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CLASSIFICATION

PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY (PES) — PART I

Report Symbol U-447

1. PROJECT TITLE	2. PROJECT NUMBER	3. MISSION/AID/W OFFICE
PVO Co-Financing	388-0010	Bangladesh 32p

4. EVALUATION NUMBER (Enter the number maintained by the reporting unit e.g., Country or AID/W Administrative Code, Fiscal Year, Serial No. beginning with No. 1 each FY) 79-15

☒ REGULAR EVALUATION ☐ SPECIAL EVALUATION

5. KEY PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DATES	6. ESTIMATED PROJECT FUNDING	7. PERIOD COVERED BY EVALUATION
A. First PRO-AG or Equivalent FY 75	A. Total $ 4,500,000	From (month/yr.) April 1977
B. Final Obligation Expected FY 79	B. U.S. $ 2,276,707	To (month/yr.) June, 1979
C. Final Input Delivery FY 80		Date of Evaluation Review 29 June, 1979

8. ACTION DECISIONS APPROVED BY MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE DIRECTOR

A. List decisions and/or unresolved issues; cite those items needing further study. (NOTE: Mission decisions which anticipate AID/W or regional office action should specify type of document, e.g., airgram, SPAR, PIO, which will present detailed request.)	B. NAME OF OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION	C. DATE ACTION TO BE COMPLETED
1. Explore alternatives to present PVO Co-Financing procedures so that we can fund more small, indigenous PVOs.	Ms. Buxell USAID/PRO	Continuing
2. Write PP for Phase II project in accordance with recommendations in issues paper and as agreed by evaluation review meeting.	Ms. Buxell USAID/PRO	08/31/79

9. INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS TO BE REVISED PER ABOVE DECISIONS

- ☐ Project Paper
- ☐ Financial Plan
- ☐ Logical Framework
- ☐ Project Agreement
- ☐ Implementation Plan e.g., CPI Network
- ☐ PIO/T
- ☐ PIO/C
- ☐ PIO/P
- ☒ Other (Specify) None
- ☐ Other (Specify)

10. ALTERNATIVE DECISIONS ON FUTURE OF PROJECT

- A. ☒ Continue Project Without Change (project almost completed)
- B. ☐ Change Project Design and/or ☐ Change Implementation Plan
- C. ☐ Discontinue Project

11. PROJECT OFFICER AND HOST COUNTRY OR OTHER RANKING PARTICIPANTS AS APPROPRIATE (Names and Titles)

Ingrid T. Buxell, PRO
Charles R. Gurney, Chief, EHAW
F. Levinson, Chief, FAN
Larry K. Crandall, Deputy Director (A)

12. Mission/AID/W Office Director Approval

Signature: Frank B. Kimball

Typed Name: Frank B. Kimball

Date: 7-30-79

AID 1330-15 (3-78)

13. SUMMARY: The body of this PES consists of the Background/ Issues Paper developed by the Mission PVO Advisor and the minutes of the evaluation review meeting.

14. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY: This was a regular evaluation which will also serve as the final evaluation since the project terminates this fiscal year. The Mission PVO Advisor visited a number of PVO projects, including many not funded by AID. She developed an issues paper based on these site visits as well as project reports. The evaluation review meeting was chaired by the Acting Director and attended by all concerned Mission staff.

Minutes of the Evaluation Meeting for the
PVO Co-Financing Project (388-0010)
1:30 PM 29 June, 1979

Participants:

Mr. Richard L. Podol, DIR(A)
Mr. Larry K. Crandall, PRO
Ms. Ingrid T. Buxell, PRO
Mr. Mike Sullivan, PRO
Mr. J.J. Dumm, PHAW
Ms. V. Molldrem, PHAW
Mr. Peter Leifert, RDE
Mr. John Yang, CONT

Discussion during the review meeting revolved around the issues listed on pages 10 and 11 of the issues paper prepared by the Mission PVO Advisor. The issues generally concerned the level of priority the PVO project has had in the Mission's program and what might be done to tie PVO activities more closely with USAID/Bangladesh's CDSS strategy. It was noted that PVOs are working at the village level and in some cases have developed effective projects. However, USAID has not found it convenient to capitalize on these successes because our program is not at the village level. Our projects are directed toward large-scale, nationwide efforts to improve agricultural research, increase availability of fertilizer, develop a viable model for making credit available to small farmers, and to extend the country's rural electrification network. Our technical divisions are not prepared to take time from their project implementation requirements to get involved in small, time-consuming PVO projects which are not directly related to their projects. And without involvement by the technical divisions, the PVO project will probably continue to be regarded as a relatively insignificant, fringe activity in the Mission program.

This problem was addressed in the Mission's manual order BD-18, issued on February 28, 1979, which provides that technical divisions will have the responsibility for monitoring PVO projects, while responsibility for the PVO Co-Financing project itself will remain in the Program Office. This new arrangement means that the

Mission will now fund only those subprojects in which a technical division shows enough interest to spend time monitoring. Given the Mission's current portfolio of projects, it is not expected that we will have many PVO projects in the agriculture and rural development sectors, while population is an area where PVO projects will complement AID's bilateral efforts to a great degree. The Rural Industries Project now under development offers possibilities for coordination with PVO activities. In any case, the PVO Co-Financing Project is available as a tool to the technical divisions if they want to use it.

Manpower/Paperwork constraints: Perhaps the greatest constraint to utilizing PVOs has been the amount of paperwork required to initiate a subproject in relation to its size. The PVOs themselves are often unwilling to and/or incapable of completing all of the documents required by AID. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the larger PVOs, who would seem capable of complying with all of AID's regulations, can usually obtain funding from other sources on less demanding terms, while the small indigenous PVOs which really need the funds are the weakest administratively. It has therefore fallen to the AID staff to ensure that all the paperwork was done properly. Participants in the review meeting agreed that the Mission must find ways to reduce the paperwork on this project if it is ever to become an effective part of the AID program. A number of possibilities were discussed: a) use the newly authorized "limited scope grant," which would greatly reduce requirements for the project proposal; b) work through one PVO, e.g., the Asia Foundation, which would be responsible for helping smaller PVOs develop their project proposals and for monitoring implementation of the projects; c) develop a different kind of project (not PVO Co-Financing) through which we could fund private organizations without requiring PVO registration. The Mission PVO Advisor will continue to explore these possibilities within the Mission, with PVOs and with AID/W in the context of the Phase II Project Paper now in preparation.

The participants agreed to the recommendations in the issues paper. The Mission PVO Advisor is responsible for the actions necessary to carry out the recommendations. A Project Paper for PVO Co-Financing Phase II will be prepared by the end of August, 1979.

U. S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

M E M O R A N D U M

To : See Distribution Date: June 22, 1979

From : Ingrid T. Buxell, PRO

Subject: PVO Co-Financing Project Evaluation

There will be an Evaluation Review Meeting on the above cited project on Friday, June 29, 1979 at 1:30 PM in the Conference Room. The attached Issues Paper provides reference and background material for the discussion. A number of copies of the Project Paper are available in my office for those who are unfamiliar with this project's PP.

Attachment: a/s

Distribution:

Mr. Richard L. Podol, DIR(A)
Mr. Larry K. Crandall, PRO
Mr. Phillip Church, PRO
Mr. Charles R. Gurney, PHAW
Mr. F.J. Levinson, FAN
Mr. Arthur D. Schantz, CON
Mr. Michael Sullivan, PRO
Mr. Gary D. Adams, RDE
Mr. Peter Leifert, RDE

BANGLADESH

PVO CO-FINANCING PROJECT EVALUATION

ISSUES PAPER

JUNE 1979

Ingrid T. Buxell
USAID/Dacca
Bangladesh

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ANNEX A : PVO Co-Financing in Bangladesh: Achievements and Shortfalls

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ANNEX E : PVO Co-Financing Criteria for Mission/BDG Support

ANNEX F : Some Annual PVO Program Costs 1977-78

BANGLADESH

PVO CO-FINANCING PROJECT EVALUATION

JUNE 1979

I. INTRODUCTION

The USAID PVO Co-Financing project in Bangladesh will end September 30, 1979, after three years of operation. Before a second phase Co-Financing project can be developed an in-depth project evaluation is needed. The purpose of this paper is to describe project performance to date, provide some observations on the PVOs current status and impact in Bangladesh, identify critical issues pertaining to PVOs in general and USAID's support to them in particular, and recommend guidelines for future action.

In 1977 nineteen PVOs were visited in preparation for that year's PVO Co-Financing project evaluation "issues paper." In preparing the present paper it has been possible to revisit only eight of the 19 organizations. Therefore, the impressions, observations and conclusions drawn in this paper are based on information and perspectives gained over the past two and a half years in dealing with PVO matters and on the specific information acquired in the recent eight project visits.

II. REVIEW OF PVO CO-FINANCING

A. Achievements and Shortfalls

Annex A contains a point by point description of project performance vis-a-vis project design components. The description does not include an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the Co-Financing approach from the USAID and PVOs view points. These are briefly listed below:

	Strengths	Weaknesses
USAID		
	-- Convenient Mission financial and administrative mechanism for supporting PVOs on a multi-year basis. Chief advantage avoids	-- Requires Technical Divisions substantive participation for full Mission benefits. Some difficulties in finding in-house

Strengths	Weaknesses
annual Congressional Notification process. Establishes multi-year Mission policy and strategy priorities for handling PVO requests.	technical expertise for certain PVO proposals.
-- Provision of a USAID consultant funded from project resources minimizes Mission operating costs for PVO in-house project management and knowledge of PVO activities.	-- At present no policy or funds exist to permit USAID provision of support to determine technical feasibility of projects and prepare technical implementation plans.
	-- Indigenous PVO registration requirement is major limitation to expanding USAID support to this PVO group.
PVO	
-- Facilitates communication and proposal processing.	-- Availability of funds not always used as demand for USAID funds generally limited to US PVOs who appear to have sufficient resources.
-- Permits special arrangements for financial cost sharing.	
-- Recent relaxation in PVO project design format requirements has facilitated proposal submissions.	-- Registration requirement for indigenous PVOs is very difficult to meet. Almost no PVOs are interested in fulfilling this precondition to receiving USAID support. Hence need to use American PVOs as intermediary which sometimes presents difficulties.
	-- PVOs generally lack funds and expertise for proper technical review and preparation of their proposals leading to difficulties in proposal presentation.

On balance the project succeeded in utilizing planned project resources in a manner, primarily convenient to USAID, for mutually shared development objectives. The impact of this is next examined.

B. Impact of PVO Co-Financing

It was assumed the project would have an impact on PVOs, USAID and development efforts in Bangladesh.

1. On PVOs

The project was expected to influence three PVO factors: amount of PVO projects, PVO project capabilities and PVO orientations. The results have been both positive and negative.

The major project assumption was that the availability of USAID Co-Financing funds would substantially "increase the number and effectiveness of controlled PVO projects demonstrating innovative approaches and strategies relating to key development problems." (PROP p. 3 next to last para and p. 7, para B. 1). This assumption has not materialized: Co-Financing provided support to seven PVOs for basically eight different projects in FY 1975-79 (with a probability of one more PVO and two more projects being obligated still in FY 1979). By comparison USAID/Jakarta approved during four years 42 sub-projects under its Co-Financing project. Some likely reasons why in Bangladesh the assumption was not valid are:

a. Most PVOs seem to have either sufficient funds or the capability to raise the necessary resources for their projects.

b. USAID project design/grant requirements and/or project approval procedures discourage PVO interest in seeking Co-Financing support.

c. Some American PVOs consider USAID funds to be politically "tarnished." (e.g., MCC, VHSS & ADAB).

d. Changed PVO programs, from relief to development, have not expanded as anticipated due to certain inherent PVO weaknesses (described in 1977 issues paper).

Another Co-Financing project assumption is that PVOs project design, monitoring and evaluation capabilities can be strengthened by fulfilling USAID proposal requirements and by the provision of periodic training courses held under ADAB auspices. The provision of

Co-Financing assistance to the seven subproject PVOs has had mixed impact in influencing their internal operations.

1. Some have significantly improved only their planning capabilities (IVS, YWCA);

2. Others also improved project monitoring (MAP/HEED, CARE);

3. One PVO (SCF/CDF) demonstrated the capability of self-evaluation however its planning and monitoring activities did not improve since project inception (largely due to substantial management turnover); and

4. Two PVOs basically discontinued project objectives after USAID support ended (Children's Nutrition Research Unit, Christian Memorial Hospital).

The Co-Financing experience indicates PVOs improve their operating procedures in response to internal needs or circumstances, e.g., special leadership, addition of qualified staff etc., rather than to the mere compliance with grant requirements. However, several PVOs, MAP/HEED, SCF/CDF and CARE have appreciated USAID evaluation inputs.

On the other hand, the provision of formal training through ADAB never materialized as their Executive Board does not consent to receive USAID assistance for this purpose. Instead USAID decided to provide individual consultations to those PVOs seeking Co-Financing support. This seems to have worked effectively from USAIDs viewpoint. Though the number of PVOs thus exposed to concepts and methodologies of systematic project planning, monitoring and evaluation is less than the Project Paper envisioned, the continued USAID informal input may yet result in more lasting changes on PVO operations.

A third major project assumption was that PVOs would have "greater impact if their projects had a more directed focus. These are areas in which AID support can play a key role." (Project Paper p. 3, next to last para.) The new Co-Financing priority for health/population activities is based on the premise PVOs have better capabilities in this area than the Bangladesh Government (BDG). The "Directed focus" is coming from the PVOs themselves, rather than the Co-Financing project, as they gain experience and begin to learn to evaluate their activities.

2. On USAID

The project was meant to help fulfill the Mission response to AID's Congressional mandate to channel more resources through the PVOs. As a development donor means the support to PVOs has not held much attraction to AID in general and USAID/Bangladesh in particular. An "appropriate level of input" has not been determined agency wide or Mission specific. And the experience with PVO Co-Financing, though satisfactory in terms of administrative and financial implementation, has made virtually no impact on changing the Mission priority assigned to this means of providing development assistance. It could also probably be said the Mission's Country Development Strategy Statement (CDSS) PVO family planning/health provision resulted more out of a frustration with BDG efforts than a conviction that PVOs are suitable instruments for generating major development change and impact. The causes for this view/situation are multi-dimensional: the PVOs own weaknesses; the nature of bilateral assistance; the context in which PVOs and donor agenci s tend to operate. Perhaps additional experiences in bilateral projects which have PVO components may provide greater scope to impress Mission thinking to the contrary. A single Mission project cannot hope to do more than make a contribution in that direction.

Furthermore, the project design at the Goal level expects "integration of findings from controlled PVO projects into BDG and AID development programming and replication of proven approaches on a national scale." So far this has not occurred. Perhaps the time frame is too short, especially as USAID support is generally provided to a PVO which has a foreign staff. These people need time to orient themselves before they produce a useful methodology and demonstrate its local suitability. Such PVOs still are groping to identify what they can do best in Bangladesh. On the other hand, the disparity between the PVO focus, which is generally at the village level, and USAID's national program orientation may be to great to permit PVO "findings" to be directly and adequately integrated into USAID's programming.

3. On Bangladesh

The sum of PVO Co-Financing projects has provided about $4 million since FY 1975 to Bangladesh for a variety of purposes. Assessment of this single project's impact on a national basis is unrealistic and probably not worthwhile even were baseline data available. The progress to which Co-Financing contributed is

described under Purpose Achievements, Annex A (items D-E): e.g., incomes have improved in SCF/CDF villages and for 200 female YWCA handicraft producers, agriculture production increased under CARE extension services, health services in MAP/HEED project unions provides for community involvement and perhaps some decreases in communicable diseases, etc. The three on-going subprojects were recently evaluated and provide further details on progress in their respective project evaluation statements. An impact in the project area can be visually noticed by one who periodically visits the sites. The need to conduct baseline surveys, now recognized by all on-going Co-Financing grantees, will enable more reliable determination of changes in a few years. Whether these changes are directly attributable to the PVO efforts would require action research of a more controlled methodology than the present grantees would be willing to adopt.

III. PVOs IN BANGLADESH

A. Status of PVOs

1. PVOs

The ADAB list of PVOs has increased from 128 to 141 agencies since January 1977. A definition of what constitutes a PVO has not yet developed. The listed organizations therefore range from development, relief, professional and missionary agencies to private foundations and single projects. Some are foreign, Bangladeshi or a combination of both. Most foreign PVOs came during disaster times: the 1970 cyclone, 1971-72 Liberation, 1974-75 drought-flood. The status of the agencies has changed during the past eight years. Many have increasingly become development oriented especially as relief funds dried up and continued operations required the PVOs objectives to be redefined. The development oriented number of PVOs is about 50 out of ADABs total listing. The most obvious changes among the PVOs since the 1977 "issues paper" are:

1. increased specialization: PVOs have begun narrowing down their activities, phasing out most relief projects and expanding their more viable program operations;

2. increased training: PVOs have generally expanded training their own staff (in-house and in formal training programs, as at BRRI) and some have established new

training projects (e.g., BRAC's TARC, SCF/CDF's VERC, and VHSS' health/family planning/nutrition workshops);

3. increased inter-PVO communications: PVOs tend to visit each others operations more often, interchange information and participate more in PVO publications through article submissions;

4. improved coordination among PVOs: since 1977 Voluntary Health Services Society (VHSS) has been established to provide information coordination in health and ADAB has been rejuvenated into a more active organization;

5. beginning PVO evaluations: several larger PVOs began evaluating their programs internally and/or with external assistance (e.g., CARITAS in health, BAM, CCDB, MCC in agriculture) some efforts involved major program changes and strengthening of operations.

These changes are generally positive developments. Substantial progress is still needed in focusing individual PVO experimentations (or at least improving documentation of experiences) and integrating PVO efforts more closely with BDG development plans and strategies.

2. PVOs and BDG

Since 1977 two major changes have occurred in the BDG-PVO relations. The Government finally after three years of deliberations promulgated a law on PVO registration. Second, the Ministries of Health and Family Planning and Agriculture and Forests initiated formal mechanisms for coordinating PVO-BDG programs in their respective sectors. These developments represent significant progress in BDG's efforts to grapple with the unwieldy job of regularizing BDG-PVO legal procedures, collecting basic program and financial data on PVO operations and attempting to formally coordinate PVO activities. These measure, however, are not without their problems.

The PVO registration process, now centralized in one ministry, Social Welfare Department, lacks adequate staff, is cumbersome and involves multiple ministry clearances. The Family

Planning Council of Voluntary Organizations serves as a forum to exchange program policy and operation information. As it is not an executing agency the Council often cannot follow up on the decisions taken. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forests Coordination Committee for Voluntary Agencies focuses, by comparison, on more project specific concerns: proposal reviews, progress reports, evaluations, training activities, etc. Its composition is small (8-10 members) and enables more detailed examination of problems. Its preoccupation with compliance of ministerial reporting requirements prevents attention to be given to ways in which PVO programs can be linked/integrated with BDG efforts.

The BDG registration and coordination systems, though still fragile, young and weak provide the most promising mechanism for Government to use and exploit in a more productive way the private organizations.

3. PVOs and Donors

Resources for PVOs to carry out development programs seem not to have diminished in the past two years and show no signs of drying up. The USAID experience with PVO proposal submissions alone indicates where there is a relatively sound proposal there exists a willing donor. (Many of the PVO submissions to USAID which were not approved have ultimately been funded by other donors.) In fact, some bilateral and multilateral donors are turning to PVOs to expand their funding presence: UNICEF support to Save the Children (USA); CIDA assistance to PROSHIKA for $3 million (when previous program was $500,000 for 3 years!). The private foreign and Bangladeshi organizations have grown and matured in the past few years. Their capacity to manage funds has improved. However, their own program levels, if expanded too quickly, may lead to saturating the PVO absorptive capacity and ultimately undermining the delicate managerial effectiveness which has been attained.

Bangladeshi disasters also help continue donor resource flows. The impact of such funds on PVOs is that they sustain agencies who are primarily relief oriented and often disrupt those who carry out development programs -- especially when the latter had their roots in relief work and have not yet successfully "completed" their transition to development work. Furthermore, the availability of relief funds also contributes to PVOs being disinterested or

postponing to change their operations from relief to development functions. This relatively "elastic" donor market in Bangladesh permits PVOs to be less rigorous in their planning and, in some cases, more costly in their methodologies (see Annex D for some PVO program cost comparisons).

B. Impact of PVOs

No one knows the exact or even approximate level of resources PVOs provide to Bangladesh's development. The BDG has tried to determine the amounts by requiring PVOs to submit annual financial data as part of their registration/program approval process. As PVO fiscal matters differ substantially in scale, complexity and budgeting systems comparative data, if even properly submitted by PVOs, will be difficult to assemble. Annex E provides a very rough estimate of some annual PVO program budgets, which includes the largest PVO programs and totals over $13 million. Were these resources designed for one single program with a well defined objective, evaluation and impact assessment would be more simple. As it is, the assessment of impact of even the 50 estimated development oriented private organizations poses formidable obstacles. Therefore, one approach is to cite known examples of the kinds of PVO efforts which have brought about recognized changes.

The PVOs most evident impact is at the village level where programs have sought and often succeeded to increase employment, income, literacy, housing, production and social services. Program coverage ranges from several villages to several thanas (CARE, CCDB, CARITAS and IUCW) and even several districts (LWF/RDRS). Some special characteristics which the more successful PVO programs show are: simple locally practicable methodologies; reliable back-stopping services for supplies and marketing (CARE, CCDB, Jute Works, MCC), varying strategies for different target populations (e.g., credit programs for landless, women, youth) process and capacity training programs for community self-reliance (BRAC, Gono Shasthaya Kendra, SCF/CDF), systematic extension services often include research components (MCC, Christian Relief World Rehabilitation Committee). The replication of some of these efforts are still limited: BDG has adopted MCC crop variety testing methodologies and often includes MCC in certain policy formulations; many PVOs are using BRAC functional education materials and BDG

periodically requests government personnel to be trained in this methodology; BDG family planning extension services have incorporated many PVO program features such as extension personnel to the village level, supervision-referral systems, nutrition monitoring, etc.; PVO pioneer experiences in handicrafts have led to several small scale/cottage industries BDG-large donor projects; and recent PVO experiments in credit to the rural poor have resulted in BDG takeover and/or expansion of such efforts (e.g., Social Welfare Directorate - IUCW and Gramin Bank - Tangail programs).

However, the PVOs strengths are also often their very weaknesses to exerting greater impact. PVO programs operate in different geographic locations, with different inputs (kinds, levels, methodologies) and for different objectives. The diversity provides a large cadre of operations/experimentors but results also in undermining a consolidated, broadbased and "directed focus" program. The PVOs independence and difficulties to coordinate themselves or link up with other development programs (BDG, donors) also complicates finding ways in which these organizations' contributions can be better exploited.

IV. ISSUES

This paper has tried to review the specific Co-Financing experience and the Mission's management of this "umbrella" project as well as the general changes which have occurred with PVOs since the last project evaluation. The general PVO situation indicates improvements in the status of PVOs and definition of BDG-PVO relations. Impact, though difficult to determine, is evident on a modest scale as PVOs continue to evolve their special role in Bangladesh and explore better means to contribute to the country's Development.

In spite of some shortfalls project performance has generally been satisfactory and a second phase is already envisioned. Before phase II can be prepared the following are some of the most critical issues which would be worthwhile to examine and discuss:

1. Does the Mission's PVO Co-Financing project have the level of priority required to be an effective and viable means whereby to pursue DAP/CDSS ends?

2. What strategy should be used to make Co-Financing more effective and expand USAID support to PVOs (i.e., how to attract more "clients" given resource elasticities and other donor more simplified grant requirements)?

3. Are the redesigned Co-Financing guidelines contained in manual order BD 18 of February 28, 1979 suitable for Phase II project design and implementation?

4. What improved verifiable indicators should be used in Phase II to measure project impact?

5. Are the present Mission staffing requirements adequate to manage/implement Co-Financing, II? What changes are needed?

6. How can results from Co-Financing be better integrated into Mission/BDG program development?

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

PVO Co-Financing, Phase II will require several modifications from the first phase. Some of these are offered here for consideration.

1. Criteria for project approval should be simplified to recognize replicability, innovativeness and short time frames cannot always be present in PVO proposals, especially Bangladeshi ones.

2. Provisions should be made to allow funding, on a limited scale, of PVO project feasibility studies and technical advice for project design.

3. Means should be developed for funding ways to strengthen indigenous PVOs, as providing funds for training under existing indigenous programs (e.g., BRAC).

4. Funds should be earmarked for several in-depth independent PVO program evaluations both for PVO Co-Financing sub-projects and non-USAID funded projects of special interest.

5. To encourage PVO coordination several workshops, forums should be USAID sponsored on topics of mutual interest (some bilateral projects have already done this, but PVOs were excluded).

In addition to the above there should be efforts made by the Mission to change the restrictive AID regulations regarding support to indigenous PVOs. The Mission will also need in the near future to reexamine its policy on centrally funded PVO grants.

PRO:LBuxell:as
6/22/79

ANNEX A

PVO CO-FINANCING IN BANGLADESH: ACHIEVEMENTS AND SHORTFALLS

Project Design*	Achievements	Shortfalls
A. INPUTS		
1. A I D		
a. Technical Assistance for project design and evaluation, including general workshops under ADAB auspices.	a. One workshop held by PCI, early 1975, at USAID. ADAB helped recruit PVO participants.	a. Attendance and interest was low. PVOs considered course too general, "over their heads" and not helpful to their own problems.
b. Partial financial grant support up to 70% of total project costs. Maximum AID total contribution $1,700,000.	b. USAID obligations to date: FY 1975-79 $1,680,893 (includes amendments to all on-going projects) which represents 40% of total project costs. See Annex B for USAID-PVO cost sharing.	b. Recent reprioritization of PVO Co-Financing uses places greater responsibilities on Pop/Health and Women Division to seek PVO proposals in their field. Asia Foundation response to this request will require AID supplementary funds to the project and Congressional Notification.
c. Clearance responsibility for project selection.	c. Carried out through USAID PVO Co-Financing Committee. See Annex C for list of PVO proposals received and those approved.	
d. Overall guidance recommendation responsibility for project implementation.	d. Performance of this function has provided PVOs advice and sense of direction generally appreciated by them.	d. As this project figures among the lowest priority Mission activities, interest and support for project implementation tended to be accordingly low. Project is not viewed by Mission as significant means for DAP/CDSS pursuit.

* References are from Co-Financing Project Paper, Revision 1

2. PVOs Project Design	Achievements	Shortfalls
a. Minimum PVO financing for any selected project 30%. Minimum PVO co-financing total contribution anticipated: $745,000.	a. PVO project share totals 50% of project costs. Total contribution $2,139,666. See Annex B for details.	a. As USAID requires no financial statements on PVOs contribution Mission has no evidence such inputs actually occured.
b. Coordination and managerial responsibility for all projects.	b. Generally performed satisfactory.	b. Life of project was prematurely terminated in one grant. (CNRU)
c. Program monitoring and implementation documentation.	c. Generally satisfactory.	c. When PVO management turnover occurs, documentation slippage follows (SCF/CDF, CARE, IVS, MAP/HEED).
d. Program evaluation	d. Only one PVO grantee performed self-evaluation (SCF/CDF).	d. Joint USAID-PVO evaluations a continued requirement.
3. BDG		
a. Financial support anticipated $220,000.	a. Actual financial contribution assessed $390,428. Generally provided in kind (e.g. use of buildings).	a. Three out of eight projects had no BDG inputs.
b. Provide timely clearance as required.	b. Generally satisfactory.	b. Slow BDG clearance held up implementation in one project.
c. Provide support staff necessary when project requires.	c. Generally satisfactory.	c. More active BDG participation in project planning, implementation and evaluation would bring project efforts to BDG policy makers attention.

Project Design	Achievements	Shortfalls
B. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN		
1. Eligibility of U.S. and indigenous PVOs.	1. All grants have been provided to American PVOs.	1. AID registration requirements for indigenous and third country PVOs prevented Co-Financing support in three cases: CONCERN, Karika and Nijera Kori.
2. Project proposals will be in a logical framework format modified slightly for PVOs.	2. Of eight project proposals approved three were submitted by PVOs in Logframe format. For the rest USAID prepared the Log Frames.	2. PVOs generally are unfamiliar with Logframe methodology and often resent imposition of this requirement. Most PVOs dislike any rigorous, systematic project design - a well known PVO weakness.
-- Log Frame concepts to be taught in 3 day course by USAID at least once a year under ADAB auspices.	-- One project design workshop held for one day by PCI in 1975.	-- Generally not done as it became evident individual consultations with potential PVO Co-Financing grantees provide more effective results. Coverage in number of PVOs is less.
-- Assistance given PVOs by USAID in project design.	-- Generally PVOs submit preliminary proposals which are reviewed by USAID consultant, redrafted by PVO and finalized for grant signing by USAID consultant. Relaxation of AID rules has decreased emphasis on logframe.	

Project Design	Achievements	Shortfalls
-- BDG representative to be involved in Log Frame/evaluation workshops.		-- Not done as activity was considered of low priority. However, PVO-USAID evaluations included BDG consultations when ever relevant.
3. USAID proposal review	3. Carried out	3. Sometimes the absence of certain technical expertise in USAID prevented appropriate review.
4. Project approval by USAID PVO Co-Financing Committee. BDG clearance obtained by PVO.	4. This system has generally worked very well.	

C. OUTPUTS

1. PVO use of systematic project design and evaluation techniques. All co-financing projects exposed to Log Frame. Annual joint evaluations with PVOs, BDG, independent organizations, local counterpart institutions and other donors.	1. CARE is only PVO which developed own project design system. Annual joint evaluations involved PVOs and USAID with some consultations with BDG (eg. IVS). On one occasion BDG representative participated (MAP/HEED, 1978, BDG/FP) in project evaluation.	1. PVOs generally do not use such techniques as they consider them too sophisticated and bureaucratic for their operations. Generally no BDG participation

Project Design	Achievements	Shortfalls
2. Low cost high impact projects involving operational innovations.	2. CARE supervisory operations in cooperative accounting and MAP/HEED field training of BDG family planning personnel have shown small impact. See Annex D for some comparative costs.	2. Generally USAID supported projects so far have not been low cost and have had limited impact because experiments not always well controlled. Baselone surveys often lacking.
3. Low cost high impact projects involving operational improvements.	3. Co-Financing projects generally strengthened PVO capacity to continue efforts on their own, e.g., CARE, YWCA & MCH.	3. In some cases absence of USAID support decreased rigor of PVO pursuit of development objectives (MCH).
D. PURPOSE		
1. Increased number and effectiveness of controlled PVO projects demonstrating innovating approaches and strategies relating to key development problems and evaluated in terms of mutual BDG/USAID program priorities.	1. A total of eight PVOs received Co-Financing support.	1. Project extensions rather than new projects predominated. Innovation generally not present in project approaches, may not constitute desirable chriteria.
2. End of Project Conditions a. General Substantial increase in overall total number of PVO projects due to USAID Co-Financing. Such projects better articulated, focused and controlled.		2a. Assumption resource scarcity for PVO projects in Bangladesh has not so far materialized; hence assumed increases did not occur. Lack of baseline on number of PVOs and their projects prevents determination of reliable change since 1975. ADAB listing of PVOs misrepresents number of Development oriented PVOs (many are relief, missionary, professional societies).

Project Design	Achievements	Shortfalls
b. Some projects in experimentation category ready for demonstration and demonstration category ready for replication.	b. Few projects operating on their own demonstrating success of their approach: YWCA & CARE.	b. Projects generally too expensive for BDG replication. No projects so far provide scope for USAID replication as bilateral projects.
c. A number of projects having increased efficiency and impact.	c. Projects have demonstrated foreign PVOs can provide effective supervision and training services to BDG programs.	c. Village projects still require time for demonstrating effectiveness of approaches and impact on rural poor (e.g., MAP/HEED and SCF/CDF).
Specific		
a. Project-location criteria defined as related to activity and methods for measuring impact.	a. Of twelve Co-Financing criteria perhaps six directly relevant: numbers 2, 6, 7, 11 and 12 (see Annex E).	a. Criteria have generally not been useful as they did not set Mission priorities, did not fit PVO interests or characteristics (e.g., #1 replicability, #4 wide practicality).
b. Activities appropriate to PVO-supported development programs tested and costed against efficiency achieved.	b. Activities generally within PVOs operational capacity.	b. Efficiency criteria needs definition within PVO, BDG and/or donor context. Comparisons are generally difficult as equivalent programs and information often are lacking.

Project Design	Achievements	Shortfalls
c. Methods for measuring impact developed, staffs trained in their use, and project evaluation and redesign systems affecting PVO operations.	c. Project personnel gained experience in measuring project impact. Utility of baseline surveys appreciated generally after 2nd year of implementation.	c. PVO operations generally not affected by project evaluation and redesign. PVOs view procedures as grant requirements rather than useful operational tools.
d. Agricultural productivity and per capita real income among the rural disadvantaged affected by PVO operations shows a perceptible rate of acceleration per year.	d. Some increases are presumed to occur (e.g. SCF/CDF, YWCA, CARE, MAP/HEED handicrafts).	d. As baseline income surveys rarely done exact improvements cannot be determined.
D. GOAL		
Integration of findings from controlled PVO projects into BDG and AID development programming and replication of proven approaches on a national scale.	Some BDG interest in MAP/HEED field training methodologies. Mission recognizes PVO strengths in health/family planning.	Thus far none of Co-Financing project findings have been integrated into either BDG or AID programs.

ANNEX B

BANGLADESH

Cost Sharing in PVO Co-Financing Projects

FY 1975-79

PVO	C O S T S						
	PVO	%	AID	%	BDG	%	Total
CARE	$ 211,825	25%	$ 422,176	50%	$201,900	25%	$ 835,901
CDF	528,557	66%	268,686	34%	-	-	797,243
CNRU	44,000	77%	26,000	23%	-	-	70,000
IVS #1 #2	40,000 207,864	10% 32%	290,000 365,531	70% 57%	85,000 66,528	20% 10%	415,000 639,923
MAP/HEED	1,068,036	79%	241,500	18%	35,000	3%	1,344,536
MCH	40,000	60%	25,000	37%	2,000	3%	67,000
YWCA	19,039	31%	42,000	69%	-	-	61,039
Total *	$2,159,321	51%	$1,680,893	40%	$390,428	9%	$4,230,642

* Includes all known USAID obligations as of end June 1979.
$13,000 for CNRU and $35,811 for MAP/HEED were subsequently deobligated.

June 1979

ANNEX C

BANGLADESH
PVO PROJECT PROPOSALS RECEIVED FOR CO-FINANCING CONSIDERATION

PVO Proposals Received*	USAID Approvals
Asia Foundation (2 proposals)	Under review
Bangladesh Association for Community Education (BACE)	
Christian Commission for Development in Bangladesh (CCDB)	
CONCERN	
Community Health Research Association	
Faridpur Academy (Asia Foundation)	
Food for the Hungry	
Ganomilan	
Holt International Children's Service	
International Union for Child Welfare (IUCW)	Under review
Legal Aid Society for Human Rights	
Narandia Integrated Rural Development Program	
Nijera Kori (Dor Ourselves)	
Seventh-Day Adventist World Service	
Underprevileged Children's Education Program (UCEP)	
Women's Voluntary Association (WVA)	
YMCA	

* Includes only formal proposal submissions. In addition, many PVOs presented proposals informally for discussion which for various reasons did not become formalized.

ANNEX D

BANGLADESH

Some Comparative Project Costs
(US $000)

Project	Total # Villages (1)	Total Cost (2)	Total Av Cost Village (3)	Av Cost/ Village/Year (4)
ULASHI (1977-79) (Swanirvar)	119*	3,545,666	29,795	14,897
SCF/CDF (1977-80)	20	797,243	39,862	13,287
IVS (1978-80)	25	573,395	22,936	11,468
IUCW (1978-80)	304	1,921,220	6,320	3,160
CARE (1976-78)	610**	634,001	1,039	519
ASARRD (1976-79)	8	*** 113,466	14,183	4,727

(1) Total number of villages under the project.
(2) Total external project cost (excludes BDG & Community inputs).
(3) Total average cost per village for varying time frames.
(4) Average cost per village per year.

* From a Two Year Development Plan prepared after Ulashi-Jadunathpur 2.65 miles long canal was dug (November 1976 - May 1977). BDG was seeking UN support for the project. Community inputs were planned at about same level.

** Refers to number of IRDP goodstanding cooperatives, which by law are to be one per village, with which CARE worked.

*** Source: Dr. M. Alamgir, ASARRD An Overview, 3rd Annual Evaluation Workshop, Dacca, June 18-19, 1979 Section 2.8, p.5. Excludes bank costs for operations and credit.

PRO:IBuxell:as
6/19/79

BANGLADESH

PVO CO-FINANCING

CRITERIA FOR MISSION/BDG SUPPORT *

To be considered favorably the project must:

1. Stress replicability of proposed project activities.

2. Involve the poor - marginal to small farmers, landless laborers, women, youth or craftsman - to help stimulate and guide communities and institutions to work on their basic needs and build their capacity to continue on their own.

3. Experiment with or demonstrate either a new cost effective and innovative strategy for local development, or an improvement in the operation of an on-going public or private program in the following areas of concentration: rural development, agriculture, and family planning.

4. Be widely practical in Bangladesh in terms of conceptual soundness, organizational and training needs for later large-scale application; local talents potentially available; concern for the "unit cost" of the activity and its relation to the very low-level of certain local resources, particularly capital.

5. Be of particular interest to BDG or local organizations (in cases in which an activity can develop and spread without BDG sanction or technical and material assistance) as evidenced by the BDG's approval or non-objection to the project activity.

6. Be an activity which the PVO can demonstrably administer with present staff or with some strengthening of staff as clearly indicated in the project's implementation plan.

7. Be an activity within an area of the PVO's demonstrated competence and interest - a logical outgrowth of previous activities in Bangladesh or already established strengths in other country programs.

Source: Project Paper, pp. 15-17

8. Be an activity experimenting with or demonstrating an approach which can be validated with a high degree of accuracy within two years.

9. Target a reasonable percentage (at least 5%) of total project funds on the development and integration of family planning/population control approaches into the project's activities during the first year if at all possible, but at least during the second year of activity. *

10. Be an activity in which the PVO is willing to utilize USAID design and evaluation procedures including semi-annual and annual evaluation reviews.

11. Be an activity in which the PVO is willing to comply with USG regulations, procedures, and accountability requirements.

12. Be an activity which is strictly development in orientation, not relief and rehabilitation.

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* The Mission is convinced that there are practical but as yet unexplored ways in which population/family planning information, instruction and the delivery of related services can be woven meaningfully into a wide variety of project activities. The Mission views PVO activities to be co-financed under this PROP as a mechanism for experimenting with this premise and has confidence that PVOs have the capacity for developing family planning/population control components into their projects. The Mission Health and Population staff will consult with all PVOs to offer guidance on the application of this criterion. If in their judgement no such meaningful 5% input is possible, the criterion can be waived.

ANNEX F

SOME PVOs PROGRAM COSTS IN BANGLADESH, 1977-78

($ 000)

Name of PVOs		Approximate Annual Budget
Agricultural Development Agencies in Bangladesh (ADAB) 1978		$ 30,000
Asia Foundation (1978)	...	480,000
Bangladesh (Baptist) Mission, USA (1978)		138,000
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) 1978		600,000
Bangladesh Voluntary Services (BVS) 1977		80,000
CARE (FY 1979)	...	1,220,200
CARITAS (1977)	...	2,020,000
Christian Commission for Development in Bangladesh (CCDB) 1978		1,175,100
CONCERN (1977)	...	810,000
Food for the Hungry (1978)	...	25,000
Gono Unnayan Prochesta (GUP) 1978	...	400,000
Health, Education and Economic Development (HEED) 1978		900,000
Lutheran World Federation/RDRS (1978)	...	2,620,000
Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) 1978		550,000
OXFAM* (1978)	...	1,620,400
PROSHIKA (1978)	...	167,000
Radda Barnen (1978)	...	191,000
Salvation Army (1978)	...	200,000
Save the Children Federation (USA) 1979		528,000
	Total:	$ 13,754,700

* Includes $332,733 for Burmese refugees.