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**ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION
OF
INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT**

USAID PROJECT 936-5300

FIELD REPORT

**COMMUNITY BASED INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT (CBIRD)
IN THE
SPECIAL TERRITORY OF ACEH
INDONESIA**

November 1979

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COMMUNITY BASED INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT (CBIRD)

IN THE

SPECIAL TERRITORY OF ACEH

INDONESIA

A FIELD REPORT PREPARED UNDER USAID CONTRACT NO. DSAN-C-0065

by

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with

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Preface and Acknowledgements

From September 10 to 16, 1979, Peter Weisel of Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) and Jerry Van Sant of the Research Triangle Institute (RTI) visited the Save the Children Federation (SCF) Indonesia Field Office in Banda Aceh as part of an assessment of SCF's Community Based Integrated Rural Development Project (CBIRD) in the Special Territory of Aceh, Indonesia. Field work included a 2-day visit to the sub-district of Tangse, 165 km southeast of Banda Aceh, where several villages are participating in CBIRD activity. On-site work in Aceh was preceded by an extensive review of reports and documentation on the SCF project, which were made available by the USAID mission in Jakarta and by the SCF headquarters office in Westport, Connecticut. SCF is the recipient of an Operational Program Grant from AID, which provides partial funding for the Aceh project.

This field visit grew out of a suggestion by USAID personnel to Jerry Van Sant during discussions in Jakarta in January, 1979 about possible applications in Indonesia of the AID-funded project, The Organization and Administration of Integrated Rural Development (No. 936-5300). At the request of Mr. Van Sant, an invitation was issued by J. Martin Poland, Director of SCF Indonesia, with the concurrence of SCF headquarters. Following approval of the visit by the Indonesian Ministry of Social Affairs and Acehese authorities, USAID granted formal clearance for the trip in the framework of the IRD Project. In view of the limited size and village location of the CBIRD project and the political sensitivity of the Special District of Aceh to outsiders, it was agreed to limit the assessment team to two persons.

This report analyzes the CBIRD project in terms of issues suggested both by the project itself and by the particular interests of the IRD Project team. It is not intended as an evaluation, but as a review of what was learned and what analytical perspectives were suggested by the CBIRD approach as applied by SCF in Aceh.

During the field visit, many persons provided generous assistance and valuable insights and information. Particular thanks go to SCF Indonesia staff: Martin Poland, Director; Hasan Basry, Training Director; Nukman Affan, Fieldwork Supervisor; Dr. Ruchira Poland, Health and Nutrition/Social Development Coordinator; Ibu Eutik Atika Utyu, Program Director; and Brenda Langdon-Phillips, Intern. Dr. Mohd Roesli Josef, Head of the Provincial Office of the Ministry of Agriculture and Dr. Yulidden Away, Head of the Provincial Office of the Ministry of Health offered significant comment from the Government perspective. In Tangse, Alwi Ali, Chairman of the Community Development Committee (CDC); Ibu Syaribanun Abdullah and Ibu Cut Bunsu, Chairpersons of two Muslimat women's groups; and Ibu Cut Kartijah, CDC Social Development Coordinator for Women's Activities, were most helpful, as were several other villagers encountered in the course of project visits. At the USAID mission, Bernard Salvo, Chief of the Office of Voluntary and Humanitarian Programs, and Louis Kuhn of the same office were of great assistance in facilitating the visit and providing background information.

We express our appreciation to these persons along with regrets for any way in which our visit may have disrupted or inconvenienced their important work.

PART I: INTRODUCTION

One purpose of AID Project 936-5300, The Organization and Administration of Integrated Rural Development, is to learn from field exploration what organizational mechanisms and management decisions improve the likelihood of project success. During field visits, an attempt is made to relate general knowledge about the organization and administration of IRD to the particular situation encountered on site. This supports a two-way learning process between consultants and field personnel.

Save the Children's Community Based Integrated Rural Development Project (CBIRD) in Indonesia is of particular interest because of the major emphasis placed on beneficiary participation in decision making and on the role of local organizations both in project selection and management and in providing a context for increasing the leadership ability and performance of poor farmers. To a large degree this is a common emphasis of SCF in its application of the CBIRD methodology in projects throughout the world. But CBIRD is a flexible approach and the ways in which modifications have been made over time in the Aceh project represent a demonstration of how management action can respond to local realities and to what is learned from early project experience.

The stated purpose of CBIRD is to improve the economic and social well-being of people living in the cooperating community. This improvement is defined as increased income and improved health, education, and community infrastructure, resulting in a more self-sufficient community. There is particular emphasis on low income people and on the utilization of all human resources including women, youth, and the elderly.

SCF describes its approach to community development in terms of "working with villagers to help them acquire the motivation, confidence, and skills necessary to identify their problems and needs, to set priorities, and to eventually assume complete responsibility for decision making, planning, implementation, and evaluation of self-help projects. This approach requires the widest possible participation, cooperation,

and effort of everyone involved in the process. It also requires dedicated community development workers who are sensitive to the needs of the local people and who treat them with dignity and respect."^{1/}

This kind of language is not unique to SCF. But the continued focus of SCF Indonesia on process issues as opposed to traditional measures of project success is unusually rigorous and thus presents a valuable case-study in grass roots community development. That focus also provides the framework for this analysis, in which exploration of selected development issues takes precedence over attempts to measure direct project impact.

Part II of this report reviews the history of SCF involvement in Indonesia and describes the context of the Tangse subdistrict project. Part III explores the process focus of CBIRD from three standpoints: the evolution of village community development committees; the application of an open management style at both local project and area program management levels; and the development of informal relationships between SCF staff and villagers and between SCF staff and government officials. Part IV reviews the issue of how a project such as this should be evaluated. A hypothesis is suggested that while a project which focuses on process issues is best assessed in terms of attitudinal and behavioral change rather than economic impact, in the long run the project, and especially attempts at replication, must be cost-effective or they will neither be sustainable nor effectively institutionalized by the host country. Part V looks at selected IRD issues that are of universal interest but to which the SCF Indonesia project has particular relevance. These issues include beneficiary participation, the role of local organizations, the sustainability of benefits, and coordination within the overall project structure. In summary, Part VI reviews what can be learned from the Tangse project and explores to what degree the strengths of the CBIRD concept can be applied to other IRD approaches, particularly large scale area development projects with an inevitably greater role for central planning.

^{1/}Save the Children Indonesia Field Office, Banda Aceh, "Proposal for Community Based Integrated Rural Development (CBIRD) Training in the Special Territory of Aceh" Draft, August, 1979, pp. 3-4.

PART II: PROJECT HISTORY AND CONTEXT

Save the Children was invited to Indonesia by the national government in 1972 to provide consultant services under a project agreement with UNICEF.^{2/} In 1974, discussions were held with the Ministry of Social Affairs (DEPSOS) regarding SCF interest in participating in rural development activity in Indonesia. DEPSOS suggested that SCF begin its work in the Special Territory of Aceh, Indonesia's westernmost Province, located on the island of Sumatra. The provincial capital, Banda Aceh, is 600 km west of Penang on the Malaysian peninsula and 1800 km northwest of the Indonesian capital of Jakarta. Because of its isolated location, Aceh had received relatively little attention from government and private agencies in the past. This provided a sound rationale for SCF involvement.

In 1975, at the request of the Government of Indonesia and the Governor of Aceh, SCF agreed to begin a Community Based Integrated Rural Development (CBIRD) program in Aceh, under the auspices of DEPSOS. As a

^{2/} This section is based on documentation and reports made available by the SCF Indonesia Field Office. These reports include:

Martin Poland, "Community Based Integrated Rural Development as Implemented in Tangse and Mbang, Aceh," in Memorandum on Community Based Integrated Rural Development, a report of the Workshop on Community Based Integrated Rural Development organized by the Department of Social Affairs in Cooperation with Save the Children Federation; Directorate of Community Self-Help Guidance, Directorate General of Social Welfare Development, Department of Social Affairs, Jakarta, December 14-17, 1977, pp. 67-97.

Save the Children Indonesia Field Office, Banda Aceh, "Semi-Annual Report, January 1, 1979 - June 30, 1979," pp. 24-29.

Save the Children Indonesia Field Office, Banda Aceh, "Proposal for Community Based Integrated Rural Development (CBIRD) Training in the Special Territory of Aceh," Draft, August, 1979, pp. 1-3.

In general, by means of narrative analytical reviews prepared by SCF Indonesia at least semi-annually, this project is unusually well documented.

result of site selection processes undertaken jointly by SCF and the Provincial government, development programs were initiated in the Syamtalira and Tangse subdistricts in 1976 and the Seulimeum subdistrict in 1979.^{3/} Consistent with SCF policy, residents of these communities were first briefed on the CBIRD program by representatives of SCF and the government and given the opportunity to accept or reject involvement in the program. Thus, although the initiative for CBIRD was external to the project areas, each community's decision to participate was voluntary within its own decision-making framework. This decision, however, was based on a very limited initial understanding of what CBIRD means.

Significantly, SCF elected to locate the Indonesian field office in Banda Aceh, not Jakarta. This decision reflects a long-term primary commitment to Aceh but also has invited certain difficulties in communications with the central government, USAID and SCF headquarters itself. If and when CBIRD projects are initiated outside of Aceh, as is likely, the issue of office location will take on added dimensions (see Part III for consideration of the significance of SCF staff relations with government officials in Aceh).

The Project Areas

Syamtalira (Mbang): Assisted in large part by a 3-year grant from Mobil Oil, SCF opened a project in the resettlement area of Mbang in 1976 for residents and persons displaced from the nearby Arun LNG fields. This program has had a mixed outcome, attributed mainly to the inability of the area to sustain a permanent population. Although some

^{3/} Criteria for site selection jointly developed by SCF and government officials include:

- population of 3000-5000 persons with possibility for spread effect
- income, rural majority
- absence of other development programs in area
- presence of development potential
- community interest in self-help
- reasonable accessibility
- scope within CBIRD capabilities

progress has occurred in health and agricultural projects, the Mbang program does not represent a comprehensive application of CBIRD and was only a peripheral concern of this field visit. With initial funding running out, SCF is currently phasing out its involvement with this project, based on a determination that continued input of resources would not be cost effective. Phase out will attempt to leave a vestigial operating program sustainable by government resources. The precise timing of the SCF departure remains under consideration. In effect, largely because of unforeseen developments unique to this resettlement area, Mbang represents a failure of the CBIRD process approach, in spite of some productive project activity. An SCF pull-out is consistent with its stated unwillingness to simply play the role of long-term patron for a needy community.

Seulimeum (Lam Teuba): Lam Teuba, a settlement of eight villages in the Seulimeum subdistrict, was selected in May, 1979, as the site of the newest CBIRD program. SCF and Aceh Government officials visited a number of sites in the District of Aceh Besar and, on the basis of a review of baseline data from the three most promising sites, selected Lam Teuba. Lam Teuba is a small, relatively isolated area and is viewed by SCF in the context of the whole subdistrict of Seulimeum. SCF sees the central town of Seulimeum as the hub of a wheel, with spokes ultimately reaching to several village clusters within a workable radius, villages which singly might be overlooked in development programs. In a sense, the Seulimeum program will represent an extension outreach service, operating from a hub with one staff serving a number of villages. This is seen as a system particularly well suited to many areas of Aceh.

The development of the Lam Teuba program -- now only in its beginning stages -- is a significant step for SCF Indonesia. It represents the first replication of the Tangse project and will be a test of how what has been learned in Tangse can be applied to a new site. As such,

it should be evaluated over time by sterner criteria than can appropriately be applied to the testing ground of Tangse.^{4/}

Tangse: Tangse, the focus of this study, represents the only comprehensive application of the SCF CBIRD methodology in Indonesia to date. Because the rest of this report discusses the history of the Tangse project from a variety of perspectives, this section will focus on the setting of this program.

Tangse is a large subdistrict encompassing 26 villages. The closest town of significance for markets and services is Sigli, 46 kilometers distant on a road that is poor and sometimes impassable. Tangse is a hill village with good soil, relatively ample water supply, and development possibilities judged by SCF and Acehnese authorities to be good but largely unexploited. In early 1976, when project activity began, Tangse did not have a post office, telegraph service, running water, or electricity.

Tangse coffee and rice are famous in the area, but in 1976 the coffee trees were not receiving special care and no replanting of trees had been planned. Rice production was limited to a single crop and stood at relatively low levels. Limited medical care was available but not widely utilized. There were obvious health problems, education needs, and lack of physical infrastructure. Economic progress was hindered by high transportation costs, poor access to markets, and limited availability of government services or opportunities for skill development.

Poverty in Tangse was widespread, though not abject. Filler foods such as fruit were available for picking, but general nutritional status was poor and there was little understanding of the relationship between diet and health. Land was available to those willing to clear jungle growth or cultivate the mountainsides. In general, survival pressures evident in some harsher environments were eased, though by no means removed, by Tangse's environmental assets.

^{4/}This point will be considered in greater detail in Part IV. SCF has now been asked by the Ministry of Social Affairs to expand CBIRD to the Island of Java, and preliminary site selection is already underway.

Tangse subdistrict's 26 villages contain approximately 2300 households with a population of 13,000. About half of the population are native to the area. Nearly 100 percent are farmers, and 80 percent own their own land. Per capita income in the villages of Tangse ranged from \$75 to \$130 in 1976.

A fairly comprehensive baseline survey based on household interviews was performed by SCF in Tangse in March, 1976. The survey sample included 31 percent of the population in the 8 villages where project activity was initially to occur. The survey covered demographic, health, and income factors. No follow-up survey has been performed for comparative purposes, but in mid-1977 a consultant provided by SCF did prepare guidelines and suggest indicators for measuring CBIRD impact in Mbang and Tangse. These recommendations outlined a more comprehensive survey than the 1976 effort.

The role of religion is of particular importance in Aceh, and especially in Tangse. The main voice of the people has traditionally been the Ulamas, Islamic religious leaders. The Ulamas have tended to focus on religious concerns, leaving socioeconomic needs less recognized or understood. This was also true for uneducated villagers, who acknowledged their inadequacies and followed leaders they either trusted, or feared, or both. SCF found that the primary thread in the local psycho-economic fabric was resignation. Hope was based on religion, and not primarily related to one's lot on earth.

A second thread in Aceh society was a traditional authoritarianism. This antedates Islam, which is conceptually egalitarian, but the authoritarianism strain has persisted within the rural Achenese culture and is in some ways bolstered by the fatalism of Islam. These threads obviously do not weave a fabric conducive to participatory development.

The CBIRD approach directly modifies this traditional community power structure. Since entrenched authority may be threatened by change, and since programs cannot succeed without active support from Ulamas, political leaders, and the military, SCF believes that established leadership must have active roles in the development process. This means the CBIRD process will cooperate with the existing system, while

incorporating new elements. Its stated purpose is to include, not exclude various elements of society. The major new element is the poor, who are brought into the decision making and planning process. In such a system the people may not have control, but they will have a voice, and, at the very least, a dialogue may be established. The traditional triangle of power in Aceh is made up of religious leaders, government, and the military. By adding the voice of the people themselves through viable organizational structures, CBIRD attempts to transform this decision-making framework into a square, with the community voice becoming one point.

For this change to occur, established leadership must help prepare the poor for involvement. It must also be willing to share authority and power, a difficult position for leaders to assume. Fortunately, there is an official policy framework in Aceh which favors the involvement of the poor. In addition, the Ulama increasingly support the movement. There are, of course, differences of opinion regarding appropriate administrative methodologies, and some resistance to outside influences, but SCF notes a growing commitment to the goal of achieving compromises that are mutually satisfactory and sensitive to local, regional, and national needs. CBIRD is an attempt to merge diverse interests in this common purpose. In Tangse, CBIRD represents continuing application, revision, and reapplication of a process designed to actualize effective participatory involvement by the poor. The next part of this report is an examination of the key elements in that process.

PART III: THE CBIRD PROCESS FOCUS

SCF Indonesia emphasizes a greater interest in process--how change occurs--than in projects--what change occurs. In the application of CBIRD, the principle issue is how the poor and disenfranchised rural farmer can be meaningfully involved in planning, decision making, and redirection of development activity. For example, a women's sewing project might appear to be a productivity project, especially if participants hope to sell what they sew. In fact, however, the main object of the project may be to encourage women to organize around a common interest so that, as an organization, they may become a factor in other community concerns as well. SCF has learned from experience that, from such organizations, new projects and other initiatives frequently grow. It is not at all unusual for secondary projects to overshadow the original, but this does not happen unless the community members get together and organize in the first place.

An SCF Indonesia report states,

During the first year, working with actual projects, the planning and management systems will be stressed over the quality of the projects. While the success of some, most really, of the projects is important, we are trying to institutionalize a way of doing things: a method, an approach. If project quality is emphasized, this may be lost. It is a preparatory, motivating, training period. To have successful projects immediately is possible. The most competent planners are selected to plan and administer and the least competent, inevitably the poor, do the work. The problem is that this approach--close to the traditional--stabilizes roles and traps the poor at the bottom of the economic ladder. The suggested approach provides rungs so that those who are capable have the opportunity to climb up the ladder. Because of the separation between the planners and doers, basic needs are not met or even recognized. The system of closed management is more susceptible to corruption and experience indicates that, even where development occurs, the economic gap increases. It's an old story in development.^{5/}

^{5/} Save the Children Indonesia Field Office, Banda Aceh, "Semi-Annual Report, July 1 - December 31, 1978," p. 13.

Consistent with this approach, SCF has found the most prominent need in its project areas to be the upgrading of local management capabilities, particularly those of the poor. Without a minimum level of competence to participate in community planning and decision making, the poor will never gain the confidence required for meaningful participation, as opposed to mere presence, in leadership councils. Based on experience in Tangse, SCF estimates that at least 2 years are required for significant progress in the competence-building process among the poorest farmers. Without learning and using basic management skills, the poor will continue to be managed by others and remain open to exploitation. Another SCF report states,

Aside from formal religious education, the villager learned essentially by trial and error. The poor were the least able to risk new techniques or crops as failure meant a lowering of an already minimum subsistence living. Experimentation was left to the relatively more affluent who then benefited from technological progress introduced by the government. The gap between rich and poor widened as more advanced technology and knowledge was absorbed into the system. The vagaries of weather, natural and man-made disasters taught that success was as much a matter of fate as diligence.

Villages in the interior, difficult to reach or leave, tended towards self-sufficiency. Times have changed. The people are no longer satisfied with the life style that self-sufficiency demanded. They have grown from a barter society to a mixed barter-money economic system. They want goods and services from beyond their village. This means selling their products outside of their village to obtain the money necessary to purchase imported goods. Improved communication, better transportation, education and exposure to a broader world has increased their level of expectation. Planning is no longer viewed as a challenge to fate so long as one acknowledges that final results are beyond the control of man. One must try to improve his circumstances as well as having faith that God's will be done. The skills essential to survival in the closed sufficient society are not adequate in the more complex interdependent society.^{6/}

^{6/} Save the Children Indonesia Field Office, Banda Aceh, "Semi-Annual Report, January 1 - June 30, 1979," p. 30.

To possess the skills of interdependent society means to possess power over the economic life of the community. If power is to be distributed, then so must the ability to plan and manage economic change. SCF believes, therefore, that while planning is needed on all administrative levels, it is of special importance to involve the poor. The first priority remains training, especially at the village level. For CBIRD, the training or learning process is the focus, not the projects themselves.

By and large, SCF attempts to facilitate learning from experience in actually planning and implementing projects. There is a minimal overlay of advance planning from the outside, so that people have the opportunity to learn by doing and by the experience of both success and failure. This is particularly true of projects not requiring direct services from beyond the community.^{7/}

The Evolution of Community Development Committees

The primary vehicle for organizing participation by the rural poor in the CBIRD program in Tangse is the Community Development Committee (CDC). The evolution of this committee and of its role in the community is an example of the SCF process approach.

Initially, SCF personnel met with community officials and formed the first CDC. It was decided to start the CBIRD program in 8 of the 26 villages of Tangse, and expand to the other villages over a 4-year period. The CDC was essentially a subdistrict rather than village committee at this point and was composed of the traditional leaders (formal and, more often, nonformal) of Tangse. There were school teachers, government employees, retired officials, farmers, and businessmen. A few women were included. Some initial projects were selected such as coffee grinding, orange planting, chicken raising, wood cutting, hat making, and a children's health program.

^{7/}In fact, SCF deliberately applies a mixture of top-down and bottom-up planning techniques in Aceh. Certain programs are introduced, particularly in health, nutrition, and family planning, apart from the expression of felt need by villagers. In time, however, linkages have developed in Tangse between projects initiated by SCF and those initiated by the villagers themselves (see discussion of project linkages under Coordination in Part V).

Although lip service was given to the idea of participation of the poor, the Committee was, in fact, dominated by leadership elements who did not really think that less educated members of lower economic groups were competent to plan. The poor actually agreed with this assessment and were quite willing to defer decision making to the better-educated and more prosperous villagers. While not ideal theoretically, this was the thinking of the people of Tangse at that point, so this is where SCF began.

But SCF had its own problems. As reported by Indonesia Director, Martin Poland,

SCF local staff was inexperienced. While there had been some training, the ideas were new and it is fair to say that the staff lacked conviction and did not fully understand the CBIRD process. They too were learning. Although planning concepts and projecting had little meaning, they were willing to try. Better planning and training were essential, but neither the community nor the staff fully comprehended how essential. The local officials were also not completely aware of what we were trying to do in the new program. They realized we were trying to help and they, in turn, were supportive, but communications were sparse. Often officials were not available because of other responsibilities, but efforts were made to keep them informed.

To further complicate the situation, Save the Children had some personnel problems. The original Director had to return to the United States unexpectedly for reasons no one could have predicted. A temporary Director was assigned, followed by another permanent Director. After three months he also returned to the U.S. for medical reasons.

Another temporary Director was assigned. In April, 1977, the present Director was assigned and arrived shortly before elections when extensive field work was not possible. The program was maintained but the combination of these problems resulted in a slowing pace. These problems were not predicted in the theoretical model, but these and similar problems are part of a working situation.^{8/}

^{8/}J. Martin Poland, "Community Based Integrated Rural Development as Implemented in Tangse and Mbang, Aceh," op cit, p. 79-80.

Several misunderstandings surfaced as project activity began. One major issue was the expectation of some CDC members that they would be paid for their work. This reflected their view of outside donor agencies as wealthy benefactors. Another misconception was that the purpose of projects was to bring economic gain to the CDC and its members. Projects were envisioned in a traditional manner, in which the poor participated as workers and the benefits were drained off by the leaders.

As a result of these misconceptions, a readjustment period occurred in mid-1977. Several CDC members quit over the pay issue, leaving a core group of 15 who understood their role in more of a service sense, although they still represented traditional leadership interests. Other developments built momentum: Land for projects was donated by certain members of the community as well as by the subdistrict government. Intensive training was undertaken for CDC members, project leaders, and local government officials. Planning, using a simplified form based on an AID logical framework, was provided by the Acehnese government and by SCF. Experience with the projects was incorporated into the training and problems with projects gave indications of where further training was needed.

It became apparent, however, that those with the greatest need were not benefitting from all this activity. Although many of the poor were now involved in working groups related to projects, they were not really involved in the planning. The CDC, at SCF's urging, reconsidered the questions of how the economically deprived could be more centrally involved. This led to two major decisions: First, that management training was necessary not only for CDC members but also for people involved in the project working groups so that they could assume a more direct management and monitoring role. Second, to involve the poor in a more meaningful way, Village-level Development Committees (VCDCs) were formed around the existing working groups. These VCDCs assumed greater operational authority and the role of the CDC changed from that of decision maker and manager to one of coordinator, guide, and instructor. Funding was dispersed among all the participating villages to reverse the tendency to concentrate major efforts in a few selected areas.

This development set a major new direction. Each VCDC was to include for the first time a representative of the poorest elements of society. Traditional leadership was not excluded, but the traditionally isolated poor were to be included. As described in an SCF Indonesia report in mid-1978,

The village committees were formed but are not functional at this time. This was expected. Project initiation and management is being phased into a lower administrative level, closer to the poor, which means that the poor are being involved on a planning and management level as well as a working level. Performance is uneven. The concept that management methodology is important is now accepted on all levels. The CDC is performing well in planning and monitoring. However, as the projects multiply there is more work than they can absorb so the importance of moving the village committees into full operation becomes increasingly apparent. They have expressed concern about financial controls as they are phased into village committees. This has heightened their awareness of the importance of full involvement of a large number of people and of maintaining a financial flow system that is easily monitored. These are problems that six months ago either would not have surfaced or would have been handled by trusting a single "honest citizen." They are now expressing a belief in both open management methods and the involvement of large numbers of villagers. We no longer hear that the poor cannot manage but rather that they need training. Attitudinally this is a major change. ^{9/}

The subsequent history of VCDC performance has been mixed. Some are described as very active; others as "waiting for a handout." The more effective VCDCs are, in effect, rewarded by SCF, since performance on previous projects is a major criterion for continued SCF funding. ^{10/}

^{9/} Save the Children Indonesia Field Office, Banda Aceh, "Semi-Annual Report, January 1 - June 30, 1978," p.5.

^{10/} The CDC continues to play an important project-screening role between the VCDC and SCF, but most project funding comes from SCF. The role of local funding is increasing as the CDC develops reserves from certain project surpluses or the recycling of loans.

A report at the end of 1978 described progress as follows:

The CDC, on advice from the Field Coordinator, is strongly supporting the stronger more active village committees. Attitude and effort are viewed as of special importance. Where these are of a high level training and educational programs tend to be well received and used. So some villages are spurting ahead based on their own effort. It is anticipated that this approach will serve to motivate the less active communities as they see their neighbors advance. They will all have an experience that will clearly reflect that their involvement determines what happens to them. They must plan, make decisions and work --- or not progress. Those who fall behind can catch up by increasing their level of participation. This coincidentally, but not by plan, is a test of motivational possibilities and is being watched carefully. In essence, although they would not put it this way, the CDC has shifted from an approach of equal treatment to equal opportunity.^{11/}

In mid-1979, VCDCs were operating in each of the 15 villages in which CBIRD was functioning. How the VCDCs operate has been found to be directly related to the performance of the village chiefs. Where the chief is active and supports the committee, the probability of success is greatly increased. This is a predictable result of the very important role the chief plays in an Indonesian village. To significant degree, CBIRD represents a dilution of the chief's almost singular authority in the village. The VCDC is a competitive source of both power and resources. It is essential that the chief accept the objectives of the VCDC and cooperate with it if there is not to be conflict. SCF may have been somewhat late in recognizing the importance of co-opting village chiefs. In part this was because of the deliberate decision to bypass the existing "official" structures when forming the CDC (see Part V: Local Organizations).

As responsibility and authority are shifted to the village level through the VCDC mechanism, projects continue to be implemented largely by poorer villagers. However, these poor are now receiving more direct benefits for their efforts. Bickering and power struggles within the communities are declining. Support is growing from political

^{11/} Save the Children Indonesia Field Office, Banda Aceh, "Semi-Annual Report, July 1 - December 31, 1978," p. 2.

and religious leaders, who welcome what they see as the first actual success -- however limited -- in preparing and involving the poor in their own development.

With the increasing shift of project responsibility to the village level, a change in the type of project is emerging. The projects selected tend to have a more immediate effect on the poor, and there are fewer long-term projects. What will have to evolve for continued development is a combination of village and subdistrict projects. It is anticipated that the subdistrict level CDC will reassume greater importance in the future, as individuals given training and experience on VCDCs begin to function on the larger CDC, instead of only their leaders or representatives. This will happen when the poor feel confident enough to express themselves freely at CDC meetings. SCF is encouraged by the progress to date, demonstrated by the active participation of the poor in VCDCs, but expects that it will require 2 years of local experience to equip the poor for participation at the subdistrict level. "Competence before Confidence" remains the byword.

A summary of the revised SCF perception of community committees is contained in a recent report reviewing site selection and new project guidelines:

After three to six months a community committee will be selected by the community with the proviso that at least half the membership must be those who volunteered to work on the first projects and that women and youth be represented. It is our experience that the volunteers will be from the economically depressed group while if the community is asked to select representatives from among the poor at random those selected are not in fact from the poor group. The concept of involving the poor at this level is new and not easily grasped. Neither the leadership nor the poor themselves are likely at this stage to have confidence that they can contribute more than labor. It is also our experience that most volunteers, while poor, were not in fact true volunteers. They are asked to volunteer but hear an order to do so.

The tendency is for the establishment to make decisions on behalf of the poor. There is often a gap between what the leaders consider the needs of the poor and what the poor themselves want. The felt needs of the poor does not usually feed into the formal

information channels. Intentions are often admirable but miss the targets. We have also observed that natural leaders emerge from the working groups. They are not part of the formal or even informal structure and attitudes of the leadership permit. Unless they are involved in decision making a top down process evolves if fact although not always entirely in form.

The emphasis during the first six months will be on establishing a structure and introducing administrative processes that will enable a full cross section of the community to be involved in selecting, planning and implementing projects with major self help inputs so that in cooperation with government programs the community itself will be a major participant in its own development. To achieve this early emphasis will be on training and learning by doing. 12/

Appendix B to this report summarizes the administrative functions and relationships among the VCDCs, CDC, and SCF staff as they evolved in CBIRD Tangse. Appendix C relates the committees to the Tangse project structure.

Open Management

An administrative approach with an evolving significance that has surprised even SCF Indonesia leadership is what they describe as open management. This is applied both at the level of the Banda Aceh SCF office and at the level of the CDC and VCDC committees.

In Banda Aceh, the application of open management is largely a reflection of the open style of the SCF Indonesia Director, Martin Polard. At his initiative, there is an air of easy informality in the SCF office, which is the base for over 15 employees. Because of continuous staff movement between Banda Aceh and the field, the number of persons actually working in the office at any given time is about half of the total. 13/

12/ Save the Children Indonesia Field Office, Banda Aceh, "Semi-Annual Report, July 1 - December 31, 1978," p. 11.

13/ See Appendix A for an organizational chart of the SCF Indonesia Office.

The fact that the SCF office and the residence of the Polands are not only in the same house but, except for one bedroom, share the same space contributes to the open atmosphere. The office is, in effect, never closed.

More importantly, there is a structured attempt to maximize communication. Staff meetings are held frequently and regularly and staff problems or complaints are openly discussed. Reports, memos, and correspondence, except strictly personal material, are posted for all to see. This contributes to a well-informed and well-motivated staff.

Openness is not achieved at the cost of a fairly rigorous personnel system. Personnel policies, job descriptions, and salary/fringe benefit factors have been under intensive review this year with the intention of producing a revised SCF Indonesia personnel manual in late 1979. The terms of a yearly renewable labor contract that SCF will use with its employees will be included. This contract will include an evaluation element. Each employee will be evaluated in writing once a year by his/her immediate supervisor. This document, along with a detailed self-evaluation written by the employee, will be submitted to the director for review and consultation. The director will subsequently arrange with the employee a contract for improvement over the coming year with specific indicators for measurement. Appropriate staff training and development opportunities will be considered in conjunction with the working out of contracts. Salary increments will be correlated with achievement of contracted improvements in staff performance.

Open management has had its greatest impact at the village level. The introduction of this management style is a major innovation for an Indonesian village. The decision to adopt this style was made by the CDC itself, but was largely influenced by training CDC members had received under the auspices of SCF. Introduction of open management occurred in 1978, concurrently with CDC reorganization and the formation of the village level development committees (VCDCs). This approach means, in effect, that all expenditures, income, receipts, and accounts are routinely published, posted, and made available to everyone. The

assumption was accepted that the CDC and VCDCs are not closed groups but are to act on behalf of the community. Therefore, the community has a right to know what is happening. Committee meetings are open. Anyone can come and express their views. SCF reports that many villagers are participating in meetings, aided by training which enables them to understand the proceedings and records of the committees.^{14/}

A major result of this openness was the willingness of the community to isolate and even remove corrupt leaders. The availability of information made clear what was not clear before -- that the community was being victimized by some of its leaders and representatives. As reported by SCF in connection with an accountant who was fired by the CDC,

Tangse did not have a history of dismissing personnel. It does now. The decision to dismiss is significant. It represents change as did previous actions against wayward committee members and against one village chief who misused government funds (bridge project). They are holding people responsible for their behavior. They are accepting responsibility and expecting others to do the same. They have been willing to accept the problems that come with this, apparently viewing the problems as better than the previous modus operandi. This, in part, reflects a power shift with the socially disadvantaged having a clear voice (which is not to suggest that the establishment is still not the primary power). There are the results of attitudinal changes and the effects are seen in many areas.^{15/}

In addition to skill development, access to information becomes a means by which the poor assume a greater share of power in the community. The SCF Indonesia process approach is an attempt to manage and structure the acquisition of both skill and information by poor villagers, in the context of a development program that creates opportunity for decision making on choices that directly affect the poor. That there has been a significant effect on the attitudes and behavior of the poor is widely acknowledged by both participants in and observers of the CBIRD process in Aceh.

^{14/}To facilitate understanding of committee proceedings and to assist local management of projects, training in basic bookkeeping has been emphasized. It is intended that every project have a trained, local, volunteer bookkeeper. This serves not only the project but the local monitoring of any funds that may be cycled upward to the CDC.

^{15/}Save the Children Indonesia Field Office, Banda Aceh, "Semi-Annual Report, July 1 - December 31, 1978," p.2.

Informal Relationships

A less structured, but equally important, element in the CBIRD process as applied to Aceh by SCF Indonesia is the influence of a variety of informal relationships. Of particular significance are the relationships between SCF staff and the people of Tangse, and between SCF and government officials in Aceh.

SCF and the Villages

Although SCF involvement in Tangse began with relatively formal briefings of villagers by government officials and SCF staff, it became clear in time that these meetings failed to impart a great deal of understanding to these persons. It took several months of involvement before residents of participating villages had a sense of what CBIRD was all about. In this early stage, SCF deliberately kept the projects small. This facilitated identification, analysis, and the development of plans to resolve problems. Workshops, demonstrations, and group discussions were held frequently.

SCF did not enter Tangse with a large degree of credibility. Government support at the beginning was only tentative, and there is throughout Aceh a particular distrust of outsiders. S.F.'s somewhat low-key approach, especially in terms of projects per se, contributed to its acceptance. But even more important was the identification of a highly personable young Field Coordinator, Nukman Affan, who is a native Acehnese. Nukman lived in Tangse and was available on a regular basis to the CDC and other community members. He served a vital and active liaison function between the SCF Field Office in Banda Aceh and the Tangse Community and was also in regular contact with government officials in Tangse and the district capital of Sigli. His role was described by SCF as one of monitoring, guiding, and teaching. It seems clear that, in fact, his role was more than that. He was a facilitator, catalyst, and the glue that held the multi-faceted CBIRD program together in Tangse.^{16/}

^{16/} Nukman Affan has recently been promoted to Fieldwork Supervisor with responsibility over the Field Coordinators in the three CBIRD project areas: Mbang, Lam Teuba, and Tangse. As soon as a replacement as Field Coordinator in Tangse is found, Nukman will relocate to Banda Aceh.

Nukman has been supported by a large number of SCF Indonesia program and training staff, who spend considerable time in the village. The SCF staff input is significantly augmented by villagers trained for local leadership roles. But the constant factor, and the fulcrum around which other inputs turn, is the Field Coordinator. His role is the key to the internalization of the CBIRD approach as a Tangse community endeavor.

Informal relationships play a key role in co-opting the community leaders whose support is necessary for projects. Non-formal leaders in particular are cultivated to take part in presenting the CBIRD program to the community in village meetings. In addition, initiating discussions between the rich and powerful and the poor broadens understanding and perception of the needs of the poor, and acceptance of programs primarily addressing their problems.

By building on informal relationships and using local leadership (both pre-existent and emerging) to a maximum degree, SCF avoids both the image and reality of a separate project structure in the village.

SCF and the Government

SCF has both formal and informal relationships with government officials. The most formal relationships are with central government authorities in Jakarta and, while these are of course necessary for SCF to function at all in Indonesia, they are the least important government contacts in the dynamics of project activity in Aceh. It is at the more local level that a network of relationships ties CBIRD to official systems and structures. Director Poland has described the nature of these relationships in these words:

The comprehensiveness of a CBIRD program, the fact that it touches so many aspects of village life, means that it is involved with a number of Government agencies and services. All of these want to know what is happening so they can make their contribution in a proper and timely manner, and generally support the program. The program has areas of common interest and concern that affect many Departments, ranging from Rural Development and Health to Education and Animal Husbandry. In addition to these, the various Government levels from Kecamatan (sub-district) to national also need to be informed. Of equal importance are the universities and other teaching and training institutions. It took a while to sort this

out and, in some cases, even to make contact. Yet these contacts are among the most important responsibilities of a director if we hope to evolve an integrated service utilizing all available resources.

Reports, and there are increasing "cc's" on progress reports, convey in a broad sense what is happening. But there is a difference between a reporting relationship and a working relationship. Reports, in my view, are not a substitute but a supplement to the meetings that should occur between and among us. The meetings allow for questions, clarifications, discussions, explorations, and a blending of ideas that is often superior to the ideas of any one individual.^{17/}

As with Nukman in Tangse, the experience of Poland in Banda Aceh indicates that the style of a project "key man" is of critical importance. Relationships with various levels of government did not come easily in every case. Breakthroughs were usually the result of opportunities for extended and intense discussion, such as in joint workshops or training programs.

Except for matters attendant to SCF permission to be present and operate in Aceh and Indonesia at all, formal links between CBIRD and government structures are conspicuous by their absence. A growing network of informal links, however, is of increasing importance to the success, growth, and sustainability of the program.^{18/} Government support is evident in three significant ways:

1. Increasing staff interchange between SCF and both Acehese Provincial Government and central government ministries' Provincial offices. This has been facilitated by extensive involvement of government personnel in CBIRD training programs.
2. Increasing coordination and application of government services in support of the CBIRD program. The number of agricultural extension staff, for example, has increased in Tangse in response to CBIRD activity.

^{17/}J. Martin Poland, "Community Based Integrated Rural Development as Implemented in Tangse and Mbang, Aceh," op cit, pp. 94-95.

^{18/}Sustainability is discussed further in Part V of this report.

3. The joining of a wide variety of government officials in declared support of a proposal for CBIRD training in Aceh.^{19/} This 5-year program would train 1452 current and prospective agricultural extension agents and 258 other officials and leaders in CBIRD methods and techniques. Additionally, it would incorporate this training methodology into existing Department of Agriculture structures.

While gradually developing government knowledge of and support for the CBIRD program in Tangse is largely attributable to informal relationships carefully cultivated by the SCF Director and staff in Banda Aceh, the newer application of CBIRD in Lam Teuba, Seulimeum subdistrict, begins with a background of much stronger interest and support. This will assist more rapid mobilization of needed government inputs.

SCF has encouraged use of government services in project areas. By making villagers aware of the services to which they are entitled, CBIRD has directly fostered a greater willingness of the rural poor to demand that these services be provided. As a result, underutilized or even dormant government extension or field programs have been revitalized, to the benefit of all. SCF is ready to support this development by including these staff in training activities.

Several SCF management, program and training staff are persons seconded from government. This growing trend has a two-way significance: it strengthens SCF links to various government departments and also imbues an increasing number of government personnel with the CBIRD methodology. Conversely, some staff originally hired and trained by SCF have later moved into government service.

^{19/}See Appendix D for a list of members and description of the function of the sponsoring committee for this proposed program, which grew out of a request by the Ministry of Agriculture's Provincial Office in Aceh. The Committee brings together various leadership elements - central government representatives, provincial government officials, university staff, religious leaders - who themselves have traditionally experienced some conflict. The Committee is seen by SCF as an immediate, transitional step in the integration of CBIRD into formal systems.

These developments have been possible largely because of the small size and relative isolation of the Province of Aceh. CBIRD is not a large program nor of notable significance in terms of budget, even in Aceh. As originally planned and proposed in 1976, the total budget is only \$2 million for an initial 5-year program. In many Indonesian provinces, access to government officials and opportunities to develop even informal linkages would be very limited. A program such as CBIRD, however innovative and successful, would draw little notice.

There is no evidence that the selection of Aceh as the initial CBIRD site was related in any way to the expectation that informal ties to official structures would become such a significant element in program success. It turned out to be a fortuitous choice. The more formal links to the government administrative infrastructure envisioned in the original CBIRD program plan would not be developing now without the essential first step of informal relationships made possible by the particular personalities involved and the favorable context in Banda Aceh.

PART IV: IMPACT MEASUREMENT

Although the CBIRD approach emphasizes process concerns, the program does operate within a planning framework. As described by Mr. Poland,

There is a five year plan. According to this plan, which was based on information available just before the program started in Tangse, anticipated progress was divided into six-month segments. This would happen the first six months, this the second, etc. Of course it never works out exactly as planned. For that reason the plan is viewed as a guide and not as a strait jacket. New information, the ever-increasing contributions of the people themselves, the unpredictable things that happen - all serve to create a new reality, and the plan must be modified accordingly. Because there is a plan, it is possible to measure what is happening with some standard of expectation. When the expected does not occur, one can often learn by trying to understand why it did not. Was there an error in data? Were expectations unrealistic? What could have been done? Plans are not road maps because the territory is the future and it has not been surveyed yet.

Plans are guides made as logically and intelligently as possible based on information on hand. They make it possible to evaluate progress and they give direction and consistency to programs, so that they at least move in the direction of their aims. When the scientists using the most sophisticated computer technology fired the rockets to the moon, they still had to make mid-course corrections to put them on target. We too have to make mid-course corrections. Without a plan, without indicators, it is difficult to ascertain whether one should make adjustment.^{20/}

SCF Indonesia has, in fact, operated within a planning context with rather specific objectives by which progress can be measured.^{21/}

^{20/}J. Martin Poland, "Community Based Integrated Rural Development as Implemented in Tangse and Mbang, Aceh," op cit, pp.92-93.

^{21/}SCF Indonesia planning is conspicuously result oriented. Much less attention is paid to project feasibility planning. This omission is, in part, deliberate, to preserve the "bottom-up" planning focus. Since the projects are small, the risk is limited. Also, villager instincts have generally been correct. In one instance a local group of 116 families wanted to plant sugar cane on a particular hillside where they remembered their grandparents had successfully done so. An agricultural extension agent questioned the wisdom of this on the basis of soil and climate analysis. SCF sided with the villagers, providing a \$5000 loan for seedlings and training. The cane is now growing successfully. Typically, there is no clear plan for marketing. The villagers will work it out.

By and large these objectives have been project-specific and have not dealt with overall community economic aggregates. A typical set of goals and indicators -- in this case for Fiscal Year 1980 -- is given in Appendix E to this report. Similar specific target lists have been prepared for each 6-month interval in the past, and progress compared to indicators has been assessed in the semi-annual reports of the SCF Indonesia Field Office.^{22/} This ongoing assessment serves more than an evaluation function. For village-level planning purposes, each project is broken down into progressive steps. Completion of one step is a signal to start the next. Whenever possible, community inputs precede outside financial inputs, to test local involvement. The people are thus helped to recognize the relationship between orderly planning and the possibility of achieving predetermined goals.

In addition to project evaluations, the SCF Indonesia reports frequently contain a rather detailed analysis of their own organizational and management problems, with a description of the planned response. That this analysis is "published" is a reflection of open management (see Part III of this report) and also of the serious attention given to administrative issues. One example, which predates consideration of the personnel manual mentioned previously, is indicative:

The lack of a Personnel Manual and standardization of personnel regulations increase the probabilities of inconsistencies and a paternalistic approach to staff.

This approach develops loyalty to the Director but not to (the program). While it can be very ego satisfying, for it's easy for the Director to be the good guy, it is not conducive to staff development in terms of individual dignity and professionalism, i.e., it fosters dependency. The goodies are seen as being bestowed by the Director rather than earned. It is the traditional way but, as we innovate in the field, I believe the development of a professional group secure in its own competency and with a sense that it has earned certain benefits rather than being dependent on the benevolence of the director is a move in the right direction. (The present system) also lends itself to misuse. We

^{22/}The six major targets are based on the original 5-year implementation plan as adjusted for actual progress to date.

will probably install a conservative policy with medical benefits, earned vacation, sick leave, etc. pending the establishment of guidelines by the Personnel Department (of SCF U.S. Headquarters) for overseas staff. 23/

General personnel issues and upcoming staff assignments are also discussed in these reports. Staff assignments are complex because of travel and temporary personnel reassignments for training activity or technical assistance to new and ongoing projects.

This sort of evaluation and continuing assessment primarily serves management needs at the Field Office and project levels. It does not constitute an overall study of CBIRD impact.

There does exist some data on the individual projects, including careful financial records detailing sources of funds and expenditures but less adequate information on benefits and beneficiaries. It would be possible to use these data to develop a very rough cost-benefit analysis of the 44 currently ongoing projects in Tangse, adjusted to reflect costs of the several unsuccessful projects which have been abandoned. That SCF has not attempted such an analysis demonstrates again the concern for process. In Tangse, aggregate economic impact is simply not the point -- at least, not yet. Of more concern is attitudinal change on the part of villagers and infusion of the CBIRD concept into the permanent structures of society. These changes are more difficult to measure. The original SCF Indonesia plan describes "end of project status" in terms of functioning community committees, effective governmental links, completed training, and successful replication (ultimately to all 129 subdistricts of Aceh). With the passage of time, interim indicators have become more specific and focus largely on degree of participation, individual project progress, and evidence of effective committee functioning (see Appendix E). But a good deal of subjective analysis, not necessarily related to specific indicators, has also been performed and is reflected in the periodic narrative reports. Several examples have been quoted in this report and are sufficient to indicate SCF's broad judgment that the CBIRD approach, as adjusted, has been validated in Tangse. This is demonstrated in particular by measures of beneficiary participation and of government interest in and acceptance of the approach.

23/ Save the Children Indonesia Field Office, Banda Aceh, "Semi-Annual Report, FY 1977-8," p. 15.

From the perspective of the AID Logical Framework Matrix, the objectives of CBIRD in Tangse may be summarized in this way:^{24/}

- Goal:** Improvement in the welfare of the people of Tangse as demonstrated by economic and social gains.
- Purpose:** Behavioral and attitudinal changes among the people of Tangse, primarily reflected in increased participation of the poor in community development dynamics.
- Outputs:** Viable development committee structures providing an arena for participatory action and training programs to equip the poor for such participation.

In a framework such as this, the link between outputs and purpose is quite clear. Indeed, the heart of CBIRD as applied in Tangse is in that very link. CBIRD is, above all, a process to structure, manage and maintain meaningful community participation and the attitudinal changes that underlie such participation. SCF Indonesia is rigorously faithful to this objective. It avoids the common tendency in development projects to confuse output with purpose. In CBIRD, committee structures and training are clearly not ends in themselves; they are means to the end of genuine behavioral and attitudinal change.

There is less clarity, however, in the link between purpose and goal that is, between behavioral change and measurable improvement in the people's welfare. This reflects, in part, the absence of developed evaluative criteria in CBIRD to assess production and income changes in the overall community.

To the extent that Tangse is viewed as a testing ground for the CBIRD process, the omission of economic impact assessment may be justified, at least in the short term. From this perspective, SCF is making an investment in the development of an area-specific methodology and an institutional framework supportive of that methodology's application and future replication.

In the long run, however, any development scheme must be sustained by direct or indirect redistribution of the economic benefits which it produces. This is true even in an intermediate stage when a development

^{24/} This is the framework as observed by the study team. The original SCF Indonesia CBIRD proposal, which is not specific to Tangse, adds elements dealing with replicability and government links.

approach is institutionalized within government structures and, in some manner, subsidized by them. Ultimately, the resources applied to a project must produce cost-effective results, reflecting realistic valuation of economic and social benefits. This also suggests the need for more accurate and meaningful data on direct and indirect project beneficiaries.

The significance of this for CBIRD pertains primarily to its spread to new project areas such as Lam Teuba. Replications of the Tangse experience will have to be evaluated in terms of goal-level indicators of economic and social gain and not only purpose-level indicators of behavioral and attitudinal change. For this reason, more precise evaluation criteria should be incorporated into the project plan for Lam Teuba and other replications than now is the case. Otherwise SCF runs the risk of exhausting available resources for CBIRD, with only a noble experiment to show for its efforts. For now, no determination has been made of whether CBIRD is economically feasible as a broad scale development approach. SCF owes itself, concerned Indonesian government officials, and other observers of the CBIRD approach an answer to that question.

PART V: IRD ISSUES

A number of general issues can be identified which are of significance to the organization and administration of integrated rural development projects. Each particular project will suggest its own mix of these concerns. In reviewing the SCF CBIRD project in Aceh, this report has emphasized the process focus which guides SCF's management approach. In so doing, it has touched on several other issues deemed to be of particular importance to the dynamics of CBIRD. These include beneficiary participation, the role of local organizations, benefit sustainability, and project coordination.

Beneficiary Participation

If development is the expansion of rural peoples' ability to manage their own affairs and improve their own welfare, then local participation is a basic test of the authenticity of the IRD process. It is a necessary condition for local behavioral change which, in turn, is essential if benefits of project activity are to be institutionalized and sustained over the long run.

As noted previously, CBIRD is above all an attempt to motivate and equip people to participate in their own development. It demonstrates the hypothesis that people organize best around problems they believe to be of priority importance. It takes seriously the corollary hypothesis that participation in needs analysis and planning is a major precondition for later participation by beneficiaries in project implementation.

Many factors that typically constrain effective participation were present in Tangse. Administrative patterns were relatively centralized and there was a tradition of top-down planning and decision making. Local power alignment revolved around elite groups--particularly religious leaders, the military, and the rich. Poor farmers experienced dependency relationships with patrons, which did not encourage openness to change.

On the other hand, certain factors facilitating participation were present in Tangse. These included relative social homogeneity and cohesion (in contrast to Mbang) and a tradition of cooperative community

effort.^{25/} CBIRD capitalized on these assets, particularly in forming project working groups that became the basis for the Village Community Development Committees.

In this context it is also possible to isolate a set of management-related factors which seem to have worked to promote increasing participation. These factors, touched on previously, include:

- . control of the distribution of project resources by SCF. SCF project staff ultimately decides which activities to fund and which to reject. Those which clearly benefit larger numbers of village poor have been more readily funded, though care is taken not to be overly rigid in project selection. Additionally, villages in which VCDC's are better represented by poorer elements are favored. These factors have influenced the development of an environment in which the poor have a greater voice. Moreover, by minimizing the provision of general up-front outside services, SCF has maximized the significance of this activity-specific financial leverage.
- . development of VCDC's. Initially, village level committees did not exist. As a result of an extended process of discussion within the subdistrict CDC and with village leaders, the decision was made by the CDC that the village-level committees should be formed. The objective of increasing local participation was clearly a major factor in this decision.
- . internal composition of the VCDC's. The decision was reached that one-half of the VCDC membership must come from villagers who were "volunteer" workers in projects. This element largely consists of poorer villagers. Over time leaders from among the volunteers have emerged, and these leaders are appearing as vocal elements in the VCDC's.
- . training of villagers. Villagers active in the SCF-funded projects are receiving extensive training to improve management and certain technical skills. The improvement of management capabilities over time is allowing the less-educated villagers to effectively participate in project related decision making. This development is also facilitated by deliberate project simplicity.
- . evolution of open management. The increased accountability of those responsible for the allocation and utilization of project resources has enhanced the position of those willing to focus on the needs of large numbers of villagers. Additionally, it has allowed poorer villagers who represent village interests to gain greater influence.

^{25/} Known in the Indonesian language as gotong royong, or mutual assistance, this tradition is a major asset for community development in most of the country. SCF is aware that there is some risk of development activity having a negative effect on traditions of cooperative labor as cash-based activities increase.

willingness of local officials to accept organizational arrangements that give the poor a voice. This was, of course, encouraged by SCF which was backed in the effort by its central- and provincial-level government counterparts and by its ability to direct resources to cooperating communities. (This financial leverage led to some initial role-confusion among members of the original Tangse CDC, some of whom looked for personal gain as a reward for cooperation).

The growth of participation by villagers has been slow but real. To its credit, SCF did not force the issue and wrest control of the participatory dynamic from the people. Effective participation was rewarded more than effective projects, providing an ongoing incentive. SCF's patience is indicated in this segment of a project review:

The coffee project is functioning but not repaying the loan on a regular basis to CDC although coffee is being sold. This was the young men's project, and they are having management problems with their books being less than perfect. The group itself recently reorganized. We suspect they suspect something was wrong but it has not been officially reported. The possible motivation is that one of the women's credit units thought the coffee project had possibilities and, through a credit union loan, have started their own coffee project in direct competition with the original project. The women seem to be doing well and are repaying the loan in spite of a more primitive operation at this point. The competition is friendly; in fact, the young men lent the women their marked bags so all the coffee is being marketed under the same "trademark." The more efficient unit may well put the other out of business, or they may combine. This will be interesting to watch. 26/

As has been noted, SCF Indonesia's rigorous preoccupation with participation has been at the expense of a serious assessment of what quantifiable benefits are accruing from the process. It is now appropriate that this aspect of participation be given greater attention.

The Role of Local Organizations

There is substantial empirical evidence to suggest that successful rural development is closely associated with vigorous, locally accountable institutions. Local organizations provide a vehicle for decision making, communication, and project management. They represent a key

^{26/} Save the Children Indonesia Field Office, "Semi-Annual Report, July 1 - December 31, 1978," p. 3, (emphasis added).

local resource for developing a participatory style of development cooperation. They serve community understanding of project activity and facilitate risk-sharing arrangements that assist poor farmers in dealing with innovation and change. Moreover, they can be an effective means of institutionalizing project objectives in the community.

All of these functions are served by the committee and project working groups structure which has evolved through CGIRD in Tangse. These organizations have become the administrative core of CBIRD at the community level.

As a matter of principle, SCF prefers to work through organizations that exist in a community prior to CBIRD initiation. This accords with conventional wisdom on the subject but not always with reality. In Tangse it has worked both ways. As in most Indonesian villages, there are in Tangse local development committees known as Lembaga Sosial Desa, or LSDs. These committees are, in effect, an advisory group to the village chief and consist of a mix of traditional leadership elements. Their control of resources varies, as does their level of activity. In Tangse they control use of the sudsi desa, a central government grant to each Indonesian village, intended to assist local development projects. Amounting to about \$500 per village, this grant is customarily used for local infrastructure projects as a supplement to village labor input. The current year's application in Tangse is village road improvement.

SCF Indonesia initially determined that the LSDs in Tangse were controlled by elite elements and neither represented nor possessed much credibility with a broad segment of the population. They did not perform any active or significant developmental function. A decision was made, therefore, that the CBIRD Community Development Committee would be a separate entity, although there was some common membership. With the passage of time, the Tangse LSDs continue to exist as separate organizations, largely unrelated to the CBIRD dynamic.

In an important sense, the CBIRD committees are performing the role that ideally would be played by the LSDs. They have become the community's primary vehicle for facilitating participatory development activity and are a basic element in the structure of the project villages and of the subdistrict itself. Control of these committees is in the

hands of a broadening cross-section of the community. Above all, as discussed previously, they have provided a context for training and leadership development. This is discussed in an end-of-1978 SCF Indonesia review:

Working committees related to specific projects demonstrate, in our experience, that new leadership will emerge from the group in two years although a few will have started their forward mobility during the first year. There is a gradual gaining of confidence with experience and training. Leaders emerge and move up through the Village Committees to the Coordinating Committee (CDC). Simultaneously they have gained respect and acceptance from the establishment with whom they have been working. Women and youth are likely to enter leadership levels previously unattainable through this channel. The structure itself lends itself to this movement although the attitudes and will of the people involved, government officials, leaders and the poor are probably the determining factors. The structure and process makes such movement possible, but the people themselves make the decision of whether or not to climb. 27/

In the case of some village women's groups, known as Muslimats, SCF was able to work through existing organizational structures. These groups, not particularly active prior to SCF intervention, now represent CBIRD's primary organizational success.

A focus on women is a central element in SCF's CBIRD approach. When the CDC was formed in Tangse, a program subsector for women's activities was part of the structure. The Muslimats became the village-level focus of activity. Special training programs for women were provided, as well as organizational and management assistance. Funds were also put at the disposal of the Muslimats, who now manage a broad range of projects, particularly in the areas of health/nutrition, family gardening, and cottage industry. In some cases they have taken over and resuscitated failing projects previously run by men. Of most importance, among the several credit union schemes begun under CBIRD auspices in Tangse villages, it is those under certain of the Muslimats which have most effectively developed and served their respective communities. Management and record keeping are performed very responsibly; participation by community women is widespread; and assets have been multiplied

27/ Save the Children Indonesia Field Office, "Semi-Annual Report, July 1 - December 31, 1978," p. 14.

beyond the original SCF-provided base by the addition of local savings and profits from other projects. In at least one case, a Muslimat has conceived, planned, and funded a new project without recourse to SCF at all, as a result of being energized by earlier CBIRD motivational and training inputs. The Muslimats are also distinguished by the wide degree of active participation by their own members in group processes of decision making and project leadership. Of all the organizational spin-offs of CBIRD, they seem closest to standing on their own.

Among the key criteria for assessing the strength and sustainability of local organizations are the linkages they maintain both with constituencies and with the higher government structures which ultimately control resources, provide services, and mediate conflicts. The CBIRD organizational structure is strongly linked internally within its own total dynamic and has strong links to its constituency population. It is also well connected to higher level government structures, although these connections remain highly dependent on the intermediary role played by SCF Indonesia. This dependence grows out of the lack of official legitimacy possessed by the CDC and VCDCs at the village level, since they are outside the LSD structure and do not have structural links to the political system at any level. In the long run, if the CBIRD local organization pattern is to become a development model for the Province of Aceh (or any large area), it will have to be more effectively integrated with formal local structures, and, in coordination with these structures, develop facilitative linkages with relevant government agencies in the broader system. This could happen by local impetus, i.e., a village chief allowing a VCDC to become, in effect, his LSD, or by some official legitimization from higher level authority. Neither is likely as long as CBIRD is essentially the program of an outside agency (SCF), regardless of how much informal support is generated. This raises the key issue of sustainability to which this report now turns.

Benefit Sustainability

A major objective of IRD project implementation is to make the benefits of development self-sustaining. In a project such as CBIRD in

Aceh, which is initially dependent on an outside agency like SCF for management and financial resources, sustainability means the capacity of the project system to continue independent of the one-time patron. This suggests four sub-issues: the institutionalization of the CBIRD concept; leadership development; resource availability; and commitment to behavioral change on the part of the target population. The related issue of coordination will be discussed separately.

• Institutionalization: As discussed previously under the categories of government linkages (Part III) and the role of local organizations (Part V above), CBIRD is connected informally to both local systems and higher level government agencies. These linkages are highly dependent upon SCF Indonesia staff and resources. In the long run there are two ways the CBIRD process can be maintained and expanded: through the permanent continuation of an internally funded coordinating field staff (an Indonesianized SCF Field Office) or through the absorption of the CBIRD methodology into the existing systems of government at all levels. The latter process is both more feasible and preferred by the present SCF Indonesia leadership. If, in theory, CBIRD expanded to a province-wide program, a large project management structure -- duplicating many present governmental functions -- would be required. This would be costly and politically unacceptable. It is more likely that CBIRD may be effectively institutionalized through an acceptance and inclusion of its approach in the variety of present government development initiatives in the area. This, of course, raises difficult issues of coordination, an issue discussed later in this report.

SCF Indonesia has a deliberate policy of cultivating and involving present and potential future leaders to support the CBIRD program. The CBIRD Development Committee is one example of its considerable success in this effort (see Appendix D). Growing staff interchange and on-the-job training of promising young government personnel with SCF is another. If SCF left Indonesia in the near future, its impact on the development philosophy and capabilities of key governmental agencies in Aceh would be considerable, though insufficient to sustain a coherent CBIRD program.

With continued training and successful program replication in Lam Teuba and other subdistricts, the institutionalization process will continue.

- Leadership development: The SCF Indonesia focus on multilevel training goes a long way toward assuring the availability of leadership to support program growth. This is particularly true at the grass roots level, but will expand broadly to include agents of supportive government services, particularly agriculture, if SCF's present CBIRD training proposal is funded. Training is a key element in the development of active government support for CBIRD and is essential to ultimate phase out of direct SCF input into project management. Specifically, it is hoped that the subdistrict level CDC will be prepared to manage strategy choices, project selection and resource allocation. This will require a level of planning sophistication and financial responsibility not yet attained (in SCF's view) by the Tangse CDC. CDC ultimate capabilities will be augmented by the developing project management skills at the village committee and working group levels. It is hoped that CDC performance will be integrated into a supporting network of government services that are provided by personnel trained in the understanding and technique of CBIRD.

To date, this part of the CBIRD process is largely on target. Leadership development is probably SCF's most significant contribution in Aceh.

- Resource Availability: SCF has mobilized financial resources from a variety of external sources to support staffing and project costs of CBIRD in Aceh. These include various Save the Children entities (U.S., Canada, Norway), USAID Indonesia, Mobil Oil, and CIDA (Canada). The Government of Indonesia, primarily at the Provincial level, has contributed staff, vehicles (loaned), consultants, trainees and cash for projects (funneled directly, not through SCF). Local participants have provided labor and recycled project profits. But virtually all the cash funding for CBIRD has depended on SCF as a direct or indirect

source and most of these funds are used to support and maintain the SCF staff and its direct programmatic and training activity. There is no indication that government agencies would be prepared to assume the costs of a continuation of an SCF Indonesia superstructure or its equivalent at the conclusion of the externally funded 5-year project period, nor has SCF asked them to consider this.^{28/} It is reasonable to expect, however, that the likely continuation of SCF Indonesia with external funding after the initial 5-year period will benefit from greater tangible government support than was enjoyed at the beginning.

To the extent that major internal resources are made available to CBIRD in the future, they will have to be resources already available for development activity but rechanneled by existing agencies of government into CBIRD type processes. As has been suggested, this type of institutionalization is occurring and will probably accelerate, providing a long-term impetus for CBIRD even without SCF.

Another aspect of resource availability concerns the network of government services required to support large-scale development. This includes such factors as agricultural extension, credit, marketing, and the economic policy context. At its present scale, CBIRD, like most community-based projects, has not placed great demands on these services. To some degree it has mobilized existing, but inactive, service structures. Expansion of CBIRD to several additional subdistricts is possible without straining additional slack resources of relevant service delivery. Furthermore, the proposed CBIRD training program, if implemented, would expand both the number and capability of required extension personnel.

At the local level, it is intended that certain production projects will spin off profits that, in part, will accrue to the CDC for re-application to new activities. The CDC would control all local project funds whether from this source or from supplementary government subsidies. An auditing function would be performed by higher level government authority, perhaps the District. Obviously, the more cost effective local programs are, the more viable the CDC will be.

^{28/} The Provincial government has committed a modest cash input to the proposed CBIRD training program in Aceh (\$62,000 out of a total budget exceeding \$750,000).

In sum, resource availability is not likely to become a major constraint to CBIRD sustainability, given the assumption that it is most likely to be continued through the institutionalization of the process within existing structures of government and within target communities themselves. A much more likely constraint, given this scenario, is a loss of program coherence in the eventual absence of the SCF staff structure.

- Commitment to Behavior Change: As discussed in Part III, The CBIRD Process Focus, a change in local participants' attitudes and behavior is the essential goal of the CBIRD approach. The impact to date, as evidenced by the CDC and VCDCs, by project working groups, and by such sectoral organizations as the Muslimat women's groups, is striking. In some cases, most notably the Muslimats, the commitment to new ways of decision making and action already appears to have a permanence that is no longer dependent on SCF motivational or resource input. The status of group-to-group changes remains very uneven, however, and greater experience will be required to assure a broad commitment to participatory development, particularly at the village level. A key indicator will be the effective, independent functioning of the CDC as it is reinforced by new members with meaningful experience in the VCDCs. This test will soon occur.

The CBIRD process of motivation and training is greatly assisted by the presence of a program and organizational context in which participants can apply and reinforce their interest and skills. Continuation of training without the program backdrop would be much less effective, particularly in generating attitudinal change. This represents a further risk in the future absence of the strong coordinating role now played by SCF Indonesia. However, the target group commitment to behavioral change now present is a major result of the SCF intervention in Tangse and will undergird future sustainability of innovation diffusion activities.

Coordination

In the previous section, it was suggested that future coordination is the major potential constraint to the sustainability of CBIRD benefits in existing target areas and beyond. Coordination is essentially a management issue. Management is particularly crucial when a range of complementary activities are designed into a system, as is the case with the CBIRD process. Neither institutionalization of the system's elements nor official commitment to its goals are sufficient if the management function is so diffused that information and resource sharing are disrupted.

The management core of CBIRD is the SCF Indonesia Field Office. Attention to the elements of benefit sustainability discussed above -- institutionalization, leadership development, resource availability, and commitment to behavior change -- are products of good management, but not substitutes for it. A major focus of SCF management should therefore be the development of patterns and structures of coordination less dependent on SCF and more inherent in the CBIRD systems and processes which are being developed. Two sub-issues of particular relevance to the need for coordination are project linkage and resource control.

- Project Linkage: Project linkage raises questions both of program scale and of the relationship between various development service providers in Aceh. Consistent with the process focus of CBIRD, the links that do exist have largely evolved informally and not as the result of any master plan. Coordination has been adequate within the limited program scope of CBIRD, largely because of the active role played by SCF Indonesia with its own network of connecting links to agencies of government. As described by SCF Indonesia Director Poland to the CBIRD Development Committee,

Because the program emanates from the people, we do not know (what government offices) will be involved: health, agriculture, public works, education, cooperatives, social, transmigration, religious affairs, etc. The people link us whether or not we link ourselves. They simply have needs and they don't always think along departmental lines or follow organization charts. CBIRD is a methodology that helps them sort out these needs and channel them constructively. It does not provide a plan as to what should be done but enables people to utilize available resources, including their own, government,

and private, so they can achieve goals that are feasible. It helps them use available services and also often identifies gaps in service a help to planners. So CBIRD does not replace any service but may well increase the demand for services you already provide. It links needs with resources. Because of this it is important that all elements of the formal structure at least understand the approach. As well as technical services it is essential that the Camats (Subdistrict heads) and Bupatis (District heads) support such community based efforts--and this means at minimum an understanding of the approach and its consistency with government programs and policies. 29/

This is sufficient as long as CBIRD's scale does not make demands which press the limits of availability and sophistication of supporting governmental services. Inputs of major infrastructure, market and credit systems, and greatly expanded extension services, which characterize most area-wide IRD programs, have not been required by CBIRD's Tangse application. Nor has it been necessary to deal with complex issues of input/output synchronization in the context of a process approach in which time lags are inevitable. If and when CBIRD expands to the point that complex inputs are required, informal coordination will not be enough. Nor will SCF Indonesia have the formal authority to obtain supporting inputs. It is far from clear how this void will be filled. Nor is it clear that, if it were filled by some agency of government, the CBIRD process focus could be maintained. This suggests that CBIRD, for all its strengths, may be a self-limiting approach to IRD and that the goal of expanding it to a Province-wide level is unrealistic. Either a lack of coordination may produce debilitating inefficiencies, or an overlay of coordination may suffocate the heart of the process.

On the other hand, as a limited area approach to development, CBIRD has contributed significantly to changes in attitude which facilitate informal coordination and understanding. CBIRD activities and related workshops have provided the first opportunity in Indonesia for the major national government departments involved in rural development to meet

29/ Save the Children Indonesia Field Office, "Proposal for Community Based Integrated Rural Development (CBIRD) Training in the Special Territory of Aceh," Draft, August, 1979, Appendix 2, p. 4.

with their counterparts on the provincial level and with the villagers for whom they plan, to discuss what is actually happening at the local level. This opportunity for high-level development planners and implementers to better understand locally perceived needs will contribute to improved linkages between the rural poor and centralized policy makers.

Cooperation between outside development agencies working in Aceh is limited, but improving. The two most significant development foci are the Provincial University, which is linked to several foreign assistance bodies, and the Provincial Planning Board, an advisory group to the Governor, which is given technical assistance by USAID through a private contractor. Coordination among the outside agencies involved is constrained by the lack of coordination among their respective counterparts, but communication is increasing and some staff or consultant interchange is now occurring.

At the village level, coordination is facilitated as people's horizons are broadened.^{30/} This happens in several ways. One is through evolving linkages between projects themselves. For example, a portion of the production of soybean cakes in a profit-oriented project are made available to a village nutrition program. Another example of broadened horizons is an increased willingness to share recycled project funds with other groups. This has come slowly: project groups tend to treat such funds in a proprietary way. Cooperation between separate villages is also increasing, though slowly. This cooperation comes as the poor -- with traditionally strong village identification -- gain experience in committee participation and begin to function at the sub-district CDC planning level.

These examples of coordination are also process phenomena -- consistent with the CBIRD planning framework but not the result of specific plans. They are to large degree products of the small scale, patient approach that characterizes effective private agency technical assistance interventions. SCF Indonesia has coordinated the CBIRD program with government structures more than is usual for such private approaches. But

^{30/} This is not true in every case. Some projects are so small that they represent little more than patronage of a single family -- an extension of the traditional SCF child sponsorship function.

there are real limits to how far this kind of coordination can go in creating necessary project linkages -- especially when the central role of the outside agency is reduced.

- Resource Control: Virtually all the resources necessary for CBIRD in Tangse come directly or indirectly from SCF. Inputs to the project from official Indonesian sources serve more to demonstrate support than to actually fuel activities. In the future, official support is likely to grow. It is not likely to replace present SCF-mobilized inputs.

Application of available resources is coordinated by SCF although, beginning at the project level through the CDC, control over resource allocation is being slowly transferred to local hands. At present this is more a goal than a reality, because of predictable irregularities and leakages of funds. SCF Indonesia, aware of the deadening effect that rip-off of funds can have on local motivation, is more reluctant to yield control of funds than control of decision making to local people. But fund control is shifting nonetheless, and with some successes such as the Muslimat credit unions. It is quite possible that, with further training and experience, the local CBIRD organizational structure can effectively coordinate subdistrict resource allocation and management. Furthermore, given a cost-effective project mix,^{31/} dependence on outside resources could be reduced.

An ultimately more critical issue than the availability of cash resources for local coordination is the availability of staff resources. This report has emphasized the many critical coordinating roles played by SCF Indonesia. It is not likely that those functions will be effectively performed by a diffused set of participants in the government agencies that may become committed to the CBIRD approach but that also have their own sets of priorities. As has been suggested, the importance of this concern grows with the size of the CBIRD program, since the demands for coordination and management grow proportionately. Assuming that no special project management unit will be created to

^{31/} Cost effectiveness is by no means a foregone conclusion, since the project selection process is not based on such a criterion. But, given the interest of villagers in increasing their incomes, cost-effective projects quite possibly may evolve.

assume the functions of the SCF Indonesia staff, this concern for future management must loom large in long-range CBIRD planning. Potential options include some sort of CBIRD coordinating group among existing agencies -- possibly as an outgrowth of the CBIRD Development Committee -- or the assumption of a lead role by an existing department -- most likely the Provincial office of the Ministry of Agriculture, which would be the main beneficiary of the proposed CBIRD training program. Each of these options has its advantages and disadvantages that have been thoroughly discussed in the development literature. Neither guarantees effective coordination, as has been demonstrated by all too much past development experience.

These issues of coordination should be taken seriously by SCF and its counterparts now. Key planning issues include determination of how far and by what coordinating mechanism CBIRD can expand; how long the continued presence of an outside SCF management input will be required; what government mechanism can best provide coordination over the long term; and what directions future training should take to maximize this capacity. That SCF and its counterparts are facing these issues now is an indication of their success in developing a program widely thought to be worth continuing and expanding in the future. But, as observed by critics of such development schemes, projects rarely survive into general practice, in part because the very effort to circumvent traditional procedures works against the adoption of managerial innovations by the larger system.^{32/}

^{32/} See especially Vernon W. Ruttan, "Integrated Rural Development Programs: A Skeptical Perspective," *International Development Review*, Vol. XVII, No. 4 (1975) and Jon R. Morris, "The Transferability of Western Management Concepts and Programs, An East African Perspective," in Education and Training for Public Sector Management in Developing Countries, Ed. Laurence D. Stifel, James S. Coleman, and Joseph E. Black (New York, Rockefeller Foundation, March, 1977).

PART VI: SUMMARY -
THE TRANSFERABILITY OF THE CBIRD CONCEPT

This report has reviewed the SCF Indonesia CBIRD program in terms of its rigorous process focus, its present and future measurable impacts, and its contribution to an understanding of key IRD issues such as beneficiary participation, the role of local organizations, benefit sustainability, and coordination. Particular emphasis has been placed on identifying a variety of factors which will either facilitate or constrain potential CBIRD replication and expansion in Aceh and other Indonesian provinces.

An additional question is whether certain of the beneficial aspects of the CBIRD methodology are transferrable to unrelated development programs under a different sort of auspices. CBIRD is conceptually similar to many private voluntary agency (PVO) development programs in its community focus and emphasis on local participation over and above central planning. CBIRD is more comprehensive and better managed than most PVO programs and is being institutionalized more than is usual by linkage with formal systems. In general, it has magnified strengths and mitigated weaknesses common to PVO projects. Elements of strength include:

- . Application of an organizational "technology" appropriate to local circumstances and with a direct return to participants;

A rigorous effort to generate the widest possible local commitment to the new organizational pattern from prospective participants;

- . A deliberate attempt to draw on local capacities for self-help;

- . A policy of combining cooperation with indigenous structures of authority (maximizing access of the project system to beneficiaries) with inclusion of the poor in decision making (maximizing access of beneficiaries to the project system);and

- . A flexible planning approach facilitating ongoing modification of project content in response to local needs.^{33/}

Identifiable weaknesses include:

- . The risk that a continuation of direct economic benefits will be contingent on future external financial support; and
- . The dependence of the overall project on the managerial and coordinating role played by a non-indigenous special project unit.

There is no reason why the strengths cited above cannot be shared by any small scale community-based development program. The most critical external requirement is competent, sensitive, and energetic management. Internal to the community there must be a degree of social cohesion and genuine interest in development -- i.e., seeds must fall on reasonably fertile ground.^{34/}

Large-scale area projects with a large central planning focus usually lack the flexibility and sensitivity to local needs that are necessary to maximize these particular strengths. It is unlikely, for example, that the Aceh Provincial Development Program -- a USAID-funded, institution-building project under the Provincial Planning Board -- could effectively adopt a CBIRD-type approach. But the two programs could be seen as a coordinated package of developmental input and joint planning be introduced. This would require significantly more communi-

^{33/} These categories represent a modification of elements common to successful PVO projects as suggested in "Final Report: The Development Impact of Private Voluntary Organizations: Kenya and Niger," Washington, D.C., Development Alternatives, February 2, 1979.

^{34/} See Part II under "Participation" for discussion of factors facilitating and constraining beneficiary participation in Tangse. The question is raised whether sites for development projects should be selected on the basis of the likelihood of success or on the basis of absolute need. The two rarely coincide. Greatest need is often associated with the resignation, apathy, and polarization which severely constrain self-help. SCF Indonesia's stated criteria (see note 3, p. 4) represent a compromise, but clearly require a favorable context. SCF departure from the Mbang project is a demonstration of this point.

cation than now seems to exist. Fortunately, this need is recognized in Aceh and there is movement in the right direction. The coincidental development that a major CBIRD supporter from a central government functional office in Aceh has become a key advisor to the Governor will facilitate progress.

The weaknesses of CBIRD noted above are common to virtually all development projects; the key variables are the proximity and permanence of the source(s) of funds and staff. Although PVO's tend to place staff in close proximity to project areas, their resources are neither indigenous nor permanent. To the extent that programs depend on supplementary donors, such as AID, the risks of resource interruption are increased. This again suggests the importance of a kind of institutionalization of the community-based approach that reduces dependence on the PVO structure. The CBIRD emphasis on leadership development is a recognition of this although, as has been suggested in Part VI of this report, concerns about future program coordination loom large in view of the key role now played by SCF Indonesia management.

There is much to be learned from the SCF Indonesia CBIRD program. The lessons have a potentially significant and beneficial impact on a wide array of future development activities. Those who are now learning from this innovative approach to project organization and decision making include government officials, SCF personnel, observers of the process such as USAID and the IRD Project study team, and, above all, the local participants. As stated by Mr. Bukhari Ali, described in an SCF Indonesia report as "one of the less affluent citizens of Tangse,"


When Save the Children came to Tangse, I expected them to give me money. They were a rich American organization and I was poor and I knew rich American organizations gave money to poor people. They did not give me money. They taught me how to use time.^{35/}

^{35/} Save the Children Indonesia Field Office, Banda Aceh, "Semi-Annual Report FY 1977-78," p. 12.

Postscript

A major intent of AID Project 936-5300, the Organization and Administration of Integrated Rural Development, is to provide field projects with technical assistance in the organization and administration of ongoing IRD projects. Subject to confirmation by SCF headquarters, the SCF Indonesia Director has requested the services of the IRD project in conjunction with planned CBIRD training in 1980. Of particular interest is management training for mid-level project personnel and Government of Indonesia staff. A further possibility is assistance in developing a coordinating framework for the overall CBIRD training program. As details of this assistance are more clearly defined, the IRD Project Staff will submit a suggested scope of work, specifying the services to be offered and personnel recommended, for SCF Indonesia Field Office review.

APPENDIX A
 TABLE OF ORGANIZATION
 SCF Indonesia Field Office
 July 1979



Source: SCF Indonesia Field Office, Banda Aceh,
 "Semi-Annual Report, January 1 - June 30, 1979," p.61

APPENDIX B

ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS AND RELATIONSHIPS IN CBIRD ACEH

- I. a. Village Community Development Committee (VCDC)
 1. Project origination
 2. Formal project planning
 3. Project supervision
 4. Project monitoring
 5. Project submission to CDC
 6. Project priority determination within village
 7. Village CD organization
 8. Education/information general
- b. VCDC Subcommittees
 1. Ad hoc
 2. Informal project planning
 3. Project implementation
 4. Project management
 5. Project maintainance
 6. Education/information specific
- II. a. Community Development Committee (CDC)
 1. Project origination
 2. Project approval
 3. Project funding
 4. Project monitoring
 5. Training
 6. Coordination with government services
 7. Coordination with non-government services
 8. Advisory services for VCDC
 9. Financial auditing (open management)
- b. Sectoral Subcommittees
 1. Health/nutrition
 2. Industry
 3. Agriculture
 4. Public works
 5. Education
 6. Social welfare
 7. Women's activities (in future)
 8. Ad hoc
- III. Field Coordinator (SCF Staffperson in Tangse)
 1. Save the Children Representative in Kecamatan (Subdistrict)
 2. Advisory service
 3. Training
 4. Monitoring as assigned
- IV. Save the Children - Indonesia Field Office
 1. Monitor programs
 2. Report to government
 3. Coordination with government services
 4. Coordination with non-government advisors
 5. Financial auditing
 6. Program auditing
 7. Program support services

V. Guidelines for Project Funding Approval

1. Broad based, community support
2. Meets legitimate community need
3. Helps the poor
4. Self help components
5. Planning procedures followed
6. Feasible
7. Within government policies and guidelines
8. Linked to overall development plan
9. Number of beneficiaries
10. Balance of sectoral programs in village
11. Balance of projects within kecamatan
12. Previous CD history in village
 - a. met commitments made in Project Plan on self-help inputs
 - b. loan repayment record
 - c. project maintainance
 - d. number of villagers involved
13. Cost effectiveness
14. Potential contribution of project to development
15. Participation of poor in planning
16. Within scope of available funding
17. Priority rating relative to other projects submitted.

VI. General Comments


1. Project ideas may originate from many sources including the community, VCDC, CDC, Sectoral sub-committees, government, Save the Children etc.--but must be approved by the VCDC with community agreement.
2. Each village to have a VCDC, usually selected by consensus, with a minimum of ten members. Two thirds of the membership must be present for an official meeting.
3. An open village meeting is held at least monthly, eleven months a year. Community members may recommend projects at the open meeting.
4. The VCDC does actual formal planning including a budget in accordance with a planning process which is part of their training.
5. The written Project Plan completed by the VCDC is submitted to the community at the monthly open meeting or at a special meeting called for the purpose. It must be approved by those present in a manner decided by the community (usually consensus following discussion but this is up to each community. In some areas a vote is preferred).
6. Approved projects are submitted to the CDC.
7. The CDC acts within published guidelines and approves, vetoes or returns the proposal to the VCDC with suggestions or questions. When a proposal is vetoed the reason is given. Projects may be resubmitted in the same or adjusted form.
8. The CDC submits projects it approved to SCF Indonesia with a recommendation for approval and comments.
9. SCF Indonesia reviews the project to determine that it is within the Guidelines and Funding.
10. Approved projects are returned with funding transferred to the CDC.

11. Projects that are not approved are returned with explanation and suggestions.
12. The CDC allocates funds to the VCDC in accordance with standard procedure.
13. At the monthly VCDC and CDC open meetings all financial transactions and the financial records including bank statements and records of receipts are announced and posted.
14. The financial and other information is also provided to the BUPATI (District Chief) on a regular basis.
15. The Camat (Subdistrict Chief) is an ex-officio member of the CDC.
16. The village chief is an ex-officio member of the VCDC.

Source: Save the Children Indonesia Field Office, Banda Aceh,
"Semi-Annual Report January 1 - June 30, 1978," pp. 9-11.

APPENDIX C

Tangse: Work Organization FY 80



Source: SCF Indonesia Field Office, Banda Aceh
 "Semi-Annual Report, January 1 - June 30, 1979," p. 44.

APPENDIX D

MEMBERSHIP AND FUNCTION OF CBIRD DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEEMembership

<u>Name</u>	<u>Function</u>	<u>Position</u>
1. Prof. A. Madjid Ibrahim	Honorary Chairman	Governor
2. A. Muzakkir Walad	Adviser	Former Governor
3. Prof. Ibrahim Hasan	Adviser	Rector of Syiah Kuala and Director BAPPEDA
4. Prof. Ali Hasjmy	Adviser	Former Governor and Rector of IAIN
5. Tgk.H. Abdullah Ujong Rimba	Adviser	Chairman of Board of Ulama
6. Mr. J. Martin Poland	General Consultant	Director, Save the Children
7. Dr. Syamsuddin Mahmud	Chairman	Head of Social Research Training Institute and Dean of Faculty of Economic, Syiah Kuala
8. Dr. Yuliddin Away	Vice Chairman I	Health Department
9. Tgk.H.Djakfar Hanafiah	Vice Chairman II	Religious leader
10. Drh. Mohd. Roesli Joesoef	Secretary/Working Group Coordinator	Department of Agriculture
11. Mariman Jarimin	Assistant Secretary I	Sub Directorate of Rural Community Development
12. M.Hasbi Hamid, BSA	Assistant Secretary II	Department of Agriculture
13. Dr. Abdullah Ali	Committee Member	Dean of Animal Husbandry/Rector of Unsyiah
14. Dr. Nasir	Committee Member	Dean of Agriculture Faculty
15. Muhamad Hasan Basry, S.H.	Committee Member	Secretary of Province

16.	T. Bachtiar PP, S.H.	Committee Member	Bupati of Aceh Besar
17.	Drs. Abidin Hasyim	Committee Member	Chairman Rural Development Center
18.	Drs. Athaillah Lam Ue	Committee Member	Department of Education
19.	Drs. Sudarno	Committee Member	Department of Social Welfare
20.	Ir.H. Ismail Hasan	Committee Member	Department of Public Works
21.	Drs. Sanusi Wahab	Committee Member	Governor's office
22.	Drs. Jalaluddin Hasan	Committee Member	Bappeda (Aceh Development Board)
23.	Drs. Kasnadi	Committee Member	Department of Transmigration
24.	Idris Yusuf	Committee Member	Department of Cooperatives
25.	My. Cut Trisnawaty	Committee Member	Women's organization
26.	Dra. Sulihati	Committee Member	Women's organization
27.	Drs. Asnawi Husin	Committee Member	Youth organization
28.	Taufiq MS, B. Sc.	Committee Member	Youth organization
29.	Drs. M. Hasan Basri	Committee Member	SCF
30.	'nsur Depsos Jakarta	Committee Member	Department of Social Welfare
31.	Unsur ABRI	Committee Member	Department of Defense

Source: Save the Children Indonesia Field Office, Banda Aceh, "Proposal for Community Based Integrated Rural Development (CBIRD) Training in the Special Territory of Aceh," Draft, August, 1979, pp. iv-v.

BEST AVAILABLE DOCUMENT

FUNCTION OF THE CBIRD DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE

- Governor** : The governor shall serve as honorary chairman of the CBIRD Development Committee. He shall appoint all the members of the committee.
- CBIRD Development Committee** : The CBIRD Development Committee shall be an informal body consisting of approximately 25 key personnel in development in Aceh. The committee's primary purpose is to develop a strategy for the planning and implementation of community based integrated rural development in the Daerah Istimewa Aceh (the Special Territory of Aceh).
The committee's responsibilities will include approving any project plans and funding proposals related to the training project. Members of the committee will serve on or supervise the four working groups.
- General Consultant** : The general consultant shall be the Director of Save the Children, Indonesia. The primary purpose of this position is to assist the committee in its deliberations through provision of information on CBIRD methodology.
The consultant's responsibilities shall also include acting as a major liaison between Save the Children project staff, officials and funding sources outside Aceh, and the CBIRD Development Committee.
- Special Consultants** : Special Consultants shall include local representatives of foreign agencies and other specialists in development. The purpose of the group of special consultants is to assist the CBIRD Development Committee in its deliberations and provide advice and information when requested.
Special consultants may also serve on the working groups if approved by the committee.
- Working Group Coordinator** : The purpose of this position is to ensure smooth organization of the activities of the CBIRD Development Committee and the working groups. This individual shall be responsible

for notifying all members of the committee of scheduled meetings, preparing and circulating minutes of each meeting, preparing and circulating agendas of upcoming meetings and fulfilling other duties as requested by the committee.

Secretary : Part-time secretarial services shall be provided by the Regional Office of the Department of Agriculture to assist the working group coordinator and consultants in preparation of letters and documents.

Working Groups

1. **Training Development Group** : The purpose of the training development group is to ensure that all materials developed in conjunction with the training project are relevant to the needs of the people of Daerah Istimewa Aceh. The committee will be responsible for reviewing curriculum, materials and teaching methods developed by project staff and will make recommendations to the CBIRD Development Committee. It will also assist in the identification of training resources, selection of training sites, and workshop participants.
2. **Fund Raising Group** : The purpose of the fund raising group is to ensure the presence of adequate financial resources to fulfill the purpose of the project. Their responsibilities will include identifying and contacting funding sources, and conducting fund raising drives. The group will also be responsible for reviewing any funding proposal developed in connection with the project and making recommendations to the CBIRD Development Committee on such proposals.
3. **Project Development Group** : The purpose of the project development group is to develop a strategy for the implementation of CBIRD methodology in the Daerah Istimewa Aceh (the Special Territory of Aceh). The group's responsibilities will include enhancing communication and coordination funct-

ions relating to community development between the Government Agencies, and developing a long range CBIRD implementation plan which would include planning and selecting sites for pilot projects in each of the districts of Aceh.

4. **Evaluation and Monitoring Group** : The purpose of the evaluation and monitoring group is to ensure that the project is meeting its stated goals. The committee's responsibilities will include assisting staff in developing and implementing an on-going monitoring and evaluation system, monitoring project progress and reporting to the CBIRD Development Committee on project activities, and reviewing evaluation methods developed by project staff.

Source: Save the Children Indonesia Field Office, Banda Aceh, "Proposal for Community Based Integrated Rural Development (CBIRD) Training in the Special Territory of Aceh," Draft, August, 1979, Appendix 4.

APPENDIX E

TANGSE Intermediate Goals and Indicators Fiscal Year 1980

I Services

Health/Nutrition Goals

Indicators

1. Improve nutrition for infants and lactating mothers.
 1. a) improved average weights for infants
 - b) decrease in major illnesses of children being recorded
2. Training traditional midwives
 2. a) 26-35 midwives and assistants trained in prenatal and postnatal care & hygiene
 - b) 26-35 midwives trained in keeping statistics
3. Expand health clinic
 3. a) construction completed by 3/1/80
 - b) Active use as training & inpatient centre for maternity
 - c) Basic equipment installed by 6/30/80
 - d) Referral system in place and used by 6/30/80
4. School garden improvement
5. Goiter prevention and control
 4. a) At least 5 schools out of 11 will have gardens
 5. a) 900 families in Tangse will use iodized salt by 6/30/80

Education and Welfare Goals

6. Start a day care centre
 6. a) Daycare centre constructed by 6/30/80.
 - b) At least 45 children attending day care classes
 - c) Improvement of day care equipment
 - d) 10 villagers trained in day care supervision
7. Improve youth activities program
 7. a) Increased number of children involved in children's activities
 - b) Increased number of children's projects

II Infrastructure

8. Improve village roads and bridges
 8. a) Eight kilometres of road improved.
 - b) Three bridges repaired
 - c) One new suspension bridge constructed
9. Housing Improvement
 9. a) Significant number of animal shelters built away from the house.
 - b) Used water disposal systems in place
 - c) Improved ventilation in traditional houses.
10. Water supply
 10. a) Water survey completed and reviewed.
 - b) Projects initiated to supply villages with clean water, funds providing.

III Agricultural Productivity

11. Control wild pig population.
 11. a) Decrease in damage to crops.
12. Increase fish production.
 12. a) Government fishery experts assisting villagers with fish ponds.
 - b) 5 new fish ponds (1 demo.) active by 6/30/80.

13. Erosion Control.

- c) 2 new varieties of fish introduced by 6/30/80
- 13.a) 40 hectares of land terraced by 6/30/80.
- b) 200 meters of retainer walls built along rivers.

IV. Credit Unions/Industry

14. Commercialize tofu production

- 14. a) Minimum increase from 60 to 110 families using tofu regularly by 6/30/80

15. Home Economics Skills

- 15. a) 50% of women in impact area shall participate in two training sessions in home economics including sewing, embroidery, cooking, and hygiene.

16. Mechanize sugar cane production

- 16. a) Sugar cane machinery in place by 6/80.
- b) Personnel trained in operation & maintenance of machinery.
- c) Increased number of hectares planted for sugar cane.

V. Management

17. Strengthen village committees.

- 17. a) Regular reports from village committees on project activities and funds.
- b) More scheduled meetings of village committees.
- c) Members of committees more involved in their jobs.
- d) A structured system of communication between CDC and VCDC established by June 30, 1980.

18. Improve loan repayment.

- 18. a) Increased percentage of loans repaid on time from 25% to 60%.
- b) At least 50% of loans from community funds will be used for agricultural production projects.

Source: SCF Indonesia Field Office, Banda Aceh

"Semi-Annual Report January 1 - June 30, 1979", pp. 42-43