PD-AAG-585

UNCLASSIFIED
CLASSIFICATION

522-0128 00150

PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY (PES) — PART I

Report Symbol U-447

1. PROJECT TITLE	2. PROJECT NUMBER	3. MISSION/AID/W OFFICE
Despiro Valley Integrated Development (OPG)	522-0128	HONDURAS

4. EVALUATION NUMBER (Enter the number maintained by the reporting unit e.g., Country or AID/W Administrative Code, Fiscal Year, Serial No. beginning with No. 1 each FY) S22-81-2

☒ REGULAR EVALUATION ☐ SPECIAL EVALUATION

5. KEY PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DATES

A. First PRO-AG or Equivalent	B. Final Obligation Expected	C. Final Input Delivery
FY 76	FY 79	FY 80

6. ESTIMATED PROJECT FUNDING

A. Total $ 711,000

B. U.S. $ 196,000

7. PERIOD COVERED BY EVALUATION

From (month/yr.) July 1977

To (month/yr.) June 1980

Date of Evaluation Review November 19, 1980

8. ACTION DECISIONS APPROVED BY MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE DIRECTOR

A. List decisions and/or unresolved issues: cite those items needing further study. (NOTE: Mission decisions which anticipate AID/W or regional office action should specify type of document, e.g., airgram, SPAR, PIO, which will present detailed request.)	B. NAME OF OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION	C. DATE ACTION TO BE COMPLETED
I. Observations Terminating Project II. Lessons Learned A. Prior to project design and implementation there was little or no effective effort to assess the needs of the community in relation to its capabilities to implement programs. This is reflected in the inappropriate activities attempted and unrealistic goals established. B. The attempted use of cooperatives was not successful. In part this failure was due to the low level of education (formal or non formal) of the members. The lack of preparation of cooperative members prevented their participation at an organizational level, and permitted a few members to control activities. The majority of the members did not identify the cooperative as a spokesman and representative of the group, and placed no priority on its success. SCR/OPG plan was not conducive to implanting the cooperative as a community force in that it did not identify specific and general roles it could play; failed to give greater independence and responsibility to the cooperative during the life of the project; and did not anticipate or later identify the legal and economic procedures necessary to increase chances of success.		

9. INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS TO BE REVISED PER ABOVE DECISIONS

- ☐ Project Paper
- ☐ Financial Plan
- ☐ Logical Framework
- ☐ Project Agreement
- ☐ Implementation Plan e.g., CPI Network
- ☐ PIO/T
- ☐ PIO/C
- ☐ PIO/P
- ☐ Other (Specify) N/A
- ☐ Other (Specify) N/A

10. ALTERNATIVE DECISIONS ON FUTURE OF PROJECT

- A. ☒ Continue Project Without Change
- B. ☐ Change Project Design and/or ☐ Change Implementation Plan
- C. ☐ Discontinue Project

11. PROJECT OFFICER AND HOST COUNTRY OR OTHER RANKING PARTICIPANTS AS APPROPRIATE (Names and Titles)

Michael Schwartz, AGR
Alejandro Corpeño, Director of SCR
Julius Schlotthauer, Mission Evaluation Officer
Dean Bernius, PGR, Project Support Officer

12. Mission/AID/W Office Director Approval

Signature John R. Oleson

Typed Name John R. Oleson, Mission Director

Date January 15, 1981

AID 1330-1a (3-78)

C. The technical activities were not successful due to low quality personnel, lack of planning and coordination, and poor initial selection of the activities.

D. The project was too ambitious in the number of activities undertaken and the size of the project area. SCF had neither sufficient funds nor experience to attempt a multifaceted project such as this.

E. The OPG had the following distribution of expenditures:

1.	Salaries and personnel	38%
2.	Transport (employees only)	10%
3.	Cooperative projects and loans	34%
4.	Training	18%

Even without considering the quality of the items in 3 and 4, this is a very expensive way to approach community development.

F. It does not appear that serious evaluations were made during the life of the project in order to provide guidelines for mid-course changes. In part the small size of the OPG can be blamed in that it puts this project at a very low priority for AID personnel.

13. Summary

Project was terminated in September, 1980.

14. Evaluation Methodology

This end of project evaluation was conducted by a private non-profit Honduran institution, Instituto de Investigación y Formación Cooperativista. The report was based on data obtained through interviews (questionnaires) with beneficiaries and Save the Children staff, site visits by technical experts, and review of reports and financial records.

15. External Factors - N.A.

16. Inputs - N.A.

17. Outputs

In general, the objectives of the project were not achieved due to:
a. poor planning and over-ambitious goals (e.g., production),
b. poor administration (e.g. credit and cooperatives),
c. Unrealistic estimation of potential impact of SCF (e.g., health and education).

18. Purpose

Help a target group of 20,000 people living in the Pespire Valley to

develop their organizational and financial capabilities in order that they become able to continue and expand their own development efforts. (See 17 regarding shortfalls in achieving purpose).

19. Goal/Subgoal

To improve the economic and social well-being of low-income persons in Honduran rural communities (See 17).

20. Beneficiaries

a.	Education and training (direct recipients)	1900
b.	Cooperative development	1300
c.	Agricultural technical assistance	450
d.	Child health and nutrition	1500
e.	Improve household income	6000

(see 17 regarding validity of beneficiary targets)

21. Unplanned Effects - N.A.

22. Lessons Learned (Other)

A. Without adequate technical and administrative capacity and talent a project will not work, even through a PVO. The high cost of personnel in this project did not guarantee quality. AID must look at the human resources which will implement the project before accepting even good ones (of which this is not among).

B. SFC essentially became the patron of the Pespire area. Independence and responsibility were limited to a very few people. This prevented a major improvement in the capacity for self inspired action by the beneficiary groups. The PVO undertaking a community development program must be willing to develop itself out of a job, and not to create a dependence upon its ability to introduce resources into the area.

C. A low level of preparation of the beneficiary group precludes many development alternatives. Careful assessment of its capabilities will help in the design of the program. For example, in the SCF/OPG the project area is characterized by high illiteracy and general low level of education and development (economic and social). To attempt to impose a cooperative system which requires active and knowledgeable participation by members on this group without intensive preliminary educational inputs is suicidal for the project.