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FROM - Seoul

SUBJECT - End-of-Tour Report by William H. Johnson,  
Rural Development Advisor, Kangwon-Do

REFERENCE - AID/W Report Control No. U-513

The saga of the Pak-Johnson regimen in Kangwon-Do is drawing to a close. Mr. Johnson is scheduled for home leave and transfer to Vietnam; Governor Pak very possibly is headed for higher official responsibilities.

The two comprised a pair that may well leave its imprint on national-provincial relations for years to come. As the attached report indicates, under their tutelage Kangwon-Do has led the way toward a reorientation of Korea's philosophy of politico-economic controls in Korea.

Mr. Johnson's influence in these spheres has extended beyond his assessments of his own contributions to a needed evolution. His down-to-earth knowledge of the local scene, plus an ungloried tendency to report his observations to the Mission, have had a beneficial effect upon the entire AID effort in this country.

May the Johnsons thrive in their assigned destinations.

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Attachment: End-of-Tour Report  
William H. Johnson

PAGE PAGES

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END-OF-TOUR REPORT (Control No. U-513)Name: William H. JohnsonJob Title: Rural Development  
Advisor/Kangwon DoCountry of Assignment: KoreaTour of Duty Began: April 13, 1964Prior Country Assignment and  
Years: USCIB/Korea, 4½ yearsTour of Duty End: May 14, 1966Project Activity (Name and No.): 489-11-110-594 Rural Development Policy  
Planning and Survey

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A. Summary

This report will cover a two-year tour as a rural development advisor in Kangwon Province in the Republic of Korea. The advisor has been fortunate in having continuity of service with the major Korean provincial staff throughout this entire period and, as a result, close professional and personal relationships have been established.

The province is essentially rural with no major manufacturing industries. Only four cities of more than 50,000 population exist at this time and except for several hydro-electric power plants and coal and iron ore mines, all of the resources are in crops, fisheries or forestry.

The advisor has endeavored constantly to influence the provincial staff in increasing their understanding of the close correlation and cooperation required in rural development activities between institutions responsible for program development and implementation, technical services

and training for agricultural improvement, and rural credit. Although national ministries in the Republic of Korea broadly determine programs, movements have been observed and fostered to encourage local units of government to develop ideas and programs within the limits of national policy. Program implementation is a function of provincial and local government and the advisor has devoted substantial time to these areas.

Major areas of attention during this period include:

1. Follow-through on programs of direct interest and concern to USOM/  
Korea:
  - a. Food for Peace activities,
  - b. Upland development programs and techniques,
  - c. Fertilizer and limestone programs,
  - d. Assistance to a corn production program,
  - e. Reporting services on crop conditions, disasters, etc.,
  - f. Surplus property utilization.
2. Activities related to cooperation and coordination between rural development institutions and strengthening of those agencies:
  - a. Contact with the provincial Industry Bureau and its agricultural sections,
  - b. Contact with the provincial Construction Bureau,
  - c. Work with the provincial Office of Rural Development (ORD) in agricultural research, guidance and training functions,
  - d. Work with provincial cooperatives in their fertilizer, limestone and credit operations,

- e. Continual effort to coordinate research, guidance, program, and credit toward common objectives in provincial rural development.
3. Activities designed to strengthen local participation in program development and fostering of new ideas to suit local needs:
- a. Establishment of Kangwon Province as a pilot operation for provincial comprehensive rural development, using Food for Peace,
  - b. Assistance in the formation of local harbor development committees at Sokcho and Mukho ports,
  - c. Encouragement and assistance in the formation of a mountain resource development advisory committee to the provincial governor,
  - d. Assistance in the formation of an Alpine area crops review committee,
  - e. Assistance and encouragement to a local agricultural college in preparation of special research projects.

In all of these activities, the advisor served more as a catalyst than as a specific technical advisor. Seoul-based USOM/K staff or Korean staff of ministry level have been called upon for specifics (technical advice, training or funds). Invariably they were cooperative and helpful.

The effectiveness of the advisor in the activities discussed above has been related to the degree of understanding of the provincial governor and the relationship of the activity to his interests. A basic requirement in such a position is that the advisor, at all times, retain a good professional and personal relationship with the power structure of the agency which he is endeavoring to influence.

B. Existing Differences between United States and Republic of Korea  
Practices and Adaptations Attempted

Differences between United States and Republic of Korea practices are most often found in problems of identifying priorities of actions. The advisor feels, in common with many other Americans in Korea, that it is not often realistic to assume that technical consideration will have the degree of influence on problem approaches or solutions in the Republic of Korea as is true in our culture. Social relationships between Korean people and the personal stake of Korean policy-makers in programs have a much stronger effect on decisions than we are accustomed to in our country.

The attitude of the advisor has been to attempt to define and understand motivations of counterparts or counterpart agencies in an effort to utilize these motivations toward common objectives.

As an example, the following review of the development of the Kangwon Do "Fire Farmers Resettlement Program" is presented:

Early in 1965, the advisor, in official and unofficial meetings with the governor and senior staff, continued to identify the serious erosion and land degradation which was occurring in the province. This condition aggravated problems of river bed siltation, river dikes being overtopped, reservoirs silting up (both for electric power or irrigation) and was resulting in denuding the forest resources of the province.

This condition was caused by illegal use of mountainside land by rural people who burn off sections, use it a few years and then move on

to a new location when the soil is no longer useful.

At this same time, the USOM/K Food for Peace program was in the process of being developed and the advisor suggested that this program might be helpful to the problem and that the provincial government might find ways of utilizing Food for Peace in solutions to fire farmer problems.

As a result, a provincial program was developed to resettle fire farmers on new land which had been properly protected by bench terraces constructed with labor paid by Food for Peace. The Korean justification for the program and the official briefing to Republic of Korea officials does not primarily aim at improved conservation practices, but is a clear-cut identification of a social problem of many underprivileged rural people, and it reflects the interest of government in being recognized as a benefactor of this group by the citizens. This attitude has been acceptable to the advisor, providing the technical controls are adequate and the land distribution is made to members of the fire farmer group.

The advisor recognizes a vast difference in understanding, both by government and citizens, of the role of local village institutions in preparation of locally oriented plans and in developing principles of democratic action. The advisor has not placed priority on working directly with individual village organizations, as such efforts could easily be negated by administrative controls from local government. Considerably more sophisticated understanding by national, provincial and local government is necessary before democratic village institutions will have much chance for success.

As a result of this belief, the advisor has directed much effort toward persuasive activities at senior staff level in the province and in the counties in an effort to develop a climate in which democratic village institutions could grow. As an example of this activity, the organization of fishery port development committees at Sokcho and Mukho harbors can be reviewed. This exercise was not only directed toward a local problem but also involved senior county officials and national staff in a training situation.

Sokcho and Mukho harbors are located on Korea's northeast coast. Sokcho is exclusively a fishery port with little coastal trade and limited lightering of iron ore from the port to off-shore deepwater anchorages of large freighters. Sokcho only recently has had electrical service and has no rail transportation or suitable highway service to major Korean population centers. Mukho port is a combination fishery port and coal transportation center. The nearby mines assure that Mukho will continue to serve as the major coastal shipping port for coal in the Republic of Korea.

Both areas face similar problems. National ministries, provincial agencies and local government are all operating projects with little coordination of effort. The national Ministries of Transportation, Construction, Agriculture and Forestry, Commerce and Industry, Communications, and Home Affairs, together with the provincial Industry Bureau, Construction Bureau, Fishery Office and Fishery Cooperatives, all have programs of various types applied to these ports.

The advisor, with strong support from the provincial governor, has endeavored to assist local agencies in combining efforts and ideas to produce comprehensive, economically oriented planning for the essential needs of these ports. The groups include representation by the staffs of the national agencies, county government, local business people, Chamber of Commerce and local fishery cooperatives.

Although no spectacular results can be reported at this time, the spirit and interest of the communities are aroused and national agencies are discovering that local officials and citizens often are very understanding of their own problems.

Another significant difference between Republic of Korea and United States practices is in the area of training. The advisor has often been discouraged by the apparent lack of Korean interest in the idea of seeking out natural leaders and, by training, to exploit this leadership in the rural areas. Korean official thinking appears to be oriented toward selection of available village people, training them both as leaders and as specialists in a narrow field, and then expect leadership "just to happen" when the trainees return to the village. The advisor regrets having had little influence in being able to modify this practice and at present a large percentage of technical training sessions are filled with rather ill-defined and occasionally inaccurate social philosophies. Little understanding of use of modern teaching techniques and the minimum use of actual field or laboratory practice also has been discouraging.

An example of the receptivity of Korean farmers to changes in methods or cultural practices can be shown by the following example of the corn production program in the province.

Corn Cultivation in Kangwon Do

<u>Year</u>	<u>Native White Corn</u>		<u>Improved Corn (US Yellow Dent)</u>		<u>Percentage of Total Production Yellow Dent Corn</u>
	<u>Area Hectares</u>	<u>Yield Metric Tons</u>	<u>Area Hectares</u>	<u>Yield Metric Tons</u>	
1962	16,430	8,869			
1963	20,591	13,166	600	600	2.8
1964	21,189	15,315	6,257	6,257	22.8
1965	18,400	14,210	11,139	12,540	40.0

The chart above indicates the willingness of Korean farmers to adopt new ideas. In spite of reports by farmers that "yellow corn uses more fertilizer" and that "yellow corn does not taste as good as local varieties", the educational efforts of staff from both the national and provincial ORD who provide technical services to agriculture has been successful.

The advisor is confident that within the limits imposed by the size of farms (average: one hectare in Kangwon Do) and the shortage of both annual and medium-term development credit, farmers show a high degree of understanding and are receptive to new practical ideas and techniques which have been demonstrated to be economically feasible.

Korean practice in government control of programs is markedly different from United States systems. Historically, national governments in Korea have retained most of the programming functions by control of funds. Provincial officials may be more loyal to national ministries than they are to their own provincial government. Provincial and county officials are often held in poor regard by national personnel. They have only been able to perform exactly as instructed by national government. As a result, local staff (county and township) have had little interest in program development, no opportunity to develop skills and, in general, have been apathetic except to a direct order from national government delivered through the province.

Another effect of this system is a near "insulation" between local government and the village citizen. The advisor has endeavored to encourage county and city judgments on solutions to their own problems. This effort has had substantial success in the Kangwon Do Comprehensive Food for Peace Program where local governments have actively developed and supported local plans.

Although the United States systems of rural guidance may on occasion show overlapping of functions and responsibilities, it is the advisor's observation that Korea, with limited resources of capital and technique, can ill afford such duplications.

The tendency of both the CRD and the National Association of Cooperative Federation (NACF) to expand their service to rural people has resulted in overlapping. This situation is related to several basic problems.

Some of these are indicated below:

1. Both organizations tend to identify their function and responsibility with farmers who are members of their own clubs or groups. As a result, both agencies wish to provide a broad spectrum of technical services to their own groups with many farmers not participating.
2. Government pressures on new programs and expansion of existing programs often result in arbitrary assignment of available organizations to perform specific jobs. As an example, in spite of a national agreement in 1965 between these organizations that the cooperatives would be responsible for guidance in farm management while the CRD would be responsible for technical agricultural guidance, in the 1966 Self Reliance Farm Program, orders from national government have resulted in assignment of CRD staff to the jobs of analysis of management plans and guidance in formulation of farm plans to be allied with credit from the cooperatives.

In broad context, the advisor believes that Korean share with US staff the same general beliefs and principles of rural development activities. Differences which exist are often traceable to timing of programs, limited funds available, or priorities of the segments which make up programs. The advisor has found sincere willingness to adapt to ideas and to take action on recommendations which have been logically and clearly presented within the degree of flexibility of the institutions.

C. Future Measures and Direction for United States Activities

1. Provincial rural development advisors will continue to play a significant role in rural Korea in the foreseeable future. This judgment is based on the advisor's experience of the past two years in observing the receptivity of government at all levels to accept and work closely with American concepts.
2. Provincial rural development advisors should continue to play an important role in Food for Peace programs in Korea. This program, if well planned in the province, can make a major contribution to the rural economy. As levels of Title II, PL 480, assistance decrease in the future, provincial advisors together with provincial government should be increasingly careful to select those types of projects most apt to have high, short range economic impact.
3. The USCM position of sympathetic understanding and limited approval of de-centralization of government should be continued. While we must retain a keen awareness of the limitations of local officials due to lack of training and education, the potential for building toward real democracy is increased when these officials acquire greater responsibility and are subject to the influence of their constituents.
4. Provincial governments are being called upon more often for program development ideas. At the national level, the Economic Planning Board serves as a general planning agency. At the provincial level, an Office of Planning and Inspection exists. Unfortunately, this

latter office does not have comparable stature to the line bureaus, nor are such offices staffed to prepare reasonable plans. As a result, provincial plans seldom relate concepts such as investment versus return, priority of alternative investments or cost-benefit analyses. The plans seldom relate to local tax collection potentials, which would reflect increased personal involvement of the provinces, the guns and cities. Changes in provincial government organization structure to provide for better utilization of these offices, combined with upgrading and training of staff, would result in improved provincial planning and program implementation.

5. The national and provincial CRD and the NACF could improve their field operations in two ways:
  - a. Adherence to clear cut guidelines as to functions and purposes of each agency's field workers.
  - b. Improved cooperation at gun and myon level between the gun CRD field men and the pioneer workers of the NACF.
6. Provincial advisors have serious problems in selection of activities on which to concentrate. The advisor regrets being unable to provide adequate counsel for programs, organizations and individuals who have requested his assistance. A two-man provincial staff, as is now scheduled, properly supported by Korean drivers and an office secretary, will make provincial advisory services substantially more effective.

The writer would be remiss in this report if he did not identify and

express his personal gratitude to the many Korean officials and USOM/Korea staff members who have assisted in his efforts. Without the deep interest and support of Governor Pak Kyong Won, few of the advisor's recommendations would have been possible of implementation. Because of this personal concern, all provincial staff have been completely cooperative in programs of interest to the United States.

The technical and administrative support of USOM/Korea, especially the Rural Development Division has been, at all times, a complete effort and there have been no cases when action or cooperation was desired when it was not immediately provided. This has been a most interesting, challenging and, hopefully, the most effective tour for the advisor.