THE ADMINISTRATION OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO AGRICULTURE

by

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A Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Public and International Affairs

in

The Department of Economic and Social Development

by

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August, 1968

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am honored to acknowledge the contribution of Professor John Lindeman, Syracuse University Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, in a special review of the Maxwell School Technical Assistance Research Project. I also acknowledge the contribution of Dr. Robert T. McMillan, rural development research officer, U.S. Agency for International Development, for assisting in gathering research materials and providing liäson with Maxwell School for this study. Professor Saul M. Katz, who directed the study, provided liäson between GSPIA and Maxwell School for the study.

Herbert D. Turner, chief of the Technical Assistance Policy Division of the AID Office of Program and Policy Coordination, read the report, contributing technical corrections as well as encouraging comments--thus a measure of validation.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The United States foreign assistance program has evolved from a series of limited objectives, beginning in 1942, and a global objective enunciated by President Truman in 1949. These were consolidated in 1953, reorganized in 1955, and further consolidated in 1961. In its metamorphosis, foreign aid has become recognized as a major instrument of U.S. foreign policy, while retaining in law, concept and practice most of the objectives and folkways of its formative stages.[1] Administrative procedures were devised or improvised to meet emergencies as the program became increasingly complex.

Many studies have been made of U.S. AID programs, resulting in the incorporation of procedures which facilitated operations.[2] However

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[1]Frank M. Coffin, Witness for AID (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964) pp. 65-74.

[2]Ibid., pp. 43, 82-87. The major studies were: Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program (Report No. 300, 85th Congress, 1st Session); The President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program--Economic Assistance Programs and Administration, Wm. A. Draper, Jr., Chairman (1959); President's Task Force on Economic Assistance, Henry R. Labouise, Chairman (1961); Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, Christian A. Herter, Chairman (1962); and The President's Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World, Lucius D. Clay, Chairman (1963).

with the exception of the Herter Committee, which studied personnel, most efforts were centered on the administration of capital assistance and on Congressional presentations. Efforts to improve the administration of technical assistance was largely neglected until 1963, when the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) commissioned the Syracuse University Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs to make a comprehensive study of the administration of technical assistance, with special reference to agriculture. (APPENDIX B) During the course of the project, June 1963 to December 1966, fifteen major preliminary reports were produced. (APPENDIX F)

Although the preliminary reports include a number of observations applicable to specific procedures from top to bottom of the administrative hierarchy, the final recommendations are restricted to broad questions of policy. The need for an understanding of sound methods and procedures of administering technical assistance remains. This is a common requirement for all organizations. It is critical in AID field operations, where the average personnel assignment is two years.

Purpose

The purpose of the present study is to draw from the preliminary reports of the Maxwell School project and other contemporary sources, apparently significant, proposals for the improvement of the administration of technical assistance, with special reference to agriculture, which seem to be applicable to AID.

Scope of the Study

1. For this study the purpose of technical assistance is given as nation building and/or socio-economic progress.[3]

2. It may be assumed, and was indeed observed in the Maxwell School studies, that there is no substantive difference between technical assistance in agriculture and technical assistance in general.[4] To hold this exercise to managable proportions, analysis of technical assistance at the sector level is restricted to agriculture.

3. The study is limited in application to technical assistance fostered by the United States Government.

Procedure

The present study proposes to respond to the question: What seems to be the most effective procedures for administering the major functions of technical assistance, with special reference to agriculture? The preliminary reports of the Maxwell School project, which have received only restricted circulation, will serve as the primary source. To this extent, the present study is a continuation of the Maxwell School series. (APPENDIX F) It may be supplemented by later sources and pertinent empirical observations.

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[3]Milton J. Esman and Fred C. Bruhns, Institution Building and National Development--An Approach to Induced Social Change in Transitional Societies, Inter-University Research Program in Institution Building (Pittsburgh: GSPIA, University of Pittsburgh, 1965) p. 22.

[4]John Lindeman, Preliminary /Final/ Report to AID on the Administration of Technical Assistance, with Special Reference to Agriculture (Syracuse: Maxwell School, August, 1965) hectographed. p. 1.

A Framework for Studying Technical Assistance Administration

Granting that technical assistance is an external effort on the part of the donor and an external resource on the part of the recipient, these major components of the process may be identified:

1. A purpose setting, enabling body. For the United States this is the Congress.

2. The principal agent for the process, who is charged with carrying out the purpose, and his staff and its process.

3. The field agent and his organization.

4. The recipient and its organization.

5. Other sources of technical assistance.

These are the functions of the headquarters unit:

1. Communicate to the policy setting and financing body:
   a. recommend policy and policy changes
   b. request funds
   c. report.
2. Communicate to the field guiding policy and spending limits.
3. Support the field mission, including:
   a. representing the mission program to the policy setting body
   b. providing personnel
   c. technical backstopping
   d. procurement and forwarding of commodities and supplies
   e. managing program connected participants and trainees.

4. Evaluate the mission program.

5. Achieve popular support.[5]

These are the tasks of the field mission:

1. Communicate to headquarters a summation of the resources required to achieve the objectives of the donor.

2. Organize the resources provided.[6]

3. Commit the resources provided.[7]

4. Evaluate the effort and report the outcome.

The potential areas of the technical assistance requirement may be deduced from Esman's "task or action oriented model for development assistance"[8] which has the following components:

1/ "a governing, goal oriented elite which bears the major responsibility for initiating and directing the process of modernizing change;

2/ "a doctrine or set of action commitments which establishes, communicates, and legitimizes norms, priorities and styles for operating programs;

3/ "a set of action instruments through which communication with the community is maintained and operating programs are implemented, (including)

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[5]Coffin, op.cit. pp. 75-89.

[6]Barnard said, "provide the system of communication". Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of Executive (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938) Part IV.

[7]Ibid. Barnard said "promote the securing of essential efforts."

[8]Esman and Bruhns, op.cit., pp. 22.

a/ "political organization
b/ "the administrative system
c/ "associated interest groups
d/ "the mass media."[9]

In underdeveloped countries, any one component of Esman's model may be deficient to the extent of limiting national development and/or socio-economic progress; hence, technical assistance for each component must be considered. This determines the framework of the potential technical assistance requirement, which may be shown as follows:

1. Advice to the governing elite on goals and public policy.

2. Technical assistance in political development.

3. Technical assistance in public administration.

4. Technical assistance in national development planning. This includes research and aid to research. It includes coordination with the host country's planning unit as well as with aiding it in coordination with line ministries and other aid donors. It includes assistance with program implementation.

5. Technical assistance in developing institutions. These include institutions for research, manpower development, educational services, information, credit, supply and marketing.

6. Technical assistance in conducting campaigns for change.

7. Technical assistance in providing feedback to the development program. This includes measuring and reporting the country's resources,

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[9] Ibid.

as well as evaluating and reporting the results of their use toward achieving national goals.

The present study considers, first, the functions of the field mission and, second, the function of the headquarters organization in providing technical assistance in the above seven areas.

Definition of Terms

Technical assistance. Foreign or international technical assistance means aiding a recipient state in the effective exploitation of resources for predetermined ends, which for the purposes of this exercise is nation building and/or socio-economic progress. Foreign or international are generally inferred. Technical assistance connotes the provision of appropriate knowledge, methods and techniques to acquire, organize, mobilize and exploit resources.[10]

Technical assistance is concerned with the provision of, a) special studies of the evaluative or enabling type, b) advice on policy, method and technique, c) training and d) scholarships for foreign study. Technical assistance does not involve capital assistance, except where a first round of capital equipment is supplied as a necessary

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[10]Porter Hardy, Jr., "The Proper Means of Foreign Aid: Technical Assistance", Devere E. Pontony (ed.), United States Foreign Aid (San Francisco: Howard Chandler, 1960) p. 120. Hardy quotes Section 418 (a) of the U.S. Actoof International Development of 1950.

Earlier definitions restricted usage to economic development. In the 1960's, application of the term came to include social and political development.

means of demonstrating a technical process.[11] On the other hand, capital assistance projects may specify technical assistance inputs as a means of execution. The provision of personnel for operational roles in on-going programs is considered to be an act of financial assistance rather than technical assistance. This includes the provision of teachers and school administrators.

Administration of technical assistance. Accepting purpose as given, the tasks of technical assistance administration are, a) determining the resources required to achieve the given purpose, b) securing the required resources, c) organizing and mobilizing the resources, d) communicating the mission-purpose to the organization, e) committing the organized, mobilized resources to the achievement of the given purpose, f) evaluating the effort at interim, g) reporting to the purpose giver on results of efforts committed and h) adjusting procedures in light of evaluation.

Expert. "Expert" is the term used by the United Nations, the OECD and the Colombo Plan for personnel sent to aid recipient countries for the purposes of national development. Webster's defintion applies: "very skillful; having much training and knowledge in some special field".[12] The "expert" group includes "operators", teachers and "advisers".[13]

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[11] Ibid.

[12] Webster's New World Dictionary (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1964).

[13] Willard L. Thorp, Development Assistance Efforts and Policies, 1967 Review (Paris: OECD) pp. 162-163.

Technician. The early U.S. technical assistance organizations used the term "technician" in place of "expert" as used above.

Personnel in education. OECD identifies in its count of "experts", "personnel in education", meaning persons engaged full time in teaching, school administration or advising on the improvement of education.[14]

Operator. "Experts", other than personnel in education, assigned to administrative roles in the recipient government or its development projects are designated "operators".[15]

Advisor. "Experts" who occupy no official role in the recipient government but whose jobs are to enhance the effectiveness of the system and its members are known as "advisers".[16] AID used the alternate spelling, "advisor".

Volunteer. OECD counts "volunteers" as separated from "experts".[17] International Voluntary Services and Peace Corps personnel are in this category. In practice, they may or may not fill any of the above categories, expertise not being a necessary qualification.

Participant. The term "participant" is used by AID for students sent abroad for education and training to fill roles in their country's development programs. OECD uses the terms "student" and "trainee" as synonymous with "participant".[18]

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[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

CHAPTER II

THE MAXWELL SCHOOL PROJECT

Scope

The Maxwell School Technical Assistance Research Project flowed from a Project Implementation Order for Technical Services (PIO/T), a standard document used by AID to obligate funds for contract services, which had the stated purpose,

> "...to conduct research for the improvement of the administration of technical assistance, with particular emphasis on the administration of technical assistance in agriculture, such improvement being a means toward increasing the effectiveness of the United States direct and indirect expenditure on technical assistance. The principle objective of the research project will be to appraise current practices in the administration of technical assistance by A.I.D. and other donors and by a selected group of recipient countries in order to determine strengths and weaknesses, and to recommend changes. Through collaboration with A.I.D. personnel it is expected that the research process and results will be directed in particular towards United States problems in this field. Special emphasis will be given to technical assistance in agriculture." (APPENDIX A, Block 14)

The terms of the PIO/T were restated as objectives in a contract between the Maxwell School and AID. (APPENDIX B)

Four areas of specific interest were identified in the PIO/T. Pertaining to field operations, programming, institutional development and manpower development (specifically, the management of participants) were mentioned. The problem of personnel administration was mentioned in global context. (APPENDIX A, Block 14).

As the studies progressed the Maxwell School team identified the following major problems, summed up by John Lindeman, project director,

> "we have identified the three key problem areas as being: a) the function of the field, b) personnel administration, and c) programming. Other problem areas...are subsumed under one or more of these categories, or peripheral to them."[19]

Lindeman identified these problems in the subsumption: a) coordination of technical assistance efforts with other donors, b) evaluation, c) project phase-out and d) "scatteration versus concentration".[20]

In addition he listed six problem subjects identified as of interest to AID in particular: a) employment of third country nationals in technical assistance roles, b) use of third country facilities for training officials of recipient countries, c) use (employment by the donor) of recipient country citizens to provide technical assistance to that country, d) encouragement of the private sector of donor countries to provide technical assistance, e) vocational agricultural education(a re-examination) and f) relationships between agricultural extension and community development.[21]

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[19] Lindeman, op.cit. p. 13.

[20] Ibid. pp. 22-24.

[21] Ibid. pp. 34-35.

A comprehensive study of the administration of participants was omitted by agreement, according to Lindeman[22], although this was not reflected in project correspondence.[23]

Methods and Sources

The Maxwell School studies were diagnostic and prescriptive. Viewing the whole process, presumably, the team selected functions to study in which significant problems were identified. Little if any space was given to functions wherein debilitating problems were not identified.

The expert observation and prescription method may be justified on the grounds of speed and efficiency. It permits rapid movement and minimizes description as well as the need for final documentation. The dominant style used in the project is exemplified in Lindeman's statement, "Documentation in this paper is minimal, for the sake of brevity and readability. /footnote/ However, we have the documentation".[24]

The method has limitations, however. First, the validity of the study rests largely on the reputation of the investigator. Second, the report is biased in the direction of the dysfunctional. That it is

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[22]Interview with John Lindeman, Syracuse, April 16-19, 1968.

[23]U.S. AID, Office of War on Hunger, Agriculture and Rural Development Service, Files (Washington: AID). There would be a tendency not to register a verbal agreement as an amendment to the contract where neither funding nor the time span of the project was affected.

[24]Lindeman, op.cit. p. 1.

necessarily critical tends to generate nostility on the part of the subject operators, which if the client is included will tend to limit its acceptance. Third, the usefulness of the study is limited to knowledgeables, which may extend little beyond the client.

Lindeman's description of the team's method was, "We interviewed as many people as we could, reviewed the literature as best as we could and we had to make value judgements".[25] The following major sources were revealed in the preliminary reports:

1. The literature.

2. AID Technical Assistance Study Group files. This is a collection of interviews of technical assistance personnel returning from foreign assignments.[26]

3. A questionnaire circulated to 33 resident representatives of the United Nations Technical Assistance Board and two U.S. AID mission directors.[27]

4. Field interviews. Ten members of the team took extensive field trips. (APPENDIX E) Lindeman reported that they conducted over

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[25] Lindeman, Interview, op.cit.

[26] U.S. AID Technical Assistance Study Group, John Ohly, Chairman (Washington: AID, 1962) Uncirculated files.

[27] John P. White, Technical Assistance and Coordination by Underdeveloped Countries: Analysis of a Questionnaire (Syracuse: LeMoyne College, 1967). This is one of the Maxwell School project preliminary reports, published under the copyright of the author.

1500 interviews. The responses were treated as privileged information; hence they were not appended to the preliminary reports. Iversen's management of the field data is representative for the project:

> "While the interviews dealt with common problems--and the ways in which they were met--no effort was made to structure the questioning in such a way that the interview data might be quantified or treated statistically. While records were kept of each interview, the information discussed was usually of such a nature as to make identification of sources inadvisable. The author assumes full responsibility for the accuracy and typicality of the information used."[28]

Members of the team exchanged information gained in the field.[29]

5. A research advisory council composed of distinguished administrators and students of technical assistance. (APPENDIX F)

6. Client review. Each working paper and preliminary report was submitted to AID for review.[30]

The project organization consisted of a full-time director and a secretary-treasurer-bookkeeper. The studies were effectively commissioned or subcontracted to, mostly, professors and graduate students at Maxwell School, who sandwiched their trips, research and

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[28] Robert W. Iversen, Personnel for Technical Assistance (Syracuse: Maxwell School, 1966) mimeographed. p. 4.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Review by the client included notations in the margins of the review copies, letters varying from acknowledgement to, in some cases, challenge or refutation. Lindeman complained that he got no response at all from his Preliminary /Final/ Report, which was prepared specifically to provoke discussion. He interpreted this as a manifestation of loss of interest on the part of AID (Interview, op.cit.). The client's reviews were consulted in the present study.

write-ups with primary endeavors. The last report submitted was dated Dec. , 1966. The project was extended to June 25, 1966. There were no further amendments to the contract.

AID officials charged with monitoring the contract maintain that the project is incomplete. They view the preliminary reports as tentative and in their present format, while containing much valuable information, of limited use.[31]

Lindeman agreed in April 1968, that the project was yet incomplete, but he held that it was not dead: in fact he was at that time drafting a final report.[32]

Discussion

The interviews and the project correspondence revealed a vast difference in the views of the two parties as to the job called for. The author of the project and its monitor for 30 months was Frank W. Parker, an agronomist with vast practical experience in the administration of technical agricultural projects, but with no professional training in public administration. (This is cited in inference that Parker was not necessarily hep to the concepts and ways of public administration scholars.) There is evidence that he expected something on the order of a manual for agricultural technical assistance.[33]

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[31]Interviews with Robert T. McMillan, AID monitor of the Maxwell School contract, Washington, July, 1967.

[32]Lindeman, Interview, op.cit.

[33]This was deduced from interviews with McMillan and Douglas Caton, AID, July 1967, from the wording of the PIO/T (APPENDIX A) and the project correspondence.

On the other hand, Lindeman sought senior administrators as his audience, as a means of affecting change. Consequently, he endeavored to provide answers to questions of concern to them. He stated,

> "What is required...[for] improvement in the administration of technical assistance...is to promote attitudinal changes, strengthen some recent innovations, implement many things that are already on the books, and obtain some minor changes in legislation."[34]

He believes the effectiveness of the research project would have been greatly enhanced, had it been monitored by the AID Office of Administration, rather than by the Office of Technical Cooperation and Research.[35] This becomes obvious if it is conceded that the intent of the project was limited to improving AID operations, as is indicated in Lindeman's statement above.

The language of the PIO/T suggests a product less noble, with wider application than to AID reorganization, with a greater life span than a one-shot reorganization study. (APPENDIX A) Whether such an undertaking is feasible remains open to question. There are at least four continuing research projects which AID has supported completely or in part, each addressed to no more than a single item in the PIO/T.[36]

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[34]Lindeman, op.cit. p. 3.

[35]Lindeman, Interview, op.cit.

[36]A Michigan State University Project is conducting field tests on theories of social change in representative underdeveloped countries; Massachusetts Institute of Technology is studying mass media in relation to rural development in Turkey; the University of Wisconsin has a study of land tenure in Latin America; a consortium composed of Pittsburgh, Syracuse, Michigan State and Indiana Universities is studying institution building; and another consortium composed of Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina State, Ohio State, Purdue, Utah State and Wisconsin Universities, is studying the contractual use of universities in agricultural technical assistance.

CHAPTER III

ORGANIZATION OF THE ADVISORY TEAM

That a country seeks technical assistance attests to felt deficiencies in its manpower relevant to achieving its desired goals. The very earliest responses of the United States in this field were in the introduction of single crops.[37] Conversely, immediately following World War II, German rocket scientists were eagerly sought by both the United States and Russia. More recently it is known that the British economist Barbara Ward has served as an advisor to President Johnson. These are cases where the recipient state selectively sought technical assistance in specific endeavors. The cases illustrate that technical assistance may be sought and can be useful at all levels.

To reverse the sequence, let us assume, as policy statements attest, that the United States is interested in the accellerated economic and social development of a number of presently underdeveloped countries.[38]

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[37]In response to a request from the Sultan in 1846, the U.S. Secretary of State sent Dr. James Bolton Davis of Fairfield County, South Carolina, to Turkey to introduce cotton culture. The venture was a failure for the Turks, but Davis brought back Angora goats. A representative of Great Britain spent the year of 1853 on the plantation of Richard Barrow, St. Francisville, La., learning cotton and sugar cane culture, which he subsequently established in India. American Brahman Breeders Association, American Brahman Cattle (Houston: ABBA, 1954).

[38]U.S. AID, "Program Guidance Manual", AID Manual, (Washington: AID, 1962) M.O. 1001.1, p. 1.

Arbitrary, piecemeal assistance cannot be relied upon for such achievement. Rather, it seems that there must be a readiness to provide technical assistance to the underdeveloped recipient country at any and all points along the scale of Esman's model.[39] The question is how can a mission best be organized to respond to such a wide scope of assistance. It is obvious from the outset that except for rare cases no one donor will in fact provide all of the advice that a government receives. But the fact that by definition it stands in need of advice calls for discussion.

Advising the Chief of State

The Chief of State will seek counsel where and when he chooses. President Johnson is an example. At one time, the late Bernard Fall was an influential advisor to Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia. In other countries, the role has been nobly, yet quietly filled by United States ambassadors. It is the task of first order in technical assistance. Regardless of his power role, the Chief of State controls the symbols of state which are so all-important in mobilizing people and governments. It is important that he becomes development-goal oriented.[40] If he should have conflicting values and objectives, the cause of development is greatly handicapped.

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[39] Esman, op.cit.

[40] In studying success in agricultural development in Greece, Mexico and Taiwan, Wade Gregory found that one of three common attributes of the three countries was a stable government with commitment. Wade F. Gregory, Agricultural Development in Greece, Mexico and Taiwan (Washington: USDA, September, 1967), Mimeographed, p. 32.

Advising the Prime Minister

Prime ministers seek outside advice in making their many knotty decisions, including those concerned with development programs. That it is important that the prime minister have sound advice is attested by Roscoe Martin, who found effective government to be the key to development.[41]

It is said that prime ministers prefer not to seek technical advice bilaterally for fear of the "puppet" label. The instances of independent advisors to prime ministers are well known. Again, however, ambassadors may contribute in this role.

The U.S. AID mission director may find himself advising the prime minister. According to protocol, they may be considered "counterparts". It behooves the mission director to make sure that the prime minister is aware of the country's development potentials and the essential steps required to exploit them.

There is room in this relationship for subordinate association, for example, of the executive secretariats of the two offices.

Advice on Planning

Development planning is a new, exceedingly complex process for developing countries, for which few have qualified personnel. Yet, the national plan can be the crucial factor in a national development program.

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[41]Roscoe C. Martin and Mildred E. Martin, Technical Assistance in the Field (Syracuse: Maxwell School, February, 1966), p. 20.

Although a national development program is conceivable without a national plan, a sound program is not likely to flow from an unsound plan.

Richard Duncan found that often times recipient governments hesitated to request bilateral assistance in developing their planning organizations, primarily from fear of foreign political interference. He noted that while bilateral donors, including the United States, provide planning advisors, the United States encourages recipient countries to make direct arrangements with private individuals or organizations. Other sources are the United Nations and the private foundations (primarily Ford).[42]

Recipient government officials complained that the United Nations did not provide effective support for its planning advisors and that they lacked the "influence to meet and deal with continuous project problems". Short term consultants were criticized for lack of descrimination.[43]

Duncan noted these common complaints by the planning advisors:

> "Their most common comment was the difficulty of obtaining adequate and accurate data, the complications of the recipient government's structure, and the lack of adequately trained staff. A number were also critical of the many delays involved in donor action where agreements had already been reached."[44]

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[42]Richard L. Duncan, The Programming of Technical Assistance (Syracuse: Maxwell School, December, 1966) Hectographed. p. 87.

[43]Ibid.

[44]Ibid.

These observations imply that the developing countries are in fact not getting the advice on national planning they need. Such problems should be expected, as a definition of underdevelopment. It is the routine job of the advisor to devise ways and means of overcoming such handicaps.

While there are immediate advantages of contracting for private planning advisors, there are serious disadvantages. The chances are that the recipient government will contract for a planning advisor when it is the job of a team and more. Besides assisting the senior officers in getting organized, there is the job of organizing a large technical office and building whole subordinate institutions to collect, feed in and process information. Equally important, there is the job of implementation, which reaches throughout the government and the country. The private contractor is likely to be without the advisory organization to follow the plan through implementation. A comprehensive mission such as AID is capable of fielding has this reach.

AID should offer planning advisory assistance to countries in which it maintains missions. The nature of the program would vary with the circumstances. It is conceivable that the aid package might include a team of specialists and a quantity of data processing equipment to be located in the planning office proper. Other advisors would be assigned to developing or improving the statistics gathering organization. In-service training would be provided for planning office workers. Key employees would be sent abroad for additional training. Assistance would

be provided the line ministries in organizing their planning units. Through linkage with project advisors, the chief planning advisor may extend his efforts to project implementation and feedback.

Advising the Line Minister

In the AID hierarchy the line division chief is responsible for advising line ministers.[45] (This is not to be confused with negotiating project agreements, which is the director's domain.)

The division chief should meet the minister at regular intervals, perhaps one hour a week. At these meetings, the division chief should have something substantive to discuss, bearing either on the ministry program or the improvement of operational procedures of immediate concern to the minister.

The Chief of Cabinet

A large number of ministries include the position of Chief of Cabinet, which is number two to the minister and roughly equivalent to the military position Chief of Staff. It is occupied by the senior civil servant of the ministry. As such, he is extremely influential and relatively permanent. In most cases it is he who commands the chiefs of the functional departments. As likely as not he will be present at the

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[45] Although the titles vary, this is the general heirarchial ranking in the USAID mission: 1) director, 2) deputy director, 3) program officer, 4) line division chief, 5) deputy division chief, 6) branch chief, 7) project advisor and 8) operator.

minister's meetings with his advisors. Whether or not this is the practice, the advisor should devote some time to assisting the chief of cabinet in his area of special interests.

Protocol does not permit the advising division chief to maintain formal relations with both the minister and the chief of cabinet. In many cases this may be done by the deputy division chief. However, the astute division chief will maintain a cultivated casual relationship with the number two man in the ministry. Many "casual" opportunities will be presented as the minister is unable to keep his appointments.

Assisting the Line Ministry's Planning Effort

The office of Chief of Cabinet should include a small planning group, whose job is primarily coordinating the functional departments with the national planning authority.[46]

Coordination is given extended meaning here. It includes, a) gathering information requested by the central planning authority, b) assessing domestic demand over the plan period, c) setting production goals, d) determining the nature and location of alternative development investments, e) negotiating sector proposals with the central planning authority, f) adjusting the sector plan to the outcome of negotiations, g) assisting the functional departments with project planning, and h) assisting the minister with implementation of the plan.[47] For an inexperienced crew to accomplish this requires the full time attention of a development planning advisor.

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[46] Egbert de Vries, Planning and Organization of Agricultural Development (Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh, GSPIA, 1968) Hectographed.

[47] Ibid.

Advising Department Chiefs

The operations of an agricultural ministry are usually divided into departments according to product or function. They may include, agronomy (field crops, tree crops and vegetables), animal production and veterinary public health, forestry, fisheries (marine and inland), irrigation, research, vocational education, higher education, agricultural and home economics extension, agricultural information, agricultural cooperatives, agricultural credit, marketing, and agricultural economics and statistics. It is in these departments that development projects are conceived, proposed, planned and implemented.

The AID system provides for an advisor, Branch Chief, to assist the chief of each department in which the Agency has special interests. The advisor's job is to assist the department chief in planning and implementing projects and programs. In projects requiring capital inputs from the United States, this is where basic negotiations take place. In day-to-day operations the representatives of the two governments literally hammer out project proposals for their chiefs later to approve.

Advising on Project Operations

A ministerial department may foster a number of activities in which the United States is interested. These consist mostly of developing service institutions, although they may include capital projects. As the magnitude of the project and interest warrants, specialists may be assigned to advise on specific projects or sub-projects. For example, a USAID

extension branch may consist of a branch chief, a rural youth advisor, one or more home economics advisors and any number of area extension advisors. An agricultural education branch may consist of an agricultural advisor and one or more university contract teams.

Advisors operating at this level are concerned with progress in a specific activity without themselves participating in the operation. If advice to the Chief of State and the Prime Minister is important to pave the way for national development, advice at the project implementation level is essential for its achievement.

CHAPTER IV

RELATIONS WITH THE HOST GOVERNMENT

The problem of donor-host government relations is so intense that undoubtedly the effectiveness of much aid effort is greatly reduced. In its severest cases (Burma and Cambodia) the United States was asked to discontinue its assistance programs. Martin found friction in U.S. mission-recipient relations at all levels.[48] Nor is the problem unique to the United States. The Ford Foundation and the Asia Foundation were also dismissed from Burma. Soviet missions also have encountered relations friction, in at least one case up to the breaking point.

Neither are multilateral agencies exempt. Ronald Nairn found a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) project in Thailand so replete with relations friction that progress was all but impossible. Continuously strained relations existed between the experts and counterparts as well as among members of the advisory team, who represented 17 different nationalities.[49]

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[48]Martin, op.cit., pp. 35-52.

[49]Ronald C. Nairn, International Aid to Thailand: The New Colonialism? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966) pp. 77-92.

The reasons for donor-recipient relations friction are manifold. Political policy ranks high in bilateral aid relations. Donor policies in allocating and administering aid contribute to friction. Ineffective communications is a frustrating block in relations.[50]

If for no other reason, relations friction may be expected from bringing the members of an aggressive social system to bear on the roles of stable systems where the values of each group are almost inconceivable to the other, as is the case with developed countries aiding the less developed. This may be illustrated by the following generalized examples:

The values held by the American technician may be centered in the Protestant Ethic,[51] the contractual agreement and technical achievement within a time frame, while the values of English and French technical assistance experts may center in self respect, scholarship and leisure. East Asian values may be centered in family ritual, status and harmony.

Status and the motivation for holding public office are greatly misunderstood and unappreciated. The definition of roles is a source of friction. The American advisor may see himself as a lone operating prime-mover. It is said that the English and French often display a memory of Colonial Office days. On the other hand the East Asian

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[50] Ibid.

[51] Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated by Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958).

government official sees himself as the servant of his superior and the master of his subordinates, deriving status from both roles.

It is axiomatic that technical assistance to the developing countries requires bringing peoples of different and strange cultures together under strenuous working relations. Means by which the aid donor may, in pursuit of its objectives, maintain optimal relations with the host government are considered in this chapter.

Role of the Advisor

The job of the foreign advisor is greatly complicated by the circumstances that he is alien to the culture in which he is working, excluded from the social system he is charged with influencing. He has no role in the system--no prestige, no authority, no power. This poses the question, what can the advisor do to most effectively pursue the objective of his presence? It is proposed that he may function in these roles, in the order given: a) research and writing, b) training and c) counseling or advising. These functions will not gain him membership in the social system. However, it is postulated that if he performs these functions in the environment of the system in a manner not antagonistic to it but complementary to the goals of its members, he will be awarded prestige and ultimately status by the system to the extent that he may influence the actions of its members.

Research and Writing

When a new advisor arrives on the scene he is not the only one aware of his almost bewildering ignorance of the job ahead: the chances are that

the people he is to advise have conducted "acquaint myself with the field" trips for many before him. How is he to learn the job at hand? The technical assistance program is oriented to problem solving: why not research the problem? The advisor may enlist the aid of a host government counterpart and teach him to do survey research in the process. They can publish the report under a joint by-line, thereby establishing equality between the two and building prestige for the counterpart.

Cross-cultural conversation is far from perfect communication, regardless of whose language is used.[52] Beyond face-to-face discussion a government official needs his advice in writing. He can study it and draw his own conclusions. Recommendations in written form provide a ready reference for implementing change.

During his tour of duty an advisor should be able to write the essentials of his philosophy concerning his area of assignment, as well as his finds, his major recommendations and the progress of the endeavor during his presence. To do this may provide well-grounded, consecutive recommendations to the host government and a record for the succeding advisor.

It is a common complaint of technical assistance advisors that the host officials they are assigned to advise have many responsibilities other than the one of particular interest to the advisor, that it is difficult to get to see the client.[53] This may be due to high demand

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[52]Martin, op.cit., pp. 92-93

[53]Herbert H. Hyman, Gene N. Levine and Charles R. Wright, Inducing Social Change in Developing Countries (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1967), p. 152.

placed on the time of people with professional qualifications in developing countries. The practice of writing recommendations greatly reduces the amount of necessary face-to-face counterpart relationships.

Training

The notion of technical cooperation expressed in the Point Four Speech was based on the principle that technique is indestructible and that it multiplies by communication. Training is the true multiplier of technical assistance.

If the advisor does well with his research and writing, he may be invited to teach, especially if he promotes the opportunity. He will not be invited--should not attempt--to teach his counterpart, or equal, in the host government hierarchy, technical qualifications not withstanding. Rather, he may be invited to teach subordinates. He should share the professorial role with the counterpart.

If the training goes well the counterpart will arrange additional courses and invite the advisor to perform as guest instructor. Later he may hear of training scheduled to which he is not invited. This may be considered a mark of accomplishment, as it signifies that the counterpart feels confident to produce a short course on his own, although he fears his advisor's evaluation of the effort.[54]

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[54]These and the above observations are based on the author's experience as agricultural information advisor, USOM/Brazil, 1957-1961, agricultural education advisor, USAID, Cambodia, 1962-1964 and senior agricultural advisor, USAID, Vietnam, 1964-1966. Unpublished papers in personal files.

Advising

If the advisor establishes that he is skilled and informed in his field of responsibility and if he has proven predictably safe--that he will not embarrass his counterpart before superior or subordinate--he may be called on for counsel. When it comes the occasion will be private, and it may concern a private matter. It might not. If the meeting enhances the pursuit of the legitimate goals of the host official the foreign visitor has become an advisor. He may expect more visits and weightier consultation.

The reputations of skillful advisors grow rapidly (they were once known as prophets). The successful advisor should expect this. Where possible, he should avoid consultation above his assigned level in the host hierarchy. Rather, he should respond through his counterpart in the host government and through his own superiors on the advisory team.

Environmental Relations

It is a common finding of visiting evaluation teams that the USAID mission establishment is overwhelming in size and that the technical advisors remain isolated behind guarded doors and air conditioners. It is further reported that the American enclave overruns the elite residential sections and sports clubs, that the Americans isolate themselves from the host population, totally indulged in cocktail parties, bridge and golf. Martin corroborated this.[55] The relevant questions are: 1) In light of

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[55] Martin, op.cit., pp. 43-44.

the purposes of the mission, are these situations desirable? 2) What are the alternatives? 3) If there are potentially undesirable features, how may they be managed to best further U.S. interests?

Office

Should the foreign advisor have a desk in the host government establishment? With a glance the answer is easy, Yes. After all, why is he in the country? But there are deeper involvements to consider.

The answer lies in the degree of involvement in operations. If the donor agent is operating, he should be centered in the operation. However, the scope of this study rules out operations.

Offices are designed to accommodate heirarchical status. There can be only one number one office in an organization. Foreign technical assistance advisors are assigned to advise chiefs of organizational units. Suppose an advisor is offered a desk in the organization he is assisting. Where would it be located? He cannot share the head office, as this would deprive the chief of status. If he is assigned the number two desk, he announces to the world that he is subordinate, status-wise, to the chief. This is a handicap which must be overcome for effective advisement to ensue. Worse, he deprives the number two actor of his rightful station in the system. This does not promote growth of the organization. It could cause annihilation from the foreigner, beginning with the number two man of the organization.

There are political considerations. What degree of visibility should the advisor maintain? It is likely that the host official has callers from other governments who may or may not be sympathetic to the advisor and his government.

To what extent can the organization chief claim control of the organization with the man with the ideas constantly present? To what extent can he claim credit for the success of the operation?

In the course of 16 technical advisory relationships with host government officials, I found an average of one hour a week to be optimal for consultation. This does not include time used in joint activities, such as travel, project planning, training and demonstration, which are products of consultation.

In summary, two points have been advanced: First, for a foreign agent to occupy a desk in a host government establishment creates social and political difficulties which may be counter-productive to the objectives in pursuit. Second, considering the inevitable shortage of office facilities, the amount of face-to-face consultation between the host government official and the foreign advisor is not sufficient to justify a desk in the establishment for the latter. In most instances it is best that he maintain his office apart from the host, where he has adequate support, including secretarial assistance, to prepare for his advisory sessions. Such arrangements in fact facilitate qualifying as advisor to more than one host official.

Housing

The Ugly American is a book of fiction containing serious technical errors, whose authors were not authorities on technical assistance.[56] However, it has greatly influenced the American image of Americans overseas. The truth is that Americans demand and come close to achieving living standards (housing and the like) overseas comparable to what they had at home. The problem is that what would be middle class housing in the United States is limited to the wealthiest sections of the capital cities of the developing countries. So this is where the Americans settle.

Politically it is perhaps good disposition, because it locates the enclave in the more spacious, less congested part of the city. That the Americans and other foreigners occupy such quarters portrays the impression that they are "veree reech", which in comparison to host citizens of equal status, they indeed are. Few Americans are aware of it.

Social Relations

One of Martin's respondents seemed to take a dim view of cocktailing as a means of socialization,[57] as could be expected in Buddhist and Muslim

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[56] William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, The Ugly American, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1958). For example, the old women got bent backs from tuberculosis of the spine, rather than from sweeping with hand brooms, and John's wife did not remedy the malady by growing long broom handles. Bamboo preceded the couple to the village considerably.

[57] Martin, op.cit., p. 42.

countries. Most serious advisors try to establish social equilibrium with people with whom they have professional contact. It is a difficult task, due to vast differences in the culture and in the wealth of the two groups.

The following guidelines have proven helpful in establishing equilibrium with host country citizens and officials:

1. The foreigner should avoid socially rushing the host official. He should allow the host the opportunity to make the first move.

2. Reciprocate in near kind. If the host has used a restaurant, it signifies perhaps that his domestic facilities are inadequate for the occasion. It would be proper for the reciprocation to take place in a restaurant, also. A party in the home at this occasion might be interpreted as a slur.

3. When entertaining groups, make sure that host citizens are in the majority. They will be uncomfortable as a minority.

4. If it is desirable to entertain host officials and their wives, entertain them one couple at a time. Otherwise, the wives may not show.

Counterpart versus Program Oriented Assistance

The earlier U.S. technical assistance programs were concerned primarily with establishing new institutions in countries having near adequate technical skills. All that was needed, it was believed, was technical orientation. So, for example, the U.S. agency would employ an agricultural extension official from a land grant college, who would organize a national extension service and serve as advisor to the new director, whom the U.S. agent referred to as his "counterpart." In two

to four years the orientation was completed and the American moved on. This established a pattern, a mode of operation which continues.

As the program spread to the less developed countries, the supply of technically trained people sharply diminished. Ralph Gleason found the lack of competent counterpart personnel to be the most seriously limiting factor in the way of success in the case histories of 19 out of 26 agricultural development projects in the Near East-South Asia.[58]

Being employed and assigned by project allotment, American technical advisors generally expect the institutions they are to nurture to have at least seen daylight by the time of their arrival. If not, frustrated, they may be prone to wait it out.

The truth is that personnel may not be available, and it takes a long time to train them to a level approaching Western standards. This may suggest the need for alternative approaches, using institutions already established. It suggests the need for great flexibility in the advisory system. Equipping government officials to perform effectively in institutional roles is the essence of the technical assistance goal. In the absence of "counterparts" the advisor should work with the leadership of the people, whatever their roles. A village chief makes a fine "counterpart". If the people can establish objectives they can make progress toward reaching them, and technical assistance helps.

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[58]Ralph N. Gleason, Technical Assistance to the Agricultural Sector of Developing Nations (Columbus: Ohio State University, May, 1963) p. 34.

Joint Operations

The U.S. aid agencies have experimented with three methods of managing technical assistance in recipient countries. One method, the principal practice today, is providing direct assistance to recipient governments on the basis of prior agreements. Two forms of joint operations were employed for divergent purposes. The Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) was established by the United States and the Republic of China to provide China a voice in administering aid funds from the United States. The other system was the servicio, established in Latin America to provide a mechanism whereby the United States might control the spending of its contributed funds.

The JCRR was headed by three commissioners named by the President of China and two named by the President of the United States, who disbursed U.S. and Chinese funds in support of rural development projects. Nineteen years after JCRR was established in Taiwan, the last U.S. AID employee, Commissioner Gerald Huffman, was transferred. John Montgomery found the venture to have been a hugh success. Agricultural output increased six per cent annually over the period and per capita income increased 47 per cent from 1952 to 1962. Montgomery's qualifications for the future use of joint operations were, a) high caliber administration and b) substantial contribution by the donor.[59]

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[59] John D. Montgomery, Rufus B. Hughes, Jr. and Raymond H. Davis, Rural Improvement and Political Development: The JCRR Model (Washington: AID, June, 1964) pp. 4, 67-78.

On the other hand Roscoe Martin, recognizing the success of JCRR in the short run, suggests that its existence precluded the formation of an agricultural ministry. Thus he doubts the country's capacity to deal with its agricultural problems in the future.[60]

In the 1940's, joint agricultural development organizations were set up in Central and South American countries, with U.S. Operations Mission (USOM) agriculture division chiefs serving as director. Brazil's servicio had co-directors, a citizen of each country.

The servicios enjoyed great popularity for the first decade or so of their lives. They were free to pay salaries above the civil service scale. With ready cash they could launch projects instantly. Their monopoly on U.S. aid dollars made them admirably conspicuous for vehicles and other imported hardware.

However, it was noticed as the years passed that the recipient governments never substantially increased their support to the servicios, rarely if ever took over the projects as was hoped.[61]

If joint operations are not supported they wither on the vine. If they are, Martin sees them, "if carried very far, lead to the creation of parallel and almost inevitably a competing administrative system".[62]

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[60]Martin, op.cit., pp. 73-74.

[61]Robert J. Schafer, The Servicio Experience (Syracuse: Maxwell School, June, 1965).

[62]Martin, op.cit., p. 76.

He concluded:

"In seeking to strengthen the machinery of government, full use should be made of the existing structure before recourse is taken to new organizational forms. The temptation is to circumvent the traditional ministeries in favor of new agencies which, it is hoped, will be free of the cobwebs of time and the constraints of entrenched bureaucracy. There may be occasions that warrant this procedure, but they are not as numerous as past practice would suggest. The presumption should be that the existing array of departments is adequate to normal needs. Only after a contrary finding based on a careful assessment of the ministries-in-being should a decision be made to create a new agency."[63]

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[63] Ibid., p. 100.

CHAPTER V

PROGRAMMING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

In 1962, AID established a new, comprehensive, integrated programming procedure designed to hold its activities to administration policy and to provide a more manageable budget presentation.[64] Subsequent usage has proven the title of the document, "Program Guidance Manual", to be a misnomer. Its application has been limited to budget presentation. The documents which flowed from these Manual Orders annually were limited strictly to project proposals (as they went to Washington) and project approvals (as they cleared Congress).[65]

Although it was the clear intent that the Manual Orders serve as a framework for program building, the emphasis on budget presentation completely overshadowed the programming function. Operating under Washington instructions, the mission program office forced the technical divisions to submit draft project proposals on deadline. Having fought the project proposals through six Congressional committee hearings, Washington did not demand that project approvals be expanded to operational plans, so the missions did not.

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[64] U.S., AID, Manual, op.cit.

[65] The predecessor program document was called Project Proposal and Approval (PPA).

The contention that through Fiscal Year 1968, AID operated without technical assistance programs rests on the definition of program. The Manual Order does not define the word.[66] Duncan proposed an all-inclusive definition:

> "Programming is therefore defined as an administrative process by which differing objectives articulated by the participants in technical assistance are resolved into meaningful and acceptable courses of action. More specifically, it is the means: 1) by which donor objectives are formulated and translated into program goals through common agreement with the recipient; 2) by which specific project activities are developed and reviewed in accordance with these goals; 3) for obtaining continuing commitment by donor and recipient for the initiation and continuation of project activities; 4) for assembling the information necessary for an overall view of the total program at required intervals; 5) for modification as required by changes in policies, or conditions of the environment; 6) for developing a strategy of transfer of technical assistance activities to the recipient organizations; and 7) for coordinating activities with other donors."[67]

In simpler form, an operations program is a scheme for reaching a set of objectives. In the project concept, objectives or goals are crystalizations of interests, and a program is a group of projects designed to reach the goals. Although the literature does not provide leads as to the scope of technical assistance projects, students of capital assistance list these necessary steps in the formulation of capital assistance projects: 1) proposal, 2) approval, 3) detailed plan of action and 4) implementation.[68]

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[66]U.S., AID, op.cit.

[67]Duncan, op.cit., pp. 150-151.

[68]U.N., Department of Economics and Social Affairs, Public Administration Division, "Some Aspects of Administration of Projects within the Context of Development Planning." ECLA Seminary on Administrative Aspects of Plan Implementation, Santiago, Chile, February, 1968 (New York: U.N., 1968) pp. 1-25.

The AID technical assistance programming process generally did not go beyond the approval stage. A search of the shelves of the AID/Washington (AID/W) agricultural division offices in 1967 revealed only four technical assistance plans.[69]

Recognizing this weakness the Agency designed a new programming procedure to be implemented for Fiscal Year 1969, calling for post approval project design.[70]

There are additional problems in clarifying U.S. aid purposes and procedures, however. The United States applies three major forms of aid -- capital assistance, technical assistance and supporting assistance -- to a multitude of ends, which are included in a long list in the introduction of the Congressional Foreign Assistance Act. Coffin believes this to be confusing and advocates simply,

> "...a broad based assistance program on the principle that we are interested in the security and development efforts of all nations firmly committed to their own independence."[71]

Duncan found the need for a long range, well understood, widely accepted program.[72] Martin recommended well defined goals in more realistic (longer) time frames.[73] Max Millikan advocates long range objectives.[74]

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[69]Near East-South Asia Region not researched.

[70]U.S. AID, "Project Documentation", Manual Circular No. 1023.2.7 (Washington: AID, June 2, 1967).

[71]Coffin, op.cit., p. 166.

[72]Duncan, op.cit., pp. 117-118.

[73]Martin, op.cit., pp. 93, 97.

[74]Max F. Millikan, "New and Old Criteria for AID", Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol. 27, No. 2, January, 1962 (New York: Columbia University), p. 114.

On the other hand, U.S. officials feel that extreme caution must be used in publishing national interests. As Haviland said, "Such statements are used as virtual claims against the U.S. Government."[75]

An AID mission is constantly concerned with three different programs. One is the activities of the host country. Another is the program the mission proposes to Washington. The third is the program approved by Washington.

Long Range Interests and Goals

Technical assistance programs flow from the donor's interests in recipient countries, in this order, a) global interests, b) regional interests, c) specific country interests, d) goals, e) programs. The AID Manual calls for this procedure. It contains a global policy statement strikingly similar to Coffin's proposal:[76]

> "The major objective of U.S. foreign policy is the development of a community of free nations cooperating on matters of mutual concern, basing their political systems on consent and progressing in economic welfare and social justice. Such a world offers the best prospect of security and peace for the United States." 77

This statement does not materially influence AID programming, however. Annually, the State Department sends out "Country Guidelines" from which

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[75]H. Field Haviland, Jr., "Foreign Aid and the Policy Process", American Political Science Review, September, 1958.

[76]Coffin, op.cit.

[77]U.S., AID, Manual Order 1000.1, op.cit., p. 1.

the next year's program is to flow. The mission's function is to propose means of pursuing the prescribed objectives within the limits of expected funds. The Manual specifies the analysis of political, social, security, economic and self-help situations and trends. The next step in the process is drafting a "Country Assistance Strategy" (CAS) -- goals and how they are to be pursued. Finally, the "Country Assistance Program" (CAP) expands the goal statements into project and activity proposals. (APPENDIX H)

It is suggested that U.S. long range interests and objectives in specific countries are not well known for the following reasons: First, technically, U.S. objectives have been set or reaffirmed annually, which in effect precludes the existence of long range goal statements. Under pressure to get the proposals approved by Congress, there is a great emphasis on brevity, short-term activities and quick pay-out. In the past there has been great hesitancy to mention long range programs. Second, the "Country Guidelines" and the CAS are classified documents. Very few AID employees outside the Program Office ever see them. Certainly no host citizens ever see them. Third, the radical changes brought about by the reorganization of the agency in 1961-1962, the subsequent shifts in regional emphasis and annual budget difficulties may cast doubt as to the reliability of any long range interests that may be gleaned from negotiations and public statements.

U.S. mission representatives have exercised extreme precaution in suggesting general national development strategy for fear of expressed sentiments being taken as commitments.[78] There are three disadvantages

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[78]Haviland, op.cit.

associated with this practice. First, it leaves U.S. interests and presence unexplained, if not unclear or suspect. Second, it may deprive the host country of assistance in formulating its general development philosophy and strategy. Third, it precludes the establishment of long range, well understood, widely accepted goals and programs.

The Manual Order policy statement was amplified by President Johnson in 1967:

> "We Americans are deeply concerned about the recognition of the right to self determination. This is what each of you demands for yourself. So let us help your fellowmen in other parts of the world to enjoy it too. .....
> .....
>
> "We believe that for the peoples of the 122 nations of the world, speaking now of the underdeveloped nations specifically, real self determination only comes when hunger and disease and ignorance and poverty are overcome. We believe that the peoples of all of these nations are entitled to that self-determination. They won't have it until we can conquer those ancient enemies--illiteracy, ignorance, disease and poverty."[79]

It is illustrative to characterize the necessary achievements of a given country to satisfy U.S. values, as proclaimed by the President. The principal purpose of the speech was to explain U.S. interests in Vietnam. An internal analysis indicated that to fulfill these principles required the following achievements in the Vietnamese rural sector.[80]

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[79]Address of President Lyndon B. Johnson before the National Convention of Chambers of Commerce, Baltimore, June 27, 1967. The Washington Post, June 28, 1967. p. A-14.

[80]Based on a review of the USAID/Vietnam Country Assistance Program -- Part II (Agriculture) Fiscal Year 1967-1968, by the author, August, 1967. (Washington: AID, VN/ND, Files) Unpublished.

1) a total population, including the rural element, that is reasonably well fed in terms of technical nutrition standards

2) a progressive land-water development program which has resulted in the efficient utilization of most of the land and water resources, or at least as much as is required for the achievement of other related goals, which continues to function in view of contempory and future needs

3) sustained, equitable, efficient exploitation of the adjacent sea

4) national self-sufficiency in forest production on a sustained yield basis

5) an equitable, efficient production supply system

6) an equitable, efficient agricultural marketing system

7) adequate rural communications systems, including roads, water transportation, mail and electronic cummunication

8) national self-sufficiency in food and rough fiber production with an advantageous export surplus equal in value to the foreign exchange requirement

9) a family of responsive, government sponsored service institutions manned by professionally skilled people, which are well known to the rural population

10) a clear alliance between the rural population and the central government through representation from the village upward

11) adequate schools, accessible through daily commuting, to qualify rural people for government service

12) an efficient, up-to-date agricultural research service of adequate dimension to keep the country's agricultural program reasonably progressive in world terms

13) an agricultural education system with adequate dimensions to supply the required number of qualified professional manpower for pertinent educational and service institutions

14) individual farm efficiency comparable to contemporaries in (other) modern Asian countries[81]

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[81]The Manual Order policy statement uses the Atlantic Community as the standard. op.cit.

15) enough net income by farmers, fishermen and woodsmen, over and above that required for food, medicine and work clothing, to permit savings for capital formation and the purchase of modest items of comfort and luxury

16) multiple means of national identification, including viable farmers' organizations and rural youth organizations; a sustained program of rural youth leadership development.

This is first purely a technical exercise to elucidate to the donor the implications of stated global policy in a given setting. Second, if the donor really ascribes to the statement in the expanded application, the resulting document might be presented to the host Head of State in some sort of well-wishing ceremony.

The mission and the host government, cooperatively, might assess the country's resources, and from this project a kind of feasibility statement for a list of aspirations derived as was the above list, as the World Bank did in Kenya.[82] This document should become the basic text for development planning and the basic guide for the programming of aid by donors.

All of the aspirations in the above list imply long range development activities. Rural development is a long range activity. The AID Manual suggested ten years, but this was for budget forecasting purposes.[83] Martin observed, "Aside from natural phenomena, little ever happens in a hurry in an underdeveloped country."[84]

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[82]International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Development Prospects for Kenya (Washington: IBRD, 1963). Kenya's national plan flowed directly from this document and a political document, Sessional Paper No. 10, October 23, 1963 (Nairobi: Government Printing Office, October, 1963).

[83]U.S., AID, Manual, op.cit.

[84]Martin, op.cit., p. 97.

Priorities

That the above aspirations may exist does not establish priorities for the allocation of scarce resources. Recently, according to Leroy Wehrle, AID Deputy Assistant Administrator (Vietnam Bureau) AID adopted the "principle of concentration on dynamic growth elements." With increase in output as the goal, the programmer searches for or endeavors to create the following conditions for the concentration of his resources:

1. Output leverage. An example may be a large rural population with basic farm skills, coupled with a technological breakthrough, such as the development of I-R-8, a high yielding rice strain recently released by the International Rice Research Institute, Los Banos, Philippines.

2. Freedom from roadblocks. This is a first screening as to whether in the existing setting the success of the undertaking is feasible.

3. Political tie-ins. This is a determination of whether the host leadership wants the activity in question, or whether they could be brought to want it.

4. Confidence. This is an inquiry as to whether the host government and the people have confidence in the prospective venture. Unless there is considered to be a reasonable chance for success, it may be better not to undertake the project.[85]

Current Program

Historically, programming has been viewed by AID and its predecessor agencies as, first, a funding exercise and, second, a means of central control. There is little evidence that programming has been viewed as operations planning.

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[85]Lecture, University of Pittsburgh, Development Institute for AID Mid-Career Officers, June 6, 1968.

Operating after the fact of appropriations, the Economic Cooperation Administration required project proposals for technical assistance as a means of holding field activities within the limits of the enabling legislation and to provide documents against which funds could be allotted.[86]

Stanley Andrews, Administrator of the Mutual Security Administration, 1950-1953, stated, "We divided the money up according to their needs and checked to see that they didn't steal it."[87]

The Foreign Operations Administration devised the PPA as the basic technical assistance program document. It consisted of a narrative of the scope and intent of the activity, an indication of commitment by the host government, and a personnel and cost worksheet covering up to five years. The PPA was followed by a project agreement (ProAg) with the host government, covering the life of the project up to five years, with often the tacit understanding of an option of renewal. Emphasis was placed on the justification for funds.

Beginning with Fiscal Year 1963, AID adopted the Country Assistance Program (CAP) presentation, requiring an annual fresh statement of proposals for both existing projects and prospective activities. The CAP required this format:

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[86]U.S., ECA, Horace Bruce, Deputy Administrator, Memorandum to the Representative, Paris, September 10, 1948 (Washington: AID, Archives).

[87]Interview, Danang, Vietnam, October, 1965.

Goal Plan

1. Goal Statement
   (Example: to increase corn production in Country X by Y percent in five years)

2. Goal Plan Analysis and Schedule
   (an hypothesis supporting the feasibility of the goal)

3. Goal Plan Summary

   E-1....5. Tables

   (showing multi-year cost projections)

Activity

1. Activity Target
   (a narrative statement of an intermediate goal--for example, to train 200 extension agents in five years)

2. Course of Action
   (a statement of requirements and costs, including personnel, commodities, training and host country contributions, worded as proposals)

3. Progress to Date

   (A statement of prior achievements, applicable to old projects)
   (APPENDIX H)

The document was sent to AID/W, and, after review, a digest was sent on to Congress. When approved, it went back to the mission as an authorized budget document.

Perhaps because of the pressure on the mission to meet AID/W deadlines and to fight for appropriations, the annual drafting of the CAP became an exercise in rhetoric with the technical advisors acting as students and the program officers as paper graders. The role of teacher in this setting is not known.

That the system did not provide for implementation plans was recognized in 1964. (APPENDIX K) Subsequently, the Agency adopted an integrated system for proposing, planning, implementing and evaluating non-capital projects, which was phased into action for Fiscal Year 1969.

The process begins with a Non-Capital Project Paper (PROP) covering the life of the project from the mission. It may be submitted at any time of year, and amendment proposals may be submitted at the discretion of the mission. It is the intent of AID/W that as long as annual project reports reflect reasonable progress, requests for continued funding will automatically be included in the annual budget proposal. At the discretion of the mission, a Preliminary Project Proposal (PPP) may precede the PROP.

Assuming the average life of projects to be five years, this could cut out 80 per cent of the field time required for budget presentation. It provides for an extension of the program time frame, recommended by Martin,[88] and flexibility, recommended by Duncan.[89]

Next in order, the system requires a Joint Project Implementation Plan (PIP), which is a detailed plan expanded from the PROP. It is to

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[88]Martin, op.cit., p. 97.

[89]Duncan, op.cit., pp. 206-208.

cover the scope of the project for its entire life, including the scheduling of inputs, processes and outputs. It is to be planned jointly with host country officials. It is changable in the mission "...within the scope of approved country strategy, sector goal plans and project authorization." Washington approval of the PIP is not required. (APPENDIX K)

The PIP satisfies Duncan's recommendation of host country cooperation and congruence in programming.[90] It also responds to Martin's recommendation of "properly planned" projects.[91] It should contribute to continuity of effort in face of high personnel turnover and unforeseen fluctuations in environmental conditions.

The Manual Order alone is not sufficient to produce good programming, however. Although instructions are given in detail, the Manual Order still assumes that project advisors are skilled project planners. This is over-optimistic. AID/W should send a project planner trainer to every mission to conduct a workshop on project planning and evaluation (The Vietnam Bureau has adopted this approach in part).

Evaluation

The fourth document in the new programming system is a Non-Capital Project Appraisal Report (PAR), which is in lock-step with the PIP. It is an annual report which reviews, a) project purposes and design, b) project outputs in terms of project, sector and U.S. objectives, c) implementation

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[90] Ibid., pp. 184, 192-193.

[91] Martin, op.cit., p. 103.

and use of inputs, and d) the role of the host country in implementing the project. The instruments include: checklists of criteria, provisions for scaled value judgements, backed by narrative explanation, pre-goal progress evaluation and accounts of relevant events. The PAR replaces six major reports. It is on the basis of this report that funds for the projects are to be continued. (APPENDIX L)

The PAR responds to Lincoln's definition of evaluation, which "...stresses the need to evaluate both the performance of AID activities in terms of specific, planned achievements and also their significance in terms of U.S. objectives."[92] Col. Lincoln conducted a year's study of the problem in 1964-1965.[93]

In May 1968, AID Administrator William Gaud adopted an evaluation system developed by Joel Birnstein whom Gaud had named his special assistant for evaluation. Gaud revealed the following plan:

> "Establishment of a management structure [for evaluation], including evaluation officers in missions, regional bureaus and certain staff offices and a Special Assistant for Evaluation in the office of the Administrator.
>
> "Year-round evaluation activity by missions and simultaneous submission of evaluation plans with program proposals for each year.
>
> "Introduction by late 1968 of a Project Appraisal Report to be submitted at least once a year on every non-capital project.
>
> "As mission and consulting resources permit, more evaluation of specific economic sectors or sub-sectors, e.g., agriculture,

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[92]George A. Lincoln, Improving A.I.D. Program Evaluation, Report to the Administrator (Washington: AID, October, 1965), p. 11.

[93]Ibid., pp. 41-43.

agri-business or agricultural production; education or vocational education; manpower development; savings institutions; power; small and medium industry.

"An AID/W 'memory bank' to make readily available the best evaluative studies in major program fields."[94]

Beyond the new hierarchy for evaluation and the PAR, there may be something yet missing. John Lindeman observed that the major requirement for the improvement of the administration of technical assistance by AID was "attitudinal change".[95] Although his observation was directed toward central administration in general, it seems fully applicable to mission personnel in relation to evaluation and reporting. Equally important, evaluation and reporting is a professional skill which is far from universal among other professions. It is best acquired through systematic learning experience. This suggests the need for special training.

Coordination of Technical Assistance Among Donors

That there is need to coordinate technical assistance to the developing countries is attested in the diversity of sources, which, even so, stand in obvious short supply. At least 24 countries, including China and the Soviet Union, provide bilateral economic aid; ten UN Regular and Expanded programs and four regional programs provide direct technical assistance; two regional cooperative programs administer technical assistance among their memberships; and there is an unknown number of private organizations

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[94]U.S., AID, Front Lines, Vol. VI, No. 13, May 15, 1968 (Washington: AID) p. 2.

[95]Lindeman, op.cit., p. 3.

in the business throughout the world.[96] Martin reported that for example, in 1964, the Philippines received aid from 120 sources, including,

> "...6 United Nations agencies, 18 bilateral assistance countries (excluding the United States), 4 United States agencies, 3 regional cooperative groups, 3 financial institutions, 7 voluntary associations registered with AID for operations in the Philippines, and 79 private agencies, foundations and organizations."[97]

These organizations have highly divergent motives for their presence. Each independent and bilateral agency holds it's own professional view, and each multinational organization holds many.[98]

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has reported progress in coordinating capital assistance in recent years. This started with reviews of the flow of funds (including terms of flow) to the developing countries, as well as the suggestion of lending standards by DAC. Subsequently, DAC has encouraged its members to hold discussions on the aid needs of specific countries in which there existed common bilateral interests. Discussions have been initiated in Thailand, Liberia, Ceylon and Sierra Leone.[99]

Consortia have been used to muster financial aid for specific countries.[100] More recently, the World Bank has advocated "consultative

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[96]Technical Assistance Research Project, The Magnitude and Complexity of Technical Assistance (Syracuse: Maxwell School, February, 1965), Hectographed, pp. 1-115.

[97]Martin, op.cit., pp. 16-17

[98]Nairn, op.cit.

[99]Development Assistance Committee, Development Assistance Efforts and Policies, 1967 Review, Draft Report of the Chairman (Paris: OECD, July 10, 1967), Chapter VIII.

[100]Ibid.

groups" having development interests in specific countries. The Bank proposes to provide the organizational effort, chairmanship and executive secretariat.

Michael Hoffman of the Bank said,

> "In agreeing to organize a consultative group, the Bank assumes the following general responsibilities:
>
> "(a) making periodic comprehensive reports on the country's development possibilities, problems and performance as a basis for the group's deliberations;
>
> "(b) commenting on the country's estimate of its aid requirements, making recommendations as to the types and terms of aid appropriate for it, and highlighting any problems arising from unduly burdensome debt accumulation;
>
> "(c) helping the recipient government to prepare or revise a development program, or advising on problems of execution, where such assistance is desired;
>
> "(d) assisting the government, as may be necessary and desired, in identifying projects, in their preliminary screening, in arranging for feasibility studies, etc., and in relating other technical assistance to the needs and priorities of the investment program; and
>
> "(e) advising the government and group members as to the sectors and, where adequate feasibility studies exist, the projects that deserve priority for external financing."[101]

Considerable technical assistance is implicit in Hoffman's proposal.

Martin observed succinctly, "The organization at the headquarters level sets the tone for coordination or non-coordination of efforts and activities throughout the hierarchy."[102] The opportunity to coordinate technical assistance at the top are limited, however. As for AID, its Multilateral Assistance Staff works closely with the U. N. technical

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[101]Michael L. Hoffman, Aid Coordination, (Ditchley Park, Enstone, Oxfordshire, England: The Ditchley Foundation, June, 1966), p. 11.

[102]Martin, op.cit., p. 126.

assistance agencies. The trouble is, according to Martin, "...the specialized agencies of the United Nations are not themselves well coordinated."[103]

Martin recommended that in-country coordination might best be led by the U.N. Resident Representative.[104] On the other hand, Duncan asked, "...might it not be better to leave this part of development activities to the innovator?"[105]

John White found that in the majority of 40 aid recipient countries surveyed, U.N. Resident Representatives reported informal coordination to be either adequate or the best arrangement that could be hoped for under the circumstances. Host governments clearly resent secret consortia on their soil, and donor representatives feel that they can accomplish little in the way of coordination in the presence of the hosts.[106]

Beyond informal relations, the hope for in-country coordination of donor effort seems to rest with the host government. It can be achieved through the central planning and aid coordinating facility. This rests on the proposition that if the national plan is good, all resources, including foreign aid, are drawn to their proper places--hence coordinated. It follows that the major effort toward coordination should be devoted to improving the plan and its implementation.[107]

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[103] Ibid., p. 129.

[104] Ibid., pp. 164-168.

[105] Duncan, op.cit., p. 141.

[106] White, op.cit., p. 28.

[107] White counters this view from the position that underdeveloped countries tend to elect technical assistance on bases other than the "economic rational-allocation-of-scarce resources." (Ibid.)

Hoffman said,

> "Assistance to developing countries in improving their coordinating efforts in these key areas /of planning, investment control and coordinating requests for technical assistance/ should, in my opinion, be viewed as a more urgent task than tinkering with or elaborating international coordination machinery."[108]

Coordination by the host country may be achieved at the sector level by the Minister holding periodic meetings of his staff and donor representatives. This practice was followed by the Cambodian Minister of Agriculture in 1963.

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[108]Hoffman, op.cit., p. 6.

CHAPTER VI

INSTITUTION BUILDING

In contrast to subsistence agriculture, the development of commercial, industrial age agriculture implies surplus production. It also implies specialization. Thus, it calls for sustained linkages with systems beyond the farm domain. These involve, at a minimum, a) means of creating, testing and delivering technology and other non-indigenous inputs, b) means of enabling the farmer to use these inputs, and c) means of exchanging the resulting surplus for replacement inputs and other valuable goods and services. These are institutional functions which are alien to subsistence societies.

The PIO/T called for a study of ways and means of aiding the development of such institutions: "With respect to administration per se: ...The arrangements for institution building." In context of the complete document, this infers research of the administration of technical assistance for institution building. (APPENDIX A) The PIO/T specifications were incorporated in the project contract, and two institutions, agricultural extension and vocational agricultural education, were examined.[109]

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[109]Don V. Hart, The Organization, Administration, Training Programs, and Dissemination of Modern Agricultural and Community Development Technology in a Bisayan Municipality, Philippines (Syracuse: Maxwell School, February, 1965), mimeographed; Manouchehr Safa-Isfahani, Technical Assistance for Community Development and Agricultural Extension (Syracuse: Maxwell School September, 1965), hectographed; and Jerry Minor, Rural Education in Underdeveloped Countries (Syracuse: Maxwell School, February, 1966), hectographed.

Current Studies in Institution Building

Near the initiation of the project, Maxwell School joined Indiana, Michigan State and Pittsburgh universities to form the Inter-University Research Program in Institution Building. This is a long range program, having particular interest in technical assistance in the development of institutions. One of the hypotheses of the study is,

> "It is possible, through systematic and comparative analysis of institution building experience, to derive elements of a technology of institution building that will be useful to persons engaged in introducing innovation into developing societies, whether they be indigenous change agents or foreign advisors."[110]

In an interim report in 1967, Milton Esman, who conceived the program, stated, "Although the basic model does not deal explicitly with the role of external technical assistance it is very much on the minds of those who designed it."[111]

Institution is defined as "an organization which incorporates, fosters, and protects normative relationships and action patterns and performs functions and services which are valued in the environment."[112]

The definition is amplified by Selznick's statement: "'To institutionalize is to infuse with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand.'"[113]

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[110] Esman and Bruhns, op.cit., p. 7.

[111] Milton J. Esman, Institution Building Concepts -- an Interim Appraisal (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, GSPIA, March, 1967), mimeographed, p. 6.

[112] Esman and Bruhns, op.cit., p. 5.

[113] Ibid. The quotation is from Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Perterson & Co., 1957), p. 17.

Esman defined institution building as,

"It also concentrates the effects of internal and environmental factors on the development of innovative, viable organizations. Special attention will be paid to 'strategic decisions' which appear to be of major importance in the establishment and operation of institutions."[114]

Esman and his colleagues identified the following elements or "clusters of variables" pertaining to the institution as a social system[:]

"leadership, doctrine, program, resources, and internal structure. Within each of the variable clusters, in turn, a number of elements and properties have been identified which appear significant for the analysis of the institution building process.

"The analytical framework also includes the concept of institutional linkages, or points of interaction with the environment. These linkages have been grouped into classes of relationships which affect the establishment and functioning of an institution in different ways. These classes are:

"1. Enabling linkages--pertaining to institutions which control authority and resources required by the subject institution;

"2. Functional linkages--relating to organizations performing activities and services which are complementary to those of the institution, which provide its inputs or take its outputs;

"3. Normative linkages--referring to institutions protecting norms and values which constrain or enhance the new institution;

"4. Diffused linkages--channels for the crystallization and expression of individual or public opinion not reflected in formal institutions."[115]

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[114]Inter-University Research Program, Milton J. Esman, Research Director (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, GSPIA).

[115]Ibid.

The study "focuses on the process of creating or reconstituting organizations in low income countries which introduce new values, functions and technologies."[116]

The first four studies completed were case histories of progress toward "institutionalization" by universities or schools receiving "institution building" assistance from U.S. universities under contracts with AID.[117]

The principal value of the four studies seemed to be in their function as preliminary field tests of the research concept. As for the resolution of the problem, the studies proved inconclusive, as could be expected at this stage. Esman reported:

> "They were particularly interesting and produced insightful results with the variables of leadership, linkage relationships, and especially with tests of institutionality. They devoted relatively less attention to the variables of doctrine, program, resources, and internal structure, particularly the latter which relates to the internal management of the organization itself."[118]

From the case studies, Esman drew ten hypotheses, which are abbreviated here:

> "1. Institutional leadership must often choose between protecting the organization and promoting its change objectives.

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[116] Ibid.

[117] Esman, op.cit., p. 7. The four cases were of the Central University of Ecuador, by Hans Blaise; the Institute of Public Administration of Thammasat University, Thailand, by William Siffin; the Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East, by Guthrie Birkhead; and the College of Education, University of Nigeria, by John W. Hanson.

[118] Ibid. p. 61.

"(a) Given this choice, they will act to protect the organization.
"(b) This is a rational choice, because the survival and viability of the organization is necessary (though not sufficient) condition to the achievement of its change objectives.

"2. There is an inherent dilemma between (a) institutionalizing an organization, and (b) ensuring its capacity to continue to innovate - its "'innovative thrust.'" ...Innovative thrust can be achieved only when (a) it is an explicit and prominent theme in institutional doctrine, and (b) it caters to interests and needs which are perceived in linked organizations or which the subject institution has helped them to perceive.

"3. Specificity in doctrinal themes provides firm guides, high levels of predictability, and "'stable reference points'" for leadership in making program decisions and in managing relations internally and with linked institutions. ..

"4. Leadership will adapt program priorities and content to ensure a steady and reliable inflow of resources, particularly of funds but also of staff, information, and of other raw materials such as students for educational institutions...

"5. Program content depends on (a) the doctrinal commitment of leadership, (b) their estimate of the technical capacity of their organization to sustain the program, (c) the estimated effects of alternative programs on access to resources, and (d) the anticipated consequences of the reactions of linked organizations and groups to particular program elements...

"6. Leadership normally places highest priority on cultivating and satisfying enabling linkages...

"7. The more an organization is diffusely structured and complex,

"(a) the more likely it will cater to a network of mutually reinforcing, self-serving vested interests with strong external links;
"(b) the more leadership autonomy and initiative are constrained;
"(c) the more difficult it is for new leadership to redirect the institution's doctrine and program.

"8. In institution building situations, the development of effective and coherent doctrine varies directly with the value congruence, ease of communication, and homogeneity of the technical assistance group,

and inversely with the variety of national approaches represented in the technical assistance team. Therefore multi-national technical assistance teams tend to be ineffective instruments for institution building tasks.

"9. In institution building situations, external technical assistance teams tend to be spearheads of change and the carriers and purveyors of change doctrine. These doctrinal themes tend to be progressively attenuated as they become indigenized...

"10. The receptivity of linked institutions and groups to the new institution will vary directly with their perception of the benefits they are likely to gain, minus the cost to them in any salient values. In establishing such linkages, the institutional leadership must attempt to probe and to estimate this benefit-cost perception.[119]

In 1965, the Committee on Institutional Cooperation, composed of 10 universities, with AID financing, undertook a study of methods and techniques of developing or changing institutions, using Inter-University Research Program Institution Building concepts.[120] This study is yet incomplete and unreported.

Discussion

Historically, institutions have been created to stabilize, immortalize and diffuse innovations to the realm of universal practice. First comes the innovation. Then there is the leader, or champion, who may or may not have been the innovator, who expresses value and prescribes ritual and doctrine. Following the doctrine, the members of the institution take the

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[119] Ibid., pp. 62-65.

[120] J.K. McDermott, J.A. Rigney and Austin Haws, "A Conceptualization of the Technical Assistance-Institution Building Process," Administrative Procedures and Strategy of the Technical Assistance Complex (TAC) in Institution Building Contracts, Research Draft (Madison: University of Wisconsin, November, 1966), mimeographed, p. 18.

innovation into the environment. Secular innovations have generally taken place apart from schools and have been subsequently institutionalized through the assignment of value, doctrine and a host for its perpetuity. Mathematics and agricultural extension are examples.

One characteristic of institutions implicit in the four case studies is that in effort to institutionalize an innovation the benefit-cost advantage is so stressed in the indoctrination that once the innovation achieves institutional status it is discarded with the greatest of reluctance. By the same token, the leadership with its doctrine tends to resist subsequent innovations.[121]

The Institution Building Program is obviously searching for a dependable procedure for developing organizations that will systematically seek out, stablize and diffuse innovations useful to the social environment and at the same time discard institutional practices and outputs which serve no useful purpose to society. This seems to call for centering instititional doctrine in the welfare of the client society, rather than in the innovation. With this orientation the viability of the institutionalized innovation should be limited in proportion to its contribution to the client society. With doctrine centered in the society the institution leadership could be expected to seek innovations as a means of continuing service and, hence, enhancing survival of the institution.

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[121] Esman, op.cit., p. 47.

Conclusion

In summary, although the study of the processes of normalizing and stabilizing innovations is yet incomplete, Esman's ten hypotheses offer useful insights for the administration of technical assistance in the development of such institutions.[122]

The U.S. approach to technical assistance in the development of institutions, generally, has been to take a complete sample (seed or scion, so to speak: leadership, doctrine, resources, program and linkages) of one of its domestic institutions to a host country and there plant it. The assumption seems to be that it will contaminate the new environment and spread, something like mold could be expected to spread in soil, for example. The rate of spread, according to Esman, would be affected by the compatibility of the environment with the institution.[123] Continuing the botanical allegory, the agronomist would contend that the overriding limitation of the spread of the innovation lies in its adaptability to the environment.

From the work presented, it is proposed, tentatively, that the following conditions will enhance the development and utility value of multiple-and-replacable innovation, client-serving institutions:

1. A clearly articulated, client-centered doctrine which is accepted by the organization.

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[122] *Ibid.*, pp. 62-65.

[123] *Ibid.*, p. 42.

2. Solidarity within the organization.
3. Multiple reinforcement. This includes recruitment, initiation, training and other means of reassurance. It also calls for mass involvement and multiple means of identification.
4. Innovations which promise substantial benefit-cost advantages to the client system. Although economic advantages are of paramount importance, they are not exclusive. Social profits, including the enhancement of status, are important. To minimize social losses by avoiding the violation of social norms, for example, seems important.

CHAPTER VII

INSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS

The task remains to examine the institutional functions considered to be requisite to adequate performance of agriculture in a commercial, industrial society. It is the purpose here to suggest the major institutional services required, not to prescribe how they are to be provided. There is almost no primary research available to substantiate such a listing; hence, the statements in this chapter must be considered tentative.

National Policy

Milo Cox, chief of the Rural Development Division of the AID Bureau for Latin America, maintains that the major factors affecting agricultural productivity is effective demand and incentive to produce. He sees these directly influenced by national policy. It is his contention that farmers nearly always produce enough to satisfy the effective demand--i.e., supply equals demand at free market prices. If an increase in demand is reflected by an increase in prices, which is passed back to the farmer, Cox believes that production will increase. Incentives may be dampened by price ceilings, often imposed by governing elites catering to the urban population. Or both the effective demand and incentive to produce may be limited by an expensive marketing system. On the other hand, the incentive to produce may be intensified, either by decreasing the cost of marketing and sharing

the savings with the farmer or by government intervention in favor of the farmer. The latter course may take the form of either guaranteed prices above the laissez faire system or by subsidizing farm production inputs (frequently fertilizer, irrigation water and technical guidance).[124]

In accounting for almost equal success in agricultural development in Greece, Mexico and Taiwan, Wade Gregory found that the farm policies of all three governments included "...economic incentives, improvements in supply conditions of new inputs, and education of how to apply the new technology as well as the economic consequences of using it."[125]

A policy setting apparatus is implicit in the central government establishment. What is important from the standpoint of "nation building and socio-economic progress" is the existance of a reference system (pressure groups) to orient the establishment to such a course, which includes the rural sector.[126] The rural sector may be represented through national political parties, to be sure. In addition, a national farmers' organization can be helpful in articulating their interests.

Research

A primary requisite for agricultural development is a research system addressed to current production and marketing problems. Professor De Vries sees research as necessary in low income countries to assure a

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[124]Lecture, University of Pittsburgh, DIAMCO, June 11, 1968.

[125]Gregory, op.cit., p. 38.

[126]Esman and Bruhns, op.cit., p. 22.

continued supply of food.[127] Douglas Ensminger, director of the Ford Foundation program in India, lists research as one of five requisites for agricultural development.[128]

The first research required is collecting and comparing the performance of indigenous and foreign strains of crops which respond to national needs. Later the process advances to phenotypic selection of plants, then crossbreeding, selection and hybridizing. Performance testing and selection of livestock and poultry follows, as does the analysis of the farm enterprise and the marketing system.

Manpower Development

The administration of development requires a multitude of special skills. More, as Esman pointed out, it requires an attitude favoring the process.[129] This is an abbreviated list of personnel categories proposed by Dean Stone as essential for development administration:

> "General leaders -- political and administrative -- who must know something about the strategy and processes required to foster rapid development and to develop citizen participation
>
> "Personnel from central planning, programming, budgetary, and other central policy offices; economic development ministries; development and central banks; and other agencies concerned with major development policies and programs.

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[127] Lecture, University of Pittsburgh, GSPIA, April 12, 1968.

[128] Douglas Ensminger, "Overcoming Obstacles to Farm Economic Development in Less-Developed Countries," Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. XLIV, No. 5, December, 1962 (Madison, Wisconsin), pp. 1382-1383.

[129] Esman and Bruhn, op.cit., p. 22.

"Program planners and supervisors in ministries or departments concerned with development in specific sectors, such as public works, agriculture, education, health, industrial development

"Personnel in the ministries and central organs who deal not only with design and evaluation of projects, but especially with scheduling, management, control and operation

"Professional and technical personnel...having supervisory roles in ministries, departments, and agencies who also need training in management, administrative processes, institution-building, program development and operations, and administrative problem-solving

"Personnel concerned with community development and rural action

"Statisticians, agronomists, and other specialized persons who engaged in some particular aspect of development and need also general or special training in the application of their technical skills

"Instructors for schools and institutes which focus on the training of the above categories of personnel."[130]

Dean Stone elaborated:

"Most of this education will need to be mid-career and feature middle level operational and technical work as well as planning and implementation at senior levels. Some of the education will be comprehensive, academic in character, and geared to long-term needs. Much of it must be short-term, specialized, intensive."

"To serve the needs of these diverse categories of persons, a variety of educational, training, and conference programs are needed -- some on an international, but most on a national and even local basis. Educational policies designed to prepare the next generation for the administrative and technical infrastructure must be paralleled by various and intensive short-term courses, workshops, and conferences designed to upgrade the present personnel. Some of these programs must utilize overseas or international facilities."[131]

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[130]Donald C. Stone, Education and Development Administration, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, GSPIA, 1964), mimeographed, pp. 17-18.

[131]Ibid., pp. 17, 19.

AID and its predecessors have assisted with training in nearly all of these catagories with varying degrees of success (no case of negative results from in-country training is known). In Gleason's 26 case studies of technical assistance projects, workshops and on-the-job training were rated second among 15 factors contributing to the success of the projects.[132] No one method of training may be rated above another, as there are places and times for all. In countries already possessing corps of technical personnel the obvious starting point would be to establish temporary centers to provide pre-service training for whatever institutional innovations that are to be introduced. Agricultural extension is an example. This is often necessary, because the inherent resistance to change in the established institutions precludes the use of its resources for such training in the beginning.[133]

Where no corps of professional personnel exists the first step is to develop academic training for the preparation of agricultural administrators, researchers and extension workers.

The following principles, which embrace the Inter-University Institution Building model, are proposed as guides to developing both short courses and longer academic programs for professional personnel in the developing countries:

1. Approach the task with dominant impact.

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[132]Gleason, op.cit., p. 33.

[133]This was observed in Brazil, 1956-1961.

2. Articulate and teach a single doctrine centered in the client society.

3. Teach practical skills in "packages".

4. Teach self-confidence and confidence in the system.

Foreign study is widely used in manpower development. The practice has proven valuable at all personnel levels, from farmer to President, under favorable circumstances. The advantages lie in the exposure to institutions, ideas and skills which do not exist at home.

There are certain disadvantages attributed to the participant training program. Among these, often because of differences in customs and goals, the foreign training received is to varying degrees not applicable to the problems at home. Due to cultural difference, students in foreign settings have fewer references with which to relate their learning experiences to problem situations than do domestic students. Further, to train an individual does not change the structure of the employing organization. Katz and Kahn affirm that it is necessary to change organizational structure and roles to get organizational change.[134]

Groups studying abroad in preparation for common, associated activities appear to profit from mutual reinforcement, both during training

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[134]Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966) Chapter 11. A former participant in the AID training program reported that as head of a government agency he was unable to institute innovations he had learned in foreign study, due to uniform resistance to change exerted by clerks and others under his command (Jamil Jreisat, Lecture, University of Pittsburgh, GSPIA, April 11, 1968).

and later in operation. This was concluded by Esman in the case of a group of future teachers training for service in the Institute of Public Administration at Thammasat University, Thailand.[135] Similar conclusions were reached by the author from the observation of groups of agricultural information specialists and poultry farmers who had observation tours in the United States, 1959-1961, and a group of Cambodian future agricultural extension workers observing in the Philippines, 1961.

An advantage claimed for developing domestic training institutions is that they -- The Inter-University type, at least -- grow in competence through the accumulation of experience and they take on additional innovations as the years pass; hence, they become capital growth assets.

Finance

The most important aspect of agricultural development, according to Professor De Vries, is the supplementation of the farm enterprise with production inputs. The greatest bottleneck to the expansion of the use of technological inputs, he says, is the lack of availability and the high cost of credit.[136] Farmers need credit to finance production inputs and to finance their consumer needs (food deficit and other necessities) between harvests. Farmers are widely dispersed from the financial centers, unknown to institutional lenders, and their unit requirements are small. Hence, the management of farm credit is costly.

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[135] Esman, op.cit., p. 47.

[136] Egbert De Vries, Lecture, University of Pittsburgh, GSPIA, March 27, 1968.

An adequate farm credit system seems to require the following elements:

1. A supra financial organization with widely decentralized outlets and widely decentralized lending authority, with minimal leakage.
2. A system of mobilizing funds equal to the demand for credit.
3. A tradition in farm credit operations.[137]
4. Timeliness in delivery of credit at relatively low cost.

To achieve a combination of relatively low cost credit and timeliness of delivery, farmers must assume most if not all of the responsiblity for approving loans and collecting debts among themselves. This means cooperative credit organizations. In commending cooperatives for the administration of farm credit, Horace Belshaw stated,

> "In most underdeveloped countries, however, these are potentialities rather than achievements.../However/ Co-operatives must be judged in terms of the alternative situation without them, rather than condemned because they do not measure up to the co-operative ideals accepted in more developed societies."[138]

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[137]It is obvious that tradition is not born full-grown. It may be enhanced by indoctrination, however. The Kenya agricultural credit program ran into serious difficulties in 1965-1966 from a general lack of experience on the part of both local credit administrators and borrowers. R.H. Clough, "Some Notes on a Recent Economic Survey of Land Settlement in Kenya," East African Economic Review, Vol. I., New Series, No. 3, December, 1965 (Nairobi: The Oxford University Press) pp. 78-83; J. Heyer, "Kenya's Agricultural Development Policy", East African Economic Review, Vol. II, New Series, No. 3, December, 1966, op.cit., p. 36.

[138]Horace Belshaw, Agricultural Credit in Economically Under-Developed Countries (Rome: FAO, 1959), pp. 147-148.

Farm Supply

The question of agricultural production supply in the developing countries is largely one of national policy:

1. Should farm production supply items be imported?
2. Should they be taxed, left duty-free or subsidized? What promise of benefit-cost ratio does the farmer require to risk the purchase?
3. Should a domestic source be developed? Should it be of state, private or mixed ownership? Should it be taxed, tax exempt, or subsidized?

The type of distribution system is also a matter of national policy. The key factors are timeliness and cost. Generally, private merchants are timely, but unless they are forced by the threat of competition their margins may be excessive.

There may have been a tendancy on the part of AID to push highly desirable imported supplies (fertilizer, for example) through cooperatives as a means of gaining patronage for those fledgling organizations. Although the strategy is understandable, it often has the disadvantage of taking away from timeliness in delivery. Generally, government officials, who are in charge of cooperatives in most developing countries, do not hustle to the tune of private entrepreneurs in delivering commodities, for the simple reason that the former are paid fixed civil service salaries with vacation time and holidays, while the latter are remunerated on the basis price times volume. It appears that for a long time to come the

developing countries will need multiple means of distributing farm supplies. The important role of the cooperative may be to hold the entrepreneur in line by providing competitive pressure.

Marketing

The need for an efficient, effective agricultural marketing system may be shown with this partial rural development model: A subsistence farmer achieves a surplus in production, due to a fortuitous season or first-round technological inputs (health promoter, improved seed, insecticides, fertilizer). He takes his surplus to the port city and exchanges it for additional production inputs and/or consumer goods. Part of the surplus goes to support an industrial labor force in the port city, while part is exchanged for imports to support both domestic industry and the farmer's accelerating production program.

There seems to be three goal areas in the development of agricultural marketing systems in the underdeveloped countries. One is efficiency, measured in terms of labor, actual cost, intermediate spread and return to the producer. The second is an awareness of market demand and effective capacity to respond in terms of production. The third is the availability of options in the market and freedom to respond to them.

It has been estimated that small farmers in the low income countries lose up to half their crops in harvesting, drying, storage and transportation.

In the early stages of market development, if the farmer is free to act independently, typically, he (or she) takes the surplus to the city

by foot or by bus if the service is available. There he (or she) sleeps in the street by the commodity by night and sits by it by day until it is sold. Then the farmer divides the proceeds between commercial purchases and the fare home. It is suspected that oftentimes the net revenue from the marketing activity amounts to no more than prevailing wages in the farmer's own village for the time consumed in the exercise, had jobs been available. To this extent, the goods marketed would be true surpluses, representing neither cost nor value on the farm, and the marketing activity must be regarded as supplementary employment.

What is needed, obviously, is scale operations to gain efficiency in transportation and market representation. With an increase in net return from increased efficiency the farmer should be expected to respond to improved techniques of harvesting and protection on the farm.

Farmers need awareness of market demands in order to gain and hold customers and maximize the return for their efforts. Consumers have peculiar tastes, they have quality preferences, and their needs are distributed over time. Awareness of these conditions may be supplied in part by market information systems. However, in the early stages of development it requires market oriented production guidance.

A cardinal element of the market is an option to choose a purchaser among many -- "A gathering of people for buying and selling things, especially provisions and livestock."[139] In many developing countries

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[139]Webster's, op.cit.

farmers make advanced pledges to deliver their crops in return for credit extended in the form of cash and/or merchandise. Thus, they sacrifice their role in the market. When an outside force, such as a government agency, attempts to intervene in the system there must be a readiness to provide the same services as did the village credit merchant. Clifton Wharton concluded that there is,

> "...the need to recognize the multiple service or function which is performed by the marketer-moneylender-merchants, when undertaking governmental programs to eradicate monopsony exploitation. For example, governmental policies and programs which aim at eliminating a multiple-function dealer's socially undesirable monopsonistic gains, but which fail to realize or take account of the multiple and interrelated aspects of his operation are doomed to failure. The small farmer will not transfer his custom or allegiance to a governmental operation which only markets his product but does not provide credit. Nor will the smallholder be able to shift if he is still in debt to the dealer as merchant. Thus, any governmental program which attacks only one facet of the monopsonist's power is inadequate."[140]

Again, it seems that if efficient, equitable agricultural markets are to be developed in the low income countries the farmers themselves must do it, at least to the extent of providing alternatives among intermediate purchasers. Although central governments must be depended upon for favorable policy, government administered marketing programs, such as government sponsored cooperatives, so far have exhibited limited capabilities. This is perhaps due to the general inexperience of the civil servant in the

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[140] C. R. Wharton, Jr., Marketing, Merchandising and Moneylending: A note On Middleman Monopsony in Malaya, Reprinted from the Malayan Economic Review, Vol. VII, No. 2, October 1962 (pp. 24-44) (New York: The Agricultural Development Council) p. 22.

market place, an absence of decentralization of decision making, and the honesty factor.

Formal Education

It is appropriate to ask what traditionally school-learned skills are required for contemporary, industrial age, commercial agriculture. Jerry Minor argues that "...in the absence of complementary agricultural inputs and marketing and transportation facilities, they---...primary education, literacy training and practical instruction for agricultural workers...--will fail to raise productivity."[141]

He proposed that any such program should be adopted on a highly selective basis, because of high cost in scarce resources. His analysis lends approval to "extensive rural primary education only if national integration is an overriding objective and if political structures can withstand the economic sacrafices and the pressures of educated persons with inadequate opportunities to use their newly acquired skills."[142] Professor Minor's response is not to What nor How, but Under what circumstances?.

Responding to What?, it was the conclusion of this reporter after observing swine growers in Southern Brazil, 1958-1961, and melon growers in South Vietnam, 1964-1966, that illiterate farmers are able to manage first level, stable, technological inputs with no difficulty.

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[141] Minor, op.cit., p. 22.

[142] Ibid., p. 21.

These include self-pollinated seed, premixed fertilizer and improved types of livestock. The next level of inputs, which includes credit transactions, insecticides and specially formulated animal rations, requires functional literacy and the ability to do simple arithmetic. These are absolute requisites for handling insecticides.

It is not absolutely necessary for the operator of a farm to possess these skills, but it is necessary that he have access to them. This was illustrated in a case where an illiterate farmer felt forced to abandon a hog project when his literate son, who had been mixing the feed and keeping records, was drafted into military service. In another case, however, the illiteracy obstacle was circumvented by a group of poultry growers forming a cooperative and delegating all exercises in literacy to the secretary-manager.

The above observations, as well as observations in the United States, suggest that a science oriented primary school education with emphasis on reading and problem solving is minimally adequate academic training for contemporary farming.

The achievement of literacy is one thing, while to maintain it is another. A survey in a rural area in Uraguay in 1962 indicated that 82 percent of adults who had spent five years in school lapsed back into functional illiteracy.[143] This suggests the need to provide rural people with useful, meaningful literature after they leave school.

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[143] Ladislav Cerych, Problems of Aid to Education in Developing Countries (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 85.

Vocational agricultural education is offered in the United States at the secondary level. Whether such training would fit into a primary school program, or the extent of its effectiveness if it did, remains undetermined. It does not fit the curricula of most secondary schools in the developing countries, where few rural students reach secondary school, and if they do they never return to the farm.

Extension

Extension is part of a multi-word name of a U.S. out-of-school rural education and mobilization institution, whose effort is also known as extension. Program coordination and implementation comes close to describing the function, but in bureaucratic practice this exceeds extension somewhat. The reason for belaboring the point is that to use the word implies that the U.S. institution is the only means of performing the functions in question. This would constitute a closed concept.

While it is the role of agricultural research to expand the feasibilities of production through devising and testing hypotheses, the need remains to formulate and implement action programs, incorporating research conclusions with other resources, to achieve the expansion of production and rural social development. This function may be performed by a U.S. type Extension Service, or a similar organization or a combination of organizations.

Extension is a means of two-way linkage between the farmer and the experiment station. Classically, extension peddles observed farm problems to the experiment station for study, takes the answers back to the farm and reports the follow-up of the solution back to the experiment station.

Extension may provide the same kind of linkage between farmers and the central planning authority. Ideally, the process begins with regular village meetings, where the needs and aspirations of the rural population are fed into the national planning apparatus through the extension service and/or other linkages.

Conversely, it may be an extension activity to mobilize the rural population, as well as a number of input resources, to respond to the national plan, once it is formulated.

The job of formulating implementation strategy fits the extension role. This includes translating research results into simple technology. It also includes designing and activating implementation programs. Rural campaigns are in the domain of extension.

The extension program is pursued through three groups -- men, women and youth. Following the American tradition, efforts among the men are centered on the improvement of farming methods. Women's programs deal mostly with the improvement of family living, including home comfort, child care and nutrition. The fact that in many countries farming and finances are managed by women, rather than by men, generally has not been recognized by this institution.

The rural youth programs are patterned after the U.S. 4-H Club, and like its early version emphasizes production technology. This program seems to be the logical supplement to primary school training for developing modern farmers and rural leaders. It can provide skill-development for rural youth between daily and seasonal school sessions as well as between

termination of school and entry into the labor force--times which are obviously very boring for rural youth. The program can provide leadership training and contribute to national integration. The institutional ritual is loaded with national symbols, including a national uniform, a flag ceremony, a pledge of national allegiance, an oath to do good for the common weal, and the overt following of national government officials.

In his field work in the Maxwell School project, Manouchehr Safa-Isfahani discovered apparently significant role and jurisdictional conflict between extension and community development workers.[144] Patsy Graves, veteran AID home economics advisor, described the situation in India as, "Everybody discovered the village at the same time."[145]

Professor Lindeman suggested the propriety of "closer programming of Agricultural Extension with Community Development."[146] Safa-Isfahani expanded on this in retrospect, with these definitions:

> "Agricultural Extension is an "out-of-school" teaching process by means of which the result of research and experiment in agriculture is communicated to the people, in response to their felt needs, and new field problems are taken back to the research and experiment stations for further study and reextension. Community Development is the process of creating conditions under which local sources of social and economic power are induced to discover the internal resources of the community and utilize them in combination with external resources, for the achievement of the community's felt needs and nationally desirable goals."[147]

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[144] Safa-Isfahani, op.cit. This corroborates the proposition above, that the first role of an institution is to protect its innovation.

[145] Rio de Janeiro, 1960.

[146] Lindeman, op.cit., p. 35.

[147] Safa-Isfahani, op.cit., p. 82.

This definition does not award extension a major role in the formulation and implementation of agricultural development programs, as is implied above to be in its proper domain. Neither does it fully provide for rural youth leadership training nor the involvement of rural women, roles which extension has had staked out for half a century.

Such conflict in the field suggest a lack of clarity of purpose and method by either one or both parties. In this area the extension worker is traditionally better grounded then the community development worker. Professor Hart recommended "...better and more frequent field supervison of rural development workers," not distinguishing between the two types.[148] In any case, there is no call for conflict. The better trained the one agent, the more he can make use of the other. The two types have worked side-by-side in the United States for half a century in the greatest of complementary harmony--the two being the county agricultural extension agent and the secretary of the Chamber of Commerce.

Information

Among the requisites for rural development are, a) the forces that control the resources must want it, and b) the rural population must be involved in the process. This requires programmed mass information.

The development program must be promoted among the elite influence groups. Secondly, the national enabling body (legislature) must be provided with adequate information about the program to justify their rational approval of it. Third, action leaders at all levels must be provided

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[148] Hart, op.cit., p. 52.

adequate, timely information to decisively defend and implement the program. Fourth, the program must be promoted among the rural masses. An effort should be made to get the idea across that no person is excluded from participation. Fifth, but not last in rank, the technology of the program must be written in understandable language of the user and made available to him.

Involvement

A fact of which there is limited awareness among western technical assistance personnel is that the rural societies of most underdeveloped countries are highly organized. Sidney Sufrin reported, "Village societies in underdeveloped countries have been highly successful; the great problems are in the cities."[149] The strength of the Chinese rural social system, for example, is shown in the testimony that it has survived in its present form for over 4000 years.[150] At the present it appears that after 20 years of effort expended, Mao Tse-tung has abandoned an all-out attempt to destroy the system.

The role of internal social system leadership in relation to innovation in the rural Chinese culture syndrome may be shown as follows: The collective value of the system is survival with ranked status. Status

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[149] Sidney C. Sufrin, Technical Assistance: A Problem in Management (Syracuse: Maxwell School, January, 1965) hectographed, p. 20.

[150] The rural Chinese social system is described by Francis L.K. Hsu in Societies Around the World, Vol. II, Erwin T. Sanders, Editor (New York: Dryden Press, 1953), pp. 25-193.

rank is achieved through service to the system through familyhood, wealth, wisdom, aid to authority and authority--each, in the order listed, commanding progressively higher status value. The status values of roles are cumulative. The rural social system endeavors to adopt innovations which promise to contribute to its survival-status goal. It tends to resist innovations that violate norms or threaten the status hierarchy. The village leadership, for example, must be entrusted with managing innovations within its domain. Village leaders control the legitimation powers and procedures and the communication systems. To a large extent they can control the unemployed time of the village members.[151]

It was proposed above that farmers should have a part in national planning. It is suggested that this can best be accomplished through regular (monthly) village meetings presided over by the village chief (in village societies--the head man in any case). From the standpoint of scope, four types of problems may be voiced at these meetings. There is the irrational category, which should be disposed on the spot. Second, there is the local self-help category, for which the local leadership, with the assistance of government outsiders, should organize to implement in proper sequence of season and priorities. Third, there is the regional cooperative category which requires action beyond the jurisdiction of the assembly present. These problems must be referred for coordination and

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[151]Based on comparative village-level observations in Siem Reap and Kampot Provinces, Cambodia, 1962-1963, and Thua Thien and Quang Tin Provinces Vietnam, 1964-1966. It is corroborated in Sufrin's generalization. op.cit.

and joint planning. Fourth, there are problems of national scope which have bearing on the welfare of the local entity. These must be forwarded to the central planning authority through government channels.

A federation of farmers' organizations, reaching from the village to the national capital, independent of government, can provide added assurance that the farmers are actually represented in the national process.

Coming down the hierarchical ladder, the same system can contribute to the implementation of the national plan by mobilizing the rural masses. The spirit of action should optimize conditions for the development of institutions (cooperatives, for example) to perform the functions necessary for rural development.

Feedback

The greatest inhibitor to national planning in the developing countries, it is universally claimed, is the lack of reliable information on which to make decisions. Statistics gathering and processing require highly sophisticated skills and procedures. Data accumulate meaning over time. Much data gathered in the former colonies over the past century have been stored in European capitals and forgotten about.[152] In many developing countries a culture gap has developed between the elite of the central government and the rural population to the extent that it is difficult for the former to extract accurate information from the latter.[153]

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[152] De Vries, Institutional and Organizational Aspects of International Transfer of Knowledge and Capital, op.cit., p. 7.

[153] U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Rural Development in Asia, Hearings, before the Sub-committee on Asia and Pacific Affairs, Part I, Statement by Kenneth T. Young, Jr. (Ninetieth Congress, First Session, March, 1967), pp. 49-50.

As for the rural sector specifically, a large proportion of agricultural production is never submitted to standard weights, measures or exchange media.

The following categories of information contribute markedly to national planning for rural social and economic progress:

1. Inventory of natural resources.

    a. A standard reconnaissance soil survey.

    b. A standard pot-test survey of soil nutritional adequacies for crop production.

    c. An underground water survey, including estimates of depth, quantity and quality for agricultural use.

    d. Mineral surveys, including limestone, phosphate, potash and petroleum.

    e. A forest survey, where market timber exists.

2. Cumulative data on natural phenomena, including rainfall temperature and major stream flows.

3. Catalogue of agricultural predators.

    a. Catalogue of crop and livestock feeding insects and other parasites and predators.

    b. Catalogue of crop and domestic animal diseases.

4. A conventional population and agricultural census every ten years.

5. An annual crop and livestock reporting system.

    a. Area and purpose of land use and its yield.

    b. Types, volume and value of commodities marketed.

    c. Types, volume and value of commodities exported.

    d. Types, volume and value of commodities imported.

6. Special studies.

   a. Orientation studies to acquaint planners and change agents with social and economic phenomena relevant to development.

   b. Special studies in support of special projects.

To be contributive, the accumulated information must be combined, processed, published and distributed to those who have need for it in the pursuit of national purpose, when they need it.

CHAPTER VIII

CENTRAL ORGANIZATION

Legislation

At least once a year since 1949, the President of the United States has stated that the foreign aid program had a major role in U.S. foreign policy. After these annual proclamations and after much testimony before Congressional committees, the program has been extended, in whole or in part, for another year. This seasonal uncertainty, on top of all-too-frequent administrative crises, has unquestionably reduced the efficiency and effectiveness of the U.S. foreign assistance effort.[154] After 20 years of study, it seems appropriate for Congress to affirm, once and for all, that foreign aid is a continuing function and authorize the President to form a permanent agency to implement the program.

Analysis of experience in development assistance to date suggests the following advantages for a permanent organization: Under the most favorable circumstances, it cannot be hoped to advance low income countries to industrial society status in less than 20 years. It is not appropriate from the standpoint of available resources and priorities to undertake a program of accelerated development assistance of every low income country

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[154]Crises include the changes of administrations in 1953 and 1961, the AID Act for 1962, the personnel freeze of 1964, the foreign exchange crisis of 1968, and the prospective reorganization for 1969.

in the world at once; thus the problem is likely to continue for a long time. The achievements scored by the U.S. aid agencies have been made by shaping the annual Congressional authorizations, one after another, into long range programs. This was done on faith that Congress would continue the programs, but at a much higher cost than would have been required by legitimate long range programs. There was considerable loss between appropriations. Technical assistance had to be carried out by either temporary personnel or contract personnel, at a higher cost per man year of comparable service than would have been the case with career personnel.[155]

Frank Coffin proposed a cooperative effort by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee and AID to re-examine the propriety of the U.S. foreign aid program, in an exercise completely apart from the annual hearings on authorization and appropriation. If it should be decided that new legislation is needed, a task force drawn from these three entities would draft a proposal clarifying "...the principal objectives, secondary objectives, the standards, and procedures of aid operations...."[156]

In another chapter Coffin proposed two major objectives of a U.S. aid program:

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[155]Added costs result from bringing temporary personnel aboard, first-tour break-in, elimination of misfits, contract start-up, contract administrative overhead and loss of the experience factor, and the loss of income tax from contract personnel.

[156]Coffin, op.cit., p. 243.

"We can and should offer military and economic assistance to nations needing help to remove the obstacles to freedom imposed by aggression and subversion. Nations have to survive and be politically stable in order to have an opportunity to harvest the fruits of liberty. It is part of our purpose to strive to see that no nations is denied this opportunity.

"Beyond this, we can and should extend assistance in economic, social, and political development to nations willing to work toward increasing freedoms for their peoples. We cannot be arbitrary or impatient in what is at best a long and difficult process. But neither can we lose sight of the basic objective of increased freedom from the great enslavers of mankind--want, disease, ignorance, and oppression. Our objective is not merely to be partners in nation building; it is to help build the kind of nations which in the long run will help secure the blessings of liberty."[157]

There is an underlying plea in Coffin's book for improvement in communications between Congress and the Executive Branch--"...an atmosphere of shared responsibility...."[158] He said this

"...implies two commitments; the commitment of such [Foreign Affairs Committee] Congressmen and [Foreign Relations Committee] Senators to invest time, to dig deeply, and to maintain their interest in a subject which has only the national interest to recommend it; and the commitment by the executive branch to consult frequently and seriously with such persons on the same basis of confidence as if they were administration colleagues. This consultation would be a continuing one, with special attention being given to the planning for the coming year."[159]

Such intensity of joint participation is reminiscent of the Truman Administration, when Senate Foreign Relations Committee leaders played prominent roles in foreign affairs, including the formation of the United Nations.

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[157] Ibid., pp. 110-111.

[158] Ibid., p. 246.

[159] Ibid., pp. 245-246.

Organizing for Technical Assistance

Systems analysts hold that the system structure of complex organizations may be best evaluated, as a set of substructures. These are identified by Saul Katz as transformation, maintenance, adaptation and guidance. He stated,

> "The transformation substructure, sometimes called technical or conversion or production subsystem is a major and central substructure in the system. It encompasses the system relationships concerned with the transformation of inputs into the system's performance-outputs." . . . . . .
>
> "Clearly the absence of substructures to carry on internal system activities mean a lack of structural capability."[160]

The Congressional Act for International Development, 1962, placed central emphasis on guidance. The senior office below the Agency Administrator was to be the Program Review and Coordination Staff, later called the Office of Program and Policy Coordination. The Act provided for

> "1) The Office of Development Financing, responsible for advising the Administrator on the providing of capital assistance...; 2) The Office of Development Research and Assistance, which will formulate research requirements and arrange for the conduct of research projects ...; 3) The Office of Commodity Assistance, which will be responsible for formulating the policies for the distribution of commodities, both project and non-project, both agricultural and nonagricultural."[161]

Although elements of the substructures for maintenance and adaptation are evident in the new organization, the substructure for performance in the

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[160]Saul M. Katz, A Methodological Note on Appraising Administrative Capability for Development, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, GSPIA, 1968), pp. 18, 22.

[161]U.S., International Cooperation Administration, An Act for International Development, Fiscal Year 1962, A Summary Presentation (Washington: Department of State, ICA, June, 1961) pp. xvii-xviii.

area of technical assistance was not provided for. Most technical offices, including Food and Agriculture, were excluded from the new organization, although the Office of Public Safety was continued.

The central administration was divided into four bureaus (later five, counting Vietnam), each headed by an Assistant Administrator. The program and capital assistance offices held the same relative positions in the bureaus as in the central structure. Each bureau included a technical assistance staff which held advisory roles. As advisors, the incumbents were obliged to advise everybody who consulted them, but they occupied no essential role in the implementation of the program.

The complete rejection of administration by process is said to be a revolt against an enviable power position enjoyed by the Office of Food and Agriculture in ICA and predecessor agencies. In that era the technical offices held rank equal to that of the program office. This resulted in a constant fight over programming, in which the Administrator, or his deputy, was forced to intervene all too often.

Dismantling the professional-technical linkage in the central administration appears to have had these disadvantages: First, it removed the technical assistance professional from the program review process and denied the Agency that internal capability. Second, it left the technical programs in the field without coordination. In the ICA days there was a number of regional training functions, for example, that were not continued in AID, simply because the positions of persons in the central office who programmed and implemented the activities were abolished. Third, no

provisions were made to continue the technical backstopping for mission personnel when the central technical staffs were disbanded. This could have been expected to result in AID technical assistance personnel, isolated from current innovations, to lapse into antiquity. Fourth, it precluded the development of a professional corps with a built-in professional improvement program.

Professor Lindeman advocates separating the administration of technical assistance from the administration of capital assistance. In his view, the great imbalance of cost between the two instruments causes technical assistance to go neglected.[162] This proposal infers organization by process, including technical assistance, capital assistance, supporting assistance and food aid. The ICA organization, which provided for specialized staffs grouped in offices of major functions, seems appropriate for technical assistance.

Organization by subsystem provides for adding professional staffs as they are needed and dispensing with them when they are no longer useful--a measure of flexibility abundantly practiced by AID and its predecessors.[163] The current AID organization reveals these major technical assistance flows: a) agriculture and rural development, b) public health, c) manpower and human resources development, d) public administration, e) public works, and f) public safety.[164]

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[162]Lindeman, Interview, op.cit.

[163]See changes in organization reflected in AID and predecessor telephone directories (U. S. Department of State, Library).

[164]U.S., Department of State, Agency for International Development, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Telephone Directory, February 1968 (Washington: Department of State).

The Office of Human Resources Development, created by AID in 1961 and later discontinued, should be reestablished. This Office should be given responsibility for assistance in manpower planning, education and participant training.

Institutional development, provided for in the organization structure, may be seen as either a rationale for technical assistance or a technology for the nurturing of public institutions.[165] Philosophy, as in the former case, has no place in internal organic structure, for to be effective, the whole organization must be subservient to the philosophy. If the latter view is accepted, the technical assistance role of institutional development must be seen as a specialized technical activity. As such, it fits best in the human resources development group.

Attention to labor, which is recognized in AID at the central office level and at the regional technical staff level, may be viewed as human resources development, political development, or both. If the primary interest lies in the former, this function, also, belongs to the human resources group.

There remains the necessity of dominant consideration of guidance in the organization scheme. This may be provided by the present Office of Program and Policy Coordination placed between the performance group and the

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[165]Professor Leland Barrows lists institution building as a current rationale for technical assistance (Lecture, University of Pittsburgh: GSPIA, June 24, 1968). While implicitly ascribing to this view, Esman and Bruhns indicate that the Inter-University Research Program is in search of a "...technology of institution building..." op.cit., p. 7.

Administrator. The major roles of this office would be, as it is today, a) to elucidate to the Administrator, his effective alternatives in policy and program, and, b) coordinate the resources and the programs in terms of policy and objectives.

For the Office of Program and Policy Coordination to be fully effective, its ranks must remain open to in-house recruitment of process professionals. A sample of the incumbents of senior positions indicated that the Office is presently dominated by the economics discipline. Eleven of 23 positions reviewed were occupied by economists, while only six positions implied such requirement. The information available indicated that the professional backgrounds of 12 of the 23 incumbents matched the technical titles of their positions.[166]

Functions of the Central Office Technical Assistance Group

The central technical assistance office should have the broad concern for the contribution of the functions under their jurisdiction to the total program. This begins with the recommendation of global and regional policy.

Program Review

The central technical assistance office should be responsible for monitoring the technical assistance programs in the field. This should begin with processing Project Proposals. Similarly, the technical assistance office would make the first analysis of incoming PAR's.

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[166] The backgounds of the incumbents listed in the AID Telephone Directory (op.cit.) were reviewed in the U.S., Department of State, Biographic Register, July, 1966 (Washington: Department of State). Twenty-three out of 36 names were matchable.

Consultation

The internal consultative capacity provided in the AID regional technical offices appears to be essential for the representation and advancement of the technical programs in the field. The present regional staffs appear to be of the proper composition--i.e., former division chiefs and other experienced personnel with outstanding records of performance--provided that the central technical offices have adequate information staffs to respond to internal, congressional and public demands. The regional officers should continue to serve as they do now in effect, as combination administrative-research assistants, program advocates and expediters to everybody concerned with the respective technical assistance programs.

In the role of concern for the progress of mission programs, the technical offices should provide special consultative assistance to the personnel office in its effort to fill technical assistance positions with capable people.

The regional technical staff, with the assistance of the central office staff, would monitor the purchase of technical support commodities. Technical consultation is one matter, while expediting is another. Gleason reported that six out of 26 technical assistance projects he examined suffered from the unavailability of late arrival of technical support commodities.[167]

Contract Monitoring

The technical assistance office should represent the Agency in negotiating and monitoring technical assistance contracts.

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[167] Gleason, op.cit., p. 34.

Backstopping

It has been asserted that AID, with special reference to agriculture, has tended not to innovate, or has tended not to keep pace with current technical innovations. There are three possible reasons for this assertion. First, AID/Agriculture has never been adequately staffed to monitor innovative research. In its heyday the ICA Office of Food and Agriculture was staffed at the rate of about one man for fifteen covering comparable areas of technical interests in the land grant universities. Second, most of the funds spent by the Agency for research in technical assistance were devoted to the study of methods, and not to physical inputs.

Third, although uncounted, an impressive list of agricultural innovations have been introduced to low income countries by AID and its predecessors, and universally accepted, with their source either taken for granted or forgotten. These include completely new crops (onions in Southeast Asia, for example) as well as species that out-yielded the traditional strains by 100 to 250 percent. AID contributed 35 such innovations to Cambodia from 1957 to 1963, and approximately the same number to Vietnam, up to 1968.[168]

It is not unreasonable to speculate that in most countries where the United States has had continuous programs for 15 years, the production and

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[168]One of the latest innovations introduced in Vietnam was a high volume, low-lift water pump designed by the University of Florida under a contract to provide preservice training for AID agricultural advisors. Another was an adaptation of a "henless chick" program appearing in a University of Georgia Extension Service bulletin, published in 1925. Each fitted local needs in Vietnam, resulting in spectacular increases in production and income.

unit yield of commercial vegetables, pork, chickens and eggs has doubled. This is attested in part in the fact that the supply of these commodities has kept pace with demand without unreasonable increases in prices, in spite of spectacular urban expansion.

Fourth, crop improvement innovations by the foundations have recently been brought to the attention of those outside the technical field, through the popular news media. The latest innovations announced have been particularly interesting, because they promise to increase the staff grains, wheat and rice. AID agronomists have not been able to conduct long range crop breeding programs, because the Agency has been "temporary". However, they have systematically tested all new strains from all sources that they could test with the resources available to them. These include Guatemala Golden Flint corn, bred by Rockefeller Foundation in the 1950's, as well as the new strains that annually emerge from the state experiment stations. The current releases by the Rockefeller Foundation are undergoing intensive tests around the world.

This does not refute the fact that neither AID nor its predecessors have provided adequate technical backstopping for its field programs. It is proposed that this can best be accomplished through open-end contracts with land grant universities. The contract would provide for reimbursing the university for maintaining a special institutional interest in the development of agriculture and the rural sector in a particular country, through backstopping the AID personnel located there.

This would call for pairing key personnel--dean with division chief, head of department with branch chief, professor with advisor--who would maintain dialogues through the exchange of program documents and other materials. Each key university person would spend up to 30 days in the recipient country each year. The university would supply personnel for longer terms upon negotiation.

Managing Participant Trainees

The management of AID participants is handled in two ways, generally. Where a university contract is involved, the student is sent directly from the recipient country to the contracting university in the United States. Where there is no contract, the participant is forwarded to Washington by AID. There the planning and monitoring of his program is farmed out to a U.S. Government Department, which performs the service on a reimbursable basis. The advantages claimed for this procedure are, a) the Departments have special expertise in curriculum planning and, b) they have special acquaintances with the admissions officers of the universities. After 20 years in the business, the latter claim is beyond question.

On the other hand, three disadvantages may be cited for the procedure. First, the procedure introduces an additional bureaucratic entity, which often adds to the confusion of the participant. Second, domestic agency personnel have no claim to special acquaintance with the needs of government officials of the low income countries. Third, the system does not provide the participants with interim counsel.

AID should assume complete management of its participant program. This should start by placing the Office of International Training in the proposed Office of Human Resources Development. This office would manage the programming, funding, forwarding, orientation and placement of participants.

It is proposed that an additional step be taken. In a rotation program of its technical advisors, the Office of Human Resources Development would maintain an AID counselor-in-residence at at least the state land grant universities.[169] It has been the observation of this reporter in the field, in Washington and at U.S. universities, that AID participants need counseling on their curricula in relation to their future responsibilities. They also need counseling concerning their private problems, which is not provided in the present system.

Information

Over and above the information on non-capital projects provided by the central evaluation and memory system, the technical assistance offices must stand ready to provide higher management and Congress with comprehensive information on the progress of all projects for which they are responsible. The central information office, by itself, cannot provide this information alone, because, out of necessity, it must concentrate on the "big picture", and because it cannot keep in touch with the sources.

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[169]The precedent was set by the U.S. Veteran's Administration after World War II.

Also, the technical assistance offices should bear their share of the burden of assisting the press in collecting timely information about technical assistance activities.

CHAPTER IX

PERSONNEL FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

The foreign technical assistance job calls for almost unattainable qualifications. It drags the incumbent to some of the most uncomfortable spots on the globe, without much special remuneration and with no employment security at all. It is obvious that those who follow the profession do so because they like it.

Qualifications

Lists of qualifications for technical assistance service have been said to add up to the ideal man.[170] Although the perfect specimen is hardly available, Etzioni suggests that the concentration of ideal characteristics may be enhanced by selective recruitment.[171]

Etzioni's personality requirements of the "'organization man'" appear applicable to technical assistance personnel. They include instant lateral social mobility, "...accustomed to shuttling back and forth between social units. . . ., a high tolerance for frustration. . . . , the ability to defer gratification. . . ," and "...achievement orientation."[172]

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[170]Anne Winslow, Editor, The Technical Assistance Expert, Report on the Conference on Recruitment, Selection, and Training of Technical Assistance Personnel, Rome, February 12-16, 1962 (New York: The Carnegie Endowment), p. 4.

[171]Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964) p. 110.

[172]Ibid., 109.

Professor Iversen noted, "There has been little improvement on the list enunciated in The Overseas American in 1960: 1) technical skill, 2) belief in Mission, 3) cultural empathy, 4) a sense of politics, and e) organizational ability."[173]

The Herter Committee list included, 1) zeal for creative accomplishment, 2) deep understanding of life and culture at home, 3) ability to communicate effectively across cultural barriers and to develop a sympathetic understanding for other peoples and their cultural heritages, 4) adaptability and flexibility, 5) executive ability and 6) specialized competences.[174]

Iversen said, "The essential aspect of the foreign technician's role is adaptive..."[175]

Professional Competence

It seems obvious that technical skill is the first requisite of technical assistance personnel, as the very lives and livelihoods of large numbers of people, not to mention the political success of projects, may rest on their recommendations. The frequently voiced observation that U.S. projects do not fail for lack of technical competence is not fully convincing. In the first place, such observations have been made

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[173] Iversen, op.cit., p. 88, from Harlan Cleveland, et.al., The Overseas American (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960).

[174] Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, op.cit., pp. 48-54.

[175] Iversen, op.cit., p. 28.

either by technical personnel, who could be suspected of bias, or by generalists, not qualified to judge. Eleven per cent of the foreign technicians surveyed by Hyman and associates reported major technical mistakes in their latest projects. This was corroborated by 12 per cent of recipient officials responding to the same questionnaire.[176] These were confessions of commission. Errors in omission may be much higher.

The tough question is technically competent at what? Does the job call for a rice breeder, for example, or does it call for a person proficient at nurturing agronomic research institutions? The answer is that both skills and more would likely be needed in the one person. For whatever assignment, the technical assistance advisor needs a relatively broad academic and professional background which has been kept current. Further, he needs to be able to do creditable, independent, problem-solving research. Without this capability, he is not likely to accurately diagnose the problems he faces or design their solutions. The capability of written expression is important. The technical advisor should also be professionally capable of teaching.

Cross-Cultural Empathy and Communication

Professor Sufrin maintains "...that technical aid is essentially a managerial exercise undertaken under difficult considerations because the manager cannot exercise the usual managerial controls over the environment he is attempting to influence."[177] Although the environment

[176] Hyman, op.cit., p. 152.

[177] Sufrin, op.cit., p. 16.

is natural, social and political, it is also cultural. Empathy is essential for significant technical assistance to take place. Not much empathy can develop without communication.

Cultural empathy is not to be confused with the "missionary spirit", or the "do-gooder" stance. Stanley Andrews explicitly warns against hiring the "do-gooder" for technical assistance work. It is his observation that the "do-gooder" tends to assume a paternalistic stance, which seriously impedes empathetic flow.[178] His views are corroborated by Price Gittenger.[179]

Representative of the Donor Government and Country

Every person outside the bounds of his homeland is a representative of his country, whether he is aware of it or not. Technical assistance personnel need the "deep understanding of life and culture at home," prescribed by the Herter Committee.[180] To this must be added a general awareness of U.S. interests and policy.

Political Awareness

It was Professor Martin's conclusion that,

> "...to foreign technical assistance personnel, to repeat, the pervading presence of politics is perhaps the greatest single deterrent to the successful practice of technical assistance in underdeveloped countries."[181]

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[178] Stanley Andrews, An Off-Shoulder Look at Foreign Aid and its Administration (Washington: Johns Hopkins University, 1963), mimeographed, pp. 21-24.

[179] J. Price Gittinger, The Literature of Agricultural Planning (Washington: National Planning Association, 1966), pp. 9-10.

[180] Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel op.cit., p. 49.

[181] Martin, op.cit., p. 41.

The Martins indicated that a seriously significant number of technicians they interviewed were found to be naive of the political process of decision making. Being unaware of the political facts of life at home, they held in disdain the identical process which became visible to them in their roles as government advisors.[182]

National Perspective and Action Orientation

Technical assistance personnel need to be self-starters who have the capacity to recognize national problems and the initiative to organize resources in pursuit of solutions.

Supplying Personnel for Technical Assistance

The management of technical assistance personnel has been difficult for the U.S. foreign aid program at least since the beginning of ICA, in 1955. It has often been difficult to get personnel of the proper technical qualifications when they were needed. Six out of the 26 projects in Gleason's study suffered from this problem.[183] On the other hand, there has been an administrative problem of placing excess personnel as the Agency has gone into periodic retractions. Since personnel have been drawn from diverse professions, states and even countries, there has often been a great variation in the nations of technical assistance requirements in specific countries.

U.S. foreign aid personnel have been judged by some as ranking below the top of their professional disciplines.[184] A "temporary" agency

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[182] Ibid.

[183] Gleason, op.cit.,p. 34.

[184] Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, op.cit., p. 114.

such as AID might be expected to attract more than its share of institutional misfits. Nevertheless, in 1963, the Civil Service Commission found AID personnel to be "'...a dedicated, competent work force.'"[185]

Professor Iversen endorsed the Herter Committee's recommendation for the provision of technical assistance personnel.[186] The first recommendation was to devise a development assistance policy for each country and, for this, project U.S. technical assistance personnel requirements for some time in the future.

The second substantial recommendation was to take into the ranks of the regular Foreign Service the personnel required as development planners and managers. This group would include "...mission directors, deputies, administrative officers, program officers, comptrollers, and a small group of specialists in such major professional fields as education, public health, and agriculture."[187]

Iversen suggested about seven per cent of the technical personnel for FSO classification.[188] The remainder would be either hired through terminal contracts or procured through intermediate contractors.

The first argument for depriving technical advisors of career rewards was that technical assistance requirements are too uncertain

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[185] Coffin, op.cit., p. 223.

[186] Iversen, op.cit., pp. 179-184; Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, op.cit., pp. 113-120.

[187] Ibid., p. 114.

[188] Iversen, op.cit., p. 164.

to staff for.[189] Such a condition would seem to preclude the propriety of a policy development exercise, so far as the jurisdiction of the Committee is concerned. Another reason had to do with the administrative inconvenience of placing specialists. Responsibility for career employment could be avoided through the use of temporary personnel or contractors.

The big argument for excluding technical personnel from the career group was that

> "...better personnel will be obtained by hiring persons for temporary tours of duty.....
> .....
>
> "...the career context and career loyalties of the best professionals lie with their professions and the whole range of activities with which those professions are associated. An association with AID, even if it could be made permanent, would not attract very many of the best professionals to spend most of their working lives overseas, far from their professional colleagues and the stimulus of professional association."[190]

This argument is usually advanced in support of university contracts. But are the people with the proven capabilities to manage the tasks at hand really available? For example, the person wanted to head a contract team assigned to assist in the development of a new university is, at the minimum, a dean in the contracting institution. But it is rare indeed that a university contract team is headed by such a person, except in cases of retirement. Professor Martin noted

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[189] Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, op.cit., p. 118.

[190] Ibid.

"...considerable vigorous criticism of the practice of sending 'old men' out to do what is considered to be young men's work....Many of these oldsters are status-conscious...."[191]

In the final analysis the Agency should be concerned more with progress toward meeting its objectives than with the standard quality measure of its instruments. The Herter Committee argument does not consider the merits of a profession of cross-cultural development assistance, which might be interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary.

The Herter Committee recommendation may be likened to a conservative but elevated version of the ICA concept of a career service, launched in 1957. In that plan technical assistance personnel were changed from the Foreign Service Staff (FSS) classification to Foreign Service Reserve (FSR), a category established during World War II to accommodate lateral entrance to the Foreign Service. Those with less than two years service -- hence, unproven -- and those with specialities so narrow that the agency could not foresee a continued demand for their services were placed in the Foreign Service Reserve-Limited (FSR-L) classification.

It is suggested that the Agency would profit by a program somewhere in between the Herter Committee recommendation and the ICA career plan. The Committee's proposal should be liberalized to include <u>development advisors</u> or branch chiefs. Personnel of this group are in the daily thick of development planning and management. The services they render

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[191]Martin, <u>op.cit.</u>, p. 44.

cannot be easily delegated to temporary or contract personnel.

In actuality, approximately half of AID technical assistance personnel have adopted the Agency for their career. It is doubtful that changes in the employment system would effect this group very much. A more favorable employment program could be expected to reduce the attrition rate of both desirables and low producers. It could be expected to increase the level of productivity from the total effort through the improvement of morale.

Regional Advisors

The use of regional technical advisors was advocated in the 1961 ACT presentation.[192] This proposal saw the spreading of single, highly specialized professionals -- veterinary public health advisor, for example--over a number of countries. However, to date there have been no cases of outstanding success of these endeavors reported, except perhaps in the pursuit of mutual endeavor, such as the Central American Common Market program. The inhibitor seems to be that the technician is never able to establish rapport with the people he is supposed to influence, and if he does, he is unable to stay in one place long enough to assist in carrying through the first activity, an all-important function of technical assistance.

Short Term Services

Echoing the Herter Committee, Professor Iversen advocated increased

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[192]U.S., ICA, op.cit.

use of short term personnel.[193] This is to be commended for short term activities, including participating in special surveys, short courses and conventions. To be effective, such projects require intensive preparation and prolonged follow-up. Although such activities may be highly complementary to a full-time advisory team, they may not be considered as substitutes for full time technical advice.

Institutional Contract Services

The question of when best to provide technical assistance through the services of direct hire personnel and when to contract the services from outside institutions was not treated in depth in the Maxwell School project.[194] Nor can it be resolved in this study. Based on foregone experience, however, these generalizations are proposed as guidelines: First, the Agency must be responsible for its own commitments and its own program; hence, the people responsible for these programs should be direct hire personnel, serving under oath. This includes personnel through the branch chief level. Secondly, team functions directed toward institution building can probably best be provided by institutions under long term contracts. Stable institutions -- universities, for example -- are advantageously qualified to provide singular, team approaches to institutional development. This requires a resolve on the

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[193]Iversen, op.cit., pp. 181-182.

[194]Iversen infers that the whole technical job should be contracted to personnel outside the Agency. op. cit., p. 180.

part of the contracting institution to put forth a single doctrine and a continuous, dynamic effort.

Preservice Orientation and Training

The prospects of finding a person meeting the above qualifications for service in technical assistance seems clearly unlikely, but as long as the need remains the ideal should be pursued. The Herter Committee recommended that, "New professional personnel, prior to assignment overseas, should receive fundamental orientation with regard to AID, its mission, its organization, its administrative practices, and the region and the country of assignment."[195] This is needed and much more.

National Policy

A fundamental grounding in the national interests and policy of the donor country is necessary knowledge for the bilateral technical assistance advisor. With such orientation he can interpret national policy in terms of technical pursuits in his own realm. Without such awareness the chances for a favorable contribution are likely to be greatly reduced.

Many technicians need orientation as to how to keep up with what is national policy. This calls for advice on current reading.

Political Awareness

It was Professor Martin's conclusion that,

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[195]Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, op.cit., p. 121.

"...to foreign technical assistance personnel, the pervading presence of politics is perhaps the greatest single deterrent to the successful practice of technical assistance in underdeveloped countries."[196]

It was his observation that technical people--perhaps those in agriculture in particular--tend to discover politics in government administration after arriving on foreign assignment. Far from being able to use politics in the pursuit of their objectives, it tends to frustrate them. Many are almost equally frustrated from living with the political processes of their own government for the first time. Martin states, "The difference between developed and underdeveloped countries lie in the manner of practice of politics, not in its presence or absence."[197]

Foreign technical assistance advisors should be given an introduction to political awareness as part of their preservice orientation. This could best be done, perhaps, by non-government personnel.

Cultural Awareness

There is ample evidence that as a person leaves his own cultural environment he must become aware of, appreciative of, the new culture in order to maintain emotional stability.[198] This begins with developing an awareness of one's native culture, personal values, norms and subconscious reasons for routine actions. Then, there is the need for

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[196]Martin, op.cit., p. 41.

[197]Ibid.

[198]Kalervo Oberg, "Culture Shock and the Problem of Adjustment to New Cultural Environment", Papers in Applied Anthropology (Rio de Janeiro: USOM, 1957) pp. 92-99.

a simple method of understanding other countries. This is a preservice orientation task.

Language

The pervading fiber of culture is communication, and the broad core of communication is language. Without the capability of direct conversation, the development of empathy and easy rapport between members of widely differing cultures seems remote. Even to make a sincere effort to learn the host's language breeds empathy. This is an exercise in which the host official can be clearly superior in a helpful role. It dispels the feeling of inequality and paves the way for profitable exchange in technical assistance.

The use of interpreters is far from satisfactory communication. Those who possess a technical, action vocabulary are rare. In many countries, interpreters come from the clerical class, and since the chances are they are overpaid by the donor agency, they may be resented by host government officials. Since they are employed by a foreign entity they are suspect. Finally, if they become proficient, interpreters tend to usurp the roles of the foreign advisors by giving advice to their countrymen in areas beyond their competence.

There can be no easy solution, because the many cultural references that supplement language in communication, and because technical assistance personnel move so frequently. But as an approach, the study of languages is recommended. This should begin, if possible, with an intensive course

in the prevailing language of the country or location before arriving for the first assignment. After arriving at his post of duty the advisor should continue language drills until he has achieved professional conversational proficiency. In the course of a career, of studying languages they tend to become cumulative and easier to learn.

Program

Technical assistance personnel destined for service at far-flung locations need the Agency's official program orientation, perhaps more than any other group. Herbert Simon and colleagues summed up the need as follows:

> "Training 'internalizes' the organization's influence. It changes the person in such a way that he will act as desired by his own motivation rather than by the stimulus of moment-by-moment instructions.....
> .....
>
> "The function of training, both pre-entry and post-entry, is to make organization members more effective in promoting the organizations goals. To promote the goal, organization members need certain personal 'tools' or abilities which training provides.
>
> 1. They need the particular manual or physical skills required to promote the goal.
>
> 2. They need to understand and accept the values that the organization is promoting--such as its goal and the value of efficiency.
>
> 3. They need the knowledge, the factual premises of decision, to select those means or actions that will best accomplish the goal within the value framework supplied them by the organization.[199]

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[199]Herbert A. Simon, Donald W. Smithburg and Victor A. Thompson, Public Administration, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 367.

AID technical assistance personnel require special indoctrination and training to manage its program documentation and reporting system. These procedures are sufficiently complicated to demand practice training under the supervision of persons thoroughly familiar with the system. Whether this can be accomplished best in a pre-service orientation program or in field training has not been determined. The latter approach seems the more desirable.

Technical Orientation

Agricultural advisors need orientation which adapts their basic and applied skills to, generally, tropical agriculture. There has been a tendency observed among agricultural experts from the developed countries to ignore tropical crops and thus overemphasize crops grown in the Temperate Zones. This can be overcome by providing brief orientation and skill training in the propagation and culture of the major tropical crops.[200]

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[200]The spontaneous comments from 12 out of 40 agricultural advisors who received 16 weeks (half days) of technical adaptation training at the University of Florida, 1966-1967, indicated that the training was successful in preparing the technician to deal with the improvement of production of previously unknown crops, including citrus, banana, cassava, taro and rice (studied at the International Rice Research Institute, Los Banos, Philippines). One informant reported that he was able to provide effective assistance to Vietnamese farmers in growing bananas, rice, vegetables and swine on garbage, as well as help with improving irrigation and fertilization--all of which were covered in his preservice training--but he did not assist with tea culture or duck production, two prominent activities in his area of assignment, which were not treated in his preservice orientation.

This training should be done by universities that have tropical agricultural programs.

Professional Development

Until the drive for budget reduction in 1968, at least, AID had a comprehensive career development program. This began with three weeks preservice orientation and up to 16 weeks of language training. Technical personnel destined for service in East Asia were provided political and technical orientation, as well.

Every AID mission receives the current release of publications by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. On the other hand, mission personnel generally do not have access to good libraries. They tend to be isolated from their colleagues in their institutional disciplines, although AID does finance their travel to professional society meetings, especially when such trips can be worked in with home leave.

The Agency has fostered a formal career development program, which includes correspondence courses, mid-career executive training and sabbatical training. In addition, a program has been encouraged in which AID and the universities would exchange personnel on sabbatical. Such an exchange was successfully initiated at the University of Florida in 1967.[201]

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[201]The University requested AID Agronomy Advisor James M. Dempsey to teach a course in hard fibers. After this he spent several months doing research at the U.S. Department of Agriculture for a book on the subject, which was to be published by AID.

In summary, in spite of the overwhelming professional requirements of technical assistance advisors, it appears that AID employees, at least, can go a long way toward keeping up with development progress.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

This has been a study of the administration of bilateral technical assistance, extending from the enabling act to the village meeting. The study was initiated to produce a concluding document for the preliminary reports of the Maxwell School Technical Assistance Research Project, which ran from June 1963 to December 1966. The study was enlarged to incorporate contemporary research which has since been published or made available in preliminary form, as well as the author's observations accumulated over eleven years service with ICA AND AID, during which, data on technical assistance were systematically collected.

The present study exceeded the [illegible] content of the PIO/T in the treatment of the role of the technical assistance advisor, Chapter III, and central organization, Chapter VIII. It fell short of the implied goal of a manual useful to technical assistance administrators and programmers, universally. Although parts of Chapters III, IV, V, VI, VII and IX have universal applicability, this study evolved as a prescriptive document addressed to U.S. bilateral technical assistance. Further independent studies are [illegible] cross-cultural technical assistance programs carried on by [illegible] organizations, nonsecular organizations and foundations. This [illegible] the differences in interests and objectives among these groups and the bilateral programs.

Recommendations

1. Legislation. U.S. aid administrators have long urged Congress to recognize the long range nature of development and thus permit long range programming of technical assistance. This would likely increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the program, both materially and politically.

It would be to the advantage of the U.S. Government, as well as the cooperating recipient countries, for the United States to administer all of its technical assistance efforts through a single agency. This would make possible the development and maintenance of unified purpose, doctrine and approach, which is not possible to achieve through multiple autonomous agencies. A single program would result in maximum administrative efficiency, with minimum dollar outlays and the greatest representation efficiency.[202]

2. Organization by process. Technical assistance should be recognized by the headquarters organization as a development aid process, and central organizational arrangements should be made to provide technically oriented administration of this process.

3. Personnel for technical assistance. It has been argued in this report that technical assistance is a long range process and that the requirement will continue for a long time. The employers of technical

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[202]Iversen recommended the incorporation of the Peace Corps in AID, op.cit., pp. 192-193.

assistance personnel should be concerned with employing highly competent people, developing in them the extra requirements for their new roles, and keeping them professionally current and on the job as long as the need persists. The Herter Committee recommendation should be expanded to include in Foreign Service career ranks technical assistance personnel through the branch chief level.[203]

4. Balanced team. The balanced team approach to technical assistance should be readopted. The argument that it does not provide flexibility is an indictment of the management of the system and not of the system itself. The balance can be flexible.

5. University roles. U.S. universities have been engaged in institution building activities under U.S. Government sponsorship since 1951. This role should be continued where multiple-member teams are required over lengthy periods.

The task of providing preservice technical adaptation training should be contracted to universities.

The practice of contracting with qualified universities to provide technical backstopping for AID mission agricultural programs is recommended.

6. Program. The long range interests and objectives which the United States may hold for each low income country should be formulated to serve as guidelines for current programming. The present AID programming system for non-capital projects fits the long range approach.

[203]Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, op.cit., pp. 114, 118.

7. Future studies. Future studies of this nature should be done as in-house exercises, with the use of outside consultants where appropriate.[204] The reorganization study of the U.S. Public Health Service, 1959-1960, is an example.[205] Improvement through evaluation is a learning process which can take place in the evaluation study.

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[204]This conclusion was voiced by Professor Lindeman. Interview, op.cit.

[205]Edith Carter, The Reorganization of the Public Health Service, Inter-University Case Program No. 89 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).

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APPENDIX A

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ORDER: THE ADMINISTRATION OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN AGRICULTURE

U. S. Agency for International Development
May 15, 1963

☐ WORK SHEET ☐ ISSUANCE

AID 12-1 (4-59) PIO/T

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ORDER

Technical Services

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1. COOPERATING COUNTRY: WORLD-WIDE

2. PIO NUMBER: 946-Z-99-SL-9-0700100

3. PROJECT TITLE: The Administration of Technical Assistance Programs, with Special Reference to Technical Assistance in Agriculture

4. APPROPRIATION SYMBOL: 72-1131004

5. ALLOTMENT SYMBOL & CHARGE: 354-07-099-54-69-31 ☒ AID/W ☐ USAID

6. OBLIGATION STATUS: ☐ ADMINISTRATIVE RESERVATION ☐ OBLIGATION ☐ SUB OBLIGATION

7. ORIGINAL ☒ AMENDMENT NO

8. NUMBER OF TECHNICIANS: See Contract

9. DESIRED EFFECTIVE PERIOD: FROM: May 15, 1963 TO: June 30, 1963

10. DURATION (MONTHS): OF SERVICES: 30 OF FINANCING: 30

11. TYPE OF ACTION

(A) AID CONTRACT	X	(C) COUNTRY CONTRACT	
(B) SERVICE AGREEMENT		(D) OTHER	

IMPLEMENTING AGENT: AID/W

FINANCING	PREVIOUS (A)	INCREASE (B)	DECREASE (C)	TOTAL TO DATE (D)
12. AID $		370,000		370,000
13. COOP. COUNTRY $ $1.=				

14. INSTRUCTIONS TO IMPLEMENTING AGENT

The Contractor shall use its best efforts to conduct research for the improvement of the administration of technical assistance, with particular emphasis on technical assistance in agriculture, such improvement being a means towards increasing the effectiveness of United States direct and indirect expenditure on technical assistance. The principal objective of the research project will be to appraise current practices in the administration of technical assistance by AID and other donors and by a selected group of recipient countries in order to determine strengths and weaknesses, and to recommend changes. Through collaboration with AID personnel it is expected that the research

(See Cont'd on Page 4)

USAID REFERENCES

15. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

A. This PIO/T is subject to AID contracting regulations.
B. Except as specifically authorized by AID/W, or when local hire is authorized under the terms of a contract with a U. S. supplier, services authorized under this PIO/T must be obtained from U. S. sources.
C. Except as specifically authorized by AID/W, the purchase of commodities authorized under this PIO/T will be limited to countries included in Geographic Code 901.

(JS:)

DATE	USAID CLEARANCES	DATE

DATE OF ORIGINAL ISSUANCE: June 4, 1963

DATE OF THIS ISSUANCE: June 4, 1963

FOR THE COOPERATING COUNTRY

The terms and conditions set forth herein are hereby accepted.

DATE SIGNATURE

FOR THE DIRECTOR, AID



☐ WORK SHEET ☐ ISSUANCE

ICA-12-1A (4-59) PIO/T/S	PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ORDER Technical Services Scope of Work AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	1. COOPERATING COUNTRY WORLD-WIDE	2. PIO NUMBER 946-Z-99-SL-9-0700100
		3. PROJECT TITLE The Administration of Technical Assistance Programs, with Special Reference to Technical Assistance in Agriculture	

16. SCOPE OF TECHNICAL SERVICES (including local recruitment, procurement & training):

As soon as practicable after the effective date of this agreement, the Contractor (a university experienced in technical assistance research) shall supply the necessary personnel, equipment, supplies, and do all other things necessary to implement this project. To realize the objectives of this project the contractor shall use a combination of research methods designed to get the best possible results from both broad coverage of many donor agencies and recipient countries, and from studies in depth of a selected few.

a. The Contractor will send carefully structured and tested questionnaires to some thirty or forty recipient countries selected to give a fair sample of countries which:

1. Are recipients of large technical assistance programs in agriculture relative to the total of external aid to them;

2. Are relatively advanced in techniques of public administration, and other countries which are relatively backward;

3. On the basis of prior investigations are believed to have had successful technical assistance programs in agriculture, and other countries which are believed to have had little success with their programs; and

(See Cont'd on Page 5)

AID FINANCING	COOPERATING COUNTRY FINANCING
367,000	

17. SCOPE OF ACCESSORY SERVICES (i.e., procurement and training outside cooperating country):

Supplies, materials, and incidentals

	PROCUREMENT	TRAINING
AID FINANCING	3,000	-
C'C FINANCING	None	None

18. TECHNICIANS (number, kinds, periods of assignments):

See Contract

BLOCK 14. Instructions to Implementing Agent (Cont'd)

process and results will be directed in particular towards United States problems in this field. Special emphasis will be given to technical assistance in agriculture. Agriculture has been chosen because it is dominant in the technical assistance programs of AID, of the UN (through the Food and Agriculture Organization), Foundations, and of other donors. Also, the broad range of technical assistance in agriculture offers an insight into many other substantive areas and thus adds to the possibility of generalized conclusions as to the effect of administration in the fields, for example, of education (extension services), or of monetary management (agricultural credit). However, given a principal focus on agriculture, it is expected that other fields will be investigated if necessary to test the proposition that conclusions can be generalized.

The major fields of research would be as follows:

a. With respect to administration per se:

1. The means of deciding on acceptable technical assistance programs and projects, with emphasis on their nature, scope, and structure, and on their relation to other development programs.

2. The review process in the recipient countries and in the donor agencies, including coordination of projects in different substantive fields and of similar projects sponsored by different agencies.

3. The arrangements for institution building.

4. Selection, recruiting, and employment conditions for technical assistance personnel, and for participants (or trainees).

b. Administrative arrangements for certain functional fields (to test the hypothesis that the quality of resistance to change can vary from field to field and that administrative corrections can also vary):

1. Up-to-date techniques (tested seed, use of fertilizer, double cropping, etc.)

2. Irrigation and drainage

3. Research, education, and extension work

4. Training centers

5. Land tenure reform and taxation

6. Agricultural credit

The Administration of Technical Assistance Programs, with Sepcial Reference to Technical Assistance in Agriculture

The major questions to be explored are as follows:

a. What arrangements exist to spread the consequence to technical assistance projects so that the relatively short term efforts of American (and other) technical assistance experts can be institutionalized in recipient countries? Under what circumstances are these arrangements most effective?

b. What arrangements exist to relate technical assistance efforts to the recipient country's broad development aspirations?

c. In view of the many sources of technical assistance, what arrangements exist (a) among donors, and (b) in recipient countries to minimize duplication and to maximize cooperative effort?

d. What are the problems with respect to the selection, recruitment, and training of technical assistance personnel, participants, and trainees? What remedies appear to be feasible?

BLOCK 16. Scope of Technical Services, ect. (Cont'd)

4. Represent a good geographical distribution among major recipient areas of the world.

The Contractor will also send differently structured questionnaires to representatives of donor agencies in the same countries (e.g., to the AID Mission Directors, the FAO local representatives or to the UN Resident Representative, etc.), and to individual technical assistance experts.

Each Questionnaire will be tailored to the respondent's specific situation as nearly as possible.

b. The Contractor will send similarly structured and tailored questionnaries to headquarters of all identifiable donor agencies whose activities in the field of agricultural technical assistance are considered to be significant. (The Technical Assistance Information Clearing House lists 138 overseas missions in the field of agriculture supported by U. S. volunteer and non-profit agencies.) This will include the regional headquarters of FAO.

c. To the extent possible the Contractor will follow up the questionnaires by interviews in depth and by supplementary questionnaires.

d. Several recipient countries (eight to ten) and the major donor agencies will be selected for intensive study of administrative arrangements and the substantive results of technical assistance in agriculture. The countries will be chosen in consideration of the factors of the importance of their agricultural development to U. S. objectives, the geographical distribution, and the likelihood that (with the aid of questionnaire returns) the results of intensive

study can be generalized to other countries. The donor agencies will include, among others, AID, FAO, the UN Technical Assistance Board and the Special Fund, the European Economic Community, the technical assistance agencies of two or more European countries, and the large American foundations (Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie).

e. All questionnaires, interviews, and intensive studies will be designed to advance previous and concurrent research in this and related fields.

f. AID will appoint an internal Consultative Committee drawn from AID, the Department of Agriculture, and other interested U. S. Government agencies so as to provide continuous liaison and guidance as the research pattern develops. In addition, the Contractor will appoint a Project Advisory Group drawn from its own staff and from outside experts in the field of technical assistance administration. Both the Consultative Committee and the Advisory Group will assist the Contractor in selecting the countries and donor agencies for broad study through questionnaires, and those to be covered by more intensive study.

g. Research results will be made known by the Contractor to AID in the form of a number of interim reports and a final report. The content and timing of the reports will depend on the inflow of research results. To the extent consistent with sound research procedure priority as to the subject matter of interim reports will be assigned in accordance with AID requirements as reported through the internal Consultative Committee. It is expected that the flow of interim reports will start within six months of the initiation of the project.

APPENDIX B

CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY
CONTRACT NO. AID/csd-289 (ABRIDGED) JUNE 27, 1963

Contract No. AID/csd-289

CONTRACT

BETWEEN THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AND

SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY

PIO/T 946-Z-99-SL-9-0700100

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY

BY Effie D. Boyd

Effie D. Boyd

this 27th day of June 1963

THIS CONTRACT, is made and entered into between the Government of the United States of America, acting through the Agency for International Development (hereinafter referred to as "A.I.D.") represented by the Contracting Officer executing this contract and Syracuse University (hereinafter referred to as the "Contractor") an educational institution chartered by the State of New York, with its principal office in the city of Syracuse, New York.

WITNESSETH THAT:

WHEREAS, A.I.D. needs: (i) certain information on administrative methods which various governmental, international, and non-governmental donor agencies are using in providing technical assistance; (ii) information on administrative methods recipient governments, agencies and institutions have for utilizing technical assistance; (iii) analysis of the relative merits of the different methods being used by donor and recipient governments or agencies; (iv) recommendations for improving the administration of technical assistance by A.I.D., donor agencies with which A.I.D. cooperates, and cooperating recipient countries.

WHEREAS, the Contractor, primarily through its facility, The Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, represents that it is

qualified to perform the work and services required by A.I.D. and is willing to undertake and perform such work and services on a cost reimbursable basis; and

WHEREAS, this negotiated contract is authorized by and executed under the authority of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and Executive Order 10784.

NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto agree as follows:

ARTICLE I - SCOPE OF WORK AND SERVICES

A. The Contractor agrees to use its technical resources and experience to conduct a research project for the improvement of technical assistance programming, design and review of technical assistance projects, institution building arrangements, and technical assistance personnel practices (including participants), with particular emphasis on technical assistance in agriculture, such improvement being a means towards increasing the effectiveness of the Government of the United States direct and indirect expenditures on technical assistance. The principal objective of the study will be to compare and appraise current practices in the administration of technical assistance by A.I.D. and other donors of a selected group of recipient countries in order to determine strengths and weaknesses, and to recommend changes.

B. The research project will be conducted according to a work plan as outlined in Appendix B, "Operational Plan," attached hereto and made a part hereof. As an introduction to the work plan in Appendix B there is included a statement of the problem and a more detailed outline of the project objectives. The work plan as outlined in Appendix B shall be subject to review, and

revision from time to time as considered necessary by A.I.D. and the Contractor.

ARTICLE II - CONDITIONS GOVERNING OPERATIONS

A. It is understood that the work performed in connection with this research project is an integral part of the United States Foreign Assistance Program and will be performed under the technical supervision of the Director, Agriculture Service of the Office of Human Resources and Social Development of A.I.D. Washington. The Contractor will be responsible for all professional and technical details of the contract and shall keep A.I.D. Washington and the US AID Directors in cooperating countries currently informed of the progress of the study.

B. Activities under this contract shall be governed by the following Appendices which are attached hereto and made a part hereof:

Appendix A, "Standard Provisions"; Appendix B, "Operational Plan"; Appendix C, "Approved Budget"; and Appendix D, "Special Provisions".

ARTICLE III - FINANCING

A. The Contractor shall be reimbursed for costs incurred by it in performing services hereunder in accordance with the applicable provisions of Appendix A and Appendix D, subject to the following limitations:

1. Total A.I.D. commitments under this contract, subject to limitations expressed in Appendix C.		$355,475
	Total	$355,475
2. Advance of funds	$40,000	

Appendix B
Contract No. AID-289

CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND
SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY

Date of Plan: June, 1963

Appendix B ----- Operational Plan

I. Introduction

The United States has been engaged in providing technical assistance to less developed countries since before the Second World War, and on a massive scale since the enunciation of President Truman's Point IV in his inaugural speech in January of 1949. The purposeful transfer of technology - of "know-how"- among nations is a major way in which the more industrialized countries can contribute to the advancement of other countries. The process of transferring knowledge is not new; it has been going on haphazardly for centuries. The new feature is that in recent years there has been for the first time a major attempt by governments and by multilateral organizations to transfer technology on a systematic basis. The United States A.I.D. program is a major part of this systematic process, but there are other parts in which the United States has a very deep interest: the programs of the United Nations and its specialized agencies (which roughly equal the technical assistance efforts of the United States in terms of manpower, and to which the United States contributes 40 per cent of the cost); the programs of the Columbo Plan, in which the United States participates; the programs of the European Economic Community and of the Organization of American States; the

bilateral programs of a number of European countries and Japan which the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD is trying to coordinate with U. S. support; and many privately sponsored programs, especially those of the large foundations such as Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie. Without doubt these programs have succeeded in transferring a considerable body of knowledge and skills from the more developed countries to the less developed countries, and with highly beneficial results.

II. The Problem

Despite the demonstrated success of most of these programs it is generally agreed by qualified practitioners and observers of technical assistance operations that there is considerable room for improvement in the sense of getting more effective results from the amount of manpower and money that it put into the effort. It is also apparent that some of the programs have proven to be more successful than others. There are clear indications that many of the major impediments to optimum results from technical assistance programs are basically administrative and that the differences in effectiveness of programs can often be traced to different administrative practices. The word "administrative" is used here in a broad sense. It encompasses all major administrative policies and actions affecting programming and implementation of technical assistance, whether these occur at A.I.D. headquarters (or the headquarters of other donors), at field office in arrangements between or among donor agencies and countries at headquarters or in the field, or at various government levels in recipient countries. Too often the administrative policies and actions have been counter-productive to the purposes of technical assistance. Also, among the governmental and

multilateral agencies involved, some of the administrative policies and actions have been inconsistent. The time is propitious to examine the administrative methods and techniques of technical assistance programs of a variety of agencies to evaluate the reasons for success or failure and to identify future improvements.

III. Objectives

A. The Contractor will use its best efforts to conduct research for the improvement of the administration of technical assistance, with particular emphasis on the administration of technical assistance in agriculture, such improvement being a means towards increasing the effectiveness of United States direct and indirect expenditure on technical assistance. The principal objective of the research project will be to appraise current practices in the administration of technical assistance by A.I.D. and other donors and by a selected group of recipient countries in order to determine strengths and weaknesses, and to recommend changes. Through collaboration with A.I.D. personnel it is expected that the research process and results will be directed in particular towards United States problems in this field. Special emphasis will be given to technical assistance in agriculture. Agriculture has been chosen because it is dominant in the technical assistance programs of A.I.D., of the UN (through the Food and Agriculture Organization), Foundations, and of other donors. Also, the broad range of technical assistance in agriculture offers an insight into many other substantive areas and thus adds to the possibility of generalized conclusions as to the effect of different administrative practices in the fields, for example, of education (extension services), or of monetary management (agricultural credit). However, given a principal

focus on agriculture, it is expected that other fields will be investigated if necessary to test the proposition that conclusions can be generalized.

B. The major fields of research will be as follows:

1. With respect to administration per se:

a. The various techniques and criteria used in deciding on acceptable technical assistance programs and projects, with emphasis on their nature, scope, and structure of the programs.

b. The project review process in the recipient countries and in the donor agencies, including examination of the means used to coordinate projects in different substantive fields and similar projects sponsored by different agencies.

c. The different kinds of arrangements provided for institution building.

d. Selection, recruiting, and employment conditions for technical assistance personnel, and for participants (or trainees).

2. With respect to administrative arrangements for specific forms of technical assistance (to provide information about and test the hypothesis that the quality of resistance to change can vary from field to field, and that administrative corrections can be adapted to help overcome that resistance) including:

a. Introduction of up-to-date techniques (tested seed, use of fertilizer, double cropping, etc.)

b. Irrigation and drainage

c. Research, education, and extension work

d. Training Centers

e. Land tenure reform and taxation

f. Agricultural credit

C. The major questions to be explored are:

1. What arrangements exist to spread the consequence of technical assistance projects so that the relatively short term efforts of American (and other) technical assistance experts can be institutionalized in recipient countries? Under what circumstances are these arrangements most effective?

2. What arrangements exist to relate technical assistance efforts to the recipient country's broad development aspirations?

3. In view of the many sources of technical assistance, what arrangements exist (i) among donors, and (ii) in recipient countries to minimize duplication and to maximize cooperative effort?

4. What are the problems with respect to the selection, recruitment, and training of technical assistance personnel, participants, and trainees? What remedies appear to be feasible?

IV. Work Plan

As soon as practicable after the effective date of this agreement, the Contractor will supply the necessary personnel, equipment, supplies, and do all other things necessary to implement this project. To realize the objectives of this project the Contractor will use a combination of research methods designed to get the best possible results from both broad coverage of many donor agencies and recipient countries, and from studies in depth of a selected few.

APPENDIX C

ORGANIZATION OF THE MAXWELL SCHOOL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE RESEARCH PROJECT

[illegible], 1964

PARTICIPANTS [illegible] CONSULTATIVE ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING

MAXWELL GRADUATE SCHOOL [illegible] ASSISTANCE PROJECT

Syracuse University Staff

Irving Swerdlow, Director, Overseas Center
John Lindeman, Project Director
Richard L. Duncan, Associate Project Director

Albert Gorvine, Brooklyn College, Consultant
Mrs. Nora Gross, Documentarian
Robert W. Iversen, Political Science
John Lacks, Comparative Education
Roscoe C. Martin, Political Science
Sidney C. Sufrin, Economics
William Wasserman, School of Business

Garnet McDiarmid, Research Associate
Mrs. Mildred Martin, Research Associate
Manouchehr Safa-Lafahani, Research Associate

John Kubert, Graduate Assistant
Raymond Lewis, Graduate Assistant
Miss Sandra Lewis, Graduate Assistant
John White, Graduate Assistant

II

Consultative Committee

The Brookings Institution:
Dennis A. FitzGerald
Karl Mathiasen

Cornell University:
G. W. Hadland

The Rockefeller Foundation:
Robert D. Osler

U.S. Agency for International Development:
Frank W. Parker

The Carnegie Endowment:
Miss Anne Winslow

The Ford Foundation:
Richard Dye

APPENDIX D

SUMMARY OF OBJECTIVES OF THE MAXWELL SCHOOL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE RESEARCH PROJECT

August 16, 1965

SUMMARY OF OBJECTIVES

Maxwell School Technical Assistance Project

1. The purpose of this project is to examine the administration of technical assistance, with special reference to agriculture, and to recommend such changes as may be needed.

2. The project began officially in late June, 1963. It became operational in October of 1963. It ends in January, 1966. Research results are not yet thoroughly analyzed or collated.

3. In the U.S. and abroad we have had interviews with more than 1500 people experienced in some aspect of technical assistance. The field work has been concentrated in Colombia, Peru, Nigeria, Kenya, Iran, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines. We have also, of course, used available file material in AID and in the headquarters of other donor agencies.

4. In the course of our research we have, as much as possible, used an inter-disciplinary approach. There have been 25 people involved in the project for varying periods of time. Sixteen of them are at the senior staff level (many of whom had extensive experience in underdeveloped countries). Nine were graduate students, whose participation in the project created an interest for them in the administration of technical assistance. Professional fields represented are political science, economics, public administration, sociology, and cultural anthropology.

APPENDIX E

MAXWELL SCHOOL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE RESEARCH PROJECT FIELD INVESTIGATORS AND COUNTRIES VISITED

APPENDIX

The Syracuse University Staff visited the following countries:

Philippines

Thailand

Pakistan

Iran

Kenya

Nigeria

Chile (ECLA)

Colombia

France (UNESCO)

Guatemala (ROCAP)

Italy (FAO)

Peru

Switzerland

United Kingdom (DTC)

Participants from Syracuse University were:

Richard L. Duncan

Albert Gorvine

Robert Iversen

John Laska

John Lindeman

Mildred Martin

Neville Miller

Manouchehr Safa-Isfahani

Irving Swerdlow

APPENDIX F

MAXWELL SCHOOL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE RESEARCH PROJECT
PRELIMINARY REPORTS

August 18, 1965

Maxwell School Technical Assistance Project

PROGRAMMED REPORTS AND RESEARCH ACTIVITIES.[1]

I. Reports:

a) Staff, "Final General Report and Recommendations".*

b) Richard L. Duncan, "The Programming of Technical Assistance".

c) Roscoe Martin and Mildred Martin, "Technical Assistance in the Field".

d) Robert W. Iversen, "Personnel for Technical Assistance".

e) John Lindeman, "U.S. Technical Assistance in Perspective".*

f) Robert J. Shafer and Others, "Joint Operations in Technical Assistance".

II. Working Papers:

g) George Adler, "Careers in Technical Assistance".

h) John Lindeman and John Kubert, "The Magnitude and Complexity of Technical Assistance".

i) John White, "The Organization of United Nations Technical Assistance".

j) John White, "Analysis of Questionnaire Returns from United Nations Resident Representatives on Technical Assistance Administration in Their Countries".

k) Sidney C. Sufrin, "Technical Administration: A Problem in Management.

l) Donn Hart, "The Organization, Administration, Training Programs, and Dissemination of Modern Agricultural and Community Development Technology in a Bisayan Municipality, Philippines".

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[1]Does not include internal memoranda and systemization of data.

*Not completed.

m) Albert Gorvine, "The University of Nebraska Project at Ataturk University: A Case Study in the Administration of a University Technical Assistance Project".

n) Albert Gorvine, "The Revelle Report: A Case Study in the Administration of Technical Assistance".

o) John Kubert, "The Administration of Technical Assistance: A Comparative Study of Administration of Bilateral Technical Assistance Programs of Fifteen Foreign Countries".

p) George Adler, "The Scope of Technical Assistance in Agriculture".

q) Jerry Minor, "Rural Education in Underdeveloped Countries: The Role of Technical Assistance".

r) Manoucher Safa-Isfahani, "Community Development and Agricultural Extension".

s) Robert W. Gregg, "Decentralization and the United Nations Regional Economic Commissions".

t) Staff, "The Organization of United Nations Technical Assistance".

u) Staff, "The Magnitude and Complexity of Technical Assistance".

v) John Lindeman, "Preliminary /Final/ Report to AID on the Administration of Technical Assistance, With Special Reference to Agriculture.**

**A discussion paper.

APPENDIX G

MEMORANDUM FROM THE MAXWELL SCHOOL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE RESEARCH PROJECT DIRECTOR TO PROJECT PARTICIPANTS -- SUBJECT: FINAL REPORT

MEMORANDUM

TO: Technical Assistance Project Participants April 20, 1966

FROM: John Lindeman, Project Director

SUBJECT: Final Report to AID

The various pieces of our AID technical assistance research project have been pulled together and sorted out, and I am now ready to proceed with drafting the Final Report.

This memo is for the purpose of summarizing where we stand. Since it is based on our many discussions, there will be little in it that will be new to you, but I want to make sure that we are in at least general agreement.

1. We have decided that the major objective of the Final Report is to create a reaction in AID which will provoke discussion of the issues that we raise. We have agreed that not many of these issues are novel. This makes it difficult to inspire controversy and discussion within the Agency: much of what we have to say is deja vu. Because of this we must be concerned especially about the potential "so what" reaction, and the reaction of "I've been saying that for a long time".

2. We have also agreed that getting a constructive reaction in AID depends on AID attitudes, and upon an evaluation by responsible AID officials of the best way to "pitch" the Final Report so that it will get high level consideration. I will undertake to get this evaluation from AID officials before completing the Final Report.

3. Pending advice from AID as to the best way to achieve impact we have decided tentatively that the Final Report should be short (no more than 50 pages) and to the point. This means that:

(A) Documentation and other evidences of a scholarly approach should be minimized. There is enough such documentation etc. in our Staff Reports and Working Papers.

(B) In line with the above the Final Report should neither be overwhelmed by conclusions and recommendations on special subjects investigated by individual project participants, nor should it be diluted by a committee approach. With your advice, but not

necessarily with your consent, I will take full responsibility for the form and content of the Final Report. You have absolution; I tremble.

(C) In order to compress our several file cabinets into 50 pages, we need an outline somewhat as follows:

(i) A very brief statement of the purpose of the project, the methodology, and the relation of this report to the masses of material we have acquired.
(ii) Recommendations in brief (keyed to iii below).
(iii) Reasons for recommendations (keyed to ii above).
(iv) Appendices sufficient to demonstrate that our research has been in depth and that the content of the Final Report has a solid base.

(D) Finally, we have agreed that the alternative of a voluminous and all inclusive Final Report would not have the desired impact on AID. The fate of such reports is often that they are measured by avoirdupois and then put on shelves. We want ours to be read.

If you have any comments I would appreciate them. I hope to talk to some key people in Washington and I will let you know the results so that we can continue discussions until the final draft is completed for review.

JL:JB

APPENDIX H

THE COUNTRY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (CAP) SCOPE AND CONTENT
(M.O.1023.3, 1962)
U. S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The following procedural instructions indicate the kind and extent of analysis which is required for each section of the CAP. Condensation, alteration or omissions are authorized by the Regional Assistant Administrator, although all of the topics and considerations outlined below are generally covered to the extent practicable. The USAID provides any additional data it believes contributes to effective program analysis and determination.

A transmittal statement addressed to the AID Administrator and indicating the Ambassador's approval of the document is required. This statement includes whatever comments the Ambassador believes are desirable.

I. Part I - Framework for AID Strategy

This section is designed to set forth in concise form the U. S. purposes and country circumstances which call for the proposed long range assistance strategy and goals. Cross references to other documents are sometimes appropriate but, where this is done, the substance is summarized in the CAP so that it is a self-contained document.

A. Current U.S. Objectives and Policies

This section explores in broad terms the importance, the possibilities and the limits of using AID programs and collateral U.S. actions to achieve U.S. objectives. As such it provides a background for the analysis of the current situation and trends and sets the framework for the more operational treatment in the Section on U.S. Assistance Strategy.

Where an approved State Department Country Guidelines paper has been issued, it is the starting point for the discussion of U.S. objectives. The Country Team refines or elaborates upon the basic document to the extent necessary to provide a specific and detailed description of U.S. objectives affecting the AID program and the factors inhibiting or favoring their achievement. The CAP departs from these Country guidelines in some circumstances. Such cases are infrequent and usually limited to cases where the Country Team believes that the Country Guidelines have been superseded by events, and has initiated action through channels to develop revised guidelines. Where a departure from these Guidelines is being considered, the field first consults with Washington.

Some of the major considerations treated in this section are:

1. What are our long-term and short-term objectives in the country? Are there significant contradictions between them? If so, how should these be bridged? Are these differences likely to become more or less pronounced?

2. To what extent do U.S. and country political and economic objectives and major policies coincide? Can and should the U.S. assistance program play a significant role in further these objectives and policies? Can the assistance program serve as an important negotiating device for obtaining greater self-help efforts or other improved use of resources to accelerate economic and social development? How?

3. To what extent do U.S. political and economic objectives differ from the country's own objectives and policies? Are these differences the result of basic ideological divergences? Historical or cultural factors? Personal views of leaders? Are they likely to be transient or of long duration? If current trends continue unchanged, are these differences likely to become more or less pronounced?

4. Are the divergent objectives or policies of the country of sufficient importance to the U.S. that we should make a determined effort to moderate or change them? Adapt to them? Are these differences largely economic or political? Can AID programs significantly influence the country's policies and objectives? Are such changes likely to be durable ones? Is traditional diplomacy likely to be a more effective instrument? What would be the result if the U.S. were to provide no assistance at all? How critical would these results be to major U.S. objectives in the area and world-wide?

B. Political and Social Situation and Trends

This section identifies as precisely as possible the issues and forces in the political and social structure and processes which are of strategic importance for economic and social development. The analysis describes not only current relationships and characteristics but estimates the shifts and changes which will probably occur during the next three to five years.

Among the factors to be considered are the following:

1. The major characteristics of the political and social structure, and the important cultural factors (e.g., attitudes, values, traditional relationships, etc.) which impede or assist development.

2. The changes that are taking place which promote or threaten the development of reasonable political and social order and continuity, and the factors that give rise to these changes.

3. The key individuals or groups in the society who make or influence development policy and action, and the nature of the the relationships between these groups and individuals.

4. The adequacy of the political and administrative institutions which are responsible for planning and carrying out the development effort.

A more detailed framework and specific questions to assist analysis of social and political factors is given in Annex C of the Long-range Assistance Strategy (M.O. Subsection 1022).

C. Security Situation and Trends

In those countries in which the United States is providing Military Assistance, or Supporting Assistance based upon military or internal security requirements, a statement regarding the current and anticipated security situation is required. This section is normally drafted by, or in cooperation with, the local Military Assistance Group or military attaches. In addition to commenting upon the nature of the security threat facing the country, the adequacy of local military forces and the role of U.S. military assistance, this statement also comments upon the relationship between development and security requirements as they affect the use of country resources as well as U.S. assistance. Among other purposes, this serves as a basis for assessing internal defense programs where such are proposed. The CAP is consistent with the long-term MAP proposals or explicitly explains any differences and indicates how the MAP submission should be changed to reconcile them.

D. Economic Situation and Trends

In this section, the Country Team analyzes, as comprehensively as its resources and available data allow, the current economic situation and estimates the changes which are likely to take place in the next three to five years.

The amount of quantitative detail provided in this section depends upon the availability of reliable data and the extent to which economic factors are significant in determining program levels and content. The Regional Bureau indicates to each US AID in the individual country guidance the extent to which deviations from the standard comprehensive analysis is acceptable.

The principal elements treated in this section are the following:

1. The major characteristics of the economy are described: the availability of material and human resources; the adequacy of basic financial and distributive institutions; the level of development of basic infrastructure. A comprehensive analysis of gross national product is provided, broken out to the extent practicable, by sector and major components within each sector. The nature of private and government consumption, the characteristics of gross investment, and the pattern of international trade and balance of payments is also described. Fiscal, monetary and foreign exchange policies are described and evaluated. The country's ability to finance its own local development

costs are carefully analyzed. Dependence on special commodity, trade or financial arrangements is noted, as is the extent of or a need for regional economic cooperation.

2. The development plan or program of the host country is thoroughly analyzed, as well as the extent to which present or probable future economic policy supports the objectives of the development plan. If no explicit plan or program has been adopted, the analysis indicates what program is implicit in current or estimated future policies or actions.

3. The concluding portion of the economic analysis consists of projections of the basic features of the economy for a period of up to five years. The C tables (see Annex A to this M. O. for description) provide the tabular format for this projection. Each table is accompanied by a statement which describes the assumptions underlying these projections and the implications of the projections for the U.S. assistance program. Where the projections are based on economic coefficients such as marginal rates of savings or taxation, capital-output ratios, etc., the basis for estimating these parameters and their magnitudes is given. Wherever possible, checks are made of the consistency of future projections against past performance. Care is taken to assess and indicate clearly the degree of reliability of data used in the analysis and included in the tables. In this analysis, particular attention is given to the identification of the amount and kinds of external resource requirements. The assumptions made regarding the source and magnitude of non-U.S. external assistance is clearly stated.

More detailed instructions regarding the preparation of the various tables included in this section is found in Annex A to this M.O.

E. Self-Help Trends

The self-help analysis is divided into two parts: (1) indicators of economic progress and self-help, and (2) elements of political and social progress and self-help.

1. The former includes to the extent practicable, the following:

   a. Economic growth and productivity

   b. Domestic savings

   c. Government finance

   d. Exports and imports

   e. Secondary and higher education

   f. Development planning and economic policies

   g. Government administration

2. Analysis of political and social progress and self-help includes:

   a. Land and income distribution

   b. Taxation systems

   c. Elementary and general education

   d. Welfare programs

   e. Political organization and popular participation in national affairs.

Though quantitative indicators are used to the maximum practicable extent, the essence of the analysis is the Country Team's qualitative evaluation of the host country's self-help efforts. Most important is the evaluation of the observed trend in each self-help area in the light of the country's needs and its practical scope for action, and the evaluation of future prospects as a basis for explaining how the U.S. strategy can be used to enhance them. The S Table included in Annex D of the LAS, M.O. 1022, should be filled out to the extent feasible in reviewing indicators of economic self-help.

II. Part II - U.S. Assistance Strategy

Having considered the current political, economic, social, self-help, and security situations and assessed future trends, the next step is to propose a U.S. assistance strategy which will help to influence these trends in directions which contribute to the achievement of U.S. objectives. This section is intended to translate basic AID policy and its programming principles (M.O. Section 1000 and Subsection 1011) into a specific strategy tailored to the particular problems and opportunities of the individual country. The following sections note particular areas that should be covered, but the basic guidance is found, for the most part, in the more comprehensive statements in M.O. Sections 1000 and 1010.

A. Emphasis of U.S. Assistance

The emphasis of U.S. assistance varies greatly under different circumstances. In virtually all cases, it considers the improvement of total resource use. Where circumstances warrant the support of an over-all development plan the need to influence the over-all resource use under the plan is taken into account in fashioning the U.S. program. Where a major objective is to support modernizing forces within the society, the emphasis in U.S. assistance is often on goals which these forces have set. The proper balance between military and economic programs is considered as is the possible need for civic action or internal defense programs. The role which U.S. assistance can play in promoting desirable social and political goals, and the appropriate balance between more and less immediately productive investment is also considered.

The emphasis in the U.S. assistance program parallels that of the country program, where we are in substantial agreement with that program, or is concentrated on areas or sectors which we believe have been given inadequate attention and need to be strengthened.

This section includes the formulation of specific goals (or, in some cases, activity targets) to serve as the initial step in the development of Goal Plans and Separate Activities. The negotiating advantages of particular areas of concentration are considered as well as their direct effect. The selection of areas of concentration also takes into account relative availability and cost of U.S. commodities and technicians. To the extent practicable, capital assistance is in sectors where U.S. materiel and equipment are most competitive and technical assistance is concentrated where the U. S. has special technical competence and/or qualified U.S. techniciáns and training facilities are most likely to be available.

B. Types of U.S. Assistance

The emphasis in this section is upon the importance, from the viewpoint of U.S. strategy/objectives, of providing certain types of assistance. It first considers which category, or combination of categories, of U.S. assistance -- aan most effectively achieve U.S. objectives and goals. (See M.O. Subsection 1012). The optimum relationship between military and economic assistance is explicity dealt with where relevant. U.S. agricultural surpluses, excess property and strategic stockpile materials are used to the maximum extent possible, in lieu of other forms of assistance, consistent with achievement of U.S. objectives. Where Supporting Assistance is recommended, consideration is given to how it can eventually be reduced or eliminated.

Within the categories of U.S. assistance proposed, consideration is given to its most effective form: Will program loans, or other non-project assistance, be more or less effective than project assistance? (See especially M.O. 1011.4). What form of assistance will most effectively stimulate increased self-help? (See M.O. 1011.1). Will the financing of local costs further U.S. objectives? (See M.O. 1011.6). Does the programming of local currencies offer additional opportunities for furthering U.S. objectives? (See M.O. 1011.8).

C. Collateral U.S. Actions and Effect on the U.S. Economy

In addition to recommending general forms and emphasis of U.S. assistance, the Country Team proposes collateral actions which it believes are important to the success of the U.S. assistance program. For example: it may suggest changes in U.S. trade policy; it may recommend appropriate diplomatic action on issues which directly or indirectly affect the aid program; it considers the position the U.S. should take in international or regional bodies (U.N., OAS, OECD, NATO, CENTO, etc.) on matters which affect the country's development. Where practicable and relevant, specific recommendations are made in a form which facilitates the initiation of action.

These recommendations do not, of course, cover the entire spectrum of U.S. policy and actions involving our relationships with the country, but focus only on those major collateral actions which significantly affect the country's development.

The effect of the proposed program on the U.S. balance of payments, along with an explanation of steps required to minimize that effect, is analyzed and explained. Other effects on the U.S. economy, if any, are also considered. (See M.O. Subsection 1016).

D. Self-Help Requirements

Special attention is given as to how U.S. assistance can most effectively promote new or more effective use of existing self-help measures. There is analysis of what measures, if any, we should insist upon; what tactics the U.S. should pursue in setting and implementing these conditions; whether aid should be withheld until action is taken, or be provided to encourage and assist such action. Consideration is also given as to whether these measures should be related to the total program or to individual activities or projects and whether there are means other than the assistance program to influence the self-help actions required.

A more detailed discussion of the concept of self-help and factors to be considered in negotiating self-help efforts is in M.O. 1011.1.

E. Other Assistance Donors

In the economic analysis, the total external resource needs of the of the country are estimated, and assumptions made regarding the source and magnitude of non-U.S. external assistance. The Country Team, as appropriate, attempts to respond to the following questions: What other donors are operating in your country? Could donors not represented make a useful contribution?

What form should our field coordination with other donors take? Should it be strictly bilateral, or can a multilateral technique be used to some extent? Is a coordinating group or consortium arrangment desirable? Are other donors adequately represented to make local coordination really successful? What objectives might be best accomplished by consideration outside the host country, bilaterally in donor capitals? Multilaterally, in DAC, IBRD, the U.N. OAS, etc.? What role does the host government play in coordinating aid, if any?

Should we seek to increase the size of the programs of other donors? Do their objectives and programming techniques coincide or complement ours? Conflict? Should we attempt to influence the form of their assistance (long-term loans, untied, credits, budgetary support, etc.)? Can an efficient division of labor among projects, sectors and skills be worked out with them? Is there competition for projects? Can coordination be achieved at the operational stage as well as in programming?

F. Summary of Strategy

This section is the portion of the CAP that is considered for formal approval. For this purpose, it needs to contain a statement of the main conclusions as to strategy, a concise explanation of their rationale, a restatement of the goals and an explanation of how they are to be achieved.

III. Part III - U.S. Assistance Program

A. Introduction and Summary

Part III of the CAP consists primarily of a series of Goal Plans and/or Separate Activities. The Introduction and Summary section contains the summary tables E-1, E-2, E-3, and E-4 for the total program along with whatever narrative material is required for their explanation.

B. Goal Plans (and/or Separate Activities)

This section contains the Goal Plans and the description of Separate Activities which connect the proposed strategy to action proposals. Goal Plans and the description of Separate Activities are discussed in M.O. Subsection 1024 of the AID Manual.

APPENDIX I

PROJECT DOCUMENTATION GUIDELINE (MANUAL CIRCULAR NO. 1023.2.7, 1967)
U. S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

MANUAL CIRCULAR

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

SUBJECT	TRANSMITTAL LETTER NO	CIRCULAR NO
	9:106	1023.2.7
Project Documentation Guidance	EFFECTIVE DATE June 2, 1967	TERMINATION DATE *
	FILING INSTRUCTIONS SUPERSEDES: AIDTO CIRC XA 212, 5-13-67 File as M.O. 1023.2.7	

I. General

This manual circular contains Agency-wide guidance on project documentation issued originally as AIDTO CIRCULAR XA-2031 dated February 28, 1967.

II. Outline for Project Documentation

A. General

B. Master Documents

C. Budget Estimate

D. Project Identification Data

E. Project Agreement

F. Implementation of the New System

III. Project Documentation

A. General

1. AID/W has decided to implement the new system of documentation for noncapital projects which has been developed by the AID Information Systems Task Force. The general outline of the new system and the planned phasing of its installation are included in this message. Detailed guidance on the formats will follow as soon as possible. For this year, the new documentation will apply only to new projects or existing projects in which major changes are contemplated (this is estimated to involve approximately 10% of the total number of projects); the balance of the projects will be documented in the same general way as in last year's (FY 1968) CAP II.

2. The objectives of the new system are:

a. To enhance the noncapital project planning, programming, evaluation, and information management processes of the Agency.

b. To lessen the peakload problems related to these processes in both the field and AID/W.

c. To relate approval and evaluation of projects more closely and realistically to sector analyses and U. S. and cooperating-country-development objectives.

d. To reduce, wherever possible, the amount of paperwork involved in these processes in prescribed documentation as well as cable and airgram traffic.

3. The objectives are to be achieved by (a) divorcing insofar as possible the planning, review, and evaluation processes from the budget cycle; (b) improving the content of the documentation; and (c) eliminating the need for annual, lengthy, repetitive, narrative justification from the field in connection with fall budget submissions (e.g., CAP Part II).

B. Master Documents

Three documents form the core of the new system and are closely related and interdependent. The degree of detail required and appropriate will vary depending upon the type of project, and flexibility will be provided for Mission and Regional Bureau discretion in this matter.

1. The Noncapital Project Paper (PROP), which was referred to in previous airgrams as the Technical Assistance Project Paper (TAPP), but has been renamed to include food projects, is the basic analytical description of the project, its nature, setting, strategy, targets, course of action, and broad magnitudes and timing of U. S. and cooperating-country resources. The PROP will serve as the basis of life-of-project substantive approval by the Regional Administrator and authorization for the Mission to proceed with further discussion with the cooperating country and negotiation short of the signing of project agreements or other obligating documents. (These actions cannot be

* To be codified as M.O. 1023.2.7 within ninety days from the effective date of this manual circular.

Note this Manual Circular on the Chapter Checklist and TL Checksheet for AID Manual Chapter 1000

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taken until funds are made available through the IAD process.) The PROP is also to serve as a standing "justification" for a project for its lifetime or until circumstances require basic reassessment and reauthorization, and will therefore require only infrequent revision (perhaps at two three-year intervals). For certain purposes, where planning for new projects is not sufficiently firm to allow preparation of a PROP, projects may be proposed to AID/W on a preliminary basis in a limited version of the PROP, called a Preliminary Project Proposal (PPP). These papers, the PROP and PPP, may be prepared and submitted to AID/W at any time of the year the Missions desire.

2. The Project Implementation Plan (PIP) provides, in structured form, schedules of resource inputs, work to be done, and prospective outputs during the life of the project and in such forward planning detail as is possible at the time of preparation. The PIP is an extension and expansion in greater detail of the course of action, planned targets and magnitudes and timing of inputs, described in the PROP. It will provide much of the data which formerly accompanied the E-1 Tables on an annual basis, but will be revised only when major changes in the scope or character and/or timing and magnitudes of project inputs occur. The PIP for new projects will be first prepared prior to or in conjunction with the initial project agreement.

3. The Project Evaluation Report (PER) is a semiannual evaluation by each Mission (or the appropriate regional or central staff office in the case of regional or interregional projects) of the effectiveness of project execution, the degree to which projected results or outputs are achieved, and the project's overall significance and relevance to U. S. and cooperating-country objectives. The Project Evaluation Report will be based upon and relate closely to both the PROP and the PIP, wherein the bases for project evaluation are established. Since basic responsibility for evaluation rests with Mission Directors in the field, it is intended that the PER be designed primarily to meet Mission needs, and also serve the collateral purpose of providing information essential to AID/W's responsibility for overall program management.

Although no final decision has been reached, the PER may eliminate or simplify existing Agency-wide requirements for several recurring reports such as the U-520, Project History and Analysis; U-307, Evaluation of Contractors Performance; U-510, Evaluation of Contractors Progress Report; and the Annual Physical Accomplishments Questionnaire. In addition, it should replace to some extent internal Mission progress or evaluation reports and reduce the number and variety of special project status reports called for by the regional and central staff offices in AID/W.

C. Budget Estimates

The concept of life-of-project substantive approval and authorization presumes that, so long as the evaluation process shows the project to be progressing in reasonable accordance with established plans and objectives, and so long as annual budget estimates are in reasonable agreement with the planned magnitudes and timing of resources, all of which are set forth in the PROP and PIP, annual funding increments will be provided, if funds are available. The PROP, PIP, and PER, therefore, are to serve as the source of supporting data for project budget estimates. As a result, the actual project budget submission in September will ultimately consist only of E-1a, b, and c Tables and a Manpower Planning Annex (MPA). Supporting tables on project cost components may be required by the Regional Bureaus until the total system is installed and such tables prove unnecessary. The only narrative required will be explanatory notes concerning major changes not reflected in the project documentation on file in AID/W when the E-1 Tables are submitted. Budget estimates for administrative and technical support, however, because of their particular characteristics, will be submitted in formats prescribed specifically for this purpose.

D. Project Identification Data

In recognition of the need for a comprehensive and readily available means of identifying the nature and patterns of AID activities, certain structured-substantive project information is to be obtained in conjunction with the planning and programming process. This will provide, ultimately through the Agency's automatic data processing system, useful aggregations of significant characteristics and trends in both capital and noncapital programs and improved cross-classification of projects for analysis in AID/W which the numerical coding system does not now permit. The timing of submission of project identification data remains to be worked out.

E. Project Agreement

The Project Agreement will continue as an obligating document which defines U. S. and cooperating country contributions to the project. However, the format of the ProAg will be expanded to cover obligations for participants and participating agency agreements, as well as for contracts and commodities, when such components are clearly an integral part of the project to be

carried out under the ProAg. This does not preclude the possibility that PIOs may serve as obligating documents under certain circumstances where there is no ProAg or in advance of a ProAg. Neither will it obviate existing authority of Mission Directors to approve exceptions to the requirement that ProAgs and PIOs be processed simultaneously. (See M.O. 712.3 - Obligation Concepts - Project Type Assistance.)

F. Implementation of the New System

In order to permit testing and refinement of the new system and spread out the work involved in changing to the new documentation, installation of the new system will not be completed until the end of CY 1969. Between now and then we will be in a transitional period, in which elements of the new system gradually replace the old documentation. Implementation will take place substantially as indicated below, subject to some slight deviations as the details of the system are developed.

1. Requirements for Summer/Fall 1967

During the remainder of 1967 the following documents are to be prepared and submitted to AID/W on a schedule to be issued in a subsequent message by each Regional Bureau.

a. For new projects to be implemented in the operational fiscal year 1968 and for continuing projects with major changes contemplated in either FY 1968 or FY 1969, a PROP and a PIP will be required. These documents can be submitted with the fall budget submission or earlier if desired.

b. For new projects proposed for budget year 1969, a PPP is required with the fall submission, or a PROP if planning is sufficiently advanced. These documents too, may be forwarded to Washington as they are prepared prior to fall budget submission.

c. For projects included under a. and b., Tables E-1a, E-1b, E-1c, and E-2 (as appropriate) and an MPA are to be submitted as part of the FY 1969 budget submission. Further instructions in completing E-1 Tables are to be sent to each Mission in the near future. With the aid of these instructions, we hope to reduce errors and inconsistencies which have been found in past submissions so that the E-1 data can form a consistent body of facts.

d. For approved projects continuing without major change in both FY 1968 and FY 1969, the documents which were used in the FY 1968 program cycle will be required, subject to further refinements which are now being considered. These documents include (1) the E-1a, E-1b, E-1c, and E-2 Tables (as appropriate), (2) the Manpower Planning Annex, (3) such supporting tables as the Regional Bureaus may require on contracts, participants, commodities, and other costs, and (4) any supporting narrative which may be necessary, including an updating of the "Progress to Date" section of the current E-1 narrative. These documents should be submitted as part of the FY 1969 budget submission.

2. Balance of Transition

As soon as possible, but in no case later than the fall of 1969, PROPs and PIPs will be prepared for the remaining projects. For the Summer/Fall 1969 and subsequent project budget submissions, only E-1 Tables and an MPA will be required, supplemented by whatever brief narrative is needed to explain deviations from previous documentation and such supporting tables as are deemed essential by the Regional Bureaus. The first semiannual Performance Evaluation Report (PER) will be required on June 30 or December 31 following initial obligation of the funds (in the case of new projects), or on June 30 or December 31 following submission of the PROP and PIP (in the case of continuing projects). Thus, by December 31, 1969, the new system will be fully in force.

William O. Hall

William O. Hall
Assistant Administrator
for Administration

APPENDIX J

NONCAPITAL PROJECT PAPER (PROP) AND PRELIMINARY PROJECT PROPOSAL (PPP)
(MANUAL CIRCULAR NO. 1025.1, 1967)
U. S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

MANUAL CIRCULAR

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

SUBJECT	TRANSMITTAL LETTER NO	CIRCULAR NO
Noncapital Project Paper (PROP) and Preliminary Project Proposal (PPP)	9:104	1025.1
	EFFECTIVE DATE: May 29, 1967	TERMINATION DATE: June 30, 1968
	FILING INSTRUCTIONS: File as M.O. 1025.1	

I. Introduction

A. The Noncapital Project Paper (PROP) is the basic analytical description of a specific noncapital assistance effort, including certain food donation assistance, and serves as the basis for its authorization. It is one of several important elements of the new planning, programming, and monitoring system for noncapital projects. It replaces and obviates the need for the previous annual E-1 project narrative justifications of the Country Assistance Program Book (Part II).

B. The Preliminary Project Proposal (PPP) is an early, partial version of the PROP, generally organized under the same headings, submitted to elicit AID/W reaction and/or to permit advance budget-year planning when project plans are not yet firm enough for the preparation of a comprehensive Noncapital Project Paper (PROP).

II. Purpose

A. The Noncapital Project Paper (PROP) is the major substantive planning paper on noncapital projects (e.g., technical assistance, certain Food for Freedom activities, and capital-type projects under $100,000). As distinguished from the E-1 narrative previously accompanying the fall budget submission, the PROP is not connected with the annual program cycle but is focused on the full duration or life of the project. Except as indicated in paragraph III. below, it is prepared and submitted at any time the responsible official (i.e., Mission Director, Regional Assistant Administrator for regional projects, designated officer for interregional projects) believes that the circumstances warrant such action. It thus affords an opportunity for more comprehensive and deliberate project planning and more thorough review and analysis prior to authorization. The PROP presents a clear picture of the relationship of the project to country, goal, and sector plans. It spells out the linkage connecting project targets and planned outputs with the nature and utilization of inputs thereby enhancing AID/W's judgments in the authorization process and providing a definitive framework for Mission project implementation and evaluation. The PROP for food donation activities requests the authorization of a specific food donation or food-for-work activity; it analyzes the appropriateness of the particular food donation effort as a component of the U. S. assistance program.

B. Where it is necessary to provide for certain new projects in budget-year estimates even though plans are not sufficiently firm to permit the preparation of a full and comprehensive PROP, and/or where the Mission may wish to consult AID/W before seriously considering major and complex new undertakings requiring close, joint planning with the cooperating country, Missions may submit a Preliminary Project Proposal (PPP). Where appropriate, AID/W Regional Bureaus may take this opportunity to consult with the major AID/W staff offices, and in some cases with participating agencies, in order to insure their participation in this early stage of the project planning process. The submission of a PPP does not eliminate the need for a definitive PROP once the requisite planning has been completed.

III. Review and Approval

A. The Regional Bureau is responsible for ensuring adequate development and review of PROPs submitted by Missions, in consultation with staff offices as necessary. PROPs for food donation activities are concurred in by the Office of the War on Hunger which is responsible for consulting, as necessary, with other appropriate government departments. PROPs for public safety activities are cleared with OPS per M.O. 1541.1 - Public Safety Programs - Basic Policy. Designated staff offices are responsible for ensuring adequate review by interested Regional Bureaus and other offices for interregional projects.

B. All PROPs for technical assistance originating in the field and involving less than $1,000,000 in U. S. costs are approved within AID

To be codified as M.O. 1025.1 by the above date.

Note this Manual Circular on the Chapter Checklist and TL Checksheet for AID Manual Chapter 1000

by the Regional Bureau Assistant Administrator or his designee. This approval is a formal authorization to proceed with negotiations with the cooperating country in accordance with the terms of the authorization. The project authorization does not authorize the actual signing of any obligating document. Funds will continue to be made available through the IAD and allotment process and Food for Freedom commodities through applicable procedures. The project authorization will approve the project either as described in the PROP or subject to certain conditions precedent or limitations which may be in terms of duration, total obligation, minimum performance requirements, or other factors. Where such conditions of a major nature are included in the authorization, Missions may comment on AID/W conditions prior to final authorization.

C. On the basis of the PROP, AID/W authorization will be for the life or duration of the project, or until such time as the review and evaluation process reveals a significant change in project direction and character. Although life-of-project funding requirements are normally met on a year-to-year basis through annual appropriations (an exception is forward funding of contracts), annual project budget estimates will be reviewed primarily in light of the results of evaluation as well as such analysis of financing elements as the Regional Bureaus may require. When a project is proceeding satisfactorily and in reasonable consonance with its stated objectives, magnitudes, and timing, annual funding increments will normally follow in due course, assuming the funds (or food commodities) are available.

D. Technical assistance projects exceeding $1,000,000 are approved by the Administrator. (See M.O. 1323.1 - Technical Assistance Activity Description, Review and Approval.) Mission authority for approval of new projects and for increases and decreases in continuing projects remains as set forth in relevant manual orders.

IV. Applicability and Installation

A. The PROP encompasses an activity or group of activities deemed by the Mission to constitute a convenient unit of management in accordance with M.C. 1301.1.1 - Projects as Units of Management of Technical Assistance (TL 12:99). The PROP is to be utilized in obtaining AID/W authorization for all country, regional, and interregional noncapital projects, including activities that may involve loan and/or grant dollars for technical assistance or commodities for Food for Freedom except the following:

1. Activities under the Special Development Activity Authorization and other "target of opportunity" types of projects. (See paragraph IV.D. below.)

2. Technical support.

3. AID/W-administered development research program.

B. In the case of food programs, the PROP will be used only for P.L. 480, Title II, food donation activities including either government-to-government or voluntary agency projects such as food-for-work, preschool and school lunch, institutional feeding, and livestock feeding. The PROP will not be used for emergency relief which will continue to be covered under existing documentation. In the case of food donation programs administered by voluntary agencies a PROP will normally cover a single activity (i.e., donation to a single category of recipients) undertaken by a single voluntary agency. However, separate projects (e.g., feeding on a district basis) may be included within the single recipient category served by a voluntary agency.

C. For new projects to be implemented in the operational fiscal year 1968 and for continuing projects with major changes contemplated in either FY 1968 or FY 1969, a PROP will be required prior to the fall 1967 budget submission deadline.

1. Where Mission planning for new projects to be proposed for budget year 1969 is sufficiently advanced a PPP or a PROP should be submitted to Washington as they are prepared, prior to the fall 1967 budget submission deadline. This, of course, does not preclude the possibility of submitting a PROP for FY 1969 implementation after the fall of 1967.

2. For already approved projects continuing without major change in both FY 1968 and FY 1969, PROPs may be submitted at any time prior to the fall of 1969, the exact timing to be a matter of Mission and Regional Bureau discretion.

3. In the case of PROPs for food, the availability of which is not dependent on an annual budgetary process, the PROPs can be submitted and approved at any time during this transition period.

D. Where the proposal or project has emerged as a target-of-opportunity, funded under the Special Development Activity Authority (M.O. 1323.1.1 - Special Development Activity Authority) or similar authorities, rather than a logical outgrowth of a country or sector strategy or goal planning process, the PROP will be clearly identified as such and submitted to AID/W in whatever detail the Mission Director deems appropriate for information purposes only.

V. Revisions

A. Although the PROP is intended as a planning document which can stand for the life of the project, there will be occasions where it will be valid for perhaps no more than two or three years before significant changes take place and it no longer provides realistic base points against which to evaluate progress or with which to defend the budget.

1. When the nature and/or magnitudes of project inputs significantly change but the character and outputs remain the same, the Mission will submit a PROP which simply refers to the previous document and explains such deviations in content as may be necessary. When changes occur during the course of implementation which significantly affect the scope, character, or magnitudes of inputs or outputs as expressed in the original authorized PROP, the project must be described in the new context in a revised PROP and reauthorized on that basis. In other cases, changes in the scope or character of a project or the nature of its outputs may be so great that it may be more appropriate to terminate the existing project and replace it with a complete, separate, new project described in a new PROP. The timing of such revised or new PROPs is a matter of discretion for the Mission Director or Regional Assistant Administrator for country or regional projects, and the designated staff office for interregional projects.

B. Changes in scheduling inputs and rates or amounts of outputs which do not affect the basic premises, objectives, or magnitudes of resource inputs as originally authorized will be accounted for in the Performance Evaluation Reports (PER) and, in many cases, reflected in revised Project Implementation Plans (PIP). Such changes do not require a revised or new Noncapital Project Paper or reauthorization of the project.

VI. Format

A. The first page of a PROP (and the PPP, to the extent possible) will be prepared on an Airgram Form (form AID 5-39) and will contain standard identifying information arranged as follows:

NONCAPITAL PROJECT PAPER (PROP)
(or PRELIMINARY PROJECT PROPOSAL (PPP), as appropriate)

Country _____ Project No. _____

Submission Date_____ Original_____ Revision No. _____

Project Title:

U. S. Obligation Span: FY____through FY____

Physical Implementation Span: FY____ through FY____

Gross life-of-project financial requirements:

U. S. dollars ----------
(for food projects show CCC value including estimated ocean freight)

U. S.-owned local currency ----------

Cooperating country cash contribution ----------
(in $ equivalent, current exch. rate)

Other donor ----------
(for food projects, including voluntary agency contributions) Totals _____

For food projects show total tons _____

The narrative will begin under this identifying information and be continued as necessary on the Airgram Continuation Sheets. These masters will permit reproduction at the Missions and in AID/W to meet their individual requirements for copies.

B. PPPs and PROPs should be unclassified if possible. Where security classification is considered necessary by the Mission for parts of the document, those parts should be made a classified annex to facilitate separate handling of the unclassified portion.

VII. Content

A. General

1. The PROP is an analytical life-of-project document which briefly summarizes the project and then in greater detail:

a. Describes the situation and environment within which a proposed project is to be undertaken.

b. Identifies the project contributions to U. S. objectives, the cooperating country's development program or food needs, and the goal and sector plans embodied in the Multi-year Strategy Paper and the Country Assistance Program Memorandum, or equivalent document for regional and interregional programs.

c. Defines the planned targets, results, and outputs which the project is intended to serve, reach, or produce.

d. Describes the manner and general plan by which the project will be carried out, and generally specifies the nature, scale, and timing of required resource inputs.

2. In developing the PROP, its specific relationship to the process of evaluation must be carefully considered. From the PROP comes the anticipated contributions to U. S. and cooperating-country objectives and expressions of project intent, against which the continued significance of the project is evaluated. From the PROP course of action and planned outputs stem the more detailed Project Implementation Plan (PIP), against which performance and effectiveness are evaluated. Therefore, the PROP, and indeed the planning which precedes it, must be in terms which are readily translatable to and facilitate subsequent evaluation.

3. The following topical outline is to be followed in the organization of the paper.

Summary Description, including tabulation of planned inputs

Setting or Environment

Strategy

Planned Targets, Results, and Outputs

Course of Action, Method of Approach

Project Identification Data Sheet

The discussion which follows is based upon this topical outline. Where the circumstances require, Missions or other originating offices may modify these PROP headings, providing that all the factors essential to a complete understanding and justification of the proposal are included.

4. The appropriate length and detail of a PROP will vary radically from case to case and will also depend in large part upon the existence and adequacy of sector plans.

5. A sector plan, if well prepared, should lead logically, realistically, and clearly to one or several project requirements; if so, it will contain much of the project justification and rationale and thereby eliminate the need for repetition in the PROP, particularly as it relates to Setting, Environment, and Strategy. A simple reference to the sector plan in this case should suffice.

6. In projects requiring a large U. S. contribution, involving a complex course of action, requiring a great variety of skills and knowledge, extending over a long period of time, and/or involving many and complex economic or policy considerations, the PROP should represent a substantial piece of work containing a corresponding range and depth of detailed information. For simpler or smaller projects, such as advisory services involving few technicians or other efforts requiring U. S. support on a small scale or limited outputs and of short duration, a briefer paper should suffice. In a rapidly changing situation, circumstances will usually warrant projects of shorter duration where actions, targets, and requirements can be planned with sufficient

realism to justify the time and effort required for their development and processing without frequent substantial restructuring. This should in no way prejudice subsequent related projects as appropriate. Where appropriate, the Mission should collaborate closely with the cooperating-country government or cooperating sponsor in preparing the PROP.

7. The PROP should state that a diligent effort reveals that no non-AID resources are available to finance the effort. (See Policy Determination 37 (filed as M.O. 1000.2).)

B. Summary Description, Including Tabulation of Planned Inputs

1. This is a succinct summary of the proposed project which highlights the following:

a. The necessity and justification for the project, i.e., why the project is essential and the significance of its intended results to U. S. and cooperating-country development objectives and related sector and other plans.

b. The project goal(s) and target(s), i.e., the change in an existing situation, and/or the result(s), outputs, or accomplishments to be achieved over a specific time period. A PROP for food donation activities summary should include a concise statement of the targets, e.g., number of direct food recipients, increase in production of animal protein or fortified foods, miles of roadway to be constructed, etc.

c. Those minimum levels of output or achievement which must be met as a requisite for continued U. S. contribution and participation.

d. The general approach and plan of action including a description of the nature of essential inputs, financial and other, by the U. S., the cooperating country, and other donors, including cooperating-country, self-help actions concerning policy, organization, legislation, etc., needed to achieve the objectives. In the case of food projects: total agricultural commodities to be donated to the food project, by fiscal year and commodity types in metric tons; inputs by voluntary agencies and food recipients, if applicable.

2. Attached to this summary description will be a tabular breakdown of the required life-of-project financial inputs, and food inputs where applicable, indicating their approximate annual magnitudes and including those of the U. S., the cooperating country, and, where possible, other donors and cooperating sponsors. (See Attachment A.)

C. Setting or Environment

1. This portion of the PROP describes in greater detail the condition and/or environmental factors which affect the need for the project and to which the project will be addressed. It should relate the project goals to country development, program strategy, and, where appropriate, food requirements, as set forth in the country's development plan, Mission strategy paper, or sector analysis. It should describe the economic, social, legislative, and administrative obstacles to be overcome if project goals are to be achieved.

2. To the extent that the proposed project is a logical outgrowth of the aggregate or sector analysis and this analysis contains supporting data for the project, repeat only the highlights of that data and reference the previous documentation.

3. Where there is no sector or goal plan, this section should describe the major factors and problems in the country situation which bear upon the need, character, and priority of the project goals. Since the PROP is addressed to people who are generally familiar with the country situation and the importance of the field or function at issue, it should perceptively and selectively treat those features of the local economic, institutional, and politico-social setting that are essential to the full understanding of the reasons for the particular project proposal. In the event this setting has been adequately presented elsewhere, the pertinent documents may be referenced here with only such further refinement as necessary to pin down the specific nature of the problem to be addressed.

4. A PROP for a food donation activity should discuss the anticipated impact, if any, on the cooperating country's production and price structure, labor market, etc., including the social and political implications.

5. This discussion of the Setting or Environment should not be permitted to develop into an extensive historical documentary. Greater conciseness and specificity will result in a more meaningful Mission and AID/W review and analysis.

D. Strategy

This section discusses the strategy and method proposed for achieving project objectives. When different avenues are open to achieve these objectives and a choice must be made, these alternatives are to be analyzed and the logic and rationale behind the chosen alternative made clear. The proposed approach should be an extension of and consistent with overall U. S. assistance strategy for the country or comparable policy framework for regional or interregional programs. A PROP should state the manner and extent of the proposed project's contribution to U. S. goals, e.g., directly increased production and income; improved infrastructure; improved social, economic, and political institutions; directly improved personal welfare; improved U. S. relations; and improved U. S. commercial interests. This section should focus upon, but not necessarily be limited to, such factors as the following:

1. Alternative Approaches or Techniques

a. Technical Assistance Projects

(1) The goals and intended results of the project, and its setting, will determine the approach to be employed. This section requires a description and analysis of the comparative advantages and costs of alternative approaches to achieving project goals. These alternatives may reflect differing points of attack, differing applications of types of U. S. assistance, differing ways of building institutions, influencing policies, changing existing methods and practices, creating planning, administrative, and technical skills, etc.

(2) This consideration of alternative approaches is not intended to force written discussion of alternatives when, from a professional, technical, or administrative point of view, there is no real choice and such a discussion would be meaningless. Neither is it intended that the originating office prepare a lengthy discourse on all possible alternatives for reaching similar objectives or producing similar results. It must be assumed that such alternatives have been considered and discarded during the earlier preliminary analytical process of (a) determining the need for a project in relation to the country program and sector plans and (b) formulating project objectives and desired results to meet that need. The consideration of alternative approaches is meaningful only when these approaches are addressed to the same objective. At this stage in the development of project proposals, alternative objectives and results are therefore not relevant.

b. Food Projects

In addition to the considerations in paragraph 1.a. above, Attachment B to this manual circular contains a number of illustrative questions on alternative approaches, as well as appropriate manual order and airgram references, which apply to food projects.

c. Cooperating-country Leadership

There must be some source of support, stimulus, and leadership within the cooperating country if a project is to suceed on a lasting basis. This support is necessary, particularly if legislative and administrative changes are required as part of the development effort. By the same token there may be certain elements of potential opposition or disinterest in the achievement of project objectives. Support or lack of support may be represented by particular individuals, public or private organizations or political, social, or economic groups. These factors, their nature, and the manner in which their influence will be either taken full advantage of, enhanced, offset, or diminished should be described in this section.

d. Cross Relationships

The PROP should describe analytically how the proposed project is related to other projects, activities and requirements within its sector or program category, and where relevant to projects in other sectors. This includes capital investments as well as other technical assistance, food aid, and institutional development and country or other donor activities as well as AID projects. A PROP is not a goal plan, but most projects are elements in a complex of mutually supporting investment and modernizing activities affecting a part of an economy, and each element can only be understood in relation to the others. The relevant activities may involve different kinds or professions, e.g., roads in an area supporting agricultural extension, agro-industry related to an irrigation project. The concern here is to assure that the proposed project is the most appropriate choice among available alternatives, represents a valid priority choice in the allocation of resources

within the sector, and is supportive or complementary to other projects in the sector.

E. Planned Targets, Results, and Outputs

1. It is of prime importance, both to the project review and approval process and the ultimate project evaluation process, that anticipated results of the project be made clear. The concept and specifications for "completion" of the project, i.e., having reached institutional viability and self-sufficiency so as to permit termination of AID support, should be stated with maximum precision, even though that concept may undergo major modification as the project progresses. For food, the completion criteria are (a) when the food is no longer needed and (b) when food is available from local or other sources. Estimates of continuing operational and maintenance requirements, and their budgetary implications should be included. Without such a precise statement it is not possible to form intelligent judgments about the adequacy and appropriateness of the proposed strategy and inputs.

2. Technical assistance is inherently an effort to improve the quality of cooperating-country resources and/or performance; it is sometimes difficult to describe project results in quantitative terms. Indeed quantitative indices which adequately express the full effect of a project may never be found. Nevertheless, practical judgments concerning project proposals and decisions on budgetary planning and execution are made in large measure on the basis of quantitative comparisons of inputs and outputs, i.e., the number or value of "things" which can be anticipated as the return on the proposed investment.

3. Accordingly, project targets or end results should be expressed to the extent possible, in terms of both quantity and quality. This may require in some cases the design of indirect quantitative indicators of qualitative changes. For example, in a technical assistance project aimed at upgrading the vocational school system or a particular group of vocational schools, a projected increase in the number of instructors and their accession rate is a quantitative measure of accomplishment whereas a percentage increase in the number of graduates placed or employed in related skills positions requiring a recognized qualifying examination may be more indicative of quality improvement.

4. The discussion in the PROP of project targets or results is intended to focus on "end" outputs, i.e., what the situation will be upon termination of the project as compared to the beginning, and when that will occur. It may also be desirable to discuss the scale or rate of progress toward these results, and to certain sub or interim outputs, which will represent significant milestone of achievement or significant contributions to project objectives. These particular aspects, however, will normally be dealt with in detail in the Project Implementation Plan (PIP) submitted subsequent to authorization of the project.

F. Course of Action

1. This is a narrative presentation in relatively broad time-frame sequences of what is to be done to achieve the project targets, and how the project is to be carried out. As with the PROP in general, this section is to cover the total life of the project and to stand as a guide to the method or approach until circumstances cause a major change in project scope or character. When the PROP is prepared, precise actions may not yet be known; nevertheless, this section must provide sufficient information to permit judgments on project feasibility and the likelihood that the proposed inputs will produce the expected outputs.

2. The course of action should reflect the mobilization, deployment, and utilization of inputs, provided separately and/or jointly, by all participants in the endeavor, i.e., the United States, the cooperating country, and where possible other donors or cooperating sponsors. "Inputs" in this instance are broadly defined as the personnel, material, and financial resources and the actions which are essential to project implementation. It should clearly show the relationship and interdependence of these inputs to one another in terms of substance and scheduling. For each of the basic nonfinancial inputs, i.e., personnel, participant training, nonfood commodities, and food, the course of action should describe the kinds and qualities to be selected, the way in which they are to be used, and, in the case of food, distribution and any local processing. When the Mission feels it would assist AID/W's review and approval, the rationale for these choices should be spelled out. It should also make particularly clear the role of cooperating-country self-help actions (e.g., passing enabling legislation, initiating administrative reforms) and the extent to which the country must contribute its own resources to insure effective project implementation. The course of action should establish (a) the appropriateness of the proposed scale of project operation, (b) the capacity of the project to

produce the desired results, and (c) the ability of the environment to absorb, support, and utilize it.

3. For many projects it may be desirable to anticipate, as a project input, the need for a research component. These research components should ordinarily not be included for purposes of project evaluation, which is already provided for on an orderly basis in the PROP, the PIP, and the PER. The purpose of project-related research normally will be (a) to solve a problem of technology or methodology, (b) to increase knowledge of certain economic or social factors affecting the achievement of project objectives, (c) to build indigenous research competence, or (d) to determine the effectiveness of development assistance techniques under specific conditions. In such instances, the course of action should specifically address the question of the need for a research component and clearly indicate its purpose, scope, and relationship to project objectives.

G. Project Identification Data Sheet

The Project Identification Data Sheet (PIDS), a concise structured compilation of key project data, will be submitted to AID/W to permit effective storage, retrieval, and analysis of project information for a variety of Agency program management and technical needs. Instructions for the PIDS will be forthcoming soon. (Pending receipt of these instructions, PROPs may be submitted separately.)

VIII. Summary

In summary, the new programming system, of which the PROP is a major component, is designed to be an instrument for joint planning, understanding, and authorization between AID/W and the field. It is designed to improve the depth and quality of the planning and evaluative processes for noncapital projects at the Mission level; to enhance AID/W judgments in reviewing field proposals at the planning stage; to relate noncapital project assistance more closely to sector and aggregate planning; to improve workload distribution on project planning, review, and evaluation throughout the year, and to raise the quality and reduce the quantity of project documentation in AID.

William O. Hall

William O. Hall
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APPENDIX K

JOINT PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION PLANS (PIP) (MANUAL CIRCULAR NO. 1025.2, 1967)
U. S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

MANUAL CIRCULAR AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

SUBJECT	TRANSMITTAL LETTER NO	CIRCULAR NO
	9:108	1025.2
Joint Project Implementation Plans (PIP)	EFFECTIVE DATE June 15, 1967	TERMINATION DATE *June 30, 1968
	FILING INSTRUCTIONS File as M.O. 1025.2	

I. Introduction

A. The new AID planning, programming, and evaluation system for technical assistance projects and food donation activities is built upon three principal interlocking documents: the Noncapital Project Paper (PROP) (See M.C. 1025.1 - Noncapital Project Paper (PROP) and Preliminary Project Proposal (PPP) (TL 9:104).), the Project Implementation Plan (PIP), and the Project Evaluation Report (PER). The PROP is the basic, relatively broad-gauged, analytical description and justification for the project. The PER is the semiannual evaluation of the significance, performance, and progress of a project. The Project Implementation Plan (PIP) is the connecting link between these two which translates the PROP into a detailed plan of action and provides the framework for a meaningful evaluation in the PER. This manual circular relates specifically to the PIP and describes the concepts underlying its use, the purposes it is intended to serve, and the manner in which it is to be prepared and utilized.

B. Well-conceived and well-prepared PIPs are an essential element in the planning, programming, implementation reporting, and evaluation processes. They are "time-phased" expressions of the work which must be done, the resources or inputs required, and the results, outputs, or accomplishments expected during the foreseeable life of the project to achieve or contribute to the achievement of an established objective(s). The new system emphasizes the Project Implementation Plan (PIP) as a major tool of Mission project management which will not only assist in crystalizing Mission planning for project execution, but will enhance actual implementation and subsequent monitoring and evaluation by providing a recognized base against which these actions may be taken. The PIP will also serve as a means of reducing repetitive project narrative and as a source of support and justification for annual increments of funds and other resources. Thus, it replaces the "course of action" narrative and certain other descriptive material previously contained in the annual CAP, Part II.

C. M.O.s 1099.1 - AID Implementation System, 1322.1 - Technical Assistance Activity Description - Content and Submission, and 1324.1 - Technical Assistance Projects: The Use of Other Planning Documents and Checklists, and the Administrator's Circulars 43 and A-104 of 1964 have previously highlighted the need and established requirements for work or implementation plans but did not prescribe their exact format and nature. As a result, several Missions have designed and instituted documentation of this type which differs considerably in use, form, and content. The role of implementation plans as an integral part of an Agency-wide system demands some degree of standardization and uniformity. The format prescribed herein attempts to capture the best features of the formats developed and currently used in the field and to provide a suitable combination of the uniformity required by the system and the flexibility desired by and essential to Mission management.

II. Applicability

A. These instructions establish the policy and procedures for the preparation and submission of PIPs for all noncapital projects (country, regional, and interregional) for which a Noncapital Project Paper (PROP) is prepared, as defined in M.C. 1025.1. For those projects for which local currency is the only financial input, Missions may find PIPs or parts thereof useful; however, utilization for this purpose is a matter of Mission discretion.

B. When these instructions refer to field Missions, they apply as appropriate to the Regional Bureaus for regional projects and the responsible AID/W staff offices for interregional projects.

III. Purpose and Basic Concepts

A. The PIP is primarily a Mission tool to facilitate planning, implementation, review, and evaluation of its technical assistance and food efforts, and provides information upon which decisions during the management process can be

*To be codified as M.O. 1025.2 by the above date.

Note this Manual Circular on the Chapter Checklist and TL Checksheet for AID Manual Chapter 1000

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based. The PIP is established by the Mission and changeable by it within the scope of approved country strategy, sector and goal plans, and project authorization, and within the flexibility afforded by existing delegations of authority to the field. The PIP will, however, also be useful to AID/W in fulfilling its responsibilities for overall program management and for the provision of essential support and assistance to the field.

B. The PIP relates directly to the authorized PROP and is an elaboration and refinement of certain information contained in that document. The PIP focuses primarily on the nature and planned scheduling of inputs and outputs, i.e., the work which must be done, when, and by whom, and the anticipated results of that work. These factors are of prime importance to adequate evaluation of progress and effectiveness. It is recognizably difficult to set forth a plan of work and predict results or outputs for some types of projects, particularly those of an advisory nature. Nevertheless, it must be recognized also that a project has a reason for being and that, in most instances, it should be possible to depict some definable steps toward a specific goal. Not only for purposes of evaluation, but for purposes of internal management, Missions should be alert to the need for a plan of action, as precisely presented as possible, and attempt to foresee outputs for each project.

C. The PIP is designed to show, as feasible, the full scope and dimensions of a project over the course of its life--the individual work steps and actions, their interrelationships, the anticipated results, cost elements, and the planned scheduling of both inputs and outputs. It serves as documentation of the plans and multiple actions by which AID and the cooperating-country government plan through joint and related actions (including those of other public and private organizations) to achieve the stated project target(s). It is subject to revision from time to time as necessary or desirable. It is the only universally prescribed document which portrays the schedule of work involved in reaching project objectives and can serve as a valuable tool with which the efforts of AID technicians and their cooperating-country counterparts can be made to mesh more effectively. In many instances, it will be the most important means of providing continuity of operations, given the frequently large turnover of personnel directly concerned with the activity. Thus, the PIP can and should be a vital, living document which helps to ensure the successful conduct and completion of AID-assisted noncapital projects.

D. Since the PIP includes the major elements of action which must be undertaken by all parties and the outputs which they seek to achieve, maximum benefit can best be derived if the PIP is developed jointly with the cooperating country and represents a bilateral and agreed to plan for action. The degree to which such joint planning and agreement can be achieved will vary sharply from Mission to Mission and perhaps, within a Mission, from project to project. However, the process of jointly developing the plan, and monitoring progress against it, should in itself be a mutually helpful exercise in the improvement of development planning and administration, and should be an objective sought on all projects. Whenever feasible, the cooperating-country counterpart agency and other institutions immediately responsible for project execution should play a significant role in the preparation of the plan.

E. The new programming system is based upon the concept of life-of-project substantive approval and authorization, and is intended to recognize more fully the Mission Director's authorities and responsibilities for planning, implementation, and evaluation. This concept presumes that so long as the evaluation process shows the project to be progressing in reasonable accordance with established plans and objectives, and so long as annual budget estimates are in reasonable accordance with planned magnitudes and timing of resources, all of which are set forth in the PIP and authorized PROP, annual funding increments will be provided, if funds are available. Thus, it is essential that PIPs which reflect the current Mission planning for authorized ongoing projects be on hand in AID/W, particularly in the summer and fall of each year when AID/W requires information to allocate funds and prepare and defend budget proposals. To the extent that current and accurate PIPs are on hand, simplified operational and budget-year submissions containing far less narrative than in the past should be sufficient.

F. The PIP is a working document and is to be produced and made available only to those individuals or offices within the Mission, the cooperating country, AID/W, and other participating organizations who have a working need for them. The PIP, by its very nature, is subject to change but it must be recognized that the need for copies updated in precise detail varies considerably among the recipients. Those individuals immediately and directly involved in project execution will undoubtedly find it advantageous, if not

indeed necessary, to annotate their copies on a continuing basis. However, the needs of other recipients should be satisfied through occasional formal revisions prescribed herein.

G. In some cases, a PIP may accompany the PROP when the latter is submitted to AID/W for approval. However, the Project Authorization will not constitute specific approval of the implementing details nor does it preclude Mission revision of the PIP. These details are fully recognized as a Mission responsibility within the parameters of the scope, character, and magnitudes of the authorized project.

H. The PIP is essentially a Mission planning and control document, not a fiscal or implementation document. It is not designed, except in general terms, to meet the information requirements of AID/W for planning and implementation purposes in such areas as personnel administration, procurement, or participant training. By virtue of its content, the PIP does serve, together with annual budget submissions, as a basis for funding allocations and budget proposals. It does not, however, commit, reserve, or obligate funds but indicates the intended use of funds when made available. Neither does it in any way supersede or otherwise impinge upon the purposes and uses of the Project Agreements and Project Implementation Orders, (i.e., PIO/Ts, PIO/Ps, PIO/Cs), and other standard obligating or implementing instruments.

I. The PIP forms generally provide space for information for periods of 5-6 years. This does not mean that planning need be restricted to this period of time. Neither does it mean that it is possible to plan with the same degree of finite detail and certainty in the later years of the project as in the earlier ones. The substance of the PIP should be as complete as current knowledge allows and periodically amended as new information is learned.

IV. Responsibilities

A. Mission Directors are responsible for establishing appropriate internal procedures regarding the preparation, review, approval, and maintenance of PIPs.

B. Basic responsibility for the preparation and maintenance of PIPs should normally be assigned to the Project Coordinator designated under the provisions of AIDTO CIRC A-104 (10/3/64).

C. Whenever appropriate, the contractor, borrower/grantee, or cooperating sponsor, in the case of food projects, may be requested to prepare PIPs, or assist materially in their preparation. However, the Mission is responsible for ensuring that these plans are prepared and revised as required.

D. Mission personnel will make every effort to promote and encourage participation by the appropriate cooperating country, agencies, or institutions in the development of PIPs.

E. AID/W approval of PIPs is not required. AID/W may render advice or comment thereon from a technical and feasibility point of view, particularly where the document assumes supporting actions by AID/W which must be within its capacity to implement. Full responsibility for and authority over specific project implementation planning lies with the Mission in collaboration with the cooperating government, and the cooperating sponsor in the case of food donation projects.

V. Composition

A. Project Implementation Plans consist of six parts, each prepared for a particular purpose as indicated below. Attention is called to the fact that the prescribed PIP does not include a summary or face sheet. This has been done deliberately to avoid unnecessary repetition of project descriptions and to permit essential flexibility at the Mission level.

B. Since the PIP is intended to be, to the extent possible, the product of joint planning between the responsible officials of the U. S. and the cooperating country at the working level (e.g., the head of the Mission technical office and the director of a department in a Ministry), Missions are encouraged to obtain the signatures of these parties in acknowledgement of their agreement to the plan. The extent to which this is possible varies so considerably with the circumstances that the manner and form in which it is done is left to Mission discretion. In some instances, Missions may wish to obtain agreement on an implementation plan by incorporating (as an attachment) the PIP or portions thereof in the Project Agreement. On the other hand, Missions may find it desirable and advantageous to utilize an internally designed face sheet on which could appear such items as a brief description of the project, a statement of objectives or targets, significant factors in implementation which warrant emphasis at the working level, and the signatures of appropriate officials. In any event, it is clearly the Mission Director's responsibility to determine whether or not specific cooperating-country approval of or agreement to the PIP will be obtained.

1. Part I — Work Schedule (Form AID 1020-18)

This part indicates the major work actions or steps involved in achieving the objectives of the project, the planned scheduling of such actions or steps, the relationships in time and interdependence of one to another, and

the organization primarily responsible for each action. The work schedule is to reflect the total project effort and includes actions to be taken either jointly or separately by the U. S., the cooperating country, and where in direct support of the project, by other donors or cooperating sponsors.

2. Part II — Selected Output Indicators (Form AID 1020-19)

This part shows the major quantitative and/or qualitative outputs, results and accomplishments expected of a project, and the scheduled achievement of these outputs.

3. Part III Personnel Requirements (Form AID 1020-20)

This part reflects, by broad personnel categories, the manpower required, the phased scheduling of these requirements, and man-year and cost estimates for the life of the project. It is to include all personnel working directly on the project, including those of the U. S., the cooperating country, and other donors or cooperating sponsors.

4. Part IV - Participant Requirements (Form AID 1020-21)

This part reflects the detailed U. S. and third-country participant training requirements during the life of the project, the phased scheduling of those requirements, and the annual estimated costs to be incurred for this purpose by both the U. S. and the cooperating country.

5. Part V - Commodity and Other Cost Requirements - Technical Assistance (Form AID 1020-22)

This part reflects, for other than food donation activities, the commodity (nonfood) and other requirements by type, and the estimated cost of those requirements by fiscal year. It includes commodity and other inputs to be provided by the U. S., the cooperating country, and, where in direct support of the project, by other donors.

6. Part Va - Commodity and Other Cost Requirements - Food (Form AID 1020-23)

This part reflects the food commodity and other requirements by type and the estimated cost of these requirements by fiscal year. It includes food commodity and other inputs to be provided by the U. S., the cooperating country, and the cooperating sponsor. For a technical assistance project involving a food component, Part Va will be used only to reflect the food requirements.

VI. Procedures

A. Completion of Forms

Detailed instructions for the completion of each part of the PIP and a set of the blank forms are included in Attachment A. A hypothetical example of each part of the PIP is included as Attachment B. This example, together with the detailed instructions, is to be used as guidance in the development of PIPs for each project.

B. Initial Preparation

1. The PIP will normally be prepared for authorized new projects immediately prior to or in connection with the negotiation of the initial Project Agreement and forwarded to Washington immediately after the signing of the agreement.

2. Much of the preliminary work of developing an implementation plan will probably be done in connection with the preparation of the Noncapital Project Paper (PROP). Nevertheless, since the PROP is to contain sufficient data for review, analysis, and authorization and will normally be submitted considerably in advance of actual implementation, the PIP need not be prepared in final form at this time nor accompany the PROP. This delayed submission of the PIP will permit its preparation in a more meaningful and precise manner.

3. A PIP need not accompany a Preliminary Project Proposal (PPP). See M.C. 1025.1.

4. During the period of transition to the new programming system, PIPs are to be prepared and forwarded to AID/W as follows:

a. For new projects, PIPs are to be sent to AID/W immediately following the signing of a Project Agreement.

b. For existing approved projects in which major changes are contemplated, PIPs are to be sent to AID/W following Washington project authorization based upon the Noncapital Project Paper (PROP) for each such project.

c. PIP Submission Schedule

(1) For the remainder of the existing approved projects, PIPs may be forwarded to AID/W at any time between now and the fall of 1969, but in no case later than August 31, 1969. Missions are encouraged to prepare and forward these PIPs as soon as possible to facilitate and expedite the transition and to gain experience more rapidly in their use.

(2) It should be noted that this schedule for the PIPs supersedes the instructions contained in M.C. 1023.2.7 - Project Documentation Guidance, originally issued as Circular A-212 of May 13, 1967 (paragraph III.F.1.a.). The new schedule relates preparation of the PIPs for new projects, and projects involving major change, more closely to the negotiation and authorization processes and thus provides for more meaningful documents.

C. Formal Revisions of PIPs

1. Revisions in PIPs are prepared under two sets of circumstances:

a. Following authorization of a revised Noncapital Project Paper on an existing project, submitted as the result of a major change(s) in the scope, character, or magnitude of the project.

b. To incorporate significant changes made at the Mission level which, while still within the parameters of the approved project and not therefore necesstating reauthorization, must be reflected in the record if the PIP is to serve as a meaningful reference document in the budget, allocation, and evaluation processes. These changes may involve such things as (1) a substantial change in scheduling, (2) the addition or deletion of major actions or steps, or (3) substantial deviations in personnel, participants, commodity, or other requirements. A change in fiscal year source of funding without substantial change in scheduling does not necessitate a revised PIP but will be accounted for in the annual budget submission.

2. The need for and actual timing of these formal revisions is subject to Mission judgment and dependent upon Mission management and implementation needs. When formal revisions in PIPs are prepared, the Mission should ensure that they are also made available to AID/W so that current Mission plans are on hand there at all times.

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APPENDIX L

NON-CAPITAL PROJECT APPRAISAL REPORT (PAR)
(DRAFT, ABRIDGED, 1968)

U. S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

NON-CAPITAL PROJECT APPRAISAL REPORT (PAR)

The Project Appraisal Report (PAR) is a periodic evaluation by each Mission (or by the appropriate regional or central staff office in the case of regional or interregional projects) of (a) the effectiveness of non-capital project execution, in terms of substantive implementing steps taken, inputs provided, and results or outputs achieved, all in relation to Mission plans, and (b) the significance of project planning and execution, in terms of U.S. and cooperating country objectives. In conjunction with the PIP, it provides a basis for estimates of efficiency in terms of cost per unit of output. To meet the evaluation needs of A.I.D.'s non-capital assistance program a Project Appraisal Report (PAR), A.I.D. Form_____, is prescribed for use within the Agency on an annual basis, to be prepared for all projects covered by a PROP (see M.C. 1025.1, paragraph IV) and a PIP (see M.C. 1025.2, paragraph VI.B.) on schedules to be arranged by the Regional Bureaus in consultation with Missions.

I. BASIC CONCEPTS OF EVALUATION

A. General

Evaluation of projects in terms of their effectiveness and continued significance necessarily is a complement to project planning, programming and implementation. An explicit statement of intended results is an essential precondition to objective evaluation. The statement is at the same time the most crucial step in the process of planning and programming a project. The evaluation of projects will provide data and judgments needed to decide whether to modify, cancel or continue them unchanged.

There are practical reasons for carrying out program evaluation separately from budgeting and programming. The pressure of the annual program submission prevents Missions and AID/W from carrying out objective and complete appraisal of experience. Therefore, the Project Appraisal Report, while utilizing programming and implementing documents for its analytical base, removes evaluation from the annual program budget process and provides the framework for independent and "de-cycled" review.

B. Nature and Purposes of Evaluation

Evaluation is done in order to improve both program planning and execution by applying lessons from past experience. It is a process composed essentially of five stages: (a) the establishment of standards and criteria against which progress is measured, (b) identification of critical variables, (c) the collection of data, (d) the analysis of data, and (e) the feed back of findings. No one of these stands alone. By the same token the whole is necessarily weakened by the failure to carry out any one. Evaluation may be conducted for several purposes: (a) significance (were the right project and sector goals selected, in light of overall country objectives?); (b) effectiveness (are planned project targets being achieved?); (c) efficiency (are costs per unit of output being minimized?); (d) compliance (are applicable laws, regulations and principles of good practice being observed?).

Effective evaluation of non-capital projects can be achieved only when conducted in light of stated program goals and objectives, with (a) well defined project targets and (b) quality standards and time schedules for

resource inputs and planned outputs. The degree of definition with which these basic factors can be established will obviously vary from project to project, but the clearer the definitions the more effective and meaningful will be the evaluation. These definitions constitute the base-line for evaluation; they make possible: (1) a comparison of actions taken against actions planned; (a) a comparison of real accomplishments, both quantitative and qualitative, against planned targets and objectives; (3) judgments as to the continued impact, import and significance of the project; (4) the identification of less-than-satisfactory performance and the causative factors; and (5) decisions regarding remedial actions. Effective evaluation must be based on well conceived planning documents.

C. Responsibility for Evaluation

The evaluation of projects is a responsibility of Mission Directors. Therefore the PAR is designed primarily to serve the Mission as an important tool of program and project management. It should enable the Mission to identify any important problems and take steps to correct them. Conversely, it should permit identification of accomplishments and successful methods. It should reveal any need to have the project analyzed in depth. For projects that are demonstrably going well, the PAR should be a brief exercise.

The Mission evaluation process should involve both top management and operating level personnel. Where possible it should also involve leaders of the implementing agency, i.e., contractor or participating agency. However, since responsibility for evaluation ultimately rests with the Mission

Director, the requirements prescribed herein do not establish any particular form of procedures, staffing or organization for evaluation purposes within the Mission. Missions are strongly urged however to seek the broadest practical range of participation within the Mission in preparing the PAR: (a) in order to gain better insight into the relative effectiveness and significance of all projects to sectoral and country objectives and (b) as a means of achieving greater objectivity and candor. For these purposes, Missions should consider the possible advantages of establishing project review and evaluation groups to examine draft PARs prior to Mission Director signature.

The extent to which evaluation can improve the quality and relevance of our project assistance varies in direct ratio to the insight and candor of the evaluator. The evaluator must exhibit professional detachment and perspective if he is to appraise the project in a meaningful way. His role is to challenge and question, not to defend and justify. Self-evaluation, by an individual or group, therefore requires even greater candor, and courage as well.

The PAR should not be perceived as a device to camouflage or to place blame for functional flaws in project concept or execution. The PAR's real value to the Mission is that it offers an opportunity to identify and diagnose problems so that the Mission itself can apply corrective measures. Mission leadership should therefore recognize that honest and perceptive criticism of a project by the project monitor is difficult and will require disciplined but sympathetic support by senior Mission staff.

The PAR can also, as a matter of economy, collaterally produce material on project implementation for AID/W. The PAR should help A.I.D. manage its worldwide program and help improve AID/W backstopping performance.

Although responsibility for evaluation and the means to apply corrective action rest in the Mission, the Regional Assistant Administrators and heads of AID/W Staff Offices also play a role in the evaluation process. The PAR will assist AID/W in carrying out its role by providing the data for the broader evaluations of sectors, technical fields, special subjects and country program significance that are AID/W's responsibility. It is also expected that AID/W's review of Mission PARs will result in the initiation of action to remedy a given problem or situation, e.g., AID/W may conduct, or request the Mission to conduct, a further study of specific problem areas.

D. Frequency of Evaluation

Evaluation is a continuing process, conducted informally as an integral part of the day-to-day execution of a project. Nevertheless, the principles of good management dictate that formal and periodic evaluation be undertaken which bring to bear upon the project the total interested resources of the Mission and which form the basis for a total Mission position or judgment concerning the effectiveness and significance of a project. For this reason, it has been determined that non-capital projects should be formally evaluated on an annual basis. This does not preclude Missions from undertaking more frequent formal evaluations of particular projects.

II. PROJECT APPRAISAL REPORT (PAR)

The PAR has been developed in consonance with the concepts, standards and requirements outlined above. It replaces the progress and accomplishments reporting previously contained in CAP II under the "Progress-to-Date" section of the E-1. It replaces also the interim Evaluation of Contractor Performance report now submitted semiannually (M.O. 1423.10); U-520, Project History and analysis Report; U-310, Goal and Activity Progress Report and U-313, Self-Help and Accomplishment Report. The PIP and PAR jointly will permit elimination of U-261, Part 2 which is the narrative portion of P.L. 480 Title II - Commodity Status Report.

Because of the varying nature and type of non-capital projects, the PAR has been designed to the maximum extent possible to allow flexibility in the manner of presentation and degree of specificity. However, since evaluation can be effective and meaningful only if made against established plans, the format of the Project Appraisal Report is structured to permit evaluation against the documentation which reflects these plans. Thus the PAR is based upon and relates closely to the two major documents involved in the planning, programming and implementation processes, i.e., the Project Paper (PROP) and the Project Implementation Plan (PIP).

It requires:

1. An evaluation of (a) the continuing relevance of the project purposes and (b) the appropriateness of project design to sector/goal plans.

2. an evaluation of the effectiveness with which planned project target outputs are being achieved and the significance of project outputs to overall sector and country objectives.

3. an assessment of implementation actions and the use of resource inputs.

4. an examination of cooperating country actions and environmental factors affecting the project.

The PAR also includes a number of structured check lists which identify and categorize the source and nature of problems affecting the progress of the project. AID/W plans to analyze this data in the data processing system.

PARs should be unclassified if possible. Where security classification is considered necessary by the Mission for all or parts of the document, those parts, sections or pages should be clearly indicated.

PART I - Evaluation of Project Purposes and Project Design.

This is a series of questions designed to determine whether the project purposes, planned output targets, and anticipated results continue to be relevant to current sector and goals plans in the light of (a) acquired operational experience by the Mission, (b) changes in the host country economic, social and political situation, or the views, policies and activities of government or private elements that are significant for the project. It is also intended to assess the appropriateness of the project design (strategy, approach, scope) to achieve planned outputs.

PART II - Evaluation of Project Accomplishments and Output Targets

This Part consists of three sections. The first section measures progress in achieving the key quantitative and/or qualitative outputs, results and accomplishments against the individual output targets which were established in the PROP and scheduled in the PIP. It cites the same output indicators and units of measurement as the PIP, Part II, and thus provides the basis for updating the PIP at annual intervals.

The second section attempts to summarize in check list form the Mission's appraisal of (a) project effectiveness in achieving stated targets, (b) project impact on sector and goal plans and (c) project significance to U.S. country objectives. This section also contains a summary of Mission recommendations on the future direction of the project.

The third section consists of a concise analytical narrative prepared by the Mission and signed by the Mission Director or his designee, which addresses itself chiefly to the aspects of the project summarized in the preceding (second) section. This section is intended as a penetrating, qualitative analysis of the productive worth of the project, the factors influencing its effectiveness and the remedial actions required to improve its contribution to the country development program. It is intended to reflect the total Mission view of the project.

In those instances where the Mission's overall evaluation in a previous PAR has not significantly changed, and the project is meeting established

time, financial and output targets, this section need be no more than a statement to this effect.

PART III - Assessment of Implementation Actions and the Use of Resource Inputs

This Part has two main sections. The first section is essentially a statement of specific progress made in implementing a project during the reporting period. Baselines for this section are contained in the Project Implementation Plan, Part I - Work Schedule. This section of Part III of the PAR, therefore, sets forth sequentially the major substantive actions which were to have been undertaken by the Mission and/or the cooperating country during the previous year, notes whether or not these actions have progressed on schedule, and explains the reasons for significant delays or deviations from planned actions; such a description should be written for each major step in the Work Schedule which requires remedial measures. It also identifies and describes the factors responsible for rapid progress.

If the actions reported in this section deviate from those spelled out in PIP, Part I, the persons directly concerned with project execution will want to make annotated changes on the PIP per M.C. 1025.2, III,F. If the actions reported here constitute a basic departure from PIP, Part I, then the project must be reexamined.

The specific implementing actions shown in this section need not be expressed exactly as in PIP, Part I, but they should be clearly related to them (see M.C. 1025.2, Attachment A, para. II, A, 4, c). The steps indicated

in the PAR may reflect a slightly finer degree of detail than those in the PIP. For example, the PIP may include a step which reads "develop and publish a new course curriculum." The PAR for a particular period may reflect components of this action, such as "form working groups to compile new course curriculum" or "obtain ministry approval and publish new course curriculum."

This section also contains several check lists summarizing the Mission's overall appraisal of the implementation process.

The second section of Part III examines the main resource components of the project (technicians , participants, etc.) to determine (a) the relative importance and (b) the actual qualitative effect on the project of a variety of operational factors. For any important factor that exerts an adverse or inadequate effect on the project, the Mission is required to indicate the cause of the problem, the consequences of not correcting the problem, and the nature and extent of required corrective action.

This section will also serve to identify and explain deviations from the implementation plan by recording the nature and extent of any implementation problems. Its operational value is to alert the responsible A.I.D. unit to the possible need for action or further study.

Narrative text may be necessary: space is provided at the end of each section.

PART IV - The Role of the Cooperating Country

This Part addresses the critically important role of the host country in project planning, implementation and follow up activities. It contains a number of environmental and operational factors grouped under three headings: (a) General Environmental Factors, (b) Specific Operational Factors Affecting this Project and (c) Host Country Counterpart Technician Factors. As in the case of factors in Part II-B, these factors are to be rated for their importance to the achievement of project targets and for their qualitative effect on the project. Further explanation is required where factors are rated as important but contributing adversely or inadequately to project progress.