

AN EVALUATION OF CLUSA'S PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT O.P.G.  
AND THE "INDIA MODEL"

By

John K. Hatch  
Consultant

New York City

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Rural Development Services  
301 West 53rd.St./23 J.  
New York, N.Y. 10019

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## I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

### A. Overview of the Program Development OPG

CLUSA's active and continuous involvement with India's cooperative movement goes back to 1952.\* Over the years this durable relationship has come to be known as the "India Model". It is characterized by the existence of a permanent CLUSA office in New Delhi, a long-term resident CLUSA Representative, fraternal exchanges of American and Indian cooperative leaders, and consultant or liaison services by CLUSA in the development of jointly-formulated projects which strengthen Indian cooperatives.

Since the mid-1960's the CLUSA/India Office has been supported by tripartite funding provided by CLUSA/Washington, USAID/India, and the Government of India. CLUSA/W has paid the salary and out-of-country costs of the Representative, some capital goods, and has arranged funding for the cost of fraternal exchange visits between the U.S. and India. USAID/India pays the local rupee costs for the CLUSA Office in New Delhi, its Indian staff, and the Representative's local housing and business travel expenses. The Government of India provides concessions--such as payment of the CLUSA Representative's Indian income taxes and duties on imported property. Although not on a formally programmed basis, the CLUSA/India operations

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\* A comprehensive description of this relationship will be found in "A Summary History of the Assistance of the Cooperative League of the U. S.A. to the Cooperatives of India, 1952-1980", prepared by CLUSA/Washington in August 1980.

benefit from a variety of in-kind contributions from Indian cooperatives; these include provision of counterpart personnel, facilities for meetings, and various kinds of material support. Moreover, most of the direct costs of U.S. delegation participants visiting India have been covered by the delegates' cooperatives.

The USAID funding of the CLUSA/India Office has been financed through a number of mechanisms. From 1964-1972 the office was supported by rupee trust funds held by the USG in India. When the use of these funds was frozen by the GOI in 1972, support for CLUSA switched to funding in dollars by ATD/W utilizing simple contract orders prepared every 1-2 years until 1978. In that year the present Program Development OPG (AID 386-2135) was approved for a three-year period. This OPG is budgeted at the rupee equivalent of US\$203,600. CLUSA/W contributions are estimated at US\$270,400, GOI contributions at US\$425,000, and Indian cooperative contributions at US\$33,000 for a total CLUSA Office support package of \$932,000. The OPG's personnel budget covers the salaries of an Indian administrative assistant/secretary, an accounts and maintenance assistant, and one driver. Several additional Indian staff--including a clerk/messenger, sweeper, and several guards for day and night shifts--are financed on a pro-rated basis between the Program Development OPG, the NCDC Oilseeds Management OPG, the NDDB Technical Assistance OPG, and the Oilseed Growers Cooperative Project (OGCF).

The purposes of the Program Development OPG are twofold: (1) to develop

and support assistance projects for Indian cooperatives, and (2) to provide a continuous and open channel for information and assistance exchange between the cooperative movements of the U.S. and India. Both purposes are to be achieved through continuing rupee financial support to a permanent CLUSA/India Office. The outputs or activity components of the OPG are all centered on the CLUSA Representative, who is assigned five basic responsibilities, as follows: (1) to serve as a liaison between U.S. and Indian cooperatives, helping to plan and coordinate fraternal visits, study tours, exchange of information, and technical assistance services; (2) to assist in the planning, design, and implementation of projects to assist Indian cooperatives; (3) to provide technical consulting services to Indian cooperatives directly, host-country organizations serving cooperatives, and other development assistance institutions; (4) to provide logistical backstopping to U.S. expatriates assigned to AID-financed projects; and (5) to provide on-going supervision or conduct information up-dates on the status of cooperative projects underway.

Although the Program Development OPG is completely intertwined with CLUSA's so-called "India Model", it is instructive to identify what characteristics distinguish that model from that of a conventional country program directorship so common among AID-supported private voluntary organizations overseas. First, CLUSA pays the Representative's salary, not USAID, and this gives him significant autonomy. This autonomy is enhanced by CLUSA's payment of the Representative's out-of-India costs, which facilitates regional contacts, attendance at meetings of international cooperative bodies, and the

broadening--during annual home leaves--of contacts with U.S. cooperatives anxious to support projects in India. Second, the CLUSA Representative is assigned on a general rather than a specific project basis. His program contacts are with a broad variety of host-country national or state institutions--i.e., with an entire movement--and avoids identification with a single counterpart agency, economic sector, or specialized development strategy. Third, CLUSA does not design or implement its own projects; rather, it co-authors project proposals with Indian cooperative institutions and assists in the identification of potential funding sources. Fourth, the Representative is assigned on a long-term basis, and he serves both as an administrator and as a technical consultant to host-country and donor institutions. Finally, the CLUSA India Model is grounded on the fundamental tenet that the U.S. cooperative movement represents a large reservoir of resources, technology, and expertise which is potentially useful in quickening the growth of cooperatives overseas. CLUSA/India serves as a catalyst in mobilizing such contributions and supervising their adaptation to local conditions.

#### B. Purposes and Activities of the Present Evaluation

The Program Development OPG was conducted as one of a cluster of assessment activities undertaken by the consultant during two separate visits to India in late 1980 and early 1981. The first visit (September 14 to October 4, 1980) was largely devoted to an evaluation of the NCDC Oilseeds Management OPG (US\$475,000).<sup>\*</sup> The second visit (March 4-30, 1981) was dominated

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\* See "Evaluation Report on the NCDC/CLUSA Oilseeds Management OPG", April 6, 1981.

by activities involving a five-man team assessment of the Oilseed Growers Cooperative Project (US\$120 million), for which the consultant also prepared a re-write of the project's Multi-Year Operational Plan.\* Because of the higher priority of these larger OPGs and the larger commitments of time required for their evaluation, the Program Development OPG received very inadequate attention by the consultant. Field research on this OPG was limited to two days in New Delhi; it consisted of several informal interviews with the CLUSA Representative plus an incomplete review of his project files and reports over the last two years.\*\*

According to his scope of work, the evaluator was asked to review the objectives of the Program Development OPG, analyze the effectiveness and impact of CLUSA's assistance under the OPG, and report on progress made in achieving the grant's goals and objectives. Regarding the India Model, the consultant was to define its components, analyze the model's strengths and deficiencies regarding its operations in India, and comment on the replicability of the model to other countries.

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\* See "A Report on the Oilseed Growers Cooperative Project", prepared by the Joint CLUSA/AID Project Assessment Team, April 17, 1981; also "OGCP Multi-Year Operational Plan (1979-1986)", April 21, 1981.

\*\* Completed rather hurriedly, the original evaluation report on the Program Development OPG (dated April 23, 1981) resulted in a sufficient number of CLUSA observations regarding errors of fact or interpretation as to justify a second write-up, begun four months later. In undertaking this revision the consultant benefitted not only from CLUSA's extensive comments on the first draft but also had the opportunity to study all the Representative's quarterly and annual reports for this OPG covering the years 1979 and 1980.

C. Summary of Findings

This evaluation found achievements under the Program Development OPG to be nearly impossible to measure objectively. The reporting format established for the OPG was ambiguous, completely lacking in meaningful performance benchmarks for the Representative's different areas of responsibility. Following this loose format, reports by the Representative were of a general and unquantified nature, providing little sense of the intensity, significance, or continuity of his efforts from one quarter to another. Timely correction of these deficiencies by CLUSA/W or USAID/India never materialized.

The grant established only one performance benchmark--namely, development to implementation of six new projects. This goal was not only achieved but actually surpassed within the first two years of the grant period. While significant in a general sense, this achievement does not measure per se the effectiveness of CLUSA performance because (1) project development responsibilities were shared with, if not dominated by, India's National Dairy Development Board (NDDB); (2) four of the six projects were in an advanced stage of development before the OPG was signed; (3) the projects are of vastly different size (dollar costs); and (4) the nature of CLUSA inputs into the development of each of them varies from critical to peripheral.

Hence, this evaluation of the Program Development OPG must be based almost entirely on subjective appreciations that are not rigorously measurable. In this regard the picture which emerges is one containing a mixture of accomplishments as well as failings. On the positive side, there was one crowning achievement during the grant period which dwarfs all others in importance and alone justifies manyfold all AID investments in the CLUSA/India Office since the early 1970's. This was the initiation of the US\$120 million Oilseed Growers Cooperative Project--an immensely important development scheme which seeks to integrate India's oilseed and vegetable oil processing industry within a nation-wide, producer-to-consumer cooperative system. The CLUSA/India Representative was intensely involved in the project's design, financing, contractual negotiations, technical evolution, and on-going logistical support. The Representative's contribution was also critical in developing a couple of technical assistance projects involving expatriate oilseed processing specialists which are intended to strengthen management and plant operating efficiency among cooperative oilseed processors.

These projects will someday generate millions of dollars worth of income benefits for low-income farmers and consumers throughout India. To have served as a catalyst in the design and initiation of such initiatives is reason enough to characterize the Representative's performance as dramatically successful. Nonetheless, it is necessary to

point out that this success was achieved at the expense of inadequate performance of some of the Representative's conventional responsibilities, and of serious but presumably temporary noncompliance with important features of the CLUSA India Model. By his concerted attention to the cooperative oilseed sector, the Representative became heavily involved with a single Indian institution, the NDDB, with the result that the frequency of his contacts with India's cooperative movement as a whole lapsed considerably. Judging from his reports, the Representative has experienced great difficulty in maintaining continuity or follow-up for his consulting contacts or project development initiatives with institutions other than the NDDB. He has complained frequently of heavy administrative burdens arising out of the mammoth OGCP that virtually preclude his effective participation in other projects, with other organizations, in exercise of his liaison, consultative, and supervisory roles.

Overall, the evaluator believes that the Program Management OPG has, and continues to meet, very important needs in India; the grant merits renewal for a second three-year period. However, as a precondition to renewal it is suggested that the OPG description be extensively revised, the Representative's duties made more explicit, his performance benchmarks expanded, his reporting format revised to facilitate meaningful documentation of his activities, and provision for supervision by CLUSA/W tightened considerably.

## II. ANALYSIS OF O.P.G. COMPONENTS

### A. Purpose/Objectives of the Grant

The Program Development OPG has two purposes: (1) to develop and support assistance projects for Indian cooperatives, and (2) to provide a continuous and open channel for information and resource or service exchanges between the cooperative movements of the U.S. and India.

The successful achievement of both objectives was to be measured by a single benchmark: the development to implementation of six new projects. As of December 1980--with one year still remaining under the grant--funding had been obtained for six projects and all of these had been initiated. Three additional projects were still seeking funding assistance, with two scheduled for initiation in 1981. The nine projects are the following:

<u>Project</u>	<u>Assistance Funding Source</u>	<u>Date of Initiat.</u>
1. Oilseed Growers Co-op Project (NDDB)	USAID	01/79
2. Oilseed Management OPG (NCDC)	USAID	09/78
3. OGCP Initial Technical Assist. (NDDB)	USAID	08/79
4. Milk Grid Computerization (NDDB)	Ford/ODA	10/79
5. Rural Management Institute (NDDB)	Ford	11/79
6. Kaira Rural Development (NDDB)	UNICEF	06/80
7. Research and Development Center (NDDB)	?	1981
8. Communications Project (NCUI)	?	1981
9. Kadana Development Project (NDDB)	?	?

In addition to the above, CLUSA/India has been involved in the formulation of some ten additional project initiatives. Most of these were

eventually abandoned as not feasible or lapsed for lack of follow-up by CLUSA or Indian cooperative organizations. Those projects identified with an asterisk are apparently still in an initial stage of development but are unlikely candidates for initiation within the present OPG period. These additional projects are the following:

1. Women and Consumerism Project (NCCF)
2. Cotton Marketing Project (Gujarat State Cotton Mktng Fed.)
3. Leather Exports Project (NFIC)
4. Weaning Food Improvement Project (NDDB)
5. Fishing Cooperatives Project (NDDB)\*
6. Cooperative Nursery Project (UNICEF)
7. OGCP Model Plant (NDDB)
8. Dal Analog Project (NDDB)\*
9. Low Cost Woolen Mill (NCCF)
10. Women's Sericulture Cooperative (NDDB)

It is appropriate to mention that the achievement or surpassing of the six-project benchmark is not a very meaningful measure of the quality of CLUSA's performance under the OPG. In all cases, development responsibility for these projects has not rested exclusively or even predominantly with CLUSA but shared with Indian cooperative organizations. Nor is there anything critical about the number six, because the above-mentioned projects vary greatly with regard to magnitude of funding required, technical complexity, and type of input required from CLUSA. For instance, the mammoth \$120 million OGCP scheme can be considered more important than half a dozen smaller projects combined. Similarly, for some projects CLUSA's technological expertise is solicited (e.g., oilseed processing); in others CLUSA is used as a conduit or intermediary to procure external technical assistance (e.g., milk grid computerization, dal analog); and still others CLUSA's

help is needed to identify potential donors or to co-author a proposal to lend it greater credibility. Finally, it remains questionable as to what extent the projects initiated during the present OPG period are in fact new undertakings resulting from actions taken since the OPG was signed, or rather represent the heritage of CLUSA efforts going back to pre-grant years. While these concerns highlight the inadequacy of the OPG performance indicators, however, they do not alter the fact that a variety of important cooperative assistance projects were initiated with CLUSA's active participation during the grant period. Hence, the basic purposes of the OPG were achieved to at least a satisfactory degree. Only lack of measureable evidence discriminating the CLUSA Representative's inputs from those of others prevent us from concluding his contribution was highly productive or even outstanding.

Nevertheless, in satisfying the purpose of the Project Development OPG CLUSA has abandoned at least temporarily a fundamental characteristic of the CLUSA India Model--namely, its broad-based support to the Indian cooperative movement in general. Seven of the nine projects which have been, or soon will be, initiated during the grant period are associated with a single institution: the Indian National Dairy Development Board. From one perspective, this exceedingly close working relationship between CLUSA and the NDDB is highly desirable. By Third World standards the NDDB is one of the most innovative, dedicated, and competent cooperative promotion agencies to be found anywhere, and because it is a private-sector, non-profit trust it avoids many of the constraints which

dilute the effectiveness of government-sponsored cooperative development activities. Moreover, the NDDB is a large, nation-wide operation with an impressive track record. The Board's great success with Operation Flood--which built an integrated village-to-consumer cooperative milk industry throughout India--has attracted offers of assistance from a variety of donors including the World Bank, United Nations, European Economic Community, Ford Foundation, and many others; it has the luxury of being selective in its choice of supporters. The NDDB is beginning to conduct continuous research to explore opportunities for expanding the Indian cooperative movement--and particularly the Anand Pattern Cooperative Model--into new commodity sectors. From dairying and oilseeds, the NDDB expects to move into fruit, vegetables, cotton, jute, fisheries, and others. Additional support for in-house study teams is included for financing from among funds generated by the PL 480 commodity grant, and the Oilseed Growers Cooperative Project specifically plans to assist ambitious commercial import and export schemes involving oilseed products. In a program development sense, then, the NDDB is a vital energy source and prime mover. Its capabilities in project research, design, and management make CLUSA's compliance with its OPG much easier. Without this dynamic institution CLUSA would have far less significant projects to relate to under the program development grant.

It is apparent that CLUSA's role in development assistance has been greatly enhanced by its association with the NDDB, especially with regard to the implementation of the Vegoil Project (OGCP). This \$120 mil-

lion commodity donation, the largest PL480 donation in the world, would never have been approved by AID in the absence of such an impressive host-country organization as the NDDB to manage it. Likewise, CLUSA would never have been interested in becoming the commodity broker for this project had it been a smaller undertaking operated by an Indian cooperative institution of dubious management capability. And finally, NDDB would never have accepted PL480 assistance directly from the U.S. Government had CLUSA not agreed to serve as an intermediary for the transfer and monitorship of the donated resources. This unique conjunction of circumstances created an exceptional opportunity for CLUSA to support a development undertaking of unprecedented magnitude. But in making this commitment CLUSA became so deeply enmeshed in problems of commodity resource procurement, and in addressing seemingly endless inquiries from USAID concerning project status and implementation requirements, that CLUSA has been left with little time for anything else.

Clearly, CLUSA/India will have increasing difficulties in handling its new functions (in commodity resource intermediation) and its old functions (program development assistance to the Indian cooperative movement as a whole) without either (1) an increase in staff or (2) a decrease in its responsibilities under its existing functions, both old and new. As the third and last year of the Program Development OPG draws to an end, it becomes necessary that CLUSA and USAID address some fundamental

questions. What are CLUSA's appropriate support roles in India? If program development and commodity resource brokerage and project monitorship/intermediation are to occur simultaneously, how should responsibility for these roles be distributed so that their burden does not fall predominantly on the Representative? Where are CLUSA's priorities to be assigned between program assistance to the NDDB and other Indian cooperative organizations? What changes in structure, personnel, and funding are required to support any redefinition of CLUSA/India's scope of work. On behalf of that self-analysis and program dialogue, the consultant offers a few suggestions:

SUGGESTION: The basic purpose of the Program Development OPG --to develop and support assistance projects for Indian cooperatives--remains valid. However, it has become necessary to carefully delineate between two separate sets of project support functions: (1) pre-project assistance and (2) project implementation assistance. Pre-project assistance involves technical guidance to national cooperative organizations in (a) identifying project opportunities, (b) formulation of project design, (c) location of potential donors, (d) project proposal write-up, and (e) proposal follow-up to project approval. Project implementation assistance involves (f) commodity procurement or external resource intermediation, (g) project monitorship or supervision, (h) technical consultation for project operations, and (i) evaluation of project outcomes.

SUGGESTION: Between these separate categories of support functions, priority should be given to pre-project assistance in the case of the CLUSA Representative's time. In contrast, project implementation assistance should be offered predominantly by additional CLUSA staff and/or technicians (Indian or expatriate) recruited by the League on a short-term or permanent basis as determined by need. As a general guideline, no less than 60 percent of the Representative's time should be devoted to pre-project assistance activities; and of this commitment, no less than half should be directed at Indian cooperative institutions other than the NDDB.

SUGGESTION; The performance benchmark for the present OPG was the development of six new projects. Such an absolute number is meaningless in the absence of criteria specifying project size, coverage, complexity, or significance. The following criteria are suggested: (1) only projects sponsored by national- or federation-level cooperative institutions will be considered in measuring CLUSA performance; (2) CLUSA will develop projects with no less than five Indian cooperative institutions over a three-year period; and (3) the aggregate value of external assistance funding for projects developed by CLUSA will exceed by no less than a factor of 10 the total three-year cost of the OPG itself.

B. Review of the Individual Responsibilities of the CLUSA Representative

The Program Development OPG lists several responsibilities of the CLUSA Representative. He is to assist in the identification, planning, design, and implementation of projects to assist Indian cooperatives. He is to serve as a liaison between U.S. and Indian cooperatives, helping to plan study tours, fraternal visits, gather information, and facilitate technical assistance inputs. He is to provide technical consulting services to Indian cooperative organizations, local agencies serving the cooperative movement, and to bi-lateral and multi-lateral donor institutions with regard to cooperative assistance projects. He is to provide logistical backstopping to U.S. expatriates assigned to AID-financed or CLUSA-assisted projects. And he is to provide on-going supervision of cooperative projects underway, where appropriate, or at least keep himself informed of their progress. The CLUSA Representative's performance under each of these components will be examined below.

## 1. ASSISTANCE IN NEW PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

The Representative's compliance with this function has been almost non-existent since late 1979, when already five new cooperative assistance projects were underway. With the initiation of the Oilseed Growers Cooperative Project, the Representative's increasing involvement in this one project gradually consumed most of his available time. There was no pressing need, nor available staff capacity, to support the development of additional projects. Indeed, in his last two annual reports on the OPG the Representative has repeated verbatim the following observation under the heading "Lessons Learned":

Any pressure to finalize and initiate too many new projects over too short a period of time should be resisted strongly. A better course would be to deliberately delay the initiation of the less critical ones in order to minimize setting an improper basis.

The Representative obviously succeeded in resisting the new project pressure he identified. The "Project Initiation Schedule" attached to the Representative's second annual report is almost a carbon copy of the one submitted the year before, except that one existing project initiative was actually abandoned. However, in his quarterly reports for 1980 the Representative mentions at least ten projects which he had some hand in discussing or formulating (see page 10), but which never made the Project Initiation Schedule. These ten projects represent five Indian cooperative institutions. This gives a rough idea of the "opportunity costs" of CLUSA's almost exclusive involvement with

one project (OGCP) and one cooperative institution (NDDDB): for in resisting pressures to develop new projects, CLUSA also resisted supporting a broader spectrum of the Indian cooperative movement. In sum, with regard to the basic project development requirement of the OPG, CLUSA reached its performance target early in the grant period. However, in doing so it allowed an important feature of the CLUSA India Model to atrophy. To assist in the restoration of a more balanced project assistance strategy, it is recommended that any future OPG specify not simply an absolute number of projects to be developed, but rather the minimum number of Indian cooperative institutions with which project assistance activities will be conducted. Specific criteria suggestions in this regard were mentioned previously (page 15).

## 2. GENERAL COOPERATIVE LIAISON

A review of the Representative's reports reveals considerable inconsistency from one year to the next in the way he categorizes his activities or institutional contacts between (1) cooperative assistance in general, (2) liaison, (3) project development, (4) consulting services, and (5) supervision. Even in theory the differences between these categories are quite ambiguous; how much more difficult it must be in practice to discriminate the essential purpose of each activity and to keep these purposes from overlapping.

With regard to liaison-type activities specifically, it is nonetheless possible to generalize (based on available reports) that during each of the first two years of the OPG the Representative coordinated at least one fraternal visit by delegates from U.S. cooperatives, several visits by CLUSA/W staff or U.S. consultants, and assisted with arrangements for one or more groups of Indian officials wishing to visit U.S. cooperatives. In almost every one of the first eight quarters of the OPG period the Representative attended at least one important event organized by Indian cooperative institutions--conferences, annual meetings, congresses, cooperative celebrations, trade fairs, and the like. During his annual home leaves the Representative visited a number of U.S. cooperatives for purposes of coordinating existing or future assistance to the Indian cooperative movement. The unquantified nature of the Representative's reporting does not permit a reliable evaluation of the duration or significance of such liaison activities, but there is sufficient written evidence to indicate his performance in this area was at least satisfactory.

### 3. CONSULTING ACTIVITIES

As mentioned above, the Representative's institutional contacts are not reported on separately by function. Neither is it clear what is meant by a "contact"--much less whether it was meaningful or not--because these cover briefings of visitors, telephone and written requests for information, meetings both at CLUSA offices and elsewhere, verbal reports to U.S. and Indian diplomats, testimony given to government boards of inquiry, and finally "consulting services" to cooperative and private sector organizations as well as bi-lateral or multi-lateral assistance agencies

and PVOs. Nor does the Representative mention the frequency, duration, and significance of such contacts. However, a review of his quarterly reports permits us to draw some broad measurements of his performance. In 1979 the Representative listed a total of 52 contacts with 28 separate institutions, for an average of 13 contacts per quarter. In 1980 the Representative recorded 43 contacts with 34 institutions, which averages 11 contacts per quarter. It is impossible to tell whether some of these contacts involved repeated encounters during the same quarter, and it may be that some institutions contacted were not mentioned. In an attempt to provide a better overall impression of the range and type of institutions contacted by the Representative, a list is presented below containing 17 Indian and 26 foreign or international organizations:

<u>Indian Organizations</u>	<u>Foreign and International</u>
<u>NATIONAL OR STATE LEVEL</u>	<u>ASSISTANCE AGENCIES</u>
1. NDDB	1. USDA-CCC
2. NCDC	2. AID/W
3. NAFED	3. CIDA
4. M.P.State Co-op.Mkt.Fed.	4. SIDA
5. M.P.State Handloom Fed.	5. WFP
6. Gujarat Mkt.Fed.	PVOs AND CONSULTING ORGANIZ.
7. Nat.Research and Dev.Co-op	1. CRS
8. Fed.Urban Banking/Thrift Soc.	2. CARE
9. NCUI	3. Ford
10. NCCF	4. Rockefeller
11. NFIC	5. VHA
12. IFFCO	6. AFFPRO
<u>PRIVATE INDUSTRY</u>	<u>PRIVATE INDUSTRY</u>
1. Soya Bareilly	1. General Foods
2. De Smet	2. American Soybean Assoc.
3. DCM Chemicals	3. Krause Milling
4. Chemco	4. Agric. Counselor
5. Anand Cotton Ginning	5. Extraktionstechnik
	6. FAO
	7. UNICEF
	8. ICA
	9. World Bank
	7. ACDI
	8. World Educat.
	9. CUNA Internat.
	10. VITA
	11. CASA
	12. Servotech.

The above list suggests a fairly balanced distribution of contacts between Indian and foreign organizations. It indicates the Representative has maintained contact with a broad sector of the Indian cooperative movement, even though project assistance activity was narrowly focused on the oilseed sector and the NDDB. It can also be concluded that the Representative has served as an informational resource to many international agencies and private voluntary or consulting organizations. Overall, the evidence suggests at least a satisfactory degree of involvement in liaison or consulting activities. Given a more quantitative, detailed, and less ambiguous reporting format, one could imagine the Representative's performance could have been demonstrated to be highly productive.

*Or on the contrary had some.*

#### 4. SUPERVISION OF EXISTING PROJECTS

It is important to mention that the Representative is not responsible for supervising all projects developed to implementation with his participation. The project initiation schedules attached to each quarterly report of the OPG clearly indicate which projects require continuing CIUSA involvement and which do not. In this regard the Representative had a continuing supervision responsibility for only three of the five projects initiated in the first two years of the OPG: these are the NCDC Oilseed Management OPG, the OGCP Initial Technical Assistance OFG, and the "project portion" (as distinct from commodity monitorship) of the Oilseed Growers Cooperative Project. The two remaining projects---NDDB's Operation Flood II Milk Grid Computerization and NDDB's Rural Management Institute---required only that the Representative keep himself

informed of their progress and needs. As with other areas of the Representative's activities, no performance benchmarks were established by the OPG concerning project supervision responsibilities. Hence, any assessment of the Representative's effectiveness in this area is bound to be highly subjective.

In the opinion of the evaluator the Representative's supervision of the NCDC Oilseed Management OPG was deficient. As mentioned in the evaluation report on that project, formal or programmed contacts between the Representative and senior NCDC staff (via a project supervision mechanism known as the NCDC/CLUSA Oilseeds Management Advisory Committee) appear to have ended after May 1980. Although the Representative was in frequent (perhaps weekly) contact with the two expatriate advisors assigned to the NCDC, he never accompanied them to the field to obtain a first-hand impression of the problems they faced or how effectively these advisors were dealing with them. Two problems in particular arose which might have been resolved more expeditiously had the Representative provided closer supervision. One of the two advisors experienced extreme difficulties in interpersonal relations with Indians and, for reasons of age and disposition, in coping with field travel conditions. These factors almost neutralized the advisor's value to the NCDC project. His early termination after some 17 months in India was voluntary but, in the evaluator's opinion, long overdue. The second problem was a breakdown in NCDC's commitment to provide its advisors with full-time Indian counter-

parts, a lapse which to this day continues to jeopardize the continuity of benefits resulting from CLUSA assistance to this institution. The Representative should have addressed this problem opportunely; it would not have required a large investment of his scarce time, and the matter was important enough to deserve his highest priority attention. Fortunately for India, the remaining advisor has been very effective in hands-on teaching of more efficient processing techniques directly to plant-level managers and staff. He has also extended his duty tour and may even accept an offer from NDDB to spend another two years in technical assistance to oilseed processors.

In contrast to the NCDC project, the Representative's supervision of NDDB projects has been relatively intense. He has made frequent (almost monthly) trips to NDDB headquarters at Anand, has visited project processing plants, port facilities, and distribution networks, has worked closely with CLUSA consultants engaged in the OGCP Operations Research Study, and possibly is more familiar with the overall picture of the Oilseed Growers Cooperative Project than any other expatriate in India. In sum, the Representative's supervision of NDDB project activity must be regarded as excellent.

Nonetheless, the evaluator would still fault the Representative on two counts regarding project supervision. First, I believe the Representative has become too involved in the OGCP, because the boundaries separating

his responsibilities (as project supervisor, technical consultant) from those of the OGCP/CLUSA Project Monitor have become increasingly blurred. This relative over-involvement by the Representative in OGCP operations has resulted in his less-than-optimal participation in other projects, other Indian cooperative organizations, and other functions that require his attention.

Second, as a strictly personal opinion concerning the Representative's style-of-operations, I believe he spends an excessive share of his available time in the office or in New Delhi, and insufficient time in field travel at the village-level which allows an appraisal of project performance from the perspective of the ultimate beneficiaries. In other words, I feel the Representative gives excessive importance to top-down approaches to his work (including intensive national-level institutional contacts), while underestimating the value of understanding project dynamics from the bottom-up. I could be mistaken, but I am unaware of any cross-cultural or logistical constraints which would prevent the Representative from intensifying his grassroots project involvement. To a certain degree I think the Representative is as much the cause as he is the victim of the heavy administrative burdens about which he so often complains. By spending so much time in the office the Representative actually becomes both more available and a more tempting target for continuous interruptions from USAID (memorandums, telephone calls, meetings) seeking additional clarifications on even marginally important aspects of CLUSA operations or project implementation.

In the last analysis, however, the above reservations are almost gratuitous. Once again, given the absence of performance benchmarks or guidelines from CLUSA/W or USAID/India regarding how the Representative should distribute his time, or what volume of achievement is expected of him on an annual basis, the Representative is well within his prerogatives to organize and employ his time in any fashion he deems appropriate.

Looking forward to the renewal of CLUSA's Program <sup>Development</sup> ~~Management~~ OPG for another three-year period, the evaluator considers it necessary to suggest considerable revision of present OPG reporting formats, more detailed specification of performance benchmarks for the Representative on a periodic basis, more quantitative reporting of meaningful institutional contacts, more analysis of significant program problems, trends, or opportunities, and tightened-up procedures by CLUSA/W to review and respond to quarterly or annual reports by the Representative. Ultimately, the need for such reforms is not merely to better control and evaluate the Representative's performance; perhaps more importantly these changes are required to permit CLUSA to document its track record in India in a more convincing way. The following suggestions are offered on behalf of those objectives:

SUGGESTION: Categorizing the Representative's activities by function--namely, (1) general cooperative support, (2) project development, (3) liaison, (4) consulting, and (5) supervision--has not proven very useful. If this categorization of the quarterly report is to be maintained, it is incumbent on CLUSA to define unambiguously what sorts of activities fall into each category. Furthermore, CLUSA should specify some kind of annual benchmark for each category of activity. Finally, CLUSA should establish a set of guidelines as to what rough percentage of his total time is the Representative expected to devote to each area of activity.

SUGGESTION: Reporting under the category "General Cooperative Support is generally satisfactory, except that its content often overlaps considerably with "Liaison Activities". It is suggested these two categories be collapsed into one for reporting purposes.

SUGGESTION: A review of his quarterly reports reveals that the Representative engages in frequent and unnecessary verbatim repetition of narrative content from one quarterly report to the next. Some paragraphs go unchanged for as long as four quarters. This deficiency is particularly prevalent in the category of "New Project Development".

It is suggested that for the first quarterly report of each year a brief (1-2 sentence) description of each project under development be provided. Thereafter, if there occurs no change in the project's status from one quarter to the next the Representative should simply cite the project title followed by the comment "no new developments".

SUGGESTION: Under "Consulting Services" the Representative has a tendency to cite only names of institutions assisted or briefed, without mentioning what sort of assistance was offered, or what was discussed, or how much time was devoted to this activity. It is suggested that future reporting under this category cite the name of each institution assisted, followed by a brief description (no more than one sentence) of the activity involved and an approximation of the time involved or duration of the service.

For example:

- Soya/Bareilly: plant visit to review equipment needs (2 days)
- NAFED: meeting with BOD to discuss oilseed cake export contract with OGCP (1/2 day)
- World Bank: review and critique of oilseed processing report (2 days)
- Ford Foundation: briefing of new Ford Rep. (1/2 day)

SUGGESTION: For OPG-type projects the Representative must file a separate quarterly report (e.g. NCDC OPG). A large project like the OGCP usually commands a separate report as well. However, these projects are also reported on in the Program Development OPG, and this occasionally results in unnecessary duplication or confusing cross-references. It is therefore suggested that when a separate report has been written on any project mentioned under the "Supervision" component of the OPG report, the Representative provide at least 2-3 lines briefly summarizing his involvement in the referenced project as well as a citation of the other, more detailed report. For example:

Oilseed Growers Cooperative Project

- Anand meetings with NDDE/OVGM staff (July, 3 days)
  - Write-up, Multi-Year Operational Plan, (August, 2 days)
  - Port visits to Bhavnagar, Jamnagar with USAID auditor (August, 3 days)
- For details, see Quarterly Progress Report, submitted October 18, 1982.

SUGGESTION: It is apparent that the Representative's quarterly and annual reports have received very casual review by CLUSA/W and USAID/India. The evidence for this assertion lies in the fact that glaring deficiencies in both the reporting format itself, as well as the Representative's use of it, went entirely undetected for at least the first two years of the OPG period.

As a minimum prerequisite for CLUSA/W supervision of the India Representative, and as a professional courtesy, the Director of CLUSA/W's Outreach Division should write a personal response to each of the Representative's quarterly reports. Furthermore, in reviewing each quarterly report, it is suggested that the reader consult the previous quarterly report (and his reply to that report) in order to better sense the essential changes in reported activities from one quarter to the next.

### III. THE CLUSA INDIA MODEL

#### A. Review of the Model's Components

Although the CLUSA India Model appears to mean different things to different members of CLUSA's staff, the consensus view expressed in written documents and seconded by the Representative himself may be summarized as follows. First, the model is characterized by the long-term continuous presence of a CLUSA Representative in India. By "long-term" is meant not merely a 2-4 year duty tour but rather an assignment lasting possibly twice that long. Second, the Representative's salary and out-of-country costs are paid by CLUSA, which gives him an essential degree of autonomy. Third, the operations of a permanent CLUSA Office are supported by host-country government and cooperative movement contributions--as well as by CLUSA/W and USAID--and its program is conducted with the approval of both the U.S. and Indian governments, but neither have any direct control over the implementation of CLUSA activities. Fourth, the model posits a gene-

ralized relationship between CLUSA and the entire cooperative movement of India; in other words, CLUSA should not operate on a single-project basis nor focus its assistance on a single Indian cooperative institution. Fifth, the model asserts that the U.S. cooperative movement represents a sizeable reservoir of expertise, technology, and human or capital resources that can be drawn upon to quicken the pace of cooperative development in India. Sixth, to compliment resource transfers from U.S. cooperatives, CLUSA/India is seen as a liaison or conduit for linking Indian cooperatives to the resources of a broad spectrum of international development assistance agencies. And Seventh, by virtue of its long-term, continuous presence in India, CLUSA is seen as an exceptionally knowledgeable source of information about the needs of Indian cooperatives, their special socio-cultural setting, the quality of their own human and material resources available for development undertakings, and the possibly unique opportunities that exist for assisting them; hence, CLUSA is seen as a catalyst for project development of potential interest to outside donors, and an agent for adapting the project initiatives of such external institutions to fit local conditions in India. While the above-mentioned characteristics suggest the need for a CLUSA Representative who is essentially a generalist, the model in recent years has amended the scope of work of the Representative to include as one of his primary functions the provision of technical consulting services to Indian cooperatives or entities which serve the cooperative sector.

B. Positive Aspects of the Model in India

Following the features described above, the CLUSA India Model was implemented in its entirety through 1979. Judged in terms of the significance of the development projects which CLUSA was instrumental in implementing --notably the huge Indian Farmers Fertilizer Cooperative (IFFCO) and OGCP schemes--the India Model must be considered an outstanding success. CLUSA's long-term presence in India has gone far in establishing solid relationships of trust and respect between the League and the Indian cooperative movement. CLUSA is frequently consulted by GOI agencies at the national and state level to provide technical inputs to specialized development plans involving cooperatives. The Representative has been invited to address many conferences of cooperative leaders or lecture to students in training for cooperative service. Even during the "Tilt Period" (1973-1978), when the USAID Mission was withdrawn and official communications between the U.S. Embassy and the GOI all but closed down, the CLUSA/India Office and its Representative maintained a continuous presence and program in India; indeed, CLUSA served as an informal intermediary for communications between both governments.

Such achievements are not easily or quickly obtained. India is a huge and diverse nation, more appropriately described as a sub-continent than as a country. To become knowledgeable enough to serve a cooperative movement stretching over dozens of ethnic groups and languages, thousands of miles, and reaching tens of millions of people is a formidable task requiring many

years of dedicated study, travel, and continuously nourished institutional relationships. A two-year Representative in India would end his tour just beginning to understand the depths of his ignorance.\* Whether by accident or absolute necessity, it happens that all CLUSA/India Representatives tend to become long-termers. Allie Felder stayed 14 years, Wally Maddox stayed 5 years, and Rex Wingard has stayed 8 years. Both Felder and Wingard got CLUSA involved in unusually significant projects which have generated large benefits for Indian farmers. There would therefore seem to be a fairly close correlation between the Representative's length-of-stay in India and the quality of CLUSA's contributions to cooperative-based development undertakings.

In this report it has been repeatedly mentioned that CLUSA's recently-established and rather intense involvement with the Oilseed Growers Cooperative Project in particular, and NDDB-sponsored projects in general, has resulted in the atrophy of an important characteristic of the CLUSA India Model--namely, its broad-based assistance to the Indian cooperative movement as a whole. This situation is really not as serious or counterproductive as it may at first appear. There is nothing sacred about the CLUSA India Model. It has evolved over time and been adapted to changing circumstances; there is no reason to insist the model will be eclipsed or invalidated if one of its many component parts is occasionally neglected. With regard to CLUSA's NDDB-OGCP connection, it

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\* As Rex Wingard is fond of telling new visitors to India: "After you've been here for a couple of weeks you're ready to write a book about this place. After a month you think you can write a good article. But after a couple of years you don't want to write anything because you're just beginning to realize how ignorant you are."

can be argued that this relationship has produced far more positive benefits than liabilities for the Indian cooperative movement; it also represents a deliberate, justified, and highly productive strategy choice for CLUSA.

CLUSA's intensified assistance to the National Dairy Development Board was not accidental. It arose out of a keen sensitivity for that organization's great potential as a totally indigenous, non-governmental source of leadership for Indian cooperatives addressing the problems of the rural poor. Assisting the small farmer: this is the top priority of the World Bank, AID, most PVOs, and in fact the large majority of the international development assistance community. Over two-thirds of the Indian population consists of small farm households, so assistance in raising their productivity and income is a first priority of the GOI as well. Add to this the fact that cooperatives in India enjoy a degree of government support and private participation which almost resembles a form of worship; rural development through cooperatives is perhaps the most politically acceptable, if not the only, strategy for raising farm productivity and income throughout India. Finally, it happens that NDDB has successfully tested a model for cooperative promotion--capable of rapid and large-scale replication--based on the creation of integrated producer-to-consumer production systems on a commodity or industry-wide basis. It was done in dairying; it has been extended to oilseeds; plans are to continue into cotton, jute, vegetables, fisheries, and other commodity sectors. NDDB represents the Indian cooperative movement's leading edge, its most innovative and highly-experienced energy source. CLUSA

simply elected to go with a winner, to provide selective assistance to a dynamic institution which is almost capable of complete self-reliance but which still needs specialized technical advice as well as help in getting its ideas accepted and financed by outside donors. In sum, rather than having been weakened by CLUSA's NDDB connection, the India Model has been strengthened and, in fact, expanded. It now contains an indigenous graft derived from the now-famous Anand Pattern Cooperative. This graft provides better focus, greater impact, and expanded legitimacy to CLUSA/India operations. The CLUSA India <sup>Model</sup> has not atrophied; it has rather been partially domesticated.

### C. Deficiencies of the Model in India

In the opinion of the evaluator there are no serious deficiencies in the CLUSA India Model as it has been implemented before and during the present Program Development OPG. There do exist, however, several features in the model which remain to be fully demonstrated as appropriate. The very success of CLUSA's close involvement with the NDDB brings into question whether a broad-based assistance commitment by CLUSA to the entire Indian cooperative movement is, in fact, necessary. In this regard it is important to distinguish between so-called "liaison" or "consulting services" and new project development. With the sole exception of a communications project currently being prepared with the NCUI, CLUSA has not actively supported any other Indian cooperative organization other than the NDDB in developing or funding a new project. Nonetheless, CLUSA has maintained continuing relationships with a broad spectrum of

Indian cooperative organizations (see page 19). Hence, it has not neglected them per se; rather, it has simply not encouraged or given much follow-up to their project initiatives. Relative to the NDDB, many of the Indian cooperative organizations who might potentially qualify for CLUSA assistance are not particularly dynamic. Some reflect marginal managerial capability; rather than start new projects which increase their service responsibilities, these institutions first need considerable strengthening in the areas of planning, program development, administration, staff-training, member communications, board-management relations, etc. Then too, some of these same institutions do not serve the same clientele that CLUSA, GOI, USAID, and many donor institutions have identified as the highest priority target for assistance--i.e., small farmers. The question therefore arises: Is CLUSA justified in making a major investment of its limited staff resources and donor good will on Indian cooperative organizations that require intensive institution-building or which serve non-rural memberships, particularly when more competent cooperative organizations already exist and have a specialized mandate to assist the rural poor?

A second feature of the CLUSA India Model which remains to be demonstrated is its assertion that the U.S. cooperative movement represents a pool of expertise, technology, and capital that is potentially quite useful in quickening or modernizing cooperative development in India. This matter actually involves two aspects: (1) the resource pool itself, and to what extent it is appropriate for application to Indian problems and settings; but (2) how the available resources can be mobilized, adapted, and used effectively. The evaluator is prepared to assume that the U.S. cooperative

resource pool does in fact exist, and that some portion of it could be reasonably demonstrated to be applicable to Indian conditions. The problem arises in how best to get the expertise, technology, and capital transferred. I believe the exchange of fraternal visits by delegates of the respective U.S. and Indian cooperative movements is highly useful in identifying opportunities for innovation, but they are generally not successful in achieving innovation itself--largely because the durations of the visits are exceedingly short as well as the tendency for innovations to require complimentary resources involving equipment or capital that is not yet available. This suggests longer-term contacts between U.S. cooperatives and their Indian counterparts, perhaps even resident advisors stationed in India. This worked well in the case of the IFFCO project because American advisors were actually assigned--for the start-up period--full technical and managerial responsibility for fertilizer plant construction and operation. They worked with full-time Indian counterparts who eventually learned enough to replace them. However, since the IFFCO precedent was established, CLUSA has not demonstrated any particular success in copying its technology transfer strategy. CLUSA-sponsored advisors have become consultants, with power to suggest but not to implement, and often without the benefit of Indian counterparts available to learn their skills on a continuing basis. Some CLUSA-sponsored consultants have been less successful than anticipated because they were only available to visit India for brief assignments, or they were too old to tolerate rigorous field travel, or they had interpersonal difficulties communicating with Indians, and other factors. A final problem involving U.S. technology transfer is that GOI industrialization policies are ex-

tremely protective of domestic equipment manufacturers, whose blueprints in some instances have not been improved for decades; the result is generalized obsolescence, with the gap between Indian and internationally-available equipment growing steadily. For advisors to help Indian counterpart cooperatives to operate more efficiently--utilizing equipment that went out of style twenty years ago--is increasingly difficult. Meanwhile, GOI restrictions on modern machinery imports, plus essential shortages of domestic fuel supplies on which modern machinery depends, result in a technology transfer conundrum that is growing more complicated every year.

A third feature of the CLUSA India model is under increasing stress as well. This is the all-important autonomy of CLUSA/India operations from USAID or GOI direct control. The lesser source of difficulty between the two is, of course, the GOI. Tax concessions for the Representative and other CLUSA expatriate staff continue to be granted, although perhaps with increasing complications and red tape. Direct GOI pressure on CLUSA to support certain projects or provide continuous up-dates on project operations is still unheard of. However, the evaluator senses a growing risk to CLUSA autonomy arising out of its close relationship with NDDB, an institution which has many enemies precisely because it has been so successful. It therefore becomes a possibility---hopefully remote--that in the event the NDDB should ever suffer a major project disaster, or a scandal, or become the target of serious private or public vendetta, CLUSA could be identified as a close NDDB ally and be "punished" in some

way. Of course, without risk there is no gain. And if CLUSA ever had to walk the plank because of its support of the NDDB, the event could be considered CLUSA's badge of honor.

A far more serious threat to CLUSA's autonomy comes from USAID. This is easily explainable but nonetheless disconcerting with regard to the intact preservation of the CLUSA India Model. The OGCP is far too large to be left to CLUSA to monitor with the same freedom it might handle a \$200,000 project. USAID has statutory responsibilities which ultimately make it accountable to American taxpayers for how their \$120 million commodity donation to the NDDE is being utilized. CLUSA must recognize that USAID has a right as well as an operating preference to hound CLUSA about the slightest detail regarding the project. On the other hand, it is unreasonable for CLUSA to expect that simply because the India Office has always enjoyed considerable autonomy it must continue to receive the same treatment, even though its responsibilities now include monitorship of project activities valued at over a hundred times that which existed before its present Program Development OFG was approved. The very size of the OGCP makes it an exception to anything the CLUSA/India Office has ever dealt with before. This fact has resulted in a de facto change in the rules of the game by which CLUSA operates in India. Without doubt these rules will continue to change in the future. The resulting uncertainty can be expected to cause endless discomfort to the Representative and his staff, but this is a fact of life CLUSA must learn to live with, and the required adjustments will make it

necessary for CLUSA to muster its finest interpersonal skills to defend itself from further erosion of its program autonomy.

D. Replicability of the CLUSA India Model in Other Countries

In general terms the evaluator regards the CLUSA Model as highly appropriate for replication in other countries. The existence of a permanent CLUSA program office and a long-term resident Representative are clearly desirable features for a cooperative assistance program conducted overseas; they may even constitute prerequisites for the success of such programs. The tripartite funding arrangements supporting the CLUSA/India Office clearly seems important both in preserving program autonomy and in legitimating program operations in the eyes of the host-country. The program's ability to elicit significant host-country concessions, financial contributions, or sundry material or human resources on behalf of a permanent program office would seem to constitute an important barometer of that program's acceptability and importance to the country's cooperative movement.

On a less sanguine note, I feel the CLUSA India Model--while appropriate--stands little chance of being replicated intact in non-Indian settings. India is a particularly unique setting for CLUSA assistance programs because it has one of the largest and most vigorous cooperative movements to be found anywhere in the world. As mentioned before, cooperation in India is practiced almost as a religion; it is the centerpiece of many

government assistance strategies and represents perhaps the most universal legacy of Fabian socialism which India inherited from the British. But at the same time the cooperative movement--unlike so many Third World countries--is not dominated or tightly controlled by the central government. One could therefore anticipate that CLUSA's India Model would be somewhat more difficult to establish in either of two prototype settings: (1) countries where little tradition of cooperation exists, and/or (2) countries where cooperatives are tightly-controlled instruments of government socio-economic engineering. In the first instance it would be extremely difficult for CLUSA to develop new project initiatives without intense and continuous investments in institution-building. In the latter case it could be difficult to develop new projects which did not have the full approval of government officials.

In India CLUSA started out its operations in the early days with a generalist Representative. Its present Representative is a highly specialized processing technology expert. The program has consequently evolved from a broad-based assistance strategy with cooperatives in general to a relatively narrow-based strategy focused on support to the oilseed sector. Depending on how CLUSA wishes to weight the importance of these alternative approaches--generalist versus specialist--the League would select its next India Representative accordingly. A generalist would restore some balance to the program; a specialist might be able to exploit already hard-won gains to create even more important breakthroughs in the future. As a general rule though, it would seem that the generalist Representative

is more useful to establishing an assistance program in its earliest stages, while a specialist Representative is more useful in later stages of program development.

#### IV. FINAL RECOMMENDATION ON THE O.P.G.

The Program Development OPG presently supporting CLUSA/India operations should be renewed by USAID. The financing mechanism of the OPG itself (which replaced earlier task orders written on an annual basis) seems perfectly adequate and far more convenient than previous arrangements because of its three-year duration. AID policy suggests that the maximum amount that can be granted under an OPG is US\$500,000. Since the first Program Development OPG was only \$203,600, this would still leave a potential sum to draw on of US\$296,400 without any violation of the policy guideline.

Nevertheless, the evaluator strongly recommends that as a prerequisite for renewal of the OPG, the grant document be extensively rewritten. CLUSA's purpose in India remains the same. The specific objectives for achieving that purpose, however, have become somewhat ambiguous because of CLUSA's close involvement with the OGCP and the NDDB. The kinds of functional activities expected of the Representative need to be redefined with greater clarity, activity benchmarks established for each type of activity, and reporting formats by the Representative generally overhauled. Detailed suggestions for implementing these changes will be found

elsewhere in the body of this report. Finally, a concerted effort will be required by CLUSA/W to improve its supervision of the OPG in general, and its review of the Representative's quarterly and annual reports in particular.

Finally, a word on staffing. CLUSA's involvement in big projects has brought it big responsibilities and many administrative burdens which the Representative can not handle by himself. The presently available Indian staff of the CLUSA Office does not appear to be sufficiently experienced to relieve the Representative of his most time-consuming obligations involving direct dealings with USAID staff. The Representative is fast becoming a full-time administrator who only has time to dabble in technical consulting, new project development, and liaison activities. A thorough review of CLUSA/India's present program and administrative responsibilities, their distribution among available staff members, and opportunities for reorganization that frees the Representative for his most important functions--such a study should be conducted at the earliest possible moment, and preferably before final approval of a follow-on Program Development OPG is approved.