo Gare

Abobo Gare is the largest and the most complex subproject (it will impact about 40,000 people). Planning this sub-project has taken two years more than the 10 months originally scheduled.

Detail studies, to be carried out by a BNEDT-BCEOM joint venture, actually began about 6 months late in November 1976. Another 3 to 4 months was added while MTPTCU

and SETU defined the infrastructure for the final design instructions. BNEDT made the first site plan presentation in April 1977; SETU design changes were incorporated in the plan presented July 1977. Further modifications were then called for by MTPTCU. In October 1977, GOIC dissolved the BNEDT causing another 6 month halt to work while BCEOM renegotiated its contract.

In December 1977, BCEOM presented the modified site plan during an IBRD Supervisory Mission. Tentative design approval was received subject to modification of the technical description to bring the bidding documents into conformance with international bidding procedures. In February, 1978, MTPTCU approved the final site plan followed in April by IBRD/AID concurrence.


The bidding documents, revised to IBRD and SETU specifications, received final approval in January 1979. During this year, the consultant slowed down work while it renegotiated additional financing for its supplemental work.

Bids for the civil works were called in April, 1979 and opened June 19; evaluation and selection is under way.

UPGRADING

ABOBO GARE

TIME FRAME



- A) CAUSE FOR DELAY:
1. Selection of Consultant - BNETD - BCEOM
 2. Infrastructure Definition Problem - Primary or Secondary
 3. Additional Topo Surveyed Required for Detail Engineering
 4. Submission Prelim. Site Plan
 5. Modifications to Site Plan Requested by SETU
 6. Resubmission Site Plan
 7. MTPTCU Requests Modify - Change Site Market Place & Taxi Gare
 8. Resubmission Site Plan to SETU
 9. Dissolution of BNETD - Studies taken over by BCEOM in Paris
 10. Submission Site Plan to IBRD/AID/BNEC/MTPTCU
 11. Modification to Tech. Description Position of Bid Docts. Requested by IBRD
 12. Approval Site Plan MTPTCU
 13. Submit Tech. Descriptio to SETU - SETU Requests Modification
 14. Resubmit Tech. Descr. IBRD Requests Modify
 15. Submission Complete Bidding Portfolio to all Parties - Approved
 16. Call for Bids

B) PROJECT DELAYS:

5 + 13 - SETU	total of 6 months
11 + 14 - IBRD	7 months
9 - BNETD	4 months
	<u>17 months</u> Due Essentially To Delays Resulting From Site Plan Modifications

DESIGN BIDDING SELECTION CONSTRUCTION
 [Bar with hatching for Design, solid for Bidding, and 'X' for Selection and Construction]

2. Adjame

Planning, originally scheduled for 6 months, took two and a half years. Work started November, 1976, but progressed quite slowly because of the additional on-site topographical surveys required and the dissolution of BNETD. In December 1977, BCEOM took over the engineering studies, but proceeded slowly while it renegotiated its contract.


In March 1978, IBRD/AID rejected the proposed site plan because of two high standards for road design and parking facilities. A semi-final version of the bid documents was submitted in January 1979, and approved by AID/IBRD. MTPTCU approval took until April, while possible project encroachment on the proposed Triumpha^l Boulevard was reviewed.

The sub-project was advertised for bids on June 28, 1979.

UPGRADING

ALJAME

TIME FRAME



A) CAUSE FOR DELAY:

- +1. Selection of Consultant for Detail Engineering
- +2. Prelim. Topo Survey Submitted - BNETD Requests Additional Topo Work.
- +3. Dissolution of BNETD
- +4. BCEOM takes over Studies
- +5. Prelim. Site Plan Submission - IBRD Requests Modifications to Parking Facilities & One Way Streets
- +6. Prelim. Site Plan Forwarded to MTPTCU for Approval - No MTPTCU Action
- +7. BCEOM Requests Additional Payment for Modifications
- +8. Bid Docts. Submitted to SETU then Forwarded to IBRD, AID, BNEC, MTPTCU for Approval
- +9. IBRD/AID Approve Bid Docts - No Action MTPTCU Resulting from Encroachment to Voie Triomphale.

B) PROJECT DELAYS:

2 + 3 = BNETD = 6
 5 = IBRD/AID = 4
 6 + 9 = MTPTCU = 10
 20 Months total - Half due to Non Approval by MTPTCU

LEGEND

DESIGN BIDDING SELECTION CONSTRUCTION

3. Pelieuville


Planning was to have taken 10 months. BNEDT began studies in November 1976, about on schedule. However, dissolution of BNEDT, the slow execution of topographic surveys, and GOIC-imposed design changes have resulted in failure to date to complete design after two years and nine months.

The BCEOM site plan was verbally approved in February, 1978, by IBRD/AID. However, MTPTCU (DCTP) called for major design changes in primary infrastructure. In October 1978, MTPTCU/DCTP approved the revised site plan, but then rejected it a month later. Another site plan was presented in January, 1979, approved by IBRD/AID, and rejected by MTPTCU (DCTP). Additional detail studies were started again.

UPGRADING

PELIEUVILLE

TIME FRAME



22

A) CAUSE FOR DELAY:

1. Selection of Consultant for Detail Engineering - BNEDT
2. Begin Topo Survey
- +3. Dissolution of BNEDT
4. BCEOM takes over Studies in Paris
- +5. Prelim. Site Plan Submission - IBRD/AID/BNEDT Approve Verbally
- +6. MTPTCU Rejects site Plan - Request Incorporation of Liaison Road + Railroad Passage
- +7. MTPTCU Contracts Additional Study of Liaison & Railroad Problems
8. Prelim. Site Plan Submission - MTPTCU Approves (DCTP)
- +9. MTPTCU Disapproves Site Plan (DCTP)
- +10. Site Plan Submitted to IBRD/AID/BNEDT/MTPTCU for Approval - IBRD/AID+BNEDT Verbal Approval
- +11. MTPTCU Requests Modifications to Site Plan (DCTP) COT Plan & Railroad Passage
12. BCEOM Restarts Studies.

B) PROJECT DELAYS:

3 - BNEDT = 6
 6,7,9,11 - MTPTCU = 15
 21 TOTAL

LEGEND

DESIGN BIDDING SELECTION CONSTRUCTION
 [Bar with hatching] [Bar with 'x' marks]

4. Port Bouet II

Studies were expected to take 10 months. A local consulting firm was selected in late 1977 as originally scheduled. Negotiation over consultant's fees took nine months, resolution of the mechanics of contracting procedures with MTPTCU (DCM) another six months, and a series of consulting engineers were rejected because of lack of local experience. Design studies started in February, 1979.

5. Bardo

This was to be a follow-on to a Phase I upgrading project financed with French assistance. The implementing agency, South West Development Agency (ARSO), headed by a director general who reports directly to the President of the Republic, has completely changed the concept of the project from upgrading of an existing community to demolition of this community and relocation of residents on adjacent sites. This is unacceptable for financing under the PDU.

B. Sites and Services

This Evaluation was as base line data the substantial experience in development of middle-income serviced sites in the Abidjan area financed by GOIC. A review of three of these SETU projects shows that design took 12 to 18 months, but that major delays were incurred during construction, which has taken from 30 to 60 months for projects of 40 to 150 ha. The major reason for these delays was GOIC lack of funds for periodic construction payments. Other delays were caused by inadequate contractor performance and material shortages.

The low-income sites/services concept and particularly the element of cross-subsidy being new, it is not surprising that the design has taken longer than the earlier SETU Projects. These delays and changes in planning concepts have led to basic reconsideration of both the original sub-projects.

1. Koumassi N.E. (second and third tranches)

Bidding on the second tranche, scheduled for June, 1976, was advertised in September 1977, 15 months behind schedule. Design studies for the third tranche, are still incomplete because of conceptual changes required by MTPTCU.

Contractor selection took 10 months because the apparent low bidder withdrew.

Construction started in September 1978, two years behind schedule, and proceeded slowly because BNEC would not disburse for civil works until full project financing was assured (IBRD loan becomes effective and conditions met for disbursement).

MTPTCU-imposed design changes reduced the low-income lots to a point where AID/IBRD considered withdrawing financing in August, 1979, with overall construction about 75% completed.

2. Abobo Nord

Planning for this sub-project was to have taken 10 months and construction scheduled to start in the Fall of 1977, was to have been completed in two years. The detailed site plan presented late in 1977 (10 months late) was rejected by MTPTCU in April, 1978, because of conflict with the proposed Triumphal Boulevard. During the ensuing discussions, which took a year, the site was occupied by middle and upper middle income Ivorian squatters, who effectively cannot be thrown out. The sub-project will be abandoned and another site identified to relocate Abobo Gare displaced persons.

KUMASSI NORD EST 2ND TRANCHE

SIT, SERVICE

27

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
AID PROJECT PAPER JUNE, 1976	DESIGN COMPLETE ██████████ XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX					
IBRD APPRAISAL NOV, 1976	██████████ 1//// XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX			JULY, 1979		
CURRENT STATUS SCHEDULE JULY, 1979	1 ⁺	2	3 4 5 ⁺ 6 7 8 9 ⁺	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX		

A) CAUSE FOR DELAY:

1. Dissolution of Study Group - Etudies taken over by New Group
2. Presentation of Prelim Site Plan - IBRD/AID/BNEC Approve
3. Request for Clarification of Bids by SETU
4. Preselection of Low Bid by IBRD/AID/SETU/BNEC/MTPTCU (DCM)
5. Withdrawal of Lowest Bid
6. Request for Clarification 2nd Lowest Bid
7. Selection 2nd Low Bid by MTPTCU (DCM)
8. Contract awarded 2nd Low Bid
9. Rainy Season Stalls begin Construction
10. Begin Construction

B) PROJECT DELAYS:

1⁺ = BNET = 9 months
 5 = BIDDER = 5
 9 = RAIN = 3


17 TOTAL

LEGEND

DESIGN BIDDING SELECTION CONSTRUCTION
 ██████████ XXXXXXXXXXXX

SITES & SERVICES

ABOBO NORD



29

A) CAUSE FOR DELAY:

1. Begin Detail Studies
- +2. Submission of Prelim. Site Plan - Modifications Requested by IBRD.
- +3. Resubmission Prelim. Site Plan - Modification Requested by IBRD - Add more Lots
- +4. Verbal Approval Site Plan by IBRD/AID/SETU/BNEC
- +5. Submission of Site Plan to MTPTCU - MTPTCU takes no Action
- +6. MTPTCU Requests Modification to Incorporate Voie Triomphale
- +7. Resubmission of Site Plan to MTPTCU
- +8. MTPTCU rejects Site Plan - No LEMS in V.T. Right of Way
- +9. Resubmission of Site Plan - MTPTCU does not Respond
- +10. IBRD/AID requests Aerial Photos to Determine Extent of Squatting - IBRD/AID/SETU/BNEC/MTPTCU request Modification to Incorporate Squatters
- +11. New Contract For Detail Studies

B) PROJECT DELAYS:

+2,3	IBRD	=	4 months
5,6,8,9,11	MTPTCU	=	18
			<u>22 months total</u>

LEGEND

DESIGN BIDDING SELECTION CONSTRUCTION
 [Hatched Bar] [Bar with X's]

C. Low-Income Public Rental Housing

Economical rental public housing projects since 1970 included state subsidies for infrastructure in order to lower rents. This component of PDU funded entirely by the HG was to demonstrate cost recovery of infrastructure as well as of the housing units through use of a progressive rental schedule. Units themselves were the stripped down "super-economic" design of SICOGI, the implementing agency.

1. Marcory East

This sub-project was planned for construction from October 1976 to July 1977. Bid documents for infrastructure were submitted to AID in November, 1976, and approved in February 1977. Bids were opened in April and AID approved the start of construction in July.

AID rejected the original unit distribution plan submitted in November, 1976, because of high costs. Discussions continued intermittently until AID approved units the progressive rental schedule and in July, 1978. One reason for this was that SICOGI was unfamiliar with AID's requirement that these schedules be approved prior to start of construction, which differs from both GOIC and IBRD practices.

SICOGI however, bid the housing units in late 1977, and started construction. Units were completed in February, 1979, 17 months after the originally scheduled date, and occupied three months after completion.

2. Koumassi N.E.

Original scheduling called for plans to be presented to AID in February 1977, but presentation was not made until November 1978. AID would not approve these plans until the following two policy issues were resolved:

- a. Despite the fact that the project was sited in one of the PDU sites/services sub-project areas, costs appeared so high that completed housing units were not affordable.
- b. An evaluation of the first sub-project showed that the majority of beneficiaries were above the median income so AID requested GOIC assurances that this project would be handled differently.

PUBLIC REVIEW USING

TIME FRAME

MARCORY EAST 830

AID PROJECT PAPER
JUNE, 1976

CURRENT DELIVERY SCHEDULE
MAY, 1979

1976												1977												1978												1979												1980											
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12

1. Begin detail Engineering
2. Submission of Site Plan and Unit Plans to AID
- + 3. AID approved Site Plan and requests modifications of Unit Plans to lower Const. Costs
4. Submission of Modified Unit Plans to AID
5. AID approves unit plans - 17 weeks
6. Call for bids VRD
7. Evaluation of Bid and Selection of Contractors - AID approves Bid Docts.
8. Begin Const. of VRD
9. Call for Bids Housing Units
- + 10. Submission of Bid Docts. to AID - Begin Const. Housing Units without AID Approval
- + 11. Submission of Sales Plan to AID
- + 12. AID approves Sales Plan and Const. = 25 weeks
13. Completion of Const. VRD & Housing Units
14. Allocation of Housing Units

33

KOUMASSI N.E.

AID PROJECT PAPER
JUNE, 1976

CURRENT SCHEDULE
MAY, 1979

1976												1977												1978												1979												1980												1981									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

* Sub Project Plans are Being Redesigned at Request of MPTCU/AID.

LEGEND	DESIGN	BIDDING	SELECTION	CONSTRUCTION

Sources of delay from original works plan estimates

	<u>SEIU</u>	<u>MIPTCU</u>	<u>AID/IBRD</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Abobo Gare	6		7	4	17
Adjame		10	4	6	20
Port Bouet. II		7	2	2	11
Pelieuville		15		6	21
Koumassi N.E.				14	14
Abobo North		18	4		22
Marcory East			3	3	6
Total months delay	6	50	23	35	111

Other include, consultant slow down or non performance

Rainy season

Total of 111 months delay, attributable as follows:

SEIU	-	3%
MIPTCU	-	50%
AID/IBRD	-	18%
Other	-	29%

EVALUATION OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
TO
THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC WORKS, TRANSPORT, CONSTRUCTION
AND TOWN PLANNING
REPUBLIC OF THE IVORY COAST

Joint Ivory Coast, World Bank, U.S. Agency
for International Development
Urban Sector Project

November 6, 1978

A. Introduction and Summary

The following is an Evaluation of Technical Assistance provided to the Ministry of Public Works, Transport, Construction and Town Planning (MTPTCU) under the joint Ivory Coast - World Bank - U.S. Agency for International Development - financed Urban Sector Project (PDU). The Evaluation covers six technicians, assigned as follows:

Direction Centrale de l'Urbanisme (DCU) - 1 TA

Direction Centrale de la Construction (DCC) - 2 TA

Société d'Equipement des Terrains Urbains (SETU) - 1 TA

Direction Centrale du Domaine Urbain (DCDU) - 2 TA

Data was gathered during September and October, 1978, by the AID project Supervisor attached to the Regional Housing and Urban Development Office (RHUDO) in Abidjan.

All participants cooperated fully in the evaluation process.

This Evaluation is a companion to the comparable evaluation dated June 26, 1978, of Technical Assistance to the Banque Nationale de l'Epargne et du Crédit.

Within the guidance provided by the Government of the Ivory Coast (GOIC), the Technical Assistants (TA) have generally been in compliance with the Terms of Reference (TOR) of their several contracts.

One TA contract (engineer assigned to SETU) runs into 1980. The other five contracts expire during 1979, at which time PDU will have from 12 to 18 months remaining before completion. Two of these contracts are recommended for a one-year extension:

- a) Town planner assigned to DCU
- b) Data processor assigned to DCDU

The other three TA, because either of completion of their technical assignments or of changed circumstances, should be able to depart upon expiration of the current contracts.

Counterpart training has been very slow to develop. The AID/IBRD letter of September 20, 1977, approving the final contracts requested that GOIC:

- a) advise IBRD and AID of the counterparts (CP) assigned to each TA.
- b) have each TA report every six months on the CP training process, clearly indicating what further steps need to be taken to ensure that the CPs will assume full responsibility at the end of the TA contract period.

GOIC has not provided CP in a timely fashion - one division (DCC) still has not complied - nor emphasized this aspect of the TORs. Neither, in the absence of GOIC interest, have the TAs.

Three TAs were to have participated in instruction offered by the MTPTCU Center for Professional Training. No attempt has been made to implement this.

The effectiveness of the TAs also is related to that of the Project Coordinator. Problems of slippage and of sometimes conflicting signals from the various GOIC departments involved probably require much stronger action from the Project Coordinator than has been possible in the past. Stronger leadership also is necessary to achieve those objectives of the PDU which involve a number of significant innovations in GOIC policy and, presumably, in public activity in the sector.

The Project Coordinator at present cannot devote sufficient attention to the PDU because of his other responsibilities. The potential contribution of DCU and DCC also has not materialized because of organizational shifts and the limitations of supervisory staff. To the extent that these deficiencies reflect a GOIC policy posture, albeit unconscious, their resolution does appear beyond the scope of this evaluation.

On an informal basis, the Town Planner and CP assigned to DCU, whose TOR include liaison and coordination, have tried to upgrade their contribution by working more closely with the Project Coordinator. This should be discussed with GOIC.

It is possible that project development may benefit from upgrading the role of the Project Coordinator by formally assigning to his office from DCU the TA responsible for coordination.

B. Evaluation By Department

I. Direction Centrale de l'Urbanisme (DCU)

(previously Direction d'Architecture et d'Urbanisme - DUA)

Responsibilities

DCU is a division of the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation, Construction and Town Planning (MTPTCU), one of whose functions is to program major construction projects throughout the Ivory Coast. Within the context of the Urban Development Project (PDU) DCU is responsible for:

1. Selection of construction sites.
2. Selection of consultants for project studies.
3. Review and approval of project plans.
4. Proposals to the Central Contracting Office (CCM) for award of construction contracts.

TA to DCU consists of a town planner.

Supervisor; Gbeyere Sopi, Assistant Director, DCU

TA: UK Someth, town planner

CP: Guedji Jean Baptiste - Engineer

Present TA replaced previous engineer on October 15, 1977.

Contract termination date is June 15, 1979. CP training began in June, 1978.

Principal TA activities:

1. Assistant to GOIC Project Coordinator
2. Assistant to Director General of Urbanism
3. Development of a procedure of competitive bidding for the architectural portions of DCU projects.

4. Analysis of project plans and specs.
5. Preparation of quarterly reports.
6. Training of an Ivorian counterpart.

Present TA activities confirm generally to TOR as defined in GOIC contract, although CP training started very late and only one instead of two CPs has been assigned. TA now works with the Project Coordinator in an attempt to strengthen overall PDU management, but it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of this effort.

TA also has seen the need for and is preparing criteria for a competitive bidding process for the architectural design of large construction projects funded by GOIC. This entails organizing the actual call for bids, technical and financial review of submissions and presentation of resulting proposals to the final jury that will award design and construction contracts. TA also conducts technical review of projects in the interior of the Ivory Coast as well as of other major projects in Abidjan.

The TOR requires the TA to assure communication between MTPTCU and all implementing agencies involved in P.D.U., as well as to make technical inputs as required into the sub-projects. TA has difficulty performing this task because of the multiple centers of decision within MTPTCU. Subproject approval requires action by the DCU, the Direction Centrale de la Construction (DCC) and DCM individually. TA has made an effort to coordinate these reviews; but because of modifications required by each department, delay is experienced

at each stage.

TA is making a concentrated effort to inform CP on all outstanding issues concerning PDU so that C.P. can follow progress more closely. He has involved C.P. in project reviews, reports and contract award procedures.

C.P. Activities

C.P. has recently started work at DCU and expressed some confusion in grasping the entire role of DCU. CP is presently concentrating on PDU issues along with a small number of other projects. C.P. appears to be well versed in land use planning and is well suited for this position.

Conclusion:

TA effectiveness was initially hampered by division of responsibilities for DCU within MTPCU and lack of designated C.P. Personnel shifts connected with a GOIC reorganization, in which the former Ministry of Construction and Town Planning was absorbed into MTPTCU left voids of authority, and consequently TA could not get initiatives necessary to advance the planning stages of the various sub-projects. This is a major MTPTCU problem, which has been resolved only partially by the activities of the new GOIC PDU coordinator. TA activities have recently proven much more productive as a result of closer communication between T.A./C.P. and the GOIC Coordinator. T.A. is becoming much more effective in his

roles, including establishment of an intensive CP training program. T.A. and C.P. work well together and are well suited for this respective positions. However completion of present tasks cannot be accomplished by terminal date of present contract, and Supervisor has submitted an official request to the GOIC PDU Coordinator for a one-year extension of the TA contract.

e) Recommendations:

1. To fulfill scope of work in GOIC contract and completion of present tasks with an emphasis on C.P. training; an additional year of T.A. is necessary.
2. TA and CP should prepare a Specific Schedule for CP Training and assumption of increased responsibilities. Progress should be evaluated quarterly.
3. Overall Project coordination, although part of the original TOR for this TA, does not now appear appropriately located within DCU, given recent GOIC personnel and administrative shifts. This issue is discussed separately. Its solution might involve a redefinition of TA responsibilities and his assignment to the Project Coordinator.

Direction Générale de la Construction (DCC)

Responsibilities

DCC is a division of MTPTCU and serves to coordinate and monitor the construction of MTPTCU projects. DCC is responsible for the design and construction of community facilities within PDU. TA, under the supervision of the DCC Director General, is assigned for each of these two functions, ie. an architect and a construction engineer. Because of his multiple responsibilities, the Director General has been able to devote only minimal attention to the PDU, and TA, and CPs have not been assigned.

a) Architecture

Supervisor: -Kouakou Yao, Director General, DCC

TA - Louis Jacquand, Architect

CP - none assigned

Principal TA activities:

1. Completion of design and bidding portfolios for:
 - a) Primary Schools
 - b) Health Unit
 - c) Community Center
 - d) Markets of 1000 m², 3000 m² and 6,500 m²
 - e) Neighborhood sports stadium
 - f) Neighborhood play grounds.

2. Financial analysis of each facility

Activities now conform to TOR in GOIC contract except that no CP training has taken place.

TA position was previously held by Lebouar, who completed one year of service. Present TA began as of September 1, 1978. Completion date is August 1, 1979.

TA spent initial period reassembling predecessor's work and has now begun to complete the portfolios of community facilities provided by PDU. TA maintains contact with the various technical ministries involved in order to complete the necessary bid documents. TA is coordinating the design of community facilities with current financial summaries in order to try to avoid cost overruns.

Conclusion

TA appears competent and interested in the development of PDU. He appears likely to complete the technical aspects of his assignment prior to the end of his contract, as follows:

- a) primary schools - minor modifications remain before completion of a comprehensive set of bid documents for a standard 12-classroom primary school.
- b) health - the health unit portfolio is 60% complete but needs modifications to meet Ministry standards.
- c) The Community Center portfolio is 70% complete and will be ready by mid December. TA is working with SETU to standardize design of center so that a portion of building will be financed by job site installation costs

provided for in construction contract and used as an on site office for construction prior to conversion into community center.

- d) markets - A portfolio of the 1000 m2 market is 80% complete, but design of the markets of 6500m2 and 3000 m2 must begin from scratch. TA deals with market areas on a second priority basis because the need for schools and health units are more immediate.
- e) Stadium - The stadium portfolio is 40% complete and requires additional study to complete design. TA believes the project will be ready for bids by December 1978.

Recommendation

There is no apparent need to continue this activity beyond the contract termination date of August 1, 1979.

b) Construction

Supervisor Kouakou Yao - Director General, DCC

TA Philippe Lechesne - Construction Engineer

CP - none assigned.

Principal TA activities

1. Preparation and follow-up of bidding for DCC construction projects.
2. Coordination and supervision construction.
3. Maintaining liaison between Contractors and DCC.

Present TA functions conform to only a limited extent to the TOR in GOIC contract. PDU progress has not reached the construction stage of community facilities, and no CP has been assigned for training.

TA began service in March, 1977 and will complete present contract in March of 1979. Initially TA worked with TA at DCU to prepare plans and specs for community facilities ie. primary schools, community centers, markets and health units. TA responsibilities were to concentrate on the calling for bids procedure and job site inspection. TA construction activities within PDU have been restricted because of the delays so far incurred in the project. TA is not fully aware of the status of the various sub projects within PDU, which indicates a lack of contact with PDU activities.

TA is currently involved with the following projects outside the PDU:

1. Abidjan Sports Stadium
2. Technical Secondary School in Abidjan
3. Technical Advisor housing units at the Riviera
4. Feminine Technical School at Yopougon

TA concentrates on financial coordination construction organization and job site quality control.

CP Activities

Although two counterparts were designated, each remained for only a brief period. TA performed no CP training and expressed doubt that a competent CP could be provided and that, if one were, training would hamper his present working schedule.

Conclusion:

In general, it appears that DCC has given little attention to P.D.U. Supervisor has temporarily the double responsibility for both DCU as well as DCC although lines of decision-making for each are not well defined. Supervisor seems much less informed on PDU activities than other TA supervisors, which indicates a lack of focus complicated by the multitude of his responsibilities. As a result, TAs and Supervisor maintain minimal lines of communication and seem to work independently of one another. Resulting from the lack of attention on PDU issues by Supervisor, both TAs have thus far focussed rarely on these issues, until the architect appointed in September 1978 began to concentrate on the design of PDU community facilities.

There seems to have been little commitment within DCC to provide CPs for either the Architect or the Construction Engineer, and TAs have expressed little desire to have CPs designated.

Supervisor believes that DCC does not have adequately trained staff to deal with PDU community facilities and has requested extension of the Construction Engineer's contract. These facilities, however, represent an investment by far inferior to that of many ongoing DCC projects handled by in-house personnel without technical assistance.

Recommendation

1. In the absence of effective DCC focus on PDU requirements, and despite the Supervisor's request there appears no utility in reviewing the contract of the Construction Engineer upon its expiration in March 1979. A significant improvement to PDU operations could be derived from greater efficiency in GOIC contracting procedures, but requires a MTPTCU policy decision beyond the competence of TA. On-site construction inspection for the relatively simple community facility construction proposed should be a GOIC responsibility.

Societe d'Equipement des Terrains Urbains (SETU)

Responsibilities

SETU, a parastatal land development enterprise, is the implementing agency for the infrastructure components of the upgrading and sites/services portions of PDU.

Principal SETU roles are:

1. Grouping all pre-bid documentation including neighborhood plans and specs developed by outside consultants.
2. Calling of bids and evaluation of submissions.
3. Coordination of construction phases.
4. Control and inspection of job site construction.

TA to SETU consists of a Civil Engineer.

Supervisor, M. Ebah, Technical Director

T.A. M. Don Buu, Civil Engineer

C.P. M. Bamba Moussa, Surveying Engineer

Principal TA activities:

1. Review and report on preliminary neighborhood and specifications.
2. Supervise all aspects of bidding including:
 - a) call for bids
 - b) evaluation of submissions
 - c) proposals for selection.
3. Coordination of general and sub-contractors involved in each sub-project.

4. Inspection and receiving of goods and supplies.
5. Preparation of financial statements.
6. Preparation of periodic progress reports.
7. Training of Ivorian Counterpart.

TA activities conform to TOR set forth in GOIC contract.

TA has occupied this position since February 1977.

During initial months TA dealt with projects closely related to PDU. At present T.A. deals exclusively in PDU activities, and has made positive inputs in the following areas:

1. Design adherence to building codes and standards
2. Preparation of bidding documentation
3. Financial review of sub-projects
4. Comprehensive C.P. training

TA carries out these functions competently and works closely with C.P. throughout his activities.

TA is presently creating a training program for SETU-employed job site inspectors, who will perform quality and quantity control during actual construction phases. TA encounters problems concerning availability of technical manuals that can be used in training activities. It appears TA presence has thus far been useful to PDU and there is a continued need for T.A.

C.P. Activities

CP has been with SETU since January, 1977. He has worked with TA constantly and followed PDU closely. He participates in coordinating meetings on financial aspects, technical reviews and contracting procedures. CP has prior training in survey engineering which has proven useful in resolving job site technical issues, including land title complications. CP maintains interest in recent exposure to financial and managerial aspects. CP and TA work well as a team in defining and following up on outstanding issues. Technical Department supervisor expresses confidence in output of C.P. It appears CP is well suited for this position and present training by TA is effective. CP feels a continued need for TA instruction.

Conclusion

TA activities and related CP training are instrumental to success of entire P.D.U. TA and CP work well together, and CP is exposed to all realms of TA activity while maintaining independent responsibilities. TA and CP are quite appropriate for these positions and are accomplishing positive technical advances for P.D.U. This TA assignment has been the most successful of those evaluated. The underlying reasons appear to be the caliber of TA and CP and the positive attitude of SETU management.

Recommendations

1. No recommendation is presently required on the TA contract, which runs until February, 1980.
2. TA/CP output could be improved by the following:
 - a) TA/CP should maintain updated cost estimates of each sub-project so that an examination of actual costs versus established financial ceilings may be conducted periodically.
 - b) TA/CP should follow more closely consultants activity so as to reduce delays resulting from non-action or design changes.

Direction Centrale du Domaine Urbain (DCDU)

(previously Service Autonome du Domaine Urbain - SADU)

Responsibilities

DCDU is part of MTPCU. It serves as a clearing house for requests for land purchase and as a land title office.

DCDU services include:

1. Receipt of individual applications
2. Examination of the validity of each application
(using criteria established by the National Attribution Committee (N.A.C)).
3. Classification and presentation to NAC of application for attribution.
4. Registration of all legal land titles.

TAs are involved in two departments at DCDU; in both cases under the supervision of the DCDU Director General:

- 1) the administrative secretarial section, which receives applications and maintains archives.
- 2) the data processing section, which deals with screening and keeping updated lists of applications.

It appears that, as a result of the need to coordinate the information collection and data processing phases, there has been some overlap of responsibilities between the two TA positions.

a) Secretarial Section

Supervisor: Koffi Simeon, Director General, DCUD

TA Pierre Allain, Administrative Secretary

C.P. Kadjo N'Dramand, Chief of Service, Section 1

Principal TA activities:

1. Instruction of staff for collection of information for a standard application form.
2. Assistance in the design of application form.
3. Organization of existing land title portfolios.
4. Instruction of staff on collection of information available in existing archives.
5. Training an Ivorian counterpart.

TA activities conform to TOR as defined in the GOIC contract.

TA began service in this position in May, 1977, together with C.P. Contract completion is scheduled for February, 1979. A major obstacle in the beginning was the mass confusion of existing archives. TA was in charge of training the necessary staff to receive and register new applications for land purchase in the Abidjan area. Both TAs collaborated to establish criteria and format for a standard application form that could be coded and used in a data processing system.

After reviewing applications for correctness, TA forwards them to the data processing section within DCDCU. After processing is completed, the applications return to TA for a final review. TA then turns them over to C.P. who forwards a letter acknowledging receipt to each accepted applicant.

When the NAC meets to distribute available land, TA prepares a portfolio of the applications for that area for consideration and selection of applicants.

It appears that the receiving and processing functions are working adequately well and that staff training for this section has been completed.

TA is presently working with data processing section to transfer the 35,000 existing land tenure portfolios onto a standard coded information form.

These data will then be organized into a filing system and incorporated into screening process of new applications.

b) Data Processing Section

Supervisor: Koffi Simeon, Director General, DCDCU

TA: Guy Henri Luc Debesson

CP: Aza Ghandji François

Principal T.A. Activities

1. Centralization of base line documentation.
2. Creation of coding system for standard application forms.
3. Computerization of review and filing system.
4. Verification and distribution of processed results.
5. Training of an Ivorian counterpart.

To date TA activities have conformed to the TOR for this position, although C.P. training began quite late.

TA has been in this position since April, 1977. Scheduled contract completion date is March 1979. Initially, encountered difficulty because the base information was not organized and there was no filing system. The DG decided they would begin from scratch and build a procedure to review and file all new requests for land purchase. TA was involved in designing a standard application form. This form is now used by TA-trained staff to collect information for computer processing of individual requests. T.A. has written programs that machine validate information on each application by 56 different controls.

The valid requests are then grouped into 3 separate listings. The system also produces a letter addressed to acceptable applicants acknowledging receipt of their request. Applicants are only eligible for one lot and are automatically eliminated from subsequent listings after attribution.

TA has processed 3,300 applications thus far, approximately 500 with C.P. assistance. To date TA has performed necessary data processing at the Central Office of Mecanography, where an IBM computer is located. TA's request for an in-house IBM screen was approved. The screen will be installed and operational by Jan. 1979.

TA supervises the final preparation of listings to be presented to NAC. This system is designed so that no changes will be necessary and so that trained staff may complete the processing phases unassisted.

Presently, TA is developing a procedure to add the 35,000 existing land tenure portfolios into the computerized screening system recently instituted for new requests. The system should assist in eliminating existing land owners from the attribution process. TA is writing computer programs necessary to register these portfolios. He will then begin a program to train staff to convert existing portfolio to the new system.

TA started C.P. training in May, 1978, immediately after CP's assignment to department. Initial training concentrated on the mechanical steps of procedure so as to enable CP to continue to process application during TA's vacation. Present training includes programming theory used thus far by TA. It will also include an IBM course on the utilization of IBM screen to be installed at DCDU.

C.P. Activities

C.P. started work at DCDU as of May 1, 1978. He has been with T.A. since his arrival and presently is involved exclusively in activities within this department. CP is employed by the National Office of Mechanography, who has attached him to DCDU. C.P.'s prior training and education is well suited for his present roles at DCDU. C.P. underwent

a brief initial training period with TA to familiarize himself with the system, in which he had not had prior training.

C.P. is responsible for carrying out the processing exercises on the IBM computer.

TA expresses approval of CP's ability to comprehend and carry out tasks assigned to him.

The DG has expressed great concern that the necessary time period for design, training and implementation of this procedure will overrun the terminal date of TA's present contract. DG believes that at least one full additional year is needed to insure completion of present activities and accomplish adequate C.P. and staff training so that DCDU may fully benefit from TA's presence.

Conclusions

There has been an evident overlap of the responsibilities of T.A.'s. Some very basic operational functions are performed by both TAs, rather than one TA and C.P. It appears that C.P. training has lagged, when actually very good opportunities exist but are not being taken advantage of because TAs work for the most part with each other.

CPs lack exposure to TA's work as a result of TA's overlapping functions.

Secretarial Section I functions for the most part independently. This section requires a minimum of TA supervision and appears competent in handling its responsibilities. Secretarial section II & III have undergone 5 months of training and are becoming proficient in their respective tasks. Another 5 months of staff training, which represents completion of the Secretarial TA contract, should be adequate to insure efficient operation of these sections, after which minimal TA supervision may or may not be necessary.

In contrast, Data Processing has not reached a level of complete competence. This is due partially to recent appointment of CP and commencement of training program, and partially to this Section's dependence on the accuracy of information compiled by secretarial sections I, II, and III. An additional factor of the

lack of in-house operational capacities. However, with the installation in the near future of an IBM terminal and corresponding staff training in its utilization, this problem should be resolved. A complex and thorough training program must be devised by TA to permit DCU to benefit fully from the terminal. It is doubtful that this can be accomplished within the period of present TA contract.

Recommendations

1. Because of the overlap of responsibilities of these two departments, and the relative completion of Secretarial Section staff training, only one TA position will be needed. TA to the Secretariat Section should end with completion of the present contract.
2. The TA contract for the Data Processing Section (Debesson) should be extended for another year, as requested by the Supervisor, to include:
 - a) Minimal supervision of Secretarial Sections I, II, III
 - b) staff training in the use of IBM equipment
 - c) continual operation of present applicant screening processes.
3. TAs need to spend more time with staff in order to expand staff perception of overall department roles.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
REGIONAL HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT OFFICE

Annex C
(second part)

June 26, 1978

IVORY COAST 681-HG-003 Urban Sector

Evaluation of BNEC TA

A. Introduction and Summary

This paper sets forth the results of an evaluation conducted by RHUDO on the impact of the Technical Assistance being provided to the National Savings and Loan Bank (BNEC) as a part of the Urban Development Project ("PDU"). The PDU provides funding for up to four positions within BNEC. Only two positions were easily evaluated, the Advisor to the Financial Director and the Technical Director. The Advisor to the Credit Director has only recently arrived, and no Advisor to the Savings Director has been named.

All participants cooperated fully in the discussions leading to this evaluation. The following participated in the evaluation process:

Mr. Yeboue Lazar, Director General
Mr. Michel Chretien, Deputy Director General
Mr. Dakassa Ouattara, Financial Director
Mr. Daniel Leclerc, Advisor to Financial Director
Mr. Michel Dennoyel, Technical Director
Mr. Konan Kouame, Deputy Technical Director
Mr. Lacine Kone, Credit Director
Mr. Jean Yves Breus, Advisor to Credit Director

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In general, the Advisors have carried out competently and effectively the tasks of the Departments to which they have been assigned. These tasks have been almost exclusively limited to BNEC's activities as a manager of Government resources. Very little attention has been paid to the activities of BNEC as a Bank, and the Technical Assistance for this activity, as a consequence, has been minimal. Furthermore, Counterpart training, a major object of the PDU seems to have lagged for the following reasons:

- a) Absence of commitment to this policy on the part of the BNEC Director General.
- b) Absence of a clearly defined training program for each Advisor (T/A) and his Counterpart (C/P).
- c) In certain cases, absence of an adequately designated/motivated/qualified C/P.

The recommendations of this Report provide guidance for achieving the objective of training counterparts.

BNEC management also needs consciously to direct attention to its banking activities and related Technical Assistance, so that its responsibilities in this area can be properly met.

B. Evaluation by Department

I. Financial Department

Director: Outtara, C/P
 Advisor: Leclerc, T/A

A. Responsibilities of Financial Department

1. Coordinate financial strategy and policy for the Fonds Social d'Habitat (FSH) and for BNEC's banking operations.
2. Plan use of FSH resources.
3. Internal management, management information and control systems.
4. Support Credit and Technical Department project evaluations.
5. Foster sound relationships with local and foreign financial institutions.

6. Train Financial Department staff.
7. Temporary control of Savings Department.

B. Activities

The T/A is making valuable inputs to the PDU but this is done without counterpart training. The T/A and C/P act independently of each other for the most part, and there is a lack of communication and only minimal contact between them. This is partly caused by the way responsibilities are allocated by the Director General.

Another consideration is the more generalized limitation on the capacity of a T/A to train a C/P who already is titular head of his department.

1. C/P

The Financial Director does not follow the overall activities of his department. The Director General has delegated to him all the accounting responsibilities for BNEC expenses, which takes a majority of his time. As a result, he participates in and follows up on only about 30% of the meetings concerning the PDU. Recently, his responsibilities have been expanded to include planning the allocation of resources to sub-project components of the PDU. This task has been handled with competence.

2. T/A

The Advisor has followed PDU activities closely and is effective in this role. However, the majority of his time is spent working on tasks assigned by the Director General. He has prepared a comprehensive financial plan which indicated present and future money needs for the PDU. This plan was well prepared and conforms to AID and IBRD reporting requirements.

The T/A has also been given responsibility for the Savings Division, inasmuch as the savings advisor T/A position has not been filled

The present T/A is scheduled to leave in July, 1978.

C. Recommendations

1. There is a continuing need for T/A in this department and to name a replacement for Mr. Leclerc
2. BNEC needs to restructure the responsibilities of the T/A and C/P and obtain their commitment to maximize interaction and to provide training so that C/P will be able to assume the full range of his responsibilities.
3. Remove responsibility for the Savings Department from the Financial Advisor.
4. Establish a comprehensive work program for this Department which will:
 - a) define responsibilities clearly between the C/P and T/A;
 - b) establish a program for shifting responsibilities from T/A to C/P;
 - c) conduct regular evaluation of the performance of both C/P and T/A.

II. TECHNICAL DEPARTMENT

Director: Denoyel, T/A
 Director Adjoint: Kouame, C/P

A. Responsibilities of Technical Department

1. Cooperate with Financial Department activities in PDU, particularly financial planning for loan disbursement.
2. Monitor all aspects of PDU and make inputs when necessary, as follows:
 - a) liaison with implementing agencies and participation in overall coordination.
 - b) joint supervision of construction with implementing agency.
 - c) establishment of pertinent documentation on construction methods and materials

- d) establishment of and maintenance of a Master Project Plan, including an up-to-date ledger of expenditures.
3. Coordinate IBRD - AID approval process by making available for review relevant documentation on:
 - a) total projected cost per unit/lot.
 - b) financial affordability to beneficiaries.
 4. Technical control of BNEC housing finance activities other than PDU.
 5. Staff Technical Department, including training of a successor.

B. Activities

BNEC's inexperience in addressing a project of this magnitude has been underlined in their slow initiation and subsequent follow-up of issues concerning the PDU. However, this department now seems to be dealing more efficiently with these issues and proceeding more expeditiously.

The financial and technical functions of project implementation have not always been clearly distinguished and separately assigned to the respective departments. On occasion, the same tasks have been doubly assigned.

1. T/A

The Technical Department has had three T/As since its creation, the incumbent serving without concurrence of AID or IBRD. The first two T/As made positive inputs to the definition and execution of technical staff tasks. Although this department is strong in the expertise needed to coordinate efforts for the advancement of the PDU, there have been repeated slowdowns in activity during the breaking in period for each T/A.

2. C/P

Kouame has insured the continual functioning of this Department but has other responsibilities that limit his complete attention. He has a good grasp of PDU financial and technical requirements. This department exhibits a continuing dialogue between the C/P and T/A; with the C/P being brought into the decision process.

C. Recommendations

1. Clearly define the separation of functions between Technical and Financial Departments. This would encourage each Department to perform its respective tasks more efficiently.
2. To help overcome serious delays in project development, put Kouame in charge of coordination between BNEC and other organizations involved in the PDU. This would enable him to stimulate communication among PDU participants; possibly better inform him of the reasons for delays; and help BNEC make more positive inputs to PDU development.
3. Develop a plan for transferring full Departmental responsibility to the C/P during the next twelve months.
4. An advisor should remain in this Department for the next year until full departmental responsibility has been transferred to the C/P. Kouame's performance should be evaluated six months after assuming full power to ascertain whether additional T/A is required.
5. Name a C/P who can be trained as Deputy Director, Technical Department.

III. CREDIT DEPARTMENT

Director: Lacine Kone, C/P
 Advisor: Breus, T/A

A. Responsibilities of Credit Department

1. Design and implement procedures for appraisal, approval, commitment, disbursement and servicing of loans.
2. Staff training.

B. Activities

1. T/A

Because this position has only been filled since January 1978, it is too early to assess the effectiveness of T/A. He has been instrumental in organizing the department and is effective in assessing needs and responding to them. His influence is felt in other

departments, because he is willing to make inputs where the needs exist. Home improvement and land acquisition loan programs for middle and upper income housing are now under way. However, of 220 applications, only 35 loans totaling \$43,000 could be approved. This is a very modest start in view of the presumed need and BNEC's savings deposits of more than \$2.5 million.

2. C/P

Mr. Kone carries the title of Director of Credit and Savings, to whom the T/A is assigned. He is often involved in dealings with the Credit Department, but he does not appear to be vested with full authority for the two activities under his supervision. There also seems to be a lack of desire by Mr. Kone to immerse himself into the activities for which he is responsible. T/A works mostly with the Chief of Credit and another employe.

C. Recommendations

1. Identify specific C/P.
2. Establish a comprehensive work program for T/A and C/P which will:
 - a) define clearly responsibilities of A/P and T/A
 - b) establish a program for increased assumption of responsibilities by C/P
 - c) conduct a regular evaluation of the performance of both C/P and T/A
3. Develop criteria and procedures for a lending program suitable for PDU beneficiaries.

IV. SAVINGS DEPARTMENT

A. Activities

To date there has been no T/A filling the position of Savings Advisor; the department has been supervised by the Financial Director T/A. The Department's activities have not been supported consistently. Periods of successful promotional activity are followed by slack. Technical and mechanical difficulties have arisen in handling accounts.

In general, BNEC management has shown little interest in expanding this activity.

B. Recommendations

1. Designate a C/P and contract for qualified T/A experienced in the mobilization of savings.
2. Establish a comprehensive work plan for T/A and C/P.
3. Review procedures including those previously developed with AID assistance to determine the most effective and efficient system to utilize for the Savings operation.

cc: BNEC
MINTP
IBRD
DS/H
ECCN
USAID/Niamey

Affordability of Cost Recovery in Upgrading
and Sites/Services

RHUDO estimates median income at CFAF 55-57,000 a month. GOIC and IBRD identify the target group as those earning the minimum wage to 2.5 times the minimum wage, or CFAF 23,000 to 57,500. On this basis affordable monthly payments should not exceed \pm CFAF 14,000.

1. Upgrading

The following are based on latest cost estimates and the "worst case" assumption that all cost increases will be passed on to tenants.

a) Abobo Gare

1. Total Secondary and Tertiary cost to residents	1,325 billion CFAF
2. Total number of households of which 90% are renters totaling	6,802
3. Average cost per household	194,800 CFAF
4. Average additional monthly rental charge per household	2,400 CFAF
5. Average current rental fee	4,500 CFAF
6. Total average monthly rental fee after expansion	6,900 CFAF

b) Adjame

1. Secondary and tertiary cost	644 million FCFA
2. Total households of which 90% renters	3,569 3,212
3. Cost per household	200,500 FCFA
4. Additional average monthly rental charges	2,500
5. Average current rental fee	5,000 FCFA
6. Total average rental fee after expansion	<u>7,500 FCFA</u>

c) Pelieuville

1. Secondary and Tertiary cost	359 million CFA
2. Total households of which 90% renters	2,525 2,273
3. Cost per household	157,950
4. Additional average monthly charge	1,950
5. Average current rental fee	5,000
6. Total average rental fee after expansion	<u>6,950</u>

d) Port Bouet II

1. Secondary and Tertiary cost	485 million FCFA
2. Total households (98% are renters)	3,700
3. Cost per household	131,080
4. Additional monthly charge	1,600
5. Average current rental fee	3,600
6. Total average rental fee after expansion	<u>5,200</u>

2. Sites & Services

For the purpose of this discussion, the following assumptions can be made:

- (1) A 25 m² core unit will cost 625.000 FCFA
- (2) Land buyers will put 20% down on infrastructure and 10% down on superstructure
- (3) Loan interest will be 12%

a. Koumassi N.E.

(1)	Infrastructure cost 125 m ² x 3,900	=	487,500 FCFA
	Superstructure cost 25 m ² x 25,000	=	<u>625,000</u>
(2)	Total cost		1,112,500
(3)	Down payment		
	infrastructure (20%)		97,500
	superstructure (10%)		<u>62,500</u>
	total downpayment		160,000
(4)	loan value		1,112,500
			<u>- 160,000</u>
			952,500
(5)	Monthly payment in FCFA		
	10 years	15 years	20 years
	13,650	11,400	10,500