

Rural Assessment Manpower Study
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FINAL REPORT¹

RAMS

ASSESSMENT TEAM

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Conclusions

1. There is a continuing need to assist the Mauritanian Government to increase its data collection, analyses and planning capability.
2. The RAMS Project, which was addressed to this need, will not achieve many of its objectives.
3. The RAMS Project Paper was unrealistic and over-ambitious in light of its short time frame and the logistic difficulties in conducting research in Mauritanian conditions.
4. Its staffing pattern was inadequate for its objectives, particularly in regard to a senior planner and a survey research expert, and it lacks any clear conception of how interdisciplinary and intersectoral research is to be integrated in terms of design, data collection or analysis.
5. Contractor performance under the leadership of the first Chief of Party was very poor in regard to financial management, recruitment and assignment of personnel, and the design and conduct of research. While overall management improved markedly following the arrival of the present Chief of Party the effects of the earlier period remain.
6. Because of the failure to integrate and coordinate the component studies adequately at the outset of the project or to properly design the surveys, there are serious problems in interpreting and analyzing the data for policy and planning purposes.
7. Due to the dearth of data currently available to Mauritanian ministries and to donors, RAMS data, regardless of their quality, will be used to plan and justify programs and projects.
8. Phase I RAMS project reports are seriously behind schedule and Phase II output requirements are unrealistic in light of available time and staff.
9. Little progress has been made in institutionalizing the RAMS data collection and analysis process in the Mauritanian Government.
10. The most critical tasks that must be accomplished in Phase II of RAMS are:

- (a) improving the quality and integration of Phase I studies; and .
- (b) analyzing, integrating and presenting findings within a policy relevant framework.

Recommendations

1. Highest priority should be placed on:
 - a. the preparation of integrated, high-quality Policy Option Papers (see below); and
 - b. supporting the preparation of the GIRM 1981-85 Fourth Five-Year Development Plan by.
 - i. having development economist Firouz Vakil, assisted if necessary by Mr. Manley, Dr. Quan Dinh, and Dr. Brown, devote additional time to the preparation of the overall policy framework paper requested by Assane Diop;
 - ii. having all RAMS experts jointly develop ideas for projects that they believe will address critical constraints in rural sector development by early February;
 - iii. detailing RAMS economist, Dr. Quan Dinh, for up to two days per week, from February through April, to assist Assane Diop in the selection and development of RAMS team project ideas according to the Fiche format required for inclusion in the Fourth Plan.
2. The requirement for the development of sectoral project papers should be dropped as a RAMS objective and output, since it is not expected by U.S. AID Mauritania or by Assane Diop and is not feasible in view of the volume of work remaining.
3. The number of Phase II reports should be reduced from 20 to approximately 6 through consolidation and the possible elimination of some topics agreed to by RAMS, GIRM, and U.S. AID.
4. The research and analysis process required for the preparation of Phase II reports should be shifted from separate efforts by individual expert consultants to working groups, in keeping with the reduction and consolidation of studies recommended above.
5. A major team-building group dynamics workshop should be conducted in late January or early February to:

- a. catalyze and orchestrate the preparation of summary project Fiche ideas for possible inclusion in the GIRM Fourth Plan; and
- b. develop objectives, a conceptual framework, and a workplan for each of the consolidated Phase II Policy Option Papers.

The workshop should be conducted by a skilled professional process person working closely with Drs. Quan and Vakil. It may be useful to include one or two additional participants with in-depth knowledge of the issues raised by this assessment and an expert in the use of the log-frame approach to workplan development.

6. Senior economist Dr. Firouz Vakil should be obtained on a full-time basis to provide policy focus and intellectual leadership for the Phase II effort. In light of their earlier failure to provide a satisfactory Senior Development Economist, Louis Berger Associates should be urged to make Vakil available to RAMS on a full-time or at least greatly increased basis (perhaps three days per week).

7. The present time-consuming, two-tier report review and modification methodology should be modified so that expert consultant group reports need be reviewed and modified in a single tier process with appropriate RAMS and GIRM officials.

8. The process of report translation should be greatly speeded up immediately.

9. The 1981 seminar schedule should be extended over an additional two-month period to provide more time between meetings both for RAMS and GIRM staff, particularly as regards Seminars 3 and 4.

10. An "extra" or additional seminar on rural development should be held in Aioun or Nema, as requested by the GIRM for reasons of "geo-political expediency" and so that the project management seminar can be presented to key GIRM managers in Nouakchott.

11. The RAMS 1981 long-term training proposal should be carried out as presented, or failing that, a minimum of two scholarships be made ASAP for:

- (a) a senior development economist ("macro" or "micro")
- (b) a macro-planner/economist

12. The GIRM should be asked for assurances--insofar as possible--that returning long-term trainees will be given a role and a place somewhere in the GIRM planning process.

13. It should be made a responsibility of RAMS expert-consultants to reestablish and maintain contacts with the seventeen designated and other counterparts within the government.

14. We do not recommend additional funding for the RAMS project or for the design of the RAMS II follow-on project referred to in the RAMS Project Paper.

15. We strongly recommend that U.S. AID Mauritania continue to support the process of developing better planning capacity with special attention to the rural sector in the following ways:

- a. Provide selective technical assistance to future national survey data collection efforts undertaken by GIRM ministries;
- b. Provide a modest level of technical assistance and training to the Office of Studies and Programming in the Planning Directorate of the Ministry of Economy and Finance;
- c. Sponsor small-scale studies of specific policy-relevant issues that have been identified by RAMS or other research efforts. These might include, for example, additional work on:
 - i. land tenure
 - ii. trade-offs between public and private enterprise in rural development
 - iii. trade-offs between investments in dry-land and irrigated agriculture
 - iv. trade-offs between large and small-scale irrigation perimeters (a critical issue in light of planned OMVS and AID/Senegal activities
 - v. ways that existing indigenous production and resource control organization could be used to foster rural development.

16. Possible follow-on activities should be discussed by the U.S. AID Mauritania mission and appropriate Mauritanian counterparts ASAP to assure continuity and follow-through on critical substantive and institution-building issues.

Preface

This report was prepared under AID contract AFR 0211-S-00-1013-00. Its objectives are to assess the work of the Checchi Company under contract for the RAMS project in Mauritania and to make recommendations in regard to: (a) work remaining to be done on data collection and analysis; (b) means of providing the GIRM with useable information from RAMS research activities; (c) the institutionalization of RAMS objectives through possible follow-on activities supported by U.S. AID Nouakchott.

Team members were Allan Hoben, Boston University African Studies Center; Emmy Simmons, U.S. AID; and William Rutherford through the U.S.D.A. The report is based on work carried out between December 8 and December 23, 1980 in Nouakchott, Mauritania and on briefing discussions held in Washington, D.C.

Documents consulted include: all RAMS Phase I reports that were available in draft by December 8; the RAMS Project Paper and Amendment; the Checchi Company proposal for the RAMS project and contract; Grant Agreement; the U.S. AID In-House Evaluation of RAMS (John Grayzell, memo of July 1980 plus annex); all RAMS quarterly progress reports, June 1979 to October 1980; RAMS Briefing Book (prepared for assessment team); RAMS Long-Term Training Proposal; Proces Verbal, RAMS "Tech Committee" Meeting June 1980 and annex (unité sociologique); Séminaire: Développement Rural Intégré (Rosso February 1980, Kiffa August 1980); GIRM, Méthodologie de Préparation du IVème Plan May 15, 1980; Briefing IVème Plan de Développement à l'usage des commissions consultatives de Planification; "Politique de Développement: Aspects Macro-Economique," by Assane Diep; Fiche de Projet (planning directorates format for Project Identification); RAMS Rural Sector Preliminary Work Plan; Atlas de la République Islamique de Mauritanie, by Charles Toupet; Area Handbook for Mauritania, American University Foreign Area Studies; Country Profile/ Mauritania, U.S. Department of State; and Economic Situation of Mauritania 1979 IBRD.

People interviewed by members of the team include:

Pierre L. Sales	Chief of Party, RAMS
Rene Weber	Technical Director, RAMS
Bruce Heath	Manpower Specialist, RAMS
David Sarfaty	Manpower Specialist, RAMS
Louis Siegel	Training and Documentation, RAMS
Cristian Juliard	Statistician, RAMS
Firouz Vakil	Senior Development Economist, RAMS
Dinh Xuan Quan	Development Economist, RAMS
Robert Brown	Agricultural Economist, RAMS
Habib Kraiem	Dryland and Oases Agriculture, RAMS
Youssef Nasri	Irrigation, RAMS
Lamine Soumah	Fisheries, RAMS
Clyde Wilder	Livestock, RAMS
Mona Fikry	Social Anthropologist, RAMS
Patrick Hauser	Geographer, RAMS
Robert Manley	Data Processor, RAMS
Alf Persson	Data Processor, RAMS
Assane Diop	Director of Studies and Programming, Planning Directorate, Ministry of Economy and Finance, GIRM
Hamadi Lam	Director of Agriculture, Ministry of Rural Development, GIRM
John Hoskins	Mission Director, U.S. AID-Mauritania
John Grayzell	RAMS Project Manager, U.S. AID
Tony Wirtz	Rural Development Officer, U.S. AID
Linda Neuhauser	Health and Nutrition Officer, U.S. AID
James Hughes	Agricultural Officer, U.S. AID
Cindy Reeser-Bogen	U.S. AID Contractor
Paul Guinett	U.S. AID Contractor
Francis Martenz	UNIDO/UNDP, Nouakchott

We would like to thank all members of the RAMS project team and the AID mission staff for their cooperation and assistance in facilitating our work. We are particularly grateful to Lou Siegel, René Weber and John Grayzell for their roles in coordinating our work.

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William Rutherford

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Washington, D.C. January 1981

I. INTRODUCTION

This assessment was undertaken at the request of U.S. AID Washington and U.S. AID Mauritania to answer several questions that arose during the review and approval of an amendment to the RAMS project. This amendment provides \$1.6 million of additional funding to cover a cost overrun and costs for which the original project budget did not adequately provide.¹

Despite a note of optimism expressed in the introduction to this amendment,² there appears to be substantial agreement among the U.S. AID Mauritania project manager, the RAMS team, and Assane Diop, the project's principal counterpart in the Planning Directorate of the Mauritanian Ministry of Economy and Finance that:

- * The RAMS Project Paper was unrealistic and over-ambitious in light of its short time frame and the logistic difficulties in conducting research in Mauritanian conditions;
- * Its staffing pattern was inadequate for its objectives particularly in regard to a senior planner and a survey research expert; and it lacks any clear conception of how interdisciplinary and intersectoral research was to be integrated in terms of design, data collection or analysis.
- * Contractor performance under the leadership of the first Chief of Party was very poor in regard to financial management, recruitment and assignment of personnel, and the design and conduct of research. While overall management improved markedly following the arrival of the present Chief of Party the effects of the earlier period remain.
- * Because of the failure to integrate and coordinate the component studies adequately at the outset of the project or to properly design the surveys, there are serious problems in interpreting and analyzing the data for policy and planning purposes.

¹Amendment to the Rural Sector Assessment and Manpower Survey; distributed in Washington June 17, 1980.

²"The project is currently functioning well. The data collected to date are extensive and reliable." Amendment, p. 2.

- * Due to the dearth of data currently available to Mauritanian ministries and to donors, RAMS data, regardless of their quality, will be used to plan and justify programs and projects.
- * Phase I RAMS project reports are seriously behind schedule and Phase II output requirements are unrealistic in light of available time and staff.
- * Little progress has been made in institutionalizing the RAMS data collection and analysis process in the Mauritanian government.
- * While there is a continuing need to assist the GIRM in strengthening its capacity in data collection and analysis for planning, it is not clear what kinds of follow-on activities can best accomplish this objective.

We believe that this assessment can make a positive contribution to the RAMS project by: providing a dispassionate assessment of the magnitude of these problems; suggesting what realistically can be accomplished in the remaining life of project; and by recommending how this may best be done. We also believe that our assessment will help U.S. AID Mauritania to plan follow-on activities in a timely and effective manner. It should be borne in mind, however, that this assessment was conducted under extreme time pressure and is not an official project evaluation.

The remaining sections of this part of the report are concerned with an overview of RAMS objectives and the evolution of various parties' expectations regarding the realization of these objectives. Part II is an assessment of project management, research accomplishments and institutionalization to date. Part III recommends specific changes in project objectives, management procedures, and institutionalization activities, and suggests directions for follow-on activities.

A. The Growth of RAMS Objectives

A review of project design and approval documents and discussions with RAMS principal AID and Mauritanian proponents indicates that its initial, underlying objectives were to support GIRM's incipient shift towards greater reliance on investment in the rural sector, and, at the same time, to begin to foster a process of more rational and environmentally sound planning in Mauritania by supporting its leading advocate in The Ministry of Planning and Mines. It was also thought that the Rural Assessment and Manpower Surveys (which were initially to be separate efforts) would be broadly useful to AID and other donors by providing the data and conceptual basis for rural sector assistance.

During the course of project design various objectives accreted to RAMS through the involvement of several design groups. Other objectives (particularly the requirements for project identification and design) were added to the project to defend it against criticism during the long and arduous process of project approval.

As a result, the final Project Paper was ambitious and far-reaching in scope. The "rural" perspective of the project's title is not restrictive. Indeed, the Project Paper implies that the RAMS effort should address all rural sector development problems as well as the larger employment issues at both micro and macro scales while at the same time responding to the needs of both policy-makers and project-designers by identifying specific projects that will weaken development constraints.

The official goal, purpose and outputs of the RAMS project are summarized in the Project Amendment submitted to AID-W in June 1980:

The goal of the original project authorized February 1978 is to establish the framework for the long-term economic development of Mauritania's Rural Sector. The purpose is to:

(1) develop information for decision-making among alternative development strategies; and (2) translate these strategies into specific programs and projects. The means of accomplishing these objectives has been baseline data collection through surveys and compilation of secondary data and studies in a wide assortment of disciplines.

The series of stages of project activity is outlined below:

1. Base Line Study - The collection of information necessary for planning purposes (substantive topics include environmental degradation; rural production; income and consumption needs; social and demographic change; labor force trends and industrial and urban unemployment);
2. Identification of Overall Development Strategies - The use of base line information to identify a number of long-term development strategies with a clear understanding of the economic, social and environmental benefits and costs of each alternative;
3. Identification of Development Program Priorities - Following the choice of a basic country-wide development orientation, an assessment is to be made as to

the necessary interventions in each relevant sub-sector (health, agriculture, manpower training, etc.);

4. Development of Project Option Papers - A detailed identification of possible projects in each subsector;
5. Design of Projects - The designing of precise projects for submission to possible funding sources;
6. Institutionalization Phase - Final rewriting, and synthesizing of the accomplishments of the preceding stages and transferral to the GIRM, to include incorporation of findings into the National Development Plan.¹

In its successful bid the contractor proposed to achieve all of these objectives within the specified time frame and budget.

B. The Decline of RAMS Expectations

RAMS, like other projects with unrealistic objectives, created unrealistic expectations among its various constituencies. Some of these expectations concerned the roles to be played and the contributions to be made by AID, the RAMS team and the GIRM; some concerned the quality and utility of the results from RAMS research; and still others concerned the future course of planning for rural development in Mauritania.

Due to the unrealistic nature of initial expectations and the serious problems that have arisen during implementation, there has been a steady decline in the expectations held by all parties. There has, however, been considerable reluctance to modify or reduce the original goals, objectives or outputs of the project for both professional and contractual reasons. It is essential to understand the nature of initial expectations and the extent to which they have been met, frustrated and modified in order to understand the dilemma faced by AID and RAMS management and the policy context within which decisions on the future course of RAMS must be made.

1. Expectations About What was to be Done

Both AID and the Planning Directorate anticipated the recruitment of a highly qualified group of experts with substantial experience in both the process of development planning and the provision of technical advice. AID's own staff capacity was quite thin as the Mission was still fairly new. The Planning Directorate, then a part of the Ministry of Planning and Mines, was scheduled to receive some staff augmentation through the World Bank, but there were in fact few

¹RAMS Amendment, pp. 1-2.

Mauritanian professionals in the Directorate at the time RAMS was being designed. It was expected that all experts would be fluent in French, a requirement recognized in the R.F.P. and stressed by Checchi in their proposal.

AID, the Planning Directorate, and Checchi all agreed that the RAMS team members would have to establish the project on the ground very quickly, for RAMS could contribute to the Government's Fourth Plan for 1981-85 only if results were ready before the drafting date. Although the implementation of the RAMS project was delayed for a full year, the expectation that RAMS could contribute to the Plan was apparently retained by all parties.

All parties also continued to anticipate that the two-year time frame would be adequate to achieve the desired results. Indeed, one of the reasons for contracting with a business-oriented firm rather than a university was AID Nouakchott's belief that only such a firm would be able to manage the recruitment, organization and logistic support of a complex project efficiently in a tight time frame.

Both AID and the RAMS team expected that there would be strong support from the Mauritanian Government. In general terms, there was an expectation of ready access to top policy-makers and technical experts through the two interministerial committees called for in the Project Paper. Specifically, RAMS expected to receive logistic support and working space from the Planning and Statistical Units (particularly from the Bureau of the Census), personnel for the planned field surveys, and data processing services. AID and the Government, on the other hand, expected that the contact between the RAMS team members and the government counterparts would support the professional development of Mauritanians in planning, primarily at a more technical professional level, but also, to some extent, at the survey enumerator and ministerial levels.

2. Expectations Concerning RAMS Results

The Planning Unit and AID both expected the numerous reports described in the Project Paper as well as a certain amount of intangible--"process"--output. It was anticipated that the reports would be based on analysis of primary field information as well as on synthesis of secondary information. In addition, however, it was expected that there would be a coherence--an "inter-relatedness"--to these reports which would add up to a strategy for rural development in Mauritania. The RAMS team agreed to the report requirements and assigned responsibility for various subject areas in terms of report titles. RAMS also agreed to a schedule of seminars for discussion of RAMS-related topics with government personnel.

It is perhaps interesting to note that there were no checkpoints built into the project implementation schedule which would have provided for reevaluation of report requirements.

3. Expectations concerning RAMS Contribution to Future Mauritanian Rural Development Planning

Expectations that the RAMS effort would contribute to the process of improved planning for integrated rural development run through the documents and were shared by all parties. The unanticipated reorganization of the government following a change in leadership and the relocation of the Planning Directorate in the Ministry of Economy and Finance caused concern, but this was alleviated by the fact that the same people remained responsible for the planning effort. While no specific targets were specified by the project documents, it seems to have been expected that the provision of training for Mauritians identified in the RAMS contacts would be an appropriate concomitant of the support needed to contribute to the future course of development planning and rural development in Mauritania.

4. Problems in Meeting Expectations

As has been noted above and is detailed below, many of these expectations were not met. Many of the "experts" initially recruited were underqualified, inexperienced, or had personal problems that interfered with their work. Not all spoke French. The arrival of the team was delayed a full year after project authorization while AID Mauritania, which was experiencing growing pains, negotiated a bilateral agreement with the GIRM. The contractor did not succeed in organizing the research in a timely fashion and RAMS data will contribute only marginally to the GIRM Fourth Development Plan.

The Mauritanian Government was unable to meet its obligation to provide enumerators for the survey or to ensure the cooperation of the statistical unit or the Data Processing Unit. The inter-ministerial committees functioned only sporadically and liaison proved troublesome.

After several months of confusion, a poorly designed, logistically difficult and expensive survey was launched in the fall of 1979. This effort, with which no one is very happy, produced statistical data of questionable validity and has preempted much RAMS staff time and budget. Phase I base line studies were delayed and for the most part evince little integration or coordination between experts, needs and findings. Finally, with the exception of the training seminars, there has been very little progress in institutionalizing RAMS activities or objectives into the Mauritanian planning process.

5. The Current Situation (December 1980)

In the face of these difficulties and other changing circumstances, RAMS Mauritanian sponsor, Mr. Assane Diop, Director of Studies and Planning, the AID Mauritanian leadership and

the RAMS staff have all reduced their expectations, but in ways that are not entirely compatible.

Mr. Diop recognizes that RAMS was over-ambitious but believes that it has achieved "20 percent of its objectives and that if it achieves another 20 percent it will have been a success and will have advanced the state of planning by decade." He is disappointed with the quality of RAMS personnel and management, the quality of data collection and analysis to date and the delay in obtaining project results.

Despite these problems, he maintains that RAMS' activity has done much to "clarify planning and data collection issues," to augment the available data base and, perhaps most importantly, to "save" the concept of a more rational planning and the nascent planning process during the recent change of government.

Because of mounting pressure to complete the Fourth Development Plan, Mr. Diop assigned highest priority (at the time of our interviews) to the preparation of a paper providing an overall framework for development planning and macro data estimates to be prepared by Firouz Vakil (a senior development economist based in Senegal and working for RAMS only four days per month) and the preparation of project "fiches" or short descriptions containing financial data for specific projects to be included in the Plan.

Also important, but less urgent in Diop's view, is the preparation of the policy option papers based on an integration rather than a recapitulation of Phase I findings. He believes that some of these should be organized by sector and sub-sector, agro-ecological zone, while others should deal with cross cutting policy issues such as land tenure and land reform, trade-offs between dry land and irrigated agricultural investment and the potential role of the private and public sectors.

At least some other Mauritanian ministry officials are expecting RAMS to provide extensive base line data and a list of projects ready for donor financing.

AID Mission Director John Hoskins expects RAMS to end on schedule and to produce useful background information for program and project planning. He does not, however, expect RAMS output to alter AID's development strategy in Mauritania or to provide the mission with pre-project or project documents. Indeed, some RAMS team members, rightly or not, expressed regret that they were not involved in or even informed about possible AID projects in their area of competence.

RAMS management is understandably concerned with meeting the extensive reporting requirements called for in their contract in an orderly and realistic way. RAMS experts expect to

complete work on Phase I reports and hope to complete the 19-odd Phase II reports. In light of the amount of work remaining to be done and the short time in which it must be completed, however, they do not expect to devote a large proportion of their time to working on material for the Plan or to project identification and design.

There is, thus, a disjunction and potential conflict between the expectations and priorities of the parties most directly concerned with what RAMS will accomplish in its final months. The most obvious problem this poses is that the Planning Directorate wants policy and project inputs in the first months of 1981, while the RAMS team, which with a few exceptions is not experienced in this type of work, believes that it must complete its analysis of the base line data prior to tackling policy or project design issues.

II. ASSESSMENT OF RAMS PROGRESS TO DATE

A. Project Management

The contractor for¹ the RAMS project is a consortium of three experienced firms, well known in the field of development assistance and with considerable expertise and background in West Africa. This fact alone makes it difficult to understand many of the anomalies to be found in an examination of the organization and management of the RAMS project.

1. Organization and Conceptualization

The present assessment team is well aware, as indicated earlier, of some of the problems inherent in the project design and the handicaps imposed upon the contractor by circumstances beyond his control (e.g., the contract implementation delays, inadequate on-site logistical support, etc.). However, in terms of organization, the project appears to have had some conceptual and organizational flaws from the beginning.

Despite the fact that the basic purpose of the project is to develop baseline data for development planning, and despite the fact that the project is being carried out under the supervision of and in cooperation with the GIRM ministry with primary responsibility for planning, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and despite the fact that the project's Mauritanian counterpart is the GIRM Director of Planning, no experienced development planner has been or is now a part of the RAMS table of organization. Furthermore, of the entire team of RAMS expert consultants, none has had any formal training in planning and very few (approximately five of twenty-one long-, medium-, and short-term staff) have had any experience of or exposure to long-term, macro-development planning. Only two medium-term and one short-term, part-time, expert consultants can be considered to have both actual training and experience in macro-economic planning.

A variety of data collection and research techniques are called for in the implementation of this project. By far one of the most important is the conduct of extensive, variegated yield surveys in areas never previously examined in depth (e.g., work force composition, consumption pattern, income levels and distribution, etc.). Such surveys are complex and

¹Checchi and Company, Louis Berger International, Action Projects International.

difficult in highly organized, sophisticated environments; they are even more so under conditions and circumstances prevailing in Mauritania. Nevertheless, the RAMS T/O did not and does not include any expert in survey techniques and methodology.¹ Consequently, the surveys conducted by RAMS have been constructed/conducted in an ad hoc manner by nonexpert staff and with predictable results in terms of accuracy and reliability (see below section 13).

The contractor prepared a voluminous response to the RAMS RFP, including a proposed methodology and detailed plan of implementation. Yet, despite a 12-month delay between contract signature and the beginning of project activities, there is no evidence that the contractor prepared or followed a well-conceived and developed work plan. Project implementation planning appears to have been ad hoc and intermittent (e.g., during the early months of RAMS, the team met in one planning workshop and in a general meeting presented/coordinated its programs with the GIRM Technical Committee established for that purpose; no team planning workshops appear to have been held in the past six months nor has there been a subsequent meeting with the Technical Committee). As a consequence, the integrated, interdisciplinary development of RAMS outputs has been elusive and difficult to achieve.

The contractor proposed in its RFP response the addition to the team of a technical director and/or deputy chief of party (COP), and an administrative assistant to relieve the COP of the major ancillary administrative tasks. This proposal was not followed up or acted upon for several months and resulted in numerous problems which had a negative effect upon project implementation. (See U.S. AID controller's RAMS Evaluation Report, May 8, 1980, annex 1D.)

2. Management of Personnel

Perusal of the Phase I reports and research documents as well as multiple interviews with individuals indicates that by and large the RAMS staff functions as a group of expert consultants working on a joint project rather than as a unified team engaged in a single, interdisciplinary and integrated undertaking. The staff is quite diverse in nationality, training, work experience, and background. This, of course, has a number of inherent implications, both positive and negative, for the project. On the one hand, the combination of expert consultants brings together diverse experience and perspectives on developing countries' problems and processes. On the other hand, unless welded together through consistent and forceful management, leadership and policies, the staff never becomes a true team but remains a group of separate expert consultants. In RAMS, the

¹Note: The first RAMS Chief of Party requested support of such an expert but it was never obtained.

latter seems to be the case. It is our view that this is due in part to: (1) the diverse work experience of some members of the staff (this is the first country-wide or "macro" project ever participated in by most); (2) the difference in educational and professional backgrounds (some staffers are quite senior, some quite junior); and (3) a language barrier (some of the staff speak little or no French, some little or no English).

3. Professional Staffing

The professional qualifications and caliber of RAMS expert consultants is both a cause and a result of the project's present predicament. Perhaps due to the lengthy delay in fielding the staff after the signing of the contract, only three of the forty long-, medium-, and short-term consultants named in the contractor's proposal actually joined the project.

The subsequent identification and recruitment of appropriate expert consultants has been long, arduous, costly, and only moderately successful if one compares expected length of stay with actual length of stay. Because of the press of time in implementing the project, some staff were identified only through hearsay, others were hastily engaged on the basis of personal resumes, and without interviews. Perhaps not surprisingly, some five staff members have been released for gross incompetence, unprofessional conduct, or similar reasons. Some loss of staff (and time) must also be attributed to an inordinate number of accidents and illnesses which have befallen the RAMS staff. Of the present sixteen long-term staff and medium-term staff members, only six have been with the project since project start-up. To date, a total of 42 long-, medium-, and short-term professional staff have been involved in the RAMS project.

As a result of this process, the RAMS staff are, with some notable exceptions, only marginally qualified for the project positions and responsibilities. Many staff members have only worked previously on "micro," local, or regional projects. In some cases, staff with limited experience who have only worked in junior positions previously, now hold senior or supervisory positions in RAMS. Some senior RAMS staff positions are filled (or have been filled) with people working outside of their principal areas of expertise; others have been patently under-qualified professionally for the positions they held in RAMS. In general, the major compromises in staffing appear to have been on the side of experience. These have been complicated by the fact that French-speaking capacity was also traded off in certain key instances.

Some examples may better illustrate this major problem of appropriate staffing:

- * The fisheries expert is a trained nutritionist. Most of his prior work experience has been in that

field; apparently with only one year's training in marine biology and work on two general "micro" marine projects of limited duration for a Senegal consulting firm, this staff member is now responsible for research, analysis, and development of strategies and projects on the "macro" scale for all Mauritanian inland and maritime fisheries. In our judgment and that of RAMS team experts, his report reflects his weak qualifications.

- * The recently replaced (December 1980) RAMS senior manpower expert holds a Master's degree in Human Resources but has had only four years' professional experience in the field (1970-1974), including manpower studies among other duties in a sparsely populated U.S. state. He has spent as much or more time as a law enforcement expert (1974-1980) and a high school teacher (1966-1970) during his professional career. He has never been to Africa before. His only previous overseas experience was as a missionary in France and Switzerland (1960-1962).
- * RAMS' second and current manpower specialist is an accomplished economist with serious academic credentials and lengthy professional experience. His vita indicates close involvement during the past sixteen years with macro and micro economic development projects in Latin America and the Caribbean. However, he has no formal training or notable background in manpower, nor does he speak French or have any relevant prior African experience. It has been indicated that he will primarily be involved in employment questions for RAMS.
- * The senior Development Economist currently attached to the project is very well qualified and is the most capable macro planner and economist in RAMS. However, he is engaged full-time on one project and part-time on another in neighboring Senegal. It has therefore been arranged that he will devote four days (a long weekend--Friday afternoon to Monday afternoon) a month to RAMS' development of alternative macro development strategies. His work with the project began in November 1980.
- * The agronomist responsible for the studies, analyses, and strategies in the key area of macro dry land and oasis agriculture for Mauritania is well trained academically. However, his curriculum vitae indicates that he has had only two years' professional experience, after leaving school, working as a junior economist on relatively small and limited "micro" projects, prior to being recruited by cable to join RAMS in a senior position.
- * RAMS principal statistician holds a doctorate in African history, Master's degrees in political economics and

government. He has fluent French, work experience in African and other developing countries at the "micro" level. He describes his principal competencies as "private sector management, research, and teaching."

4. Management Methodology and Outputs

a. General. Aside from the ancillary administrative and logistical support tasks connected with the functioning of the RAMS staff, the fundamental responsibility of the managers of the project is the achievement of project goals and purposes.

Staff briefing and coordination, the establishment of work plans and timetables, the meshing of interdisciplinary inputs, the orchestration of the various factors required to achieve desired project outputs, is the functional role of management. Obtaining the efficient preparation of high quality products in a timely manner is a direct result of management leadership and organizational abilities.

Interviews with RAMS staff members indicate that at project start-up no project or other background briefings were given to expert consultants prior to their arrival in the field. In many cases, little or no briefing or orientation on the Mauritanian environment in general, and project development planning in particular, were provided to RAMS staff when they arrived in the field.

In other words, RAMS expert consultants were recruited in various countries, traveled to Mauritania, joined the RAMS team--where the major management focus in the early months was on such critical logistical problems as housing and transportation--and were left to flounder on their own. One senior staff member declares that it was at least a month before their roles and expected inputs began to emerge. This procedure is said to have been the general pattern for most arriving mid- and short-term expert consultants. No "team-building" processes seem to have been employed, thus leaving newly arriving expert consultants "foreigners" to the rest of the staff.

b. Methodology. As far as a work plan is concerned, little or no overall use seems to have been made of the logical framework contained in the project paper (e.g., it was never translated into French). Nor do the long sections in the contractors' proposal on the research methodology, report production scheduling (years one and two), and staff involvement in RAMS outputs, seem to have been translated into an updated, revised on-the-ground work plan.

After the departure of the first Chief of Party (COP) who reportedly had become practically dysfunctional due to personal problems prior to his release, a new working procedure evolved. An all-staff seminar was held over several days in

mid-1980 to review and coordinate planning, research, and other project activities.

An in-house U.S. AID evaluation of RAMS took place in spring 1980.¹ A number of valuable and pertinent comments and suggestions were made by John Grayzell, U.S. AID Project Manager, Linda Neuhauser, AID Health Officer, James Hughes, AID agronomist, and Doug Sheldon, AID controller. Some positive responses were obtained from some RAMS staff as a result.

RAMS management subsequently decided upon and carried out the following procedure: (1) Upon completion of the first draft of an expert consultant's Phase I sector paper, it was presented to and critiqued by an all-staff seminar. Copies of drafts were simultaneously sent to U.S. AID and GIRM. (2) Suggestions, comments, and/or criticisms were made at that time; and (3) the author subsequently modified or revised his/her paper in consequence. This step was to provide and permit input from all team members from all the other sectors and disciplines involved in RAMS, thus fortifying the intersectoral and interdisciplinary approach. (4) The next step was review of the subject paper by RAMS management and the GIRM Director of Planning. After their critique and concurrence (and any further revisions required), the paper was considered final and (5) given for translation (into French and/or English) and reproduction in the requisite number of copies. The last step--reproduction/translation--is done partially "out country" and reportedly requires a horrendous two and one-half (2-1/2) months for completion. Prior to the translation/reproduction step, an average of three (3) months are required from the time an expert consultant completes his first draft to its final clearance by this two-tiered review process.

This approach, however, has completely failed to achieve the desired and necessary degree of interdisciplinary integration. Attention was called to this fact in a memorandum on methodology from the Technical Director dated November 23, 1980 stressing the need for all Phase II papers to reflect a unified application of data and research findings. The interdisciplinary aspect, it was felt, would be enhanced by universal utilization of a single format, an example of which was annexed to the Director's memorandum.²

Further, the COP issued a memorandum on Report Requirements (October 22, 1980)³ reviewing the contractual obligations of RAMS and indicating by name the individual expert consultant responsible for their achievement. This memorandum contains a reprise of the original group approach to paper/report preparation and repeats the fact that "Activity Group III involves

¹ See Annex, 1A, 1B, 1C, and 1D.

² See Annex 2.

³ See Annex 3.

detailed analysis of elements that cut across sectoral boundaries." The Phase II formulation of overall development strategies adds a senior development economist to both sector paper input and review tiers in the Phase II assignment flow chart (November 25, 1980).¹

c. Planned Outputs. The best measure of the appropriateness of RAMS management methodology is a review of project implementation progress. Achievement of study report production schedules is as shown below.

(1) Phase I Studies

(a) Planned completion²

Phase I reports were originally scheduled for completion over a twelve-month period, with base line studies being completed in five (5) to eight (8) months after project start-up; subsector and functional studies were to commence in the sixth to eighth months and to be completed by the twelfth month.

(b) Actual status³

Due to the methodology used and other factors including vicissitudes mentioned above, some sixteen (16) Phase I reports are still not completed at the time of this report (December 31, 1980). Three (3) of six (6) base line studies are not yet complete⁴ some nineteen (19) months after project start-up (and some ten months after the arrival of the new COP). Subsector and functional studies are also less than 25 percent complete.

(2) Phase II Studies

(a) Planned completion

Phase II option papers were originally scheduled for completion within a three to nine-month period of the second year of the project.⁵ Subsequent project extension/amendment now schedules completion of these documents for the three and one-half month period of November 1980 to mid-February 1981.⁶

¹See Annex 4.

²See Annex 5. Contractor's Proposal, page 5.

³See Annex 6. Status Phase I Reports (Situation des Etudes, 1ere Phase).

⁴Ibid.

⁵See Annex 7. Contractor's Proposal, page 59.

⁶See Annex 8. Schedule for Phase II option papers.

The completion of other project elements (excepting the final report, EOP evaluation, etc.) was scheduled as shown below at the time of the signing of the contract amendment extending the project by four months and increasing the budget by \$1.6 million (for a total of \$5.6 million).¹

<u>Phase</u>	<u>Scheduled Completion Date</u>
1. Base Line Studies (formerly Data Collection/Aggregation Evaluation Phase)	August 1980
2. Identification of Overall Development Strategies (formerly Policy Option, Phase I)	September 1980
3. Identification of Program/Project Priorities (formerly Analysis/Project Identification Phase)	October 1980
4. Development of Project Option Papers (formerly Policy Option, Phase II)	January 1981
5. Design of Projects (formerly Project Development Phase)	April 1981
6. Institutional Phase-Re-Writing-Necessary Additions-Synthesis (formerly Policy Option, Phase III)	August 1981

(b) Actual status

At this writing,² information garnered by the assessors indicates that no Phase II option papers (shown above as Phase 4) are yet ready for the review process; and most are apparently not even in the first draft stage. With the exception of the "Agro-Ecological Regeneration" paper, which is in the first draft stage, the remaining Phase II Option Papers are presumably "in preparation." However, the assessors were only able to identify and confirm this status for four (4): "Nutrition/Health," "Agricultural Production," "Health," and "Appropriate Organizations."

It is anticipated that the "visiting" senior development economist will prepare the work covered in Phase 2 (Overall strategy identification). No work appears to have been done on Phase 3 (Project identification). Both of these reports are reputedly scheduled for completion one month from now in January 1981.

¹See RAMS Contract Amendment, page 17.

²As of December 31, 1980.

d. Other Outputs

In addition to the planned outputs discussed above, the contractor has provided constant support and assistance to the GIRM Directorate for Planning in the form of counseling, "brainstorming," and counsel advice as requested. The GIRM has made frequent use of RAMS personnel as "technical resources" since project inception.

In addition to the above "extracurricular" inputs, RAMS was also called on in July 1980 to produce--on extremely short notice--a series of ten Phase I syntheses of sectoral findings to be used in a GIRM ministerial level Economic planning conference in August. These papers were distributed to the GIRM Sector and Planning Commissions.¹ In the words of the Planning Director, "RAMS responded splendidly to our needs." Most of the research in the subsector and functional study areas was well advanced and the collection of base line (survey) data nearly complete at this time. The highest priority was given to this Mauritanian request and the sectoral syntheses were prepared and distributed to the relevant GIRM development ministries in time for what turned out to be a highly successful national economic and planning conference. It should be noted that these papers were not called for in the contractor's scope of work and were distributed, for political reasons, within the Mauritanian Government under the imprimatur of the "Ministry of Economy and Finance--Bureau d'Etudes et de Programmation." As a result, while RAMS received neither credit nor feedback, it is clear that certain of their materials have received wide circulation and attention at many important levels of the GIRM.

5. Management Summary

While laboring under a number of handicaps RAMS management has been characterized by inadequate, inept, and often poor performance in the areas of project conceptualization, planning, and implementation. Inefficient personnel identification and recruiting methods have resulted in the classic bind of too little, too late.

Certain key posts such as planning, survey expert, and macro development economist have not been adequately filled to this date. The current RAMS staff, though generally only marginally qualified for its myriad tasks, has labored hard and long to the best of its ability to produce the project/management outputs achieved to date.

The materials produced by the RAMS effort so far are of varying quality and degrees of usefulness. However, RAMS management has yet to supply the leadership and methodology needed to weld the team into a cohesive unit capable of producing a well-integrated interdisciplinary product.

¹Rural Development, Human Resources, Industrial Development, Infrastructure, Finance and Economic Relations.

It would also seem that more aggressive and creative management could alleviate if not eliminate the two and one-half month gestation period for the translation/reproduction of a document even if it meant setting up a special courier service and sending the material to Paris, London, or even New York.

Because of various problems which basically redound to RAMS management responsibility, the project is seriously behind schedule; it is completely out of synch with the needs of the GIRM Fourth 5-year Development Plan and is in serious danger of failing altogether to produce the outputs called for in its contract. In fact, the assessors have the gravest doubts at this point about the reasonableness of even expecting RAMS to adequately complete a number of the tasks contractually called for--despite the additional funding and four-month time extension.

B. Research

RAMS' unrealistic objectives, weak design, late start, staffing problems and poor management have left their mark on the quality and efficiency of its research design, data collection and processing and analysis to date. This will restrict the quality and utility of its results. It should be noted, however, that in spite of the difficulties they face, present RAMS team members show great dedication to their work.

The type of interdisciplinary and intersectoral development research envisaged in the RAMS project design is very difficult to carry out even under ideal circumstances. The difficulties stem fundamentally from the fact that experts in each field tend to be most comfortable with their own professional models and over-confident of their explanatory powers. As a result, each expert focuses attention both on the kinds of data collection and analysis and on the manipulation of certain variables and relationships with which he/she is most familiar. Simultaneously, experts make numerous explicit and implicit assumptions about relationships and variables that are exogenous to their models. These assumptions may be more or less accurate, particularly with regard to a particular developing country's conditions. While they are often useful for the experts' home country conditions, they may well be inadequate or erroneous in the host country context. To the extent that their assumptions are inaccurate, of course, their conclusions and recommendations may also be incorrect or sub-optimal.

If a manpower survey identifies only male respondents, for example, in a country in which women are also traders and farmers and artisans, the resulting assessment of "human resources" is likely to be biased. Similarly, if field visits are confined to regions with all-weather access roads,

observations on economic activity in "all rural areas"--without specifically allowing for differential access--are likely to be meaningless if not downright misleading. Failure to take account of distinctive aspects of class and ethnic relations, ways that access to productive resources are structured or production and marketing are organized can all lead to serious misinterpretation of data.

Unless a research project provides strong incentives for meaningful interaction and some structure for guiding this interaction, experience indicates that the expert members of an interdisciplinary team will pursue their individual research in a way that is personally and professionally satisfying. They will produce reports addressed to their peers, but not necessarily to their project colleagues or to the development policy choices facing host country planners and donors. This, unfortunately, has tended to happen in RAMS.

In order to overcome these centrifugal tendencies in multidisciplinary and intersectoral research, it is necessary to have:

- (1) Strong intellectual leadership and coordination provided by someone who understands the objective (or problem) and has the respect of all team members.
- (2) Strong logistic and financial management to ensure the coordination of components.
- (3) Experts who are intellectually broad-minded enough to learn from one another as well as qualified in their specialized areas. This implies personality traits as well as intellectual skills.
- (4) A clear, overall shared objective or problem that can be used to help determine the relevance, interrelations, and priorities of issues within the component studies.
- (5) An overall conceptual framework in terms of which the principal researchers from different professional backgrounds can understand the relationships between their models. It does this by showing each of them that many of the factors (or exogenous variables) assumed to be constant, randomly variable, or unknowable are the objects of other researchers' study.
- (6) Sequencing of design, data collection, and analytical work activities within and between component studies in order to be appropriate to the given time frame.
- (7) The capacity to test hypotheses against data from independent sources on an iterative basis.

RAMS has not been very successful in satisfying any of these conditions. While management has improved, strong intellectual leadership is still lacking. From all reports, the initial team members did not respect one another or interact constructively and their overall morale was described to us by one of the two lone survivors as "the worst I have seen on any project." Later arrivals have had to take over the research already begun and to "catch up" on their general country knowledge and orientation. At the time of our visit there was still remarkably little professional interaction between members of some research units within RAMS (e.g., Geography and Agriculture, Sociology and Agriculture, Manpower/Employment and Sociology).

The project design provided no unifying objective or priority among its objectives.

The time frame of the project was unrealistically compressed from the outset but this was not adequately taken into account in the sequencing of field investigations, hypothesis development, and survey research. Activities in virtually all areas of research--environment, rural production, income and consumption, social and demographic change and labor force trends, and industrial and urban employment--were undertaken hastily, without sufficient mutual definition of common concerns and objectives, and with inadequate design support--at great cost in dollars, staff time, integration, and quality of results.

The general quality and utility of the Phase I component studies, therefore, has suffered. The amount of quantification is less than anticipated, the quality of the numbers coming out of the survey work is highly questionable, the publication process has proved more lengthy and complex than anticipated, the time required to right previously-incurred errors has cut into time to do needed new work on schedule, and consistency among reports and the means for integrating concepts and observations have yet to be established.

The studies carried out by the sociology unit illustrate the problems caused in Phase I of RAMS by the failure to define overall research objectives, the absence of a shared conceptual framework, and the failure of project management to integrate and coordinate and sequence appropriately the research of all project components. This is particularly unfortunate as the sociological perspective should have played a central integrative role in RAMS by illuminating the interactions between rural Mauritians' agricultural, herding, and migratory strategies, and the way they satisfy their needs and desires.

Indeed, properly designed micro-studies of household and community-level decision-making focus attention on the types of

natural resources that are scarce factors of production in each agro-economic zone, on the way people of differing ethnic and socioeconomic and sexual status gain access to these resources and mobilize labor, choose between alternate types of agricultural, pastoral, and off-farm income generating activities, and on the ways they save their incomes, invest, avoid risks, and seek to translate their wealth into power and their power into wealth.

The hallmark of this and other types of in-depth micro case studies is that it focuses on the way that particular individuals in particular socioeconomic settings perceive their opportunities and interest and make choices and not on a generalized description of "traditional beliefs" and "customary behavior." Like a microscope, in-depth work of this type can reveal processes and relationships that cannot be observed or inferred on a different scale from aggregate data.

Its great value is not in establishing different representative behavior but in generating hypotheses, in raising issues to be clarified with other types of observations and analyses. Some of these, for example, the implications of international transhumant herding strategies for livestock sales in Mauritania are sectoral in character. Others--such as the trade-off between labor investments, herding, high risk but high return dry land agriculture, participation in a SONADER irrigation perimeter, seeking a job in Nouakchott or Marseilles--concern intersectoral linkages. Still others, such as those concerning the real cost in time and "fees" of agricultural credit, or farm marketing strategies, may suggest further investigation of the relative efficiency of private and public sector enterprise. Social analyses are thus a valuable tool for analyzing in detail and generating hypotheses concerning intersectoral issues and policy linkages.

Viewed in this way, a people's social organization and culture are not seen as mere constraints on more rational forms of economic activity but as the framework of existing productive and economic organization--within which constraints are to be identified. Development oriented sociological research thus seeks to identify the strengths and potentials of existing technologies and forms of organization as well as their weaknesses. This cannot be done if "social" issues are treated analytically as a residual category--or an implementation issue--if social research is first carried out independently of other research and "integrated" later, or if the basic questions that inform all other research projects are not reflected in the design of the sociological study.

Due to an almost complete absence of intellectual leadership in the critical first half of the project, the sociological studies were not focused on clear objectives, integrated conceptually, or sequentially into the project as a whole. The

sociologist (social anthropologist) who is well qualified in her discipline but lacked previous experience as a member of an interdisciplinary research team, was initially given no scope or work plan other than the contract and project paper terms of reference. A single meeting of the RAMS long-term team members, held at her request, was not productive, and did not yield shared objectives or agreement on a conceptual framework.

The sociologist's recommendation that the generalized sociological profiles called for in the project paper should be dropped or incorporated into more focused research was rejected. The subsequent preparation from written material--profiles of "Moors" and "Black Africans"--with the collaboration of Mauritanian sociologists was fraught with difficulty and took longer than expected. The profiles themselves provide interesting and informative background material but are largely descriptive and historical and do not clarify relationships that are of central concern to contemporary development policy.

Delays and difficulties on the preparation of profiles, the failure of project leadership to identify specific issues of interest to other research groups and the inappropriate use of Mauritanian counterpart sociologists greatly reduced the quality of the field studies carried out in support of the four reports on social change. Consequently, these studies are of uneven quality and utility. The report on pastoralism presents three "cases" that are purely descriptive and are not in-depth case studies of the type discussed above, while the other three reports are purely historical and interpretive and at times base conclusions on judgmental theories of development rather than on analysis of detailed data or reports of local Mauritanians' perspectives on the fundamental socio-economic changes that are affecting their lives. An example of this is found in the "Synthesis of Studies," August 1980, p. 42:

Material incentives push the youth towards the cities and outside of the country but also attract salaried laborers to the land through necessity. In both cases, new forms of dependency are created based on a system whereby the monetarization of social and economic relationships prevail and, indeed, lead to a greater proletarianization of labor (urban and rural) and a heightened pauperization of the individual.

While several members of the RAMS team indicated that they had greatly profited from discussions with the sociologist, the general reaction to the sociological reports at the staff seminars devoted to them was that they were interesting but not very helpful in the context of RAMS.

The geographic and environmental studies also should have played an integrative role in RAMS research design since the

agro-economic zones on which they focused were supposed to provide the cross-cutting sample framework for the other base line studies. Our assessment team lacked professional competence to judge the quality of the geographic studies though it should be noted that they were completed on schedule and emphasize physical more than human or cultural geography. We could, however, find little evidence of coordination or integration between them and the production subsector studies. Indeed, due to the sequence in which studies were carried out, the agro-economic zones were changed in number and boundaries after the sample selection based on them was complete.

One of the RAMS project's primary objectives is to supplement Mauritania's meagre national statistics with base line data regarding the stock and productivity of natural and human resources, actual incomes, expenditures, and prices and the distribution of these characteristics between differing socio-economic and regional groups. The quality of survey research undertaken by the project is thus central to this assessment.

A series of surveys were undertaken early in the project's implementation. A Production Survey, a National Employment Survey, and an Expenditure/Consumption Survey were undertaken jointly. A Qualifications Survey was undertaken as a separate effort to identify skills requirements for different rural job categories. An Industrial Establishments Survey was undertaken to cover modern sector industries and a census of all informal enterprises in Nouakchott provided an estimate of the number, although no characteristics of, "nonmodern" establishments. Demographic information was analyzed from Bureau of Census tapes; price information and other bits of information relating to rural production were collected sporadically without standardized survey instruments. An incomes questionnaire was administered in the last of four passages of the Expenditure/Consumption Survey and a check questionnaire on rural production questions was given to half of the Expenditure Survey households.

A review of the survey instruments and methods leads us to conclude that the goal of amassing a coherent set of national base line data for planners has not been met. No one currently on the RAMS staff is satisfied with the quality of the survey results although several analysts are moving ahead as best they can. Nevertheless the data are scheduled to be used.

Since Mauritania has few empirical statistics available; there is a danger that these highly indicative--rather than reliable and statistically verifiable results--will be indiscriminately used. There is also the possibility that they will be so suspect that any report that uses them will be dismissed out of hand by future readers. Cautionary notes in the text may help to alleviate these problems, but are unlikely to take care of them completely.

A short critique of the Production Survey will illustrate more clearly RAMS' problems of data collection and quantification for analysis, including the absence of appropriate sequencing of research activities, and the use of appropriate personnel to design and conduct survey research. Apparently, the Production Survey was designed without benefit of an agricultural economist, farm management specialist, or serious pre-testing. It was definitely designed without a plan for analysis. Many types of difficulty are apparent:

1. Questionnaire design: The questionnaire includes 43 pages, many of which have tables including a hundred or more individual items to be filled out. The questionnaire is not self-coding, nor were coding or tabulation plans designed until all the forms were completed in the field. It requires several hours to complete a form of this length in a reasonably complex household. It seems unlikely that many enumerators or respondents actually endured this ordeal.

The questions used in the questionnaire (which was only in French--with no manuals in local languages) are extremely imprecise and are not geared to the likely skill levels of the respondents. For example, Question 03 is "How many children do you have, boys and girls?" and the possibility that the respondent might include either those currently in his tent, or those on trek with the cows, or those who have gotten married and moved away is only partially clarified with the next question, "Of those children, how many are in your charge?" A more serious example of inadequate questionnaire design--serious because it concerns people's wealth, and occurs early in the interview--is on page four. Here, after asking a complex table full of questions about various types of cattle, Question 21 poses the summary question to a presumably illiterate herder: "What is the average weight of your cows in a good year?" It is difficult to believe that any respondent would continue to respond to further questions after this part in the interview.

2. Designation of Respondent: Even assuming that the designated respondent stuck with the questionnaire as well as could be expected given the design, it should be noted that only one person was actually designated for interview. Since animals belonging to different owners may be in a single production unit, it is difficult to see how the "chef d'exploitation" could be expected to automatically include the information about a whole meaningful production unit unprompted.

3. Sample Design: The original sample was selected systematically from households within villages which were randomly selected from within agro-ecological zones (of which the definition was later changed). No listing or pre-stratification was done within villages--a physical counting off of living quarters from a central point in the village was used--so it is impossible without some creative use of the census information

to assess representativeness of the sample actually selected. One independent observer of the consumption sample households in Akjoujt for example thought that they were on average more wealthy than others. If the same were true of the Production Survey households, sampling errors might further distort the errors attributable to survey design and administration.

4. Coding and Tabulation: Since the plans for coding and tabulation of all the surveys were not made prior to their conduct, there was a delay in getting any feedback on the quality of the data. A data processing person was hired locally who was grossly under-qualified; this further muddied the empirical waters. Eventually, a "rescue expert" was brought in to process the survey data that seemed in the best shape and for which the analysts had greatest need. The Production Survey, however, was not in this group. It was conducted in December 1979. In June 1980 hand tabulation was undertaken. This experience was enough to indicate the need for the fourth passage check survey, conducted with the Consumption Survey in October/November 1980.

What makes this example of problems associated with the collection of base line data and the establishment of a statistically reliable, micro-level data base so devastating is that:

- * much time and money was spent administering and massaging a poor survey instrument--with what will be unreliable results; other, more useful data gathering activities were precluded;
- * information needed to integrate RAMS' various studies is still needed. (For example, what resource use decisions do production units make? what decisions about agricultural investments and labor allocations, and what are their criteria for these decisions?)
- * the integration activity on the production trade-offs and investment allocation priorities within the agricultural/livestock sector will have to rely on very subjective assessments.

The only rural survey for which data have actually been processed and included in a report is that on revenues or incomes. This survey shares many of the same flaws as the Production Survey, although the active participation and expertise of the future analyst in the third and fourth passages of the field effort will no doubt help the validity somewhat. The Qualifications Survey has just been processed and will be analyzed in the next months; the dietary intake information from the Consumption Survey has been sent to the nutritionist in Paris. The Employment and Establishments Surveys in the urban areas have been tabulated although only some of the most basic information has been included in reports to date.

Attempts have been made, particularly by the RAMS production unit, to use other Mauritanian data as checks on sample information validity (tea and sugar imports are said to coincide very nicely with tea and sugar consumption information) as well as to plug gaps (as with livestock and crop production data). Again, however, it is important to note that the indicative and scattered nature of the empirical data collected mean that RAMS will not have accomplished a great deal in this area. If the Planning Unit and the AID Mission continue to be interested in this objective, full cognizance of the lessons learned in the RAMS effort should be taken. Measurement activities should not be undertaken without knowing what needs to be measured, without careful assessment of alternative ways to get this measurement in a cost-effective way, and without planning for coding, processing, and analysis before undertaking the field work.

Similarly, analysis activities should not be started before hypotheses are determined and, in interdisciplinary work, some agreement reached on a common analytical framework.

While integrating data after the fact is surely a backwards way to go about interdisciplinary, intersectoral work, it is RAMS' only alternative at this point. Mauritania's planning needs for improved rural sector development strategies can only be met if some common framework for assessing various possibilities is developed--even at this late date. Recommendations in the final part of this report suggest some steps by which RAMS can confront the substantive problems discussed above.

C. Project Institutionalization

1. Background

Contrary to the basic strategy of many development projects which through the use of counterparts and other measures seeks to "institutionalize" or create an equivalent indigenous capability, the RAMS Project does not do so. The RAMS Project Paper, the Grant Agreement and the Project Contract all call for institutionalization "of the analytical and data collection process begun by this project" in an anticipated follow-on or RAMS II Project.

On the other hand, the RAMS terms of reference (TOR), as spelled out in the three documents mentioned above, call indirectly for "institutionalization" in three ways. Firstly, "by means of contact between contract staff and GIRM professionals (the) transfer of knowledge in the skills and disciplines of the project (will be) encouraged."¹ Secondly, while no "out-country" training per se is included in the RAMS Project, U.S. AID undertakes to provide such training as is pertinent outside of the project (using SMDP and other funding

¹RAMS Contract, page 5.

sources) and the contractor is called upon to make recommendations in this regard. Thirdly, a series of eight seminars is called for (a flexible number in the PP and GA, the eight seminars became mandatory in the contract) to include policy level, technical and other selected personnel of the relevant ministries "in order that the results of the studies may be effectively utilized by the GIRM. . . ." and that instruction be given "in the techniques of data collection, project design and evaluation. . . ." ¹ The contractor is further required to make a series of recommendations regarding institutionalization in his final report. A report on these activities follows.

2. RAMS/GIRM Liaison/Contacts

Since the outset of the RAMS Project the main point of contact within the GIRM has been Mr. Assan DIOP, Director of Studies and Planning. He has served as counterpart to the project and principal liaison/coordinator with other units and entities of the GIRM.

An obvious first move on the part of various RAMS expert consultants was to attempt to identify and seek out all existing information and documentation relevant to particular areas of concern which might exist within the government. At the outset this caused a deal of confusion and concern with RAMS staffers turning up, unannounced, unknown and acting only on their own authority in myriad government offices demanding information and documents "in the name of RAMS." This situation was particularly distressing from the Mauritians' point of view since RAMS expert consultants had nothing to offer them and could only seek input for their own needs. This situation was brought under control when through the offices of Mr. Diop it was requested that liaison/contact/counterpart persons be designated in each of the seventeen (17) odd directorates in the six key development ministries (i.e., the Ministries of Finance and Economics, Rural Development, National and Fundamental Education, Public Works and Labor, Health and Social Welfare). (These directors constitute the GIRM interministerial "Technical Committee" set up under the RAMS Grant Agreement and responsible for liaison with the project and the development and use of its products.) This move was also expected to smooth the way for the "transfer of knowledge" and information in a number of ministries through regular contacts between RAMS and GIRM personnel.

It was also expected that good interfacing would take place between GIRM and RAMS staff as a result of a series of seminars (see following section) held with the seventeen directors and their staffs.

Similarly, it was hoped that meetings between RAMS expert consultants and an interministerial "Policy Committee" (made up of the six ministers themselves) would help to

¹Grant Agreement, page 5.

"sensitize" the latter to RAMS objectives and perspectives and enhance the work of the former. Unfortunately, developments were as follows:

(a) As RAMS staff finished gathering what information/documents were available at the various GIRM ministries, their information focused on field research, the survey and other areas of activities and contacts at the ministerial counterpart/liaison/contact level dwindled within six months to a trickle.

(b) The initial meeting/seminar/presentation¹ with the "Technical Committee" was well attended and received. However, the second such meeting was only held a year later² and was much less well attended (some directors sent representatives and did not attend). Consequently there has been little or no further contact at this level.

(c) The interministerial "Policy Committee" has never held a meeting with RAMS. As a result, RAMS contacts with GIRM are almost nonexistent, and aside from unfocused, sporadic and casual contacts with various and sundry low-level GIRM civil servants, are mainly limited to the seminars described below and the office of Mr. Diop.

3. Training

To assist with the development of GIRM personnel able to participate in the application and utilization of data and material produced by RAMS for Mauritanian development, U.S. AID has supplied a number of short- and long-term scholarships, and is considering others, funded from other sources, as follows:

(a) Two persons were sent for long-term training in public administration and statistical analysis in the U.S. in Spring 1979 during the RAMS Project start-up.

(b) Five persons have been sent for short- and medium-term training in African institutions of higher learning in 1980 in Senegal and Tunisia to study development economics (2 persons, 9 months), agricultural economics (2 persons, 2 years), and public administration (2-year course). All trainees will return in June 1981 to spend the last two months working with RAMS staff during the wrap-up of the Project during July and August. The trainees as well as the institutions in which they are now studying were identified by RAMS.

(c) In keeping with its charge to make recommendations in this regard, the contractor has proposed the following

¹June 1979.

²June 1980.

scholarship program for 1981-1982 (training in the U.S. at the Master's level):

<u>Number</u>	<u>Major Discipline</u>
2	Human Resources Development/Planning (one in Education, one in Manpower)
1	Ecology
1	Business Administration
1	Computer Sciences
1	Statistics (including Survey Research Specialization)
1	Sahel Masters Program (Michigan State)
1	Sociology
1	Planning (macro and micro)
1	Documentation

At the time of our assessment it seemed unlikely that AID would be able to obtain funding for more than one or two of the scholarships per year.

4. Seminars

The RAMS TOR calls for some eight seminars to be held approximately every three months. This activity has proceeded apace and is on schedule, although it was late in being initiated, like other RAMS Project elements.

To date the following seminars have been held:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Number of Participants</u>	<u>Topic</u>
1. Nov. 6-16, 1979	Nouakchott	70	Survey Research Development
2. Feb. 25-28, 1980	Rosso	40	Integrated Rural Development
3. August 20-22, 1980	Kiffa	40	Integrated Rural Development
4. Dec. 2-5, 1980	Kaédi	100	Agricultural Development

These seminars in the capital and different areas of the South and central sections of the country were generally well received and attended. The Nouakchott seminar coincided with

and included a part of the training of some 49 enumerators used in the subsequent survey to garner base line statistical data in various areas. Similarly, the Kiffa seminar coincided with a national conference on economic development and planning. As a result, many GIRM officials, who might otherwise not have been reached, were able to attend.

This has been one of RAMS' most successful undertakings which contribute to the "institutionalization" and understanding of research and analysis methods, information and their uses for Mauritanian development.

Four additional seminars are scheduled for 1981 as follows:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Topic</u>
1. January 1981	Aleg	Regional Planning
2. February 1981	Selibaby	Regional Planning
3. March 1981	Nouakchott	Human Resources Planning
4. April 1981	Nouakchott	Development Project Design/Evaluation

The directorate of planning has asked that seminar No. 4 be held in either Aioun or Nema, cities in the southeastern region of the country, in order to give local officials a sense of participation in planning activities. On the other hand, RAMS considers that because of the topic matter, this seminar would be more productive if held in Nouakchott, where the various development and other ministries are located and more officials would be able to participate (one possible solution is shown below under recommendations).

Taking into account the number of Mauritanian officials (and others) who participated in RAMS organized seminars in 1980, it is projected that a total of some 360 persons will have been reached by this Project by its end in 1981.

5. Institutionalization Summary

It has become more and more apparent to all those concerned with the RAMS Project, including AID/W and the present assessment team, that insufficient emphasis has been placed upon institutionalization or the creation/enhancement of indigenous capabilities. What will be the Mauritanian capacity to continue or to replicate RAMS-type activities once the Project is finished?

The issue has always been relegated to the EOP evaluation and was to be a major component of "RAMS II" or similar follow-on activities. But suppose there is no RAMS II or significant follow-on activity? The question is pertinent and troublesome.

At the present time there is only very limited contact between the RAMS team and the GIRM, focused mostly on one or two persons in the directorate of planning. The five short-term trainees will return to join RAMS for its last two months but will then leave again to complete their studies abroad. Following their eventual return there is no guarantee as yet of a place or role for them in GIRM planning or elsewhere.

Similarly, the long-term trainees--actual and anticipated--have no assurance of a place in Mauritanian development planning.

For these reasons it must be considered that practically no real "institutionalization" has really taken place so far under RAMS. Materials (the syntheses discussed under management outputs above) prepared and made available to the GIRM planning commissions were anonymous. The seminar series were successful but are more likely to have "sensitized" their participants and contribute only marginally to institutionalization.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations have two principal purposes. One is to suggest to RAMS management and to U.S. AID Mauritania realistic ways that the RAMS Project can most effectively use its remaining time and resources to improve the quality of its research results and their utility for present and future Mauritanian planning needs. The other is to suggest to U.S. AID Mauritania management ways that it can continue to strengthen the process of rational planning for rural development in Mauritania after the termination of the RAMS Project.

A. Recommended Actions

1. Highest priority should be placed on:

- a. the preparation of integrated, high quality Policy Option Papers (see below); and
- b. supporting the preparation of the GIRM 1981-85 Fourth Five-Year Development Plan by:
 - i. Having development economist Dr. Firouz Vakil, assisted if necessary by Mr. Manley, Dr. Quan Dinh, and Dr. Brown, devote additional time to the preparation of the over-all policy framework paper requested by Assane Diop;
 - ii. having all RAMS experts jointly develop ideas for projects that they believe will address critical constraints in rural sector development by early February;
 - iii. detailing RAMS economist Dr. Quan Dinh for up to two days per week, from February through April, to assist Assane Diop in the selection and development of RAMS team project ideas according to the Fiche format required for inclusion in the Fourth Plan.

2. The requirement for the development of sectoral project papers should be dropped as a RAMS objective and output, since it is not expected by U.S. AID Mauritania or by Assane Diop and is not feasible in view of the volume of work remaining.

3. The number of Phase II reports should be reduced from 20 to approximately 6 through consolidation and the possible elimination of some topics agreed to by RAMS, GIRM, and U.S. AID (see discussion below).

4. The research and analysis process required for the preparation of Phase II reports should be shifted from separate efforts by individual expert consultants to working groups, in keeping with the reduction and consolidation of studies recommended above (see discussion below).

5. A major team-building group dynamics workshop should be conducted in late January or early February to:

- a. catalyze and orchestrate the preparation of the summary project Fiche ideas for possible inclusion in the GIRM Fourth Plan; and
- b. develop objectives, a conceptual framework, and a work plan for each of the consolidated Phase II Policy Option Papers.

The workshop should be conducted by a skilled professional process person working closely with Drs. Quan and Vakil. It may be useful to include one or two additional participants with in-depth knowledge of the issues raised by this assessment and an expert in the use of the log frame approach to work plan development (see discussion below).

6. Senior economist Dr. Firouz Vakil should be obtained on a full-time basis to provide policy focus and intellectual leadership for the Phase II effort (see discussion below). In light of their earlier failure to provide a satisfactory Senior Development Economist, Louis Berger Associates should be urged to make Vakil available to RAMS on a full-time or at least greatly increased basis (perhaps three days per week).

7. The present time-consuming, two-tier report review and modification methodology should be modified so that expert consultant group reports need be reviewed and modified in a single tier process with appropriate RAMS and GIRM officials.

8. The process of translation should be greatly speeded up immediately--probably through the recruitment of at least two highly skilled, professional English/French - French/English resident translators--to overcome the current two and a half month delay and the inevitable surge in need during the final months of the project.

9. The 1981 seminar schedule should be extended over an additional two-month period to provide more time between meetings both for RAMS and GIRM staff, particularly as regards Seminars 3 and 4.

10. An "extra" or additional seminar on rural development should be held in Aioun or Nema, as requested by the GIRM for reasons of "geo-political expediency" and so that the project management seminar can be presented to key GIRM managers in Nouakchott.

11. The RAMS 1981 long-term training proposal should be carried out as presented, or failing that, a minimum of two scholarships be made ASAP for:

- (a) a senior development economist ("macro" or "micro")
- (b) a macro-planner/economist.

12. The GIRM should be asked for assurances--insofar as possible--that returning long-term trainees will be given a role and a place somewhere in the GIRM planning process.

13. It should be made a responsibility of RAMS expert-consultants to reestablish and maintain contacts with the seventeen designated and other counterparts within the government.

14. We do not recommend additional funding for the RAMS Project or for the design of the RAMS II follow-on project referred to in the RAMS Project Paper.

15. We strongly recommend that U.S. AID Mauritania continue to support the process of developing better planning capacity with special attention to the rural sector in the following ways:

- a. Provide selective technical assistance to future national survey data collection efforts undertaken by GIRM ministries (see discussion below);
- b. Provide a modest level of technical assistance and training to the Office of Studies and Programming in the Planning Directorate of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (see discussion below);
- c. Sponsor small-scale studies of specific policy-relevant issues that have been identified by RAMS or other research efforts. These might include, for example, additional work on:
 - i. land tenure
 - ii. trade-offs between public and private enterprise in rural development
 - iii. trade-offs between investments in dry-land and irrigated agriculture
 - iv. trade-offs between large and small-scale irrigation perimeters (a critical issue in light of planned OMVS and AID/Senegal activities)

- v. ways that existing indigenous production and resource control organization could be used to foster rural development.

These studies could be undertaken by IQC and University contractors with which AID has existing contracts for appropriate services or with other university groups with a predominant technical and geographic capability.

16. Possible follow-on activities should be discussed by the U.S. AID Mauritania Mission and appropriate Mauritanian counterparts ASAP to assure continuity and follow-through on critical substantive and institution-building issues.

B. Discussion

Recommendations 1 to 6 are mutually supportive and are all addressed to the tasks of improving the quality of RAMS data and analysis, and of organizing them in a policy relevant rather than in a narrowly sectoral and technical framework. The consolidation of Phase II reports will make it possible and indeed necessary for experts to work together in a genuinely collaborative mode.

The preparation of the 20 narrowly defined Phase II papers listed in RAMS document and Checchi contract, which RAMS management has identified as its primary Phase II objective, requires the assignment of responsibility for report preparation to individual experts, and a consequent focus on disciplinary and sectoral lines. In the first phase this procedure produced little integration of the field observations and quantitative information. For example, it is not possible from Phase I work to understand what a rural production unit actually does, or to understand why a particular production unit would buy more livestock rather than investing in an irrigated perimeter.

Unless project management clearly endorses the priority of the objective to do interdisciplinary, intersectoral work and defines the objective in such a way that such work is required, RAMS staff members from different units are likely to continue to work in an isolated fashion. We recognize that RAMS staff have already begun to use a common framework for laying out and discussing intersectoral constraints; the thrust of our recommendation is to reinforce and facilitate this trend.

The consolidation of reports and their preparation by working groups can encourage experts to cross-check their data and confront one another's assumptions and seek additional information in a constructive and iterative manner.

The way in which reports should be consolidated, and which reports should be eliminated, must, of course, be determined

through discussion among the RAMS team and must be agreed to by AID (a letter of implementation may be a sufficient instrument) and the GIRM. Based on our extensive discussions with Assane Diop, the RAMS team and Dr. Firouz Vakil we suggest the following:

- * that the rural production subsector reports be consolidated into one report;
- * that the marketing, credit, and pricing issues be treated in a single report;
- * that the agricultural research, extension, and implementation modalities papers be incorporated into the rural production report to the extent possible;
- * that the report on the improvement of rural diets be eliminated and that the possibility of eliminating or simply issuing as an "issues discussion paper" the report on the improvement of rural health be considered;
- * that the report on reducing desertification be prepared as a stand-alone document but that consistency with the production report should be a primary concern;
- * that the overall development strategies report be prepared--with a first draft completed as soon as possible--to raise options for more detailed consideration in the rural production and resource regeneration reports;
- * that the proposed employment and manpower-related reports be consolidated;
- * that a decision be made as to the adequacy of information and perspective regarding inland maritime fisheries--at this point we recommend elimination of these reports;
- * elimination of the report on project priorities;
- * reconsideration of the preparation and publication of separate reports on the role of the private sector and alternative organizational arrangements.

The multidisciplinary and intersectoral working groups should be established as soon as possible to facilitate the integration of Phase I findings in the preparation of Phase II policy papers. In light of their small number and central role in Phase I studies, all long-term experts should probably

constitute the core of all or most working groups. Other experts from the RAMS team, resource people brought in because of their in-depth knowledge of relevant issues in the Mauritanian or Sahelian context.¹ Mauritanian expert counterparts, including Assane Diop, should be brought in as is deemed useful by the group. It is strongly recommended that U.S. AID Project Manager and Mission Anthropologist John Grayzell be invited to participate in work group sessions to obtain the benefit of his in-depth knowledge of the country and to ensure better liaison between RAMS Phase II work and the development of the U.S. AID program. The number and nature of the working groups will, of course, depend on the policy papers to be produced.

The work of each group must be clearly defined in relation to objectives that are stated in advance and are further broken down into subproblems. The purpose of the working groups activity is not to develop interdisciplinary concepts, methods, or theories, but rather to clarify a specific issue problem or relationship by bringing to bear the findings of other RAMS experts.

Previous experience with efforts of this type indicate that they are successful only if the group shares a common set of objectives and focuses on the same empirical problem and context. We believe that the common objectives of RAMS Phase II working groups must flow from a common policy framework and an agreed-upon set of policy objectives and issues.

In our judgment, Dr. Vakil can provide the policy framework for the RAMS team and can play a critical catalytic role in focusing and integrating RAMS team efforts. He is well-grounded in the elaboration and implementation of interdisciplinary development projects and planning, familiar with RAMS work, respected by all team experts and has an excellent working relation with Assane Diop.

The functioning of the work groups can also be enhanced by interaction and planning at the team building workshop. Preparation for this workshop should include the drafting of illustrative matrices relating, for example, to sectoral and subsectoral production issues to cross cutting issues such as land tenure, ethnicity, environmental degradation, migration and labor migration, the role of the private and public sector, infrastructure, and administrative and institutional adequacy. In light of the communication problems the RAMS team has had in the past, we also believe that a skilled process-oriented workshop leader is required at the workshop.

¹If the need for such experts is identified in advance, they may be identified and recruited through existing U.S. AID contractual arrangements with university or other contractors. In some cases, their services can be obtained without reimbursement by RAMS.

ANNEX

1-8

This series of actions seemed to help stabilize the project but still could not substitute for the needed internal dynamic effort missing in project activities. In addition, the project seemed incapable of building the extended liaison and working relation with the GIRM governmental apparatus as called for by the PP and Project Agreement. Finally, in concurrence with the request of the GIRM, a new Chief of Party and a permanent administrative assistant were provided by Checchi in February '80.

Observations and Comments: A significant number of mission personnel attended the meetings held to review the work of each of the project's divisions and there was an extensive exchange of ideas. In addition Mr. Douglas Sheldon/ Mission Controller, Mr. Gerald Hansley/ IDI Controller, Ms. Linda Neuhauser/ Mission Health and Population Officer, and Dr. James Hughes/ Mission Agricultural Officer contributed highly appreciated written commentaries, copies of which are appended to this memorandum. The following commentary represents my own personal views as both RAMS project manager and as the mission's behavioral science advisor.

Basic Conclusion: The project seems to have quickly reorganized itself under its new leadership. While the consequences of past mistakes will remain to some extent, the present situation appears to be among the best to be expected and, provided necessary additional support is granted, a good end product can be hoped for. A new standard of discipline and quality is being evidenced in the work effort and a greatly increased level of communication between the project and GIRM services and representatives has arisen. Little more can be done to alter the course of phase I (baseline studies). Phase II, the production of policy options and project proposals does, however, offer some major opportunities for insuring a major development contribution.

Managerial Problems Remaining:

- 1) There is an overriding need for a budgetary increase of \$ 1.6 million dollars to cover the costs of new personnel and a four month extension of project activities. The justification for this need is being individually handled in a separate document but there is no question that failure to obtain these funds will cause extreme damage to the final product.
- 2) There is a continuing underlying struggle between U.S.A.I.D. and RAMS personnel whenever an attempt is made to obtain access to the project's substantive findings. This situation stems from a combination of factors. The most fundamental involves the project's access and use of data, especially the 1976 census, which still has not been publically released and which is seen by some as having significant politically implications. Much additional data that RAMS itself is collecting is seen as potentially falling under a similar rubric. There is also an inconsistency between the Project Agreement itself which clearly describes the project as an assistance to the GIRM, and AID's in-house justification that partially focuses on the need by foreign donors including AID for such information for project planning purposes.

While the two perspectives are not inherently contradictory, the AID perspective places an emphasis on the immediate availability of findings while the GIRM perspective emphasizes the propriety of judicious release of information as judged appropriate. There is no question that this situation has produced problems for project management since it has not been possible to continuously assess the project's progress in the light of all the facts. Moreover, it has on occasion seemed as if some project members have tried to use the situation as an excuse to coverup their own deficiencies. However, it would seem obvious that in terms of contributing to Mauritania's capacity to plan for its future development, it is far more important that the GIRM fully cooperate with the study and identify with it as its own, than AID try to insist on premature release of its findings. Therefore a lower level of direct involvement and identification has been accepted than might otherwise be under other circumstances.

Substantive Project Problems: The progress and findings of the project's separate divisions was fully discussed during the evaluation meetings and will not be repeated here, since it was felt that their research and reports were all in an "in-progress" state and that project purposes would best be served by using the occasion as an exchange of ideas rather than a judgmental exercise. However, there are some substantive problems that appeared common to the research effort per se that should be noted, since they demand particular attention and effort at correction.

- 1) The first problem involves the lack of true interdisciplinary effort as clearly envisioned by the project design. In large part this is due to the fact that most specialists are inherently reluctant to alter their own methods and ideas to accommodate other fields. Since the arrival of the new CP there have been weekly meetings that have facilitated the exchange of information but there was evidenced little real coordination between research divisions, either as to specific areas and phenomena focused on, or as to making an effort to evolve and use common analytical categories (such as the idea of "constraints to production" suggested by Jim Hughes in his attached commentary). While it appears to late to do this for the baseline studies, thought should be given to reorganizing the units for the project planning phase into mixed discipline teams working on a common problem.
- 2) The second problem involves the ongoing survey activities which have increased in extent and cost beyond what was originally expected. There is no question that the surveys are picking up massive quantities of data not previously collected. However, it has also become evident that, in the haste to organize the surveys, the preliminary step of each specialist first acquiring a basic understanding of the phenomena in question in the Mauritanian context - Prior to evolving questions and hypothesis for random statistical analysis - was skipped. This has resulted in several unfortunate consequences. First, it has delayed some reports because the concerned consultants have relied to too great an extent on the survey to provide them with the initial raw data. Second, some important questions of which people were not aware have arisen. Third, and perhaps most seriously, many questions were not properly couched to adjust for the cultural context. Important if not immediately obvious differences between types of millet or rice, proper time and place for questioning (e.g. time of day, month, season, in home or market), and a realistic acceptance of the difficulty of obtaining certain information from direct questioning, and the evolution of alternative information gathering strategies, were not fully confronted.

Compensation for the delays encountered has forced a projected extension of project life and some additional investment in machines and personnel to speed up the report preparation phase. Providing an extension is obtained, this problem should be resolved. Consultants on their own have attempted to fill in data gaps but there will have to be some plans for additional, very project specific information gathering during phase two to answer important unresolved questions. As to the third problem, there will have to be a planned effort to analyze survey data after collation and to redefine it in terms of the team's new understanding of the surrounding socio-economic context. If this is done and if the survey results are published in the form of a qualified annotated compilation of information, then the result should be a major document of wide benefit. (If, on the other hand, they are merely assembled as statistical tables, they will not only be of limited value but subject to ready misuse by others who will accept them on face value and attempt to use them in ill-suited ways and models without true understanding of their origin or import.)

3) The question of model building and proper cultural and developmental context touches on another problem area, namely how the baseline studies are to be used to derive phase two policy options. With the possible exception of the Manpower team, there did not yet seem to be developed on the part of most reporters a larger developmental scheme into which they were able to fit their findings and from which to project future development. In some cases possible excessive emphasis seemed to be being placed on present trends, on the assumption that this represented automatic linear projections into the future. Once the baseline studies are complete there will be a need for an increase in the input of development experience from other times and areas - adjusted to the Mauritanian specifics. One question is whether the team itself adequately possess such experience. Hopefully the addition of an experienced developmental economist will help ameliorate this situation. In addition, occasional inputs from other sources such as the Sahel Development team, AID/DA, other donors, etc. should be investigated for phase two. One possible vehicle might be via the RAMS seminars which could focus on specific questions and encompass a more varied and experienced range of participants than now contemplated.

Institutionalization of a Dynamic Planning Process for Mauritania:

With the exception of the training of surveyors, the seminars for GIRM personnel and the modest present contributions of Sahel Manpower Training Program Funds to train a number of GIRM candidates, the question of insuring the continuation of a dynamic empirically based planning process in Mauritania has not been a major focus of the project to date. In fact, this is in accordance with the project agreement that calls for a phase two joint GIRM-AID evaluation to review this question. The problem has however been continuously in the background and there is no question that it has affected daily decisions as to who to hire, the extent to which project activities should respond to immediate GIRM information needs, who should be consulted on findings and recommendations, and such mundane matters as the marking of project reports and materials. While the project team will have to maintain a delicate balance between fulfilling its primary tasks and inculcating various GIRM services and personnel with the project's ideals, it would seem that increasing concern with eventual institutionalization is certainly justified. Such concern could, among others means, manifest itself in insuring that final findings are presented in a form useable by average GIRM policy personnel rather than extremely specialized western experts, and in building into project proposals the means for continuing data

collection and analysis. Hopefully, the up-coming phase two evaluation will make additional suggestions in this area. The question of continuing data collection is extremely important because team members have relied almost exclusively on the survey, secondary sources, and personal observation for their own data. They have not made an effort to establish simple ongoing experiments in primary information retrieval, such as test quadrangles on peoples fields or pasture to correlate growth and yield rates with rainfall, or the continuous monitoring of select markets, families, clinics. etc, in order to clearly identify longterm patterns and seasonal or occassion specific fluctuations in prices, dispenses, or disease.

Summation: There is no question the RAMS project suffered some initial setbacks, some of which were almost inevitable given the embryonic nature of AID-GIRM relations, and that some of these have had permanent effects on the project's evolution. However, at present the project seems to have pulled together and to be progressing to the greatest extent that could be hoped for. Team members are in general working with a new intensity that provides a strong basis for predicting a substantial and successful outcome. There is also no question but that the GIRM counterpart for the project, Director of Studies and Programmation, Assane Diop, continues to make a rarely found professional and personnel contribution. Likewise, I feel AID mission personnel, in general, have been open and active in providing support and concern whenever possible. It is therefore to be hoped that we will be able to obtain the necessary additional material support that is needed to insure the project achieves its full potential.

Date: 4/15/80
From: John Grayzel, RAMS/Proj. Mgt
Subject: RAMS Evaluation Meetings
To: All Interested AID Parties

The following meetings are scheduled to be held in the mission's conference room. An interested, constructively critical audience would be a valuable asset to our in-house evaluation. It would also seem appropriate for mission personnel in general to be well acquainted with this important and highly visible AID effort. Therefore, it would really be appreciated if people would attempt, to the extent possible, to assist at these gatherings, despite their heavy work schedule. Meetings will be in English.

<u>Date:</u>	<u>Subject:</u>	<u>Time:</u>
THURS - April 17	General Orientation -Sales/Weber	3:30 P.M
FRI - April 18	Geography - Agro-Ecological Zones Hauser-Fall	3:30
TUES- April 22	Agriculture - Livestock-Fish Dhillon -Kraiem-Wilder-Souma	3:30 P.M
WEDS April 23	Statistics-RAMS Survey Julliard - Person	10:00 A.M
MON April 28	Manpower-Employment -Health-Allemano-Lebel	10:00 A.M
TUES April 29	Sociology-Health Fikry	3:30 P.M
WEDS April 30	Seminars -Training -Sales	10:00 A.M

1. B

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

DATE: May 21, 1980

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: Linda Neuhauser/Health

SUBJECT: Comments on RAMS in-house Seminar

TO: John Grayzel/Project RAMS

1. Studies seem very well planned and will provide much needed information.

2. Suggestions re: health components

a. Ministry of health needs to be involved in planning, execution and evaluation of these Studies since they will be implementing.

The recommendations from these studies, (Enchallah). Can't be over-emphasized that unless the health ministry is so involved, there is little chance that they will take an active interest in the reports, on without the health ministry's O.K. no health planning emanating from Min. of Plan will be effective. The other consideration is that the health Min. is called on to cooperate with those doing studies in health sector. They will be happy to cooperate if involved from the outset. Suggest a health Min. - Diop mtg as soon as possible.

b. Re health study this summer:

In Informal talks, he. Ministry officials have defined their interests vis-a-vis further studies in that sector. They are divided with respect to the utility of the CILSS report. As far as going the next step with further studies of the genre recommended in the report, the general feeling is that the areas are interesting but rather than more studies on health problems & projects/programs, Min. would prefer an examination of the health planning process in the Min. (there's a service de plannification) with special emphasis on the collection of health statistics program data.

In other words, how the Ministry can get information & use it to plan. This min. interest will have to be balanced against min. Plan/RAMS' interest in a report that includes other aspects of health situation in Mauritania. I'll be glad to help Mona arrange mtgs with Ministry.

c. Nutrition Study

Waiting for Mme Moudot to arrive this study could provide very valuable information on nutr. and habits.

d. Household Consumption Surveys:

Will provide . valuable data on food consumption, family expenses, ethnic group breakdown, etc. Taken together, this well give a profil of overall food consumption/expenditures from which inferences about dietary adequacy can be drawn.



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5010-112

These inferences are only good up to a point and if we want valid data on nutritional status of those in the survey some adjustments will have to be made to overcome these problems:

(1) food consumption survey does not measure intrafamilial distribution

The quantity and type of food that different family members eat is probably as important or more important than what the entire family eats. The food consumption of weanlings and children under five as well as that of pregnant women as considered the most important indicators of dietary adequacy. With this breakdown acceptable inferences on the nutritional status of the family members can be drawn, without it only the crudest assumptions can be made. Granted, it will be difficult to find out who eats what from the communal bowl, but there are some techniques that can be used to get some of this information. I can go into this in more detail. The information from this will be crude & mostly anecdotal but provides a very important component to the study.

(2) Food Consumption Survey does not measure clinical nutritional status of individuals in the Survey:

Dietary data only infers the nutritional status (physical) of an individual. Clinical examination gives actual data. Without this Component, the survey data will be considered interesting but incomplete from a nutritional point of view. Most "food/nutrition" surveys are lacking in data in one or more of these areas:

- (a) food consumption (by individual or age group)
- (b) physical status
- (c) socio-economic indicators giving profile: ethnic groups, financial status, expenditures for food ("food demand"), and the many other factors which help to explain (a) & (b).

This study has the possibility of including all these elements to give an understanding of the system that produces malnutrition.

clinical component: would be a relatively simple addition taking only a few minutes/household visit. There is a choice of standard indicators of nutritional status that can be used. Most involve measuring the person (anthropometry) and checking for several clinical signs. Blood measurements could be added (done by the Centre National D'Hygiene), but much information can come from the body measurements. Dr. Randriamanana, WHO nutritionist here is interested in working on this section of the study.

(3) Methodology of food weighing and analysis might need revision:

suggest a look at the methodology as used by the enquêteurs to make sure (a) they are using the same procedures (b) scales are calibrated. Also a look at the methodology to analyze this data to make sure:

- (a) foods are accurately described by the nutrient analysis to be done; whether The cooked or uncooked weights of foods are taken is very important; if mixtures of food are weighed, the surveyor will have to figure out the components (and their respective weights) of the mixture.

(I'll be glad to help over the survey procedures and suggest that a nutritionist do spot checks of the surveyors.)

(b) The food data is recorded in such a way that the analysis of its content can be done efficiently. This depends, of course, on the method of analysis chosen (computer is the easiest and ready made tapes are available)

Note: I've requested information from the AID central nutrition office on assistance methodology they can make available to RAMS on this particular study.

3. General:

For all studies, RAMS should see if it can take advantage of AID centrally - funded consultants and projects. Most of these are free and often underused since few people know about them.

examples:

DS/RAD: consultants in all phases of Rural Devel.

DS/Nutr: General consultants for nutrition studies, food production/food/consumption Short term studies.

DS/Health - consultants for all aspects of short term (max. 3 mo.) Studies.

Consultants for above available from consulting firms, land grant universities and a variety of other institutions.

memorandum

DATE: May 8, 1980
REPLY TO: James Hughes, RD
ATTN OF:
SUBJECT: Your invitation to suggest/formulate possible studies for RAMS
TO: Mr. John Grayzel, RAMS, PM

I have given some thought to your request during the May 5, 1980 staff meeting for AID staff members to suggest constructive suggestions for the RAMS study.

My thoughts may well be anticipated and built into a format for RAMS for the agricultural study, but one of the agricultural basic problems in any developing country are production constraints.

Agricultural production constraints are those constraints in any given social/economic context which constraints or blocks methods to increase food production.

Production constraints occur in both modern and traditional societies, but are less understood in traditional societies.

We know that population is increasing while food production is diminishing in Sahelian countries. This observation is clearly defineable in Mauritania where the recent drought (in some regions still continuing) has been blamed for most of the crop failures and low production. While this observation is fairly easy to assess, other constraints were causing agricultural production to diminish in the Sahel before the last drought. The decrease in soil fertility, insect, disease and weed damage, the lack of exotic germ plasm for varietal improvement, all contribute in varying degrees to lower yields.

Economic and social constraints to production cannot be left out or wished away. Most high yielding varieties (HYV's) of rice, sorghum, corn and wheat have been genetically bred to increase yields based on shorter stalks, disease and insect resistance and direct response to high nitrogen fertilizer inputs. Based on high infrastructure inputs, farmers with advantages of credit sources, availability of pesticides, extension services and native know-how have increased crop yields dramatically, especially in Southeast Asia.

As an example, the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) at Los Banos in the Philippines has conducted most of their research efforts since 1964 on high infrastructure inputs. Rice productivity has increased dramatically in most Asian countries (Indonesia, and some parts of the Philippines are an exception).



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
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
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GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
5010-112

These research endeavors were, again, based on capital intensive increments, the most notable being the use of timely, high rates of nitrogen fertilizers.

Even with such production possibilities, it was discovered in the mid 1970's that many small Philippino rice farmers were not following IRRI's suggestions. They were, for the most part, growing improved varieties, but not applying capital intensive inputs.

The "Yield Gap" between potential and actual farmers' yield is due to both biophysical and socio-economic constraints.

Yield gaps can be explained by a simple diagram which gives a graphic picture of maximum potential yields for most crops and the actual yields most farmers produce:



Biophysical gaps are caused by non-use of HYV's, fertilizers and pesticides, cultural methods, and low soil fertility.

The socio-economic gaps, or why farmers do not use biophysical practices may include costs and returns, lack of knowledge of intermediate technology lack of credit and often times traditional beliefs.

As an Agronomist I feel confident given the time and resources by using biophysical inputs, yield increases for sorghum in the Sahel could increase 50-100% in controlled field experiments. These estimates assume soil moisture would be sufficient based on .5 -1 mt/ha average yields.

The yield gap between a controlled experiment, where all the necessary inputs are available for the most part, are lost somewhere in the constraints of reproducing such results in farmers' fields.

In traditional farming societies the socio-economic constraints are particularly difficult to discern.

Although very little cooperation has occurred in the past, organized cooperation is imperative between the physical and social scientist if we are to fully understand, traditional farmer constraints to food production. Determining constraints will point the way for specific project implementation if our efforts are to be meaningful. Identifying these constraints to production would help to determine where and how much emphasis has to be brought to bear to overcome these constraints.

Feedback from traditional farmers would help scientists identify specific constraints to help combat low productivity.

The social implications of the World Bank financed Gorgol Project are becoming well known. It is as important to understand other aspects of possible faulty project design before redundant technology is imposed on disinterested traditional farmers.

The point I have attempted to lay ground work for in this exercise is clear. Cooperation between social scientists and physical scientists appears tantamount for project implementation if these data are to be understood.

Traditional farmers will probably not be able to utilize high infrastructure for many years to come. Low infrastructure encompassing many traditional farmers appears to be a means of raising the quality of life for a broad strata of the population as compared to high infrastructure attempts.

If I knew the socio-economic/biophysical constraints to overcome in Mauritania for our Vegetable Project, we wouldn't be groping for as many answers as to how to increase production and farmer acceptance. At the moment, we can only make a calculated guess as to methods to utilize to overcome the unknown.

cc: B. Chessin, RD

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : John Grayzel, Project Manager/RRD

DATE: May 8, 1980

FROM : Douglas L. Sheldon, Controller/FM
Gerry E. Hensley, IDI Controller

SUBJECT: Project 682-0211 (RAMS) Evaluation--
Controller's comments

As you requested, FM has prepared a paper on the RAMS project in connection with your evaluation. The paper reviews the project's implementation in terms of: 1) project management and administration, and 2) fiscal management and budgeting.

cc: John A. Hoskins, Mission Director
Sally Sharp, PDE
George Hawbaker, RDD



PROJECT 682-0211 (RAMS) EVALUATION -- CONTROLLER'S COMMENTS

INTRODUCTION

The RAMS project envisions the provision of a series of studies to the GIRM within a specified period of time which will be used as planning data. The preparation of these studies has been entrusted to a team of contractors fielded by Checchi & Co. The inputs to the project therefore pertain to the technical services provided by Checchi & Co. and to the ~~inherent technical~~ direct and operational support. Actual implementation of the project, (preparation of the studies), has been fully entrusted to the Contractor, Checchi & Co. under the general supervision and review of USAID, acting through the Project Officer and in coordination with the Ministry of Plan. USAID ~~is providing~~ direct support to the Contract Team, generally involving commodity procurement and provision of physical facilities. The Contract Team has assumed the bulk of responsibility for operational aspects of the project.

The magnitude of the RAMS project is such that it represents a separate entity which can only be monitored by USAID in the most general way. USAID does not have the capacity, nor presumably the inclination, to become involved in the day-to-day ~~implementation of either~~ the technical or administrative aspects of the project. Therefore, direct USAID review and monitoring is, for the most part, by definition, ex post facto.

MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE PROJECT

The intensity and magnitude of the project's technical services input and respective direct and operational support needs poses rather unique administrative and managerial problems for both USAID and for the implementer, (Checchi & Co.). The administrative requirements are virtually equivalent to that of a small USAID mission in terms of the number of technicians and local employees, as well as the necessary operational support needs and budget. While internal administration is certainly not the "raison d'etre" of the project, it is quite clear that the quality of project implementation is very much dependent upon the administrative capacity of the project entity.

The project's management and administration can be evaluated by reviewing implementation progress.

Much of the delay and resultant project cost over-run can be attributed to the management and administration of the project, by both USAID and Checchi & Co. The problems experienced to date are discussed below.

USAID Management and Administration

USAID management and administration problems existed from the beginning of the project. At the time the initial grant agreement was signed, in March 1978, USAID/Mauritania was experiencing its own growing pains in respect to increasing program assistance activities and staffing levels. At this time, only the most essential tasks could be performed. However, as staffing levels increased in early FY 79, more time was allocated to project management. Due to this, as well as other factors, contract signing and contract team arrival in-country was long delayed. The anticipated date of the Contract Team's arrival in-country was May-June 1978. The team did not actually arrive until May-June 1979-- approximately 12 months behind schedule.

Managerial and administrative problems of the project, in respect to USAID, can be attributed to :

Inaccurate planning-- inadequate budgeting and failing to anticipate, and therefore plan for, the magnitude and necessity of various inherent aspects in the project's support function;

Delay-- as discussed above, numerous delays, unavoidable to a certain degree, in contracting for technical services and the arrival of the contract

team in-country ~~leading~~ to increased project costs and project extensions;

Management inconsistency-- three different USAID project managers ~~having been~~ assigned to the project since March 1978.

Checchi & Co. Management and Administration

The managerial and administrative problems of the project in respect to the Checchi & Co. internal administration of project resources and implementation can be attributed principally to the lack of qualified administrative personnel. Although initially due to inaccurate planning, (the project paper considered an administrator, however USAID apparently acquiesced to Washington dropping this individual in the original contract), the administrative difficulties grew as no corrective action was taken. The administrative situation during this time resulted in an ever increasing burden of minor administrative details being placed on the Chief of Party as well as the USAID project manager. In October 1979, USAID/ FM specifically noted the following.

- Checchi & Co. stewardship of funds entrusted to them was inadequate from a sound fiscal management perspective.
- Local employees working in administrative positions were not capable of performing routine functions without the constant and direct supervision of the Chief of Party.
- Anticipated local currency funded operational requirements were insufficient to meet actual needs.

The situation was one of constant confusion and misdirected effort, and warranted immediate remedial action. In November 1979, with USAID concurrence, Checchi & Co. obtained the services of an expatriate administrator who assumed the responsibility for day to day operations. Unfortunately, the workload increase was such that the administrator and the Chief of Party were unable to achieve significant progress in administrative reorganization. Their work, at least administratively, was geared towards crisis management.

The Office of Financial Management expressed increasing concern over the administration of funds entrusted to Checchi under the local currency advance for operational costs. FM specifically noted:

- failure to submit replenishment requests in a timely manner, as well as insufficient projecting immediate disbursing requirements, thus causing the project to run short of ready funds for operations and thereby, presumably hindering operations;
- consistent failure to recognize expenditures which are allowable either in terms of AID regulations or terms of reference of the revolving fund, inter alia, total exclusion of costs applicable under the Checchi contract;

- lack of planning as to operational requirements, and lack of monitoring of available funds to insure liquidity until replenishment request of funds received;
- increasing differences between reported balances per Checchi & Co. and per FM calculations, (actual advances less certified expenditures).

In February/March 1980, FM performed a full internal review/audit RAMS (Checchi & Co.) local currency fiscal operations. The results of this review included:

- Calculation of the funds which were unaccounted for in terms of the local currency advance, and issuance of a bill for collection;
- review of RAMS fiscal procedures and accounting and control systems, with a written report to Project and Checchi Management;
- recommendation of an appropriate accounting system and suitable internal financial and managerial controls.

In February/March 1980, significant personnel changes were effected by the Checchi & Co. including the replacement of the Chief of Party and the Administrator. Certain changes were also made in the local administrative staff.

The new management appears to have made significant progress towards the correction of the administrative problems which have plagued the project during the last year. We specifically have noted the following.

- (1) FM recommendations on financial and internal controls have been adapted and implemented. While it is too early at this point to conclude that fiscal problems in terms of the accounting system have been resolved, we consider that fund controls is receiving the proper attention and should cease to be a problem.
- (2) Significant progress has been made on the resolution of the unaccounted for fund balance.
- (3) The planning and monitoring capacity for local requirements has improved.
- (4) Administrative procedures have been imposed to streamline the administrative practices and reduce wasted effort.

Management and Administration-- Conclusions

The project has experienced a number of managerial and administrative problems, resulting in delays and increased costs concerning implementation as well as less than acceptable fiscal management of funds entrusted to

Checchi & Co. These problems are attributed to inaccurate planning in terms of the contract team. However, over the 10 - 12 months of actual implementation, the administrative and managerial capacity has developed to a point where the entity can be reasonably expected to operate with an adequate degree of efficiency. It appears that RAMS is now capable of monitoring and correctly utilizing the AID resources available. It is perhaps unfortunate that the development of this capacity required such a time period, but this may well have been unavoidable due to the "personnel intensive" nature of administrative support in Mauritania.

Additional measures are still required to enhance the project administration and management. Smoothing of administrative procedures should be a continuing effort by the management in order to reduce the high cost of staff time associated with administration and to place administration in its proper perspective as an ancillary support function.

It should be noted that the time and effort in training local employees in both the administrative and technical sense is not necessarily a "sunk cost" of the project. Positive consideration should be given, at the termination of the project, to finding alternative employment within the US Mission for outstanding local employees of the RAMS project.

BUDGET AND FINANCIAL REVIEW OF THE PROJECT

The LOP funding authorized for the RAMS project has been clearly shown to be inadequate. A cost over-run of approximately \$ 1,626,000, or 41% of the original anticipated LOP funding, is now predicted. Delays in project implementation are expected to require a four-month extension of the PACD, Approximately 61% of the cost over-run pertains to the Checchi dollar contract directly; the remainder to the direct and operational support of the contract technicians. The factors responsible for the cost over-run are discussed below.

Delay in Project Implementation

Actual project implementation began with the arrival of the contract technician team. The arrival of the Contract Team in-country was originally contemplated for June/July 1978. The team actually arrived approximately one year later. This delay was due to the contracting process taking longer than expected, to the rights and privileges issue, and the contractor mobilization taking longer than anticipated.

The delay in the contracting process is clearly demonstrated in financial terms. In an economy with a considerable inflation rate, a nine-month delay in the contracting process was no doubt, reflected in an inflated contract cost for technical services. Considerable costs were incurred in the rental of houses and office facilities long in advance of the contractor's arrival.

In retrospect, implementation planning was far too optimistic even considering unanticipated pitfalls such as a rights and privileges issue.

Budget Inadequacy

It is again obvious that the project paper budget did not adequately provide for the requested technical services. Even with consideration of an inflation factor for a seriously delayed contracting, the provision was simply not enough to obtain individuals of the appropriate skill levels, under a contract such as was signed with Checchi & Co.

It is also apparent that the direct and operational support, which was inherent in the support of the contract technicians, was not adequately identified or provided for in the PP budget.

Attitude Toward Budgetary Limitations

The unwillingness on the part of either the Contractor or USAID to seriously consider a reduction in the scope of the activity in order to live within the authorized LOP funding is a definite factor in the cost over from the time the budget shortfall was adequately determined and documented in June/July 1979, no serious efforts have been made to reduce expenditures or to re-examine workforce requirements. There was an immediate and continued presumption that additional funding would have to be provided. This attitude reflects, to some degree, the importance that USAID places on the project outputs, the studies, and because this project is one of our first significant efforts, and accordingly entails a significant responsibility, to bring the project to a successful conclusion.

Adequacy of the Proposed LOP Budget of \$ 5,626,000

The revised LOP estimate which has formed the basis of the USAID proposed project paper amendment was prepared by the project manager using data supplied by the Contractor for the dollar contract costs and based on an expanded version of an FM estimate of local costs. The principal variable is the required funding for the dollar contract with the anticipated extension and the personnel changes which USAID has in effect approved, and which will not be known until SER/CM negotiates the amendment.

It is therefore difficult to assess the adequacy of the estimated and requested LOP funding. The requirement for operational support of the effort is to a certain extent elastic, in that managerial emphasis and prioritization can reduce or expand the funds requirement. Therefore, FM cannot judge the adequacy of the proposed LOP funding based on the data available at this time. It should be noted, however, that the estimate of requirements is probably as reasonable an estimate as can be made prior to the enactment of the contract amendment.

Financial Implementation of the Project

Project costs are financed under three different methods: 1) direct contract with Checchi & Co. for personnel and personnel support, 2) a local currency revolving fund entrusted to the Contractor for local operational costs not specifically excluded in the direct contract, and 3) direct payments by USAID to suppliers for certain support elements such as housing and commodity procurement. Principal financial implementation responsibility rests with the contractor. In an effort to facilitate USAID monitoring, project components presented in the project paper budget have been modified to a project specific input basis, further broken-down into sub-inputs and line items. This format will be made official in the project agreement amendment.

Monitoring expenditures in order to indicate project progress can be misleading in a project such as RAMS. Expenditures are, for all practical purposes, dependent on the physical presence of the contract team and therefore have no direct relationship to the achievement of the project purpose.

Project expenditures are monitored, however, to assess the adequacy of the project budget and to predict cost over-runs. To date, the expenditures have generally correlated to expenditures projected in the revised financial implementation plan prepared in September - October 1979. The project financial status report as of March 31, 1980, prepared in the revised budget format, provides a good break-down of expenditures.

Summary

The financial picture for RAMS is unclear at this time. The two principal variables are AID/W provision of an increased LOP funding level, and the amendment to the Checchi contract to provide for the anticipated extension and the personnel changes which have, in effect, been approved by USAID/Mauritania. These variables must be clarified as soon as possible. A full budgeting exercise is required to review requirements for local project support. This is now underway.

The cost over-run is simply a fact which must be accepted. USAID/Mauritania is now deeply committed to bringing this activity to a successful conclusion. However, project management must be prepared to achieve such success as may be possible within the revised project funding level. This will no doubt require a significantly more stringent review of operational and contractual expenditures. The Contractor must be fully cognizant and supportive of all efforts to remain within the revised funding level.

ANNEX 2

MISSION D'ETUDE POUR L'EVALUATION
DU SECTEUR RURAL ET DES RESSOURCES
HUMAINES DE LA MAURITANIE

NOUAKCEOTT, le 23 Octobre 1980

MEMORANDUM

N° 735/1/RAMS/RW-as

A tous les Experts et Consultants

De : R. M. WEBER

Objet : Méthodologie pour la préparation des
rapports d'orientation, Phase II

La réalisation des études de première phase du projet a montré le caractère imparfait du travail interdisciplinaire de notre équipe.

Cette situation est due en partie à l'aspect sectoriel du plus grand nombre des études entreprises, et le plus souvent au manque de connaissance des experts entre eux.

Elle a eu pour résultat la présentation d'un ensemble de travaux dont le caractère de convergence et de coordination aurait du être plus marqué.

Avec la deuxième phase, s'ouvre une période d'activités dont le caractère collégial est obligatoire et doit être considéré comme le seul moyen possible de travail des experts.

L'extrait ci-dessous de la section 2-1 (2) de l'accord de projet n°682.0211 illustre bien cette situation :

- " En travaillant en collaboration avec le GRIM et sous sa direction préparer, analyser et reviser :
- Deux voies alternatives de développement comprenant les stratégies associées ou options pour le développement rural intégré et l'amélioration des problèmes de la main d'oeuvre et de l'emploi.

- les formes d'organisation possible pour l'exécution des grands projets, par exemple les structures organisationnelles "centralisées" contre les structures "décentralisées".
- Divers mélanges des secteurs public et privé comme instrument de développement rural intégré.
- Diverses formes d'exécution des projets en tenant compte du milieu sociologique mauritanien.
- Nouveaux projets associés aux voies de développement et stratégies associées.
- En outre seront examinées les possibilités de la régénération de l'environnement du tiers Sud de la Mauritanie.

(fin de citation)

Cette citation met en évidence deux points :

- La collaboration avec le GRIM - celle-ci est obtenue par le travail avec la Direction des Etudes et de la Programmation et les relations du RAMS avec les comités (technique et interministériel).
- Le caractère "intégré" - des travaux effectués qui amène à l'exécution d'études et de rapports envisageant tous les plans (économique, technique, social, financier etc...) d'une hypothèse de développement. Pour donner satisfaction au GRIM le projet doit produire vingt études d'orientation dont le détail a été donné dans une note rédigée par le COP le 4 Juin 1980.

Le présent memorandum vient en complément de cette note, il précise la méthodologie du travail qui devra être utilisée par les responsables pour la réalisation des études de deuxième phase.

Cette méthodologie porte :

- a) sur l'utilisation d'un schéma général pour la rédaction des rapports d'orientation
- b) sur la réalisation des travaux en commun.

Schéma pour la rédaction des études

Nous devons présenter au Gouvernement une politique a long terme de développement, dont les travaux sectoriels ne constituent que des parties.

Bien que la logique veuille que ces parties ou secteurs soient étudiés dans un premier stade il n'en demeure pas moins qu'ils doivent l'être d'une manière telle que les options présentées soient cohérentes entre elles et susceptible d'intégration.

Il est apparu que l'un des moyens permettant cette cohérence était l'emploi d'un schéma unique orientant les réflexions.

Celui qui est présenté en annexe (1) se propose, après un rappel à l'échelon national et si possible régional de la situation du secteur ; ainsi que des recommandations qui sont faites dans les études de phase I, que soient dans un paragraphe II, décrites les différentes options de développement que l'on veut présenter.

Il s'agit dans ce chapitre d'une description globale de l'option montant les actions à long terme à entreprendre et son inscription dans la politique de développement.

Le paragraphe III est sans doute celui qui demandera la plus grande activité pluridisciplinaire. L'étude comparée des différentes options est rendue nécessaire pour permettre au Gouvernement d'apprécier l'intérêt de chacune des orientations proposées. L'examen doit donc

(1) Voir schéma en annexe.

"couvrir" l'ensemble des aspects technique, financier, économique, social, ainsi que des incidences écologiques de la politique proposée. Il engage pour chaque étude une connaissance macro et micro économique, technique (pour les études de production, sociologique, financière, institutionnelle et organisationnelle du projet envisagé.

Il suppose également que sont examinées les incidences de l'option sur les autres sous-secteurs.

Dans un paragraphe IV on examinera l'incidence régionale des options.- Il est important en effet que chaque fois que cela sera possible soient étudiées les conséquences régionales de l'action entreprise, de même que (particulièrement pour les actions de production), la zone de terrain qu'elle concernera et l'importance économique qu'elle prendra dans la région.

L'intégration du développement demeure l'un des points capitaux de notre réflexion, aussi est il indispensable d'examiner cette intégration tant au plan national (ou elle aura l'aspect d'une coordination des politiques) qu'à celui plus pratique de la région où l'on devra en estimer l'impact sur l'évolution de la zone intéressée, aussi bien que l'on évaluera le degré interne de cette intégration.

Le paragraphe V est prospectif, il a pour but global d'examiner les conséquences sur la vie des populations, leur bien-être, et sur l'économie du pays, des politiques à long terme étudiées. Il s'agit selon des hypothèses de différentes natures (haute - basse etc...) d'évaluer l'amélioration ou les améliorations qu'apportera l'option proposée et de les comparer aux besoins estimés de l'époque.

Dans les conditions d'activités ci-dessus et dans l'hypothèse d'un véritable travail pluridisciplinaire, les études d'options présentées par le projet devraient posséder un degré de cohérence suffisant à la constitution éventuelle d'ensemble de développement "logiques".

L'exécution des études de deuxième phase

Elle se déroulera en deux phases simultanées

- d'une part définition des stratégies globales de développement
- rédaction des études d'orientations.

Pour la réalisation de ces travaux il est indispensable :

- a) que les données établies par le RAMS et publiées dans les études soient utilisées pour les travaux de préférence à toutes autres. Les sources extérieures d'information ne devant être utilisées que lorsque les sources RAMS n'existent pas.

Il s'agit avant tout d'uniformiser les informations, d'utiliser des chiffres toujours les mêmes pour les données de base (démographie main d'oeuvre, éducation etc...) et d'assurer à l'ensemble des travaux une unité documentaire.

- b) les études sont placées sous la responsabilité des auteurs.
ci-dessous :

Agriculture

Livestock	Elevage	MM's WILDER
Irrigated agriculture	cultures irriguées	NASR Y.
Non-irrigated agriculture oasis agriculture	cultures s/pluie cultures d'oasis	KRAIEM W
Inland Fisheries	Pêche continentale	SOUMAH L.
Traditionnal maritime Fisheries	Pêche maritime	SOUMAH L.
Food Marketing	Etude de la commercialisation	STELLY R.
Food Pricing (including credit policy)	Prix des produits et crédit agricole	STELLY R.

Extension Policy	Politique de vulgarisation	NASRY Y.
Agricultural research	Recherches agronomiques	NASRI Y.
<u>Human Resources</u>		
Manpower Development	Développement de la main d'oeuvre	SARFATY RAYMAEKERS E.
Employment generation	création d'emploi	SARFATY
<u>Economic</u>		
Establishment of project priorities.	choix de la priorité des projets	KLAYMAN M.
Overall Development Strategies	Stratégies globales de développement	KLAYMAN M.
Private sector	étude du secteur privé	JULIARD C.
<u>Other</u>		
Improvement of rural health	amélioration santé rurale	DELGADO R.
Improvement of rural diets	amélioration de la nutrition rurale	MONDOT J.
Reducing desertification	réduction de la désertification	HAUSER P.
Appropriate organisational arrangements	organisations appropriées	SIEGEL L.
Implementation modalities	modalité de mise en oeuvre	FIKRY M.

Un mémorandum du COP précisera compte tenu des charges contractuelles le rôle de chacun des experts.

- c) Préalablement au démarrage des travaux, des réunions individuelles auront lieu entre les experts et la Direction du projet afin de mettre au point la rédaction des études, la coordination de leur contenu et les modalités de réalisation. La date de ces réunions sera fixée prochainement.
- d) Pour l'établissement, à partir du schéma général, point des canevas précis d'étude, il est souhaitable que toutes les liaisons interdisciplinaires apparaissant soient discutées et mises au point. (Dès le moment de la rédaction du canevas) avec les spécialistes concernés.

En tout état de cause, il est indispensable qu'une unité de pensée se dégage de l'ensemble des travaux. Pour ce faire il est nécessaire que les considérations d'ordre économique, financier, sociologique, de main d'oeuvre etc... soient concertées avec les spécialistes du projet. L'unité doctrinaire du projet doit être autant que possible préservée.

- e) Il en est de même au cours de la rédaction des études, sur les différents points faisant appel à des avis multiples pouvant faire l'objet d'échanges de vue avec les différents spécialistes de façon informelle ou lorsqu'il sera nécessaire à l'occasion de réunion formelle plus étendue.

-----oo-----

Il est rappelé que plus encore que pour les travaux de première phase ceux de seconde doivent être considérés comme ayant un caractère collectif bien plus qu'individuel et qu'il est souhaitable que cette caractéristique soit sensible aux lecteurs.

Type de Schéma pour la Rédaction des Rapports
d'Orientations

-----oo-----

I Rappel sommaire de la situation du secteur à l'échelon national et régional et des recommandations des études de phase I

II Les voies de l'amélioration pour le secteur considéré.

Option A	(
Option B)	description générale dans le contexte à long terme du développement
-----	(

III Etude critique comparée des options

Pour chacune d'elles

- caractéristiques techniques
- caractéristiques économiques (action sur le revenu global étude individuelle de rentabilité)
- caractéristiques sociales (y compris la création d'emploi et les besoins de formation)
- caractéristiques financiers (si nécessaire)
 - investissements
 - charges récurrentes
 - pour l'Etat
 - pour les collectivités
 - pour les utilisateurs
- Limites écologiques ___ action sur l'environnement
- caractéristiques structurelles
 - organisation de l'Etat
 - des Sociétés, des coopératives
- Relation avec les autres options

IV Pour chacune des options et à partir de la situation régionale actuelle du secteur considéré, définir les modalités d'application régionale des options.

- zone d'action dans la région (option prod)
- condition d'intégration aux autres activités régionales de développement

V Conséquences prévisibles de l'application des options :

- sur l'auto suffisance alimentaire
- l'indépendance économique
- la satisfaction des besoins fondamentaux
- le respect du milieu et sa restauration

VI Modalités possibles de mise en oeuvre
(liste de projets).

Memorandum No. 732/1/DAIS/PS/nj

October 22, 1950

To : All Experts
From: Pierre L. Salas
Subj: Report Requirements

As we complete Phase One reports and initiate the option papers for Phase Two, certain basic considerations should be borne in mind. The project agreement specifies some of these considerations and are excerpted below for your information and guidance.

Max

Two alternative development paths, including associated strategies for integrated rural sector development of the rural sector and the amelioration of manpower/employment problems.

Evaluations of a number of existing projects in light of the global view presented by the development paths and associated strategies.

New projects associated with the development paths and related strategies.

Engaging appropriate Ministries and concerned regional governments in a continuous dialogue with regard to the economic, political and sociological processes of development, including technical and administrative cadre of the regions with regard to project development, analysis and evaluation, taking into account the global view presented by an overall development strategy.

The inter-relationships among these (RAMS) studies will have been completed, with the result that two development paths will have been identified, which are internally consistent and reflect a judgmental balance among the several factors to take into consideration, i.e., employment, incomes, manpower and sociological constraints, etc.

Project Development Phase

During this phase the projects previously identified with the two alternative development paths will be designed in consideration of the development path selected. Prior to actually designing these projects, however, it probably will be necessary to "feedback" into the whole structure of studies the results of the policy meetings with the GIRM.

(Bruce)

Utilizing the data base being developed by the Project, projects will be identified in the rural and manpower/employment sectors. These projects will first be identified in a general way, for each strategy (development path); then, after appropriate decisions are made with regard to the development path, they will be brought up to the point where they will attract donor interest in a reasonable length of time.

.../...

...2.

In addition to the foregoing studies, certain special evaluations will be undertaken as follows.

- (1) Preparation of three policy option papers will be completed based on the following evaluations:

- | | |
|-------------|--|
| Louis | a. An evaluation of the appropriate organization structure e.g., centralization versus 'decentralization' for implementation of significant rural interventions; |
| Criss | b. An evaluation of the appropriate utilization of the private sector as the cutting-edge in rural development, e.g., commercants and private herders and farmers, and |
| Patrick | c. An evaluation of the possibility of undertaking projects which collectively would result in the regeneration of the environment in those areas of Mauritania (roughly the southern third of the country) where the existing environment has been destroyed by overgrazing, drought, population growth, and poor use of water. |
| Louis | Organizational alternatives for the implementation of major interventions, e.g., "centralized" versus "decentralized" organizational structures. |
| Criss | Various public/private sector mixes as vehicles for integrated rural development. |
| Criss/Louis | Preparation of policy options, in addition to those implied in (1) above related to possible trade-offs of alternative investments, <u>inter-alia</u> covering: (a) the appropriate organizational structure, e.g., "centralization" versus "decentralization" for the implementation of rural projects; (b) use of the private sector, e.g., commercants and "progressive" herders and farmers, as the cutting edge in rural development. |
| Criss/Mona | The Fourth Development Plan will incorporate appropriate decisions made with regard to the GIM organizational structure as it applies to project implementation, the role of the private sector in development, as well as guidelines for project implementation modalities. |
| Criss | Recommendations for conversion, absorption, or adaptation of survey related activities into institutional capacities will be prepared by the Contractor as part of his final report. |

...3...

Criss

In the present project, computer operations will be kept at a minimum because of the time constraints on project completion and because of the costliness of those techniques. These scenarios should be minimized for the following reasons:

- First, through the device of the Policy Papers and the resulting interchange between the Contractor and the GIRM, a considerable number of decisions should be made that will obviate the necessity for "feedback" scenarios. Additionally, the submission of Policy Papers has been programmed to be accomplished in three steps.
- Second, these scenarios can be even further eliminated to the extent the senior members of the Contract Team are experienced on developmental issues to be in a position to substitute judgment for "feedback" scenarios.

Louis

A full-time in-resident person to prepare the seminars, organize them and otherwise see that this aspect of the project moves smoothly. This person additionally will prepare the necessary documentation for the review of GIRM and CILSS projects, including organizing the sessions needed to accomplish this task.

Training and Institution Building

As part of the activities financed under this project, a series of seminars will be conducted for the benefit of the personnel in the Ministries participating in the project. The personnel will be selected by the GIRM in order that the results of the studies may be effectively utilized by the GIRM in its developmental efforts. These seminars will be conducted in Houakchott and appropriate regional capitals, and will be conducted on the average of once every three months during the life of the project. These seminars will include instruction in the techniques of data collection, project design, project development and project evaluation. These seminars will demonstrate the application of these techniques to a limited number of projects specified in the Third Development Plan and the list of projects developed by the CILSS. The precise projects to be discussed will be determined by an implementation letter between the AID Mission and the GIRM, in consultation with the American contractor.

...4...

Criss

A formalized on-the-job training program for the GIRM staff will not be established. However, the American contractor in cooperation with the GIRM will pass on the benefits of its findings to GIRM personnel in order to establish on-going institutional capacities in such disciplines as survey methodology, information systems and services, research and development, etc. It should be noted that the informal on-the-job training opportunities for GIRM personnel, particularly in the two Inter-Ministerial Committees, will be considerable. The Contractor will also be required to prepare a training program independent of the seminars, within the first six months of operation for review and approval by the GIRM and the AID Mission. This training program, to the extent that funds are available, will be implemented under the African Manpower Development Project (AMDF).

Louis

Additionally, a series of seminars is to be arranged for technical and policy level personnel of the relevant ministries, both in Kouakchott and in selected regional capitals. They will be conducted for the benefit of personnel in these same ministries, the personnel to be selected by the GIRM, in order that the results of the studies may be effectively utilized by the GIRM in its development efforts. These seminars will be conducted on the average of once every three months.

These seminars will include instruction in the techniques of data collection, project design, project development, and project evaluation. These seminars shall demonstrate the application of techniques to a limited number of potential projects developed by the GIRM in the context of its own Development Plans, the Permanent Inter-State Committee for drought control in the Sahel ("CILSS") and of the Senegal River Development Organization (OMVS). The precise projects to be discussed in the seminars and the precise projects to be evaluated will be determined by an implementation letter between the USAID and the GIRM, in consultation with the American contractor.

Mona

Activity Group III involves detailed analysis of elements that cut across sectoral boundaries:

1. Demand/Consumption (health/nutritional) Study
2. Social Systems and Change Study

...5...

Kona

Sociological Profile and Projections

A profile of the various ethnic groups will be prepared describing the social organization of these groups in relation to systems of production, their territories in the total society, land ownership profiles, and their basic tenets and beliefs which influence change patterns. The study will also describe the relationship among the various groups and systems of production. Projections of change in these relationships, organizations, tenets and beliefs will be made, using various hypotheses relating urban/rural migration and inter-zonal migration. This study will form the basis for the input for studies of project implementation alternatives.

Rural Social System and Change Study

Utilizing the sociological inputs into the production sub-sector studies, the Sociological Profile Study and experience in implementation of projects in Mauritania, this study will elaborate alternative implementation strategies with a view to establishing techniques and modalities which will enable national, program, goal and project objectives to reach the targeted populations with maximum chance for reasonably prompt realization of these objectives and without the use of repressive measures.

Quan

Projections of Food and Related Non-Food Demand

Building on the above projections of food and related non-food demand will be made in total by zone and region. In arriving at these estimates, significant changes in consumption caused by the drought (decreased milk consumption by nomads, increased use of wheat, rice and "red" millet by rural and urban consumers) will be examined to assess their permanent and long-term effects. An examination will be made on the effect that changes in population composition have on food consumption. Additionally, estimates of internal and external demand for agricultural commodities will be made (firewood, charcoal, hides, etc.).

Projections of Population

On the basis of demographic data from the 1976 census, projections of population growth will be made by age and sex, by agro-ecological zones and region. In

...6...

Quan/Bruce

addition, estimates will be made of employment, by major activity category, unemployment and skills availabilities. In arriving at these projections, various hypotheses of rural/urban and inter zonal migration will be made. This analysis will provide a basis for the supply and demand analysis (below) and the definition of the employment and unemployment problem in both the rural and urban sectors.

Quan

Demand Study

The Demand Study will provide critical information on national demand and hence the goal of self-sufficiency. Existing information on food consumption is very sparse and mostly outdated. This study is designed to provide relevant information on nutritional and health related conditions in areas, households, and individuals.

(Tiona)

The results of the study will be used to refine estimates of food demand, determine the market potential for marketable surpluses of food and related non-food production, and refine the policy recommendations in various production sub-sectors with regard to integrating various agricultural/livestock programs.

The study will evaluate the existing data on food consumption, nutrition, and evaluate current rural nutrition and health programs. It will construct a food balance sheet for the nation as a whole and for the agro-sociological zones. It will determine the inter seasonal variation in food consumption by zone, and evaluate diets for nutritional implications (parasites, micro nutrient deficiency, sanitation, susceptible age groups, etc.).

Bob/Quan

Projections of Rural Production and Income

... a study ... will project aggregate demand for major commodities, this study will first estimate the current production of major commodities and other items produced in the rural sector such as food grains, livestock, wood and fuel as a basis for estimating rural income and refining estimates of GNP. The baseline estimates will provide the basis for projecting supplies of major commodities or commodity categories available for domestic consumption and/or export and for assessing the impact on production, income and employment of alternative development strategies.

...7...

Bob/Quan/Kiona

The Overall Aggregate Program - Summary and Follow-Up

After collecting base data a consistency check will be made on the aggregation framework to ensure that it generates coherent results for a known base year, prior to using the framework for predictive purposes. Projections to 1980, 1985, 1990 and 2000 will be made for the macro-economic and sociological variables. These will be an output of the Project. As primary data from this and other projects becomes available it will be necessary to "feed back" adjustments to initial projections, reflecting for example, projected changes in income, food availability, and health and nutrition as these would be expected to impact on population growth, aggregated demand, and through price levels to production changes. Projects to be developed would affect the natural condition of the resource base. A developmental emphasis on certain agro-sociological zones would act to accelerate sociological change and employment which are objectives of the overall development program.

Bruce

Activity Group IV involves detailed analysis of the potential for ameliorating the manpower/employment problems in Mauritania. It will consist of two studies one in each of these two areas

1. Employment Study
2. Manpower Study

Habib/Youssef/
Lamine/HapActivity Group II Detailed Description of the Sub-Sector Production Studies

Five rural sub-sector production studies are planned. The objective of these studies is to determine in general terms, the current levels of production and income associated with these activities, to determine in general terms the potential to expand output on each commodity or commodity group, and the physical, institutional and social constraints to such expansion. The 5 studies are:

1. Irrigated agriculture
2. Dryland (rain fed) agriculture
3. Livestock/grazing
4. Oasis agriculture
5. Inland Fisheries.

In the first phase of these studies the current data base will be reviewed (aggregate study 4); in a second

...8...

phase, procedures established to verify estimates and fill data gaps and in a third phase optimal strategies/ programs/projects for Mauritania Rural Development will be assessed given alternative strategies, levels of domestic and export demand, production potential, and analysis of constraints enumerated.

Activité de Groupe II - Description Détaillée des Etudes de Production des Sous-Secteurs

Il y aura 5 études sous-sectorielles de production. Celles-ci fourniront la base pour la prise de décisions en ce qui concerne les stratégies alternatives de production dans chaque secteur et entre eux. Les 5 études sont:

1. La culture irriguée
2. La culture en terre sèche,
3. L'élevage;
4. La culture d'oasis;
5. La pêche en eau douce.

Dans la première phase de ces études, la base actuelle des données sera examinée (étude des synthèses no. 4); dans une deuxième phase, des procédures seront établies pour vérifier les estimations et combler les lacunes des données et dans une troisième phase, les stratégies/ programmes/ projets optimaux pour le développement rural intégré de la Mauritanie seront déterminés en fonction des stratégies alternatives, des niveaux de demandes locales et d'exportation, les potentialités de production et l'analyse des problèmes énumérés.

Patrick

Description of Agro-Ecological Zones

Using existing descriptive and cartographic data vis-a-vis soils, vegetation, rainfall, surface and groundwater supplies, land use and other physical and socio-economic data, define cartographically and describe principle agro-ecological (land resource) zones (four-ten zones). Wherever possible, these should be generalized along well recognized physical or political boundaries in order to facilitate summary of survey data. These zones will provide the basic sampling frame for data collection and projection of the impact of various levels of development investment and of alternative development strategies. Special emphasis should be given to identifying those sub-zones which have superior developmental employment generating potential and to the identification of the activities (grain food crop, cash-export crop, forest products, grazing) for which the zone (or sites within the zone)

...S...

are suited and the socio-economic and the socio-economic and lead/political constraints to such development.

Description des Zones Agro-Ecologiques

En utilisant des données cartographiques concernant les sols, la végétation, la pluviométrie, les ressources en eau de surface et souterraine, l'utilisation des terres, et les autres données physiques et socio-économiques, définir cartographiquement et décrire les principales zones (quatre à dix zones) agro-écologiques (terres, ressources). Partout où c'est possible, celles-ci doivent être généralisées le long des frontières physiques ou politiques bien définies afin de faciliter le résumé des données de l'étude. Ces zones fourniront le cadre de base pour le prélèvement des données et l'évaluation de l'impact des différents niveaux d'investissements pour le développement et les stratégies alternatives du développement. Un accent tout particulier doit être mis sur l'identification de sous-zones ayant les plus grandes potentialités de créer de l'emploi et à l'identification des activités (les cultures vivrières, cultures d'exploitation, les produits de sylviculture, les pâturages) pour lesquelles les zones (ou les sites dans la zone) est appropriée et les contraintes socio-économiques et politiques d'un tel développement.

Policy options on the possibility of formulating strategies for the regeneration of the environment in the southern third of the country.

Youssef

The Mauritanian agricultural resources base is slender and has been severely shaken by the drought. Nevertheless, a number of alternative strategies for realizing the considerable potential of the rural sector appear to be available. The resource requirements and consequences of these alternative strategies and development paths for reaching the objectives of the Plan (and beyond into the future) have not yet been critically examined. The optimal balance between agriculture and irrigated agriculture - with all other options, strategies and projects - needs to be analyzed in terms of consequences on objectives of the Plan, and in terms of implications with respect to the timing of the development and utilization of resources, i.e., infrastructure, human capital, and service institutions (credit, extension, etc.).

...10...

La base de l'agriculture mauritanienne est fragile et a été sévèrement touchée par la sécheresse. Néanmoins, un choix de stratégies pour la rive en valeur de l'immense potentiel du secteur rural semble être disponible. Les besoins de ressources agricoles et les conséquences de ce choix et voies de développement pour atteindre les objectifs du Plan (et au delà dans l'avenir) n'ont pas encore été examinés d'une manière spécifique. L'équilibre optimal entre l'élevage (nomadique et sédentaire), la culture en terre sèche et la culture irriguée avec l'ensemble des différents autres projets, options et stratégies - doit être analysé en fonction des conséquences de chaque choix conduisant à la réalisation des objectifs du Plan et leurs implications, l'étalage dans le temps du développement et l'utilisation des ressources (les fonds, l'encadrement, etc.).

All Experts

(Max)


Policy options papers are expected to flow generally from the basic preparatory studies outlined above, although some papers will be prepared individually. There are a total of 19 Policy Papers proposed, including the paper presenting the options for Overall Development (two paths). Options prepared will include analysis of likely impact upon the environment so that decisions can be made with full knowledge of potential effects.

ANNEX 4

Assignment Flow Chart


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
Phase II

1. Formulation of Overall Development Strategies

Chief of Party/Technical Director and Government Review

Chief of Party/Technical Director and Government Review


Manpower Education



2. Formulation of Sample Option Paper (e.g. Agricultural Research)

Chief of Party/Technical Director and Government Review

Chief and



ANNEX 5

Figure 4.7-A

REPORT PRODUCTION SCHEDULE -- FIRST YEAR

	M O N T H												NO. OF MO*
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	
<u>BASE LINE STUDY</u>													
1. Agro-ecological Zones	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••								4
2. Demographic Projections	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••								4
3. Rural Production and Incomes	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••							5
4. Food and Related Non-food Demand	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••								4
5. Sociological Profiles	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••					7
<u>SUB-SECTOR STUDY</u>													
6. Irrigated Agriculture				•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••		6
7. Rain-fed Agriculture							•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	5
8. Livestock							•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	5
9. Oasis Agriculture								•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	4
10. Inland Fisheries								•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	4
<u>FUNCTIONAL STUDY</u>													
11. Nutrition and Health							•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	5
12. Social Systems and Change (Techniques for Reaching Rural Population)							•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	5
13. Employment Situation							•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	5
14. Manpower Skills							•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	4
<u>ADDITIONAL EVALUATION</u>													
15. Appropriate Organization					•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••			4
16. Private Sector							•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••		4
17. Regeneration of Environment	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••							7

18. Project Progress Reports			••			••			••			••	1/2
19. Progress Reports to Host Government			••			••			••			••	1/2
20. Statistical Manual	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••							6

* NOTE: Months are calendar months, not man-months.

KEY:
 = Data collection and field trips by medium- and short-term staff.
 = Report writing.

ANNEX
 MS. 11-11-6

Etudes	Français	Anglais
<p>A. Aggregate Studies</p> <p><u>1. Agro-Ecological Zone</u></p> <p>a. Basic Study b. Regeneration 1/3 Sud</p> <p><u>2. Demographic Projections</u></p> <p><u>3. Rural Production</u></p> <p><u>4. Food and Non-Food Demand</u></p> <p><u>5. Rural Income</u></p> <p><u>6. Sociological Profiles</u></p> <p>aa. Negro Africain Mauritanien b. Noirs</p>	<p>Tirage définitif 120 ex. terminés Tirage préliminaire 20 ex. fait distribution RAMS (étude 12/12) ✓</p> <p>Traduction française faite tirage définitif</p> <p>Rédaction terminée tirage 20 exemplaires en cours</p> <p>Rédaction en cours 20/12 ✓</p> <p>Prêt pour tirage définitif Prêt pour tirage définitif</p>	<p>Tirage définitif 100 ex. terminés <u>Traduction entamée</u></p> <p>Corrections faites tirage définitif possible</p> <p>Rédaction en cours</p> <p><i>Traduction en cours</i></p> <p><u>Traduction en cours</u> <u>Traduction faites stencils</u> Prête pour tirage définitif</p>
<p>B. Subsector Studies</p> <p><u>7. Irrigated Land</u></p> <p><u>8. Dryland Agriculture</u></p>	<p>Correction en cours</p> <p>Rédaction en cours</p>	

Etudes	Français	Anglais
9. <u>Cases Agriculture</u>	Correction faites tirage préliminaire 2ème quinzaine —	Traduction
10. <u>Livestock</u>	Traduction faites —	Correction en cours —
11. <u>Fisheries</u> a. Inland b. Marine	Correction en cours — Rédaction en cours	
C. <u>Functional Studies</u>		
12. <u>Nutrition and Health</u> a. Nutrition b. Health	Rédaction en cours (31/12)	
13. <u>Social Changes</u> a. Pastoralism b. Agricultural Labor c. Migration d. Accumulation e. Sociologic Synthesis	Stencils corrigés Traduction faite tirage préliminaire Stencils terminés Stencils en cours Correction en cours —	<u>Traduction en cours</u> Traduction terminée <u>Traduction en cours</u> Traduction faite
14. <u>Employment</u> a. Analysis of Employment	<u>Traduction entamée</u> —	Correction en cours
15. <u>Manpower Skills</u> a. Manpower Study b. Formal Education	Tirage préliminaire 20 ex. —	Correction en cours <u>Traduction en cours</u>

Etudes

Français

Algérie

1/14

c: Non-Formal Education

Allemano Correction -

.D. Additional Evaluation

16. Appropriate Organization

Rédaction en cours -

17. Private Sector

Rédaction ^{terminée} en cours

ANNEX 7

Figure 4.7-B

REPORT PRODUCTION SCHEDULE -- SECOND YEAR

POLICY OPTION PAPER	MONTH												NO. OF MONTHS*
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	
1. Livestock Development-----	•••••	•••••	•••••										3
2. Irrigated Agriculture-----	•••••	•••••	•••••										3
3. Rural Health-----	•••••	•••••											2
4. Marketing-----	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	6
5. Employment Generation-----	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••							4
6. Developmental Priorities-----				•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	5
7. Implementation Modalities ^{1/} -----				•••••	•••••	•••••							2
8. Pricing (of Agricultural Produce)-----	•••••	•••••											2
9. Rain-fed (dry land) Agriculture-----	•••••	•••••											2
10. Oasis Agriculture-----	•••••	•••••											2
11. Inland Fisheries-----	•••••	•••••											2
12. Agricultural Credit and Extension-----	•••••	•••••	•••••										3
13. Agricultural Research-----	•••••	•••••											2
14. Manpower-----	•••••	•••••											2
15. Training-----	•••••	•••••											2
OTHER POLICY OPTION PAPERS													
16. Development Paths-----	•••••	•••••											2
17. Nutrition and Health-----							•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	2
18.-19. To Be Decided-----				•••••	•••••	•••••							2

20. Progress Reports-----			••			••			••		••	••	1/2
21. Progress Reports to Host Government-----			••			••			••		••	••	1/2
22. Final Report-----				•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	6

*NOTE: Months are calendar months, not man-months.

KEY: ••••• = Data collection and field trips by medium- and short-term staff.
 ••••• = Report writing.

^{1/} i.e., groups through which changes can best be effected, such as women's organizations, business associations, teachers' groups, farmers' associations, religious groups, livestock owners' groups, etc.

ANNEX 8

Schedule for Preparation of

Phase Two Option Papers

<u>Title of Paper</u>	1980		1981	
	November	December	January	February 15
1. Livestock Development		XXXXXXXX		
2. Irrigated Agriculture			XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	
3. Inland Fisheries			XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	
4. Traditional Maritime Fisheries			XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	
5. Dryland Agriculture				XXXXXXXXXXXX
6. Oasis Agriculture			XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	
7. Food Marketing	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX			
8. Extension Policy			XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	
9. Food Pricing (including Credit Policy)	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX			
10. Agricultural Research			XXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXX
11. Manpower Development (including Training) (Education)			XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXX
12. Employment Generation			XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	
13. Establishment of Project Priorities				XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
14. Overall Development Strategies	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX			
15. Improvement of Rural Health			XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	
16. Improvement of Rural Diets			XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	
17. Reducing Desertification by Management of the Environment			XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	
18. Utilization of Private Sector				XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
19. Appropriate Organizational Arrangements			XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	
20. Implementation Modalities			XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	

} who?