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PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY

1. Mission or AID/W Office Name USAID/Tanzania			2. Project Number 621-0093		
3. Project Title Masai Livestock and Range Development					
4. Key Project Dates (Fiscal Years)			5. Total U.S. Funding - Life of Project		
a. Project Agreement Signed	b. Final Obligation	c. Final Input Delivered	\$ 4,769		
1970	1979	1980			
6. Evaluation No. as Listed in Eval Schedule			7. Period Covered by this Eval.		
78-4			From: Jan 1977 Month/Year		
			To: March 1978 Month/Year		
9. Action Decisions Reached at Evaluation Review, Including Items Needing Further Study:			10. Officer or Unit Responsible for Follow-Up		11. Date Action to be Completed
Complete detailed project phase-out plan			McCandliss		July, 1978
Complete individual project personnel workplans for period 6/1/78 - 6/1/79			McCandliss		June, 1978
Continue work on range management plans			McCandliss		Continuing
Continue studies on sociological factors inhibiting project performance			McCandliss		Continuing
Fully implement Monduli Ranch Training Center activities, including obtaining title to land.			McCandliss		August, 1978
Continue water mgmt./control activities in Monduli and Kiteto Districts.			McCandliss		Continuing
12. Signatures:			Mission or AID/W Office Director		
Signature 			Signature		
Typed Name: Barry H. Hill, Asst Ag Dev Officer			Typed Name: Richard L. Fodol, A/DIR		
Date: Agricultural Project Evaluation Officer			Date: 16 May 78		

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13. Summary

This Project Evaluation Summary describes activities covering the period January 1, 1977 to March 31, 1978. Several complex factors occurring within the project require that this document be unusually lengthy in order that the reader can achieve perspective of the problems involved.

A. Positive Aspects

During the reporting period, water development has continued to be the most visible physical sign of progress with the Masai Project. Ten dams were built and six boreholes dug which provide dry season water in these districts. The relationships between contract personnel and host government officials have been sustained in positive ways. The excellent rapport built up over several years in the region has expedited the design of the new Arusha Planning and Village Development Project in 1977/1978. The bull distribution and animal health components of the project have continued to be successful and the Masai people have responded positively to the technologies introduced in the area. A substantial body of knowledge relating to the Masai social structure has been compiled by the Project Sociologist and TDY consultants which reflects favorable responses by the Masai to innovations introduced in the Masai Project. Further work has been completed on range inventories and tolerance of various grasses to wet and drought conditions. Aside from the personnel limitations stated below, a number of Tanzanians presently are assigned to key management roles in the project. The Project team has reached full strength and a Project Manager is now in place.

B. Negative Indications

During 1977, the project was effected by the full impact of the Tanzanian villagization efforts. In Masailand, a number of communities were relocated. This had the effect of defocusing grazing and management plans that were based on prior locations of political/geographic/land units. Actions to register ranching associations have effectively halted. The end result is that Tanzov policy regarding village relationships with the districts is not clear for Masailand, and the project team has been unable to implement plans on a timely basis previously developed for rational grazing and animal management systems.

Another negative indication is the fact that after eight years of project implementation, comprehensive data on animal census, grazing or livestock marketing practices still is lacking. The Rural Training Center has not yet been developed into a working entity, although the facilities have been completed (as of 3/78). Ownership of the 1,200 acre farm on which the RTC is located remains to be transferred to the Arusha Region, and the staffing and modus operandi of the Center are still to be decided upon. A serious detriment to the facilitation of the project has been the absence of a Chief-of-Party and AID Project Manager during most of the year, which resulted in lack of direction and leadership for the team. This lack of leadership on the U.S. side was not helped by the fact that some Tanzanian participants trained under the project were re-assigned outside of the project after their return to Tanzania. Several of the team members still lack counterparts.

The project is also being faced with a continuing problem of Masai equipment, acquired under an AID loan, being diverted to other uses. Equipment in Monduli District, for example, has been used 27% of its working time on off-project assignments. In Kiteto District, the equipment was used off the project for 21% of the total hours worked. Given the problems of vehicle and equipment maintenance, such diversion renders the utility of the equipment to the project considerably less than that would be possible otherwise. It should be noted that equipment diversion has tended to take place toward the end of the fiscal year when recurrent funds for the Masai development have been exhausted, but funds for other development projects within the Region were still available. To the Tanzanian the diversion seemed sensible, given the funding situation.

In general we can say that physical infrastructure goals are being achieved but that the institutional development required to make them fully effective is lagging. The problems with institutional change are a combination of political factors and Tangov policies. We have come to realize how limited our experience is in these areas and how long it takes to affect permanent changes. However, we do believe that providing organization and services aimed at the Masai economy (their cattle) is the only way for us (outsiders) to direct major change. In this respect we are helping to lay the base for changes in the Masai society which we hope will eventually lead to closer relationship with "Tanzania", in a less disruptive and painful way.

14. Evaluation Methodology

This report is constituted from the materials prepared by Masai project personnel for its annual FES evaluation inputs, a preliminary report by Alan Jacobs, Anthropologist, who visited the project during August 1977 and USAID staff. No special data collection techniques were used other than consultation with project members over particular issues.

15. Documents to be Revised - None

16. External Factors

As indicated in the Summary (13) the main external set of constraints has been the frequent and continuous TanGov policy changes which appear to have peaked during the last year. It is not just shifts in emphasis or structures which cause the problem, but uncertainties as to how new policy is to meld with old, and with project tasks.

Noteworthy are policies relating to the Villagization Program vis-a-vis Ranching Associations, priority areas of work and administrative jurisdiction.

Since 1973 Tanzania has made resettlement of people its first priority. This has had a major impact on Masai project operations because it has not only delayed ranching association formation for the past four years, but has also placed the focus for development into smaller geographical units, i.e., villages or management units. The project has gradually redirected its efforts toward more active concentration in these units in keeping with District interests and planning. There is essentially no conflict between a management unit (co-terminous with a Kijiji) and a ranching association, and the main thrust of project activities is within these components of ranching associations and not on the larger association level on the whole. However, the uppermost question (and not entirely an academic one) is the future of the ranching association as a unit for development. The project has attempted to keep the organizational aspects of the association within its operations and planning, and the Districts appear to favor continuing to at least give lip service to the concept (eight of the priority areas chosen by the districts are associations, in place or in formation), but until the TanGov decides to re-emphasize this superordinate level of organization, it will not be feasible or desirable for the project to do so.

Attempts have been made in the project to shift its orientation from the larger Ranching Association units to these smaller management units, or viji,ji. Nevertheless, it has still retained the association concept as a viable unit of organization and, indeed in areas where associations were not moribund, continued to foster their development. Recent decisions indicate the association notion may be completely abandoned; however, it is not clear what will happen to those associations' rights of occupancy, nor what the ecological impact would be of focusing exclusively on smaller entities. It is also unclear what will be the status of the four "Ujamaa" Hill ranches, because their Tanzanian Rural Development Bank loans have been based on association members' stock as collateral.

From the start of their implementation of their annual work plan, based on five priority areas in Monduli and Kiteto Districts, project technicians have been faced with abrupt changes of plans and emergency operations. At the present time neither district appears to be certain as to which areas will be priorities for the project to operate in. Competition over management responsibility between the Arusha Region and the districts has created an issue over who is to take responsibility for what. Over the past year this involved jockeying for operating funds for project equipment. With control of funding still an issue, the Tanzanian Project co-Manager recently attempted to reorganize the entire administrative structure of the project, removing it almost completely from day-to-day cooperation with the districts. The issue of control of funding remains unanswered.

In addition to shifts in policy, a major external set of constraints concerns allocation of manpower. Although less severe than in past years, U.S.-trained Tanzanian personnel have been moved out of project positions either through their own choice or by direct transfer. To make matters worse, those who remain in the districts are often directed to other tasks, which makes their participation in the project minimal.

A serious constraint over the past year has concerned redirection at district and regional discretion of project machinery and funds. With increasing local control over equipment, there has been increasing diversion of project equipment for non-project use. The same problem has occurred

with funds slated for project tasks. Last year no boreholes were dug in Kiteto District, in spite of the fact that there were funds available (an exception to the usual situation with diversion).

The fundamental problem is simply that both districts depend upon project equipment to carry out most of their other development requirements because their departments lack most of the vehicles and heavy equipment needed in order to maintain operational capability for the priority areas. They also depend upon project-budgeted funds to obtain needed funds for other inadequately funded operations.

We should note that apparently no recurrent funds will be made available to the livestock segment, the project in Kiteto and Monduli Districts because of Government policy of not allocating recurrent funds until a project is completed. These funds will become available when the project ends in 1980. Given this situation, redirection of funds and equipment is not at all surprising. It should also be noted that recurrent funds are available for water development from the Ministry of Water Development. This is the primary source of funds for tractor operation, dam construction, and borehole drilling.

Another set of external constraints concerns local implementation of policies. The Districts, while anxious to see the resettlement program be completed and grazing systems introduced, have not been able to establish permanent communities in areas where the project is supposed to be promoting grazing management. Nor have stocking quotas been enforced assiduously. For example, in one of the oldest ranching associations, after three years, the resettlement program is still being implemented. A ten percent animal off-take program through sales is theoretically in force, but there is no control on introduction of more stock through purchase. Also range management is made difficult by individual cattle ownership and joint land use.

17. Findings about Project goal/sub-goal

The goal is "To assist the Tanzanian Government achieve its objective of self-sufficiency and exportable surplus in the livestock subsector."

At the present time it is difficult to measure to what extent the project is directly contributing to this goal. The management of marketing is no longer controlled by the project, hence it is difficult to measure the impact of the project in this area. It should also be noted that Masailand experienced a severe drought up until the long rains of 1977, which made development and expansion of a livestock economy difficult. In addition, controlled meat prices at national level have discouraged increased offtake.

However, it can be said that in spite of local District problems and infrastructure, the project has had a positive influence in increasing animal production through its programs of more stable water supplies, dipping, veterinary centers, and training of Tanzanian personnel. More recently, project focus is being directed to Kenyan border areas of Masailand in the belief that greater availability of Tanzanian facilities will assist in halting movement of sale stock to Kenya.

18. Project Purpose

The purpose is "to assist the Tanzanian Government in its efforts to integrate the Masai people more fully into the national economy through establishing the capability in the Monduli and Kiteto District Development Offices for directing, maintaining and progressively extending integrated livestock programs in Masailand Ranch Association areas and thereby attain an improved livelihood and lifestyle."

In 1976 the Project Purpose was revised from a former emphasis solely on livestock production and animal off-take to include some focus on the social development of the Masai and their integration into the Tanzanian economy. This shift in the purpose statement was a response to Tanzania's efforts at decentralization, villagization and self-reliance, and in response to the Congressional Mandate. However, the purpose statement is more rhetorical than meaningful in the sense that there is little basis upon which to accurately measure social response, net income, or for measuring animal production and offtakes. Therefore, in the aggregate, progress in achieving the project purpose will not be measurable, particularly in view of the fact that the project is now in the penultimate year of funding. As shown below under outputs, it is unlikely that many of the project outputs will be reached.

This problem of project purpose may mean that the purpose statement reflects inadequate project design rather than unsuccessful efforts over the past eight years. The Masai are successful in their occupation as livestock herders if through no other evidence than the fact that they can survive in a hostile environment characterized by erratic climatic changes. Sociological investigations also indicate that the Masai may be comparably more wealthy than their sedentary crop producing neighbors.

The project experience shows that expatriates, particularly U.S.-oriented livestock specialists, can do very little in terms of organizing livestock production and range management in Masailand. What a contract team can do, however, is organize and deliver technology, services and infrastructure which will enhance the Masai's capacity to improve their husbandry practices. This project was designed and approved before the Tanzanian Government's decision to effect the villagization and decentralization. Conflicts have occurred because of these policies. Villagization reduced the size of geographic units and rendered obsolete the management plans based on ranching associations. Decentralization has resulted in a shift to district-level financial and administrative control of project resources. The "Masai Project" can no longer function as a separate entity.

A list of end-of-project indicators of the progress to date is set forth below:

Progress towards EDFS:

<u>INDICATORS (EDFS)</u>	<u>Progress</u>
Ranching Associations (RA) organized and functioning	Continuing developmental efforts are focusing on constituents of RAs (management units or Vijiji) as basic units. (Little progress since last EAR.)
Acceptance of improved bulls	Introduction of improved milk herd stock in Komolcnik, beef in other areas, mostly associated with Ujamaa bull ranches. Two ranches organized over the past year. Capital works (water & dips) being done on others.

- Outreach program** Rural Training Center facilities 100% complete, but implementation of the program hampered by delays in arrival of audio-visual equipment, staffing, development of a Center syllabus and purchase of land. (Little progress on this aspect.)
- Tick control** The program of dip construction continues. More serious problems of repair, supplying acaricides, and water, tend to inhibit full implementation of dipping program.
- Provision of dry season water points** Program continuing through borehole and dam construction: Six boreholes in Monduli District dug and three cleaned; ten dams built in 1977.
- Management plans** This past year's experience would indicate creation of plans and range inventories as on target, but actual implementation of plans has not occurred for reasons given in # 16.
- Masai attitudinal change** In 1977, steps towards establishing an ongoing monitoring system were initiated. This was severely limited due to lack of funds. The Project Sociologist's report on change among the Masai and the Jacobs paper provide an adequate baseline of a qualitative nature on which to base future investigations.

19. Outputs - Inputs

Since the key project outputs of a quantitative nature revolve around the preparation of range and livestock management plans for Ranching Associations, it is unlikely that these outputs will be achieved. As described above, the villagization efforts of the Tanzanian Government over the past two years have effectively disrupted the organizational base of the ranching associations. A surrogate structure will probably be villages established on a smaller geographical area than a ranching association. These new organizational structures are not yet in place.

The quantitative output indicators as they were originally conceived are shown below:

1. 10 RA's with tick control requirements met by at least 75% of the livestock.
2. 10 RA's with at least 40% permanent water coverage for dry grazing areas.
3. 10 RA's with at least 80% permanent and seasonal coverage.
4. 34 Participants' training completed--long term U.S.
5. 12 RA's registered
6. 8 RA's with rights of occupancy
7. 12 RA's fully covered by management plans
8. 3 RA's complying to stocking quotas adjusted to range conditions studies
9. 600 persons trained at Rural Training Center
10. 10,000 persons oriented through RTC Outreach program

The qualitative outputs having to do with changes in Masai attitudes and training through the Rural Training Center may be more positive. However, given the problems of the Rural Training Center, unless more emphasis is placed on getting the center operational and programs accelerated, it is questionable whether or not the center will achieve the project's original training targets. The qualitative output indicators as they were originally conceived are shown below:

1. RA's organized and functioning as independent and self-governing entities with basic facilities.
2. Broad acceptance of selective breeding using improved bulls, castration and culling.
3. Outreach component established through the Rural Training Center.

4. Noticeable attitude change by Masai towards a modern society.

The shift in TanGov policy from the ranching association concept to one of smaller functional management units centered around the Kijiji has rendered meaningless the progress indicators as originally conceived in the project. Nevertheless the infrastructure installed with project resources remain to be utilized by whatever functional units may be in vogue at any given time, and a significant number of the other quantitative outputs originally intended under the EOFS are expected to be met.

20. Unplanned effects

The loss of Tanzanian personnel trained in the U.S. under the project to other activities and Government positions has created serious problems in project management. Taking a broad view, such talent is not lost to the country as a whole, but this is not the intended purpose of project training components. One partial solution may be a closer selection of individuals for training.

21. Changes in Design or Execution

While no changes in design or execution are being suggested per se, project management is expecting to give greater emphasis in the future in its day-to-day operations to overcoming problems being cited herein. Diversion of project resources by districts to meet other district development needs calls for more operational and fiscal planning and budgeting. This problem will be brought before responsible authorities at both the district and regional levels. During the final phase of the project, reviews will be made to increase even more the participation of the Masai in the decision-making process on developing management plans and project installations, although with regard to project field extension programs it is doubtful that these will enable the Masai people to amalgamate their livestock practices with the stated goals and purposes of the project. Hopefully, this will serve to reinforce the maintenance of specific innovations introduced by the project and establish a greater degree of responsibility at the local level.

Project Phase-out Plan

USAID/Tanzania has been planning for the phasing-out of this project since the last in-depth evaluation performed in February 1976. External factors have hindered and undermined

achievement of project objectives (see Sections 16 and 20) which led to changes in project purpose at the time of the last evaluation. Efforts in the next 1½ years will continue toward fulfilling the major objectives of developing priority geographic areas--to include preparation of range management plans, incorporating and amalgamating, where possible, the ranching association concept with the vijiji (villagization) program--continuing highly successful activities in water management, and pursuing the completion, equipping and staffing of the Rural Training Center.

It is USAID/Tanzania's intention to incorporate district planning for Masailand into the primary phase of the Arusha Region Village Development Project. During the first phase of this new project, which entails the design of an Arusha Region Development Plan (a one year effort), the post-project needs of the Masai project will be taken into account. It is partly intended that by 1981, the two Masai Districts-- Monduli and Kitoto--will have been incorporated into certain aspects of the Village Development Project. By 1981 USAID/Tanzania will be in a position to decide how elements of the Village Development Project (rural road construction, waterworks construction, boreholes, for example) may successfully be employed and integrated into Masailand activities, and what adjustments may be necessary in the Rural Training program to continue its activities.

Discussions with Arusha Regional officials are underway at present to identify three priority areas in the two Districts in which, over the remaining life of the project, activities will be concentrated. After this selection process is finished, major efforts will be made by U.S. contract staff and their Tanzanian counterparts to design well-founded and detailed range management plans in the areas selected. The contract team will also begin the preparation of materials to serve as guides for Districts and RA's (and/or management units) for continued development in the priority areas after departure of the team.

A detailed phase out plan is now being prepared.

22. Lessons learned

Over the past ten years, Tanzania has grown and matured as a nation—changing as needs and problems arose and attempting to test and develop means by which self-reliance and equality would work in rural areas. Accordingly, policies and attitudes have also changed.

All the while there has been no doubt that the Tanzania Government is sincere and has taken a positive outlook despite the seemingly contradictory and self-destructive changes that are recurring. The outcome however, has been that Tanzania now has a clear path toward development directed toward the needs of rural villages and their people.

Perhaps the project has been handicapped in achieving its purpose because the AID system is not flexible enough to allow Missions to respond quickly to changes. For example, if USAID/Tanzania were to have prepared a FF revision to modify the Masai Project more in line with villagization, up to one year would have been required for approval. Ironically, this project may have been in the vanguard in exemplifying the Congressional Mandate prior to the time the Mandate was even published, since it was truly oriented to the rural poor from the start.

The Masai Project has offered many lessons for us in the design of the Arusha Regional Plan Village Development Project. More flexibility to adapt to changing situations has been built into that program. The Village Project also attempts to acknowledge procedures and operation patterns of districts and regions that we have come to know and understand in carrying out the Masai Project.

In the final evaluation of the project special attention should be given to external changes that will inevitably occur during implementation of any project lasting as long as this one has. During the lifetime of this Masai Project these changes have taken place in both the TanGov's policies and objectives (e.g., emphasis on villagization), as well as the U.S. Government's development directions (e.g., new focus of

meeting basic human needs of the rural poor). These policy changes cited have directly affected implementation of this project. The probable occurrence of such changes in long-term projects must be carefully considered by project designers. Furthermore the longer the duration of a project, the more the Mission must have full authority to change project directions and scope on a timely basis if project goals are to be reached.