

DEVELOPMENT IS A JOINT EFFORT

Discussion Paper

on

Improving the Effectiveness  
of USAID-Funded Technical Assistance  
to Mali

Submitted by

James L. Roush  
Consultant

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- Attachments: A - Assessment of Project Funded Technical Assistance  
(from Bamako 5426)  
B - Resumé--James L. Roush  
C - List of People Interviewed

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At the request of the USAID, James L. Roush, an AID retiree and consultant, arrived in Bamako November 10, 1980 to assess the quality of technical assistance provided by the USAID to the Government of the Republic of Mali (GRM) in recent years and to suggest ways of improving its effectiveness. Mr. Roush interviewed USAID, USAID-funded contractor and GRM personnel and reviewed USAID's files. On the basis of his study, he submitted this report December 15, 1980 with the recommendation that it be considered a discussion paper for subsequent meetings with GRM officials and contractor personnel after it has been translated.

Mr. Roush reviewed the implementation progress of a number of projects and identified the primary implementation problems (see Table 1, page 6) as a means of assessing the validity of the conclusions of an audit team that the host country contracting mode was primarily responsible for poor implementation and for the reduced effectiveness of USAID-funded technical assistance provided to the GRM. Conclusions reached were:

- 1) Implementation delays have been very serious in most USAID-funded projects in Mali and the delays, themselves, are a primary contributing factor to the reduced effectiveness of USAID-funded technical assistance.
- 2) The host country contracting mode was not the primary reason for project implementation delays or the reduced effectiveness of the technical assistance provided; however, it was a serious contributing factor to implementation delays in two projects: (Livestock Development and Rural Works--the latter has been terminated) and it has had some negative impact on the effectiveness of technical assistance in all five projects reviewed which use the host country contracting mode.

As a means to being able to recommend remedial action to alleviate the implementation problems identified, it was necessary to search out the underlying causes of the problems. An analysis was made of the top six problems listed in Table 1 and the following were identified as the fundamental causes of project implementation difficulties and the reduced effectiveness of USAID-funded technical assistance:

### USAID

- a. Insufficient attention to the need for joint GRM-USAID collaboration in project design and formulation;
- b. Inappropriate attitudes toward joint GRM-USAID-Contractor collaboration in project implementation, particularly in projects using the host country contracting mode;
- c. Inadequate planning during project design and project implementation;
- d. Misunderstandings regarding the purpose, uses and costs of technical assistance and the means of obtaining the maximum benefit from such assistance;

- e. Problems of communication because of different cultural patterns, values and life styles;
- f. Inexperienced and inadequately trained GRM Project Directors and USAID Project Managers; and
- g. Insufficient attention paid to the implications and possible problems inherent in moving abruptly to the host country contracting mode and, thus, inadequate preparation for the change.

Section III of this report deals with the need for greater collaboration in planning and project implementation, with some of the attitudes expressed toward such collaboration, and with some of the perceptions of the purpose of USAID technical assistance (a, b and d above). Recommendations are also made about ways of improving communication, especially with regard to promoting cross-cultural understanding (see pp. 15-17

Better and more comprehensive planning requires greater collaboration and more attention devoted to the "how" of implementing projects. Inputs from the intended beneficiaries are essential, both in the planning/design stage and during implementation. Recommendations in Section IV encompass pre-project planning, reviewing the project plan at the time of project initiation, and in-progress planning.

While improved collaboration and more comprehensive planning are highly desirable, the most crucial need at this time is for substantial upgrading of project management. This need is generally recognized and management training appears to be a felt need--even though there is some skepticism about the feasibility of initiating a program quickly. The consultant's view is that early initiation of an in-country management development program is feasible and should be the USAID and GRM's highest priority. Such a program could be based in part on local institutions drawing heavily on the work of a Denver Research Institute team who left a draft report with the USAID following the team's visit in June-July 1979. Set forth on pages 25 and 26 of this report are some of the skills and understandings that Malian participants would be expected to obtain from the type of program suggested by DRI.

Neither the GRM nor USAID officials have been satisfied with the caliber of some of the personnel furnished under technical assistance contracts. Even when highly qualified technically, experts have not always been successful because of communications weaknesses, including lack of French language capability, and attitudinal problems. A number of recommendations are made in Section V. B. 1. designed to reduce the numbers and improve the quality of technical assistance personnel and insure a more effective use of such personnel.

Section V. B. 5. is devoted to a discussion of the host country contracting mode: AID's policy; the relevance of the underlying assumptions of that policy to the administration of Malian government contracts; and thoughts about the future of host country contracting in Mali. It is suggested that USAID should incline toward continuing the host country mode, but that each future situation should be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

by case basis. To decide whether the host country contracting mode should be utilized in a specific case, USAID and the GRM should determine that:

- a. the project, or activity within a project, is of high priority to the GRM; and
- b. the factors underlying the contract supervision problems cited in V. B. 3.(p. 42) have been largely overcome and any remaining factors can be dealt with through training or technical assistance which can be incorporated in the project or accomplished prior to the start of the project.

Section V. C. provides recommendations designed to improve commodity procurement because procurement delays have been contributing causes to reduced effectiveness of technical assistance teams in three projects. The recommendations relate to: a) obtaining more blanket waivers of U.S. procurement requirements; b) overcoming bottlenecks in moving goods inland to Mali from the ports of Dakar and Abidjan; and c) expediting customs clearance in Bamako. An increased role for the GRM in procurement, especially procurement planning, is also recommended.

## I. BACKGROUND

During their audit of the Livestock Development project in November 1979, auditors from AID's Auditor General questioned the appropriateness of the host country contracting mode in Mali. This was reiterated in their published report (No. 80-67 of June 6, 1980): "The Government (of Mali) has not utilized AID-financed technical assistance fully and effectively. It is our opinion that this is due to the use of the Host Country Contracting Mode." The auditors recommended that USAID/Mali assess the Government of Mali's capability to utilize the host country contracting mode in the new proposal being developed for a follow-on Livestock Development project.

In a seminar of USAID/Mali senior personnel held in February 1980, the decision was made to review the various contracting modes in use in Mali. It was subsequently determined that the USAID would not be able to do the review using its own resources. Further, it was decided that bringing in an outside expert would insure objectivity. USAID requested that AID/W arrange for an expert to come to Mali for about five weeks to help the USAID do its review. At the same time, USAID expanded the scope of the study.

The USAID decided to assess the quality of technical assistance provided by the USAID to the Government of the Republic of Mali (GRM) in recent years and to investigate different approaches by which to improve its effectiveness and the efficiency of the USAID's operations. It was anticipated that the assessment could facilitate the establishment by USAID of criteria and operational standards for:

1. selecting the optimum method of arranging for technical assistance for specific types of projects;

2. improving the quality of technical assistance personnel;
3. improving the utilization of, and support to technical assistance personnel; and
4. more efficiently monitoring and evaluating the performance of technical assistance teams.

A more detailed description of the proposed study is provided as Attachment A.

In response to USAID's request, James L. Roush, an AID retiree and consultant was contracted through the Indefinite Quantity Contract arrangement with Experience, Inc. and arrived in Mali on November 10, 1980. Mr. Roush, whose curriculum vitae is provided as Attachment B, has been assisted in this review by a USAID team:

Gerald Cashion, Design & Evaluation Office

Robert P. Jacobs, Controller's Office

Helen Vaitaitis, Program Office

Robert O. Weiland, Management Office

The USAID team has made suggestions to the consultant regarding sources of information, facilitated interviews, arranged logistic support, etc. However, all interviewing has been done by Mr. Roush and this report was written by him. See Attachment C for a list of those interviewed.

The approach used by the consultant was that suggested by the USAID: a review of project files, followed by interviews with USAID Project Officers and support personnel, members of contractor teams and GRM Project Directors and other knowledgeable project personnel or Ministry officials. The

consultant also had interviews in Washington with AID officials and representatives of four contractors who have worked, or are working, in Mali.

The consultant presented his preliminary conclusions orally on December 3, 1980 to the U.S. and Malian staff of the USAID (excluding USAID management). A follow-up meeting was held with this group on December 8th, following the distribution of a draft report on December 6th. USAID management reviewed the draft report in an all-day session on December 9th.

The consultant recommended that his revised report ("final report" under the Work Order) be: (a) translated into French, (b) distributed to appropriate GRM officials and AID-funded contractors; and (c) utilized as a Discussion Paper for tripartite meetings (GRM, USAID, contractors) on the issues raised and recommendations proposed in the report. This recommendation was accepted by USAID management, with the proviso that the decision regarding tripartite meetings would need GRM concurrence and would need to be discussed and arranged with the GRM and the contractors.

## II. WHAT ARE THE PRINCIPAL IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS?

In the process of interviewing, it became apparent that a number of USAID personnel felt that the host country contracting mode was responsible for most of the implementation problems encountered in the projects as well as reflecting an ineffective use of technical assistance by the GRM as has been stated by the auditors. It seemed important, therefore, to look carefully at project progress, and especially at the various implementation problems encountered by the projects recommended for intensive review. Those projects, grouped by the method of procurement of technical assistance, are as follows:

### Host Country Contract

- 203 - Mali Livestock II (less CVL--below)
- 204 - Rural Works
- 205 - Land Use Inventory
- 208 - Rural Health Services Development
- 210 - Operation Haute Vallée

### AID Contracts or Grants

- CVL - Central Veterinary Laboratory (Contract and Participating Agency Service Agreement with Department of Agriculture)
- 219 - Semi-Arid Tropics Research (Grant to International Research Center)
- 224 - Rural Water Improvement (Grant to Private Voluntary Organization - CARE)

A number of project files indicated delays in initiating projects because of excessive time in getting project approvals or in arriving at signed Project Agreements after project authorization. However, for purposes of

this analysis, implementation delays are defined as those taking place after the signature of the Project Agreement or Grant.

There follows a matrix (Table 1) showing the most significant implementation problems and their relative importance by project. The degree of severity of the problem has been indicated with a numerical rating, with 5 being the most severe. While the numerical values assigned reflect but one person's judgement, they can be useful if looked at strictly as general indicators. As such, they provide an indication of the projects which have had the severest implementation difficulties and the types of problems that seem to have contributed the greatest to those difficulties.

An analysis of Table 1 is useful for two purposes:

1. to assess the validity of the conclusions of the auditors and the perceptions of some USAID personnel regarding the negative impact of the host country contracting mode on project implementation and the effective use of USAID-funded technical assistance; and
2. to suggest areas for priority attention by the USAID, GRM and contractors for initiating collaborative action to improve project implementation and increase the effectiveness of USAID-funded technical assistance.

As indicated in Table 1, all but one of the projects reviewed has experienced significant delays; the Rural Works project has been terminated. The most serious delays were experienced by the projects utilizing the host country contracting mode. However, multiple factors have been cited as causes for implementation delays. Contract Management is the primary

Table 1

CATEGORIZATION OF IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS

<u>Type of Problem</u>	<u>CVL</u>	<u>203</u>	<u>204</u>	<u>205</u>	<u>208</u>	<u>210</u>	<u>219</u>	<u>224</u>	<u>Total Points</u>	<u>No. of Projects with Problems</u>
USAID/GRM Disagreement on Project Objectives	3*	3	4	-	-	2	-	-	12	4
Performance/Suitability of Contract Personnel	-	3	2	-	4	3	-	-	12	4
Contract Management and Contractor Support	-	4	3	1	2	1	-	-	11	5
Poor/Inadequate Design	-	3	5	1	1	-	-	-	10	4
Delay in Signing Consultant Contract	-	-	-	3	3	3	-	-	9	3
Delay in Equipment Delivery	-	2	-	3	-	3	-	-	8	3
Need to Replace Experts on Short Notice	-	2	2	-	2	-	-	-	6	3
Funding Availabilities	2	2	-	-	-	-	1	-	5	3
Excessive Turnover of Personnel (GRM, Contractor and/or USAID)	-	1	2	-	-	1	-	-	4	3
Force Majeur (Lack of water, electricity, or rain)	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	3	3
Delayed Departure of Participants	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2
<b>TOTALS</b>	<u>6</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>82</u>	<u>2</u>
(Number of Types of Problems)	(3)	(10)	(6)	(5)	(5)	(7)	(1)	(-)		

\*Research Component Only

203 - Mali Livestock II (HCC)

204 - Rural Works (HCC)

205 - Land Use Inventory (HCC)

208 - Rural Health Serv Dev (HCC)

210 - Operation Haute Vallée (HCC)

219 - Semi Arid Tropics Research (AID Grant)

224 - Rural Water Improvement (AID Grant)

CVL - Central Veterinary Lab (AID Contract, PASA)

5= Crucial

3-4= Very Important

1-2= Minor to Secondary Importance

-- Not significant

factor that could be a function of the host country contracting mode, and it is indicated as a very important contributor to project delays in only two projects: Livestock Development and Rural Works. Even in these projects, there have been a number of other problems ranked as very important or crucial. It should also be noted that the projects not utilizing the host country contracting mode are much less complex, and the objectives and methods of implementation are very precise in relation to the other projects.

### CONCLUSION

(1) Implementation delays have been very serious in most USAID-funded projects in Mali and the delays are themselves a primary contributing factor to the reduced effectiveness of USAID-funded technical assistance. Therefore, a primary need is to suggest ways of overcoming the implementation problems cited.

(2) The host country contracting mode is not the primary reason for project implementation delays in USAID-funded projects in Mali, but it was a serious contributing factor in two projects: Livestock Development and Rural Works.

Virtually all of the factors listed in Table 1 are relevant to the effectiveness of technical assistance personnel, with the first six listed being the most significant. Need to Replace Experts on Short Notice was of secondary importance; however, it is primarily a function of either Contract Management or Performance of Contract Personnel. The equipment procurement underlying the Delay in Equipment Delivery factor was not performed by the GRM or affected by the administration of host country contracts. Therefore, the only factor directly affecting contractor effectiveness was Contract

Management and Contractor Support. The Performance/Suitability of Contract Personnel factor theoretically could be affected by Contract Management, but appears not to have been the case in most projects.

#### CONCLUSION

(3) Host country contracting has not been the primary cause of the reduced effectiveness of technical assistance provided under USAID-funded projects in Mali; it has, however, had some negative impact in all five of the projects using the host country contracting mode.

Before one can recommend priority remedial action to alleviate the problems cited above, it is necessary to search out the underlying causes of the problems cited. An analysis was made of the top six problems listed in Table 1 to determine the most pervasive underlying factors.

#### CONCLUSION

(4) The principal factors underlying the implementation problems cited in Table 1, and thus the more fundamental causes of project implementation difficulties and the reduced effectiveness of technical assistance, are:

##### USAID

- a. Insufficient/attention to the need for joint GRM-USAID collaboration in project design and formulation;
- b. Inappropriate attitudes toward joint GRM-USAID-Contractor collaboration in project implementation (and re-design when needed), particularly in projects using the host country contracting mode;
- c. Inadequate planning during project design and project implementation;

- d. Misunderstandings regarding the purpose, uses and costs of technical assistance and the means of obtaining the maximum benefits from such assistance;
- e. Problems of communication because of different cultural patterns, values and life styles;
- f. Inexperienced and inadequately trained GRM Project Directors and USAID Project Managers;
- g. Insufficient attention to the implications and possible problems inherent in moving abruptly to the host-country contracting mode and thus inadequate preparation for that transition.

Further discussion of these factors and recommended action to eliminate or alleviate their negative effects is included in the following three sections: Improving Collaboration and Communication; Planning Better and More Comprehensively; and Making Project Management More effective.

### III. IMPROVING COLLABORATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

Two quotes serve to lay out the problems of collaborative style, the first from an American in USAID related to collaboration in project design and the second from a GRM official related to collaboration in project implementation:

"We don't have time for more collaboration in the project design phase."

"Once the bilateral Grant Agreement is signed, the use of the funds provided in the agreement is under the complete control of the GRM."

The following quote from a Malian employee in the USAID seems an appropriate response to both of the above:

"DEVELOPMENT IS A JOINT EFFORT"

#### A. Collaboration in Project Design

The top five implementation problems cited in Table 1 substantially could have been alleviated by more effective collaboration during project design, especially the factors GRM-USAID Disagreement on Project Objectives, Poor Design and Delay in Signing Consultant Contract. Specific recommendations are provided in the following section: Planning Better and More Comprehensively. Given the skepticism expressed in the United States (Executive, Congress and press) about AID's ability to carry out the U.S. aid program efficiently and the questioning of whether the aid provided really makes any difference, can any USAID afford not to take the time to improve collaboration when it is so important to the ultimate success of the USAID-funded joint development efforts? Pressures from AID/Washington to expedite Project Papers<sup>1</sup> and obligations must not be allowed to interfere with orderly planning and obligation of funds. When problems arise, the USAID will be blamed--not AID/Washington.

B. Collaboration in Project Implementation

The second quote above regarding the control and use of project funds reflects an attitude that was found in the two projects that had the worst implementation records. The actions which flowed from this attitude which affected the supervision of GRM contracts are listed and analyzed in sub-section V.B.3. (Contract Supervision). Such an attitude makes other aspects of project implementation extremely difficult. It is the nature of development that there will need to be changes in implementation plans and budgets. These changes need to be approved by both parties, regardless of which party has implementing responsibility. And necessary approvals can be given in a timely fashion only if there is a free flow of information among the parties involved, including contractors if they have responsibility for some aspects of implementation.

The quote, and the attitude it reflects, simply is unacceptable as it pertains to the ownership and control of project funds. AID is accountable to the U. S. Congress and the American people for insuring that AID funds, and the resources purchased with those funds (technical assistance, other contractual services, commodities, pay and allowances, etc.), are used in accordance with U.S. law and high ethical and professional standards. Therefore, AID must have free access to all pertinent information necessary to insure proper accountability of AID funds, regardless of which government commits them for project purposes.

It should be pointed out that the types/<sup>of</sup> financial controls established for operations/<sub>in Mali</sub> are fundamentally the same as apply in any other country, including in the United States. They are designed to protect both the

USAID and the GRM and its Project Directors. Fortunately, this is recognized and appreciated by some Project Directors.

The attitude reflected in the quote stems, in part at least, from poor communications regarding the roles of all concerned. As indicated previously, there appears to have been insufficient attention paid by the USAID to the implications and possible problems inherent in moving abruptly to the host country contracting mode. Misunderstandings regarding the purpose, uses and costs of U.S. technical assistance appears also to have been a contributing factor to this attitude.

C. Purpose, Use and Costs of U.S. Technical Assistance

"The purpose of U.S. technical assistance is to support U.S. contractors."

A misunderstanding of the purpose of U.S. technical assistance is incomprehensible to most Americans. The initial reaction is to assume the speaker is joking. However, when the statement is made by two GRM officials and one Malian employee of the USAID, all in separate interviews, it appears necessary to look for the possible reasons for such a misunderstanding and clarify the situation.

One of the statements made to justify the thesis in the quote was that 60 to 70 percent (50 to 60 percent by another interviewee) of the AID funds provided to Mali are for costs of technical assistance contracts. Furthermore, much of the equipment provided comes from U.S. suppliers, and it frequently is not appropriate for Malian conditions. Additionally, it is charged that Mali is forced to accept technical assistance that it does not need. The high salaries and generous benefits of U. S.

contractor personnel, especially when compared to Malian professionals, causes resentment and contributes to the attitude expressed. Finally, many Malians have expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of the personnel provided under technical assistance contracts.

It is understandable that one might feel that U.S. technical assistance is to support U.S. contractors since a very large share of the AID dollar is used for purchases of U.S. technical services and commodities. Furthermore, AID and its supporters use this fact to try to convince a reluctant Congress that it should continue a large program of U.S. bilateral aid. However, AID's policy is to provide whatever mix of personnel, commodities, contractual services, operating costs, etc. is deemed appropriate to assure that a proposed project can obtain the results projected. Sometimes, the mix proposed will reflect a USAID judgement that a certain technical input is necessary to insure optimum use of the other inputs being financed by AID. If the GRM were not in agreement with AID's judgement, perhaps USAID should contract for the input and call it something other than technical assistance.

When interviewees compare the share of project costs for technical personnel to the share for investment, they are implying that investments are more productive. However, if the technical assistance is well used, it also represents an investment --an investment in human resources, which is very important to Mali's development at this stage. The technical assistance can also help insure that Mali gets its money's worth from other investments financed by AID.

It might be helpful to mutual understanding to reflect on U.S. practices

of using consulting services. These are frequently used by U.S. government agencies and private business enterprises to supplement their own resources. In other words, use of "technical assistance" does not necessarily reflect a technical inadequacy on the part of the organization, but a need for supplemental resources so that a given task can be done more efficiently or more expeditiously. Or more objectively, as in the case of this study. In addition, the outside expertise may not be any more highly qualified in a technical sense, but have wider experience, particularly in problem-solving. Frequently, the purpose of the outsider is to provide training which the operators do not have the time, or patience, to do.

USAID understands the resentment of a number of Malians over the high costs of U.S. personnel, given the very large differentials between salaries of Malian and American professionals of comparable educational backgrounds. However, these salaries and related family support items are necessary to recruit good U.S. professionals to come to Mali. Therefore, rather than using valuable time trying to negotiate <sup>/marginal changes</sup> in salaries and benefits, USAID and GRM officials should give priority attention to insuring that:

1. all technical assistance personnel are really needed;
2. only high quality personnel are provided under the contract;
3. personnel stay only as long as they are needed;
4. all necessary support and facilities are ready for technical assistance personnel upon arrival; and
5. technical assistance personnel are treated as members of the team and are encouraged to give their best advice under all circumstances.

Specific recommendations for achieving the foregoing are provided in the planning section (Section IV) and the project management section, especially sub-section V.C.

D. Improving Communications

The importance of an improved collaborative effort, involving GRM, USAID and contractor personnel, has been stressed above. This can lead to improved communications among the development team. At the same time, increased efforts to improve communications are needed to facilitate the strengthening of collaboration. One very important ingredient to improved communications is a greater understanding of each other's cultural patterns, work habits, values and life styles. This implies a greater effort on the part of all members of the development team: GRM Project Directors, contractor personnel and USAID personnel. This effort includes a willingness to be both teacher and student.

On an individual basis, all Malians and Americans can read about each other's country, traditions, people, etc. Efforts can be made to increase cross-cultural social activity. Turns can be taken in hosting informal rap sessions.

On an organization basis, the three groups (GRM project direction, USAID and contractor) could take turns organizing special events or join together in co-sponsorship of special programs. Some illustrative ideas for such events include:

1. Briefings by Malians on their government's development plans; on potentially useful training programs that are offered by Malian institutions; on various GRM systems, e.g., budget, financial control, personnel management.
2. De-briefings by Malian returned participants on observations of the society in which the training took place as well as summarizing the learning experience.

3. Presentations by members of all three groups of ideas and innovations in their field of interest that they have learned from their travels or reading.
4. Presentation by USAID of a summary of the process of providing project assistance and the rationale for the various components of the process.
5. Workshops or panel discussions presenting American and Malian methods or techniques for dealing with various types of management problems, e.g., providing incentives to subordinates to improve their performance, establishing disincentives for poor performance, reprimanding a subordinate, initiating a new program, developing an implementation plan and budget, performing an evaluation or an inspection, etc.
6. Speakers (from within the development team or outside guests) on management subjects such as Management by Objectives, Management Information Systems, Project Tracking Systems, etc.
7. Showing of videotapes — either the general interest types that might become available through the U.S. International Communications Agency or special development-related programs which are made available through the MEETS program of the Manpower Development Division of the Office of Personnel Management, AID/Washington.
8. Social type occasions relating to U.S. and Malian holidays or events, slide showings, special musical programs, etc.
9. Periodic meetings of technical experts in-country, Malian and expatriate, to exchange information on their activities, the

current state of information developed in on-going research activities, etc. Some meetings might be held at or near on-going research programs, e.g., ICRISAT and SAFGRAD agricultural research and the Central Veterinary Laboratory research on livestock disease vectors.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- (1) That USAID, GRM and contractors seek ways of improving communications and mutual understanding, drawing on the foregoing ideas to the extent they appear helpful.

#### IV. PLANNING BETTER AND MORE COMPREHENSIVELY

Good planning is essential in its own right to insure a reasonable chance of efficient and effective implementation. However, it is also a way of improving communications if it is carried out collaboratively. Planning must be looked at not as a one-time thing, but as a continuing process. For presentation purposes, the process is divided into three segments: Pre-Project Planning; Reviewing the Plan at the Outset of the Project; Planning during Implementation.

##### A. Pre-Project Planning

AID's system of pre-project planning involves the following steps:

1. Program planning -- deciding upon which subject matter areas USAID should participate in during the coming five years.
2. Preliminary project proposal -- after approval of its aid strategy the USAID submits to AID/Washington Project Identification Documents (PIDs) for each new project proposed for initiation in the coming fiscal year.
3. Project Paper -- after policy approval of the PID, the USAID prepares a detailed description of the proposed project. If it involves large-scale funding, it will require AID/Washington approval.

The beginning of joint collaboration should begin with the program planning submission. This provides an opportunity for the USAID to find out if its proposals are consistent with the GRM's long term plans and are considered appropriate by the GRM for USAID financing. In addition, it provides an opportunity for the GRM to find out what AID

is able and prepared to undertake, which helps the GRM in its own planning.

The degree of collaboration at the preliminary proposal or PID stage would depend upon the degree of collaboration in the preparation of the program planning document. However, at a minimum, the planning authorities and the likely implementation agency should be aware of the USAID PID submission.

Collaboration in the preparation of the Project Paper can be exceptionally helpful in avoiding, or at least alleviating, a number of the implementation problems cited in Section II above. It is at this point that there should be an input from the intended beneficiaries of the project, or at least from a sociologist/anthropologist who has studied them, and the local officials in the project area. Other elements of the Project Paper in which a GRM input could save time later include:

1. a detailed procurement plan -- GRM input at this time can insure that any U.S. procurement that would be inappropriate can be identified and approval of waivers sought with the approval of the Project Paper;
2. a detailed analysis of the financial system of the implementing agency to determine whether financial or managerial technical assistance will be required;
3. a detailed technical plan, including a determination of technical assistance needed -- GRM input at this time can insure that only needed technical assistance is planned for. The GRM could inventory the Malian personnel who would likely be assigned to the project and

determine whether some personnel should be sent for training even before project approval to reduce the time in which expatriate assistance would be needed. The technical plan will also indicate the intended source for technical assistance. The GRM may be able to suggest a source that would be interested in a long run collaborative relationship with Mali; this could facilitate technical help later that would already be familiar with Malian conditions and personnel;

4. a funding plan, including the proposed budget for operating costs and the allocation of project costs between AID and the GRM;
5. a management plan, focusing on the structure, quantity and quality of personnel and other resources and capabilities of the intended implementing agency.

Collaboration in the preparation of the Project Paper can help insure that there is mutual understanding of what is to be done and how it is to be done. In addition, such collaboration facilitates the initiation of certain pre-implementation actions even before the project is formally authorized (see Appendix 3G of the draft revision of Handbook 3 ). This can mean that some GRM actions can be taken before signature of the Project Agreement, thereby precluding the need for some of the conditions precedent, the fulfillment of which often has taken months -- over a year in some cases.

#### RECOMMENDATION

- (2) That USAID and the GRM increase their collaboration in the preparation of AID Project Papers.

(3) As a means of increasing collaboration, that the USAID and GRM seek to establish a joint project development team, with co-directors from each side who would make assignments in their respective organizations for the preparation of the sections of the Project Paper and would coordinate all facets of the preparation of the document.

B. Reviewing the Project Plan at Project Initiation

Frequently, a considerable amount of time elapses between the time a Project Paper is prepared and the Project Agreement is signed; even more elapses before the project is ready to start. Sometimes, the initiation of the project must await the arrival of contract personnel. GRM personnel assigned to direct and implement the project may not be the same people that participated in the design of the project. For these reasons, it is essential to review the project plan when actual operations are about to begin.

One important part of the review is involving the contract team in this review, so that all persons can see clearly how they relate to the whole project and to other elements of it. In addition, local officials and representatives of intended beneficiaries should be included in this review. It would probably be preferable if the review took place at or near the project site, but part might be in Bamako to insure participation of all agencies that would have a role in project implementation, and part on site with appropriate Bamako representation.

As a part of the foregoing review, detailed annual and quarterly implementation plans should be prepared. To facilitate this, Chapter 9 and

Appendices 9A and 9B of the draft revision of Handbook 3 should be translated into French and distributed to GRM project personnel. English language versions should also be distributed to USAID project officers and selected contractor personnel.

After review of the plan of execution of the project, and when actual start up dates are firm, the appropriate ministers, representatives of other participating organizations, the U.S. Ambassador and the USAID Director should be invited to a presentation of the broad outlines of the project plan with emphasis on the roles of participating agencies and organizations and the expected benefits to the beneficiaries. It should be seen as an orientation session and as a media event which would provide public commitments of agencies and their officials, including USAID, to produce. It could also be used to emphasize the physical things that were to happen rather than the Mali Franc size of the grant which is usually the case with the publicity given to the signing of agreements. The foregoing could be reinforced by a similar type gathering at the project site to celebrate the initiation of significant elements of the project.

#### RECOMMENDATION

- (4) That USAID encourage and assist the GRM to undertake the type of review process presented above at the outset of new projects.

#### C. In-Progress Planning

At the review of the plan discussed above, project leadership would also have prepared implementation plans for the first year's and first quarter's operations. If done properly, these can be used to develop an effective

project monitoring system for monitoring physical progress and the financial plan. Such a system can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the project managers; it can also ease the monitoring job of USAID and facilitate communications between all of the implementors and monitors.

In most operations, there will be a need for a more or less formal look at accomplishments on a quarterly basis, with a view to revising the implementation plan if necessary and developing new quarterly Work and Financial Plans. Naturally, if an important assumption about an input is found to be invalid, one should revise the implementation plan when this becomes known, not wait for the quarterly review.

The quarterly reviews and the preparation of new Work and Financial Plans should be a tripartite affair: GRM in the lead role, the contractor playing a support role to the GRM, and the USAID in a supporting and monitoring role. If all parties participate at this time, the subsequent approvals by USAID should be obtained quickly. To insure this, and to profit from a multi-disciplinary approach, the USAID project officer should invite members of the USAID Project Committee to the review and planning sessions and encourage the GRM Project Director to also invite other supporting agency personnel. It is useful, for example, for financial personnel to attend discussions of implementation problems so they can devise a system for the flow and control of funds that enhance, not hinder, project operations.

#### RECOMMENDATION

- (5) That USAID work with GRM Project Directors to improve their current in-progress planning efforts along the lines set forth above.

V. MAKING PROJECT MANAGEMENT MORE EFFECTIVE

A. General

For analytical and presentation purposes, planning and communications (including collaboration) have been discussed separately. However, it must be emphasized that project management encompasses these elements. In fact, they are the basis for, and a part of, any project management system worthy of the name. Even if one looks at project management essentially as the management of project implementation, in-project planning (discussed in the previous section) clearly is a part of that process. Communication in project management encompasses the communication system between the Project Director and all project personnel and between the Project Director and all agencies or organizations participating in or affecting project implementation. Thus, communications in project management is much broader than reflected in the discussion in Part III above which focused on only one part of project personnel -- contractor personnel -- and only one outside agency -- USAID.

In June-July 1979 two experts from the Denver Research Institute made a study of project management performance and development in some USAID-funded projects in Mali. They found a number of weaknesses in the various component elements of project management, while also finding indications of a serious concern for, and attempts at, improving project management. Their findings appear just as relevant today as they were a year and a half ago. It is very discouraging, therefore, to find little knowledge of the existence of the draft report and apparently no action taken as a result of it.

The Denver Research Institute experts presented the principal components of a management development program for Mali. As a result of the proposed program, participating Malian managers would be expected to:

1. Develop an understanding of the "organization" as a system (be it Ministry, firm or project), of the role and importance of objectives for an organized activity, of the meaning and relevance of strategy, of the nature of the management process and the role of the manager.
2. Develop an understanding and appreciation of the importance to an "Operation" of external relations (with community, regional and local government, other agencies, Ministry, donors), develop appropriate approaches to external relations and ability to apply them.
3. Develop an understanding and appreciation of planning as a process and as a management tool, of its numerous applications (e.g., to activities and to allocation of human, financial and material resources at various organizational levels) and of its value to management; develop the ability to apply basic planning principles and to use selected, specific techniques.
4. Develop an understanding and appreciation of the role of information and communications in management, and of different information systems and their components; outline a basic information system and develop guidelines for its adaptation to individual project needs.
5. Develop an understanding and appreciation of the tools and uses of financial management, including accounting, budgeting and control systems; learn special requirements associated with AID funding and

how to satisfy them.

6. Develop an understanding and appreciation of human resources management; identify ways to increase delegation of authority (and responsibility), accelerate decision-making, reduce bottlenecks in the authorization process, increase staff initiative, increase effectiveness of advisory personnel, increase staff capability.
7. Develop an understanding and appreciation of the implications of managing materiel, particularly procurement, inventory control and maintenance aspects; become familiar with tools and systems relevant to project needs and special requirements or problems in this area.
8. Develop an understanding and appreciation of the concept and techniques of control, particularly control by results (and objectives); identify information needs for effective control; plan control system development for "Opérations".
9. Develop an understanding and appreciation of the importance to an "Opération" of the marketing function (with respect to technical services, credit and materials).
10. Develop improved understanding and teamwork within the management ranks of individual projects and between them and others with whom they must interact, including AID personnel.

The initiation of a management training program, along the lines set forth in the draft report of the Denver Research Institute team is critically needed and is long overdue. Attendance should not be limited to Malians,

however; rather the USAID and contractor (at least in some cases) counterparts should also attend the program for two reasons: (1) generally they need it; and (2) it will greatly facilitate communications among the counterparts.

The program should not be seen as a one-time thing, but as a continuing program at least until a critical mass of participants is obtained in all USAID-funded projects. This indicates the need to create a capacity in-country within a relatively short period of time to continue the program without, or with minimal, expatriate assistance. This will not only save money but, more important, leave behind a badly needed resource that can serve additional parts of the GRM as well as the private sector.

The desirability of such a program appears to be acknowledged, but the feasibility has been questioned by a number of USAID personnel. Their questions/concerns are:

1. Are the Malians really interested? After all, they say that they do not need any technical assistance.
2. It takes a lot of time to develop such a program and to put the training to use. GRM Project Directors are already over-worked. USAID is under-staffed and its project officers are relatively inexperienced so USAID cannot help.
3. If one starts a new project to develop such a program, it will take two to three years at least before there will be any impact.
4. It takes a considerable amount of funds to initiate such a program and funds are tight.

There seem to be answers to those questions/concerns that indicate the feasibility of initiating management training within a few months, not a few years. Some of these answers are:

1. Malians have expressed an interest in such training. As those directly responsible for results, they feel more keenly the need for tools to help them improve performance. They also have to respond to AID's reporting requirements.
2. It is not necessary for USAID or GRM Project Directors to devote time to developing such a program, other than to indicate their priority needs to those developing the program. Following the training, GRM Project Directors will want help in establishing improved management systems, but the organization providing the training should be staffed so that it can provide consulting services to its graduates.
3. Also related to the time concern is the feeling that management, utilizing a good management system, requires much more time and personnel. This does not seem to be borne out by experience, and one is left to conclude that an insufficient number of AID personnel have had the experience of operating within a good management system or even of being exposed to management training. However, even if the consultant has under-estimated the personnel requirements and the time required of the Project Director to put the system into operation and make it work, he has concluded that neither the GRM nor USAID can afford not to make the investment. Too much time and resources have already been spent with too little to show
4. If the USAID and the GRM give the proposed training program the

priority being recommended, even a new project could/should be initiated within a few months. However, it probably is not necessary to start a new project to initiate the management training proposed. It appears that there are one or more local institutions that could provide the core element for the development and implementation of a management training program. Funding can be arranged by re-allocating funds within existing projects to fund such training from individual projects. Alternatively, funds could be shifted from on-going projects to provide special funding for the program. Funds juggling is an art in AID; where there's a will, there's a way!!

#### CONCLUSION

(5) An immediate initiation of management training in-country for management personnel associated with USAID-funded projects is an immediate need and is feasible.

#### RECOMMENDATION

(6) That USAID and GRM establish a joint committee or other appropriate mechanism charged with developing a plan for initiating management training in-country within six months at the maximum.

(7) That within the management training program and related consulting assistance recommended above, highest priority be given to the development of a project performance tracking system which would permit the Project Directors and Activity Chiefs to monitor performance against targets in terms of physical accomplishments and funds commitment and utilization.

(8) That USAID base its own project monitoring system on the monitoring system established by the Project Directors of USAID-funded projects. This will facilitate communications, reduce USAID monitoring workload and improve the chances that USAID support services will be provided on time.

One of the most essential elements of good project management is follow-up. The creation of a good management information system is useless unless it is used. When projects are in the regions, on-site visits are essential to insure that the reporting system is functioning properly, that progress is really being made, and that project resources are being correctly and effectively used. Visits should be scheduled not only when a major activity is coming to a climax, such as harvest time, but also when the on-site personnel should be engaged in detailed planning. USAID Project Officers should be encouraged to go with GRM (and contractor in some cases) counterparts when this is feasible, but also set up special visits and include other USAID personnel such as the Rural Sociologist, someone from the Controller's Office, etc. These other personnel may see ways of helping the activity directors improve their management systems.

#### RECOMMENDATION

(9) That the USAID Director require USAID Project Officers to make periodic focused field trips to project sites, with the periodicity being determined by the complexity of the project, the nature of project activity going on, availability and reliability of reporting from the site, etc. Visits should include on-site review of managerial and financial progress and review of work plans, financial plans,

Procurement requirements, etc.

(10) That USAID encourage and assist, as appropriate, the creation and improvement of management systems for on-site managers of USAID-supported field projects. Managers of field projects should also be included in the management development program discussed above.

(11) That quarterly reviews of project implementation and preparation of quarterly Work and Financial plans (per IV.C. above) for projects with field activities be done, to the extent possible, in the field. Where a field review is not feasible, field personnel should participate in the Bamako review, following an on-site mini-review in the field with representation by the GRM Project Director or his designee, the USAID Project Officer and, if appropriate, a representative of the contractor providing technical support to the project.

When planning projects, it is always prudent to request contingency funds in the budget to cover underestimates, inflation and slippage in the implementation schedule. There may also be situations in which an agency, other than the implementing agency, is very important to the success of the project, but it is unable or unwilling to respond as expected. If funds were available and set aside for this purpose, implementation could be facilitated by funding an appropriate input to the support agency.

USAID includes an allowance for contingencies in most Project Papers and it will generally be incorporated in the authorized Life of Project funding for the project. However, most of the USAID's projects are being funded annually in increments. Thus, the contingency becomes available

only in the final year of the project. On the other hand, it appears that unforeseen needs arise during every year and require either a slowing down of activity, an early request for the next year's funding, shifting between projects, etc. While some reasonable accommodation will usually be worked out, it may be only after some delay or often extensive effort by the Project Director and/or USAID Project Officer. Either way, it has impeded good management.

#### RECOMMENDATION

(12) That USAID seek to obtain AID/Washington concurrence to including a contingency (based on previous shortfalls) in the annual funding increments which would be included in the annual Project Agreement Amendment as a separate line item.

Contingency funds would be allocated by USAID at the request of, or with the concurrence of the GRM.

#### B. Contract Management

As indicated in Table 1 in Section II, contract management and matters related to the performance of contract teams have had a significant negative impact on the implementation of some of the projects. The way some of the contracts have been managed has also had a very negative impact on communications between the contractors and the GRM, between USAID and the GRM, and in some cases between contractors and USAID. Mutual distrust and suspicion have developed.

Some of the possible reasons for the attitude of some GRM Project Directors was discussed in Section III.C. Many members of contract teams

and USAID ascribe most of the problems of project implementation to the administration of GRM contracts. GRM officials in turn have been critical of the technical assistance furnished by contractors and of perceived AID policies related to the furnishing of technical assistance.

The foregoing indicates the importance of reducing the emotion on all sides and establishing a dialogue to clear up misconceptions and begin to search for ways of dealing with the underlying problems which led to the charges and countercharges. Sections II and III B. and C. deal with the misconceptions and attitudes that flow therefrom. In this section, more specific problems, and recommendations for dealing with the problems, are presented.

The issue of whether or not future contracts should be in the host country mode is of less immediate concern and is dealt with in the last sub-section. The first four sub-sections deal with means of improving current contract management or offer recommendations for dealing with problems that, based on past experience, might arise if follow-on host country contracts are decided upon. Some of the recommendations are pertinent regardless of the contracting mode.

1. Establishing Requirements for Contractual Services

At the end of Section III. C., certain priority actions were suggested for insuring that the GRM and AID obtain the maximum benefit from USAID-funded technical assistance. These included being sure that personnel are really needed, that high quality people are provided under the contract, that personnel stay only the minimum time feasible to meet project objectives, and that maximum benefits

are obtained from contract personnel. A few ways of achieving foregoing were discussed in the Pre-Project Planning sub-section (II A.) above. However, it is not always feasible to be as specific as one would like at the time of the preparation of the Project Paper. It is very important, therefore, to have studied requirements thoroughly by the time the Request for Technical Proposal (RFTP) is issued -- presumably this will be slightly before or just after the signature of the Project Agreement. It is important, also, to be as precise as possible in the RFTP about working and living conditions.

#### RECOMMENDATION

(13) That the GRM select the principal Malian staff for any new project (or new activity in a follow-on project) by the time the RFTP is prepared and that a training schedule for any Malian project personnel be established by that time so that the GRM and USAID can establish more accurately than heretofore the requirements for, and the scheduling of, technical assistance personnel.

(14) That the tasks for which technical expertise is needed should be described in the RFTP rather than a listing of the types of technical personnel. Then contractors would be encouraged to use their imaginations to put together an appropriate team.

(15) That, in conjunction with the foregoing recommendation, the RFTP provide in the selection criteria that extra points would be provided for keeping the number of long term experts to a minimum and for keeping down the length of stay of the long term experts which are proposed.

- (16) That the RFTP provide for extra points for proposals that utilize Malian or other African personnel as a part of the contract team and/or provide for sub-contracts to Malian, other African or U.S. minority firms in the execution of the contract.
- (17) That the GRM and USAID try to identify at the time of the preparation of the RFTP situations where the contractor can be given complete responsibility and authority for achieving a specific task within a specified time.
- (18) That the GRM and USAID set forth as thoroughly as possible in the RFTP and the contract the relationships that are expected to exist between contract, GRM and USAID personnel and provide for a framework or mechanism whereby questions about those relationships can be raised for discussion by any of the parties without fear of reprisal or recrimination.
- (19) That the RFTP provide for the Chief of Party, and the administrative officer if there is to be one, <sup>to</sup> arrive two to three months before the principal group of experts. This will insure that experts arrive only after the contractor and the GRM are ready to provide all necessary support to them.
- (20) That RFTPs and contracts specify the vehicles that will be made available to the contractor and provide that the vehicle will be under the contractor's control and will be his responsibility.
- (21) That such vehicles be titled in the USAID if that is necessary to insure that they will not be commandeered.

(22) That USAID work with the GRM, with input from resident U.S. contractors, to establish rules for the use of the vehicles by contractor personnel and that such rules be made a part of subsequent RFTPs and contracts.

(23) That USAID prepare a document setting forth a standard package of housing, furnishings and other in-country personal/family support items — comparable to those of direct hire USAID personnel for use in all future RFTPs and contracts, whether host country or USAID. This will simplify negotiations and avoid misunderstandings later.

(24) That USAID explore possibilities for (a) reducing the cost of such a package and (b) providing the package more efficiently, including finding ways of having the package available upon arrival of contractor personnel, thereby improving the efficiency of contractor personnel and reducing temporary lodging costs. (This might entail seeking some waivers to procurement rules.)

It has been noted above that there have been complaints about the quality of personnel supplied under a number of USAID-funded contracts. The weaknesses cited have been in technical qualifications, personal communication skills and attitudes, knowledge of the project and the country setting, and French language capability. Remedial action would seem to include: (a) insisting upon better selection methods by the contractor; (b) maintaining requirements even if the recruiting time has to be extended; (c) providing for alternate ways of recruitment (at least for short term experts); (d) improving the orientation of contractor

personnel, and (e) paying, in some cases at least, for French language training.

RECOMMENDATION

(25) That USAID and GRM officials design, for use in RFTPs, a form or format for use by contractors for presenting curriculum vitae type information for proposed members of the contract team. The purpose would be to elicit a more realistic c/v. It might include questions about usage of French, reasons for leaving previous positions, more complete job descriptions, etc.

(26) That the RFTP and contract provide that if the contractor is unable to recruit an expert within a reasonable period of time (it may be necessary to define reasonable), the GRM and USAID would be free to use an alternate recruiting source.

(27) That USAID be prepared to use the Contingency Fund described in Recommendation 12 to carry out Recommendation 26 and to finance unanticipated personnel needs, where such needs could be provided under Indefinite Quantity Contracts or PASA/RSSA arrangements or by Personal Services Contracts.

(28) That USAID obtain information from AID/Washington to the extent available for use by the GRM or USAID (whoever is contractee) in evaluating contractor proposals and personnel proposed by contractors.

(29) That project budgets include funds to permit trips to the U.S. for the purpose of interviewing proposed candidates under contracts, at least for the more critical personnel.

(30) That RFTPs provide that French language training may be authorized for highly qualified experts nominated for long term assignments. If Chiefs of Party precede the rest of the contract team, as per Recommendation 19, time spent in language training by other personnel should not delay implementation of the project.

(31) That contracts provide that where language training is paid for by the project, the contractor should insure that orientation on the project, and on Mali and the Malian people would also be included in the training program.

(32) That RFTPs and contracts specify that contractors must provide for at least a 5-day orientation program for any long term personnel who have not had previous service in Mali.

(33) That RFTPs and contracts specify that contractors must provide all experts with the relevant portions of the Project Paper, the Project Agreement and the contract in advance of their orientation so that the contractor can assure in the orientation session that all experts fully understand what the project and the contract are about and what the expert's role is.

(34) That USAID prepare, in collaboration with selected Malians, an orientation document on Mali that could be furnished to contractors for use in their orientation effort.

## 2. Contractor Selection and Contract Negotiation

The following have been reported as examples of improper actions occurring during contractor selection and contract negotiations:

- a. A member of a contractor selection panel voted extremely high scores for one contractor:
- b. A member of a contractor selection panel argued extensively and excessively for one particular contractor;
- c. A contractor deliberately understated his overhead to obtain selection, knowing that a higher overhead would be paid when home office records were audited by AID;
- d. In two, and perhaps three cases, the contractor selected for negotiation was unable to field the chief of party listed in the contractor's proposal. This would have resulted in a lower score for the firm, possibly dropping it out of first place;
- e. In at least two cases, the scope of the contract was substantially reduced in contract negotiations from that advertised in the RFTP. This could have affected the scoring of those submitting proposals. Furthermore, had the final scope been advertised in the RFTP, additional (perhaps smaller) firms might have participated, possibly resulting in better proposals. Improved collaboration and better planning as recommended in previous sections should preclude a recurrence of this problem.

#### RECOMMENDATION

(35) That chairmen of contractor selection panels be alerted to the possibilities of behavior cited in a. and b. above. They should be urged to exclude the vote of panel members whose objectivity is subject to question (as was done in case a. above) and caution panel members that their actions must not only be objective,

they must also be so perceived by others.

(36) That USAID obtain from the Office of Contract Management, AID/Washington or the Contract Officer in REDSO/Abidjan a paper explaining the types of overhead arrangements AID accepts and the circumstances under which different approaches would be preferable.

(37) That in cases like d. above, the contracting officer be requested to reconvene the contractor selection panel and recalculate the contractor's score given the new chief of party candidate. If the score is below the previously second ranked contractor, negotiations should be suspended and opened subsequently with the previously second ranked firm.

The above actions are necessary to protect project resources, maintain the integrity of the two governments and insure that honest and highly qualified contractors will continue to respond to Request for Proposals or Invitations to Bid on AID projects in Mali. Furthermore, taking less than the best available just to save time, as in the case of d. above, has been very costly -- in time and money.

### 3. Contract Supervision

The crucial elements affecting the utility and effectiveness of technical assistance are the quality of the technical assistance personnel and the quality of contract supervision; even less than desired quality of personnel often can be offset by high quality contract supervision. Implementation delays have been greatest where contract supervision has been weakest.

Four critical factors in contract supervision are: (a) How is the contract team utilized? (b) Are the team members treated as professionals? (c) Are the team members given the support needed to fulfill their tasks -- vehicles and other equipment, working facilities, counterparts? (d) Are the team's tasks, responsibilities and authorities clearly delineated?

The following incidents or situations have been cited as examples of poor contract supervision which have had adverse effects on contractor performance and upon communications among the development team:

- a. There have been delays in removing unsuitable contract personnel
- b. Some contract personnel have been removed precipitously, without prior discussions with USAID or the contractor chief of party.
- c. Contract personnel have been ordered to perform tasks that were not within the scope of work of the contract or leave the country.
- d. Newly arrived contract personnel have been told by the Project Director in their first meeting: "I can cancel your contract any time I wish."
- e. Contract personnel are called forward, but actions are not taken which are necessary prerequisites to the personnel being able to perform their assigned tasks.
- f. Contract personnel were not provided vehicles and other equipment essential to the performance of their duties.
- g. Contract personnel were forbidden to take field trips, thereby disrupting schedules and delaying project implementation.
- h. Contract personnel have been criticized for non-performance, even though they were not given sufficient authority to insure

performance.

1. Contract personnel have been forbidden to talk to USAID personnel about the project except in the presence of GRM personnel.

The underlying factors which contributed to the foregoing incidents, situations and judgements appear to be the following:

- a. An inappropriate philosophy/attitude about project administration (See Section III);
  - b. A feeling by some GRM officials that they were being forced to take technical assistance that they did not need (see Section III)
  - c. Indignation over the high cost of U.S. experts (see Section III);
  - d. Disagreement over project objectives and implementation methods and poor project design which were not dealt with collaboratively;
  - e. Terms of reference for contractors which were not sufficiently specific and which were not clarified by collaborative discussions;
  - f. GRM Project Directors who lacked sufficient experience and/or trained staff to manage a project of the magnitude being attempted and who had no experience in supervising U.S. contracts;
  - g. USAID inexperienced or over-worked Project Officers who generally felt that their orders, at least at the outset, were to keep hands off and let the GRM and the contractor work out any problems that arose, rather than requesting and insisting upon joint discussions to resolve issues and re-establish appropriate working relationships.
  - h. Insufficient attention by all concerned to cultural differences.
- In dealing with the problems of contract supervision, as in the general problems of project implementation, the solutions lie in improving com-

munications, planning better and improving managerial effectiveness. The communications problems have been dealt with in Section III. If there is acceptance of the collaborative style of planning set forth in Section IV, other problems will dissolve. Adoption and implementation of the recommendations in sub-section B. 1. above should go far toward creating a better atmosphere for future contracts that may be negotiated. Initiation of the management training program (Recommendation 6 ) should help GRM supervisory and managerial personnel learn improved methods and techniques of management and contract supervision. If the collaborative style recommended herein can be applied to contract supervision and if open communications can be maintained, most of the problems that will inevitably arise can be dealt with forthrightly and with minimal adverse impact on project implementation. In this vein, there are some things that could be done now to improve the current situation.

#### RECOMMENDATION

(38) That a task force of GRM, contractor and USAID representatives develop a set of guidelines for appropriate working relationships among the three parties which could be made effective as soon as approved by the individual parties.

← Some suggested guidelines for the task force's consideration:

a. the contractor has the right to request, without prejudice, that an order be referred to AID (or GRM in a USAID contract) for written decision or for discussion in a tri-partite meeting if the contractor feels that the order given is contrary to the bilateral Project Agreement, the contractor's contract, or jointly

approved implementation and financial plans.

b. that the contract supervisor (whether GRM or USAID) will advise the other signatory of the bilateral Project Agreement of any dissatisfaction with contractor performance (with a specific individual or with the general role of the team) as soon as it arises and request a meeting to discuss appropriate action. If there is not agreement on remedial action, or the remedial action does not result in rectification of the situation, the contract supervisor may take steps to remove a member of the contract team or change the scope of work of the team or a member of the team. The first step in the process would be to advise USAID (or the GRM if a USAID contract) in writing of the intended action. USAID (or the GRM) would have a week in which to protest the action formally; otherwise, the contract supervisor would be free to advise the contractor formally of the action being taken.

c. USAID (GRM in USAID contracts) has the right to seek information from all project personnel (GRM, USAID, or contractor) about project activities, but will refrain from giving instruction to any project personnel unless so authorized by the contract supervisor. Dissatisfaction over project implementation, contractor performance or contractor supervision will be reported to the contract supervisor in an appropriate forum, followed up by written notification when the seriousness of the situation justifies.

In the June 1980 workshop on AID project implementation in the Sahel, it was recommended that where the host country contracting mode is being implemented, AID must recognize the need to work with and train

host country personnel in U.S. contracting precepts, AID's contracting regulations, including Handbook II, should not only be available in French, but these regulations should be simplified and re-written in a format that would be of service to the host government. AID should develop standard operating guidelines for use of host governments in the contracting process. The guidelines should include formats to develop scopes of work, overhead rates, and contractor benefits.

Some recommendations have already been made in this report which deal in part with the above recommendations of the June workshop. However, it would be helpful to the USAID and the GRM if AID/Washington would follow-up and implement the recommendations of the workshop.

#### RECOMMENDATION

(39) That USAID request early action by AID/Washington on the recommendations, especially the proposals to re-write the regulations in a simple format and the development of standard guidelines.

(40) That USAID request MEETS videotape 44-0-00 on AID Procurement Planning and Contracting Procedures, and written supplements, and review it with English-speaking Malian contracting officers and contract supervisors (and possibly selected contractor personnel). Afterwards, the group could suggest, for AID/Washington use, the additional information and guidance that are needed to improve contract management by the GRM and USAID.

Many of the problems that have arisen in the supervision of USAID-funded contracts stem from problems of cross-cultural communications. Even problems of other origins have been exacerbated by problems of communi-

cations and a lack of understanding of each other's cultures. Suggestions for improving cross-cultural communications were presented in Section III D. above. It could be particularly illuminating and helpful if a workshop or panel discussion could be held in which some contract personnel could tell how they tend to react to certain actions of their supervisors, whether American or Malian, and what they expect of a contract supervisor. On the same program a Malian contract supervisor could explain the type of relationship he believes is appropriate between contract supervisor and contract personnel, and describe the kinds of actions by Americans that are particularly bothersome.

#### RECOMMENDATION

(41) That USAID be prepared to facilitate the above type of workshop or panel discussion if GRM and contractor personnel are interested in participating in such a program.

(42) That USAID develop an orientation program, covering particularly the content of the USAID program, the GRM's development plans, and the history and culture of Mali, for presentation periodically to newly arrived USAID and USAID-funded contractor personnel.

#### 4. Contractor Evaluation

In the case of USAID contracts, there is a requirement for a Contractor Evaluation Report. However, no such reports are mentioned in Handbook 8 on Host Country Contracting. If AID/Washington ever develops a system for the storage and retrieval of information on contractor performance, it would be desirable to have performance evaluation reports on host country contractors included in that information system. In the

meantime, it is questionable whether there would be any point in requesting a formal report. On the other hand, it would appear highly desirable to have periodic evaluations of the contractor's performance with feedback to the contractor. This should result in better communication among the participants in project implementation and better performance by the contract team.

#### RECOMMENDATION

(43) That USAID seek to work out with GRM Project Directors and contractor Chiefs of Party a procedure for periodic evaluations of contractor performance.

The format for, and procedures to be followed in such evaluations could be developed by the task force recommended above for working out relationships between contractors and GRM and USAID officials. Some suggestions/comments that might facilitate the task force's work are:

- a. Evaluation is possible only if the objective, scopes of work, responsibilities, authorities, support, etc. are clearly defined before work begins -- or at least clarified later as some of the realities of the situation are clarified.
- b. The chairman of an evaluation session should see his/her role as a moderator -- but a firm moderator to insure that the meeting does not deteriorate into a clash of personalities or a passing of blame for lack of implementation results. The evaluation session must be seen as part of the planning process: learning from mistakes and accomplishments, revising roles and tasks where necessary and setting realistic targets for future performance.

c. A useful format might be to let the contractor's Chief of Party make an overall presentation and each of the team members make individual presentations of their activities. These presentations should be seen as self-evaluations by the presenters plus recommendations for actions needed to make their performance more effective. The tone set for the meeting could then be to respond to the recommendations for improvements.

d. The timing of such evaluations should reflect the nature of the project and the importance of the contractor in the implementation of the project. However, in all cases, it would seem desirable to have a mini-review (rather than an evaluation) within 3 months of the arrival of the full team to insure that any problems in roles and working relationships are uncovered and resolved early. Beyond that, some indicators of contractor performance should normally come out in the implementation reviews carried out each trimester (as recommended in Section IV). These reviews might indicate a need for a special session on contractor performance/roles. Barring any need for a special session, an annual evaluation should be sufficient after the initial shake-down review.

##### 5. Host Country Contracting

As indicated previously in this report, a number of types of implementation problems were identified in the projects reviewed, and the host country contracting mode was a significant contributing factor to these problems in only two projects. Furthermore, the host country contracting mode, per se, did not appear to be the principal problem; rather, it was the underlying philosophy or attitude about GRM-USAID relationships in

project administration. Nevertheless, there have been serious problems in the administration of some host country contracts. Furthermore, the scope of work for this study specifically calls for the consultant to recommend criteria for when/the different kinds of contracting modes. Since the primary question that has been posed is when is it appropriate to use the host country contract, that will be the principal focus of this section.

#### AID Policy on Host Country Contracting

AID's official policy is to give preference to the host country contracting mode if the host country entity has a record of good contracting performance and adequate staff resources. Appendix 8 C of the draft revision of Handbook 3 provides guidance on assessing a grantee's procurement and contracting capability.

AID's policy on host country contracting is based on the principle that the countries AID assists should themselves undertake the implementation of their development programs rather than employ AID as its agent. This principle rests on a number of considerations:

- a. the ultimate responsibility for all development projects rests with the countries whose projects they are;
- b. the process of implementation is itself an important opportunity for development of technical, institutional and administrative skills;  
and
- c. AID is not principally a procurement agency and must conserve its staff resources for its primary functions as a planning, financing and monitoring agency.

Application of Policy to Mali

It seems appropriate to look at some of the implicit assumptions in the foregoing principles in the Malian context. Regarding the first principle, there seems to be no question that Malian officials welcomed the opportunity afforded by the host country contracting mechanism to take responsibility for the projects, although some project directors have also been quick to blame project failures on USAID, the contractor or individual members of the contract team. The projects which involved host country contracts appear to have had priority attention.

It is true that the process of project implementation can provide an important opportunity for developing technical, institutional and administrative skills. It must be recognized, however, that host country project directors may be either unable or unwilling to allot sufficient time and personnel to achieve this objective. It is not automatic.

It has also been argued that while it is good for host country counterparts to obtain experience in project implementation, it is questionable whether host country personnel need to become familiar with all of the AID regulations on contracting, procurement and accounting principles. The validity of this argument would seem to rest on the assumption that the host country already has needed regulations and procedures in place and that they are adequate. On the other hand, the AID rules, even though they might need to be adapted to the local situation, and some clearly would be inappropriate (e.g., Buy American), may offer exposure to some useful management techniques.

In the current situation, the host country contract is not affording any additional experience in commodity procurement. And the experience in project management could have been achieved under an AID direct contract. Therefore, the only learning experience not otherwise obtainable was the negotiation and supervision of a contract with an American contractor. This has been a painful experience for many of those involved and the basic question for the future is: Was it also a learning experience? If not, the administration of some of the contracts clearly would not meet the policy stipulation of the need for a record of good contracting performance.

The third principle suggests that AID will conserve its staff resources under a host country contract. In the Malian experience, it is doubtful that there was much savings on staff resources in the contract negotiation process. It is abundantly clear that the time allotted to monitoring host country contracts is much greater than that allotted to USAID contracts and grants. However, it is impossible to calculate how much of that is due to problems that would have risen even under an AID contract because of poor project design and lack of agreement on project objectives and implementation methods.

The analysis above could lead one to conclude that the basic premises upon which the host country contracting policy is based were not valid for most of the GRM contracts. However, it is important to return to the proviso in the policy statement about the pre-conditions: a record of good contracting performance and adequate staff resources. It does not appear that either of these existed at the time the decision was

made to adopt the host country contracting mode. Furthermore, inadequate steps were taken to provide guidance and training that could have offset, at least to some degree, the shortfall in contracting experience and trained staff resources. Therefore, the less than desirable results should not be surprising.

As to the future, there would seem to be no basis for an unequivocal recommendation. At this time, the most important consideration should be the degree to which there is general acceptance and follow-on implementation of the recommendations in this report, particularly those relating to closer collaboration in planning and implementation, making greater efforts to bridge the cultural differences and expediting a management development program. These seem to be fundamental to improving project implementation, regardless of the contracting mode; however, they are crucial to improved contract management by the GRM.

It is quite possible that the response to the recommendations in this report may vary by operating agency within the GRM. It seems prudent, therefore, to review each situation on its merits as the times arrives for making a decision. The general inclination should be to go the host country contracting route, except in the special cases cited below, because it clearly involves host country personnel more directly and makes them feel that the project is clearly the host government's. This can happen under a USAID contract too, but there have been too many instances when it did not work out that way. To <sup>decide</sup> determine whether the host country contracting mode should be utilized in a specific case, USAID and the GRM should determine that:

- a. The project, or activity within a project, is of high priority to

the GRM; and

b. The factors underlying the contract supervision problems cited in B. 3. above (p. 42) have been largely overcome and any remaining factors can be dealt with through training or technical assistance which can be incorporated in the project or accomplished prior to the start of the project.

When Host Country Contracting is Not Appropriate

In some cases, the type of project or the preferred source of technical resources will determine the contracting mode. For example, the following circumstances would generally preclude the use of a host country contract:

- a. The best source of technical assistance would be a U.S. Government agency, e.g., the Department of Agriculture, Department of Energy, etc. In this case, AID is obliged to arrange for the experts through a Participating Agency Service Agreement (PASA) or similar arrangement;
- b. The best source of technical assistance personnel is from an American university which is prohibited by its charter or the laws of its state from contracting with a foreign government. In this case AID/Washington or the USAID would contract with the university;
- c. The proposed activity (generally rather small) can be performed by a firm eligible to receive awards under Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act. In this case AID must enter into a direct contract with the Small Business Administration;

d. The proposed activity originates from a private voluntary organization (PVO). The PVO could be Malian or American. In this case, the USAID, after obtaining appropriate GRM clearance, would give a grant to the PVO;

e. The proposed activity is funded from regional or central funds and is being administered by an AID regional office or AID/Washington. The regional office or AID/Washington, after obtaining appropriate clearance, would sign and administer the contract or grant;

f. the proposed activity is to be managed, with GRM concurrence, by an outside organization, e.g., ICRISAT or a similar research institute. In this case, AID would be able to provide a grant to the institution, rather than contract with it. This would give the organization greater operational flexibility.

### C. Commodity Support

As indicated in Section II, delays in the availability of commodities have seriously retarded implementation of some project activities. Non-availability of vehicles has seriously impaired the performance of contracted technical experts and, in some cases, caused the use of project funds for vehicle rentals considerably in excess of budgeted amounts.

Some of the most serious obstacles to a smooth flow of commodity resources are:

1. Inadequate pre-project planning (see Section IV.A. above);
2. AID Buy-America requirements in those cases in which U.S. commodities are not appropriate for Malian conditions, especially 4-wheel drive vehicles;

3. Time required to obtain waivers to permit purchases other than in the U.S.;
4. AAPC cannot force suppliers to meet delivery dates specified in the PIO/Cs;
5. Delays in moving commodities from African ports to Mali (e.g., difficulties in obtaining space on the train from Dakar and getting complete truckloads in Abidjan);
6. Delays in getting commodities cleared from customs after arrival in Bamako;
7. Force Majeur problems such as port strikes in the U.S.

RECOMMENDATION

(44) USAID, in conjunction with other Sahelian and West African USAIDs, should seek additional blanket waivers permitting non-U.S. purchase of commodities which are utilized frequently in projects and the procurement of which from the U.S. is not feasible or desirable in terms of suitability or in terms of back-up support (e.g., spare parts, maintenance).

The actual commodity categories would have to be studied and the USAIDs in the region should insist on action by AID/Washington in this regard. This problem appears about as bad as it was 15 years ago. AID/Washington could minimize the risks of alienation with U.S. suppliers by at least two ways: (a) consult with U.S. suppliers before taking action on specific commodities, thereby giving the U.S. suppliers the opportunity to establish in West Africa outlets for the commodities with spares and

backup facilities; or (b) establish the blanket waiver for a specified period, say one year initially, to see if they get flack and if so, then meet with U.S. suppliers. In any case, the waiver should be automatically continued and utilized by USAIDs unless AID/Washington specifically revokes it.

#### RECOMMENDATION

(45) That USAID seek, in conjunction with other land-locked Sahelian missions to break the deadlock at the ports of Dakar and Abidjan.

Some ideas that need to be studied with REDSO/Abidjan and possibly AID/Washington include:

(a) The land-locked country missions could cooperate in financing a periodic charter flight for accumulated cargo at the ports, presumably at least monthly although experience might indicate a need for more frequent flights. Each charter would deliver commodities to Upper Volta, Mali and Niger. There could be cost-sharing between the missions and between project funding and operating expenses, with the charters bringing project commodities plus sea pouches, mission support commodities, consumables shipments, etc.

(b) A variation of (a) would be to have a charter truck (or trucks) for departure from the port on specified day(s) each month. Presumably only two of the three missions could participate in such an arrangement.

(c) USAID might arrange a freight car on the Dakar-Bamako railroad at specified time(s) each month. If it appeared that it would not be possible to fill it regularly with project and official shipments,

a sharing arrangement might be worked out with some other donor or diplomatic mission resident in Bamako.

RECOMMENDATION

(46) That USAID seek additional ways of expediting the customs clearance in Bamako.

As indicated above, the GRM Project Directors and their staff do not have a significant role in the procurement process for offshore purchases. A greater role would seem to be appropriate given the underlying AID philosophy which led to a preference for the host country contracting mode. This would prepare personnel to handle such actions subsequent to the completion of an AID project. It could also encourage advance planning for the utilization of the commodities once they are delivered. It could also have a salutary impact on the system utilized for in-country purchases

RECOMMENDATION

(47) That USAID explore the possibilities and means of gradually shifting more commodity procurement to the GRM project management. A logical first step would be an involvement in procurement planning.

ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT FUNDED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE (from Bamako 5426)

- Objective:
- A. Assess quality of Technical Assistance provided by USAID in recent years, and
  - B. Investigate different approaches for
    - 1. improving the effectiveness of USAID's Technical Assistance, and
    - 2. Improving the efficiency of USAID operations

Purpose of Assessment: Establish Mission criteria and operational standards for:

- 1. selecting optimum method of arranging for Technical Assistance by type of project
- 2. improving quality of Technical Assistance personnel
- 3. improving utilization and support to Technical Assistance personnel
- 4. more efficiently monitoring and evaluating performance of Technical Assistance teams.

Scope of Consultant's Work:

- A. Assess Technical Assistance to Government of the Republic of Mali (GRM) under:
  - 1. Host Country Contract (HCC)
  - 2. Direct Aid Contract
  - 3. Participating Agency Service Agreement (PASA)
  - 4. Personal Services Contract (PSC)
  - 5. Grants to Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO)
  - 6. Title XII - grants/contracts to U.S. land grant colleges
  - 7. Ciba-Geigy (CGLAR)
- B. Assess how and why these modes differ in practice and the appropriateness of each by type of project. Assess:
  - 1. performance of AID/W, USAID, GRM in contractor and grantee selection and negotiation processes
  - 2. qualifications and performance of Technical Assistance personnel
  - 3. requirements for, and adequacy of technical, logistical, and administrative support provided Technical Assistance personnel by GRM, contractor/grantee and USAID
  - 4. supervision and utilization of Technical Assistance personnel resources.
- C. Focus primarily on:
  - 203 - Livestock Sector (HCC, PASA, USAID)
  - 204 - Rural Works (HCC)
  - 208 - Rural Health Delivery Services (HCC)
  - 210 - Operation Haute Vallée (HCC)
  - 219 - Semi-Arid Tropical Research (AID Contract)
  - 202 - Operation Mills (PSC)
  - 224 - Rural Water (OPG)

## Consultant will:

- A. Review documents in AID/W:
  1. handbooks on contracting/grants/inter-agency agreements
  2. Project Papers, Project Agreements, Contracts and Evaluation Documents for above projects, focusing on implementation strategy and approach.
  3. auditor General's Report on Host Country Contracting
  4. report of June 80 conference on Contracting in the Sahel
- B. Conduct interviews in Bamako and at selected project sites. Be a sounding board. Insure objectivity of findings and facilitate constructive dialogue for improving Technical Assistance.
- C. Analyze:
  1. adequacy of contracting documents and procedures
  2. GRM capacity to manage contracts and effectively use Technical Assistance
  3. capacity of Technical Assistance institutions to furnish Technical Assistance resources and support them
  4. performance of USAID and AID/W in monitoring contract implementation
- D. Make preliminary recommendations (draft report) to USAID Senior Management re steps to improve: (1) quality and (2) impact of USAID project-funded Technical Assistance in Mali, including as a minimum:
  1. most appropriate mode for providing Technical Assistance for various types of projects
  2. steps which can be taken to insure that goals, purposes, and objectives outlined in Project Papers are reflected in contract documents and their implementation
  3. steps to improve GRM, AID/W, and USAID capacity to identify specialists and teams capable of working effectively in Mali
  4. steps to improve GRM and USAID ability to manage, monitor, and support Technical Assistance personnel (individuals and teams) to obtain maximum benefit from their services
  5. methods for improving management, utilization and maintenance of resources provided under USAID projects
  6. most appropriate roles for technicians (operational vs advisory) under various types of projects
  7. most appropriate systems of contractor accountability to USAID and the GRM
  8. efficacy of placing responsibility for negotiating technician salaries and support levels in hands of Malian project personnel
  9. criteria and operational standards for evaluating performance of Technical Assistance teams.

- E. Act as facilitator for a 2-day workshop retreat to discuss and act on preliminary findings and recommendations. Possibly hold separate group discussions with (1) providers of Technical Assistance, and (2) USAID Project Managers and GRM Project Directors.
- F. Prepare final report, including major findings, recommendations and conclusions.

JAMES L. ROUSHHIGHLIGHTS OF EXPERIENCEProgram Management

- Supervised AID programs in Cameroon, Chile and Central America (Regional)
- Managed major overhaul of AID's planning, budgeting, accounting and reporting systems
- Managed planning, budgeting, obligating and review of \$200 to \$300 million annual project program in Vietnam
- Represented USG or AID in international conferences

Research, Analysis and Evaluation

- Appraised the U.S. aid program in Sri Lanka and analyzed Sri Lanka's development experience (1978)
- Prepared a proposal for a Technology Exchange and Cooperation program with middle-income LDC's (1978)
- Appraised AID's Reimbursable Development Program (1978)
- Evaluated an AID Section 211(d) grant to the Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin (1978)
- Helped design Development Studies Program, a training program for AID program design and implementation officers (1975)
- Designed an integrated system for the planning, budgeting, designing, implementing, accounting and evaluation of AID's project program (1974)
- Report on how to reduce the trafficking of narcotics in the Southern Cone of South America (1972)
- Paper describing how "peace initiatives" policies were made in the U.S. Government (1966)
- Comparative analysis of the economic development of Chile and Argentina (1966)
- Paper outlining a proposal for a political solution in Vietnam (1966)
- Master's thesis on the evaluation of U.S. aid programs (1966)

AWARDS FROM A.I.D.

- 1954 Meritorious Honor Award
- 1969 Superior Honor Award
- 1976 Distinguished Honor Award
- 1978 Distinguished Career Service Award

JAMES L. ROUSH

EMPLOYMENT CHRONOLOGY

Agency for International Development (AID)

1977 - 1978 Evaluation Officer, Operations Appraisal Staff, AID/Washington (AID/W)--retired 3/12/78  
1976 - 1977 Director, USAID/Chile  
1974 - 1976 Director, Planning, Budgeting, Accounting and Reporting (PBAR) Task Force, AID/W  
1973 - 1974 Regional Coordinator/Latin America, PPC, AID/W  
1971 - 1973 Deputy Country Director for Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, ARA-LA/APU, Department of State  
1970 - 1971 Deputy Director, Regional AID Office for Central America and Panama (ROCAP), Guatemala City  
1967 - 1969 Assistant Director for Program, U. S. Operations Mission, Saigon, Vietnam  
1966 - 1967 Deputy Director, Office of North African Affairs, AID/W  
1965 - 1966 Student, U. S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pa.  
1961 - 1965 ICA Liaison Officer, Program Officer, AID Affairs Officer (& Attache), USAID, Yaounde, Cameroon  
1958 - 1960 Assistant/Deputy Program Officer, USAID/Ethiopia  
1956 - 1958 Statistical Analyst, U. S. Mission to OEEC, NATO and other European Regional Organizations (USRO), Paris, France  
1953 - 1956 International Economist, Office of Research, Statistics and Reports, AID/W (then MSA & FOA)

Other U. S. Government

1950 - 1951 U.S. Army, Plans Section, Chemical Corps School  
1945 - 1947 U.S. Army, Class A Agent Finance Office, Darmstadt, Germany  
1943 - 1944 Payroll Clerk, Mare Island Navy Yard, Vallejo, Calif.

EDUCATION, TRAINING AND LANGUAGE

1944 - 1945 Univ. of California, Berkeley  
1948 - 1950 BA (Economics), UCLA  
1951 - 1952 MA (Economics), UCLA  
1953 - 1955 Postgraduate economics, American U., Washington, D.C.  
1959 Course in geography of Africa, University College, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia  
1960 4-month special Program of Training for Africa, part at Boston Univ., part at Oxford Univ.  
1965 - 1966 M.S. (International Relations), George Washington U., Washington D.C.  
1971 8-week executive's program, Federal Executive Institute, Charlottesville, Va.

Proficient in Spanish and French

ORGANIZATIONS

American Economics Association  
Society for International Development  
United Nations Association of the USA

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Self-employed as a Consultant since 1979

- May-Aug 79 Member of a Selection Panel for International Development Interns being recruited by A.I.D.
- October 79 Five-day consultancy with Experience, Inc. to complete a Project Paper for an agricultural research project in Sao Tome and Principe. This involved editing a draft paper, reviewing and supplementing the economic analysis and preparing the Logical Framework, the Initial Environmental Examination and the Statutory Check Lists.
- Oct-Nov 79 Member of the 1979 Foreign Service Performance Evaluation Panels for A.I.D.
- Jan-Feb 80 Three-week consultancy with Experience, Inc. to serve as the leader of a two-person group to prepare a Small Program Statement (five-year assistance strategy) for the Indian Ocean islands for the Office of East Africa in A.I.D.
- Feb- Jun 80 Contracted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture under its RSSA arrangement with the Office of Nutrition in A.I.D. to visit four countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (Paraguay, Bolivia, Jamaica and Costa Rica) to prepare scopes of work for policy impact studies to be carried out in those countries. Policy impact in this context refers to the impact of agricultural policies on food consumption.

People Interviewed

Jon Anderson, Project Officer, Energy, AID/Mali  
Felix Ashenhurst, Director, CARE Mali  
  
Quincy Benbow, AFR/DR/ARD, AID/Washington  
Eddy Benmuvhar, V.P., TAMS, New York  
Robert Berg, Evaluation Office, PPC, AID/Washington  
Jean Pierre Brumin, ORT Engineer, Mali Rural Works  
John Buursink, Chief of Party, TAMS, Mali Land Use Inventory  
  
Loel Callaghan, Chief of Party, HIID, Mali Rural Health  
Randy Casey, Program, AID/Mali  
Gerald Cashion, PSC, DEO, AID/Mali  
Mahmadou Cisse, Livestock Assistant, AID/Mali  
Daniel Creedon, Director of Manpower Training, Office of Personnel  
Management, AID/Washington  
William Crossen, Chief of Party, Chemonics, Mali Livestock II  
Charlotte Crystal, PSC, AID/Mali, Action Blé  
  
Larry Dash, Chief, SDPT/Mali  
Boubacar Daou, Program Assistant, AID/Mali  
Steven Daus, Range Ecologist, TAMS, Mali Land Use Inventory  
Tito DeBeca, Economist, Chemonics, Mali Livestock II  
Robert Delamarre, Experience, Inc., Washington  
David Delgado, AADO, AID/Mali  
Oumar Dia, Assistant to the ADO, AID/Mali  
Moctar Diakite, Procurement Specialist, Management Office, AID/Mali  
Macky Diallo, Technical Counsellor, Ministry of Livestock

James Dickey, Livestock Advisor, SDPT/Mali  
Michael Dwyre, Program Officer, AID/Mali  
  
George Eaton, Deputy Director, AID/Mali  
  
John Ford, General Development Officer, AID/Mali  
Michael Furst, World Bank Representative, Mali  
  
James Goodwin, Chief of Party, TAMU/Mali  
Clive Gray, Economist, HIID, Mali Rural Health  
A.A. Guindo, MRD, DNFAR, Agricultural Apprentices Training Project  
Ousmane Guindo, Project Director, Mali Livestock I  
  
Peter Hagan, SER/COM/ALI, AID/Washington  
Howard Helman, ORT, Washington  
Harlan Hobgood, DS/RAD, AID/Washington  
Henry Homeyer, Peace Corps Director/Mali  
Richard Hough, AID/Washington, OAS Mali Appraisal  
  
Robert P. Jacobs, Financial Analyst, AID/Mali  
George Jenkins, Assistant Controller, AID/Mali  
  
Salif Danoute, Project Director, Mali Land Use Inventory  
Moussa Kante, Project Director, Operation Haute Vallée  
Fafaran Keita, Associate Peace Corps Director/Education/Mali  
Guimba Keita, Project Assistant, Mali Rural Works  
Amadou Koita, Administration and Finance, Operation Haute Vallée  
Debra Kreutzer, former Peace Corps Volunteer and Administrative  
Assistant, Mali Rural Health  
Harold Kurzman, Louis Berger, Inc., Washington  
Sanoussi Konaté, Deputy Director of Public Health



Almouzar Maiga, Director, O.M.BE.VI.

Niels L. Martin, Senior Range Ecologist, TAMS, Mali Land Use Inventory

Jonathan McCabe, AFR/DR, AID/Washington

Sandra Miller, Chemonics, Washington

Frank Olvey, PASA Veterinary, Central Veterinary Lab

Jack Packard, Associate Director, CARE/Mali

Thomas Park, Public Health Officer, AID/Mali

Richard Pronovost, Administration and Finance, Chemonics, Mali Livestock

Tom Remington, PSC, AID/Mali, Operation Mils Mopti

Jeffrey Schmidt, Acting Chief of Party, Louis Berger, Inc., Operation Haute Vallée

Paul Scott, Legal Officer, AID/REDSO/Abidjan

Richard Scott, Project Officer, AID/Mali, Mali Rural Works

Philip Serafini, Chief of Party, ICRISAT/Mali

Gail Shands, Project Officer, AID/Mali, Operation Haute Vallée, Mali Land Use Inventory

Rober Shoemaker, Design/Evaluation Officer, AID/Mali

Moussa Simaga, Livestock Assistant, AID/Mali

Roger Simmons, AFR/DR/SWAP, AID/Washington

Glenn Slocum, AFR/DR/SWAP, AID/Washington

Myron Smith, Agriculture Development Officer, AID/Mali

Alassane Toure, Project Director, Mali Livestock II

Moussa Toure, Project Assistant, AID/Mali, Operation Haute Vallée

Mody Toure, Director, Central Veterinary Laboratory

Wk

Helen Vaitaitis, Program, AID/Mali

Farnad Vakil, Administration and Finance, Louis Berger, Inc.,  
Operation Haute Vallée

Carl van Haeften, Experince, Inc., Washington

Robert Weiland, Management Officer, AID/Mali

Stanley Wills, Livestock Officer, AID/Mali