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FINDING THE WAY

Second Review of Nutrition Planning in Chile

New TransCentury Foundation  
(James M. Pines, Consultant)  
1789 Columbia Road N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20009 USA

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## FINDING THE WAY: A SECOND REVIEW OF NUTRITION PLANNING IN CHILE

This Report should be read with Nutrition Planning in Chile, a previous review of CONPAN experience. CONPAN's 1977 Annual Report and technical assistance contractor Community Systems Foundation's (CSF) documents also provide information essential to understanding the current review.

### INTRODUCTION

The past twelve months were difficult and almost fatal for CONPAN. During the first review visit (March 1977), it was a proud, lively, optimistic group where staff, contractors, and technical assistance team shared a learning experience, understood the Agency's problems, and were attacking them effectively. In May, 1978, it is emerging from demoralization, with pessimistic staff, contractors and technical assistance no longer sharing, insecurity widespread, more problems, and less zeal and competence in attacking them.

CONPAN was not as good, a year ago, as it thought it was. It is not as bad, today, as it thinks it is. With INTA and CONIN (Corporación de Nutrición Infantil, formerly COEPANI), CONPAN gives Chile the best potential for attacking malnutrition of any country in the world. This Report seeks to help CONPAN in Finding the Way to fulfillment of that potential, by pointing out lessons more readily apparent to a visitor than to those directly involved.

CSF's Report of Technical Assistance for July 1977 - January 1978 asks whether CONPAN structure and context are "inimical to creation of a planning process as originally envisioned (p.10)". Acknowledging that, in many ways, the current structure and context are not favorable, this Report emphasizes what can be done within them. CONPAN has not yet begun to meet that challenge.

THE BRIGHT SIDE

Before looking at what went wrong, CONPAN's recent accomplishments deserve recognition. The 1977 Annual Report, itself a good indicator of capability, presents many important results confirmed during this visit. Well-executed contractor pilot projects (e.g., family gardens, casetas sanitarias) and studies (e.g., monitoring nutrition status, estimating food production, identifying foci of malnutrition) increased useful knowledge substantially. Continued assistance and study helped improve national programs (e.g., school feeding, encouragement of breast-feeding). Collaboration with JUNAEB (school feeding agency) and with the Ministry of Health offer prospects for regular nutrition planning and implementation assistance by CONPAN. CONIN and INTA continued their good work and moved toward sharing of a common approach with CONPAN.

CONPAN relations with USAID, once a problem, improved greatly. More sensitivity in personal relations helped, but so did better administration within CONPAN. A Manual of Procedures and a functioning library also illustrate CONPAN administrative development. CONPAN now has realistic information system plans and approached preparation of the 1978 Implementation Plan efficiently. It shows high proficiency in other formal aspects of institutional performance. The July 1977 Reorganization created an adequate structure, though the Agency has not mastered the human problems of using it effectively.

The foregoing description shows the dangers of relying only on documents and data. CONPAN's decline cannot be deduced from the paucity of new "projects" or the failure to reach disbursement targets. There could be sound program

**reasons** for the level of these indicators, as there were during the last visit. This time, however, the numbers reflect a) serious problems of intra-CONPAM and outside relations, b) unresolved questions of strategy and tactics, and c) unproductive staff attitudes and concerns.

WHAT WENT WRONG

CONPAN staff like to blame their problems on external political and economic factors. It is true that the "Chicago approach" to economic development, and its Chilean administrators (Central Bank, ministries of Economy and Hacienda), give nutrition goals and related planning low priority. Political uncertainty and national budget problems also affect CONPAN's operation. The "contradiction" or "poor fit" between CONPAN's mission and the rest of Government policies, mentioned by many interviewed, limits options and power of CONPAN.

These factors help explain CONPAN's troubles, but the external conditions existed from the start, are as serious but less damaging to morale in other countries (e.g. Philippines, Indonesia), and tell only part of the story. A look at CONPAN's response to its environment shows how the Agency nearly produced its own demise.

CONPAN isolated itself from the start. Instead of working with ODEPA, for example, to improve information on food production, it contracted for an outside study. When it wanted to study food demand by income level, it proposed a new contract instead of first contacting the National Statistical Institute (INE) and others to explore a joint program. The Consejo of Ministers cut further independent CONPAN work in these areas at its last annual meeting (November 7, 1977). Review of the meeting minutes indicates that the Consejo did not want CONPAN doing the work of others. It did not bar CONPAN from helping others or learning from them. It did not prohibit all contracts, only those reflecting CONPAN unwillingness to work with and through other government agencies.

CONPAN isolation and independence, interpreted by some as reflecting a "superior" attitude, also influenced the year's budget problems. The Ministry of Hacienda refused to increase CONPAN's administrative budget and then would not pass through the Agency the additional counterpart expenditures required by the AID loan. During the five months required to resolve these problems, CONPAN almost faded away.

Hacienda's position reflects political and other factors beyond the scope of this Report. Nevertheless, the new arrangement whereby Ministry nutrition-related spending counts in counterpart totals, also flows partly from CONPAN failure to relate effectively with others. The new arrangement forces CONPAN to work more closely with ministries, if it expects to do anything, and may be a blessing in disguise. It is too early to tell how the system will work, but neither AID or CONPAN should consider it a blow to the future of nutrition planning in Chile. Future direct CONPAN budgets depend on making the system work.

Many in CONPAN now contend that the Ministry of Hacienda, Dr. Monckeberg, and others are "against planning and analysis" or "only interested in interventions". They view formation of a new Executive Committee, four or whose seven are doctors, as a fundamental shift away from nutrition planning or as a capitulation to the "external factors" that allegedly tie CONPAN's hands. To the outside observer, this view misinterprets, suffers from self-pity, and fails to confront the real issues of CONPAN's future.

The kind of nutrition planning in which finance, agriculture and other "economic" ministries listen to nutrition planners before adopting policies is the last step, not yet attained anywhere, in a long process that includes

establishing credibility, learning each other's language, and building relationships throughout all systems involved. Dr. Monckeberg, Carlos Schlesinger, and perhaps CSF as well, seemed to view "reaching" ministers as the first step of nutrition planning. Dr. Monckeberg responded to ministerial indifference by emphasizing "visible" intervention and improved efficiency, adding to his impressive record during the past year, until ministers become more responsive. Others in CONPAN emphasized independent study and analysis, as though ministers would listen if only "causal variables were quantified" or "successful pilot project with favorable benefit-cost ratios" could be shown. The Ministry of Vivienda's decision to install 20,000 "casetas sanitarias" following a CONPAN pilot project, far from supporting the "we'll show them how" view, has more to do with mobilizing self-help in housing than with reducing malnutrition.

The Monckeberg approach and the more academic planning, study and pilot project method are both consistent with CONPAN's mandate and goals. There was no need for them to polarize the institution, reduce intra-agency communication, alienate other agencies and contractors, or destroy technical assistance relationships, but they contributed to these present conditions.

a. Polarization - CONPAN formed a much needed "Analysis and Planning Group" in July 1977. But it has yet to find a proper place in the Organization. Instead of being viewed as support to be integrated with the "Operations" and "Project Management" groups, it has become the refuge for expatriate assistance and for "planning". INTA, Dr. Monckeberg's technical arm, came to be viewed as "not interested in planning". COMIN, his "intervention" side, also lost favor among those interested in broader planning questions. Despite Dean

Wilson's excellent work in building a common conceptual framework and stimulating creative thinking, CONPAN split apart as it moved from the self-education phase of early days. It has not yet figured out how to translate the neutral conceptual framework into a useful tool for operating within the Chilean context. The unfortunate polarization of "planning" and "interventions" shifts attention away from development of the additional processes and techniques required to link the two and make them part of more effective nutrition planning.

b) Intra-agency Communication - CONPAN moved, during the past year, from a very open society to a very closed one, producing damage to morale, confused decision-making patterns, and poor coordination within the Agency. Schlesinger perceived correctly that the happy-go-lucky, unstructured ways of the learning period would not serve CONPAN well during the expansion of project monitoring and similar activities. Communication got lost during the conversion, but not because of formal changes in structure or failures to describe channels or jobs. The causes lie within the personalities, attitudes, and values of those involved. CONPAN turned inward, instead of joining together to become a strong and united institution facing the outside world, during this critical period.

c) Alienation of Agencies and Contractors - The disenchantment of CONPAN contractors goes beyond their understandable resentment at sudden loss of a good, and for some their only, client. During the budget squeeze, none received new work and prospects are still poor. They complain of indecision and ineptness in CONPAN, recognize the Agency's self-isolation, and acknowledge the absence of integration with other agencies. Few clients are heroes to their contractors, but CONPAN receives more brickbats than most. Contractor performance has been very professional and their reports compare

well with those of U.S. firms, so their comments merit serious consideration.

One need only talk within COMPAN to hear about alienation of other agencies. The Mapuche Project, the 40-community project, and the Regional Project, for example, are said to have left ill-will, confusion, and unkept promises in many places. Although INTA and CONIN enjoy the protection of Dr. Monckeberg in relations with COMPAN, conversations with senior staff of both also exhibit some disillusionment about the planning agency's attitudes and potential.

d) The Technical Assistance Relationship - It was inevitable that CSF would move from a role close to sharing leadership to a narrower assistance position. It is, indeed, a mark of COMPAN maturity and CSF success that the Agency now relies less on the contractor. Physical isolation and constant bickering were not essential to this transition, but have occurred. Future arrangements are not yet clear, though both American staff leave within three months. The parties talk about their problems by the hour, but communication seems thin. While many factors affect the delicate and always-difficult technical assistance relationship, CSF is a victim of, and perhaps a contributor to, the general malaise within COMPAN that flows from interaction of the various external and internal factors described above.

It is difficult to separate causes and effects in COMPAN's current situation. The Organization must be viewed as a system and trying to identify what came first, or what is the most important cause, helps little. Making the system work more effectively requires attention on many fronts and, as in nutrition, "interventions" improve performance even when "fundamental" causes (e.g. personalities, politics) remain unchanged.

The foregoing emphasis on "planning" and "intervention" must be distinguished carefully from the "isolation" (use of contractors" and "integration" (working through other agencies) styles through which both are implemented. Much criticism of "planning" really refers to the isolation that accompanied COMPAN efforts. Had planning studies gone through national agencies, with contractors serving instead of executing, their relevance would have been less subject to attack. Few people consider the COMPAN information system required for planning to be "academic", for example, except when it develops without involvement of those who will ultimately provide data and learn from analysis.

In addition to blaming "political and economic factors", it is also tempting to blame COMPAN's difficulties on the skill and personality deficiencies of staff. When INTA and CONIN are included as COMPAN resources, which they clearly are, skill availability is outstanding. Within COMPAN, the capacity to "get things done", a vague but critical skill, seems adequate, despite some opinions to the contrary. Strong and difficult personalities complicate the Agency's life, but do not account for its troubles or explain all of what went wrong.

TOWARD NUTRITION PLANNING AND COORDINATION.

The alleged conflict between "planning" and "interventions" disappears on careful examination of the Chilean context. Opinions may differ about National economic policies and the use of "social" interventions and subsidies to compensate their casualties, but the resources available for compensation make Chile different from other countries. With an average malnutrition rate of 12 per cent, health service and supplementary feeding systems that reach most people, and more than \$100,000,000 available annually for food and related costs, Chile differs significantly from countries with more malnutrition and less money. For them, eradication of malnutrition through "interventions" and "palliatives" is impossible. In Chile, it is both possible and a stated policy. When permanent intervention becomes policy, the line between "attacking fundamental causes" and temporary intervention blurs.

The analysis required for planning eradication of malnutrition remains the same. Unless the intervention agencies (e.g., COMB, Jardines Infantiles, Health Ministry) know where, and how much, nutritional damage is likely to result from agricultural and economic policies, they cannot act to prevent it by (e.g.) increasing rations or enrolling new participants. Unless they know what food availability and market demand will be, they cannot use Governmental demand (feeding programs) to direct supply in nutritionally favorable directions. Without analyzing the nutritional consequences of "non-nutrition" activities, CONFAN cannot help agencies plan reduction of damage or design actions to improve nutrition status. Nutrient flow

**analysis and quantification of causal factors provide the framework within which intervention design and improvement take place.**

Since existing activities carry potential for eradicating malnutrition, there need be less concern for developing new ones. The constraints imposed by "external factors" do not discourage national nutrition planning. They direct it toward modification and linking of current interventions and away from macroeconomic policies, though the analytical base remains the same.

Whether the foregoing shift is viewed as political, technical or necessary for survival, it provides a promising context for CONPAN. It also suggests fundamental differences in approach from earlier work;

a) Building an Information System - CONPAN still needs an information system, to be useful. The system is likely to be more acceptable politically and more relevant if it moves away from building the bases for national nutrition policies and toward providing a framework for modifying and linking existing interventions. Monitoring nutrition status, already a priority, remains important, for example. Following changes in food prices, their relation to wages, and to other prices becomes essential. Identification of area-specific changes in nutrition status also requires attention.

An information system more oriented to immediate planning clearly must work with existing agencies and their data. Despite the limitations this imposes on scientific completeness and accuracy, the increased relevance to action and elimination of the unfortunate, because undeserved, "academic" image support the change. CONPAN has not been academic, it has been isolated.

b) Nutritional Review - Since CONPAN's impact will be through existing nutrition-related and other activities, review of their consequences becomes

more important than developing broader models of the nutrition system. This is more acceptable politically, since review implies no criticism of non-nutrition goals. Accepting these goals, it explores modification of activities to reduce nutritional damage or improve nutrition status, without disturbing present goals.

Some classic accomplishments of nutritional review include:

- 1) Adding processing of lower quality fish for domestic consumption to a project previously concerned only with export;
- 2) Shifting extension services to malnourished farm families without sacrificing production goals; and
- 3) Training community development workers to identify, and respond to, felt needs for improved nutrition.

Nutritional review may just encourage linkage of existing activities for improved nutrition. The Ministry of Vivienda's current plan to install 20,000 casetas sanitarias, for example, may have little nutrition impact unless CONPAN assures linking of appropriate health education activities.

c) Coordination - CONPAN's legislative mandate includes coordination, but the Agency never defined, or assumed, this responsibility. The ministries of Health and Education formed a committee to improve nutrition education, for example, while CONPAN worked on a "pilot project" independently.

A coordinator operates with a theory or conceptual framework and CONPAN has one. It needed no more to begin organizing involved agencies to look, for example, at competing messages in nutrition education, duplication in feeding, or coverage of malnourished families by health services. Coordination required no pilot projects or special studies and CONPAN's delay makes the task more

difficult. Interviews suggested that Chilean agencies resist coordination strongly, but every country shares this problem.

d) Orientation and Training - If CONPAN is ever to be taken seriously at ministry level, those who advise, educate, and influence ministers need preparation. CONPAN continues to describe ministries in monolithic terms inappropriate to even the most centralized bureaucracies. Few in the ministries understand nutrition planning because CONPAN, which presumably does, never explained it to many. Non-threatening multisectoral seminars or workshops, common elsewhere, encourage economic ministries and others to leave nutrition planners alone. Relationships established through such efforts often broaden nutrition planner influence.

e) Evaluation - CONPAN now proposes to expand evaluation activities. If CONPAN staff, or their contractors, come in as outside evaluators, CONPAN's isolation will be complete. Fear, defensiveness and resistance hamper attempts to be useful and long delays in feeding back data leave little possibility for the receiving agencies to perceive benefits.

Evaluation offers CONPAN opportunity to bring visible improvements by helping agencies improve their own self-evaluation systems. Dr. Monckeberg's promising suggestion that CONPAN "evaluate" a system of supermarkets serving deprived areas ("AUCOS") will gain if, instead of a "special study", CONPAN establishes a continuing relationship for assisting review of the markets' capacity for improving nutrition without sacrificing financial goals.

Review of impact or results involves CONPAN in areas more dangerous than the successful efficiency studies made in JUNALEB and elsewhere. Few agencies enjoy outside evaluation that threatens survival. Although partly a matter of style and approach, improvement of self-evaluation or internal information systems differs substantively from conventional evaluation studies. An agency

that discovers deficiencies for itself is also more likely to do something about them.

ORGANIZING FOR NUTRITION PLANNING

The approaches proposed here require no structural changes at CONPAN, though the functions and techniques of present groups should be modified.

a) Gestión de Proyectos - This Group manages projects, provides assistance (e.g., to JUNAEB), and has been CONPAN's principal contact with the outside world. As CONPAN moves from a discontinuous "project" approach to continuing relationships with Government agencies, Gestión is the logical line group. Instead of project responsibilities alone, staff would have agency liaison assignments, including management of projects and contracts stemming from the agency involvement.

The Group is also the best vehicle for national inter-agency coordination, though not for the regional coordination now properly proposed for the Operations Group. Intra-CONPAN communication between the two groups flows from these related responsibilities and an expanded Executive Committee will build external communication.

b) Operations Group - The Regional Project proposed for the 1978 Implementation Plan offers a promising model for CONPAN assistance and coordination at sub-national levels. It is not a "Project" but a job description for Operations staff and only CONPAN's need to finance by projects accounts for the failure to see the Group as a line office with staff and budget requirements for performance.

c) Planning and Analysis Group - This Group has had most difficulty finding a role, partly because it has not been viewed as a service arm for the line groups of CONPAN. The information system is not a "project", but the Group's continuing task. If it is to serve them, Planning and Analysis

must know needs of other groups, and, at the same time, must help them understand the potential offered by the information system. Planning and Analysis needs the other groups, too, for access to the agencies and regions that will be the generators and heaviest users of data analyzed by the Group.

The Planning and Analysis Group will have no monopoly on nutrition planning. The other COMPAN groups will be introducing, to agencies and regions, the conceptual framework and techniques of nutrition planning, using Planning and Analysis as a basic resource in the process.

This Group is also the logical one for handling substantive aspects of the orientation of inter-agency groups, since it is "guardian" of planning methodology within COMPAN. Form and content of presentations, however, require careful attention to the needs and psychology of participants, best gained by consultation with COMPAN's liaison people.

d) Administration - As COMPAN relates more to other agencies and moves away from projects, new kinds of contracts and convenios are likely to be needed. Implementation plans and budgets will require different presentation. COMPAN will, in effect, be using other ministries as contractors, a practice inevitable under the new counterpart funding arrangement regardless of program approach.

e) INTA and CONIN - Some AID and COMPAN people see INTA and CONIN as being unrelated to, or even against, nutrition planning. A view more consistent with approaches to nutrition planning elsewhere would consider both to be important COMPAN resources. Although both have independent agendas, they offer permanent institutional, quasi-governmental, bases

for the research and intervention testing services required by CONPAN. They are, in this respect, quite different from the other contractors used by CONPAN.

Even so-called "basic" research has a place in nutrition planning. Long-term attack on micro-nutrient problems, for example, often depends on fundamental research that, at first, may seem irrelevant. This is seen clearly, too, in "cancer planning" in the United States.

Independent CONIN and INTA agendas may tempt Dr. Monckeberg to seek CONPAN funds for purposes related only minimally to the Agency's mandate, but that has not yet occurred. Reasonable interpretation of that mandate offers wide scope for permissible expenditures.

The problem is one of balance rather than distortion. How much and what kind of research makes the most sense for nutrition planning provokes wide opinion differences, but the value of a technical research arm to a nutrition planning agency remains incontrovertible.

Heavier use of INTA does not eliminate all contracts or use of Government agencies. The National Statistics Institute (INE), for example, would have been a more logical choice for research on demand, even without the projected household survey that led to its selection. INTA may prefer not to enter fields where existing contractors are outstanding and CONPAN needs are likely to be intermittent. However, some broadening of INTA capacity seems appropriate, with CONPAN control of funds assuring consistency with CONPAN needs.

Similar reasoning applies to CONIN. When "planning" and "interventions" become complementary, CONIN's role as a tester of both conceptual and operational

feasibility becomes more important. Unlike PLADEN, for example, which showed that home gardens can add to family intake but could not show that the program was expandable, CONIN can also test system capacity. The nationwide center network and other operations distinguish it from typical contractors. CONPAN failures to involve operating agencies in pilot testing left valid concepts still untested for feasibility.

CONIN offers another useful possibility for nutrition planning. As third degree malnutrition declines, CONIN centers will be available for the Chilean equivalent of municipal or community nutrition planning. Their family-oriented approach leads naturally from recuperation to prevention and, eventually, to linking of local interventions in a broader attack on malnutrition. The Centers are, in this respect a vital arm of CONPAN. In the Philippines, for example, construction of "municipal nutrition centers" is part of the national nutrition planning approach. Chile will soon have them and CONPAN's role need only be to help them broaden and refine their activities.

The new 7-person committee formed by Dr. Monckeberg offers opportunity for better integration of CONIN, INTA, and the Ministry of Health with CONPAN. Unlike the Planning and Analysis Group, clearly under CONPAN direction, CONIN and INTA are more independent service arms. Nevertheless, since all interests will be served by closer collaboration, it behooves INTA and CONIN to be responsive to CONPAN needs. CONPAN, in identifying those needs, requires their technical and personal collaboration as well.

f) Technical Assistance - Many technical assistance issues go beyond the implications of treating planning and intervention as complementary or

**even synonymous.** Whether CONPAN should execute a subcontract, whether it needs expatriate advisers, and whether particular individuals are appropriate, for example, are questions that this Report omits, since they are influenced by many factors beside program.

CONPAN uses the CSF and other contracts to meet staff needs. This blurs the definition of "technical assistance", a flexibly defined concept at best, though staff provided by CSF meet reasonable interpretations of the term.

CSF seems to be identified with "planning" and "studies", as opposed to "interventions", a classification that is neither useful or accurate. The analytical framework and techniques introduced by Dean Wilson are neutral, dictating no unique balance between "macro" planning and "interventions". The real issue is isolation versus involvement and CONPAN, not CSF, decides that.

CONPAN needs to make explicit the staff needs for doing its work, including intermittent or highly specialized requirements that fit the narrowest definitions of technical assistance. INTA and others can fill some of these, with CSF also responding. Once the substance of what kind of people will work at CONPAN becomes clear, CONPAN can decide the best forms for finding and paying them. Personnel planning should precede the contractual and financial issues that now burden discussion. As buyer, CONPAN makes the choices, subject only to prior legal and other constraints.

While available nationals can probably handle most tasks required by CONPAN, the Agency needs a vehicle for keeping up with new developments in the rapidly changing nutrition planning field. Skillful use of the technical assistance contract can achieve this.

PROCESS, MANAGEMENT AND STYLE

This Report could have been entitled "from Isolation to Involvement", for Finding the Way requires this fundamental change in CONPAN's approach. Despite important improvement since the previous Review, CONPAN is still far from what it could easily be, an integral part of the national institutional fabric. This reduces possibilities for post-loan survival. The visible results emphasized by Dr. Monckeberg are necessary, but not sufficient, to keep CONPAN going. Building supporting constituencies at all levels requires equal attention. This is best understood by those in CONPAN with most "grass-roots" involvement. Unlike some senior staff who view the Agency as lantling on all fronts, and not just at highest levels, they recognize the need for a more conciliatory posture toward less political elements in the ministries. Fighting isolates, being conciliatory involves.

a. Building Bridges - CONPAN now has models for expanding the conciliatory approach, from work in JUNALE and the Regions. The recent joint appointment of Dr. Nicolás González to CONPAN and the Ministry of Health offers another, even more promising. While Dr. Monckeberg's relation to the Ministry and Dr. González' understanding of nutrition planning made it easier, possibilities for successful bridge-building exist throughout Government. CONPAN people moving into other agencies, the reverse, and joint appointments, all serve the same purpose. By accepting the need for such bridges, CONPAN would be on the way to building them. It is even possible that a good economist, badly needed in CONPAN, could be hired away from the Ministry of Hacienda or that one, trained by a year of work in CONPAN, would then be hired by the Ministry.

b. The Collaborative Style - Planning agencies with power often lose quality and impact by failure to develop participatory and collaborative

work styles. One without power has even more need.

In simplest terms, this means getting out of the office, finding out what agencies and potential beneficiaries think and know, helping freely and refraining from the temptation to pontificate. Collaboration implies building on what exists, not rejecting it as imperfect. CONPAN involvement in agricultural information, education and school gardens, for example, appears to have been just the opposite.

The absence of a more collaborative style derives partly from the idea that agencies could not be approached until CONPAN "had something to offer". Now that the new counterpart funding arrangement forces CONPAN closer to the ministries, it is important that relationships begin with "something to learn" or "something to do together", an effort to serve as catalyst. CONPAN staff with collaborative skills and experience should train others.

c. Internal Decision-Making Patterns - People within CONPAN now complain of not being involved in decisions and of indecision among those who are. A year ago, everybody was involved and nothing was decided finally. This exaggerates a problem that is still significant in CONPAN. Management needs to decide a) Who will be involved, b) In what decisions, and c) For how long. It is often more important that decisions be timely and reasonably final than that they be right. This suggests need for the difficult management decisions that a) discussion has been adequate, and b) the choice has been made.

Attention to broader involvement will reduce the internal communication, and related morale, problems now bothering CONPAN. Concern for timing and stability of decisions will alleviate the unrest of contractors and others dealing with CONPAN. Although problems of internal decision-making go beyond the limits of this Report, their aggravation of basic CONPAN conflicts

merits attention. Alleged CONPAN weakness in "getting things done" also stems partly from this cause.

d. The Project Mentality - CONPAN implementation plans consist almost entirely of "projects". This flows from early reliance on contracts, but is less appropriate in a CONPAN involved more heavily in continuous coordination, liaison, and information responsibilities. A "Project" is, by definition, finite and discontinuous. This shifts attention from the need for CONPAN staff to relate more broadly with ministries and agencies. These relationships involve occasional supporting projects, but are not themselves describable as projects.

CONPAN and its collaborators should express their common agendas and formalize their relations by convenio, but this will not always include execution of projects. Assisting self-evaluation, for example, or coordinating nutrition education are not projects in the same sense as specific studies or limited pilot tests are.

e. The Uses of Analysis - An outside observer finds great difficulty in understanding the alleged differences between "planners" and others in CONPAN. How the Planning and Analysis Group became so isolated remains a mystery, since the title suggests unavoidable involvement with the rest of the Agency. The Group seems to have viewed its role as including generation of new project ideas, thereby alienating other individuals and groups with similar aspirations.

In the old CONPAN, "coming up with new projects" seemed the pathway to prestige, power, and excitement. In the new one, this pathway should go from successful involvement with other agencies. New ideas and new

projects will flow naturally from such involvement, assisted by work of the Planning and Analysis Group.

This need not lead to reduced prestige for Analysis. CONPAN's entire conceptual framework gives a primary role to learning from experience and this Group is most qualified to assist that process. If the Group has been "academic" in the past, as alleged by some, this reflects CONPAN failure to integrate it properly. It is not academic to study economic and agricultural variables, for example, when the study makes intervention design more effective.

Like INTA, the Planning and Analysis Group should have some money for what others consider research that is not "useful". Dr. Monckeberg, who emphasizes the unexpected applications of basic research, understands this better than most. The Group's major task, however, is to serve by responding to requests of others and by feeding to them some of the routine exploration of non-project relationships that is essential for understanding broader implications of intervention results.

f) Salary Policies - The CONPAN situation suffers, along with problems already mentioned, from disparities in compensation and benefits paid to people doing work of similar technical difficulty. Agency records verify specific cases and what people think is true may be more important than what is true.

CONPAN doesn't need a special study to reduce this friction. Administration can veto shifts (e.g., to a different contractor) that suddenly convert work neighbors, with equal pay, into lucky and unlucky rivals. Limitations on contractor compensation policies are common in AID and CONPAN could learn from them.

In a thriving CONPAN, salary discrepancies would be minor irritations. During the past year, they aggravated an already difficult situation.

CONCLUSION

Institutionalizing nutrition planning in Chile depends on what happens during the remaining Loan period, now extended to October, 1980. Dr. Monckeberg's visible interventions buy time, but alone cannot save the Planning and Analysis Group's work and the line groups' liaison and coordination activities, the essence of nutrition planning that justifies independent existence of CONPAN. They will survive Loan expiration only by demonstrating value despite the context that limits original conceptions of Chilean nutrition planning.

CONPAN is already moving in the right direction. The new Executive Committee provides a framework for some multi-sectoral coordination, despite absence of ministers and other senior decision-makers. More involvement with other agencies is inevitable under new counterpart funding and CONPAN work with JUNAEB and the Health Ministry offers promising models. The formal requisites for an effective and respected CONPAN exist. Time is short, scars of past traumas remain, and translating these formal requisites into action requires great skill and sensitivity.

The task ahead demands a degree of mutual forgiveness within CONPAN, and a degree of humility toward those without, that may seem too much to ask. The excellence of past achievements, the potential for future accomplishment, and the importance of the task, should encourage favorable response.